A HISTORY OF ROME 



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HISTORY OF ROME 



TO THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM 



BY 



EVELYN SHIRLEY SHUCKBURGH, M.A. 

LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 

AUTHOR OF 

A TRANSLATION OF POLYBIUS, ETC. 



WITH MAPS AND PLANS 






iX^cto gork 
MACMILLAN AND CO. 

AND LONDON 
1894 

Ail 7-ights reserved 



Copyright, 1894, 
By malm 1 LI. an AND CO. 



■i^^ 
^ (-\i 



Xoriuooti iSrcsss: 

J. S. Gushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith. 

Boston, Mass., U.S.A. 



IN • HONOREM • 

MATRIS • NOSTRAE • ALTRICIS • 

MAGISTRO • SOCIIS • QUE • 

COLLEGII • EMMANUELIS • CANTAURIGIAE 



PREFACE 

To write the history of a great people during a course of more 
than seven hundred years in about as many pages is a task of 
which the difficulty, best appreciated by those who have attempted 
it, may not unfairly plead for leniency of construction. No one 
can be more conscious than the author of such a book that there 
are many things that had better have been otherwise than they 
are ; that expansion would have been advisable here and com- 
pression there ; that much is to be said against some views that 
he has adopted as true, and much in fiivour of others that he has 
passed by or rejected. Such a writer can only plead that he has 
used his judgment honestly, and studied his authorities with such 
diligence and intelligence as he possessed ; and that neither space 
nor the purpose of his book admitted of frequent or lengthy dis- 
cussions on disputed points. 

As it was my object to present in as vivid a manner as possible 
the wonderful story of the gradual extension of the power of a 
single city over so large a part of the known world, I have dwelt 
perhaps sometimes at too great length on the state of the countries 
conquered and the details of their conquest. But Vergil saw that 
the keynote of Roman history was parcere subiectis et debellare 
superbos, and it is impossible, I think, that a history of Rome and 
her mission in the world can be other than a warlike one. The 



viii HISTORY OF ROME 



Republic won what the Empire organised ; and as each province 
was added some new principle of management was evolved 
which has had to be noticed at the time. I have, however, 
treated in separate chapters the internal development of the State 
up to the time of the Gracchi. The constitutional changes after 
that time are so closely entangled with foreign affairs that it is 
hardly possible to treat them so entirely by themselves. Yet 
I have attempted to set them forth clearly in the course of my 
narrative, along with some indication of the development of 
literature and the change of social habits.^ By the mechanical 
means of printing at the head of the chapters the names and 
dates of Italian colonies, provinces, and numbers of the census, 
I have tried to draw attention to the gradual expansion of the 
people and their Empire. 

The book is founded throughout on the ancient authorities ; 
and I have placed at the end of each chapter the names of those 
authorities on which it rests, as likely to be useful to students 
who care to read and compare for themselves ; but except in 
special cases I have not given references for each statement of 
the text. I shall seem no doubt to some to have been too 
credulous in regard to them. But the great genius of Niebuhr 
seems almost a warning against the construction of history by 
arbitrary selection of what to believe or disbelieve among a 
number of facts resting on precisely the same authority ; and I 
must be pardoned if I cannot always follow Lewis or Ihne in 
the summary rejection of all history up to and often beyond the 
time of Pyrrhus ; and if it has seemed to me that small discrep- 
ancies and apparent, though often not real, contradictions and 
repetitions have been seized upon to discredit this or that writer's 

1 If chapters viii. xiii. xvi, xxi. xxvi. xxxv. xl. are read consecutively, what 
I have to say on this branch of the subject will be made clear. 



PREFACE ix 

statement when it conflicts with a favourite theory or a modern 
notion of the probable. I ' have tried to judge fairly in each 
instance, and have not hesitated to reject when a good case has 
been made out. No doubt human nature is the same now as it 
was two thousand years ago ; but human knowledge is not the 
same, and we must sometimes admit that men acted then as 
they would not act to-day. Even now the unreasonableness of 
a measure is not a complete security against its being adopted. 

Though the book is grounded on the ancient writers, it 
is almost superfluous to say that I also owe infinite obligations, 
directly or indirectly, to the great names that have illuminated 
Roman history, from Niebuhr and Arnold to Zwegler, Mommsen, 
Drumann, Ihne, Merivale, Duruy, and Pelham ; to the encyclo- 
paedic work on Roman Antiquities and Polity of Marquardt and 
Mommsen ; to our own dictionaries of Biography, Geography, 
and Antiquities ; to Willem's le Senat and Droit Public Roinain ; 
and to many works on separate episodes, such as Reinach's 
Mithridate Eupaior ; Napoleon's and Col. Stoffel's Jules Cesar; 
and others. It is impossible to acknowledge such obligations in 
detail. Every one knows that these books must be continually used. 

Lastly, I have the pleasant task of acknowledging the help of 
various friends, who have read parts of my book in proof and 
helped me with suggestions and corrections. They are Mr. W. T. 
Arnold, author oi Roman Provincial Administration ; Mr. A. W. W. 
Dale, Fellow of Trinity Hall ; Messrs. \V. Chawner and P. Giles, 
Fellows of Emmanuel College ; Mr. A. A. Tilley, Fellow of King's 
College. I would add a word of thanks to the Printers, whose 
patience, I fear, has often been tried but has never failed ; and to 
my friends the Publishers, who have been always indulgent in 
granting requests and pardoning delays. 

Cambridge, April 1894. 



CONTENTS 

The Beginnings of Rome and the Regal Period 
B-t:. 753-509 

CHAPTER I 

The consolidation of Italy — Four periods of Roman history: I. Rise of the city; 
II, Conquest of Italy; III. The growth of a foreign dominion; IV. Civil 
wars, leading to the rule of a single Emperor — The place of Roman in 
universal history — Its continuity ..... Page i 

CHAPTER H 

The lie of the Italian peninsula — The ancient limitation of the name — Its sub- 
sequent enlargement, first,- about B.C. 280, up to the Rubicon, and secondly, 
in the time of Augustus, up to the Alps — The parcelling out of the peninsula 
by the Apennines — The difterent character of the Apennines in the centre and 
south of Italy — Their contiguity to the sea, and the consequent fewness of 
important rivers— On the north of the Apennines, Gallia Cisalpina ; on the 
west, Etruria, Lo^tium, Campania; on the east, the Senones, Picenum, 
Pretutiani, Vestini, Marrucini, p'rentani, Apulia, Calabria; in the centre, 
Umbria, Samnium ( — Sabini, Marsi, Samnites), Piccntini : continued into 
Lucania and Bruttium — Etfect of the geographical formation on the history of 
Italy, early causing a struggle between highlanders and men of the plain 

Page 5 

CHAPTER HI 

The inhabitants of Italy — Iberian and Ligurian tribes in Italy before the beginning 
of history — First to arrive the OSCANS and Iapygians; followed by the 
Umbro-Latins, dividing into Umbrians and Latini — (2) The Sabellians 
or Sabines, which branch off as Samnites, Picentes, Peligni, and perhaps 
Marsi, Marrucini, and Vestini — The Samnites branch off into Frentani, 
Lucani, Apulia, Bruttium — (3) The Etruscans, their occupation of the north 
basin of the Po, and partial occupation of the south — Their gradual expulsion 
by (3) the CELTS, who came over the Alps in various waves, whence North 
Italy is called Gallia Cisalpina, which includes the probably distinct tribes of 
the Ligures and Veneti— (4) The GREEK colonies in southern Italy mingle with 
Oenotrians and Ausonians and Itali, but are eventually overrun by Bruttii, 
Lucani, and Apuli, who give their names to the districts . Page 10 



xii HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAPTER IV 

Origin of Rome— Heroic legends of its foundation— Settlement of Aeneas in 
Italy— His wars with the Rutuli— His supremacy over the Prisci Latini— His 
son removes to Alba from Lavinium— The Aiban kings— The two sons of 
Proca, Numitor and Amulius— The birth of Romulus and Remus, and their 
education by shepherds— They restore their grandfather Numitor to the throne 
of Alba— Their foundation of a new city— Death of Remus— Romulus founds 
the city on the Palatine and calls it ROME— The gradual extension of the 
Palatine city to include the Septimontium— The Roman era B.C. 753 

Page 21 

CHAPTER V 

The situation of Rome— Latium, its different meanings— ROMULUS, 753-71^— 
The foundation of the city and earliest institutions— The joint reign with 
Titus Tatius— Laws of Romulus, and his death— Numa Pom pi li us, his relig- 
ious institutions and laws— The temple of Vesta and the Regia; the flamens, 
vestals, and Salii— His calendar— TULLUS HOSTILIUS— The destruction of 
Alba Longa — Wars with the Sabines — The Horatii and Curiatii — Provocatio 
— ANGUS Marcius — Makes the sacra known to all — Wars with the Latins 
— The jus fetiale — The pons sublicius and fossa quiritiurn — L. TarquiniUS 
Priscus — His arrival from Tarquinii, begins temple on Capitoline, city walls, 
circus maximus, and cloacae— W'\s murder— Servius Tullius, the agger 
and completion of town walls — His reforms, the four tribes, and the 193 
centuries distributed in five classes — The comitia curiata and cotnitia centu- 
riata — The object and results of his reform — The patricians and plebeians — 
His first census — His death — TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS — His oppression of 
the Senate— His wars with the Volscians — Capture of Gabii — His works in 
Rome and his colonies — The Sibyl — Embassy to Delphi — Siege of Ardea — 
The story of Lucretia — Expulsion of the Tarquins — The credibility of the 
legerids — The authorities on which they rest — Their value . Page 28 

The Growth of Rome to the end of the Latl\ League 
B.C. 509-338 

CHAPTER VI 

The effect of the Revolution on the position of Rome in Latium — Attempts of the 
Tarquins to recover their property and royalty — Battle with the Veientines 
and people of Tarquinii on the Naebian meadow — Etruscan invasion under 
Porsena — Stories of Scaevola and Cloelia — Subjection of Rome to the Etrus- 
cans — Defeat of Etruscans before Aricia — Isolation of Rome in Latium — The 
Latins attack Rome — Battle of the lake Regillus — Gradual recovery of Roman 
power, and return to the Latin League (492) — Wars with the Sabines, 
Volscians, Aequians, Hernici — Effect upon the Roman character — Tales of 
Coriolanus and Cincinnatus . . Page 61 

CHAPTER VII 

Enmity of Veii and Rome — State of Etruria in fifth century B.C. — General move- 
ment against Hellenism — The Fabii — Farther movements of Veientines and 



CONTENTS xiii 



Sabines — Fidenae and Veii — A. Cornelius Cossus and the spolia opima — The 
Etruscan League refuse help to Veii — Twenty years' truce (425) — Samnites 
drive the Etruscans from Campania — Last war with Veii, its siege and fall 
(405-396) — The effect of the long siege — The Alban lake — M. Furius Camillus 
— Stories connected with the fall of Veii — Fall of Melpum — Capture of Falerii, 
Volsinii, and Sutrium ...... Page 'jj 



CHAPTER VIII 

The early Republican government foiinded on that of the kings — Consuls, quaestors, 
and people — Effect of Servian reforjns — Disabilities of the plebs — Roman civitas 
— Laws and Fatria Potestas — Perduellio and quaestiottes — Provocatio — Other 
laws of Poplicola — The ownership of land — Laiv of debt — The nexi — Appius 
Claudius refuses relief to the nexi — Secession to the Sacred Mount — Tribunes 
of the plebs appointed: their powers, duties, number, and manner of election — 
Aediles and their duties — Agrarian law of Spurius Cassius : His impeach- 
ment and death {48s) — Lex Publilia Voleronis (^7/) — Proposal by Terentilius 
to limit and define the power of the consuls — The embassy to Greece (^^j) — 
The first decemvirate {451^ — 7)4<? ten tables — The second decemvirate {450) — • 
Change in policy of Appius Claudius — The two nexv tables — Murder of Sicinius 
and story of Virginia — Decemvirs deposed and consuls and tribunes elected — 
Valerio-Horatian laws — Their effects — The laws of the twelve tables — The lex 
Canuleia {44s) — Tribuni militares consular potestate — Appoifitment of censors 
— Increase of poverty — Murder of Spurius Maelius {4jg) — The four quaestor- 
ships open to plebeians {421) — Exile of Camillus — The tribunes in the Senate — 
The Gallic invasion — Surnrnary of laws .... Page 89 



CHAPTER IX 

The Gauls in Italy — The Senones and Lingones attack Clusium — Roman envoys 
at Clusium join in the battle — The Romans refuse satisfaction — Advance of 
Brennus on Rome — Battle of the Allia (midsummer 390) — Burning of Rome 
and defence of the Capitol by Manlius — Camillus at Ardea — His recall and 
appointment as dictator — Saving cff the Capitol by the geese— Exhaustion of 
the Gauls by pestilence — They overrun the campagna — Recalled home by an 
invasion of the Veneti — Camillus said to have attacked and retaken gold and 
standards — Effects of the capture on Rome . . . Page 114 



CHAPTER X 

Hostilities break out against Rome after the departure of the Gauls — Camillus 
conquers the Etruscans, Volscians, and Aequians (389) — Fresh war with 
Volscians and Etruscans; capture of Sutrium and Nepete (386) — The Vol- 
scians joined by some of the Latini and Hernici ; colony sent to Satricum 
(385) — Pestilence — Rebellions at Lanuvium, Circeii, Velitrae, Praeneste (383- 
382) — War with Volscians and rebellion at Tusculum (381) — Cincinnatus con- 
quers the rebellious Praenestines (380) — A Roman disaster in Volscian terri- 
tory (379) — Conquest of Volscians and Latins (378-377) — The Gauls (367- 
282)— The first Samnite war (343-342)— The Latin rebellion— T. Manlius 
Torquatus (340-339) — Dissolution of the Latin League, and last struggles of 
the Latin towns (338-336) — First dramatic shows . . Page 123 



XIV HISTORY OF ROME 



The Conquest of Italy, b.c. 326-265 
CHAPTER XI 

Magna Graecia — Invitation from Tarentum to Archidamus (338) and Alexander 
(333) — Alexander's treaty with Rome — Palaepolis garrisoned by Samnites — 
War declared with Samnites (326) — Treaty with Neapolis — Confederacy in 
south Italy — The Caudine Forks — The Senate refuse the terms of Pontius 
(321) — Revolt of Volscian towns — Capture of Luceria, victories in Apulia 
and Lucania, revolt and recovery of Sora (320-314) — Destruction of Ausones 
and colonising of Luceria (314-313) — Victory over Samnites at Cinna (313) — 
Development of Roman power in Italy, and growth of navy (313-312) — Etrus- 
can war and battle at the Vadimonian lake (311-309) — Wars with Samnites 
and Hernici (308-306) — Peace with Samnites (304) . . Page 135 

CHAPTER XII 

Between the second and third Samnite wars (303-298) — Complaint of the Lucan- 
ians and the beginning of the third Samnite war (298)— The Samnites league 
with Etruscans and Gauls (296) — Failures of Appius Claudius Caecus (296) 
— Battle of Sentinum (295) — Last five years of the war (294-290) — The 
legiones linteatae — Battle of Aquilonia (293) — Capture and execution of 
C. Pontius (292) — Peace with the Samnites (290), and their subsequent atti- 
tude towards Rome ...... Page 152 

CHAPTER XIII 

The period {jgo-286) full of wars, and not marked by literary production — Great 
growth of Rome witnessed by increase of tribes, numbers, colonies — The strug- 
gles between patricians and plebeians — Proposed relief of poverty ; M. Manlius 
{3^5) — Measures against usury {jyS-'zgj) — Abolition ^/ nexus {326) — Licinian 
rogations proposed {376) : their purpose, resistance to them, carried {j6y)— 
The praetor — Curule aedile — Decemviri sacrorum — The comitia tributa — First 
plebeian censor (J57)— Leges Publiliae {jjg)— First plebeian praetor {336) — 
Censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus {312-300) — His innovations and their 
aim — Cn. Flavins publishes the legal formulae {303) — Lex Ogulnia {2g6) — Lex 
Hortensia {286)— The new nobility and the Senate— Stories of the wife of 
Licinius and of the Chapel of Castitas Patricia— /^/>j/ law against ambitus 
{35^) — Laws against usury — Sumptuary laws . . . Page 163 

CHAPTER XIV 

From the end of the third Samnite war to the invasion of Pyrrhus (B.C. 290-280) 
—Wars with Senones and Boii with Etruscan contingents— Defeat of the 
Lucani and Bruttii in the territory of Thurii— Quarrel with Tarentum, and the 
invitation to Pyrrhus ...... Page 176 

CHAPTER XV 

Early life of PYRRHUS— He comes to Tarentum— Message to the Roman consul 
—Battles of Pandosia (Heraclea), AscuLUM (280-279)— State of Sicily— 



CONTENTS 



Pyrrhus goes to Syracuse — Attacks the Mamertines and Carthaginians : takes 
Agrigentum, Panormus, Hercte, and other towns — Besieges Lilybaeum un- 
successfully — Recalled to Italy^ (278-275) — Battle of Beneventum (275) — 
Pyrrhus retires to Tarentum and returns to Epirus (274) — The Romans take 
Tarentum and Rhegium : subdue Lucania, Bruttium, and Calabria, and the 
Picentines, and become supreme in Italy (274-265) . . Page 183 



Contest with Carthage for supremacy in the Mediter- 
ranean, B.C. 264-201 

CHAPTER XVI 

The limitations of consular powers, and their devolution on other curule magis- 
trates, censors, and praetors — The aediles, quaestors, praefectus urbis, and 
sacred colleges — The legion, its enrolment, numbers, officers, discipline, encarnp- 
ment, and disposition in the field ..... Page 202 

CHAPTER XVII 

Seeds of hostility between Rome and Carthage — Object of the first Punic war was 
Sicily — The Phoenicians and Greeks in Sicily — The Sicani, Elymi, and Siceli 
confused by the Romans with Greek Siceliots — Character of Sicilian Greeks — 
Power of Syracuse — Carthage, its foundation, constitution, and the charac- 
ter of its people — Their possessions in Sicily — The boundary of the Halycus 
— Cause of the Romans coming to Sicily, and the results of the war to the two 
peoples contrasted — Romans and Carthaginians compared — Judgment of 
Polybius— The city and harbours of Carthage . . . Page 219 

CHAPTER XVIII 

First Punic war — First Period (264-262) — Help sent to Messana at the request 
of the Mamertini — Claudius enters Messana — Battle with Hiero, and with the 
Carthaginians — The siege of Syracuse (263) — The consuls lay siege to Agri- 
gentum — Hiero makes alliance with Rome — Many cities in Italy join the 
Romans— Fall of Agrigentum (262). SECOND Period (261-255)— The 
Romans build a fleet — Loss of the consul Scipio — Victory of Duiiius at 
Mylae (260) — Relief of Segesta, siege of Hippana, Mytistratum, Camarina 
(259-258)— Naval battle off Tyndaris (257)— Battle of ECNOMUS, the 
Romans land in Africa : after successful campaign Regulus is left for the 
winter at Clupea with half the army (256) — Defeat and capture of REGULUS 
(255) Page 233 

CHAPTER XIX 

Third Period (255-251) — The Romans increase their fleet, but abandon Clupea 
— The fleet is lost in a storm (259) — A fleet is again built and Panormus is 
taken (254) — The Roman fleet is again wrecked (253) — The Romans abandon 
the sea, but Himera, Thermae, and Lipara are taken, the last by help of ships 
from Hiero (252) — Victory of Metellus at Panormus — Alleged mission of M. 
Regulus — The Carthaginians remove the people of Selinus to Lilybaeum 
(251). Fourth Period (250-241)- The Romans again build a fleet and 



xvi HISTORY OF ROME 



invest LiLYBAEUM (250)— Great defeat of Claudius at Drepana— Wreck of 
a large fleet of transports carrying provisions to the camp at Lilybaeum — 
C. Junius Pullus seizes Eryx (249)— Siege of Lilybaeum continued (248) — 
Hamilcar Barcas comes to Sicily, and occupies Hercte (247)— Hasdru- 
bal seizes Eryx and besieges the Romans on the summit of the mountain, and is 
himself besieged in Eryx— Frequent but indecisive engagements at Lilybaeum, 
Eryx, and Hercte (246-243)— The Romans once more build a fleet (243) — 
Great victory of LUTATIUS at the Aegates islands (loth March)— The Cartha- 
ginians evacuate SICILY, which became a PROVINCE (241) . Page 253 

CHAPTER XX 

Progress in Italy during the first Punic war— Six days' campaign against Falerii 
(241) — Mutiny of mercenaries in Carthage — The " truceless war " (241-238) 
—Sardinia surrendered to Rome (238)— Wars with Ligurians and Boii (239- 
237) — Temple of Janus closed (235) — Illyrian war (229-228) — Embassies to 
Aetolian and Achaean Leagues (228)— Agrarian law of Gaius Flaminius (232) 
— Gallic war (225-221) — The Via Flaminia (220) . . Page 269 

CHAPTER XXI 

Social distinctions — Apparent change in character and influence of Senate and the 
aristocracy — Increase in number of slaves, and consequences of it — The Libertini 
and Peregrini — The games — Gladiators — Funerals — Women a?td divorce — A'^iJW) 
nobles — Greek irifluence on personal habits, arid on literature — Livius Androni- 
cus — Cn. Naevius — Absence of prose writings . . . Page 283 

CHAPTER XXII 

Second Punic war— FIRST Period, from 219 to spring of 217 — Origin of the war, 
Carthaginian expansion in Spain, Hamilcar, 238-229; Hasdrubal, 229-221; 
Hannibal, 221-218 — Roman treaty with Hasdrubal confining the Carthaginian 
supremacy in Spain to the country south of the Ebro (228) — Founding of 
New Carthage about the same time — The Romans make treaty of friendship 
with the semi-Greek communities of Emporiae and Saguntum — Hannibal 
becomes general of the Carthaginian forces in Africa and Spain (221) — He 
subdues the Olcades (221), the Vaccaei (220) — The Saguntines in alarm 
appeal to Rome — Roman commissioners visit Hannibal in the winter 220, 
ordering him to abstain from attacking Saguntum, or from crossing the Ebro 
— They then go to Carthage — The second Illyrian war (219) — Hannibal takes 
Saguntum after a siege of seven months (219) — The Romans send an embassy 
to Carthage demanding the surrender of Hannibal, and on the refusal of the 
Carthaginian Senate Fabius declares war (219-218) — Hannibal starts from 
New Carthage in the early summer of 218— Subdues Spain north of the Ebro, 
and puts it under the care of Hanno ; crosses the Pyrenees and arrives at the 
Rhone while Scipio is still only at Marseilles (September, 218)— P. Cornelius 
Scipio finding himself too late, sends on his brother Gnaeus to Spain, returns 
himself to Italy with a few men, and takes over the legions of the praetors 
and awaits Hannibal on the Po — Hannibal crosses the Alps and descends 
into the basin of the Po, takes Turin and defeats Scipio's cavalry on the 
TICINUS— Scipio (wounded) retires to the Trebia near Placentia, south of the 
Po — He is joined by the other consul Sempronius Longus from Ariminum^ 



CONTENTS xvii 



Defeat of Sempronius on the Trebia — The Romans go into winter quarters 
at Placentia and Cremona — Meanwhile Gnaeus Scipio defeats and captures 
Hanno in Spain, and secures the country north of the Ebro (summer of 
2i8) . . . . ' . . . . . Page 289 

CHAPTER XXIII 

Flaminius enters upon his consulship at Ariminum (217)— Hannibal marches into 
Etruria — His sufferings in the marshes of the Arno — Battle of the Thrasy- 
MENE Lake — Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (Cunctator) baffles Hannibal, 
who enters Campania, but finds it unsuitable for winter quarters — He makes 
his way back to Apulia by a stratagem, and encamps near Gerunium — 
Minucius made equal to Fabius, but defeated by Hannibal — Preparations in 
the winter of 217-216 — P. Terentius Varro — The BATTLE OF Cannae — 
Courage and activity of Varro after the battle — His return to Rome Page 313 

CHAPTER XXIV 

Hannibal, after Cannae, is joined by Italian towns — Enters Campania, recoils 
from Naples, but is joined by Capua — Movements of Marcellus — The Castra 
Claudiana. SPAIN — Defeat of Hasdrubal and diversion of Carthaginian 
reinforcements from Italy (216) — Hannibal winters in Capua (216-215) — 
Takes Casilinum (215) — Fall of Postumius. SICILY — Death of Hiero — 
Hieronymus joins Carthage — Revolution at Syracuse and death of Hierony- 
mus (215) — Hippocrates and Epicydes at Syracuse defy the Romans — Mar- 
cellus in Sicily — Siege of Syracuse (214-212) — The inventions of Archimedes 
—Hanno at Agrigentum (212). ITALY (214-207)— Hannibal in Campania 
— Goes to Tarentum (214)— Fabius takes Arpi — Hannibal takes Tarentum 
(212) — Livius holds the^ citadel (212-210) — Siege of Capua — Hannibal's 
march on Rome — Fall of Capua and settlement of Campania (211) — Fall of 
Cn, Fulvius at Herdonia — Three days' fighting in Lucania — Marcellus con- 
fined to Venusia (210) — Fabius recovers TarentuiM (209) — Fall of Marcellus 
(208) — Defeat of Hasdrubal on the Metaurus (207) . . Page 331 



CHAPTER XXV 

Change in the location of the war — Events in Sicily from 210 and settlement of the 
island — The war in Spain from 215 — Recovery of Saguntum — Syphax — Fall of 
the Scipios (212) — Gallantry of L, Marcius — C. Claudius in Spain outwitted 
by Hasdrubal (211-210) — Character of P. Cornelius Scipio — Elected proconsul 
for Spain (211) — His first year in Spain spent in negotiations (210-209) — 
Capture of New CaRiHAGE and release of hostages (209) — Battle of Baecula 
and departure of Hasdrubal for Italy (208) — Battle of Ilipa — Scipio's visit to 
Syphax : his illness, and the mutiny on the Sucro — His interview with 
Masannasa — The defeat of Indibilis and Mandonius (207-206) — Scipio returns 
to Rome (206-205) — Scipio elected consul lias Sicily as his province, and 
prepares to invade Africa (205) — The distur'ia.ice at Locri ar accusations of 
Scipio (205-204) — He crosses to Africa, is j jined by Masani, a, and winters 
near Utica (204-203) — Storm and burning of the camps of Hasdrubal and 
Syphax (203) — Hannibal returns to Africa (203) — Negotiations for peace 
broken off— Hannibal's interview with Scipio — Victory at Zama and terms 
imposed on Carthage (202) ..... Page 360 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Growth of the Provincial Empire, b.c. 200-133 

CHAPTER XXVI 

Settleinent of Italy after the second Punic war — Changes in Roman life during the 
epoch — The Senate — The army — Tendency to leave country life — Literature: 
EnniUS, PlautuS — Their illustration of city life — Their identification of 
Greek and Roman gods— ChniO and country life . . . Page 395 

CHAPTER XXVn 

The state of Asia and Greece from 323 to 215 — The development of the three 
great kingdoms of Egypt, Asia, and Macedonia — The lesser Asiatic powers, 
Pergamos, Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Galatia — The extent of the Mace- 
donian influence in Asia and Greece — The Achaean and Aetolian Leagues — 
The accession of Philip V. — He conceives the idea of invading Italy — His 
treaty with Hannibal — The Romans declare war with him (215) — His defeat 
at Apollonia — His vigorous measures and victory over the Aetolians at Lamia 
(209) — The war languishes for some time (208-206), but the Romans, by 
the advice of Sulpicius, are unwilling to make peace — The Aetolians there- 
fore make a separate peace with Philip : followed by general pacification at 
Phoenice (205) ....... Page 408 

CHAPTER XXVni 

The conduct of king Philip during the peace of 205-200 — His league with 
Antiochus against Egypt (205), and his attacks on the Cyclades and Thracian 
Chersonese of Asia (202-201) — The Rhodians and king Attains declare war 
with him (201) — Appeals from Ptolemy and the Greek states to Rome — 
The Roman commissioners in Egypt and .Greece (203-201) — The Romans 
proclaim war (200) — P. Sulpicius Galba lands in Epirus and sends aid to 
Athens — Ineffective campaigns of 200 and 199 — Arrival of T. Quintius 
Flamininus (198) — Victory of Flamininus in the Antigoneian Pass and his 
march through Greece — The Achaean League join Rome (198) — Peace 
congress of Nicaea fails (198-197) — Campaign of 197 and battle of Cynos- 
CEPHALAE — Freedom of some Greek states proclaimed at Isthmian games 
(196) — War with Nabis of Sparta, settlement of Greece and triumph of 
Flamininus (195-194) ...... Page 423 

CHAPTER XXIX 

I. The Boil— The importance of the struggle with them and the Ligures— The 
Boii attack Cremona and Placentia (199)— The Insubres help the Boii, and 
are defeated by C. Cornelius Cethegus (197)— Marcellus takes Felsina (196) 
— L. Cornelius Merula defeats the Boii, but is refused a triumph (193)— 
Scipio Nasica finally conquers the Boii (191) — The province of Gaul informal 
from 191, formal from 181 — Road made from Bononia to Arretium, and the 
construction of the via Aemilia (187)— Colonies at POLLENTIA, PiSAURUM, 
BoNONiA, Parma, Mutina, and Aquileia (189-183)— Ligures: The 
Friniates and Apuani threaten Pisae and Bononia (187), defeat Q. Marcius 
(186), but are defeated by M. Sempronius Tuditanus (186), and finally 
crushed by L. Aemilius Paullus (181), and are transferred by M. Baebius to 



CONTENTS xix 



Samnium (i8o)— Colonies at PiSAE and Luna. II. Spain — Extent of Roman 
power in Spain — The limits of the provinces of Hispania Citerior and Ulterior 
— Hostility of the Celtiberi (205-198) — Appointment of two additional 
praetors for Spain (197)— Serious risings (197-196)— Cato comes to Spain as 
consul, defeats the Spaniards near Emporiae, and advances to Tarraco — 
Causes the towns to throw down their walls — Assists the praetor of Hispania 
Ulterior — Takes Vergium Castrum (195-194) — Reverses of Sex, Digitius 
(194-193) — P, Cornelius Scipio Cn. f. conquers the Lusitani— C. Flaminius 
the Oretani (193-192) — Twelve years comparative peace in Spain (191-179) 
Great Celtiberian rising ( 18 1-179)— Victories of Tib. Sempronius Gracchus 
and his settlement (179-178) ..... Page 450 

CHAPTER XXX 

Greece after the settlement of Flamininus (194-193) — Discontent of the Aetolians 
— They resolve to call in Antiochus — The kingdom and early reign of Anti- 
ochus — His confederacy with Philip for the partition of Egypt — He occupies 
the Thracian Chersonese — His haughty answer to the Roman envoys — 
Hannibal at his court — Hannibal's plan rejected — Nabis of Sparta breaks 
the terms of his treaty, and the Roman fleet come to Peloponnesus — Death 
of Nabis (192) — Preparations in Rome — The Aetolians occupy Demetrias 
and invite Antiochus to liberate Greece — Antiochus arrives in Phthiotis and 
is proclaimed strategus of the Aetolians at the congress at Lamia — He 
takes Chalcis (192) — He attempts to form a Greek confederation — Decay 
of his forces in the winter of 192-191 — M'. Acilius Glabrio comes to Thes- 
saly in 190 — Defeat of Antiochus at THERMOPYLAE, who returns to Asia 
— L, Cornelius Scipio with his brother Africanus come to Greece in July 
189, grant six months' truce to the Aetolians and march to the Hellespont 
— Meanwhile the Roman Beet had taken Sestos, and sailing to Samos shut 
up the king's fleet at Ephesus — Reduction of towns in Caria — Failure at 
Patara — Great defeat of the king's fleet in the bay of Teos — In October 
190 the consul Scipio crosses the Hellespont, and in November conquers 
the king at MAGNESIA, who is forced to evacuate Asia Minor — Settlement of 
Asia and victories over Pisidians and Gauls by Cn. Manlius Vulso (189-188) 
— End of the Aetolian war and capture of Ambracia by M. Fulvius Nobilior 
(189-188) ........ Page 464 

CHAPTER XXXI 

Last days of Antiochus, Hannibal, and Scipio — The anti-Roman policy of Philip V. 
in the last years of his life — Death of his son Demetrius — Death of Philip 
and succession of Perseus (179) — Character of Perseus — His activity and 
schemes for asserting the independence of Macedonia and regaining supremacy 
in Greece — The jealousy of Rome and the complaints against Perseus made 
by Eumenes — The Senate decide to go to war (172) — The first campaign in 
Thessaly and defeat of Licinius — Reduction of Boeotia (171) — The second 
campaign in Thessaly also abortive — Rising in Epirus (170) — Third cam- 
paign : Marcius Philippus enters Macedonia — Perseus intrigues with Gen- 
thius, Rhodes, and Eumenes, but is only helped materially by Cotys (169) — 
Fourth campaign — Aemilius Paulus defeats Perseus at Pydna, who is captured 
in Samothrace (168) — Division and settlement of Macedonia — Punishment 
of Epirus, Aetolia, and the Macedonia party in Greek states — Deportation 
of Achaean statesmen — Supremacy of Rome — Antiochus and Popilius at 
Pelusium ........ Page 498 



XX HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAPTER XXXII 

Suspension of the tributum, growing luxury and consequent cases of peculation 
and embezzlement — Laws, Calpur?ua de repetundis (149) — Sumptuary: 
Orchia (182), Farmia (161), Didia (143) — Greek literature and teachers — 
Writers imitating Greek literature — Terence, Pacuvius, Statins Caecilius — 
Cato's opposition — Expulsion of Greek rhetors (161) — Visit of the philoso- 
phers (155) — Demolition of stone theatre (151) — The Bacchanalia (186) — 
Laws against bribery, Aemilia Baebia (182), Cornelia Fulvia (159) — Ballot 
laws, Gabinia (139), Cassia (137) — MACEDONIA between 167-146, the dis- 
contents arising from the Roman settlement : war with the pseudo-Philippus, 
and formation of the province (148-146) — Destruction of Corinth and settle- 
ment of Greece (146) — Carthage, the Roman pohcy in favouring Masannasa 
— Immediate causes of the THIRD FUNIC WAR — Consuls land at Utica (149) 
— Inefficient conduct of the war (149-148) — Rising reputation of Scipio the 
younger Africanus (147) — Destruction of Carthage — The province of Africa 
(146) Page 517 

CHAPTER XXXIII 

Wars with Ligurians and Dalmatians (168-155) — State of Spain after the settle- 
ment of Gracchus (176). I. THE LUSITANI invade tribes subject to Rome 
(154) — Campaigns of L. Mummius and M. Atilius (154-152) — Treacherous 
massacre of the Lusitani by Galba (150) — Rise of Viriathus (147) and 
disasters of Vetilius, G. Plautius, and Claudius Unimanus (147-145) — Cam- 
paigns of Q. Fabius Aemilianus (145-144) — Defeat of L. Quinctius (143) — 
Peace made by Q. Fabius Servilianus (142-141), but rejected by Q. Servilius 
Caepio, who causes the murder of Viriathus (141-140) — Campaigns of 
Decimus Junius Brutus in north-west Spain (138-136). II. Celtiberian 
Wars — the Titthi, Belli, and Arevaci — Disasters of Q. Fulvius NobiUor 
(153-152) — M. Claudius Marcellus makes terms and founds the town of 
Corduba (152-151) — War with the Arevaci at Numantia and the Vaccaei 
continued by L. Licinius Lucullus (151-150) — Five years peace (149-144) — 
The Arevaci again revolt (144) — Campaigns of Q. Caecilius Metellus, Q. 
Pompeius Rufus, M. Popilius Rufus, C. Hostilius Mancinus, Q. Calpurnius 
Piso (144-134) — Scipio Aemilianus sent to Numantia, which he takes after a 
long siege (134-133) Page 537 



Period of Revolution and Civil War, b.c. 133-31 

CHAPTER XXXIV 

State of Sicily since 205— Speculations in land— Miseries of the slaves— Disorders 
in the island from about 139— Murder of Demophilus, and organisation of 
rebellion under Eunus and Cleon— Defeat of the praetors— M. Perpenna 
retakes Henna— Defeat of Hypsaeus— Campaigns of C. Fulvius Flaccus 
(134-132) and P. Rupilius— Capture of Tauromenium— The lex Rupilia 
(132)— Second war in 103— Fraudulent reduction to slavery— Legal decisions 
of Licinius Nerva liberating 800 slaves— Protests by the landowners— Out- 



CONTENTS xxi 



break under Tryphon and Athenion — L. Licinius Lucullus (103-102) — C. 
Servilius (102-101) — M'. Aquillius ends the war (101-99) Page 546 

CHAPTER XXXV 

Depopulation of Italy — The ager publicus — Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, tribu- 
nus plebis in ijj, attempts to re-enforce the Licitiiati law — Difficulties of the 
attempt — Deposition of his colleague Octavius — The law passed and a land 
commission formed — He promises other refortns, but is killed while seeking- 
re-election as tribune for ij2 — His younger brother Gaius returtis to Italy in 
i;^2 — Supports Carbo's law for allowing re-election of tribunes — The Italian 
holders of ager publicus protest against the resumption of their allotments — 
Scipio supports them and tratzsfers the judicial power of the commissioners to 
the consuls — Death of Scipio {i2g) — Foreign affairs from i2g to 125 — Gaius 
Gracchus in Sardinia {i26-i2§) — Elected tribune for i2j — His legislation: 
(7) de provocatione, {2) lex frumentaria, ( j) lex militaris, {4) lex judiciaria, 
(5) f(^^ ^^^ collection of the taxes in Asia, (<5) de provinciis, (7) de sociis — 
His roads, bridges, and colonies at Fabrateria, Tare7itum, Capua, and Carthage 
— Outbidden by the tribune Livius Drusus — Not re-elected a third time as 
tribune for 121 — Proposal to annul his colony of jfunonia at Carthage — Death 
of Gracchus during the riot Ofi the day of voting —Prosecution of his followers 
— Results of the 7noveme7it ..... Page 551 

CHAPTER XXXVI 

The formation of the first province in Transalpine Gaul — Wars with Gauls, the 
Balearic islands, and Dalmatia — The CiMBRi defeat Cn. Papirius Carbo at 
Noreia (113), and Manlius and Caepio in Gaul (105) — History of Jugurtha 
— His bribery at Rome — His murder of Massiva — The JUGURTHINE war 
(112-106) — Scandalous misconduct of the Roman commanders — Successful 
campaign of Metellus (109-108) — Marius consul (107) — Capture of Jugurtha 
(106) — Five consecutive consulships of Marius (104-100) — His conduct of the 
Cimbric war — Great defeat of the Teutones and Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae 
(102), and of the Cimbri at Vercellae (loi) . . . Page 568 

CHAPTER XXXVn 

Political parties at Rome — The Senate and the equestrian order — Frequent scenes 
of violence — Marius and the reformed army— The second tribunate of L. 
Appuleius Saturninus — Murder of Nonius — Agrarian law of Saturninus 
and banishment of Metellus — Murder of Memmius — Death of Saturninus and 
Glaucia (100) — Events abroad from 102 to 92 — The lex Licinia Marcia and 
alienation of the Italians (95) — Compromises proposed by M. Livius Drusus 
(91) — Death of Drusus — Prosecutions of Varius— The Marsic or Social war 
(90-88) — Sulla consul with command of the Mithridatic war — Revolutionary 
proposals of Sulpicius and the substitution of Marius for Sulla — Sulla 
advances on Rome — Death of Sulpicius and flight of Marius (88) — Cinna 
consul in 87 — Expelled from Rome, raises army and returns with Marius — 
Reign of terror in Rome — Death of Marius in his seventh consulship (86) — 
Successive consulships of Cinna, persecution of the party of Sulla, and 
preparations to prevent Sulla's return (85-84) — Death of Cinna (84) 

Page 581 



xxii HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAPTER XXXVHI 

The origin and state of the Roman province of Asia — Causes of discontent — Rise 
of the kingdom of Pontus (315-121)— Early Ufe and character of Mithridates 
Eupator (120-111) — His victories in the Crimea and extension of the Pontic 
kingdom north of the Black Sea (111-102)— His tour in Asia (105) — He joins 
Nicomedes of Bithynia in an attack upon Paphlagonia (104)— Obeys Roman 
commissioners and evacuates Paphlagonia, but occupies Galatia — Breach 
between Nicomedes and Mithridates in regard to Cappadocia— Meeting of 
Marius and Mithridates (98) — The Senate order Mithridates to evacuate Cap- 
padocia (94) — Tigranes of Armenia allied with Mithridates — Sulla restores 
Ariobarzanes (92) — M'. Aquillius in Asia (90-89) — Mithridates determines on 
war (88) — Defeat of the Roman forces and massacre of the Italians (88) — 
Mithridates attacks Rhodes, and his general Archelaus occupies Athens (88- 
87) — Sulla arrives in Greece with five legions (87) . . Page 600 

CHAPTER XXXIX 

Success of the quaestor Q. Bruttius Sura in the spring of 87 — Sulla lands in 
Epirus in the early summer, and marches to Athens — Revolution of feeling 
in Greece — Siege of Athens and the Peiraeus (87-86) — LucuUus sent to Egypt 
and the islands to collect a fleet (86-85) — Capture of Athens (86) — Destruction 
of the Peiraeus — Battle of Chaeroneia (86) — Unpopularity of the government 
of Mithridates in Asia and revolt of Ephesus (86) — Dorylaus defeated by 
Sulla at Orchomenus (85) — The Romans again supreme in Greece — L. 
Valerius Flaccus sent out to supersede Sulla is murdered by Fimbria (85) — 
Fimbria overruns Bithynia (85) — Mithridates takes refuge in Pitane (85-84) 
— Arrival of LucuUus with fleet, and negotiations with Mithridates at Pergamus 
— Death of Fimbria (84) — Return of Sulla to Italy (83) . . Page 623 

CHAPTER XL 

Sulla lands in Italy — He is joined by Metellus, Pompey, Crassus, and many others 
— His march to Rome — Defeat of Norbanus and the younger Marius at Tifata 
— Surrender of Scipio and Sertorius at Teanum — Fire at the Capitol (83) — 
Campaigns of 82 — Defeat of Marius at Sacriportiis, and siege of Praeneste — 
Victory of Metellus on the Aesis— The war in Etruria and Gallia Cisalpina— 
Battles of Saturnia, Clusium, Faventia, Fidentia — Flight of Norbanus and 
Carbo— Defeat of the Samnites at the Colline Ga/<?— Fall of Praeneste and 
Norba (November 82)— Sulla at Rome— The proscriptions— Sulla dictator— 
His political reforms— His code of laws—Y2\\ of Nola and Volaterrae— 
Devastation of Samnium (82-80)— Pompey in Sicily and Africa (81)— Abdi- 
cation of Sulla (79)— His death {^Z)—Rot7ie expanded into Italy— Change 
in the colonial system — Extent of Empire — Number of provinces — Their con- 
tributions to the Rofnan exchequer — Indifference at Rome to foreign affairs — 
The new generation— Developmetit of oratory and literature . Page 640 

CHAPTER XLI 

Lepidus attempts to rescind Sulla's acts— He is sent to Etruria (78)— Attacks 
Rome— Is defeated and goes to Sardinia (77)— Sertorius in Spain— Defeats 
many Roman armies— The campaigns of Metellus (79-76)— Sertorius joined 



CONTENTS xxiii 



by Perpenna and partisans of Lepidus (77) — Negotiates with Mithridates 
(75-74)— Pompey in Spain (76-74)— Death of Sertorius (72)— Rebellion of 
gladiators and slaves under Sparticus (73-71) — Victories of Crassus (72-71) 
— Second war with Mithridates under Murena (83-81) — Wars with Thracians 
and with the pirates (78-74) — Third war with Mithridates and campaigns of 
LucuUus (74-67)— BITHYNIA left to the Roman people (74)— Battle at Chal- 
cedon and siege of Cyzicus (73) — Naval victories (72) — Battle of Cabria (71) 
— Mithridates in Armenia (71-69) — LucuUus invades Armenia, battle at Tigra- 
nocerta (69) — Battle of Arsanias (68) — Mutiny in the Roman army (67) — 
Recall of LucuUus (67) ...... Page 659 

CHAPTER XLII 

Pompey's first consulship — Censors — Restoration of Tribunician power — The 
judices (70) — Pompey and the war with pirates (67-66) — The lex Mariilla 
appointing him to Bithynia and the Mithridatic war — He goes to Pontus — 
Two defeats of Mithridates who retires across the Caucasus — Capture of 
Artaxata and submission of Tigranes — Victory over the Albani (66) — Victory 
over the Iberes — Reduction of Pontus and settlement of Asia (65) — Syria 
taken from Tigranes — Dispute in Judaea between Hyrcanus and Aristobulus 
— Pompey's arrival in Damascus (64) — Death of Mithridates — Pompey takes 
Jerusalem (63) — Returns to Amisos — Makes final arrangements in Pontus 
and Asia— Returns to Rome (62)— New Provinces: Bithynia and Pontus 
(74-63), Cyrene (74) joined with Crete (67), Syria (64) . Page 679 

CHAPTER XLHI 

State of parties at Pompey's return — The leaders of the Optimates — The Popu- 
lates without a leader — C. lulius Caesar — His early career — His support of 
popular measures (73-68) — Quaestor in Spain (68) — Supports the Gabinian 
(67) and Manilian laws (66) — Aedile (65) — Fails to get appointed to Egypt — 
Index quaestionis (64) — As duovir capitalis condemns C. Rabirius — The 
Catiline conspiracy crushed by Cicero as consul — Caesar advises against 
executing the conspirators — His election as pontifex maximus (63) — Caesar's 
praetorship — His contests with the Senate — Fall of Catiline (62) — Caesar 
propraetor in Spain (61) — Caesar returns from Spain to stand for consulship 
— Is not allowed to be a candidate without entering Rome — Elected consul, 
and forms a league with Pompey and Crassus (60) — His consulship and laws 
(59) — P. Clodius — His violation of the mysteries (62) — His adoption into a 
plebeian gens and election as tribune (59) — Cicero is banished and Caesar 
goes as proconsul to Gaul (58) — Clodius' laws — Quarrels with Pompey who 
supports the recall of Cicero (57) — Pompey praefectus annonae for five years 
— Goes to the congress at Lucca on Caesar's invitation (56) . . Page 692 

CHAPTER XLIV 

Caesar vainly attacked for actions during his consulship (58) — First campaign 
in Gaul against X\\q Helvetii and Germans under Ariovistus (58). Second, 
against the Belgae and Nervii (57) — Attacks upon Caesar in Rome by Aheno- 
barbus, and the conference at Lucca (57-56). THIRD campaign in Gaul, the 
Veneti — Consulship of Pompey and Crassus (55). FOURTH campaign, de- 
feat of Germans on the Meuse — Crossing the Rhine — First invasion of Britain 



HISTORY OF ROME 



(55). Fifth campaign, second invasion of Britain — Outbreak in North 
Gaul and loss of a legion (54). Sixth campaign, the Nervli and Tre- 
i,eri — Second crossing of the Rhine (53). SEVENTH campaign, Rebellion 
in southern Gaul — Capture of Avaricum — Failure at Gergovia — Capture of 
Alesia (52). EIGHTH and NINTH campaigns, reduction and pacification of 
Gaul (51-50) — Events leading to the Civil war (55-50) — The Senate decide 
to give Caesar a successor — Refuse to consider his despatch — Expel the 
tribunes — Caesar crosses the Rubicon Qanuary 49] . . Page 718 



CHAPTER XLV 

Civil war — Preparations for the defence of Italy — Caesar's rapid advance — Fruit- 
less negotiations — Pompey leaves Italy — Caesar at Rome — Siege of Massilia 
— Campaign in Spain — Surrender of Massilia — Caesar declared dictator holds 
elections (49). Caesar as consul crosses to Macedonia to attack Pompey — 
His difficulties — Beleaguers Pompey's camp — Pompey pierces his lines — 
Retreat to Thessaly— Battle of Pharsalus— Death of Pompey in Egypt (48). 
Alexandrine war (48-47) — Expedition into Pontus — Battle of Zela — Second 
dictatorship (47) — Pompeians in Africa (48-46) — Caesar's campaign in Africa 
—Battle of Thapsus— Province of New Africa— Rectification of calendar 
and legislation, year of 445 days (46). Campaign in Spain against Pompey's 
sons — Battle of MUNDA — Third dictatorship (45) — Plans for enlargement of 
Rome — Scheme of colonies — Preparations for Parthian expedition — The con- 
spiracy — Murder of Caesar (44) .... Page 738 

CHAPTER XLVI 

Antony and the acta of Caesar — Popular feeling against the assassins — Change in 
the provincial arrangements of Caesar — M. Brutus and C. Cassius resist — 
Arrival of C. Octavius (May) — His disputes with Antony — He enrols a legion 
of veterans — Antony made governor of Cisalpine Gaul for 43, besieges Dec. 
Brutus in MUTINA (44) — Decrees of Senate against Antony — Battle near 
Mutina — Antony in Gaul, joined by Lepidus, Pollio, and Plancus — Death of 
Decimus Brutus — Octavius (now C. Caesar Octavianus) comes to Rome and 
is elected consul (19th August) — Makes terms with Antony — The Triumvirate 
— The proscriptions and death of Cicero (43) — M. Brutus and C. Cassius in 
Macedonia and Syria — Sext. Pompeius in Sicily — Battles of Philippi — Death 
of Brutus and Cassius — Division of the provinces (42) — L. Antoniusand the 
siege of Perusia — M. Antonius and Cleopatra — Disputes between Caesar and 
Antony — Peace oi Brundisium (40) — Peace oi Misenwri with Sext. Pompeius 
(39) — Defeat and death of Pompeius (36-35) — Lepidus deprived of power 
(35) — Antonius in the East — Wars in Parthia and Armenia (38-36) — 
Cleopatra's renewed influence (36-33) — Battle of ACTIUM (31)— Death of 
Antony and Cleopatra (30) — Province of EGYPT — The new constitution — 
Literature at the end of the Republic— New buildings begun at Rome 

Page 763 



LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS 



The Great Divisions of Italy 

Magna Graecia . 

Rome, with the Walls of Servius 

Latium 

Campania . 

The Samnite Wars 

Etruria . 

Sicily 

Carthaginian Possessions 

Roman Fleet at Heraclea 

Spain 

Gallia Cisalpina 

Lago Trasimeno . 

Hannibal's March down Italy 

Cannae 

Syracusae 

Harbour of Tarentum 

Thessaly and Southern Macedonia 

Carthage .... 



PAGE 

7 

i8 

24 

30 

128 

137 
148 
220 
225 
247 
292 
305 
315 
318 
326 
33S 

344 
440 

533 



XXVI 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Asia Minor 

Sulla's Campaign in Boeotia . 

Gaul at the time of Caesar . 

Bay of Dyrrachium 

North Africa 

The Roman Empire 



PAGE 


. 


. 6oi 


. 


. 628 


. 


. 721 




• 743 




• 751 




• 785 



CHAPTER 1 

PRELIMINARY 

The consolidation of Italy — Four periods of Roman History : I. Rise of the 
city; II. Conquest of Italy ; III. The growth of a foreign dominion ; IV. Civil 
wars, leading to the rule of a single Emperor — The place of Roman in 
I universal history — Its continuity. 

[ When, after the victories at Philippi in 42, Antony and Octavian Italy 
1 were settling the division of the Roman world between them, among becomes the 
\ the provinces to be allotted no mention, we are told, was made of ' 
I Italy. They assumed that everything they had been doing had been 
[ done, not to gain possession of Italy, but in behalf of the authority 
i of Italy over the rest of the Empire.^ 

t Now when Rome first appears as a corporate town it had only a 

' small territory, probably not more than five miles in extent in any 

direction. Its history should teach us how it came to pass that Italy 

1 could thus be spoken of as constituting the Roman State and not 

' merely the city of Rome : how first the city on the Palatine absorbed 

other townships and became Rome of the Seven Hills ; how Rome 

of the Seven Hills secured dominion first over all Latium and then 

over all Italy ; how farther it was led step by step to extend its 

power over Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, Africa, Spain and Gaul in 

the West, and eastward to Illyricum, Macedonia, Greece, Asia Minor, 

and Syria. 

The time was to come when, one man being at the head of the 
State, all these countries and more were to be combined into one 
great Empire, in which all free inhabitants possessed equal rights of 
citizenship. But for a long time the peoples of the countries external 
to Italy remained in the position of conquered subjects, retaining 

1 Dio 48, 2; cp. id. 41, ^2.; Caes. B. Civ. i. 35. 
IE B 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The State 
always in 
theory 
urban. 



indeed certain local freedoms and in many cases even their native 
rulers, but being really subject to men of another race, who ruled and 
did not amalgamate v^^ith them. 

With Italy the case was different. There too the supremacy of 
Rome was the consequence of success in war, and there too local 
freedom and local forms of government often continued to exist. 
But not only was it covered with a network of colonies, in which 
the settlers retained the full rights of Roman citizens, or the partial 
rights known under the name of Latinitas, but its native races were 
also gradually organised under a form of government which tended 
more and more to uniformity, until after the Social war the lex 
Julia (89) gave the full Roman citizenship to all the cities of Italy 
below a line marked by the river Rubicon on the east and the Macra 
on the west. The conquest of Italy by the Romans, therefore, may 
in one point of view be rather called the consolidation of all Italians 
within this limit into one nation. 

Yet historical continuity was preserved by the fact that Italians 
possessed the sovereign rights of a nation over the subject provinces, 
not as Italians, but as cives Roinani. For though Italy became in 
a certain sense a nation, with a capital city, yet Rome was more 
than a modern capital. The idea of the urban state was strictly 
maintained. The magistrates, whether possessing or not the 
full powers included under the word imperiimi., could not be 
elected elsewhere; laws could only be passed there; treaties and 
conditions of peace must be confirmed there. At Rome alone 
could the Senate properly meet ; and from Rome came all regulations 
for the provinces and all provincial governors. Even when the 
government became practically vested in the person of one man, the 
ancient forms of election were for some time maintained ; the names 
and some of the functions of the republican magistrates were still 
unaltered ; the authority of the Emperor was the sum of the powers 
of various city magistrates vested in a single man for life ; and though 
both Augustus and Tiberius, in fact, conducted the aiTairs of their 
great Empire at their sole discretion, the government was still 
directed in theory by the Senatiis popiihisqiie Romatms. 

The abolition by Tiberius of the empty form of popular election 
marks the completion of the first step in a change which was 
gradually to reduce the position of Rome to that of a modern capital, 
in which the chief seat of government is placed for convenience, 
though nothing is held to prevent the highest functions from being 
bestowed and exercised elsewhere ; and which later, when (in the words 
of Tacitus) the secret had long been revealed "that an Emperor 
could be created elsewhere than in Rome," was to lower it still more 
almost to the le,vel of a provincial city, seldom, if ever visited by the 



CONTINUITY OF ROMAN HISTORY 



Emperor, and whose Senate had little more power than that of an 
ordinary town council. 

This, however, was long after the period included in this book. The four 

Our history up to the reign of Tiberius falls naturally into iowx periods. 

periods. First, the development of the city on the Palatine into 

Rome, and the extension of its territory in Latium. Secondly, 

Rome's gradual annexation of all Italy. Thirdly, the acquisition of 

a wide foreign dominion outside Italy; and its government of the 

dominion when acquired. Side by side with this we shall have 

to trace the changes in the government of Rome itself: first 

under kings, next under a republic which, beginning as a close 

I oligarchy of birth, passes to an oligarchy of wealth ; thence to a 

I system of apparent equality, which through various corruptions 

induces a series of civil wars leading to our fourth period, in which 

power became centred in the person of one man, though with many 

of the republican forms still maintained. ,..-^_. 

The interest of the first two periods is confined to Italy. In the 

,two last Roman history takes its place in the line of universal 

j history. From the gradual disruption of the great Empire won and 

I civilised by the Romans the modern countries of Europe have mostly 

I sprung, many of them still Latin in speech, in law, and habits. 

\ As their lands are still marked by Roman works, temples, roads, and 

(walls, so, where the deluge of barbarian invasion has not succeeded 

I'm wiping out its traces, the peoples of modern Europe still bear 

(indelible marks of Roman rule. Thus Roman history is not an 

[isolated episode; it supplies the true origiiies of modern history, 

I without which much of it must be unintelligible. 

I There is also an inner continuity, a necessary connexion between Connexion 
• the periods of Roman history itself. The Republic is not fully between 
I intelligible without a knowledge of the traditions of the kingly period; *^^^- 
I nor the Imperial system without a knowledge of the struggles, 
j reforms, failures, and victories of the Republic. Many of the enact- 
1 ments in the famous body of Roman law, the foundation of modern 
jjurisprudence, were passed in the time of the Republic. Many of 
(the questions touching the relations of citizens to each other and to 
jthe State were settled in the struggles between rich and poor, 
privileged and unprivileged, patrician and plebeian. In this point of 
view the " fall of the Republic " is a somewhat misleading phrase. 
In a sense the Republic did not fall in the time of Augustus or his 
successors. Though their powers and function were altered or 
curtailed the old magistrates were still appointed; the old laws 
were still in force; and the absolute powers of the Emperor 
Jwere generally exercised under cover of an authority resting on the 
exercise of the functions of consul, censor, or tribune. He was 



HISTORY OF ROME chap, i 



tacitly assumed to be the chosen of the people and to represent in 
his person the authority of the old popidiis Romanus, to whom, there- 
fore, that appeal against the decision of other magistrates was 
addressed, which was regarded as the chief safeguard of a citizen's 

rights. . 

Outside Italy the Emperor was supreme m precisely the same 
way— by absorbing, that is, the functions of the proconsuls or pro- 
praetors of former times. Here there was even less break of con- 
tinuity. These governors had continued to do really what the 
consuls had originally done at home, but had long ceased to do. 
They commanded armies, sat as judges, collected taxes. These 
thincrs continued to be done by representatives of the Emperor, who 
was^ead of the army and had control of the public purse, and was 
the ultimate court of appeal. 

Thus the successive periods of Roman history are inextricably 
connected. The magistrates divided among them the powers once 
exercised by a single king ; the Emperor combined again the powers 
of the magistrates in his single person. The conquests of one 
generation led inevitably to the conquests of the next. The civil 
difficulties of one period were the inheritance from the difficulties or 
mistakes of that which preceded. No period must be omitted if 
we wish to understand any. 



CHAPTER II 

ITALY 

The lie of the Italian peninsula — The ancient limitation of the name — Its sub- 
sequent enlargement, first, about B.C. 280, up to the Rubicon, and secondly, 
in the time of Augustus, up to the Alps — The parcelling out of the peninsula 
by the Apennines — The different character of the Apennines in the centre and 
1 south of Italy — Their contiguity to the sea, and the consequent fewness of 
J important rivers— On the north of the Apennines, Gallia Cisalpina; on the 
I west, Etruria, Latium, Campania; on the east, the Senones, Picenum, 
Pratutiani, Vestini, Marrucini, Frentani, Apulia, Calabria; in the centre, 
t Umbria, Samnium ( = Sabini, Marsi, Samnites), Picentini : continued into 
( Lucania and Bruttium — Effect of the geographical formation on the history of 
I Italy, early causing a struggle between highlanders and men of the plain. 
I 

I Of the three great Mediterranean peninsulas, that which has for The lie of 
(more than two thousand years been known as Italy lies between thepenin- 
^46° 10' and 37° 50' N. latitude. It slopes so much to the south-east •^"^^• 
that whereas its north-western frontier is only a little more than 5", 
its south-eastern extremity is more than 16° east of the meridian 
of Greenwich. Its natural boundaries are the Alps on the north and 
I north-west, and the sea on all other parts. 

1 This is Italy as we know it, and as the Romans regarded it from The appli- 
I about B.C. 27. But for a long time this name was not applied to by cation of 
any means all the peninsula. Within historical knowledge it had ^^^^'^^ 
1 belonged to only a small part of it, south of a line drawn from about ^ifj-g^gnt 
I Metapontum on the gulf of Tarentum to Paestum, nearly fifty miles epochs. 
south of Naples, including the districts afterwards called Lucania 
and Bruttium ; and perhaps earlier still was confined to the latter of 
these two. 

Again, it was not until the time of Augustus that the basin of the 
Po was reckoned, except in colloquial language, a part of Italy. All 
between the Alps and the Apennines was known by separate names, 
derived from its inhabitants — Liguria, Gallia, Venetia ; or was 
spoken of by the general term Gallia Cisalpina. The official frontier 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Italy 
below the 
Rubicon. 
General 
configura- 
tion. The 
Apennines. 



Results of 
the lie 
of the 
Apennines. 



of Italy was first the Aesis,i and then the Rubicon on the east, and 
the Macra, just above Luna, on the west, the Apennines fiUing up 
the Hne between the two streams. 

This part of the peninsula, then, from the Rubicon to the 
southern extremities, had obtained the name Italia from about 
the time of the invasion of Pyrrhus (281-275), and it is in this 
sense we shall speak of it until its extension to the Alps in the 
time of Augustus. But until about the time of Pyrrhus it seems 
not to have been spoken of by this general term. The various 
divisions, such as Etruria, Umbria, Samnium, and the like, were 
specified ; and if the name Italia was used, it referred to the southern 
l-)ortion already described as below the line between Paestum and 
Metapontum. 

The entire peninsula is roughly portioned off by the ramifica- 
tions of the Apennines. From their point of junction with the 
Maritime Alps— somewhere about Vada Sabbata— the Apennines 
stretch across the country in a direction nearly parallel to the Po, 
almost to the shore of the Adriatic, a little north of Ariminum, about 
the parallel 44^^ N. latitude. Then, leaving Gallia Cisalpina to the 
north, they bend to the south, and run in a direction roughly 
parallel to the eastern shore of Italy to about 42° N. latitude, the 
eastern slopes leaving a district between themselves and the sea 
averaging about forty miles in breadth, while the average distance 
between the western slopes to the Tyrrhenian sea is about double 
that distance. Thus the district of Etruria is left on the west, 
intersected indeed by less elevated mountains, but embracing 
also considerable plains and several lakes of importance. From 
42° N. latitude the mountains take a more westerly direction, en- 
closing between themselves and the sea the broad undulating plain 
of Latium and Campania, and then, still bending westward, spread 
out through the whole of Lucania and Bruttium, from Metapontum ' 
to the promontory of Leucopetra, leaving on the east the great low- 
lands of Apulia and Calabria. The south-west range, thus 
running to the toe of Italy, was called Sila, and was looked 
upon as ending with Leucopetra; but it is truly continued by 
the mountains of Northern Sicily, the Montes Nebrodes {monti 
di Madonia), which, like the Sila, are moderate in elevation and 
covered with forest. 

One consequence of the peculiar configuration of the Apennines 
IS that, forming as they do the watershed of the peninsula, they are 
too near to either sea to allow of many great or important rivers. 

j The Acsis separated Picenum from the Senones. When the Senones were 
destroyed (about 285-283) the boundary of Italy was extended to the Rubicon. 



GEOGRAPHY OF ITALY 



The Arnus, the Tiber, the Liris, and the Volturnus are the only 
considerable streams on the west ; while on the east no river of 
any importance, south of the Po, falls into the Adriatic until 41° 20' 




¥- 








•o 


^1 


V: 


w 






11 


S|. 








%< 


i 


§ 


^ 


c'" 


i-- 


o,-"^ ■ 


- 


Ji 




H 


oJ 


0. 



N. latitude, where the Aufidus, with its affluents, after a course of 
some length from the eastern slopes above Mount Voltur, finds its 
way to the sea. Still, from the eastern slopes of the Apennines 
at least fifteen other streams fall into the Adriatic, which at certain 



g HISTORY OF ROME chap. 



times of the year are formidable torrents, bringing down consider- 
able volumes of water. ^ 

Again in Central Italy the Apennines (mod. Abruzzt) are very 
lofty and form a true mountain country, with upland valleys, table- 
lands, and passes ; but in the south they are not nearly so lofty, 
except in the case of some isolated peaks; and thus Lucania 
(Oenotria) and Bruttium (Italia), though still to be called moun- 
tainous districts, are neither so wild nor so rugged as Central 
Italy. Their shores, indeed, form a district proverbial for its beauty 
and pleasantness, and were so fringed with Greek colonies that 
they acquired the name of Magna Graecia. 
rour^reat To sum up the general facts of Italian geography. The natural 
divisions- divisions into which the peninsula falls are— (i) The basin of the Po, 
(/) The Po between the Alps and the Apennines, including Venetia, Gallia 
bastn. (-') cisalpina, Liguria, sometimes spoken of in general terms as 
m'th'f^^ Gallia Cisalpina. (2) On the west, between the Apennines and 
Tyrrhen- the Etmscan sea, Etruria, Latium, and Campania, the boundary 
ion sea. between the first and second being the Tiber, and between the second 
(j) ^-^'f- and third the Lids, or the range of mountains immediately to the 
*Adr 7 ^'^' south-east of that river, according as the ager Falernus is counted 
{/{ Centra/ ^^ Latium or Campania. (3) On the east, taking the Rubicon as 
//a/y. the southern boundary of Gallia Cisalpina, we have between the 

Apennines and the sea a maritime district extending from Ariminum 
to the river Aesis occupied by the Senones. From the river Aesis, 
just north of Ancona, to the river Matrinus, south of Hatria, the 
ager Picenus, the south part of which was properly called Praetu- 
tianus ager. Between the river Matrinus and the river Frento come 
three smaller districts occupied respectively by the Vestini, Mar- 
RUCINI, and Frentanl And south of the river Frento come the two 
large districts of Apulia and Calabria, occupying the great space 
of comparatively flat country left by the Apennines, as they bend to 
the west, l)etween themselves and the Adriatic, and forming the heel 
of Italy. (4) Central Italy, consisting of the mountainous tract 
which traverses the peninsula in a slanting direction, following the 
line of the Apennines. It begins with Umbria on the west of the 
Senones; goes on with a great district sometimes called collectively 
Samnmum, sometimes divided into the separate territories of the 
Sahini, Marsi, and Samnites. It extends from the river Nar to the 
river Silarus, touching the western coast along a narrow line of 
shore inhabited by the Picentini between Salernum and Paestum. 
Of this central district Lucania and Bruttium are, properly 

» The Arimimts, Crustumius, Pisaurus, Metaurus, Aesis, Potentia Flusor, 
Iruenlu^, yomatitis, Aternus, Sagrus, Trinius, Tifernus, Frento, 'cerbalus, 
following the order of the rivers from north to south. 



II RESULTS OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES 9 

■ speaking, a continuation, though, as has been said, the mountains 
which nearly cover them are of a different character to those in the 
more northern part, and constitute a highland region fitted for 
pastoral folk, not intersected with the vast heights which effectually 
separate tribes ; while, on the other hand, the interval between the 
mountains and sea is comparatively narrow, and therefore gives less 
room for the distinction between natives of highlands and those of 
maritime plains, conspicuous elsewhere. 

These are the broad outlines of the geography of Italy. The 
particular features of each district, the mountains and rivers which 
subdivide it, are often most necessary to be known in study- 
ing popular movements or campaigns. But they must partly be 
described as we go on ; partly must be learnt from other books and 
maps. Some general facts, closely connected with this geography, 
must be kept in mind. The long eastern coast line has few indenta- Want of 
tions or harbours, and therefore the people did not readily take to harbours 
^ the sea or make their way to the Greek shore ; but on the west and ^'^ ^^^ 
south the outlets are more numerous, and therefore the dealings of ^^^^' 
the Italians with other nations were mostly to and from the west and 
south. Secondly, the Alps are easier of ascent from the north than 
I from the south, and thus migrations into Italy were frequent, 
i from Italy northwards almost unknown. Lastly, Italian history 
' for a long time deals with the struggles of peoples living on plains The divi- 
and by the sea— and therefore agricultural or mercantile — with sion into 
I tribes living in central mountains, who are therefore mainly pastoral f"ghland 
\ in their way of life, less settled, less civilised, and, accordingly, less ^" . ^"'' 
I capable of permanent progress and continuous dominion. In such peoples, 
j a struggle ultimate victory is usually with those who are the more 
I capable of civilisation, of progress in the arts and in material pros- 
perity, if they have the power or the good fortune to repel the first 
i assaults of the more hardy mountaineers. 



CHAPTER III 

INHABITANTS OF ITALY 

The inhabitants of Italy— Iberian and Ligurian tribes in Italy before the beginning 
of history— First to arrive the OSCANS and lAPYGlANS; followed by the 
Umbro-Latins, dividing into Umbrians and Latini— (2) The Sabellians 
or Sabines, which branch off as Samnites, Picentes, Peligni, and perhaps 
Marsi, Marrucini, and Vestini— The Samnites branch off into Frentani, 
Lucani, Apulia, Bruttium— (3) The ETRUSCANS, their occupation of the north 
basin of the Po, and partial occupation of the south— Their gradual expulsion 
by (3) the CELTS, who came over the Alps in various waves, whence North 
Italy is called Gallia Cisalpina, which includes the probably distinct tribes of 
the Ligures and Veneti— (4) The GREEK colonies in Southern Italy mingle with 
Oenotrians and Ausonians and Itali, but are eventually overrun by Bruttii, 
Lucani, and Apuli, who give their names to the districts. 

Early in- It is not the province of the historian of Rome to trace to remote 
habitants times, even were it possible to do so, the migrations of races. We 
of Italy. i-,ave to deal with Italy as it was from the eighth century B.C. down- 
themoutry '^^'^'"^^' ^"^ ^^''^ Origin of the various peoples inhabiting it need only 
■ be noticed so far as it helps to explain the state of things then 
actually existing, and the mutual relations of its various parts. Even 
the little that must be said here on this subject is encompassed by 
difficulties, and though we may believe ourselves to have a theory 
which, on the whole, reasonably accounts for many of the known 
facts, we must remember that direct evidence is exceedingly scanty, 
if, indeed, it may be said to exist, and that most statements are 
inferences drawn from researches made in a great variety of ways, 
and variously interpreted. 
Iberiam There is reason for believing that before the arrival of the Aryan 

and Ugur- peoples —that is, peoples speaking some variety of the languages 
"^''^- groui)e(l by philologists under this collective title— Italy was in- 

habited by liocrian and Ligurian tribes. Whether these were the 
aborigines of whom Livy and Dionysius speak we cannot be sure, 
but It seems probable that they were for the most part in occupation 
of the peninsula when the Umbro-Latin people arrived there. At 



CHAP. Ill lAPYGIANS, OPICI, UMBRIANS, SABELLIANS ii 

what time, in what order, and from what lands the new stocks 
came we cannot pretend to determine. The people farthest south, The lapy- 
the lapygians^ found in historical times in the extremity of Calabria, gians. 
were so Hellenised by Greek Colonists from Epirus, that it remains 
uncertain Whether they really came originally from the north (as 
some few words of their language which survive seem to indicate) or 
found their way there by sea. At any rate, in spite of this Hellenisa- 
tion, they retained in historical times sufficient peculiarities to mark 
them off from the other inhabitants of Italy. 

In the centre of Italy another race of men, whose language 
survived their conquest, is still to a certain extent known to us in 
extant inscriptions, and has certain affinities with Latin. These are The Osci 
the Osci or Opici, who appear to have occupied the district from or Opici. 
the borders of Latium and Campania to the Adriatic, and perhaps 
penetrated to Lucania and mingled with original inhabitants there, 
the Itali or Oenotrn, who are believed to have been of what is called 
Pelasgian,! that is, of old Greek, stock. 

Upon Italy, thus partly inhabited, came two other great invasions The Um- 
or immigrations. First the Umbro-Latins. Those of them who brians. 
took or retained the name of Umbrians ^ spread over the north 
central part of the peninsula from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian 
sea, including not only the district which afterwards preserved their 
name, but a considerable part of what was afterwards Etruria. The 
kindred Latini settled on the left bank of the Tiber in the small Latini of 
district afterwards known as Vetus Latiiun, bordered on the east Vetus 
and south by the Oscan tribes of Aeqtii, Hernici, and Volsci, who ^^^i^^' 
were afterwards included in the greater Latium, and whose language 
indicates either an original kinship or a subsequent amalgamation. 

Again another great family, classed sometimes under the general 
name of Sabellians, settled first on the high ground of the central The " Sad- 
Apennines. Hence they spread under various appellations in various elHansy 
directions. Thus the Sabmi occupied the district bounded on the 
north-west by the Tiber and its affluent the Nar, and bordering 
on the south upon the Latini. From them apparently came the 
Samnites, and occupied the mountain district of the Abruzzi down Samnites 
to Campania ; while the Peligni and Picentes, and perhaps the Peligni, 
Marsi^ Marrucini, and Vesthii — smaller offshoots of the same stock Picentes, 
— occupied some less extensive districts in Central and Eastern Italy. 
The Samnites became the most important of all, and extended their 

1 Who the Pelasgi were, of whom we hear in Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, 
and other writers is a vexed question. I here use the word as indicating inhabit- 
ants of Greece prior to the Hellenic settlers, whoever they may have been. 

2 Helbig identifies the Umbrians with the people who constructed the Swiss pile 
dwellings, and who afterwards constructed similar dwellings in the Italian lakes. 



HISTORY OF ROME char 



frrntam conciuests in various directions. One branch, c^W^d Frentam, 
Lucam, ' occupied a district on the Adriatic; while others gave their names 
'-//«''. to Lucania, Apulia, and Bruttium, which they gradually overran and 

^"'"'"'- occupied.^ . u .1 1 

Subsequently, as it appears, Italy was entered by another people, 

J A. I-frus- whose greatness is evident even from the scanty mformation which 

cans. we possess. The Etruscans, whom the Greeks called Tursenoi or 

Tyrrhenoi, and who apparently called themselves Ras or Rasenna, 

are first heard of as a " Pelasgic " tribe at the head of the Adriatic 

knd about the Rhaetian Alps. An ancient tradition brought them 

from Lydia, where there was a town Tvppa, the people of which 

AfytAical were called Tvpp-qvot or TvpprjfSot.'' Their real origin is shrouded 

ori^^infrom in mystery. Their language, as has now been ascertained, bears no 

Lydta. analogy to any other Indo-European dialect, and cannot help us to 

connect them with the other peoples of the peninsula.^ Yet their 

alphabet, and their religion and mythology, as represented on their 

Their con- tombs, indicate, if not unity of origin, at least very early intercourse 

nexion ^yith the Greeks. They appear to have come upon the Umbrian 

with other jj^ttlers after the discovery of the use of bronze, and before the middle 

andTreels ^^ ^^^^ eleventh century B.C. The district between the Po and the 

' Alps, bounded on the west by the Ligurians, would seem to have 

/// the basin been occupied by them entirely ; while south of the Po, between it 

of the Po. and the Apennines, there arose a mixed population of Etruscans and 

Umbrians. From the more northern of these two districts they 

were early displaced by an invasion or invasions of Celts. Their 

Driven occupation of the more southern district, between the Po and 

tnto the Apennines, was more prolonged ; but from this too they were 

htruria. j,^ tj^^g displaced, and established themselves farther south still, 

in tlic country which ultimately retained their name, stretching from 

1 The generally received ethnology of the Sabellians may be thus tabulated : — 
(Sabellians.) 
Sabini. 
1^ 

. r I I 1 

Samitites. Peligni. Picentes. {'>. Marsi,Marrucini,Vesiini.) 



I ^1 

Frentant, Lucant, Apuli, Bruttii. 

It must not be supposed, however, that these " Sabellian " races are to be clearly 
distinguished, cither by language or national characteristics, from the Oscans. The 
Bruttii, for instance, are said to have derived their name from the Oscan word 
for a runaway slave, Brutt or Brett (Strabo vi. i. 4; Diodor. xvi. 15). 

2 An Ktruscan inscription found in the island of Lemnos (1886) has been 
held to confirm their Aegean, and perhaps Asian, origin (Thucyd. iv. 109). 

8 The discovery of a great part of an Etruscan book on a linen mummy- 
wrai^KT m 1891 has still farther shown the isolated nature of the language 



Ill ETRUSCANS AND LIGURIANS 13 

the Apennines to the Tiber. 1 They were a commercial people, 
and early became celebrated for their work in bronze and iron. Their em- 
Their corsairs infested the seas round Italy, and their merchants ployments, 
competed with those of the Greek communities established on the ««^ <^^«- 
coasts, at first in combination with the great Semitic traders of "^^/f^!^ 
Carthage, whose jealous rivalry at a later time curtailed their ex- f/^^e^ 
tension, and eventually contributed largely to the weakness which 
ended in their absorption by the growing power of Latium under 
the leadership of Rome. When at the height of their power their 
activity was shown, among other things, by their settlements in Their 
Campania,^ which were wrung from them by the Samnites about B.C. settleinents 
424-420, much about the same time as their commerce was crippled "^ ^'^^' 
, by the rising power of the Syracusans, while they were being hard f'^^^^"" 
\ pressed also by Celtic attacks in the north. From the time of the 
fall of Melpum, which is said to have taken place in the same year 
^ as the fall of Veil (391), they were almost entirely confined to the 
! district known as Etruria.^ 

North of the Apennines, between them and the Alps, lived the 
so-called Celtic tribes of the Gauls, who one after the other The " Cel- 
sought the rich basin of the Po from the overcrowded regions tic" Gauls. 
I beyond the Alps, or the northern slopes of the Alps themselves. 
' They expelled the Etruscans, took possession of their land, and 

gave their name to the district. 
I One part of North Italy they did not overrun. In the extreme The Ligur- 

j north-west, between the upper Po and the sea, from Nicaea to Luna, ians. 
the Ligurians had lived from time immemorial. Whether they were 
connected in blood with the Gauls who came into Italy, or were, as 
( seems most probable, allied with the Aquitani of Caesar and their 
I descendants the modern Basques, is a question which we have not 
full means of deciding. Some of their customs and characteristics 
I agree with those of the Gauls, and they seem at first to have main- 
j tained friendly relations with the tribes that came over the Alps. 
j On the other hand, Polybius distinguishes between Gauls, Iberians, 
j and Ligurians ; and Strabo states that they were of a different 
I 

ii The cities in Gallia Cisalpina believed to be of Etruscan origin, the names 
of which are known, are Felsina (Bononia), il/a«/«a, Adria, Melpum (? Milan), 
J Ravenna, and perhaps Adria in Picenum, with Cupra. 

1 2 The cities in Campania believed to be Etruscan were Capula, Nola, Pompeii, 

I Herculaneum, Stirrentum, Marcina, Salernum. 

I 3 Etruria thus constituted wacs regarded as a league of twelve cities, which 
perhaps varied in number from time to time. Those certain are Tarquinii, 
Veil, Volsinii, Clusium, Volaterrae, Vetulonia, Perusia, Cortona, Arretium. As 
to the other three there was apparently a variation. Among those sometimes 
named are Caere, Falerii, Faesulae, Rusellae, Pisae, Volci (Livy iv. 23; 
Strabo v. 2, 9; Dionys. vi. 75). 



14 



HISTORY OF ROME 



from 



the Gauls, though resembling them in their manner of 



hfe.i 



The Gallic 
immigra- 
tions — 
I.an'i and 
I.ebccii. 
Insubres. 



Cenomani. 
I 'eneti. 



Ananes, 
Boii, Lin- 
gones, 
Senones, 
Salluvii. 

Displace- 
ment of 
Etruscans 
and Um- 
brians. 

Description 
of the 
Gauls. 



According to Polybius,^ the first tribes that crossed the Alps 
and settled on the left bank of the Po nearest its source were the 
Laevi and Lebecii, though Livy^ counts the Laevi among Ligurian 
tribes, and calls the latter Libui. Next came the Insubres, M\^ 
largest tribe of all, whom Livy describes as a mixed host of Bituriges, 
and six other tribes led by Bellovisus, a nephew of the king of the 
Bituriges, about the time of Tarquinius Priscus. But he somewhat 
absurdly accounts for their adopting the name of Insubres from the 
fact of finding a district called by that name which they had known 
as belonging to a canton of the Haedui. It seems more likely that 
the Insubres were, as Polybius says, a Gallic tribe who brought their 
name with them to this district, of which Mediolanum became the 
capital, and that Livy's story of Bellovisus and his mixed host is only 
a tradition of a second immigration, perhaps invited by the original 
settlers. These were followed by the Cenojnani, who also settled on 
the right bank of the Po, but more to the east, bordering on the 
Vnieti, who had been long established on the shore of the Adriatic 
between Aquileia and the mouths of the Po, their territory being 
bounded on the west by the river Athesis. These last were allied in 
race to the Celts, but differed from them both in language and dress. 
South of the Po settled the Ananes ; next them the Bou ; and next, 
on the coast of the Adriatic, the Lingones ; and south of these the 
Senones. Livy mentions, besides these, the Salhivii, who settled 
on the left bank of the Po near the Ticinus. 

By these invasions the Etruscans were gradually thrust out of 
the district between the Po and the Alps, and both Etruscans and 
Umbrians from the district between the Po and the Apennines. 
Those communities which remained had to submit to the Gauls, 
and either dwindled away or became absorbed. 

The Gauls themselves are described to us as being in a very 
primitive state of civilisation. They cared for nothing but "war and 
agriculture," by which last is meant not the cultivation of the land, 
but the pasturing and breeding of cattle. They raised no fortifications, 
but lived in open villages or collections of huts, in which were no 
cumbrous articles of furniture. Their beds were mere heaps of straw 
or leaves ; and their only wealth was cattle and gold, which could be 
easily moved from place to place. They do not appear to have as yet 
fallen under the influence, half ecclesiastical and half legal, which 
Caesar found prevailing in Transalpine Gaul under the direction of 

n /. ^"^-fA f ■•• ^.''■^^° "• 5- ^8. Polybius uses KeW and sometimes 
raAarac or all Gauls md.fferently ; he never applies either term to the Ligurians. 
" P^'>'^^- "■ ^5-17. 3 Livy V. 35. 



Ill THE ITALIAN GAULS 15 

the Druids. 1 A chief or king indeed commanded his tribe ; but his 
authority rested on his personal influence, his reputation as a warrior, 
or his skill in stirring his unruly subjects by his harangues. The 
men of chief power in the tribes were those who by fear or affection 
attached to their persons the largest number of followers or clients ; 
and though the chiefs could lead their tribes to the field or on a 
foray, they could not persuade them to endure the fatigue of a long 
siege or the dangers of a prolonged campaign. Bold, restless, 
and undisciplined, these tall, blue - eyed, flaxen - haired warriors '-^ 
scoured the countries far and wide through which they marched, or 
in which they set up their quarters. But they had not the qualities 
which enable conquerors to make durable settlements. The plunder, 
which they successfully drove or carried off" in their raids, was not 
unfrequently destroyed in the quarrels which attended its division ; 
and if they behaved like gallant warriors on the field, their victory 
was often followed by scenes of brutal drunkenness and barbaric 
gluttony. 2 They had, in fact, the virtues and vices of savages. 
Improvements and developments even in the art of war they disliked 
or neglected. They preferred to enter a battlefield half naked, trust- 
ing to their strength or their agility, and hoping to terrify their enemy 
by their hideous yells, the blare of their horns and trumpets, or the 
barbaric splendour of their ornaments.* Their swords were poor 
weapons, only fit for a down stroke, without point for thrusting, and 
of such bad material that they were often useless after the first 
blow. 5 Yet they were also good horsemen, and early adopted the 
use of the chariot in war. They were able to shift their quarters 
with astonishing speed ; and being used to support themselves on the 
produce of pillage, could live wherever they could find cattle to be 
killed or to supply them with milk. It is not surprising that such a 
people should spread terror wherever they went, through Europe and 
Asia, nor that they should have failed to establish stable kingdoms 
or states. They could win battles, but not a campaign ; they could 
burn and pillage, they could not build up or organise. 

1 Caes. B. G. v. 11-14. 

2 This description of the Gauls in North Italy does not suit those whom we call 
" Celts." Yet it is confirmed by every ancient writer who speaks of them, and 
seems to prove that they were generally of the stock of the Belgic Gauls, nearly 
allied to the Teutons. The most important account of them, next to that in 
Polybius ii. 17, is in Diodorus v. 25-32. The best modern account is Helbig's 
Die Italiker in der Poebene. 

3 Polyb. ii, 17, 19. 4 Polyb. ii. 29. 

5 Ensis is the stabbing sword in Latin ; gladius, the cutting sword, is said to be 
a Celtic word, found in the old Irish claideh. The light spear, lancea, is also said 
by Diodorus (v. 30) to be a Gallic word, but by Varro (Aul. Gell. xv, 30) is declared 
to be Spanish. 



i6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The Greeks 
in Italy. 



Names of 

Greek 

towns: 

(I) In 
Vetus 
Italia. 



Strabo, writing shortly before the Christian era, says of Magna 
Graecia, that with the exception of Tarentum, Rhegium, and Naples 
it had all become de-Hellenised (tK^ejSap/^apwo-^ai) • Cicero in his 
dialogue on Friendship puts into the mouth of Laelius, supposed to 
be speaking in B.C. 129, the remark that "Magna Graecia once 
flourishing was now utterly destroyed" {deleta est). But up to the 
time of the Punic wars, though their decadence had been long 
progressing, these Hellenic towns were sufficiently important to 
demand a place in an account of the inhabitants of the Italian 
peninsula. They never, indeed, fully amalgamated with their neigh- 
bours. They remained exotics, Italiotae and not Itali. Their 
settlement had been for the purposes of trade, or to relieve some 
over-populated town in Greece ; but though they succeeded for a time 
in Hellenising some districts in Italy, they had brought with them 
the habit, which had ever been the curse of Hellenism, of jealous 
separation and frequent war between town and town, as well as 
internal feuds in the several cities themselves.^ 

These towns may be conveniently placed in three groups. Those 
in Vetus Italia, that is, in parts of Lucania or Bruttium, those in 
lapygia, and those north of Vetus Italia. 

I. The towns in Vetus Italia were Sybaris, an Achaean colony 
of B.C. 720, from which were founded Metapontimi^ about 700- 
680; Posidonia (Paestum), about 600; and Lans and Scidriis, 
in which the remnants of the Sybarites took refuge at the time of 
the destruction of their town (510); Crotona, also an Achaean 
colony of about 710, from which were founded Terina and Caiilonia^ 
perhaps with additional colonists from the mother country. From 
Locri Epizephyrii, a colony of the Ozolian Locrians (about 710), 
came Hipponitim and Medma. Siris, probably an Ionian colony 
about 690-660, was believed by some to have been originally settled 
by fugitives from Troy. The stream of Hellenic settlers had long 
ceased to flow towards Italy, at any rate with its old strength, when 
the last two Greek colonies were formed in this district. These were 
Thurii, a mixed colony, promoted by Pericles, and consisting partly 
of a remnant of the old Sybarites, partly of settlers from Athens and 
various cities in Peloponnese, sent out in the spring of 443 : and 
Heracleia, founded in B.C. 432 by a mixed body from Tarentum 
and Thurii. =^ 

1 The term Magna Graecia is first found in the writings of Polybius Uara Av 
MevaAnv -EAXaSa n. 39) ; but he uses it as a well-known designation; and it had 
hal^'^S r.h''? 'T' ''";! ^^V^^y^'^ to indicate the Greek colonies in Southern 
a si hnftht Hn"'" '' } '™'' "^ '"^^^^" "^'^"'' '^^ ^^"^^ '^^ Greek cities in Sicily 
'''°i '.:l h! tlirX^Fr^:}^}^^^ ^-^ ^^^ g--al practice. 



Besides these Greek colonies there 



not colonies. 



were certain other towns which, though 



more or less Hellenised, Skylletium or Skylacium, which 



MAGNA GRAECIA 17 



2. In lAPYGiAthe chief town was Tarentum, colonised by Spartans (2) In 
in 708, which rose to great wealth, and became notorious for the ^apygia. 
luxury of its citizens. Callipolis, also founded from Sparta, with the 
assistance of the Tarentines. - The Sallentifn, who inhabited several 
cities, one of which was Veretiun, at the extreme heel of Italy, were 
believed to be of Cretan origin, as were also Brundisiimi, Hyria^ 

and Hydruntum; but to these towns, though always mentioned as 
undoubtedly Greek, or with the inhabitants at least partly Greek, we 
cannot assign with certainty either time or place of origin. 

3. Of Greek towns north of Bruttium or Vetus Italia, the (j) North 
most ancient of all Greek colonies was that of Ciimae^ the founda- </ ^^«/- 
tion of which was placed, though without good evidence, in 1050. A ^'"'"* 
joint colony from Cyme in Aeolis and the Chalcidians of Euboea, 

it rapidly rose to wealth and power, and long governed a considerable 
district of Campania. From this, combined with fresh colonists 
from Chalcis and Athens, probably came the colony of Palaepolis or 
Neapolis (the name changing with a change of locality), which 
eventually became the most important city in the district. Velia or 
Elea, established by Phocaeans, in 544, who fled before the victorious 
general of Cyrus, became famous for a school of philosophy founded 
by Xenophanes (about 540-520) and Parmenides (about 480-460). 
Pyxus (afterwards Bitxentinn) was probably at first a colony of Siris, 
supplemented by settlers from Rhegium in 470. 

So long as these Greek cities had only to deal with the Oenotrian Causes of 
inhabitants of South Italy, who were themselves probably of Pelasgic ^'*'^''' ^<^ 
or old-Greek origin, they seem to have experienced little difficulty in '^^''"'' 
uniting and living at peace with them. They were active in trade; 
learning and philosophy found congenial homes among them; and 
they rapidly became both wealthy and powerful. Some of them 
became also notorious for their luxury, it being reported, for instance, 
that at Tarentum there were more public festivals than days in the 
year; while Sybaris furnished a word for a debauchee which has 
never been forgotten. This may have contributed to the decline of 
Magna Graecia, but a more potent cause was the quarrelsomeness 
habitual to Greek states, both of town with town, and of parties 
within the several towns themselves. Thus a revolution in Sybaris, 
which made Talys its tyrant and drove out a number of the oli- 
garchical party, led to a war with Croton, which had offered the 

according to some was an Athenian colony; Pandosia, which appears to have 
been an important Oenotrian town, and afterwards to have received Greek 
settlers, perhaps from Crotcna ; Petelia, a town of the Oenotrian Chones, and for 
some time subject to Crotona ; Temesa, an Ausonian city, believed to have been also 
colonised by Aetolians, but at any rate Hellenised, and at one time under the power 
of the Locrians. 



i8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



exiles its hospitality, the result of which was the ent.re destruction 
„ Sylaris ('.o) And this was followed by a genera revolu 
tionary movement in several cities. The details as well as the 




't:* 



2_!£_ 



ROMAN MILES 



13° 



Helleiiized Towns underlined. ..Siponttim 



I'.ast ot 14 Circenwicl 



ll^alkcr Gr BoutalL tc 



origin of it arc obscure ; but it took the form of an outbreak against 
the followers of the mysterious philosopher Pythagoras, who had 
spent the last part of his life in Croton, and whose disciples in their 



DECADENCE OF MAGNA GRAECIA 



various clubs or schools in many of the towns of Magna Graecia 
appear to have combined with philosophy some sort of association 
for the maintenance of political power in the hands of the upper 
classes. Not long after the fall of Sybaris, therefore, there seems 
to have been a very general uprising of the democratic party in the 
several towns. The Pythagorean schools or club-houses were burnt, The burn- 
and great disorder and confusion prevailed. At length an appeal ing of the 
was made to the Achaeans, who had been long living under the ^y^^^'' 
government of a League of twelve cities/ enjoyed a high reputa-^T^^f 
tion for justice in Greece, and were also the original authors of 
several of the Hellenic colonies in Italy ; and the result of this arbitra- 
tion was an attempt for a time to unite the Greek colonies by a 
somewhat similar League. But the arrangement, if it worked at all, 
was very short-lived. There is no trace in the mention of the 
Italiots by Thucydides of any common action on their part ; and the 
history of the dissensions of Thurii (443-413), with the bloody Thurii. 
quarrels which characterised its earliest years and the alternate 
exclusion of the democratic and oligarchical parties in the next 
generation, offers a specimen of one of the causes constantly at 
work to weaken and destroy Hellenism in Italy. This was followed 
I by the more obvious dangers arising from external attack. One 
I of the chief sources of these was the jealousy of the Siceliots, 
: especially of Dionysius of Syracuse (405-367). For a time this Defeat of 

danger drew the Italian cities together. A general League was Italian 
I formed to resist Dionysius, but proved ineffectual; and its com- ^'^'^'^•^.'^•^ 
I bined forces were defeated in a great battle near Caulonia, on the ^°"^y^^^^' 
j river Helorus. This was followed by the emigration of a large 
I number of Caulonians to Syracuse, and by the siege and submission 
I of Rhegium (about 393-391). But Dionysius was not their only 
enemy. They were being hard pressed about the same time by 
J the incursions of the Umbrian tribes of Lucani, Bruttii, and Apuli. The inva- 
I The Lucani first attacked Posidonia, next Tarentum, and the towns ^i<^"^ ^/ the 

immediately round it, and then overran the territory of Thurii, ^^'^^^^^ 
j and defeated its army. This was followed about 356 by incursions '^ Jl' /• 
j of Bruttii, who captured Terina and Hipponium, and devastated the 
j districts of Rhegium, Locri, and Croton. Harassed within and 
I without, the Greek cities of Italy, like those in Greece, sought help 
! from foreign princes, — from Archidamus, king of Sparta, against the 
j Lucani (338) ; from Alexander, king of the Molossi, against Samnites Ruin of 
and Lucani combined (332) ; from Cleonymus of Sparta against the Ma^na 
Lucani and Metapontum (303) . But the final result was that the Bruttii, Graecia. 
Lucani, and Apuli became the prevailing inhabitants of Southern 



1 Herod, ii. 145. 



HISTORY OF ROME chap, hi 



Italv, and gave their names to districts in it. The Greek cities had 
not 'ceased to exist, or in the main to be Greek, but independence and 
Hellenism were alike disappearing. Their appeal for foreip help 
had also brought upon them another power external to all alike; and 
when, linallv, Tarentum asked the help of Pyrrhus (280) it was not 
acrainst Apu'lians or Lucanians, but against Rome. The loss of in- 
dependence which followed ^N-as consummated by the rum of many 
of the towns during the Hannibalian war, and their replenishment, 
not by Greek but Roman colonists, till Hellenism in South Italy, 
except in the three towns of Tarentum, Rhegium, and Neapolis, 
became a mere memorj- of the past. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE ORIGIN OF ROME 

Origin of Rome — Heroic legends of its foundation — Settlement of Aeneas in 
Italy — His wars with the Rutuli — His supremacy over the Prisci Latini — His 
son removes to Alba from Lavinium — The Alban kings — The two sons of 
Proca, Numitor and Amulius-^The birth of Romulus and Remus, and their 
education by shepherds — They restore their grandfather Numitor to the throne 
of Alba — Their foundation of a new city — Death of Remus — Romulus founds 
the city on the Palatine and calls it ROME — The gradual extension of the 
Palatine city to include the Septimontium — The Roman era B.C. 753. 

Every people that has risen to be of importance has had heroic The heroic 
legends connected with its origin or its early struggles. As the ^c^^nds of 
English chroniclers, it is impossible to say on what ground, referred fo«nd- 
the first settlement of Britain to Brute the Trojan, so the Roman ^^;J 
annalists, or the Greek historians for them, invented or pieced to- 
gether the legend of Aeneas. 

When Troy was taken, they said, Aeneas with his father and Aeneas. 
son and a considerable band of followers escaped from the burning 
city, and sailed away in search of a land destined by the fates for 
him and his descendants. After trying in vain to find this promised 
; land in Macedonia and in Sicily, he at last reached the Italian shore 
I near Laurentum, some few miles south of the Tiber. The Trojans, 
j who in their long voyage had suffered much from a scarcity of pro- 
visions, began to plunder the country round, in which Latinus was 
' ruling over a people called Aborigines. The king mustered his 
1 forces and came out to repel the marauders ; but he was worsted 
in the field, and therefore made peace with the newcomers ; and, as 
j the wife of Aeneas had perished in the escape from Troy, he gave 
him his daughter Lavinia in marriage, and granted him land whereon 
, to found a city. Aeneas called his new city Lavinium, after his wife 
Lavinia, and begat a son called Ascanius. Then followed wars with 
' the neighbouring nation of the Rutuli, whose king Turnus had been 
' affianced to Lavinia. Neither side was wholly victorious, yet the 



22 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Alba - 
Longa. 



Birth of 
Romulus 
and 
Remus. 



Rutuli found it necessary to retire across the Tiber and join 
Mezentius, the king of Caere in Etruria. But in the course of the 
struggle king Latinus had fallen, and Aeneas now reigned over his 
people, whom he called Latini in his honour. He ruled well and 
wisely, and the Trojans and Latini rapidly became one people, 
strong enough to repel the attacks of the Etruscans, the most power- 
ful nation in all Italy. At length he fell in a great battle against 
them, and his grateful people buried him by the river Numicus, and 
worshipped him under the name of Jupiter Indiges. 

His son Ascanius succeeded him in his kingdom, and presently 
quitted Lavinium, which was becoming crowded, and founded Alba 
Longa to receive the surplus population. His power was so great 
that the Etruscans made terms with him, and agreed that the Albula, 
afterwards called the Tiber, should be the frontier of their respective 
dominions. A long list of kings reigning at Alba succeeded him— 
Silvius, Aeneas Silvius, Latinus Silvius, Alba, Atys, Capys, Capetus, 
Tiberinus (whose drowning in the Albula gave the name to the river), 
Agrippa, Romulus Silvius, Aventinus, Proca. 

Now Proca had two sons, Numitor and Amulius. To Numitor, 
as the elder, the royal power descended; but his brother Amulius 
gathered a party round him, drove Numitor from the throne, killed 
all his male offspring, and, under pretence of doing him honour, 
doomed his race to extinction by making his daughter Rea Silvia a 
Vestal, bound to virginity. Nevertheless Rea brought forth twin sons, 
of whom the god Mars was father. Amulius doomed the mother to 
perpetual imprisonment, and ordered the boys to be thrown into the 
Tiber. The servant to whom the destruction of the children was 
entrusted carried them away to the then deserted region which lay 
between the Palatine Mount and the Tiber; and, as the river was 
overflowing its banks, contented himself with placing the vessel in 
which they lay in the shallow flood water. The river presently sank 
back to its ordinary channel, and the children were left on dry land, 
at the foot of a tree, long afterwards preserved and called the Ficus 
Ruminalis, " the fig of suckling." A she-wolf that had lost her cubs, 
attracted by the cry of the children, and impelled by the pain of her 
distended udder, gave them suck; and presently a shepherd named 
Faustulus, who had watched the wolf often going and coming to the 
place, found the boys, and took them to his wife Laurentia, who 
brought them up and called them Romulus and Remus. When they 
grew to manhood they made themselves conspicuous among the 
neighbouring shepherds for their gallant bearing, and their prowess 
in repelling robbers, and rescuing the flocks and herds which were 
being driven oif. Some of these robbers determined to be revenged ; 
they therefore lay in wait for the brothers when they were engaged 



IV LEGEND OF ROMULUS 23 

in a rustic festival on the Palatine, instituted many years before by 
the Arcadian Evander. Komulus managed to escape capture ; but 
Remus was taken, and, beings carried before Amulius, was accused 
of having plundered the land of the king's brother Numitor. To 
save Remus the shepherd Faustulus imparted to Romulus the secret 
of his birth ; who, collecting the shepherds round about, prepared to 
rescue his brother. Meanwhile Numitor had seen and questioned 
Remus, and had himself come to the conclusion that the twins 
were his grandsons. Thus from more than one quarter at once an 
attack was prepared against Amulius. He was killed, and Numitor 
was restored to the throne of Alba. 

But the boys, though they had restored their grandfather, had They quit 
been so used to rule that they could not tamely settle down to the Alba and 
position of subjects. Moreover, there were again more inhabitants ^^""^ ^ 
in Alba and Lavinium than there was well room for. They therefore p'^T^ ^ 
determined to found a new city. And what better site than those 
hills, near which they had been exposed for death as infants, and 
about which they had dwelt with shepherds as young men? But a 
new city must have a founder and a name-hero : which of the two 
should he be? As none knew which of them was the elder, they 
determined to settle the difficulty by an appeal to augury. Romulus 
took up his position on the Palatine, Remus on the Aventine, to 
watch for omens. They proved ambiguous. Remus was the first 
to see a flight of six vultures ; but, just as his companions were 
announcing this favourable declaration of the gods, Romulus sighted 
double the number. Both therefore claimed to have been divinely 
selected to be founder, and in the quarrel that ensued Remus was 
killed; or, as some said, when Romulus, acting on the omens, had 
begun to build the city walls, Remus in derision leapt over them and 
fell by the spear of his angry brother. Thus Romulus became the 
founder of Rome, and proceeded to build his fortifications on the 
1 Palatine, where he had been brought up. Within these walls he 
j gathered all that he could collect round about to join the settlers 
I from Alba and Lavinium, and gave them laws. 



I Whatever the origin of this famous legend, whether some real The city 
* tradition, or some ancient ballad handed down among the pastoral o/the 
j folk who once fed their flocks about the seven hills, or deliberately P(^^<^t^ne. 
\ invented, as some think, by late Greek sophists, there seems to be 
this truth at the bottom of it, that on the Palatine was the first 
township or fortress, established originally by a shepherd - folk, 
j which gradually grew to be Rome. This is attested first of all 
: by the remains of the ancient Roma Quadrata, still to a small 
extent visible, and much more evident in the time of Tacitus ; by 



24 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



the existence in historical times of the festival of the Lupercalia 
(15th February) on the Palatine, which was a pastoral ceremony of 
purification or "beating the bounds" of the old city;i and of the 
Palilia (2 1 St April), a festival of the rustic goddess Pales, to celebrate 
its foundation ; and again, by the well-established position of two^of 
the gates in the original wall, the Porta Mugionis (" gate of lowing ), 
somewhat to the east of the present entrance to the Palatine from 
the road above the Forum, and the Porta Romanula ("gate of the 
river"), which was reached by steps from the Velabrum, near the 



ROME 

with the Walls of Servius 

ROMAN FEET 



'he four regions. 

^\\-^^ I. Suburana 
rS5J^^^^- Esquilina 
'^ III. CoUina 

<- m IV. Palatina 

^^^<^-^*I 




modern church of S. Giorgio in Velabro, on the north side of 
the Palatine.2 Thus the course of the Pomoenum of the ancient 
city may be traced with tolerable certainty. ^ 

But this city did not all at once expand into the greater city 
enclosed by the Servian walls. Before that there were several ex- 

1 varro Z. Z v 13. " Varro, L. L. v. 164. 165. 

3 Lancikni M««>«^ Rome, ch. ii. ) thinks also that archaeological discoveries 
have proved that a shepherd community came from Alba to the site of Rome 
(which he derives from roumon, ' ' a river " ) in search of better and safer pasture 
when the eruptions of the volcano, of which the Alban lake is the crater, made 
the neighbourhood of Alba insecure. 



IV ROMA QUADRATA 25 

tensions of the bounds, even, it was believed, in the lifetime of the The Septi- 
founder. Livy tells us that the city increased by gradual inclusion montimn. 
of one spot after another, although there were not as yet citizens 
enough to fill them.^ But the new enclosures would hardly be made 
unless they were in some way needed. The simplest explanation 
is that on each of these spots there were cottages or hamlets, the 
inhabitants of which desired to be under the protection of the city, 
and that they were accordingly united to the wall on the Palatine by 
loop walls, which, though of lighter construction, were yet of use 
against marauders, or perhaps by ditches or fossae, such as the 
fossa Quiritium attributed to Ancus, Enclosures so made would 
naturally contain considerable vacant spaces, and this would account 
for the tradition followed by Livy that the city included a greater 
amount of ground than there were citizens to fill. The gradual 
additions appear to have been commemorated by the " festival of 
the seven mounts," septwiontitun^ which, Varro says, was not a festival 
of the whole people, but only of the Montani, which may plausibly 
be held to mean the inhabitants of the Mons Palatinus and its six 
adjuncts, and perhaps originally only those of the Palatine itself.^ 
These inferior fortifications would naturally disappear when the Servian 
wall was built, streets and buildings taking their place, and a united 
town, irregular in its arrangement, was the result. 

That a similar fort or township existed at the same time on at The 
least one of the other hills is not improbable in itself, and has been Quirinal. 
inferred from the existence of a Capitolmm veins, with a sanctuary 
of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva on the Quirinal, prior to that on the 
Mons Capitolinus ; from the double worship of Mars on the Palatine 
and Quirinal ; from the existence of two primitive colleges both of 
the Salii and the Luperci, one connected with the Palatine, the other 
with the Quirinal; and lastly, from the indications that the inhabit- 
ants of the Mons Palatinus and Collis Quirinalis were distinguished 
by the names Montani and Collmi, " mount men " and " hill men " ; 
whence we have the Porta Collma, the Salii Collini opposed to the 
Salii Palatini, and the tribus Collina in the Servian division. 

In the absence of all means of arriving at a certainty as to the The 

date of the founding of the Palatine city, we must be content to Roman 

accept the traditional calculation. If walls were built, whether ^''^• 

753- 

1 i. 8, alia atque alia adpetendo loca. 

2 Mommsen (i. 52) identifies the six suburbs with the Velia (connecting the 
Palatine and Esquiline) ; the Cermalus (the slope of the Palatine towards the 
Capitoline) ; the three points of the Esquiline — the Fagutal, Oppius, and Cespius ; 
and the Subura (between the Esquiline and Quirinal). The festival of Septi- 
montium was celebrated down to a late date, but its cause was indistinctly 
remembered, and it was vaguely supposed to refer to the seven hills of the later 
and larger Rome. 



26 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

round an uninhabited hill-top, marked out for the first time by the 
ploughshare of the founder, or round a village community that had 
gradually been growing there, and now received the defences neces- 
sary for its existence in such times and with such neighbours, it is 
clear that there must have been some year and day in which they 
were begun. The Greek and Roman antiquaries and annalists who 
ventured upon the calculation arrived at different conclusions, but 
not as widely different as might have been expected. The Greeks 
usually accommodated it to their chronology by observing the coin- 
cidence of events with the Eponymous archons of Athens, the 
Olympic victors, or the priestesses of Here at Argos ; or reckoned 
the years (generally 408) from the fall of Troy to the first 
Olympic festival (B.C. 776). By what means they made the reigns 
of Aeneas and the Alban kings fit into the required period we cannot 
tell ; but the result was that the foundation of Rome was assigned by 
most of them to the second year of the seventh Olympiad (b.c. 751). 
Timaeus, indeed, declared it to have taken place in the thirty-eighth 
year before the first Olympiad (B.C. 813) ; but Polybius, apparently 
on the authority of documents in the custody of the Pontifices, 
arrived at the date Olympiad 7.2 (b.c. 751). 

The Romans themselves do not appear to have used the founda- 
tion of the city as an era until late in the first century B.C. They 
dated the years by the names of the consuls as they appeared in 
the Fasti, and if they calculated from any epoch at all it was 
usually from the first year of the Republic. Thus, if the list of con- 
suls in the Fasti for the years before the capture of the city in B.C. 
390 were to be trusted, it was easy enough to count the years from 
any given event to the year of the expulsion of the kings, and we 
should have no difficulty in assigning that event to the year B.C. 510. 
But, unfortunately, the Fasti for the period between the expulsion of 
Tarquin and B.C. 390 were far from being certain or regular, and 
therefore the exactness of the calculation must remain doubtful. We 
need not, however, think it to be seriously wrong, and from B.C. 390 
downwards the lists are as certain as we can hope anything so far 
back to be. If we accept, then, as the date of the regifugium the 
year of the city 244 (b.c. 510), we see that for the regal period the 
Roman antiquaries had nothing for it but to count backward the 
sum of the years traditionally assigned to each reign. This gave 
244. Cato, indeed, made another calculation, starting from the fall 
of Troy, and arrived at a result which would make the year of the 
foundation answer to B.C. 752 ; while the poet Ennius, writing about 
B.C. 172, speaks of Rome having been founded roughly 700 years before, 
which would agree more nearly with the era of Timaeus than with 
any other. The computation that eventually prevailed was that of 



THE ROMAN ERA 27 



Varro, which was accepted by the most learned Romans of the day, 
such as Cicero and Atticus. - He assigned the foundation to the 
spring of the third year of the sixth Olympiad, which, according to 
the usual calculation, answers to the year B.C. 753. From thence- 
forward this was the official era ; and in a.d. 47 the hidi secular es 
were held on the ground that it was the Sooth year of the city. 
Even the day of the first act of foundation was believed to be fixed, 
and was commemorated on the first day of the pastoral festival, the 
Palilia^ the 21st of April (xi. Kal. Mai).i 

1 Dionys. i. 74; Cic. de Rep. 2, ^ 18; Varro, R. R. iii. i; Ovid, Fast. iv. 
721; Plutarch, Rom. 12; Tacitus, Ann. xi. 11. The authorities for the early 
legends are Livy and Dionysius, and Plutarch's Life of Romulus. The sources 
from which they drew, and other scattered records which we possess, are discussed 
at the end of chap, v. 



CHAPTER V 

THE REGAL PERIOD 

753-510 

The situation of Rome — Latium, its different meanings — RoMULUS, 753-716 
— ^The foundation of the city and earliest institutions — The joint reign 
with Titus Tatius— Laws of Romulus, and his death— Numa Pompilius, 
his religious institutions and laws — The temple of Vesta and the Regia; the 
fiamens, vestals, and Salii— His calendar— TULLUS HOSTILIUS— The de- 
struction of Alba Longa— Wars with the Sabines— The Horatii and 
Curiatii — Provocatio — Ancus Marcius — Makes the sacra known to all — 
Wars with the Latins — The jus fetiale — The pons sublicius and fossa Quiritium 
— L. Tarquinius Priscus— His arrival from Tarquinii, begins temple on 
Capitoline, city walls, circus maximus, and cloacae — His murder — Servius 
TULLIUS, the agger and completion of town walls— His reforms, the four 
tribes, and the 193 centuries distributed in five classes — The comitia curiata 
and comitia centuriata — The object and results of his reform — The patricians 
and plebeians— His first census— His death— Tarquinius Superbus— His 
oppression of the Senate — His wars with the Volscians— Capture of Gabii — 
His works in Rome and his colonies — The Sibyl — Embassy to Delphi — Siege 
of Ardea — The story of Lucretia — Expulsion of the Tarquins — The credibility 
of the legends — The authorities on which they rest — Their value. 

The advan- THE advantages of the situation of Rome both for security and com- 
tageoiis merce, in being at some distance from the sea and yet having a 
^Rome^" convenient access to it, are noticed by Cicero and attributed by him 
to the wisdom of its founder. About eighteen miles from the mouth 
of the Tiber, it was sufficiently far from the sea to be safe from 
sudden surprises by a piratic fleet, while the river afforded an easy 
highway for its merchandise. The amphitheatre of hills which 
encloses the meadows in the bend of the river, which afterwards 
became the Campus Martins, varying from 120 to 180 feet above 
the stream, offered heights sufficiently elevated and abrupt for forti- 
fication, yet without difficulties for the builder or cultivator. On the 
opposite or right bank of the river a chain of low hills, extending for 
about a mile and a half, afforded a protection from the north ; while 



CHAP. V VETUS LATIUM 29 

on both sides of the river there was an excellent line of country for 
connecting the capital with its harbour. 

The district in which it stood was called Latium. But Latium, The 
in the later acceptation of the term, was not, when Rome began, peoples of 
inhabited entirely by Latins. The Aequi lived in the north-east Latmm. 
corner of it, a hilly district beyond Tibur {Tivoli). To the west the 
Volsci and Aurunci held nearly half of it, with a coast-line stretching 
from Antium to Sinuessa. Between the Aequi and Volsci dwelt the 
Hernici. Even in the remaining portions to the west, bounded on 
the north by the Tiber, there were other tribes besides the Latins. 
The Rutuli inhabited Ardea and its neighbourhood, about twenty 
miles south of Rome ; and even the people of Aricia, afterwards the 
first stage on the Appian Way, only fifteen miles from Rome, were 
said to be of a different stock. Up the river the Latins extended 
for about twelve miles to Crustumerium, which, according to some 
writers, was partly a Sabine town ; while some of the territory of "the 
Aequi, from Antium to Circeii, had once been occupied by them. 
But from this they had been driven out or had been absorbed by the 
Aequi; and on the whole the Latini, who were afterwards to give 
their name to the larger tract of country reaching as far south as 
Sinuessa, were in the early days of Rome being pushed from their 
lands by the surrounding tribes, though at times they rallied and 
recovered lost ground. 

Old Latium, therefore, was not marked off by any natural Vetus 
frontiers, and varied in extent at different times, but was at best but Latium. 
a small part of the later Latium. The Latins in it formed, it is 
said, a League of thirty cities, of which the common meeting-ground 
and place of worship was the temple of Jupiter Latiaris, on the 
Alban mount. Although the number of cities in the League was 
nominally thirty, both the particular towns and the total number 
varied. Dionysius^ gives the names of twenty-nine, some of which 
are of importance in early Roman history, and from receiving 
Roman colonies, or for some other reason, remained in varying 
degrees of prosperity or decadence till late times ; while of the 
others some were never important, and some perished so early and 
so entirely that their site was unknown. Pliny reckons as many as 
fifty-three separate communities in Latium which in his time had 
thus perished without leaving any traces. ^ 

The ager Romanus was at first apparently among the smallest The ager 
of the territories in this smaller Latium, extending in no direction Ro7nanus. 
beyond the city wall for more than five miles. Rome, however, very 
early stretched out her arms to secure the free use of the Tiber, the 

1 Dionys. v. 71. 2 PHny, A^. H. iii. 5, 70. 




iiiiPiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiininjMir 



CHAP. V THE SEVEN KINGS 31 

navigation of which was the origin of her commercial importance. 
Thus the founding of the harbour town Ostia, at the mouth of the river, 
sixteen miles from Rome, was, according to a consistent and undeviat- 
ing tradition, attributed to the fourth king, Ancus Marcius ; to whom 
is also assigned the first occupation and fortification of the Jani- 
culum, and its union with Rome by the pons sublicius. While, 
still earlier, the capture and colonisation of Fidenae, which com- 
manded the bridge across the Tiber above Rome, was attributed to 
Romulus. It was a city thus small in itself and in its territory, 
whose gradual rise to a commanding position in Latium, under the 
rule of seven successive kings, is described by the later Roman and 
Greek historians. 
I 

I. Romulus {753-7 i6y 

To Romulus is ascribed the foundation of the Palatine city with Foundatio. 
full Etruscan rites. The plough, with share of bronze, was drawn of the 
round to mark the line of its wall, and lifted where a gate was to be ^^"^'^ 
made. The space between this furrow and the actual wall, as after- ^"^ ^'^ ^' 
I wards a similar space within the wall, was called the PomoeriutHy Pomoe- 
' and was to be kept sacred from building or cultivation, and marked rium. 
' the limits to which the auspicia of the city magistrates extended. 
I Within this circuit were three " temples '' or sacred enclosures, 
dedicated to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, and in the centre a vault or 
mitndus, into which a clod of his native earth was cast by the 
founder, with other emblems of the necessaries of life ; and in which, 
I according to some, was stored what was sufficient for the immediate 
I needs of the community. Romulus also was the author of the 
, earliest extensions of the new city by the inclusion of those six Septlmon- 
I minor ridges, with inferior fortifications joined on to the chief wall tium. 
I of the Palatine, which first gave it the name of the city of seven hills, 
j the Septimontium.- 

I Now the settlers whom Romulus brought with him from The 

! Lavinium and Alba were not sufficient to people his new town, asylum. 
I He therefore appointed a place on the neighbouring height of the 
I Capitolium (then called the Mons Tarpeius), between its two ridges, 
, which afterwards was known as ijiter duos Incus, to which all who 
j had reason to be dissatisfied in their native towns, or were forced 
( to flee for fear of the laws or their domestic enemies, might find 
a safe asylum. So men became abundant in Rome; but there 
were not enough women whom they might marry, and there- 
fore there was danger that the inhabitants might again dwindle 

\ 1 The traditional dates are given in the regal period, but they are of course 

without any good authority. 2 gee chap. iv. p. 25. 



32 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

The Sabine away. After consulting the hundred patres whom he had selected 
women, as a council or senate, Romulus sent messengers to the neighbouring 
Latin towns asking that Rome should be admitted to the League, at 
least so far as to give his citizens the power of making legal 
marriages with them. But his messengers were treated with con- 
tempt, and the request refused. Thereupon he sent a proclamation 
to the various towns of a great festival to be held at Rome in 
honour of Equestrian Neptune. ^ The festival was attended by a 
crowd of strangers from Antemnae, Caenine, Crustumerium, and 
several Sabine towns, accompanied by their wives and daughters. 
While the games were attracting the attention of all, suddenly the 
Roman youths, at a concerted signal, rushed among the spectators 
and began carrying off the virgins from their seats. The assembly 
broke up in confusion, and the fathers of the virgins fled, loudly 
protesting against this breach of the laws of hospitality. Their 
complaints were listened to in the various Sabine towns, and brought 
to the ears of the Sabine king, Titus Tatius. But though Tatius 
was prepared to avenge his subjects, the people of the Latin towns — 
Antemnae, Caenine, and Crustumerium — would not wait for his slow 
movements, and invaded the Roman territory on their own account. 
The first were signally defeated by Romulus, losing their king and 
many of their citizens. The second fared likewise, but on the 
petition of Hersilia, the wife of Romulus, were spared from general 
slaughter and received as citizens of Rome. The people of 
Crustumerium were still more easily beaten, and their lands divided 
among Roman farmers. 
Titus After these things Titus Tatius entered the Roman territory at 

Tatius and the head of a great army. He captured the fort on the Capitoline 
mount, thanks to the treason of Tarpeia, the daughter of its com- 
mander, who guided the enemy into the fortress, and was rewarded 
by being crushed to death under their shields ; for she had bargained 
for " what they carried in their left hands," meaning thereby the 
heavy bracelets and jewelled rings which it was the Sabine custom 
to wear. The next day the Sabines descended into the valley 
between the Capitoline and the Palatine and gave the Romans 
battle. At first the Romans, who had the worse position, were 
routed, and Tullus Hostilius, who fought in their front rank, was 
killed. But as the broken lines were retreating towards the gate 
in the Palatine wall, Romulus vowed a temple to Jupiter Stator if he 
would but " stay " the panic ; and then, as on the authority of the 
god, he called loudly to the Romans to stop. They rallied just 
outside the city gate and charged down upon the Sabines, who, 

1 Or in honour of Consus, god of counsel, the Consualia. According to 
others Consus is only another name for Neptune. 



the Sabines 

attack 

Rome. 



V THE SABINES IN ROME s^ 

under Mettius Curtius, were close upon them. The Sabines broke 
and fled ; and though they once again rallied and renewed the battle, 
the Romans were gaining the victory. Then the Sabine women, 
who had been carried off by the Roman youths and were now 
Roman matrons and mothers, with torn garments and dishevelled 
hair, rushed between the ranks of the combatants and implored 
those who were now their husbands and the fathers of their children 
on the one side, and their own fathers and brothers on the other, to 
cease the unnatural conflict. Their prayers prevailed. Not only 
was the battle stopped, but the two hosts agreed to be united in one 
state, ruled jointly by Romulus and Tatius. Upon this junction of 
I the two peoples the number of the senators was raised from loo 
to 200; the three centuriae of cavalry were doubled in numbers, 
so that they now contained 600 men ; and when the people were 
summoned to arms they were enrolled in two legions instead of 
one. The citizens included in the gentes were divided, apparently The 
for military purposes, into thirty curiae or wardships,^ founded Ramnes, 
on a still more ancient threefold division into tribes — the Ramnes, ^''^"' ^"^ 
I Titii, and Luceres. Of these the first two were connected by ^'^'''"* 
I the Roman writers with the names of Romulus and Tatius, and 
were accordingly believed to indicate the Roman and Sabine 
elements among the people. Of the third they could give no 
account; but Plutarch connects the word with the hicus or asylum 
on the Capitoline, in which case it would indicate the adventitious 
element of the Roman people gathered from the neighbouring Latin 
towns. The truth is that we cannot tell what the origin of the words 
is, and the explanation of Mommsen, that they represent originally 
separate communities living about the site of Rome, is only one more 
among many conjectures which cannot be proved. We can only 
■ recognise the fact that some threefold division of the popidus is im- 
plied in all the early institutions — the thirty curiae, the three centuries 
of equites, the 3000 men of the legion, the six Vestal virgins, the 
two colleges of Salii each consisting of twelve, and others. But one 
permanent trace remained of a mixture of Sabines with the Romans. 
The name Quirites survived to the latest times as an appellation of Quirites. 
the Roman citizens in their civil capacity, derived from the Sabine 
qjiiris, "a spear." The king or chief of the Sabines had been wont 

1 According to Dio (fr. 5) the tribes like the curiae were divisions grafted on 
the armed host, and were purely military : Romulus found that his armed levy 
amounted to 3000, and he accordingly divided the men into three tribes, each 
tribe into ten curiae or "wards" {4,povrL<TTripia, curae). Livy (i. 13) holds that 
the curiae were named after the captured women ; Varro (Dionys. ii. 47) from 
ancient leaders and other sources; Plutarch {Rom. 20) from localities. Seven 
only of the thirty names are known to us and are not decisive on the point. 

D 



34 



HISTORY OF ROME 



to address his subjects as Quirites or Quirhii ; and the name, which 
had once been applicable to a host under arms, was retained at 
Rome to indicate the citizens when performing civil rather than 
military functions.^ 

The joint rule of Romulus and Tatius did not last long. After 
a few years Tatius was slain at Lavinium ; and Romulus reigned 
alone over what was now a mixed population of Roman-Latins and 
Sabines. He warred with the people of Fidenae, who had invaded 
the ager Romanus ; and not only conquered them in the field, but 
took their town, in which he placed some Roman coloni, and forced 
them to surrender to Rome a district on the right bank of the Tiber 
called Septempagi, "the seven villages." This roused the jealousy 
of Veil, a flourishing Etruscan town, about fifteen miles from Rome, 
long since allied with the people of Fidenae, who, according to some, 
were partly Etruscans and partly Latins. The Veientines accord- 
ingly made raids upon the Roman territory ; and so the Romans 
for the first time crossed the Tiber in arms, chased the Veientines to 
their walls, and returned, wasting the country as they came. The 
Veientines sued for peace, and a truce for loo years was arranged. 
Thus the prowess of Rome became noised abroad. 

But it was not only for his achievements in war that he was 
honoured. He was the author of wise laws and useful institutions. 
Thus it was said that he made a marriage law which forbade 
the wife to divorce her husband ; or the husband to divorce his wife 
save for three causes only — poisoning her children, excessive luxury, 
or adultery. He ordained that a father should have complete 
power, even of life and death, over his son ; but forbade the 
exposure of male children or the first-born daughter; and made 



members of the original gentes who had settled in Rome with him, 
and those others that had come with Titus Tatius, many strangers 
had been attracted to the city and its territory who were not citizens, 
and depended for protection on certain of the full citizens, he made 
laws regulating the conduct of these two classes, the patroni and 
clietites. He also established festivals in honour of the gods ; and 
appointed a college of three augurs who might declare their will to 
the people. He also defined the functions of the king and the 
Senate, and of the magistrates as they then existed, the tribumis 
celertim, the quaestor es^ and praefectiis iirbi. He ordained also that 
every ninth day there should be a market {nundinae) held in the 
town for the country folk to sell the produce of their farms ; and 
he himself administered justice on a raised platform (tribjinal) in 

1 The Romans, probably without reason, connected the word with the Sabine 
town Curea 



INSTITUTIONS ASSIGNED TO ROMULUS 35 



the market-place. He fortified the Capitol and the Aventine with Fortifica- 
trench and palisade for the security of the flocks and herds of \X\^ Hon of the 
shepherd people who dwelt there; and added the Quirinal ^i^^ ^^P^^o/ and 
Caelian hills to the city, on the former of which he settled the ^^^"^'"^^ 
Sabines as well as on the Capitoline, while the Romans dwelt 
chiefly on the Palatine and Caelian. He built temples to Jupiter 
Feretrius and Jupiter Stator ; first won the spolia opima ; and first 
mounted the Capitol in triumph. Thus to their first king did the 
Romans attribute the beginning of many things known in later times. 
Not to such a hero could any but an heroic end be assigned. The Death of 
people loved him ; but there were certain of the senators who were Romulus, 
jealous ; and some say that he was assassinated in the Senate-house 
by those who hated him for his severe justice, and that the murderers 
dismembered his body, and so were able to conceal their crime. 
But others say that on a certain day, when he was addressing his 
assembled army, a sudden darkness fell upon the earth, though the 
sky was clear ; a mighty storm of thunder and lightning passed over- 
head, and when it cleared away, Romulus could nowhere be seen. 
But as the citizens were mourning for their lost king, a certain Julius 
' Proculus came with a marvellous tale. Romulus had appeared to 
I him from heaven, and bidden him warn his people that they should 
give their whole minds to the arts of war; that the gods willed Rome 
I to be the capital of the world ; and that, if they obeyed him, she 
' would be irresistible by any human power. So it came to be believed 
I that Romulus had been carried to heaven in the chariot of his father 
Mars, and he was worshipped under the name of (2uirinus, "the 
I spear-god." 

II. NUMA POMPILIUS {7 1 J -67 2) 

I For a year after the death of Romulus no king was appointed, hiterreges. 
' The two parts of the city could not agree : the Romans wished for 
a Roman king, the Sabines claimed that, as they had submitted 
' patiently to the sway of Romulus, so now it was but fair that a 
' Sabine should rule for a time. Meantime the government was 
j carried on by interreges. The senators were divided into boards of 
' ten men {decuriaa), each board holding office for fifty days, while 
' each of them in turn wore the royal purple and was attended by 
i twelve lictors for five days.^ But the people could not brook the 

1 Livy i. 17 ; Dionys, ii. 57. This is the account of Dionysius and 
apparently of Livy, who, however, is much less explicit. In subsequent 
references to interreges we hear nothing of the divisions of Senate into decuriae. 
The Senate appoints an interrex for five days, who declares the election of his 
> successor, and so on, until the necessary election of king or consul has been held 
(see Dionys. viii. 90; Livy i. 32; iii. 40; iv. 7; v. 31 ; vi. 41 ; vii. 17, 21 ; viii. 23). 



36 



HISTORY OF ROME 



rule of the senators and clamoured for a king. The Senate yielded 
and promised to ratify by their authority a worthy election by the 
Curiae. The Curiae in return permitted the Senate to choose 
Election of Their choice fell upon Numa Pompilius, a man of Cures, renownec 
Numa. for his wisdom and his knowledge of divine and human law. He 
was summoned to Rome, and consecrated by the augur. He rulec 
well and wisely, maintaining peace with his neighbours, teaching his 
people by what ceremonies to appease the gods, and how to regulate 
His insti- their lives according to the divine will. Thus to him are attributec 
tutions and the custom of closing the door of Janus in peace, and opening it ir 
laws. time of war ; the appointment of the separate priests for the worship 

of Jove, Mars, and Quirinus, — \h^ flajnen Dialis, flai}ien Martis^flameti 
Quirini; the foundation of the college of five pontifices, and the 
delivery to them of a written scheme of religious services, calendars 
and the like ; the appointment of four Vestal virgins, and of the 
twelve Salii of Mars Gradivus. He taught also the ceremonies al 
funerals, and in expiating prodigies ; and, above all, he reformec 
their mode of calculating time, for he divided the solar year intc 
twelve lunar months, with an intercalary month in a cycle of twent) 
years ; and distinguished between holy and secular days {dies nefast 
and fasti). He is said, too, to have organised trade-guilds, and the 
consecration of Argei or local chapels may refer to some such 
division of the citizens. It was he, too, who introduced the custom ol 
dividing conquered lands among the citizens. So high was his repu- 
tation for holiness, that he was believed to hold converse with the 
gods. He often wandered in a glade sacred to the Camenae, where 
there was a holy cavern, out of which issued a stream of fresh water, 
There as he lingered, taking counsel with his own heart and with 
nature, it was rumoured that he met the nymph Egeria, who lovec 
him and taught him wisdom more than human. 



III. TULLUS HOSTILIUS {6/2-640) 

Numa's death was followed by a short interregnum. Then the 
people, with the sanction of the Senate, met in their Curiae and 
elected Tullus Hostilius, grandson of that Hostilius who had foughl 
against the Sabines at the foot of the Capitol. To him no peaceful 
institutions are attributed. His reign was one of war, and such 
religious ceremonies as he introduced were connected with the 
formal proclamation of war. His great achievement was the 
lion of Alba extension of the Roman territory by the destruction of Alba Longa, 
Longa. and bringing its inhabitants to Rome. This was the result of a 
series of border wars. First, we are told, the Albans invaded the 
Roman territory under their king Cluilius. When Cluilius was killed 



The war- 
like reign 
of Hosti- 
lius. 



Destruc- 



DESTRUCTION OF ALBA TONGA 37 



' the Albans were forced to retire, and they appointed Mettius Fufetius 

■ to be their dictator. The Romans then invaded the Alban territory ; 

■ but on the suggestion of Mettius it was agreed that the victory should 
' be decided by a contest between three brothers on the Roman side 

■ and three on that of Alba, the Horatii and Curiatii. This combat 
' took place in the presence of the two armies. Two of the three 

' champions on either side were killed ; but the survivor of the //ora^ii 
Curiatii was badly wounded, while Horatius was still unharmed. He and 
therefore easily killed and despoiled the third opponent, and the Curiatii. 
' victory was declared to be on the side of Rome. Mettius, in 
f accordance with the agreement, put himself and his army at 'the 
! disposal of Tullus Hostilius. But soon there was a new war with War with 
\ Fidenae. The people of Fidenae had submitted to Rome in the days Fidenae 
' of Romulus ; but they now again made alliance with the Veientines and ^'"^ ^^"• 
\ broke with Rome. Mettius was summoned to bring an Alban army 
\ to aid the Romans. But though he obeyed and advanced across the 
i Anio, yet neither he nor his countrymen were zealous in the cause ; 
( and in the battle against the combined forces of Fidenae and Veil 
< Mettius wasted time in manoeuvres meant to avoid active participation 
\ in the struggle, but when the Romans proved victorious, was loud 
i in his congratulations to Tullus. His double dealing was terribly 
i punished. Two quadrigae were placed side by side, and to each 
j chariot one of his legs was fastened. The chariots were then 
1 driven in different directions ; and he who had halted between two D^atk of 
opmions was torn in two and perished miserably. Then Tullus ^^'-'fi'nis 
determined to destroy Alba and bring its people to Rome ; and ^"'/''^"'•y- 
^ when this was done the number of people at Rome was once' more 
I nearly doubled. The Mons Caelius (already included by Romulus 
Mn the city) was assigned to the new inhabitants; the Senate,^ the 
gentes, the equites, and the legions were all increased. 

The next war was with the Sabines, between whom and the Wanvith 
Romans mutual causes of offence had arisen. The Romans alleged ^^^ '^^"'^'>'^-f 
that certain of their citizens had been carried off while engaged in 
peaceful trade near the temple of Feronia, at the foot of Mount 
Soracte; the Sabines that their exiles had taken refuge in a sacred 
grove at Rome and had been there retained.- Tullus invaded the 

: 1 To accommodate the increased number of senators Hostilius was Said to 
have built a new Curia, hence called to the latest times of the Republic the Curia 
\Hostilia (Livy i. 30). 

2 Neither Livy nor Dionysius is clear as to the nature of the offence. 
Dionysms calls them "exiles" {<^vy6.ha^). Some editors wish to insert the word 
servos m Livy's text. That would give a more intelligible account of the ground 
of complamt, but would not agree with Dionysius. It is perhaps more in keeping 
Iwith the usual causes of quarrel between such States to suppose the men to be 
Ipolitical refugees, or at least fugitives from justice. 



38 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

Sabine territory, and won a battle at the silva nialitiasa. After 
a reign of thirty-two years, marked by other wars and by a great 
pestilence, he died, full of honour and fame.^ 
Provocatio. One other story is told of him which it is important to remember, 

because it illustrates a right of the citizens of Rome, which, if it did 
not really exist at this time, was afterwards looked upon as of the 
highest value. The victorious Horatius, when returning to Rome 
flushed with his victory over the Curiatii, and accompanied by the 
liveliest expressions of joy from his fellow-citizens, was met by his 
sister, who had been betrothed to one of the slain Curiatii. She 
recognised among the spoils which he carried a cloak which she had 
worked for her affianced husband, and amidst the general joy she 
alone was weeping and lamenting. In a sudden passion of resent- 
ment her brother slew her. Thereupon the king summoned a 
meeting of the Curiae, and named duoviri to condemn Horatius on 
a charge of perdiielliof that is, as a public enemy. They declared 
the sentence of the law ; and the king in accordance with it ordered 
the lictor to bind his hands, that he might undergo the legal penalty 
of scourging and hanging. Then Horatius, with the permission of 
the king, cried, "I appeal" {provo'co). This appeal was judged by 
the people, who released him from the penalty, on the performance 
of certain rites of purification and a formal penance. Thus, if this 
story is founded on fact, the right of provocatio — the most valued of 
civil rights — existed at Rome under the kings, though it was gener- 
ally considered to rest upon the lex Valeria (508) and the leges 
Valei io-Horatianae (447). The books of the Pontifical College, 
however, contained entries attesting its existence in the regal period ; ^ 
and this is in harmony with the fact connected with nearly all legisla- 
tion. Laws seldom if ever create an entirely novel right ; they 
usually confirm or expand one which has already existed by unwritten 
convention or tradition ; their immediate object is to prevent en- 
croachments upon a right which exists, but is liable to be invaded 
The early by despotic rulers. Moreover, the story as we have it shows this 
stage of right in an embryonic and imperfect stage. In the first place, the 
the right of Yixyg is represented as appointing the duoviri, not because he could 
^c7. ^^^ have proceeded without them, but because he wished to avoid 
odium. In the next place, the duoviri do not try the accused. His 
guilt is assumed and they only have to declare the law. Lastly, he 

1 Yet Plutarch has preserved a tradition that he was punished for his contempt 
of religion by the loss of his senses, in consequence of which he fell into grievous 
superstition, quite unlike the ordered religion of Numa (Plut. Num. 22). 

2 Connected with daelluvi, the old form oi belhim (cp. Duelona= Bellofia : 
duonus = bonus) ; it means " levying war on the State." 

3 Cic. de Rep. 2, § 54. 



V PROVOCATIO— THE FETIALS 39 

can only appeal to the people by permission of the king. The 
power of the king is absolute, but- he may choose, either to avoid 
responsibility, or because he wishes the accused to escape from the 
law, to refer the case to the people. 

IV. Angus Marcius {640-616) 

On the death of Tullus Hostilius the customary interrex being Ancus 
nominated held a meeting of the Curiae, in which Ancus Marcius, ^^i<-^blishes 
son of the daughter of Numa Pompilius, was elected king. Because, ^^/f'^" ^ 

. IHlliltlCS of 

unlike the last king, he showed himself anxious that the laws ^^ pyoclalm- 
religion, which his grandfather had taught the people, should be htgwar. 
observed, and took care that the public sacra should be inscribed 
on an albin/i, so that all might know them, he was believed to be 
unwarlike. The Latins, therefore, renewed hostilities. They made 
a raid over the Roman frontier, and refused all restitution. But king 
Ancus Marcius was no coward. He was prepared to fight the 
, enemies of Rome, but even in war was careful that due religious 
j rites should be observed. A legate was sent to formally demand the 
I restitution of the plunder, and to proclaim war with proper cere- 
. monies, if the booty and captives were not restored within ten days. 
I When the legate returned announcing the enemy's refusal, the 
I king solemnly put the question to the senators, who one by one with 
I equal solemnity declared that war might be waged with clean hands 
i and a clear conscience.^ Then the fetial took a spear, with an iron 
j head, or with its point hardened in the fire, and hurled it over the 
( frontier, and in the presence of not less than three youths solemnly 
I proclaimed war. The war was fortunate at all points for king Ancus. War with 
I Many of the Latin towns were stormed ; and some, such as Politorium, the Latins. 
were destroyed, and their inhabitants transferred to Rome and settled 
in the space between the Palatine and Aventine. Thus the power 
of Rome over her neighbours was increased by Ancus, who is also 
believed to have taken an important step for securing her command 
of both sides of the Tiber ; for he connected the city with the Janiculum 
by means of the " Bridge of the wooden piles," the pons sublicius, Pons sub- 
the construction and repair of which were accompanied by strict Hcius. 
\ religious rites. No iron was allowed to be used in it,- and its beams 

1 Puro pioque duello quaerendas censco, itaque consenlio consciscoque. 

2 This was probably connected with a religious tradition derived from the age in 
which bronze was the only metal in use, before the discovery of iron. Thus the 
flamen Dialis might not be shaved or have his hair cut with an iron razor or 
knife — aeneis cultris tondebatur. The rule as to the poiis sitblicius was long main- 

] tained (see Dionys. v. 24; Varr. L. L. v. 83; Ovid, Fast. v. 622; Pliny, N. H. 
36, ^^ 100). 



40 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



were to be so placed as to be easily and quickly removable in the 
case of an enemy's approach. That from very early times Rome 
had the command of the right bank of the Tiber is shown by the fact 
that the Incus Deae Diae, the seat of the very ancient Arval Brother- 
hood, was five miles from Rome, on what was afterwards called the 
via Portuensis. The bridge was therefore not merely for defensive 
purposes, as connecting the city with the outlying strong post on 
the Janiculum, but was a necessary means of communication with 
a district already part of Roman territory. Its construction, again, 
seems to indicate that an intercourse was growing up between Rome 
and Etruria of a more peaceful kind than that with her southern 
neighbours. Finally, the name of po?itifex shows that its construction 
and maintenance was from early times a matter of importance and 
even sacred obligation. Besides this there was attributed to Ancus 
Marcius an extension of the city area, protected by some kind of 
The fossa artificial defence ; for this appears to have been the nature of 
Quiritium. the fossa Qiiiritmm, the exact position of which is uncertain, but 
which perhaps followed the line of part of the subsequent Servian 
wall, from the porta Capena to the Tiber, round the foot of the 
Aventine. 



V. L. Tarquinius Priscus {6i6-jy8) 



The 

Etruscan 

dytiasty. 



Lucumo 
corrupted 
to Lucius, 



When Ancus Marcius had reigned twenty-four years he died, 
leaving young sons behind him. But at some period during his reign 
there had come to Rome an Etruscan noble or Lucumo. He was 
said to be the son of Demaratus, one of the Bacchiadae of Corinth, 
who had migrated first to Sparta, and then to Tarquinii, after having 
long traded with the Etruscans. Discontented with the inferior 
position of Tarquinii, he came to Rome with his wife Tanaquil, in 
search of a more important career. When he reached Janiculum, an 
eagle suddenly swooped down and carried off his cap, and replaced 
it with loud screams. His wife, skilled in Etruscan augury, bade her 
husband look for the highest honours in their new country. In 
Rome he purchased a house and dwelt therein in wealth and 
splendour. His title of Lucumo was corrupted to Lucius, and the 
Romans called him also Tarquinius after the town from which he 
came. His reputation for wealth caused him to become known to 
king Ancus ; and his great ability and zeal soon made him his 
trusted friend and minister. On the death of Ancus he induced his 
sons to absent themselves from Rome on a hunting expedition, and 
in their absence persuaded the Curiae to elect himself. This may 
be only a perverted account of a transaction less pleasing to Roman 
pride ; and the fact may have been that the attainment of sovereignty 



V THE ETRUSCAN DYNASTY 41 

at Rome by an influential Etruscan family points to an extension of 
Etruscan power, which at this, time was almost at its zenith. This 
view is to some degree supported by the fact that nearly the first 
public transaction after the expulsion of the Tarquins was a treaty 
with Carthage. While Rome w^as under Etruscan influence no such 
treaty would have been needed ; for the Etruscans and Carthaginians 
were up to this time and long after on close terms of friendship. 

Be this as it may, it seems certain that a Tarquin reigned at The ivars 
Rome; and to him were ascribed various achievements in war, certain of Tar- 
civil institutions, and the commencement at least of some great public 1"'^"^^^- 
works. Twice he fought with the Sabines ; and in the second of 
these wars he took Collatia, a town in Latium, but inhabited by 
Sabines, and added it and its territory to the dominion of Rome. By 
another series of wars he gradually reduced nearly all the towns of 
the Prisci Latini to the Roman obedience. 

As a sign of the growing importance of Rome he planned, and His great 
even began, a great temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline, to be buildings. 
the central place of worship of all the Roman dominions. He 
also began the city wall, afterwards completed by Servius Tullius ; 
laid out the Circus Maximus for the races and games, by which a 
great central city not only provided amusement for its own citizens, 
but attracted a vast concourse of visitors. And, lastly, he improved 
the city itself by the construction of some of these vast cloacae or 
sewers, the remains of which still testify to the greatness of the 
resources at his disposal. ^ 

All these things are so many evidences of a growth of the city 
of Rome; and two political changes attributed to him point the 
same way. In the first place, he raised the number of the 
senators to 300; and the new fathers, being selected from the 
gentes that had been at one time or another added to the roll of 
the original gentes, were called patres minoruni gentium^ " fathers of Patres 
the younger houses ; " and, in the second place, he doubled the ^ninonim 
number of the knights. The story goes that he had intended to do ^^'^^'"'"• 
this by doubling the number of the centuries ; but a famous augur, 
named Attus Naevius, warned him that it was unlawful to change 
what Romulus had instituted with due religious rites. Tarquin, 

1 The Cloaca Maxima, as it is called, is not the largest of which remains exist, 
although it is the most easily seen. Another still larger opens into the Tiber about 
300 feet lower down. As the city increased these cloacae were extended in every 
direction, and served not only to carry off sewerage, but to drain the surface 
water of the valleys, and make them habitable. Besides the passage in Livy 
(i. 55) the Cloaca Maxima is described by Dionysius, iii. 67; Pliny, A^. H. 33, ^^<J 
104-109, with the other cloacae; Aurelius Vict. v. 3, 8 ; Strabo v. 3. The reader 
will find interesting descriptions in Professor Middleton's Remains of Ancient Rome, 
i. 142 sq. and in Lanciani's Ancient Rome, p. 53 sq. 



42 HISTORY OF ROME 



irritated by opposition, tried to discredit the augur's skill. In the 
presence of the people in the Forum he asked him whether it were 
possible to do what he had it in his mind to do. Attus consulted the 
omens and replied that it was possible. " Well, then," said the king, 
" I wanted to know whether I could cut this whetstone with this 
razor." "You can," said Attus. The king applied the razor to the 
whetstone, and to his own astonishment easily cut it in two. Thus 
the authority of Attus was confirmed, and the king, fearing to 
double the number of the equestrian centuries against his warning, 
and yet believing it necessary that the number of knights should be 
increased, doubled the number of men in each century, so that 
instead of 600 there were 1200 men arranged in three centuries.^ 
Posteriores These additional knights were called posteriores eqitites, "later or 
equites. junior knights " ; yet in course of time they were reckoned as 
separate centuries, and the equites were spoken of as sex siiffragia. 

VI. Servius Tulltus {578-534) 

Origm of Tarquinius died at a good old age, or, as some say, was murdered 

Servius ^y the SOUS of Ancus, who had all along resented his rule as injurious 

Tullins. ^Q W^^vc rights. These men also now spoke vehemently against the 

person who seemed the popular favourite for the succession. This 

was Servius Tullius, said to be the son of a slave or captive woman 

in the palace of Tarquinius,"^ and at any rate of obscure origin. He 

had been marked out for a great future by a miraculous fire which 

played round his infant head as he slept in the palace. When he 

grew to manhood he displayed such high qualities that he rapidly 

became the most important person at Court, and was married to a 

daughter of Tarquinius. In their jealous anger the sons of Ancus 

resolved to prevent his succession. They suborned two shepherd 

youths to feign to be quarrelling near the king, to whom they 

appealed for arbitration. Both began speaking at once, until the 

Murder of lictor bade each state his case separately; and whilst the king 

^'"'- turned to one, the other smote him with an axe. In the midst of 

qumius. ^j^g excitement Tanaquil ordered the palace gates to be closed and 

all strangers ejected. After trying in vain to cure her husband's 

wounds, she sent for Servius Tullius, and begged him to avenge his 

1 Livy (i. 36) reckons 1800, but the rest of his narrative implies the number as 
given in the text. The error, however committed, cannot now be corrected. We 
may observe that 1200 gives the normal number of 300 for each of the four 
consular legions. 

2 The Emperor Claudius asserted that he had found in Etruscan writers that 
Servius Tullius was an Etruscan named Mastarna, who came to Rome with the 
remains of the army of Caelius Vivenna, and settled on the Caelian hill. 



THE SERVIAN CONSTITUTION 43 



murdered father-in-law, and to seize the kingdom. She even 
addressed a crowd of people surrounding the palace, assuring them 
that the king would recover, and bidding them meanwhile obey 
Servius TuUius. Thus for a time Tarquin's death was kept secret, 
until Servius Tullius, having secured his power, allowed the truth to 
be made public, was elected king by the Senate, and protected by 
a body-guard. 

His reign is the most important part of the regal period in regard 
to the Roman Constitution. For to him has been universally 
attributed not only the completion of the famous agger, extending for The ao-^^er 
about three-quarters of a mile from the Colline gate, and the town- ServH and 
wall which enclosed the seven hills, and remained, with its pomoerium, ^^^'' ™'^''^- 
the legal limit of the city, with some minor enlargements, until the 
erection of the wall of Aurelian (about a.d. 270), but also a new 
division of the people, which, intended apparently for purely military 
purposes, actually resulted in a constitutional change of the highest 
importance. 

As our whole information in regard to this comes from writers Reforms of 
who lived many centuries later, we naturally find that they judged of Servius 
its intention by its actual effect. To them it appeared as a measure ^'''^^""• 
of reform enlarging popular privileges, as indeed it proved to be ; 
but it seems certain that in its original intention it was an extension 
of duties and burdens rather than of privileges. That those to whom 
these duties and burdens were extended should in course of time 
claim privileges and rights also, was inevitable. 

We must remember that, as far back as we can at all trace The 
Roman history, there was always a populus with a distinct identity, populus. 
and accustomed to regard three things as properly inherent in itself: 
(i) The election of a king and of military officers; (2) the passing 
of laws ; (3) the decision as to peace and war. 

With a king possessing absolute power, and a Senate claiming 
that its auctoritas must first be obtained, the two last rights were, 
perhaps, seldom exercised, and only when the king desired to have 
his hands strengthened by a show of popular support. Still, how- 
ever much in the background, they existed from very ancient times. 

Now, by the pofidiis seems originally to have been meant the 
fighting force, whether actually under arms or ready to be so. It 
was when on a war footing that the people would be consulted on a 
question of peace or war; it was as an army that they would elect 
their officers ; and if they were ever required to pass a law, no other 
machinery existed for obtaining the expression of their will but that 
of their military divisions. 

The populus, then, consisted of those who were liable to serve in 
the army — those men, that is, whose names were included in the 



44 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

thirty Curiae. These were the members of the original gentes, 
whose inclusion in the Roman name was earlier than a ly memory to 
the contrary, as well as of certain gentes and families which had 
been subsequently admitted. To them, apparently, must be added 
men of humbler means, such clients and dependents as had become 
closely connected with them. It was this body alone that furnished 
soldiers to the levies, and paid the war tax or "war loan" {tribu- 
titni) to the treasury. 

Theplebs. Round them, as Rome increased, was settled an ever-growing 

number of families of foreign origin, whom interest or compulsion 
had caused to reside within the city or its territory, or who, being 
descended from freed men of the old families or clients of extinct • 
gentes, retained the names of their old lords. The members of these 
femilies had no civic rights, they could not even contract a legal 
marriage with a citizen. They formed the multitude (^plebs) who, 
while actually living and trading in Rome, were not yet Romans. 
But as they had no privileges, so neither had they the same burdens 
as the citizens; they probably paid some fee for protection, and 
were hence called aerarii^ but they were not liable to the tributuni^ 
nor to service in the army.^ 

The tribes. The Servian reform altered this state of things. The Roman 

army had originally been for the most part cavalry ; and the names 
of the three tribes, Ramnes, Titii, and Luceres appear to have sur- 
vived as distinguishing titles of three centuries of horsemen. But 
there must always have been infantry of some sort, and its import- 
ance was now to be recognised, and it was to be drawn from all free 
inhabitants alike, whose property reached a certain standard. To 
obtain the necessary information as to their property a census must 
be taken, and in order to take a census the whole number of free 
men living in Rome and the ager Romanus was divided into tribes, 
which were lo nave no concern with the origin or civil status of the 
inhabitants, but were to be entirely local. '^ Four of them were city 
tribes — Palatina, Suburrana, Collina, Esquilina, corresponding to the 
"regions" into which Servius divided the city; sixteen were rural 
tribes. The total number was afterwards gradually raised, as new 
territory was added, but never exceeded thirty-five. This division 
made it easy to hold a census of property, whether in land or in 
cattle, — which implied the possession of land, — so that all men with 
a settled home {assidui) could be fairly assessed for the payment, 

1 This theory of the origin of the plebs is one of many. Two others are (i) 
that they were the creation of Romulus; (2) that they were the inhabitants of 
neighbouring villages subdued and annexed to Rome. 

2 The tribes necessarily ceased to be local when the Italians were enfranchised, 
and probably had nearly ceased to be so before. 



V THE COMITIA CENTURIATA 45 

which now, as heretofore, might be called tributum, " the tribal pay- 
ment.'" ^ 

So far this division, including all owners of property, had nothing 
political about it, conferred no right and implied no possession of 
civitas. There were still patricii, "men with ancestors," and 
plebeii, "men of the multitude.'" All civil rights were still exclu- 
sively in the hands of the former. The tribes, it is true, as well as 
each vicus and pagiis, had some sort of local government and local 
religious rites, '-^ but as far as Roman civitas was concerned the old 
distinction remained, and the patricii were alone full citizens. 

The other part of the reform of Servius was destined, though not The 
apparently introduced with that intention, to bring this inequality to comitia 
an end. centuriata. 

The whole of the people included in the tribes was again divided 

into 193 ceiitiiriae for the purpose of military service; and these 

centuriae were arranged in classes or " summonings," according to the 

amount of their property, and the members of the centuries were 

, required to provide themselves with a particular kind of armour, 

I according to the class to which their century belonged, — a measure 

' to which we have a striking analogy in the " Assize of Arms " of our 

I own Henry 11.^ First of all came 18 centuries of equites, developed 

from the original three equestrian centuries, partly by multiplying the 

I numbers in the centuries, partly by the addition of new centuries.^ 

\ The members had an cquus publicns and an allowance from the 

( State for its keep. Next come 80 centuries (40 seniores, i.e. of 

1 men over forty-five years of age, 40 juniores) of the first class, 

^ consisting of men whose property exceeded 100,000 asses. Next 

I 20 centuries (10 seniores, 10 juniores) of the second class, consisting 

' of those wdiose property was over 75,000 asses. Then 20 centuries, 

similarly divided, of the third class, of those whose property was over 

' 1 It is an interesting question as to what was the basis on wliich this valua- 
I tion was made. Some have held that it was land ; others that it was cattle (which 
- would imply land). Servius was believed to have introduced the use of coined 
1 money, and the earliest coins had the figure of an ox, a sheep, or swine impressed 

I upon them, and therefore probably represented the values in animals, the propor- 
tion being i ox = 10 sheep (Plutarch, Popl. xi. ; Q. R. 41 ; Varro, L. L. v. 95). 
2 Yicus was a subdivision of a city region ; pagi are villages or fortified places 
i with the land round, into which the country was divided. Their magistrates 
j were called magistri or prafectl or praepositi, and the paganl had an annual cele- 
I bration called paganalia. 

I 3 Thus the men in the first class were to have the galea, cfypeus, lorica, ocreae, 
\\ hasta,gladius. The second class a scutum and the rest except the lorica. The third 
had no ocreae. The fourth no defensive armour, only a hasta and verutum. The 
fifth had slings and stones {fundi lapidesque missiles). 

4 Thus the six seem to represent the sex suffragia, or the three centuries 
duplicated, which, though in name still three, were yet counted for voting pur- 
poses as six. 



46 HISTORY OF ROME 



50,000 asses ; and 20 centuries, also divided into 10 seniores and 
10 juniores, of the fourtli cjass, of those whose property was over 
25,000 asses. Then 30 centuries (15 seniores, 15 juniores) of the 
fifth class, consisting of those whose property was over 10,000 asses. 
All whose property was below 10,000 asses were included in a single 
century, were called proletarii, and were not liable to military ser- 
vice. The military nature of this division is shown by the addition 
to the first class of two centuries of fabri, " engineers,'' and to the fifth 
class of two centuries of cornicines^ " horn blowers,"* and tubicines, 
" trumpeters " ; and by the regulation which excluded men over sixty- 
one years of age from the centuries.^ 

The whole number of centuries is thus 193. But as we are told 
that at the first census held under this arrangement the number of 
citizens of military age was found to be 80,000 (a number probably 
much exceeding the truth), it is evident that centui'ia had ceased to 
have anything to do with the number 100. Originally a ceiituria of 
cavalry no doubt meant 100 men, but it had come to mean a 
"division" without regard to the number in it, just as "tribe" 
ceased to have any connexion with the number three. 

It is important to observe that whether we speak of the Roman 



1 This will be made clearer by being thus tabulated :— 



Equites . 


. 


18 centuries 


First Class— 






40 centuries of 


seniores 


1 


40 


juniores 


.82 „ 


2 fabri 




1 


Second Class- 






ic 


seniores 


[- - 


10 


juniores 


Third Class- 






ic 
10 


seniores 
juniores 


■ 2C 


Fourth Class- 






ic 
10 


seniores 
juniores 


}.o „ 


Fifth Class— 






15 


seniores 


1 


15 


juniores 


^32 .. 


2 cornicines and tubicines ^ 


1 


Capite censi 




I 



Property valued at loc.occ asses. 



75.00c 



50,000 



25,000 



12,50c 



193 

Another account assigns the fabri and tubicines to classes 2 and 4. The value 
of the as, as has been remarked above, was not at first probably reckoned in 
actual copper weight or coins, but in cattle, an ox being equal to 100 asses. 



THE COMITIA CURIATA 



47 



people as divided into tribes or into centuries, the same body of Distinction 
persons is meant. But in the latter case they are organised as a between 
fighting body ; and while service in the army is still looked upon to ^^''^^^ ^"'^ 
a certain degree as a privilege not within the competence of some of '^'^'" uj les. 
them, yet, as far as such service is a burden, it has now been 
extended from the old and more contracted body included in the 
Curiae, and spread over a larger number. The amount of the 
change was somewhat lessened by the fact that the Curiae, the num- 
bers in which had been enlarged by the admission of new geiites^ 
included many clients and dependents who, in strictness, should have 
been classed with the plebeians. Still, many of those who were now 
included in the centuries had been little better than resident aliens, 
and had never voted in the Curiae ; and therefore, as the numbers 
were now greater, the turn for military service would come less 
frequently to each individual, even though larger summer levies 
were needed. 

Theoretically, the Curiae were still the sole citizen body to elect Function 
the king, to be consulted by him, and, if necessary, to pass law^s. ^'^^amed by 
So much was this the case, that to late times we find that for certain ^^ ^^^'^<^^' 
purposes the Comitia citriata had to be summoned as alone capable 
of conferring hnperiuffi ^ upon the magistrates elected by the larger 
assembly. Before it — represented in later times by thirty lictors — 
I the formal adoption of , a man who was siii jn?'is irora one gens into 
j another {arrogatio) was performed, and wills were made. But it 
I rapidly lost all legislative or electoral power. We cannot trace the 
i steps by which it was superseded by the assembly of the people in 
I centuries, Comitia ceiituriataj but we know it was so superseded, 
and it is possible to form a plausible theory as to the way in which 
' this took place. Naturally the men who were to serve in the army 
would be the men to elect their officers, when such election was 
I allowed by the king. If the election took place, there was no 
I organisation to conduct it but that of the centuries. The Curiae Elections 
' had held their meetings in the Comitium ; but the centuries, as i" tf^^ 
I being a military assembly under the command of an " imperator," '-omitia 
I met outside the city in the Campus Martius. Here then the people 
I would gradually grow into the habit of voting in centuries for their 
; officers. No chronicler has ventured to relate any meeting of the 
centuries during the regal period for election purposes, much 
' less for the passing of laws. The absolutism of the king probably 

'^ Imperium, "the right of command," was a part of the kingly office which 

belonged to the consuls and dictator. By a constitutional fiction it was not 

supposed to be conferred on them by their election, but had to be bestowed by a 

I separate vote of the Comitia ctu-iata. Thus it was afterwards bestowed on certain 

other magistrates and pro-magistrates, and even on privati in case of need. 



48 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



First 
recorded 
action of 
the Co 1)7 it ia 
centuriata. 



The 

Comitia 

centuriata 

and 

democracy. 



Though not 
democratic 
it led to 
democratic 
changes. 



made the latter exceedingly rare, if it ever took place at all. The 
first time we hear of the Comitia ce7ituriata acting as an elective 
body is when it elects the first consuls after the deposition of Tar- 
quinius. Now, supposing this to be an historical fact, it is not 
likely that such a meeting would have been held there for the first 
time ; there must have been occasions of inferior importance, on 
which the manner of working the assembly had been gradually 
learnt. We cannot tell for certain whether such a meeting did 
take place at the time of the expulsion of the kings; but we know 
that from the earliest time of the Republic, of which we have any 
account, the people elected their magistrates voting in their cen- 
turies, and not as before in Curiae. 

Granting, then, that the Co7nitia centuriata has become the 
national assembly, we must observe how far the arrangement was 
from being democratic. In the first place, it perhaps disfranchised the 
poorer clients who had been used to vote in the Curiae; and at any 
rate it made no immediate diiference in the mutual position of the 
citizens and the non-citizens, who now began to be called patricians 
and plebeians. The latter voted in the Comitia, but they could not 
form a legitimate marriage with the citizens, or hold any office other 
than military. Nor, again, was their vote in the Comitia worth 
much. The final decision was not by individual votes, but by 
centuries. Now the eighteen centuries of knights, together with the 
eighty or eighty-two centuries of the first class, formed an absolute 
majority of the whole 193 centuries; and as the patricians were 
still, as a rule, the richest men in Rome — at any rate the richest 
landowners — these centuries would consist chiefly of patricians, who 
would therefore, if they wished, carry any question or election about 
which they were anxious. The numbers in the centuries of the first 
class must also have been comparatively very small ; therefore when 
the assembly began to meet for voting, the votes of a minority 
would overpower those of the bulk of the people, who were vastly 
superior in number. 1 

Still though this arrangement, when it came to be used for civil 
purposes, did not directly favour the rights of the plebeians, who 
would be mostly in the centuries of the lower classes, it led to 
agitations which eventually secured a full equality of rights. People 
subject to the tributum and military service, and with the right of 
electing their own military officers, naturally began before long to 
question the justice of their exclusion from other rights of citizenship, 
the right of intermarriage with patricians, and the right of holding 

1 It also gave a great advantage to older as against younger men. There 
could not have been anything like as many seniores as junior es ; and the equites 
were at first aWjuniores, i.e. under forty-five years of age. 



V DEATH OF SERVIUS TULLIUS 49 

office. Many of their own body were wealthy and might naturally 
look to form such marriages, and to hold such offices. Such rich 
plebeians were indeed a minority; and their grievance might have been 
long neglected. But w^hen the multitude found themselves pinched 
with poverty, while the policy of the privileged class was continually 
directed to secure and increase their own wealth, and to rivet the 
chains of penury upon their less fortunate brethren, it was natural 
that these last should begin to look for a remedy of their evils in a 
fuller share of political rights. Personal suffering will do what a 
theoretical grievance may long fail to do^- 

Whether the beginning of this organisation is rightly attributed 
to a king called Servius Tullius we cannot be sure, nor whether it 
was indeed the single conception of some wise ruler, and not rather 
the gradual result of several acts of reform. But we may accept 
the fact that some such organisation existed in the early days of the 
Republic, and that on it later changes were based. 

The historians have little more to tell us of Servius Tullius. The first 
He held his first census, at which the number of men of military ^<^"^"^ ^'/ 
age, however exaggerated in our accounts, shows Rome to have -r'^!"^ 
already become one of the most powerful states in Italy. He is 
• said to have dealt wisely with the other Latin cities, whose peoples 
' he persuaded to join in building a temple of Diana at Rome, to be a Temp/e of 
I common place of worship for the whole confederacy, of which Rome ^"^"^^ <^^ '^ 
w^ould thereby be acknowledged the head. In the same way he ^"^'^^'"^' 
tried to secure the future allegiance of the Sabines. Thus for ^o^^'j- i^aHns 
1 four years he ruled with wisdom, and lived in peace with his 
I neighbours. 

I His death happened in this wise. Tarquinius Priscus had left Death of 

i two sons or (as some say) grandsons, Lucius and Arruns, who were '^'^'''^'"•^• 

married to two daughters of king Servius, both of whom were 

named Tullia. The elder of these women was bold, ambitious, and 

wicked ; the younger was gentle and loving. Lucius and his brother 

I Arruns also differed in disposition. Lucius was haughty and ambi- 

j tious, Arruns quiet and gentle. The haughty Lucius was married to 

the gentle Tullia, the peaceful Arruns to the bold Tullia. This last 

despised and hated her husband for his unambitious temper, and 

looked longingly upon the bold and stirring husband of her gentle 

sister. They resolved mutually to free themselves and unite their 

ambitions. Arruns and the gentle Tullia were quickly got out of 

the way, and Lucius married the hauglity Tullia. Urged on by his 

wife, Lucius formed a plot against the life of his father-in-law. He 

collected a party for himself in the Senate, among the patres 

"^ininonim f^entiitin and the younger men in the State, by large 

promises and bribes. At length, when he felt himself strong enough, 

E 



50 HISTORY OF ROME 



he came surrounded by an armed band into the Forum, and, ascend- 
ing the royal seat, delivered a speech, denouncing Servius as a 
slave's son and usurper, and claiming the throne as his by right. 
Servius was sent for, and appeared in the Forum while Lucius was 
still speaking. Then there was a fierce struggle between the partisans 
of the two ; and Tarquin, thinking that he must now dare all, seized 
Servius, and hurled the old man down the steps of the Curia, and 
then entered the building to hold a meeting of the Senate. Servius, 
bruised and bleeding, was staggering towards his house, when he 
was overtaken by some emissaries of Tarquin and killed. While 
this was going on, Tullia arrived at the Curia, called out her 
husband, and was the first to salute him as king. He bade her 
return ho»ie from a scwie of such disorder and bloodshed. As she 
was riding back in her car, the driver checked the animals at the 
sight of the dead body of Servius ; but his fierce mistress smote 
him with her hand, bidding him drive on — and thus her chariot 
wheels crushed her father's corpse. The horror of the people at 
this ruthless act was commemorated by the name of sceleratiis viais, 
ever afterwards borne by the street in which it was done. 

Thus Servius died, and Tarquin the Proud became king at 
Rome. 

VII. Tarquinius Superbus {534-500) 

Evil deeds As Tarquinius gained his power by violence and bloodshed, so 

of Tar- he exercised it with cruelty and oppression. He refused the rites 
of burial to his father-in-law, and put to death some leading senators 
who had favoured his cause. He surrounded himseli with a body- 
guard (as indeed Servius had done at first), naturally fearing the 
enemies that such measures were sure to create. He revoked the 
good laws of Servius Tullius, and destroyed the tablets on which 
they were engraved. He held trials on capital causes in secret and 
without assessors, m which he could fine, banish, or put to death his 
He op- opponents. He depressed the Senate, refused to fill up vacancies, 
presses the and seldom consulted it, carrying on the administration of domestic 
Senate. ^-^^ foreign affairs alike on his own authority. These are the usual 
allegations made against the Greek tyrmtjii, and against certain men 
who seized tyrannical powers in later times at Rome. There is 
nothing improbable in them. All we can say against them as 
historical facts is that there are no authorities to support them 
within at least two centuries and a half. 
His foreign But though a tyrant at home he made Rome's power respected 
policy. among her neighbours. He tried, indeed, a conciliatory policy with 

the Latins, gave his daughter in marriage to Manilius of Tusculum, 



qmnius 
Superbus 



THE TYRANNY 



and made personal treaties of hospiiiuni with others. But to all 
who resisted he was ruthless. When Turnus Herdonius of Aricia 
denounced his pride in a congress of Latins summoned at the hiciis 
Fercntinae, he revenged himself by contriving his death. And this 
led the way to a more definite assertion than ever of Rome's primacy 
among the Latin states, and to the actual enrolment of Latin youths 
in the Roman legions, — a fact which was believed to account for the 
two centuries in the maniple. 

Success in war is also attributed to him. He was the first He ivars 
Roman king to fight the Volscians, from whom he wrested Suessa "^^'t'^ the 
Pometia. It was from the spoils there taken that he began con- ^olsaans. 
structing on a splendid scale the temple of Jupiter of the Capitol, 
which had been projected by his father. He next attacked Gabii, 
an ancient Latin town which had offended him by harbouring Roman 
exiles. His son Sextus feigned to fly thither for fear of his father, 
and being trusted with high command, found means to admit the 
Roman troops. 

It is in relation to this enterprise of Sextus that a story was The story 
told, which Herodotus ^ also narrates of Thrasybulus, the tyrant of </ Sextus 
Miletus. When Sextus, it is said, had gained power at Gabii, he sent ^^ G'^bu. 
to ask his father what he was to do next. Tarquinius gave no verbal 
answer ; but receiving the messenger m his garden, walked up and down 
as though in profound meditation, striking off with his stick the heads 
of the tallest poppies. When the messenger told Sextus how his 
father had acted, he understood that he meant him to put to death 
the leading men in Gabii. 

Gabii having fallen, Tarquin made peace with the troublesome His works 
Aequians, and negotiated a treaty with the Etruscans. After this he in Rome. 
gave his whole attention to his public works. The Capitoline temple 
was pushed on, the Capitol having been first cleared of certain minor 
sacred buildings or shrines. Only it was said that the statues of the 
god Terminus and of Juventus could by no means be removed, and 
had to be included in the new building. Like his father, too, he is 
said to have built cloacae. The largest of all, the Cloaca Maxima, 
part of which still remains, was believed in particular to be his work, 
as well as the permanent seats or fori in the circus. 

But these works had imposed grievous burdens on the people. Colonics of 
and he found it necessary to appease their discontents. Hence it is Sign ia and 
said that for the first time since the reign of Romulus, colonists were Gtrced. 
sent out to Signia, near the frontiers of the Hernici, and to Circeii, 
on a promontory in the territory of the Volsci. Signia, placed in 
a commanding position, secured the communication between Rome 



1 Herod, v. 92, ^Ji 6. 



52 HISTORY OF ROME 



and the friendly Hernici, and its colonisation was probably prompted 
by considerations of security, as much as by the motive attributed to 
Tarquin, So also the position of Circeii, both as a fortress against 
the Volscians, and as an excellent situation for commerce, was no 
doubt the chief motive in settling a colony there. 
The Sibyl. One other tale is told of Tarquin, connected with a fact of some 

importance in Roman history. An old woman, a foreigner and un- 
known, came to the king bringing nine books which she asserted to 
contain divine oracles, and offered to sell them, naming a large sum. 
The king laughed at her as mad. Thereupon she placed a brazier 
before him, and having burnt three of the nine, asked him whether 
he would purchase the remaining six at the same price. Tarquin 
ridiculed her still more. Thereupon she burnt three more, asking 
again the same sum for the remaining three. Struck with her 
pertinacity Tarquin finally consented to give the whole price for the 
three books. Thereupon the old woman departed and was seen no 
more. The account of this event is given differently by others ; but 
it is a fact that certain oracular writings were preserved in the 
Capitol, and were destroyed in the time of Sulla, when the Capitol 
was burnt. The '' Sibylline books," as this collection was called, as 
having been obtained from the Cumaean Sibyl, were placed under 
the care first of two, then of ten, and lastly of fifteen commissioners, 
whose duty it was to consult them on an order of the Senate. When 
they were burnt in 82, others were collected from various sources, and 
frequently revised and consulted to a late date after the Christian 
era. Many such collections existed in Greece; and the particular 
importance of this one lies in the fact that from it, among other 
sources, was derived a large element of Greek religion, which 
became inextricably involved with the old Italian cult. Thus it 
was by directions drawn from it that the worship of the Magna Mater, 
Aesculapius, and Apollo was introduced or extended at Rome, 
— deities apparently unknown in Italian theology, — and that of 
other gods performed according to the Greek rite ; while legends of 
Greek divinities were associated with the names of Italian gods. 
Lastly, it is not impossible that the legend of Aeneas and the Trojan 
origin of the Roman people was derived from this source.^ 
The nobles Such are the actions attributed to Tarquin the Proud. The 

hostile to forced labour on his great works, his revocation or neglect of the 
Tarqum. good legislation of Servius, would perhaps not have turned the 

iThe story of the Sibyl is told by Dionysius, iv. 62; Pliny, N. H. xiii. 88; 
Aulus Gellius i. 19. According to Pausaqias her name was Demo (x. 12, 8). 
The collection of Greek verses which now pass under this name are of various 
ages, some as early as the second century B.C., and others as late as the fourth 
century A.D. 



FALL OF THE TARQUINS 53 



nobles against him. But a tyrant was always especially hostile to 
and hated by those high in rank and wealth, and the contempt with 
which he is represented as treating the Senate would account for the 
revolution which followed. The immediate cause of his fall, and 
of the abolition of the kingship has always been stated thus. 

There had happened an alarming prodigy. A serpent descended Embassy to 
from a wooden pillar and devoured the sacrifice on the altar. Such Delphi. 
a panic ensued that, by the advice of the Etruscan soothsayers 
who were called in, an embassy was despatched to Delphi. The 
envoys were two of the king's sons, and Lucius Junius Brutus. The 
Pythia answered that he of them who first kissed his mother should 
^ hold sway in Rome. The young princes failed to understand the 
' oracle ; but Brutus, who had up to that time feigned dulness to 
avoid the jealousy of Tarquin, rightly interpreted it ; and on landing 
again in Italy pretended to stumble and f^ill, and thus kissed his 
mother-earth, and was pointed out by the oracle as the first consul 
of Rome. 

But as yet no one understood what was to come. Tarquin, Siege of 
like other tyrants, finding that war and plunder were needed to keep --^rdea. 
I his subjects from sedition, attacked on some slight pretext the 
( wealthy town of Ardea, belonging to the Rutulians. It resisted 
' stoutly, and the siege dragged on. Now it chanced that as the 
young princes Sextus Tarquinius and Tarquinius CoUatinus were 
i sitting with their friends over their wine in the camp, the conversa- 
' tion turned on their wives at home, and how they wer^ spending their 
' time in the absence of their lords. Each boasted of the virtue of 
\ his own wife ; and it was agreed that they should go secretly to 
I Rome and Collatia and see for themselves. They mounted their 
; horses and hurried away. The wife of Sextus at Rome was found 
1 feasting with her friends ; but Lucretia, the wife of CoUatinus, was 
I discovered at Collatia sitting amidst her handmaidens weaving late 
j into the night a garment for her husband. All agreed that the chief 
I praise was due to Lucretia. But Sextus came away inflamed with an 
I unholy passion. He presently found some excuse for going to Violation 

I Collatia, was hospitably received and entertained by Lucretia as a of Lucretia. 
relation of her husband's, and in the night forced her to yield to his 
; desires by a terrible threat. He declared that he would slay her, 
and then killing a slave, would place their dead bodies together on 
a couch, and proclaim that he had killed her as an adulteress. 

Next morning Lucretia sent for her father from Rome and her Conspiracy 
husband from Ardea ; she confessed to them what had been done, against 
and, rejecting their offers of pardon for that to which she had been '^'^^i""'- 
forced, plunged a dagger into her heart. Brutus had accompanied 
j CoUatinus, and now, throwing aside his pretence of stupidity, seized 



54 HISTORY OF ROME 



of the accursed race of 
Tarquin should ever reign again in Rome. The oath was shared by 
Collatinus and Lucretia's father, Spurius Lucretius, and by Publius 
Valerius, who had accompanied him. The dead body of Lucretia 
was displayed in the Forum of Collatia. Amidst the lamentation of 
the crowd, the bravest of the young men gathered round Brutus, 
and, leaving a garrison to hold Collatia, hastened to Rome. There 
their tale raised a like storm of indignation. A crowd collected in 
the Forum. Brutus, as tribimus celenim, sent a herald to summon 
an assembly ; and when the people gathered round him spoke fiery 
words of the shameful deed of Sextus, and of the long oppression of 
the commons, ground down by the mechanical labours imposed on 
them by Tarquin. Finally, he proposed that the king and all his 
house should be exiled for ever. This was carried by acclamation, 
and an army was enrolled to attack Tarquin at Ardea. In the midst 
of the tumult Tullia left her palace and fled, amidst the curses of the 
people, who invoked against her the furies of her murdered father. 
The news of this outbreak soon reached Ardea, and Tarquin with 
his army marched towards Rome. Brutus, with the new levy, had 
already set out, leaving the city in the charge of Lucretius, as praefectus 
nrbi; but he intentionally avoided meeting Tarquin, and, passing 
him by another road, reached the camp at Ardea, where he was 
gladly received. Meanwhile Tarquin found the gates of Rome 
shut, and was refused admittance ; and being also cut off from 
the camp at Ardea, gave up hope of regaining his power for the 
present, and with two of his sons retired to Caere in Etruria ; while 
Sextus went to Gabii, of which he had become king, and there, not 
long afterwards, was assassinated. 
sog. Thus kings ceased to rule in Rome in the 244th year of the 

Two yearly city ; and instead of a king for life, the people, being summoned to 
mas^istrates ^|-,gjj. Comitia, elected two joint kings to rule for a year, who were 
"] k'^V called perhaps at first praetors, but afterwards came to be called 
for life. "the Colleagues" or consuls. The first were Lucius Junius Brutus 
and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus. 

Lc^^rendary Such is the story of the Seven Kings of Rome, as we have it in 

nature of t}-,g earliest histories we possess. The reader will be able to see 
ZTJni^^h!!^^ for himself that in many ways it has the features of all early legends 
dealing with the beginnings of great states, the real story of which 
has been lost, or so embellished by pure romance as to make it 
impossible to disentangle the true from the false. Some of the 
stories were perhaps derived from ballads ; many from a desire 
to account for institutions, buildings, or other local features and 
names actually existing in historical times. Some, we cannot often 



regal his 
tory. 



V THE NATURE OF THE LEGENDS 55 

tell which, were real traditions of actual occurrences, distorted or 
added to as such traditions usually are ; ornamented with tales 
built by skilful story-tellers on a slender foundation of fact, and with 
those miracles of divine interposition which the credulity of simple 
folk made easy of acceptance, and the taste of a later and more 
critical age was yet content to regard with indulgence. 

We ought to know, however, how far we are from having any- The lack 
thing like contemporary evidence of the early history of Rome, cf con- 
Yet one word of warning seems necessary. A story is not disproved t^'"po>''^^'y 
by the fact that the relators of it were born many years or even 
centuries after the alleged events, who may have had sources of 
information of which we know nothing. It is only shown to be 
unsupported by sufificient evidence to demand credit. 

It seems hard to believe, again, that the whole history was, as Was it 
some think, deliberately invented by late Greek sophists to flatter deliberately 
the vanity of the Romans. For, in the first place, when the story i-^^'^'^'^f^d? 
first appeared it seems doubtful whether Rome was yet important 
enough to invite such flattery from Greeks ; and, in the second 
place, though mistakes, and even deliberate falsifications, are common 
enough in all literature, a wholesale and impudent invention of an 
entire history is contrary to our experience. 

Nor can contradictions and repetitions be held by themselves to What are 
invalidate a body of iradition indiscriminately. They are tlie almost not com- 
inevitable result of a story being handed down through many genera- f^^{^ ^'^J"' 
tions. It is a diflicult task to detect the undercurrent of truth in ' 
the midst of these accretions, but we must not hastily conclude that 
no such truth exists. Lastly, supernatural elements in a story are 
not proofs of its essential falsity. In times of ignorance men were 
always ready to account for everything wonderful or strange, every- 
thing which they did not understand, by alleging the direct agency 
of something above humanity. What happened they may yet tell 
truly, though they may be quite mistaken as to the cause. It is not 
doubtful that the Athenians won a battle at Marathon, yet no one 
believes, as they did, that Hercules, Theseus, and other heroes 
rose from the ground to help the Athenian soldiers. 

The reason is that there are trustworthy and almost contemporary Lack of 
records of this event, unaffected by and independent of the belief in contempor- 
the miraculous particulars. And this is the difference of our position ^"^ history. 
in regard to early Roman history. There is no testimony near the 
time at all. The earliest writers who tell us the whole tale are Titus 
Livius (B.C. 59, A.D. 17) and a Greek writer, Dionysius of Hali- 
carnassus, who came to Rome about B.C. 29, and died about a.d. 19. 
Some thirty years earlier Cicero wrote a book about the Republic, 
which only survives in a mutilated form, but evidently contained 



56 HISTORY OF ROME 



a story very like Liv3^''s ; and Cicero's contemporary, Sallust 
(B.C. 86-34), gives a brief sketch of the origin of Rome in 
his history of CatiUne, which shows that he accepted, with more 
or less of scepticism, the same story. But of course these authors 
drew their knowledge and opinions from earlier writers. Both Livy 
and Dionysius often refer to them, and these references enable us to 
Authorities trace the existence of the story at any rate for a few hundred years 
earlier before the end of the Republic. The most important of these writers 
than Livy. ^^^ ^^^^ Roman M. Porcius Cato (r>.c. 231-149), who compiled an 
account of Roman history from the earliest times, for which he seems 
to have taken great pains in studying local antiquities. The Greek 
Polybius of Megalopolis, who during his residence in Italy (b.c. 167- 
151) studied the Archives and such ancient inscriptions as he could 
find, besides any ancient histories that existed, and compiled an 
account of the early times of Rome. But though a considerable 
portion of his Universal History still remains, the part treating of 
the early history of Rome has almost entirely perished. O. Fabius 
Pictor, born about B.C. 245, who was living, and a member of the 
Senate during part of the second Punic war (b.c. 218-202), wrote 
a history of Rome, probably in Greek, from which Livy took many 
of his statements. Still earlier a Sicilian Greek named Timaeus 
(about B.C. 350-256) had in his History also told, at any rate in 
part, the story of Early Rome.^ 

We cannot, therefore, trace this story in written history earlier 
than about B.C. 320-300, even at second hand, for we do not possess 
the works of the writers just mentioned in sufficient completeness to 
enable us to judge on what earlier authorities they depended. 
The evi- But besides historical books these writers had other ways of 

dence of satisfying themselves of the antiquity of the story they were telling, 
monuments such as monuments, inscriptions, and buildings. Thus Livy learnt 
possessed ^^^^ -^^ ^^ 2^6 a bronze figure of a wolf suckling the twins was set 
historians ^^P ^'^ Rome. This is a sufficient proof that sixty years before 
The she- ' Pictor wrote the story was current, and was believed by at least 
7volfof2g6. some people. It does not, however, push the date farther back 
than the age of Timaeus. Dionysius makes a statement which, if 
The Latin true, carries us into much more remote times. He says that there 
treaty. existed in his time a bronze tablet in the temple of Diana, on which 

was inscribed in Greek letters the terms of the Latin alliance nego- 
tiated by king Servius Tullius. It is not, indeed, quite certain 
from his words that he ever saw it himself; but that the Greek 
alphabet should be used in such a document is far from unlikely. 

1 Plutarch, who hved in the first century after Christ, says that in his Life of 
Rotnulus he followed Diodes of Peparethus. But we do not know the age of 
Diocles. 



AUTHORITIES FOR THE EARLY HISTORY 



57 



The later period of the kings witnessed in all probability a great 
extension of Etruscan influei\ce in Rome, and the very ancient 
Greek alphabets found at Caere and Formello (near Veii) testify 
to the use of these characters in Etruria; while a still more 
ancient inscription in Greek letters found in the Latin town of 
Praeneste only a few years ago is a witness to its use in Latium. 
Dionysius's statement is quite precise, and the probability is that 
such an inscription did exist, and did contain some ancient treaty 
with the Latins, but its adscription to Servius Tullius may have been 
only an instance of the tendency to refer all monuments, the anti- 
quity of which was beyond certain knowledge, to the kings, just as 
at Athens all or most of the ancient tablets of laws were ascribed to 
Solon. 1 The next most ancient monument quoted by any of these The treaty 
historians is the treaty between Rome and Carthage, which Polybius with Car- 
copied and translated, assigning it to the first year of the Republic, i'^^^ge- 
If it is really of that time it confirms one point in our story, namely, 
that at the end of the regal period Rome was the most important 
state in Latium, and had possessions on the coast at least as far 
south as Circeii. Such ancient inscriptions, however, when they 
existed were very difficult to decipher, and it is not likely that Livy 
troubled himself much with them. 

Another class of evidences which some of the authorities did The fasti 
consult was that of -the various public records. The chief of \\\^^^ and other 
were the Aiuiales Maxiini^ a concise statement of the chief events ^ffi'^^<^^ 
of each year drawn up by the Pontifex Maximus, and exposed each ''^'^^''"■^• 
year on an album or whited board, and preserved in his house. 
These were apparently entered in a book, and existed up to the 
earliest times in the age of Cicero and Livy. But it is extremely 
doubtful whether the parts relating to the first centuries of Roman 
history were original, and not rather restorations, formed partly, no 
doubt, from actual fragments remaining, but filled up on what the 
Pontifex Maximus of the day tliought trustworthy testimony. Similar 
documents were the Conunentaries of the pontiffs, relating to the 
fasti and to the regulations as to civil business or religious ritual. 
The books of the other magistrates, the censors and praetors, called 
libri lintei, must of course have been of later date. There were Laicda- 
also waxen busts of the ancestors of the great families preserved in tiones. 
their houses, with names and brief statements attached ; laudationes, 

1 In i8i it was reported that two stone coffins were found on the Janiculum, 
one inscribed with the name of Numa, the other containing his writings in Circek 
or Latin. The writings were destroyed as harmful, and were vaguely rumoured 
to be books of Pythagorean philosophy. The ground of their destruction by the 
order of the Senate was the novelty of their religious doctrines; and Livy seems 
to regard the whole matter as a deliberate fraud (xl. 29). 



58 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Funeral 

vionu- 

iiie/Us. 



Loss of 
dociDiients 
at the cap- 
ture of the 
city by the 
Gauls in 
390. 



Tlie value 
of the 
stories. 



or funeral orations, pronounced by surviving relatives from time to 
time, recounting the glories of the family — which, however, were of 
so partial a character as often to falsify history ; funeral monuments ; 
and other inscriptions. Perhaps, also, there were ballads or songs of 
unknown antiquity retailing the heroic actions of the past. 

No monument now existing is older than the third century B.C. 
How much farther back those existing in Livy's time went we cannot 
tell. We know that Cato was fond of studying them to help him in 
his Origi7ies, as we know that Polybius investigated the records of 
the Pontifices and other Archives. This last Livy also professes to 
have done. But how far did those then existing go back? He 
himself tells us : — 

*•' The history of the doings of the Romans from the foundation 
of the city to its capture [b.c. 390], first under kings, then under 
consuls, dictators, decemvirs, and consular tribunes, their foreign 
wars and domestic broils, I have described in my first five books. 
The facts were obscure, dim as objects seem from afar. This was 
the result of their antiquity. But also in those times written records 
were extremely rare, and they alone can be trusted to preserve faith- 
fully the memory of events. Besides, even such records as were 
preserved in the commentaries of the pontiffs and other monuments, 
public or private, perished at the burning of the city." 

As is usually the case in great disasters, more destruction was 
perhaps attributed to the Gauls than they really accomplished, and 
Livy himself, in the same passages, acknowledges that the laws of 
the twelve tables, certain treaties, and some of the royal laws 
remained undestroyed, and were collected after the fire ; nor does 
he say that the Aiinales Maxwii were lost, and he afterwards quotes 
the libri lintei as existing before this date. Still, we must observe 
that the words quoted contain a confession on Livy's part that he 
had found very few records of the earlier history of Rome, which 
from their undoubted antiquity could be regarded as coeval with the 
events, or as trustworthy in themselves. 

What, then, should we think of these stories? What is their 
value? In the first place, they contain the account of the origin of 
the city and its institutions, with which the Romans themselves were 
long content. And if this account is to be regarded as founded on 
things existing, rather than really telling us how they came about, 
yet it enables us to understand these institutions more fully, and to 
see them with somewhat the same eyes with which the ordinary 
Roman citizen regarded them. In the second place, they convey a 
correct view in the main of the actual progress made by the city 
from its beginning, first to internal order and freedom, and then to 
independence and even supremacy among its neighbours. For 



HISTORICAL MONUMENTS 



59 



whether the history- of the kings be partly true or wholly false, yet, 
by the time that Roman history begins to be more really known to 
us, Rome had become much what the history describes her as grow- 
ing to, — a city with a constitution, in which there were elements of 
freedom and equality imperfectly developed — a city with a small 
territory struggling for mastery among surrounding states, possessing 
facilities for commerce with the world outside Italy of which she was 
beginning to avail herself, commanding both sides of the Tiber, and 
having already secured the control of the coast from Ostia to Circeii. 
She is beginning to feel her strength and the greatness of her 
destiny, -'mewing her mighty youth/' and even now dealing on 
equal terms with the great Semitic merchant city of Carthage, which 
had been long the chief power in the western Mediterranean. 

Lastly, the city still retained tangible traces of its previous Actual 
history in buildings, natural objects, and memorials, which had to be *'^"^^'^"^ "/ 
accounted for in some way. Thus the line of the wall of the Palatine ^ ''^'"^' 
city — Roma quadrata— could still be traced even in the time of 
Tacitus. There was also on the Palatine a cave said to be that of 
Cacus {Scalae Cad), and another, the Lupercal, said to have been 
dedicated to Pan by the Arcadian Evander. There was the Jiats 
Rummalis, under which the she-wolf suckled Romulus and Remus, 
and a cottage — casa Ro7nuli — to which the twins were taken by 
Faustulus. The agger between the Esquiline and the Colline gales, 
and the walls of Sei'vius, have not even yet wholly disappeared, and 
throughout the Republic remained almost intact. The vault of the 
strong prison at the foot of the Capitol was always called the TuUia- 
num, from its founder Servius TuUius. The Curia Hostilia, never 
wholly destroyed until the Clodian riots in ]?.c. 53-52, kept alive the 
name of king Tullus Hostilius ; while the dwelling of the Pontifex 
Maximus attached to the temple of Vesta was ever called the Regia,i 
as having been the palace of king Numa; and not far oif was the 
Puteal, under which the whetstone that the razor of Tarquin cut at 
the word of Attus Navius was believed to be buried. The great 
cloaca of Tarquin still drained the Velabrum ; the great national 
temple of Jupiter still crowned the Capitol. There were also temples 
of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva on the Palatine ; of Diana on the 
Aventine; of Jupiter Stator near the Palatine, and a chapel of 
Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitoline ; the temple of Vesta in the 
Forum ; of Fors Fortuna on the Janicuhmi ; of Quirinus on the 
Quirinal ; of Fortuna in the Forum Boarium, and of the Mater 
Matuta close by. These and more were indelible records of a near 

1 The domus publica in which the Pontifex Miiximus lived was properly distinct 
from the Regia, a kind of chapter-house or oftice of the Pontifex, but was often 
called by that name. 



6o HISTORY OF ROME 



past, the true story of which might be confused, misrepresented, or 
forgotten, but which had undoubtedly existed. Of it the Romans 
believed that they possessed an account, which, if not literally exact, 
was yet in its main outlines reasonable and worthy to be regarded 
as history. 

Authorities. — The story of the kings is told in Livy's first book, and at 
greater length and with even less sign of doubt or criticism by Dionysius of Hali- 
carnassus (i.-iv.) ; also with some differences of detail by Zonaras (vii. 3-1 1), chiefly 
perhaps from Dio Cassius ; Eutropius (i, 1-9); Plutarch's Z./z/^i' of Romulus and 
Numa ; Cicero, de Republica, and others. What remains of the Roman writers 
of history before the Augustan era is collected by H. Peter in his Historicoriun 
Romanorum Fragmenta. 



CHAPTER VI 

FROM THE EXPULSION OF THE KINGS TO THE WAR WITH VEII 

509-403 
COLONIES CENSUS 

Norba . . . B.C. 492 B.C. 465 . . 124,214 

Antium . . . B.C. 467 B.C. 459 . . 132,409 

i Ardea . . .B.C. 442 

] Labicum . . . B.C. 418 

The effect of the Revolution on the position of Rome in Latium — Attempts of the 
I Tarquins to recover their property and royalty — Battle with the Veientines 

I and people of Tarquinii on the Naebian meadow — Etruscan invasion under 

Porsena — Stories of Scaevola and Cloelia — Subjection of Rome to the Etrus- 
I cans — Defeat of Etruscans before Aricia — Isolation of Rome in Latium — The 

Latins attack Rome — Battle of the lake Regillus — Gradual recovery of Roman 
j power, and return to the Latin League (492) — Wars with the Sabines, 

Volscians, Aequians, Hernici — Effect upon the Roman character — Tales of 
I Coriolanus and Cincinnatus. 

I 

i The supremacy among the prisci Latini, secured to Rome by the abihty I^omc ex- 
of her later sovereigns, was almost entirely lost within twelve years of c^"^^''^^ 
the fall of the kingship. What the exact nature of that supremacy -^,^^'''^ ^^^ 
was we do not know, but it seems probable that, while leaving each Leame 
community free as far as external relations were concerned, it secured • 

} for Romans and the citizens of the towns thus united the private 
rights which are the most valuable features of a common nationality 

1 —the right of intermarriage, the right of free trading, and of free 
settlement or residence. This arrangement was renewed in 493- 
492, after some years of interruption and some sharp struggles ; 
but it was certainly broken off soon after the expulsion of the 
Tarquins. 

The consuls first elected by the centuries were Lucius Junius 509. 
Brutus and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus. But it was felt that the '^ l^'-'f'^'^t 
presence of a Tarquin, however hostile to the rest of his family, was ^^^^^^ ^- 



62 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Collatifius 
abdicaics. 



Conspiracy 
in favour 
of the 
Tarquins. 



The 

Campus 
Mariius. 



Invasion 
from Tar- 
quinii and 
Veii. 



inconsistent with the decree which imposed perpetual exile upon all 
of the name. Collatinus, therefore, was persuaded to abdicate,^ and 
Publius \'alerius was elected in his stead. The first difficulty which 
the consuls had to meet was a conspiracy for the restoration of the 
Tarquins. Though the twenty-four years of the tyranny had sufficed 
to obliterate from the minds of the people the wise rule of its former 
kings, even this tyranny had, as always happens, partisans of its own 
— some who from gratitude for favours, or from dislike of popular 
rights, looked back with regret to the fallen dynasty. The conspiracy 
came to a head when emissaries arrived from Tarquin, professedly 
with the sole object of asking that the property of the king and his 
family should be restored. The treason, however, was promptly 
discovered and sternly punished. Among the conspirators detected 
were two of the sons of the consul Brutus ; and with feelings of 
mingled horror and admiration the people saw the stern Hither not 
only pronounce the condemnation of his sons, but witness with 
unmoved face their punishment and execution. It was a scene never 
likely to be forgotten. The inflexible sternness of Brutus found more 
than one parallel in later Roman history ; and, whatever may be the 
ground on which the truth of the story rests, it is highly characteristic 
of Roman sentiment, which regarded duty to the State as above all 
others. 

The property of the Tarquins was then divided among the poorer 
citizens ; and their fields in the bend of the Tiber, on which the 
corn was standing, were cleared (the corn being thrown into the 
Tiber), consecrated to Mars, and reserved for a public drilling and 
recreation ground under the name of the Campus Martins, or the 
Campus. It was believed that this great weight of straw thrown 
into the river formed the nucleus of what became by dint of alluvial 
deposit the Insula Tiberina.- 

But the Tarquins did not acquiesce peaceably in their banish- 
nient and the confiscation of their property. It was easy to stir up 
Rome's ancient enemy A'eii against her ; and with Veii is said to 
have been associated the native town of the Tarquins, Tarquinii, 



^ According to Dionysius, Collatinus quarrelled witli Brutus on the questions 
(i) of giving back their property to the Tarquinii, and (2) on the sparing of some 
of the conspirators for their restoration. Livy seems to conceive of his abdication 
as taking place earlier. 

'- Livy ii. 5 ; Dionys. v. 13 ; Plut. Poplic. 8. None of these writers seem to 
have any doubt of the fact. Those who believe it argue that, had the insula been 
fully formed before, \}i\<t pons sublicius would have rested on it as a natural pier — 
as Mommsen says it did, disagreeing herein with most antiquarians. These eyots 
have a tendency to form quickly, and it is possible that a great bulk of refuse 
would gather round a nuid-bank already existing, and help to raise it rapidly ; 
that is all that can be said. 



ETRUSCAN INVASION 63 



.'illhoiij^h tlicsc two towns appear to have lon^ maintained an 
unfriendly rivalry with each other. The invasion was met by the 
consuls at some place not name.d by Livy, but called by Dionysius 
the Naebian meadow. 'I'he battle was indecisive ; but legend said 
that from the neighbouring grove,' "the Arsian Wood," a voice was 
heard to proclaim that the victory was with the Romans because the 
Etruscans had lost one man more than they. liefore the battle Death, of 
the consul iirutus had fallen in single conflict with Arruns Tarquinius, l'^'''^"''- 
killing his adversary at the same time. In his place Spurius 
Lucretius Tricipitinus was elected {siiffechis) ; but he only lived 
a few days; and on his death M. Iloratius Pulvillus became 
consul.- 

liy the consul Horatius the great temple of Jupiter on The temple 
the Cai)il(jl, designed by the first 'i'arquin and completed by <^f Jupiter 



the second, was at length dedicated ; his colleague Valerius bein^ ^^^^ 



( 'dpi tut- 

Still (jutside the city engaged with the remains of the Veientine 
war. 

Another popular story illustrating Roman stoicism was told of 
this consecration. The friends of Valerius were annoyed that 
I Iloratius, the junior consul, should have this honour to himself. 
(They therefore caused it to be announced to him in the midst of the 
(ceremony that his son had died. His hand was on the temj)le door- 
post, and he was about to utter the solemn prayer of consecration. 
' He did not remove his hand or turn his face from the temple, but 
'bidding the messenger take an order back for his son's funeral, he 
(went on with the ceremony unmoved. 

Thus the first year of the new Republic passed. One great danger The 
had been repelled ; and a solemn national ceremony had symbolised Etruscans 
the greatness and permanence of the State. But a still worse danger ^'^"'^^^^ ^"-^ 



■ now threatened the city. Whatever may be the true account of 

j Porsena's motive in the invasion of Latium, whether its chief object 

I was the restitution of the Tarquins, or whether the attack upon Rome 

I was only an incident in a great Etruscan movement upon Central 

I Italy, or whether both irujtives were combined, there can be no 

J reasonable doubt that the Etruscans did reduce the Romans to 

submit to humiliating terms. There can be also as little doubt that 

Porsena did not restore the Tarquins, and did not storm or dismantle 

the city. How this came about ; how he so reduced the jjower of 

^ Dionysius (i. 14) calls it the grave of the hero Horatius. Plutarch [Pupl. ix. ) 
the "Apaiov dXaos. 

^ Livy (i. 8) says that some authorities omit Lucretius, and make Horatius 
follow Brutus. The diversity in the legends is farther shown by the fact that 
jPolybius (iii. 22) names the year from Hrutus and Horatius, who, if Livy is 
right, were never consuls together. 



Romans. 



64 



ITISTORY OF ROME 



4gj. Lar 
Porsena. 



Porsena 

takes the 

Janicii- 

lum. 



Horatius 
Codes. 



the Romans as to force them to submit to such terms, and yet did 
not restore the Tarquins or harm the city, is thus explained by Livy 
and Dionysius.i 

It was in the third consulship of Valerius Publicola, and the 
second of M. Horatius Pulvillus, that the king of the great Etruscan 
city Clusium, Lar Porsena, undertook at the entreaty of the Tarquins 
either to restore them to their kingdom in Rome, or to force the 
Romans to give them up their property. In the previous year he 
had vainly sent legates with these demands ; now he would enforce 
them at the head of an army. Rome was already weakened by the 
defection of some of her Latin allies. Tusculum was ruled by Tarquin's 
son-in-law Octavius Manilius, and would support him ; Cameria and 
Antemnae had openly renounced their league with Rome ; and 
others who had as yet taken no overt step were already in secret 
communication with the Tuscan. The coming attack was not un- 
known at Rome. The country-folk were warned to bring cattle, 
goods, and slaves within the protection of the city or of the forts on 
neighbouring heights ; the fortifications on the Janiculum were 
strengthened, and guards were posted upon it. The loyalty of the 
poorer citizens was conciliated by promises of future immunities 
from taxation ; and the arrival of the invader was awaited with con- 
fidence. 

But Porsena took the height of the Janiculum by storm, and his 
men were following close upon the heels of the flying soldiers, who 
were rushing over the po7is sublicms into the city. It seemed as if 
the enemy must immediately be in the very heart of the town, when 
the gallantry of three men averted this supreme disaster. There 
was but one bridge ; and its narrow entrance might be held 
by a few resolute men against a host long enough to enable 
those at the other end to cut through the beams, and render the 
river impassable. Spurius Lartius, Titus Herminius, and Publius 
Horatius, called Codes from the loss of an eye in battle, volunteered 
for this forlorn hope. Amidst showers of missiles and fierce sword 
thrusts the three heroes held their ground until, the Roman soldiers 
having crossed, the bridge was about to fall under the axes of the 
workmen on the southern bank. Then just in time Lartius and 
Herminius slowly retreated step by step over the bridge. But 
though the consuls and the people on the other bank shouted to 
Horatius to do the same, he would not stir until he heard the bridge 
go down. Then he sprang into the river, wounded and bleeding, and 



1 Mommsen holds that the non-restoration of the Tarquins is sufficient proof 
that Porsena never undertook to restore them. But he may have used tliem for 
his purposes, and then, as the historians relate, have seen fit to alter his plan 
when he found liimself successful. 



ROME BESIF.GED BY PORSENA 65 



swam to the opposite shore.^ Maimed in this deed of gallantry, 
he was disqualified for the consulship ; but such honours as were 
possible were heaped upon him. In the midst of the distress caused 
by the siege every citizen contributed something to his support, a 
statue was raised in his honour in the Comitium, and as much land 
as he could plough round in a day with a yoke of oxen was assigned 
to him. 

Thus Rome was saved from storm : but only, as it seemed, to be Dis/rcss in 
reduced by hunger. Porsena entrenched himself on the Janiculum ; ^''^''"■• 
while a detachment of troops under the Tarquins managed to cross the 
river higher up, laid waste the country round, and prevented supplies 
from reaching Rome : and though the Roman consuls were said to 
have had sundry minor successes in sahies against these plunder- 
ing parties, the city was getting nearer and nearer to starvation. 
Appeals sent out for aid to various Latin towns were rejected ; and 
though some provisions were brought in from the sea up the Tiber ; 
they were by no means sufficient for the great population of Rome, 
raised above its ordinary numbers by crowds of alarmed rustics. 

In the midst of the distress, when Porsena was sending in his Caius 
demands as though to a people unable to resist, another devoted Mucins. 
act of daring once more turned the tide. A young man named Caius 
Mucins, with the assent of the Senate, made his way into the 
Etruscan camp, in- the garb of peace, but with a dagger concealed 
in the folds of his dress. Seeing a man transacting business on a 
high tribunal, and clad in purple, he supposed him to be Porsena, and 
drawing his dagger stabbed him to the heart. The man thus slain 
was not, however, the king, but his secretary. Mucins was at once 
arrested and hurried before Porsena. There he boldly avowed that 
his intention had been to kill the king himself; but he promised, 
on condition of being spared the tortures with which he was 
threatened, to give the king important information. The assurance 
being given, he told Porsena that 300 youths in Rome, equally bold 
and equally careless of their lives as himself, had sworn to slay 
him ; that the lot had fallen to him first, but that the king must lay 
his account with a similar danger day and night. Another version 
of the story was that, when the king ordered fire to be brought, in 

^ Elaborate details were given by Dionysius of the wounds of Horatius. 
According to him also he swims across without losing shield or any of his armour, 
though there is a terrible eddy from the fallen bridge, which, moreover, is not 
cut down spontaneously on the part of the consuls, but in consequence of a 
message from him. Livy describes him as being shot at by the enemy while 
swimming, and also first solemnly commending himself to "Father Tiber." 
Polybius (vi. 55) knows nothing of the two first heroes, and say that Horatius 
perished in the river. He gives the story as an example of the Roman senti- 
ment to the State, — which is the point of view in which it is of value to us. 

F 



66 



HISTORY OF ROME 



order to compel Mucins by torture to disclose his accomplices, he 
thrust his ri<;ht IkukI into the llame, antl held it there till it was 
consumed, to show him how little torture would be able to bend him. 

Convinced by Mucins of the difticulty and danger of keeping up 
the siege, Porsena made one more attempt to induce the Romans to 
come to terms. His demands now were that they shouUl restore tin- 
rarcjuins' property, • should surrender their domains on the right 
bank of the Tiber, and give hostages. The two last demands were 
immediately complied with, and twenty boys and girls were ai 
once sent. Hut while negotiations as to the Tar^uins' proi)crty 
were still going on, the maiden Cloelia, having by a ruM- 
got out of sight of the soldiers assigneil to guanl her, accom- 
panied by the other girls who were hostages with her, i)lunged into 
the Tiber and escapeil back lo Rome. 'I'hc people, however, kcj)! 
faith, and sent them back to the Ktruscan camp. 'Ihe Tartpiin 
princes, in wrath at the supposed inlluence that thi-> would have 
upon Porsena, tiictl to inlercein and slay them as they returned, and 
almost succeeded in so doing.-' Hut their bad faith, and the 
honourable comluct of the Romans dc( ideil Porsena to break with 
the rarcjuins, to raise the siege, to restore the hostages, Cloeli.i 
being jiresented over and above with a horse and armour, and to 
give back the Roman prisoners without ransom. lie led his nun 
away from the Janiculum, making a free present of his camp 
apparatus and stores to the people. These things were sold by th« 
quaestors ; which gave rise to a symbolic expression or formula 
used even in the tlays of Livy, in selling public goods by auction. 
Such an auction was called "Sale of Porsena's goods.' The Senate 
in gratitude voted him a throne and sceptre of ivory, a golden 
crown, and purple robe. 

It does not follow because we have good reason to believe that 
the cud of Porsena's siege was not as Livy and others represent it, 
that the whole of the heroic incidents in this story are incredible in 
themselves. They are not without a certain consistency and reason- 
ableness, and they did not appear absurd or mythical to the Romans 
of a later date. There are, however, certain facts about this 
Etruscan invasion which seem established. First, it is obvious that 
in coming against Rome Porsena either tlid not intend to restore the 



' Livy [W. 13) says ihat the restoration of the Tar{|uins themselves was 
demanded, hut only j>ro forma. Dionysius says only the restitution of their 
property. 

- Accortling to Dionysius the hostages were only saved from the Tarquins at 
the very gate of the camp (v. 33) ; accordinc: to another story the Tarquins did 
manage to intercept them, and killed all but the daughter of Valerius Poplicola, 
who escaped l)y swimming (Tliny .V. //. 34, § 29). 



VI SUBMISSION OF THE ROMANS 67 

Tarqiiins, or quickly abandoned the intention for other reasons than 
the want of power to enforce it. Secondly, that he never actually The city 
took the city. The distinction drawn by Tacitus between the cases of ""^ <''"''''- 
Porsena and the C'.auls, in the one case speakini^ of the city as dediia^ ' - ^'^'^'^"■ 
in the other as capta^ shows that his information, whatever it was 
worth, did not convey the idea of an actual capture. Thirdly, that 
Porsena did not leave Rome on the t;encrous temis described in the 
story. Pliny had seen the treaty, and he tells us that in it was a 77/,. 
clause forbiddin^^ the Romans to use iron except for agricultural h'omnns 
purposes.' That is, the people were disarmed, and would have to 'f^prnrJ 0/ 
be dependent on a sujierior lord for defence, and would be prevented '^''""• 
from interfering; in whatever plans of aggrandisement in central Italy 
the Etruscans might entertain. And this they themselves acknow- 
ledged by their gift of the ivory tlirone and sceptre, the cnnvn of 
gold and purple robe sent to Porsena. .Such terms would only have 
been submitted to by a people unable to resist. 

What the real juirpose of the Ktruscan invasion was is shown 
perhaps by the secjuel. And the failure of that purpose involves 
a natural explanation of what seems a certain fact, namely, that the 
Romans only abided for a very short time by the humiliating terms 
of the treaty, which dci)rived them not only of the means of extending 
their torrilor^', but also of self defen< e. 

When Porsena retired from the Janiculum, we arc told, he left sojjiob. 

his son Arruns in command of the Ktruscan forces to continue the -f"""'^ '" 

war in Latium. His first act was to attack Aricia. This indicates ''.""": 

Siff^f of 
the object of the invasion. Aricia, or what was afterwards the .\ppiiin jricia. 

road, was the first stronghold on the way to the territory of the \'oIsci, 

and thence to Capua, and the other towns in Campania, which were 

(Icpendent on the Ktruscans. Hence a conquest of Latium was 

important to them as securing a communication by land between 

themselves and their dependencies in central Italy. It was not, 

however, only to the Latin communities that this was a subject for 

alarm. The Creek states throughout Italy had been oppressed and 

harassed by the Ktruscan corsairs. As the Persians to the 

Asiatic and even the Kuropean Creeks about this time, as the 

Carthaginians to the Creeks of .Sicily, so to the Italian Creeks the 

Ktruscans were oppressors whose enmity had been often experienced 

and was constantly dreaded. Accordingly we find that it is not only 

the Latin and X'olscian jieoples of Tusculum and Antium that send Kf lief of 

help to Aricia ; a strong force came also from the Campanian ■f^'"" 

Cumae, the oldest Creek colony in Italv. It had already repelled •{?"" 

^ ' . ' C urn tie. 

a formidable attack of a mixeil force of l-'.truscaus, Umbrians, and 
' Tac. //is/, iii. 72 ; Pliny .V. //. 34, § 139. 



68 HISTORY OF ROME 



bank of l/ic 
Tiber 



Daunii. In this war a youn;:^ kni-ht named Aristodcmus had so 
distinguished himself as to provoke the jealousy of the oligarchical 
rulers of Cumae, who were glad to send him on the hazardous expedi- 
tion to the relief of Aricia, and did their best to secure his fall.^ He 
triumphed, however, over all difficulties. The Etruscan chieftain was 
slain in battle, the siege of Aricia raised, and the broken remnants 
of the invading force compelled to take refuge in Rome. They were 
so kindly treated that they preferred to remain there, and built 
houses for themselves in a district long afterwards marked by the 
name of the Tuscics vicus^ one of the streets leading into the I*\)rum 
between the Capitol and the Palatine. - 
The Rom The kindness shown to these Etruscans was rewarded by Porsena 

ms irroiYK restoring the Roman territory on the right bank of the Tiber, of 
///<■ -'v;/// which they had been deprived in the previous year. At any rate we 
may infer that the failure of the Etruscan arms at Aricia enabled 
the Romans before long not only to secure once more the all-import- 
ant command of the right bank of the river, but also to ignore the 
terms of the treaty which forbade them the use of arms. 
I'roiit We know hardly any particulars of the twelve years in which 

///,■ i/r/cat Rome appears to have gradually recovered from her fall, and to 
"f /^'>' have regained her old position of superiority in the Latin League. 

invadn-i Pcrhaps the danger which had lately threatened them from Etruria 
to the re- taught some of the towns to regard the weakening of Rome as the 
-niranee of loss of a necessary bulwark. But this did not come at once ; it was 
preceded by a period of hostility on the part of the Latins, accounted 
for in our authorities in the first place by the ceaseless activity of 
Tarquinius and his family till his death in 496 ; and, in the second 
place, by the view which the Latins took of the position of Rome in 
regard to the Etruscans. They charged the Romans with having 
given Porsena a free passage into Latium, and with having harboured 
the Etruscans vanquished at Aricia, It does not indeed seem 
improbable that for a time, from policy or under compulsion, Rome 
was acting in close alliance with the still formidable Etruscan power ; 
and that the Latins, who had lately, by prompt combination and by 
summoning help from Campania, succeeded in repelling a serious 
Etruscan invasion, might regard Rome's position as treasonable and 
as dangerous to their common interests. At any rate it is not until 

^ The career of Aristodcmus forms an episode in Dionysius (viii. 2-12) very 
interesting as a piece of the history of an Itahan Greek town, but not in place 
here. He dates the assault on Cumae as Olymp. 64, B.C. 524-520, Just at this 
time the Persians were securing Egypt and becoming known to Carthage. 

- It seems certain that the Vicus Tuscus obtained its name from an earlier 
settlement of Etruscans in Rome. Tacitus (.-/. 4, 69) refers it to the followers of 
Coelius Vibenna in the time of Tarquinius Priscus, but owns that authorities differ 
as to the particular king under whom the settlement was made. 



Rome into 
the I.atin 
I.eai:;iu\ 
505-I93- 



WAR WITH THE SABINES 69 



about five years after the struggle with the Latins had terminated in 
the admission of Rome to the Latin League, that we find her engaged 
in a contest with an Etruscan power — her old enemy Veii. 

But before the hostility of the Latins had come to the point of War 
actual war, Rome was already engaged in a fierce struggle with «"''''^ ^^<^ 
another enemy. As early as 505 the Sabines seem to have ^^^^"^^-^ 
taken advantage of the weakness of Rome to attack her territory. ^^■^"^^'' 
For the next three years there was constant war between the two 
peoples. The details are obscure and generally perhaps fabulous ; 
but it seems clear that by some means Rome did manage to 
strengthen herself in the direction of the Sabine hills. Fidenae, 
important as commanding a bridge over the Tiber, was held for 
a time by a Roman garrison : Crustumerium and Cameria were 
taken, and the powerful town of Praeneste was induced to quit the 
Latin League, which now excluded Rome, and join her fortunes with 
those of the Republic. The heroes of these wars are Publius and Publius 
Marcus Valerius Poplicola. The former died about 503, after aud 
being four times consul, having twice triumphed, yet so poor that ^^^'1^*;^"^ 
he was buried at the cost of the State. He is the Washington of ^"P^'"''^''' 
Rome ; and every virtue, civil and military, was attributed to him. 
But whatever may have been the details of this struggle, it is clear 
that Rome resisted the attacks of the Sabines, and on the whole with 
success. To have done so she must have had arms. The Sabine 
wars, therefore, mark the first step of her recovery in getting rid of 
the humiliating conditions of the Etruscan treaty. 

Another sign of reviving vigour is disj)layed in the fact, if it be hmnigra 
a fact, that at this period a powerful chief at the head of his clan ti<^'n of 
migrated from the Sabine town Regillum (of uncertain site) to ^^^'' 
Rome. Atta Clausus and his clan were received into the number ^j^^^hh 
of patrician gentes, — a precedent, perhaps the first, for the right 'family. 
afterwards exercised by the Senate and later on by the Emperor 
of raising families to the Patriciate. This was the origin of the great 
Claudian gens ; while the property granted to him north of the Anio 
gave its name to the Claudian tribe. It may be safely concluded 
that Atta Clausus would not have migrated to a city hopelessly weak 
or at the feet of a foreign prince. ^ 

But this revival of Roman power and influence was a work of 
some years, and not the result of any great and sudden blow. The 
Sal)ine war, however, is said to have been ended for the present 
by a great battle fought near Cures, in which the Roman legions Battle if 
were commanded by the consul Spurius Cassius Viscellinus (502). Cures, so. 
To the same man is attributed with more certainty the diplomacy 

^ A less credited account placed the migration of Atta Clausus in the time of 
Romulus and Titus Tatius (Sueton. Tib. i). 



70 HISTORY OF ROME 



and the 

Latifi 

League 



the lake 
Regillus 
4<)8. 



Spiirius by which at the end of the struggle with the Latins Rome again 
Cassius became a member of the League.^ For though the Sabines and 
the towns in north-east Latium, which were half Sabine also, were 
forced for a time to suspend their hostility, Rome had still to face 
the attack of the Latin League fostered by the intrigues of the 
Tarquins, supported by the people of Aricia, and led by Mamilius of 
Tusculum. 

Battle of When, after some years of preparation, the cities of the League 

took up arms, the Latin host encamped near the lake Regillus. 
This has been plausibly identified with a small volcanic crater, arti- 
ficially drained in the seventeenth century, at the foot of the hill on 
which the modern Frascati stands. There the famous battle was 
fought in which the Romans won a glorious victory over their 
enemies. The danger had appeared so formidable that the consuls 
had been superseded by a dictator, Aulus Postumius Albus, who, 
with his master of the horse, T. Aebutius Elva, enrolled the legions 
and commanded them in the field. The Latins were assisted by a 
corps of Roman exiles led by Sextus Tarquinius, or, as some said, 
by the old king Tarquin himself.''^ In the battle, as usual in battles 
which necessarily consisted in actual hand to hand fighting, the 
salient incidents remembered in tradition, or imagined by the 
chroniclers, were the personal encounters between the leading men 
on each side. Thus M. Valerius, enraged at the sight of the younger 
Tarquin, dashes at him ; Tarquin retreats, and Valerius, becoming 
entangled in the enemy's line, is transfixed by a spear. Again, later 
on, T. Herminius recognises the Latin leader Mamilius, drives his 
spear through him, and is himself so grievously wounded, whilst 
engaged in stripping the spoils from the fallen enemy, that he is 
carried back to the camp only to die. The battle, according to both 
accounts which we have of it, was decided principally by the picked 
horsemen serving as the dictator's bodyguard, who, seeing the 
infantry waver, sprang from their horses to join in the melee, and 
only mounted them again to follow the flying Latins. Such incidents 
may be imaginary, but they are true in spirit. As in the battles of 
the Middle Ages, before the invention of gunpowder and arms of 
precision, the personal prowess of individuals must have had a 
decisive influence on the final result which can hardly be realised 

^ Livy (ii. 33) appears to have seen a pillar engraved with a treaty, in which 
the name of Spurius Cassius was inscribed. 

2 Livy (ii. 19), qiianqua^n jam aetate et viribus erat gravior. Dionysius says 
Sextus, and is accordingly accused by Ihne of inventing a new Tarquin, because 
he found that the old man must be past ninety by this time. The traditions 
followed by Dionysius's authorities may well have varied, nor does it seem certain 
that Sextus was yet dead. His assassination would be more probable after the 
hopes of the Tarquins were wrecked (Livy i. 60). 



VI BATTLE OF THE LAKE REGILLUS 71 

by those conversant with modern warfare ; and the superiority of the 
mounted soldier to the foot in all circumstances, except when the 
phalanx was perfectly unbroken, must have been almost as great as 
that of the ironclad knight over the peasant with pike and target. 
Finally, though doubtless dust obscured much, the absence of smoke 
helped to make such deeds of gallantry more conspicuous. 1 

In the midst of the fight, when the day seemed going against the Castor and 
Romans, the dictator Aulus vowed a temple to Castor, which he Pollux. 
afterwards began in the Forum, and which his son dedicated. Its 
ruins still stand on the south-western side of the Forum. In after 
times the tale was told that to Postumius and his staff" on the field 
of battle two strange horsemen had appeared, exceeding beautiful, 
and tall above the stature of men, who rode in front of the Roman 
cavalry as they charged ; and that the same day at evening two 
young men were seen in the Forum, alike in age and height and 
beauty, with all the marks upon them of having come fresh from the 
fight. They washed the foam from their horses in the spring hard 
by the temple of Vesta ; and when men crowded round them to ask 
for news, they told them how the day had gone and that the Romans 
were the victors. Then they departed from the Forum, and were 
seen of no man again. 

The ides of Ouinctilis (i 5th July) was kept as a festival in remem- The parade 
brance of the victory ; sacrifices v/ere offered at the temple of Castor '^/ {'^^ 
built by Aulus in consequence of his vow, and a solemn parade was '"'^ 
held of the knights, clad in purple and crowned with olive, who rode 
in procession from the temple of Mars outside the wall to the temple 
of Castor and Pollux. 

This celebration of the day, which doubtless gave rise to the 
legend, — though such appearances were easily believed in a time of 
excitement, and accordingly are constantly heard of in connexion 
with great battles in antiquity, — shows at least that the Romans had 
the tradition of some great and important deliverance which the battle 
of the lake Regillus secured to them. It is, however, an isolated 
fact in the struggle. The years which follow embrace no great or Death of 
decisive event ; for three years there was " neither war nor a certain T<^' 
peace," says Livy. But the death of Superbus at Cumae (496) 
relieved the Romans of one source of constant uneasiness, and there 
were signs of a steady growth. Fresh colonists were sent to Signia. 

1 Mommsen (i. 349) speaks of the legend of the victory of the lake Regillus 
as "unusually vivid and various in its hues," and seems to accept it as a real 
victory of Rome over the rest of ihc Latin League. Ihne will have none of it. 
He imagines a division of Latium for and against the Etruscan pretensions : the 
anti-Tuscan party, which included Rome, were successful, and Rome, having 
thus obtained independence by the help of the Latins, treated with the League as 
an independent nation. 



qut7nus 
Superbus, 



72 



HISTORY OF ROME 



which was an important place as commanding the road to the Her- 
nici ; and the number of the tribes was increased, which impHes an 
increase of territory. Such fighting as took place was no longer with 
the Latini, but with the Volscians, Aequians, Aurunci, and Sabines. 

The extension of the power of the Romans at the end of the 
regal period had brought them into collision with the Volscians, and 
it seems certain that at this time Antium, Circeii, and Terracina, 
towns on the Volscian coast, were in some way under the protection 
of Rome.i liut this progress was not always maintained, and many 
vicissitudes may be traced — Antium now being free, now under the 
Romans. It was natural that the Volscians should take the oppor- 
tunity of Rome's weakness to recover their control over these places. 
They had threatened, we are told, an attack before the Latin war, 
but had been kept in check by a movement of Roman troops, and 
had been compelled to give hostages. After the battle of the lake 
Rcgillus they had endeavoured again to renew their attack upon the 
Roman territory. They made a league with the Hernici, and sent 
messengers to the Latin towns to instigate them once more to take 
up arms. But the Latins were unwilling to move after their late 
defeat, and even arrested the Volscian legates and handed them 
over to the consuls. In gratitude for this 6000 Latin captives, 
then confined at Rome, were restored without ransom, and the 
question of renewing the League with the Latin towns was referred 
to the consuls of the next year. Whatever may be the exact facts 
of these transactions, thus much again seems clear, that in this period 
Rome was once more taking her place in the Latin League, and 
coming to be regarded, not as an enemy, but as the champion of the 
Latins. In the struggles periodically recurring in the following 
years the Latins act as the faithful outposts of Rome, and warn the 
consuls of threatened invasions. There is no sign of their jealousy 
being roused by additions made from time to time to the Roman 
territory, or of their seeking to take any advantage when the Romans 
were engaged with the Sabines on the north-east, or with the Aurunci 
on the south. And when, by the diplomacy of Spurius Cassius, now 
consul for the second time, Rome once more became formally a 
member of the Latin League, the treaty seems to have been a recog- 
nition of a state of things already practically existing. This is the 
first step indeed in Rome's advancement from which there was no real 
recoil. The League towns, with which were joined the Hernici in 
486, soon found themselves practically subjects of Rome, nor was 
any serious attempt made to change this until the war of 340. 

From the time of the renewal of the Romano -Latin League 



^ See the treaty with Carthage (Polyb. iii. 22). The early c^ate of this treaty, 
denied by Mommsen, who places it after 348, is generally admitted. 



VI ROME AND THE LATIN LEAGUE 73 

(493) to nearly the end of the century (403) there is a constant iVars 7vi/k 
recurrence of warfare with the Volscians, varied by similar struggles Vohcians, 
with Sabines and Aequians. They seldom rose above the dignity ■^^^^>^"^^. 
of border raids, though there was often much spoil, and several ^2equiatis 
triumphs were celebrated. At times the enemy ventured to approach ^gj.^oj. ' 
the city itself, and the citizens were called to arms when " the smoke 
from burning homesteads and the flight of the rustics " gave warning 
that the Volscian, Aequian, or Sabine host was on the march. On 
one occasion (460) the Capitol itself was seized by a Sabine named 
Appius Herdonius. Rowing down the Tiber under cover of dark- Appius 
ness, with some 4000 followers, composed of exiles and slaves, he Herdomus 
landed at the foot of the Capitol where there was no defending wall, ^r^'^1% / 
and succeeded in occupying the summit and the temple of Jupiter. 
It does not appear that he was acting for the Sabines. It was the 
adventure of a lawless chieftain and his followers, and there was no 
force at hand to co-operate with him. He relied on notorious dis- 
sensions then dividing patrician and plebeian in the agitation for a 
written constitution, and accordingly proclaimed equality for plebeians 
and liberty for slaves. It seems scarcely credible that, with an 
audacious enemy occupying the very Capitol, the Tribunes should 
have instigated the plebeians to refrain from fighting ; and it is at 
least as probable, as suggested by Livy, that the patricians feared to 
arm the urban proletariat, and wished to have the credit for them- 
selves and their clients. In answer to Herdonius's proclamation, 
however, no important defection took place, even among the slaves, 
and the adventurers were quickly captured and destroyed, though 
with some hard fighting, in which the consul Valerius fell. 

The struggle with the Aequians appears to have constantly The 
centred round Mount Algidus, one of the Alban heights frequently Aeqmans. 
occupied by them as a base of operations against the Roman 
territory ; and the battles which stand out conspicuously amidst T^vo baitle% 
the monotony of the constantly recurring details of the war- of Mointt 
fare are two fought there, the first in 458, when Cincinnatus con- fj^ "l'^ 
quered Cloelius Gracchus ; the second in 428, when Postumius 
Tibcrtus was victorious over a combined force of Aequians and 
Volscians. 

With the Volscians the fighting, though not confined to one The I'ol- 
place, often came to a head at Antium. That town, long an object ^'^"''"^• 
of contention, appears to have been under the protection ot the 
Romans at the end of the regal period. In the weakness which 
followed the fall of the Tarquins it had regained its independence, 
or had been forcibly annexed again by the Volscians. It is said to 
have been taken and colonised by the Romans in 468, but the 
colonists were not numerous enough to counteract the inclinations of 



74 



IIISTORV OF ROME 



the Volscian inhabitants left in it, and in 459 it revolted. From 
that time it is the scene of constant fighting. 

To these difificulties must be added that of pestilence. Eight 
visitations are recorded as occurring in this century (500-400), and 
four of them within a space of twenty years, 452, 435, 432, 431. 
In the first of these Dionysius asserts that nearly all the slaves and 
half the free population perished. Yet Rome, united with the Latin 
towns, was steadily growing. Velitrae had been colonised before, 
and was strengthened with fresh colonists in 492. In the same 
year Norba, commanding the Pomptine district, was colonised ; 
Ardea in 439, Labicum in 416 ; and Circeii must have been recovered 
in this period, if not for the first time colonised. The census is only 
given in 465 and 459, but the numbers show a satisfactory increase. 

To these wars belong the famous tales of Coriolanus and Cincin- 
natus, preserved, perhaps, and adorned with roniantic details in 
family traditions, but reflecting the spirit which the Roman believed 
to have animated the age. 

In the early wars with the A'olscians the Romans were besieging 
Corioli, a town not far from Anlium, which the Volscians had 
wrested from the Latins. One da)- a sudden advance from Antium 
was made upon the besiegers by the Volscians, and at the same time 
a sally by the besieged garrison in Corioli. It chanced that a young- 
noble named Caius Marcius was on duty in the Roman outposts 
near this town. He not only succeeded in repulsing the sally, but 
forced his way through the gates with the fi>ing garrison, set fire 
to the buildings near the walls, and took it. The cry of the 
captured city animated the Romans outside, so that they conquered 
the Volscians who came from Antium to relieve it. Thus Caius 
Marcius gained great glory, and was ever afterwards called Corio- 
lanus. r>ut he was a stern aristocrat, hating the privileges which 
the people, by the help of their tribunes, were beginning to get 
for themselves ; and when there Avas a dearth at Rome, and the 
Senate purchased corn from Sicily and would have sold it to the 
people at a small price, Caius Marcius opposed this relief, and 
declared that the plebs by their seditions had caused the dearth, and 
should be allowed to suffer for it. He was almost slain as he left the 
Senate House ; and the P^athers were so alarmed at the popular fury 
that they were obliged to allow Marcius to be impeached before the 
people. He would not appear, but went into exile among the 
Volscians, threatening vengeance against his country. The Volscians 
received him gladly, and their chief, Attius Tullius, entertained him 
as his guest. Presently, by the machinations of Attius Tullius, war 
was once more begun against Rome, and Coriolanus, with Tullius, 
led the Volscian armv. Everywhere he was successful ; town after 



flatus. 



VI LEGENDS OF CORIOLANUS AND CINCINNATUS 75 

town fell into his hands, till at length he pitched his camp five miles 
from the city. The frightened Senate sent legates to treat of peace. 
They were sent back with a stern message, ordering the Romans to 
make full restitution of all that they had taken from the Volscians. 
When other legates were sent, they were refused admittance into the 
camp. The sacerdotes with the emblems of their holy ofiice were in 
like manner repulsed. Then the matrons begged his mother Veturia 
and his wife Volumnia, with her two young sons, to go to the \^olscian 
camp and entreat the fierce Caius Marcius to spare the city. At 
first, seeing only a crowd of women, he remained obdurate to their 
tears and cries for mercy : but when he distinguished his mother, 
he leapt from his seat and would have embraced her ; but she 
repelled him so long as he was minded to enslave his country. 
While he stood hesitating his wife and children embraced his knees, 
and overcome by their importunity he led the Volscian army away 
and returned to Antium, where some say that he was slain by the 
Volscians as a traitor, and others that he lived to a great age, 
declaring that only an old man knew the misery of exile. 

Again in 458 the Acquians under Gracchus were engaged in one Legend 
of their periodical raids. As often before, they occupied a camp of Cincin- 
on Mount Algidus, and the consul Lucius Minucius was sent against 
them. But Minucius proved himself timid and incompetent. The 
enemy nearly succeeded in blockading him in his camp, and 
there was danger of the Roman army being starved into surrender. 
Hefore the investment was quite complete some horsemen broke out 
and made their way to Rome. A war was going on at the same 
time with the Sabines, but the Senate recalled the other consul from 
the Sabine war and forced him to name a dictator. With the 
approval of all he named L. Quintius Cincinnatus. The officers sent 
to tell him of his appointment found him working on his small farm 
across the Tiber, some said digging a trench, others guiding the 
plough. When he heard the news he called to his wife to bring his 
toga from the cottage, and, wiping off the sweat and soil from his 
face, was taken on board a vessel up the Tiber, and entered the city 
preceded by his lictors and escorted by a great crowd of people. 
Next day he ordered all business to be suspended, all shops shut, 
and all men of military age to assemble on the Campus Martins 
with provisions for five days, while those who were too old for 
service should busy themselves in preparing food for his camp. By 
midnight he had reached the Aequian lines. Each of his soldiers 
carried one or more stakes,^ which they drove into the ground when 
they arri\ed, and before daybreak the Aequians found themselves 

^ This was long u custom with Roman soldiers (see Polyb. xviii. 18). 



76 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Effect of 
the century 
of wars 
oti the 
Romans. 



surrounded by a palisade, and shut in between two armies. Forced 
to surrender, their lives were spared, but they were compelled to 
submit to the disgrace of "passing under the yoke." Two spears 
were fixed upright in the ground and a third laid across them. The 
defeated army, stripped of all arms, marched under this as a symbol 
of their submission. Their camp was given up to the Romans with 
all it contained, and Quintius returned laden with booty to celebrate 
his triumph. On the sixteenth day from that on which he had been 
named dictator he abdicated his office, having in that time saved a 
Roman army, gained immense spoils, and won great glory for the 
Roman name. 

This constant warfare had a lasting effect on Roman character 
and the political constitution. The frequent need of levies gave the 
plebs opportunities of extorting one right after another from the 
privileged classes. Civil rights were not valued where all power 
was in the hands of a single king. But with the new state of things 
the vote became important, and as the burden of military service 
and tribute fell on all in various degrees, the other privileges were 
sure to be demanded also. When the next great struggle with Veii 
was ended important steps had been taken towards civil equality. 



Authorities. — We still depend almost entirely on Livy (ii.-iv, ); Diony- 
sius, v.-xi., is continuous to B.C. 459; but of the remaining books there are 
only fragments remaining. Plutarch, Poplicola and C. Marcius Coriolanus (the 
story of Coriolanus is told also by Appian, Res Ital. fr. v.) Zonaras vii. 12-19 ; 
Florus i. 9 ; Aurelius Victor, de Viris Ilhist. 10-19 ; Eutropius i. 9-19 ; 
Orosius ii. 13. 



CHAPTER VII 

ROME AND VEII 
I 482-395 

Enmity of Veii and Rome — State of Etruria in fifth century B.C.— General move- 

! ment against Hellenism — The Fabii — Farther movements of Veientines and 

Sabines — Fidenae and Veii — A. Cornelius Cossus and the spoiia opima — The 

Etruscan League refuse help to Veii — Twenty years' truce (425) — Samnites 

! drive the Etruscans from Campania — Last war with Veii, its siege and fall 

' (405-396) — The effect of the long siege — The Alban lake — M. Furius Camillus 

I — Stories connected with the fall of Veii— Fall of Melpum — Capture of Falerii, 

Volsinii, and Sutrium. 

The enmity between Rome and Veii was of long standing. Six Long- 
I wars are recorded in the regal period, and that which ended with standi?ig 
j the fall of Veii was the fourteenth. This ever-recurring hostility ^^'^"^h' 
( needs probably no explanation beyond the fact that the interests of ^^'^^," , ^ 
j the two towns were opposed to each other and their territories con- yeii. 
\ tiguous. A few hours' brisk walking would bring a man from the 
! gates of Rome to those of Veii ; and when Rome obtained territory 
i on the right bank of the Tiber, some of it at any rate must have 
I been at the expense of Veil. Thus when Porsena deprived the 
I Romans of their lands on the right bank, he is said to have given 
] them to the Veientines ; when he restored them to Rome he had to 

take them from Veii. Putting aside all question as to the personality 
j of Porsena, the transaction represents what must almost necessarily 

have happened. It must always have been a question between the 
I two States as to which of them had the command of the right bank 

of the river in the neighbourhood of what was afterwards the Milvian 

bridge. The successful claim of the one must have been the loss of 

the other. 

This sufficiently explains their constant quarrels. Nor is it sur- The 

prising that the Veientines should so long have held their own in ^irength 
\ the dispute. A city, not less in magnitude or weaker in position '^ "'' 
f 



78 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



State of 
Etr/tria. 



General 

movement 

against 

Hellenism, 



in ivhich 
Veil takes 
part, 482. 



than Rome itself, Veil, as an outpost of the Etruscan League In the 
direction of Latium, would also be able to count on the support of 
the rest of Etruria in maintaining the contest. It was when that 
support failed her, and she was left to fight Rome almost single- 
handed, that she at length succumbed to the growing power of her 
great neighbour. The history of her fall, therefore, must be looked 
at in some degree in connexion with the general history of Etruria. 

We have already seen that the Etruscans had established settle- 
ments in Campania, originally, doubtless, as commercial centres. 
Their supremacy at sea had long made them an object of fear and 
hatred to the Greek towns of Italy ; and they were constantly in 
league with the Carthaginians, those other mortal foes of the Greeks. 
We have seen that they had joined in an unsuccessful attack upon 
Cumae (524), and had made a great attempt to secure a free road 
through Latium to their possessions in central Italy (507-506). The 
resistance which they experienced in these two cases finds parallels 
in other parts of Italy. In 494 we hear of Anaxilas, tyrant of 
Rhegium, erecting a fort on the Scyllaean rock to repel them ; and 
in 479 Hiero of Syracuse, in answer to an appeal for help, sent ships 
to Cumae and inflicted a severe defeat upon the Etruscan fleet near 
that town. " They humbled the Tuscans," says Diodorus ; and from 
that time forth they seem rather to act on the defensive than to 
venture upon attacking the Italian towns.^ 

But it is impossible to disregard the fact that these transactions 
synchronise closely with the struggle that was going on between the 
Persians and Greeks in the East and the Carthaginians and Greeks 
in Sicily. On the very day, it is said, on which the Persian invasion 
was crushed at Salamis, Hiero repelled a similar attack of Cartha- 
ginians upon Sicily (480) ; and there is good reason for believing 
that the Carthaginians were acting in concert with the Persians. 
The Etruscan fleet which threatened Cumae in that year, and was 
destroyed in the next, seems to have been also taking its part in a 
great movement for the destruction of Hellenism and subjugation of 
Greece and Italy. Rome, barring the way between Etruria and the 
South, was one obstacle to be removed. It may therefore fairly be 
regarded as an indication that Veil was taking part in the same 
movement when, after a quiescence of some twenty-five years, her 
soldiers once more entered Roman territory (482). We are told 
that, in the almost annual raids that followed, the Veientines were 
supported by auxiliaries from all Etruria, with the object of taking 
advantage of the internal quarrels in Rome to destroy her. 

In the battle of 482, as in the succeeding campaign, the names 



See p. 13. 



VII THE LEGEND OF THE FABH 79 

of various members of the Fabian gens are prominent. The Fasti The Fabii. 
for seven years in succession (485-479) show a Fabius as one of the 
consuls ; and the family seems to have regarded the Veientine war 
as its special province. Hence the famous story of the fall of the 
306 members of the gens. 

Kaeso Fabius Vibulanus was consul for the third time in 479. Xaeso 
He came, it is said, into the Senate-House and proposed that, instead Fabiits 
of sending the usual army against the Veientines, he, at the head of Vibulanus. 
his gens, should undertake the Veientine war. The offer was gladly 
accepted, and amidst the praises and prayers of the people Kaeso, 
in full military array, led his clansmen out of Rome by the For/a 
Carmentalis^ the right arch of which was ever afterwards regarded 
as ill-omened for the commencement of a journey. Livy and Ovid 
\ seem to confine the numbers who thus sallied forth to the 306 
members of the Fabian gens, but other versions of the tale represent 
them as being accompanied by clients and dependents, amounting in 
all to about 4000. It is indeed unlikely that men of their rank and 
wide connexions would fail to be followed by clients and slaves. 
Their object was to occupy some permanent post in the Veientine 
lands, from which to prevent inroads upon the Roman territory, and 
I to watch for opportunities of inflicting injury upon Vcii. 
I The greatness and magnificence of the town of Veii are attested 
( by ancient writers, and have been confirmed by the few scattered Expedition 

remains on the site, which, as far as they go, indicate a town at <■'/ fit^ 
• least as large as Athens. It stood about twelve miles from Rome ^''"'"' ■t79- 
I in the fork of two streams, which, uniting on the south-east of the 
I town, form the river called Cremera, the modern La Vulca. When 
1 the Fabii reached the valley of the Cremera they pitched their camp 
' on a steep hill, and fortified it by a double trench and many They 
\ towers. This post they held through the winter, repelling all attacks f^^'^^fy 
' of the Veientines, and repeatedly plundering their territory. Next ^^ ^ j^^ 
year the Veientine army was defeated by the consul L. Aemilius at in the 
a place on what was afterwards the Flaminian road, called ad Veientine 
Rubra Saxa^ and were compelled to sue for peace. For some ^<^^^^^<>U- 
reason, of which we are not informed, the people of Veii did not 
accept the terms offered by the Romans, and resolved to try once 
more to dislodge the Fabii. The struggle went on through another 
winter, and after numerous less important engagements they at The Fabii 
length succeeded by stratagem. Choosing a plain so surrounded fdHintoau 
by covert as to admit of an ambush for a large force, they turned '^"'^"^ • 
cattle out to feed apparently unwatched. The Fabii descended 
into the plain and began driving off the cattle. Then the Veien- 
tines rose from their ambush and slew them to a man. 1 he one 
boy who survived of the whole clan was destined to be the 



8o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The ex- 
planation 
of the story. 



The 

Veientines 
occnpy the 
J an ic II linn, 
476. 



They ally 
themselves 
7viih the 
Sabines. 



475-43S- 
A period of 
peace with 
I 'eii. 



ancestor of the famous Fabius Cunctator, who broke the power of 
Hannibal. 1 

Such a tradition is not Hkely to have arisen without some founda- 
tion in fact. It probably represents a great disaster sustained by a 
Roman force about this time, in which the Fabii were largely repre- 
sented.- But that the whole Fabian gens should thus have all 
perished in a single day involves the all but impossible circumstance 
that every Fabius but one was of military age, only one of the 306 
having a son below that age ; while in fact we find a P\'ibius in the list 
of consuls for 467 and 464, ten and thirteen years after the alleged 
occurrence. 

Inspirited by this success the Veientines made more determined 
attacks upon Roman territory, even occupying Janiculum and 
threatening Rome with a siege (476), until, after various minor 
engagements, the consul Spurius Servilius stormed their camp on 
Janiculum. He was reinforced by his colleague Aulus Virginius, just 
when he seemed about to suffer a signal defeat, and the two together 
cut to pieces the army of the invader. 

The Veientines now sought alliance with the Sabines. A Sabine 
army crossed the Tiber, and lay encamped under the walls of Veii. 
The Romans sent a force under the consul Publius Valerius, which 
made a vigorous assault upon the Sabines. The Veientines sallied 
forth to their relief, but after a stubborn fight the camp was taken 
and the Sabines dispersed (475)- 

For thirty-seven years from this time we have no Veientine 
inroads recorded. It was a period of constant civil strife in Rome, 
with frequent intervals of wars with the Volscian and Aequian ; and 
yet Veii, Rome's implacable foe, seems not to have troubled her. 
The reason is probably to be found in the difficulties of the Etruscans. 
They were suffering from determined attacks in more than one 
direction. Their fleet was annihilated at Cumae in 474; in 458 a 
Syracusan fleet, first under Phayllus and then under Apellas, was 
plundering their settlements in Aethalia {Elba) and Corsica ; ^ the 
Gauls were threatening on the north ; and Veii was therefore not 
only called upon to contribute to the national defence, but could look 
for little help from the rest of Etruria. 

The immediate occasion of the next war was a sudden revolt of 
F denae (438). This town had in very early times been partially 



^ Another version of the story attributed the destruction of the Fabii to an 
ambush set along the road to Rome, whither they had gone to offer a family 
sacrifice. 

2 This seems the view of Diodorus Siculus, xi. 53. Niebuhr and Mommsen 
regard it as a kind of " secession " of the Fabii for political motives. 

2 Diodorus xi. 88. 



FIDENAE AND VEII 8i 



gains the 

spolia 

opima. 



occupied by Roman coloni,^ but from time immemorial it had 43S-4JJ. 
been closely connected with Veii. At this period the earlier element R^'^^lt of 
of the population apparently found itself strong enough to revert to ^^^f^,^^ 
the traditional policy of the city. A league was made with Lar league ivith 
Tolumnius, king of Veii : and when four Roman commissioners were Veii. 
sent to demand an explanation, they were put to death by the 
Fidenates, at the instigation of Tolumnius.'-^ Though Tolumnius tried ^Var and 
to disclaim this breach of international law, the Romans at once pro- "^^^^^'y 
claimed war both with Veii and Fidenae ; and in the next year ^^;;^^;,^ 
(437) a battle was fought which appears to have been unfavourable 
to the Roman arms. A dictator, Mamercus Aemihus, was named ; 
veteran centurions w-ere called out ; and the enemy were gradually 
mancEuvred out of the Roman territory, and forced to take up a 
position on the line of hills between the Anio and Fidenae, until 
auxiliaries arrived from Falerii. . Encouraged by this reinforcement 
they ventured to descend into the plain, but were driven back into 
their camp with great slaughter. King Tolumnius was slain and 
spoiled by A. Cornelius Cossus, who thus won the spolia opima — the Cornelius 
second instance recorded in Roman history. The sight of the head Cossus 
I of their king on the victor's spear began the rout of the Veientines, 
I which the Roman dictator turned into a disastrous flight. Many 
I of the Fidenates saved themselves by retreating to the hills ; but 
Cossus crossed the Tiber with some cavalry, and brought back large 
' spoil from the Veientine territory. On his return to Rome the 
I dictator celebrated a triumph : but all eyes were turned, not on 
• him, but on Cossus carrying the spoils of Tolumnius (437). ^ 
\ But neither Veii nor Fidenae was long cowed by this disaster. 

^ Before the system of sending colonies to towns in Italy (see p. 164) was fully 
established, it was the custom in case of conquered towns to confiscate part of 
their territory and settle thereon Roman farmers {coloni) with a certain allotment 
of the land. 

■^ Their names were C. Fulcinius, Cloelius TuUus, Sp. Ancius, L. Roscius. 
Their statues were placed on the Rostra and were extant in Cicero's time (Livy 
iv. 17 ; Cic. Phil. iv. 9 ; Pliny A^. H. xxxv. 11). 

^ Livy (iv. 20) has a curious discussion on this subject. It was the rule, he 
says, that the spolia opima could only be gained by a leader who slew and stripped 
the leader of the enemy [quae dux duci dctraxit) ; therefore there was a question 
whether Cossus— whom he calls a military tribune — could gain them. When 
, Augustus inspected the temple of Jupiter Feretrius with a view to its restoration, 
he found the cuirass of Tolumnius with an inscription mentioning Cossus as 
consul. But the Hb7-i lintci placed the consulship of C'ossus nine years later, at 
which date there was no mention in the Fasti of a Veientine war. Livy declines to 
solve the difficulty, but points out that a Cossus was consular tribune in 434 ; 
consul in 428 ; master of the horse, again to Mamercus, in 426 ; and seems to 
leave us to choose our year. In this last year (426) Diodorus (xii. 80) mentions 
an indecisive battle with the Fidenates, which would not answer to the battle 
mentioned in the text. 



82 HISTORY OF ROME 



435. Two years later (435) we find their combined army again invading 

FidcTiae 
taken. 



Etrtiscan 
cities 7-e.fuse 
to aid Veii, 
■^34-429. 



Roman territory nearly up to the Colline gate. Again a dictator 
was nominated (Q. Servilius), who raised an army and forced the 
enemy to retreat. Fidenae itself was besieged ; and at length, like 
Veii afterwards, taken by means of a mine or tunnel, by which the 
Roman soldiers got upon the rock of the citadel. Yet Fidenae does 
not appear to have been treated with harshness. New coloni indeed 
were settled there, but enough of the original inhabitants remained 
to give trouble again before long. 
The The success of Rome caused alarm throughout Etruria. The 

Faliscans had refused to take part in the last invasion ; but they still 
feared the vengeance of the Republic for their share in the previous 
war, and now joined the Veientines in a mission to the other towns 
of Etruria, to organise national succour for Veii. The Romans, 
alarmed at the prospect of an attack from united Etruria, again 
named a dictator. But they were soon reassured by news brought 
by merchants that the Etruscan congress at the temple of Voltumna ^ 
had refused to assist Veii. 
P^'^^fi For a few years, therefore, the Veientines were quiescent. But 

luoi'cmen s j^^ g ^|^^ again made raids on the Roman territory, in which 
in ./2S-423. . ' °. . . . ■^' 

certam of the Fidenates were accused of participating. No battle 

of any consequence, however, took place ; and, after some minor 
encounters near Momentum and Fidenae, a truce was arranged. 
But the Veientines broke it, and war, proclaimed in 426, was begun 
in the following year. A defeat sustained by the Romans at the 
beginning of the campaign of 425 caused once more the nomination 
of a dictator. The Veientine army was surrounded and destroyed. 
Fidenae was again captured, the city plundered, and many of the 
inhabitants, instead of being left as before to foment new rebellions, 
sold into slavery: and, though the town does not seem to have been 

4^5- destroyed, it was never of any influence again. The Veientines had 

lost more than an army : they had lost their base of operations 
against Latium, and had to accept a truce of twenty years. 

425-405- These years were eventful ones in the constitutional history of 

the Romans, and were not marked by any external wars of importance. 
But while they brought new strength and better social and political 
conditions to Rome, they witnessed internal strife at Veii, and deca- 
dence throughout Etruria. Not only were her maritime settlements 
harried by Syracusans, and her northern communities threatened 

^ The position of the Fanum Voltumnae is not known ; but it seems to have 
certainly been in northern Etruria, perhaps near Tarquinii (Dennis, Cities and 
Cemeteries of Etruria, ii. 33). The merchants would have been at the fair 
which seems to have accompanied the meeting of the congress, hke that at the 
lucus Feroniae and other places. 



7\ventv 
years truce 



Decadence 
of Eti 



VII THE LAST WAR WITH VEH 83 

by Gauls, but a new enemy had appeared. We do not know at The 
what age the Samnites arrived in Italy. But this powerful branch ^'"w'/^-f 
of the Sabellian stock 1 had long occupied the central district touch- i/ "^^ 
ing on the shore of the Adriatic between the rivers Atarnus and inEtruria. 
Frento, and was now pushing" down from the niountainous district 
of the centre into the fruitful plains to the west, supplanting the 
Etruscans in their ancient settlements in Campania. In 423 they 
took Capua, then called Volternum ; and before long became the 
dominant race in that district. Thus the Etruscans were being 
assailed on all sides. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the last 
contest with Rome, the Veientines found themselves left for the most 
part to fight alone. 

The immediate cause of this final war is not very plain. The The causes 
twenty years' truce was expiring, and the Romans accused the ^ ^^^ ^^^^ 
Veientines of predatory acts in their territory ; and, finally, of a con- '^^f^' /^^'^^^ 
tumacious answer to ambassadors sent to demand restitution. We 40^-396. 
may assume that the pretext for war was of this nature. But doubt- 
less the growing strength of the Roman arms, trained in the frequent 
struggles with the Volscian and the Aecjuian, from which the Republic 
had on the whole emerged with extended territory and widening 
reputation, inspired the people with the courage and determination 
for a more continuous efibrt. And when to this were added distraction 
and decadence in Etruria, the Romans may naturally have thought 
that the time was come to strike a decisive blow at the existence of 
their inveterate enemy. 

War was declared in 405, and in the next year the siege was The siege of 
begun. The fact of Veil thus acting entirely on the defensive Veilhegim, 
instead of making, as of old, incursions into the Roman territory, is a '^^^' 
proof of the change in the relative power of the two which the last 
twenty years had brought about. At first the siege was carried on The siege 
languidly : there was a war at the same time with the Volscians, and ^'"* earned 
the attention of the Romans was divided. But, the Volscians '^''f ^^^ 

.' vigour at 

defeated, they were able from the second year of the siege (403) to con- fifst. 

centrate their whole force upon the doomed city. 

Still the siege dragged on without much hope ; and though the The people 

Etruscan League had refused assistance, partly because a revolution of Falcrii, 

in Veil itself had established a king unacceptable to the other cities, ^'^Pf'^' 

. Ml /- r T-. Ill ei.na Jar- 

yet, the apparent ill success of the Roman arms, and perhaps the g^if^n ^^^^ 

fear of being themselves the next object of attack, induced the soine help 

people of Falerii, Capena, and Tarquinii to make some not very to Veii, 

effective efforts to relieve the beleaguered town (402-401); and -^^'^^ 

later still the League in its annual meeting, though still declining 

^ See p. 12, note. 



84 HISTORY OF ROME chat. 

formal help, authorised the raising of volunteers from the cities in 

Etruria. 

I'hc The Romans were now obliged to extend their operations to the 

Romans territories of ?\alerii and Capena, in order to prevent farther relief 
retaliate on , . i' •• j • j • i • «- i i 

Fakrit and '^^'"o ^^"^ ^^ \ ^w ; and m domg this sufrered some severe losses. 

Capena, At the same tmie renewed trouble with the \'olscians compelled them 

J97-J9^- to retake Anxur, which had fallen shortly before the siege of 

Veii, but had since revolted or been recaptured by the Volscians. 

These various distractions may well account both for the long 

resistance of Veii, and the general slackness in maintaining the 

blockade and m the discipline of the Roman camp. 

Ejects of Xor was its continuance without more enduring effects on the 

t/ie /onx Roman state. The first step towards creating a military class, and 

'/7'f\>," changing the citizen, who armed for the summer excursion to protect 

ar/nv. ^'^ homestead, into the professional soldier, had been taken when 

Soldiers <^uring the siege of Anxur, in 406, pay for the men serving in the 

j,,]y. ranks had been decreed. I^ut it was yet a farther step when, during 

the siege of Veii, the Roman soldier for the first time spent the 

winter in camp instead of returning to his farm or business. Men 

who had been for several years absent from their ordinary homes 

and occupations would never return to them quite the same in spirit 

or in habits, and there must soon have been some who began to look 

to the army, not as the occasional sphere of a citizen's duty, but as 

the calling of the greater part of their life. 

Tril'utuni. Again, the long continuance in camp of a large army drawing pay 

must have increased the burden of the tributum ; for during the siege 

of Veii the cavalry also began to receive pay beyond the ordinary 

allowance for the public horse. Heavy taxation is a sure prelude to 

civil discontent ; and it was natural therefore that the plebeians, who 

felt its weight, should press for a larger share in the government. 

Rise of Accordingly we find that now they at length succeed in securing one 

plebeians. or more places among the consular tribunes for men of their order 

to which they had all along been eligible. It was inevitable indeed 

that a long war, with frequent variations of success and failure, 

should test the hold of the patriciate upon the chief administration 

of affairs. Three hundred years later the nobles failed under such 

a test in the Jugurthine war. But as yet corruption had not 

seriously weakened them. They were roused to fresh exertions : 

they selected their best and most distinguished men for the service 

of the State : and at length the undertaking was accomplished by one 

of their most haughty and unpopular champions, Marcus Furius 

Camillus. 

Lastly, the long continuance of the siege gave rise, as is the case 
almost throughout Roman history, to frequent reports of prodigies. 



THE ALBAN LAKE 85 



The most remarkable was the sudden rise in the level of the Alban The rise in 
lake, threatening- a dangerous inundation in the Campagna, where ^^<^ A /ban 
many Romans had farms (398). Flood and pestilence, with both of ^'^^^' -^^'^* 
which the Romans were only too familiar, were regarded as direct signs 
of divine displeasure. In this case the rise of water seemed more 
alarming because there had been no unusual rainfall to account for 
it. Yet Livy reports the previous year to have been marked by a 
great frost and heavy snow : there was, therefore, a simple explanation 
of the phenomenon, which would have satisfied a less superstitious 
age. But a report reached Rome that an old Etruscan augur had 
been heard to say that " The Romans would never take Veii till an 
outlet had been made for the waters of the Alban lake." The old 
man was captured and brought to Rome, where he declared that it 
was written in the Etruscan books that " the gods would not depart 
from Veii until, the .A.lban lake being swollen, its waters were 
drained off by the Romans.'' It was thereupon resolved in the 
Senate to consult the oracle at Delphi. The answer of the Pythia 
confirmed the Etruscan, and with rather more directness than usual 
ordered the Romans to drain the Alban lake, and promised success 
against their enemy when they had done it. 

It is useless, in view of the habits of antiquity in regard to such Theansurr 
things, to object to the story that the Alban lake had nothing to do ^:f ^^"^ 
with \'eii. The Pythia was asked for advice as to a threatened ^y""'^- 
flood, and very sensibly answered ''drain the lake." The contingent 
promise of success in war was as usual founded on information which 
the priests at Delphi always took care to possess, and was sufficiently 
vague to save the credit of the oracle, whatever might happen at Veii. 

But in fact it is not improbable that the work done at the Alban '^f^c outlet 
lake had an effect on the Roman success, \\hether in obedience to ^f^^^'^ 
the oracle or no, the great work was accomplished, which seems cer- }^^^J 
tainly to belong to this age. The cniissarium of the lake is a subter- 
ranean channel, bored through the tufa rock, i 509 yards long, varying 
in height from five to ten feet, in breadth averaging- from three to four 
feet, and giving a fall for the water of about si.xtecn feet. It conducts the 
water of the lake into a small stream about a mile from Albano, which 
flows into the Tiber. It is a work of astonishing engineering skill 
for this age, though the great cloacae show that there were already 
among- the Romans men capable of dealing with subterranean struc- 
tures on a large scale ; and ahead)' Fidenae was said to have been 
taken by means of a tunnel or mine. But this work at the Alban 
lake is far above anything yet done. It involved not only the long 
boring through the rock, but the cutting of great perpendicular shafts 
for the admission of air {sp/mcu/a), traces of which can still be seen. 
No doubt much experience of tunnelling had been gained in mining 



86 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Capture of 
]'e.ii, B.C. 
?9S- 



M. Furius 
Camillus 
takes com- 
mand at 
Veil. 



for metals ; and this method of capturing towns was well known in 
Greece, and was afterwards frequently employed by the Romans, i 
Still, if the Alban einissariinn is of this age, as there seems every 
reason to believe, we may say either that the experience gained in 
making it may have helped the sappers at Veii, or that its construc- 
tion at least shows that there were men at Rome capable of making 
the tunnel described. 

Veii at any rate was certainly taken ; and the story of its capture, 
handed down and believed by the Romans, was this.- 

In the tenth year of the siege, — the work at the Alban lake 
having been completed, — the Romans resolved on a supreme effort 
to end it. There was grave reason to believe that affairs in 
the camp were going on ill : discipline was relaxed ; men skir- 
mished at will, or held converse with the enemy ; and it was clear 
that some man of authority and firmness must be sent to take 
command. Therefore M. Furius Camillus was made dictator, and 
he took P. Cornelius as his master of the horse and went to the 
camp before Veii. He had already ravaged the territory of Falerii 
(400), and as consular tribune taken and sacked Capena : and, 
though he seems to have been unpopular with the plebs, he had great 
qualities as a leader. No sooner did he take the command than a 
change came over the Roman army. There was a new spirit in the 
men. Discipline was enforced with rigour ; those who had fled in 
the presence of the enemy were visited with military punishment ; 
new soldiers were enrolled, and auxiliaries obtained from the Latins 
and Hernicans. Having defeated the forces of Capena and Falerii, 
who were still watching for an opportunity of relieving Veii, he 
strengthened the lines by the erection of new towers at less distance 
from each other, and strictly prohibited unauthorised skirmishing 
between them and the city walls. But above all he pressed on the 
working of a great mine or tunnel which was to open a way on to the 



^ Aeneas Tacticus, xxxvii. ; Poh'b. xxi. 28. 

- To regard Livy's story as historical up to 397, and then to attribute the 
rest to a " poem," is at any rate an arbitrary assumption. Nothing can be more 
rationalistic than Livy's account ; he disavows belief in the dramatic story of 
the sudden interruption of the Alban sacrifice, and of the voice from Juno's statue. 
Nothing else is impossible or unlikely in the narrative. The influence of a good 
disciplinarian and active man in the disordered camp, the added energy which 
just sufficed to accomplish a work which had been long preparing, are natural 
circumstances. The emissarium in the Alban lake is a stubborn fact which 
cannot be attributed to a " Furian poem" or be assigned with better reason to 
another age than to this. Appeals to oracles, irrational to us, were not so to a 
Roman ; and the Pythia frequently mentions subjects in her answer which were 
either not asked, or seemed totally disconnected. Finally, there is precisely the 
same reason, neither more nor less, to believe Livy in this story as in all the early 
history. 



THE FALL OF VEII Zy 



citadel. Six relays of sappers digging for six hours each carried on 
the work day and night, until the surface was reached near the 
temple of Juno. Then Camillus, having first vowed a tenth of the 
spoil to Apollo of Delphi, ordered an assault to be made on several 
parts of the wall at once, that the besieged garrison might all be 
drawn away from the citadel ; while he led a picked company of 
men through the tunnel, who, springing through the orifice, charged 
down upon the defenders, set fire to some of the houses, and burst 
open the city gates, through which the Roman army entered. Veii 
was at last taken, and a scene of wild disorder and carnage followed, 
until Camillus proclaimed that the unarmed should be spared. The 
inhabitants surrendered, and the soldiers were allowed to help them- 
selves to the spoil. Next day the captive Veientines were sold by 
auction and their price paid into the treasury. Thus the long 
struggle with Veii, almost coeval with the rise of the city of Rome, 
was once and for all laid to rest. 

The city itself does not appear to have been destroyed ; and its 



T/ie Fate 
of Veii. 



before and after the capture of Rome by the Gauls serious pro- 
positions were mooted for transferring the chief seat of the Roman 
people to it. These propositions, however, having been defeated, it 
gradually dwindled away : and its materials were so constantly carted 
off for other buildings, that in the time of Augustus it was utterly 
desolate, and within a century after the Christian era, its very site 
was a matter of dispute. 

Two tales connected with the fall of Veii were told by some, both 
of them regarded by Livy as fabulous. 

When the Roman soldiers, it was said, came to the mouth of T/w iufer- 
their tunnel, they could hear just above them an haruspex, attending ^'^'P^'^'^ 
a sacrifice which was being offered by the Veientine king, declare ^'^^'J"'^ 
that the victory would be his who should complete the sacrifice by 
duly cutting the entrails. At the word the Roman soldiers started 
out of the earth, seized the entrails, and carried them to the dictator, 
who at once performed the ceremonial act, and was thus pointed out 
by Heaven as the victor. 

Again, it was said, when it had been determined to remove the The stahte 
statue of Juno to Rome, certain young men clothed in white, and (f J'^^o. 
with bodies duly purified, entered her temple at Veii. For a while 
they hesitated in awe of the divine figure ; until one of them in jest 
or earnest ventured to say, " Wilt thou go to Rome, Juno ?" Then 
a voice was heard to say distinctly " I will." And when they came to 
move the statue, behold it seemed light and easy to bear, as though 
the goddess herself were marching along with them. So they bore 
her to Rome, and a temple was built for her by Camillus on the 



HISTORY OF ROME c^ap. vii 



/ 

The Gauls 
take Mel- 
putn. 

Falerii. 



Aventine. Thus did legend set forth the ancient faith that the gods 

themselves deserted a captured city and clave to the victorious cause. i 

Triumph of Camillas was allowed a triumph, and celebrated his victory by 

Camillus. dedicating a temple of Juno and the Mater Matuta. The tenth of 

the spoil vowed to Apollo was obtained by allowing those who had 

it, and who wished to relieve themselves from the religious obligation, 

to estimate their own share and contribute a tenth. A gold bowl 

was then made and sent off to Delphi, was captured by pirates of 

the Lipari Islands, but piously restored by them to the god. 

Results of The immediate result to Rome of the fall of Veii was a rapid 

the fall of extension of her influence in Etruria. On the same day, according 

to a good tradition, the Gauls took the great Etruscan town of 

Melpum : - and this perhaps gave Rome still greater opportunities of 

gaining a hold in Etruria, either as conqueror or protector. In 393 

Falerii, the next most powerful town of southern Etruria, yielded to 

the arms of Camillus. It was said that its surrender was made in 

admiration of his good faith. For when a certain schoolmaster, in 

charge of the sons of Faliscan nobles, brought his pupils to Camillus 

as hostages, he ordered the traitor's hands to be tied behind him, and 

giving the boys rods, bade them drive him back to the town. Yet we 

may be sure that the Faliscans would not have submitted to a large 

war-indemnity had they thought themselves able to resist. 

Volsinii Early in 390 Volsinii was also subdued, whose people had the 

and year before invaded Roman territory ; and finally the capture of 

Sutrium. gutj-iuj-pj j-i-iade the Romans masters of all Etruria south of the Ciminian 

forest, and her influence in the country was shown, fatally to herself, 

in the appeal for help from Clusium against the Gauls. 

1 When Lucan wrote victrix causa diisplacuit, he was enunciating a very old 
belief, more perhaps Greek than Roman. Thus the goddess Athene was believed 
to have deserted the Acropolis when the Persian was coming (Herod, viii. 41); 
Aeschylus told the same tale of Thebes (5. c. Th. 207) ; Vergil imitated him in 
regard to Troy [Aen. ii. 351) ; and later on Tacitus tells us how. on the firing of 
the Temple of Jerusajem, audita major Humana vox EXCEDERE Deos ; simul 
ingens motus excedentium [H. v. 13). The reason, says Euripides, is, that in a 
desolate citv the gods do not get their due of sacrifice ( Troad. 23). 

" Its situation is unknown, the neighbourhood of Milan is the most general 
conjecture. 

Authorities.— The fall of the B^abii is described by Livy (ii. 48-50); 
Dionysius (ix. 19-22) ; Diodorus (xi. 53). The subsequent dealings with Veii 
are also found in Livy (iii.-iv. ) and in Dionysius (ix. 36). The siege and fall in Livy 
iv. 6i-v. 1-23 ; Dionysius xii^ fr. 8-21 ; Plutarch, Life of Camillus ; Florus i. 12; 
Eutropius i. 19 ; Zonaras vii. 20-21. A few details of little importance in Appian, 
Res Ital fr. vL-viii. 



CHAPTER VIII 

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM 509 TO 390 

The early Republican government founded on that of the kings — Consuls, 
quaestors, and people — Effect of Servian reforms — Disabilities of the plebs — 
Roman civitas — Laws and Patria Potestas — Perduellio and quaestiones — 
Provocatio — Other laws of Poplicola — The ownership of land — Law of debt — 
The nexi — Appius Claudius refuses relief to the ncxi — Secession to the Sacred 
Mount — Tribunes of the plebs appointed : their powers, duties, number, and 
manner of election— Aediles and their duties — Agrarian law of Spurius Cassius : 
his impeachment and death (485) — Lex Publilia Voleronis {471)— Proposal 
by Terentilius to limit and define the power of the consuls— The embassy to 
Greece (453)— The first decemvirate (451)— The ten tables— The second 
decemvirate (450) — Change in policy of Appius Claudius — The two new tables — 
Murder of Sicinius and story of Virginia — Decemvirs deposed and consuls and 
tribunes elected — Valerio-Horatian laws — Their effects — The laws of the twelve 
tables — The lex CaTiiileia (445) — Tribuni militarcs consiilari fotestate — 
Appointment of censors— Increase of poverty — Murder of Spurius Maelius 
(439) — The four quaestorships open to plebeians (421) — P2xile of Camillus — 
The tribunes in the Senate — The Gallic invasion — Summary of laws. 

The abolition of royalty did not at first change the principles on ^^he con- 
which the government was administered. But what had been done !f A^^^' 
by one man elected for life was now to be done by two elected for a tors") 
year. The two yearly magistrates, at first apparently called praetors, 1 take the 
but afterwards consuls, occupied the place and performed the place of 
functions, civil and religious, of the king, except special sacred rites ^ ''''•^" 
for which a " king " was held to be imperatively required, and which 
were therefore delegated to a 7-ex- sacrorum. As the king had been 
irremovable for life, so were they for a year. Like him they were 
supreme judges, commanders-in-chief of the army, representatives of 

1 The name given to the headquarters in a Roman camp, praetoriian, among 
other things, confirms this. Zonaras (vii. 19) says that the name consul was not 
used until after the decemvirate (449), and Livy (iii. 55) seems to agree with him. 
Still all Greek and Roman writers, from the habit of their own time, agree in 
speaking of them as On-arot and "consuls," and it will be most convenient to 
follow their exami)le. 



90 HISTORY OF ROME 



The 



the State before foreign governments. Like him they were assisted 
by a council of " fathers," whom they alone summoned, and whose 
advice they were not bound to take. As a symbol of this supreme but 
divided power each was preceded in turn by twelve lictors with fasces 
and axes, and each sat in the curule chair. 

The only other regular officials were the quaestors or quaesitores. 

qicaistors. Originally charged with the duty of tracking crime (or perhaps only 

murder) and bringing the offenders to justice, they were soon after 

the expulsion of the kings, if not before, farther charged with the 

care of the State finances and treasury, and gradually lost their 

judicial functions. 

The people. The people, thus governed, were divided broadly into two bodies. 

First, those who belonged to the gentes, of which there were about fifty, 

and their clients,^ who, without being actually members of the gentes, 

were closely connected with them {ge?itilicii though not geiitiles)., 

and seem to have voted in the thirty curiae into which the gentes 

were divided. Secondly, those who had settled in Rome for any 

reason without being members of the gentes, who were reckoned as 

denizens {i?ico/ae) and not full citizens. These men formed the plebs 

or multitude, were not counted in the curiae, and originally were not 

liable to the tribiitiim or military service. 

Effect of The Servian reforms had included both these classes in a two- 

Servian ^^j^ division: one local into tribes,^ the other military into 193 

7-eforms. . ^ . . ,,1 1 , , 

•' centuries. From that time all, except the one century^ below the 

fifth class possessing property of less value than 12,500 asses, were 
obliged to pay the tributum., and to serve in the army, and to supply 
themselves with arms according to the class to which their century 
belonged. All alike, even the one century of capite censi.^ were in- 

^ Whatever may be the origin of the clients — a subject of great difficulty — we 
may note certain facts : (i) The clients were not the same as the plebeians, and 
are constantly represented as acting with their patrons against them. (2) A client 
{KKveiv "to hear") owed certain duties of respect and practical service, both in 
war and money, to his patronus, and xSxe. patro7ius in his turn owed his client pro- 
tection, especially as his representative in a court of justice, and this obligation 
was a most solemn and religious one. (3) That though the institution was com- 
mon in Greek states, the Roman clientela differed from others in being hereditary. 
(4) Though the clients were not " plebeii " yet there must have been a tendency to 
recruit their numbers from the plebeians, and for them to become merged again 
in plebeians on the extinction of gentes. 

- The four city tribes are universally attributed to the "Servian" reform. 
Whether the "rustic tribes" were also formed at the same time, and after- 
wards fell into abeyance owing to a loss of territory, is a vexed question. At 
any rate at the beginning of the Republic the seventeen rustic tribes existed, 
called by the names of certain of the patrician gentes. These twenty-one tribes 
(the four city tribes always remaining unchanged) were raised to twenty-five in 
387 ; to twenty-seven in 358 ; to twenty-nine in 332 ; to thirty-five in 241. After 
this their number was never increased, and they later on ceased to be local. 



DISABILITIES OF THE PLEBEIANS 



duded in the tribes, that a census might be taken of their numbers 
and property. By these means the whole of the inhabitants had 
been welded together, and may all be called citizens {cives)^ though Gives. 
not with equal rights. 

The military division into centuries presently became a civil one The civil 
also, by means of which all voted in elections and on laws ; and the disalnhtics 
tribal division still later resulted in making the influence of the m.ass ^, /' . 
of citizens a reality. But for a long while anything like equality was 
prevented in several ways : 

First, the number of centuries assigned to the highest class, The 
which consisted of the few wealthy, practically left the decision on '^'^<-^tihy 
all questions to them ; and therefore not only did the plebeians, who ffi^^o^f^jii^^ 
were generally the less wealthy, not really attain substantial power 
in the comitia centuriata., but the geiitilicii probably had less than 
they had formerly exercised in the comitia ciiriata. 

Secondly, the comitia curiata^ in which plebeians had no share. The 
still claimed and exercised the right of conferring impcriiim. tnipenum. 

Thirdly, though all the people voted for magistrates, plebeians The con- 
were excluded from the consulship, on the religious ground that ^'^'^'"P- 
patricians alone could take the auspices. 

Fourthly, the patricians claimed that they alone could contract No 
religious marriage {co?7ubium)^ and therefore alone could have children cojiubium. 
jjossessed of full civil rights {fives Optimo jure). The marriage of 
plebeians, a union with women that they might be mothers {mat?'i- 
)ii07niim\ did not produce such children. Therefore there could be 
no legal marriage between patrician and plebeian, the one party to 
it being incapable of fulfilling the conditions. 

Thus we have a body of citizens with certain common rights and 
common burdens, but marked off as to other rights by two distinctions, 
one between rich and poor in practice, and another in theory and 
practice alike between patrician and plebeian. That is, the Roman The full 
civitas, to use a later definition, was composed of two classes of fiK^ii^ "/ 
rights {Jura): (i) public — the right of voting (Jus suffragii)., the ^^^^^^[ 
right of holding office {jus honorum\ the right of appeal against a 
magistrate {jus provocationis) ; (2) private — the right of trading {jus 
commercii)., the right of contracting a full and religious marriage {jus 
conubii). Of these the plebeians possessed \)i\Q. jus suffragH.^ though, 
if poor, their vote went for very little, the jus provocationis^ and the 
jtis cojumercii., but not the jus ho?ioruin or jus co?iubii. 

The early constitutional history of Rome is the history of the amal- Patrician 
gamation of these two orders till the distinction became unimportant, <^nd ple- 
and, in so far as it still existed, was practically in favour of the lower ,.^ ' ^^^^ 
order. But the struggles which led to this were continually involved poo,-. 
with the inevitable and more lasting struggle between rich and poor. 



92 HISTORY OF ROME 






The two react upon each other, are sometimes mistaken for each 

other, and each lends to the other its peculiar bitterness. 

Up to 4^1 Among an industrial people the struggle for a share in the privi- 

is^ii^^aimt^ leges of office, and especially unpaid office, as the Roman honor was, 

thc)<nos of 's not the first which engages attention. Personal hardships, exces- 

dcbt. sive charges on the fruits of labour, personal tyranny on the part of 

those who for any reason have a hold upon them — these are the 

grievances which it is the first instinct of a people to remove ; it is 

only when they see that they are caused or maintained by inequality 

of civil rights that they begin to strike for their removal. Accordingly, 

up to 471 we find that the struggles of the plebeians are not for 

privilege, but for protection against harsh government, especially 

against the consequences of poverty and debt. 

Whether there was any written code of law in existence at the 
end of the regal period is a question of great difficulty. Livy speaks 
of some royal laws extant in his time ; and a collection of thcin 
was made by a certain Sextus Papirius, believed to have lived in tin- 
time of Tarquinius Superbus.^ But none has come down to us on 
good authority. It seems likely that the king administered justice 
rather according to customs {mores) than by written laws. Much 
of what we should look for in a criminal and even in a civil code was 
rendered unnecessary by the complete power, extending to enslave- 
ment or death, possessed by the paterfamilias over all members of 
his family, including wife, natural or adopted children, grandchildren, 
and wives of sons- — a system saved from great abuse by the obliga- 
tion to decide on each case in a " council " of relations. Local 
government in the /^i// or country districts also seems to have existed 
early, and trade disputes were often settled by arbitration. Crimes 
against the State were judged by the king or those ajjpointed by 
him for the occasion. They may be summed up in the term 
pcrditcllio or act of " hostility," by which may be indicated almost 
any act likely to damage the community. Under the Republic 
such crimes were at first judged by the comitia^ but presently by 
committees {quacstiojics) of the sovereign people appointed for the 
particular case.2 Against hardship from judicial decisions or edicts 
of a magistrate individuals were protected by the right of appealing 
(^provocation to the coniitia from his sentence. Hence the consul, 
except when in command of the army out of Rome, ceased to decide 
capital charges or inflict summary punishment. That was only done 
after trial by the whole people as represented by such committees. 
We have seen that this right of appeal appears to have existed 

^ Pomponius § 2. Livy vi. i. 

- Xo standing committee assigned to a special class of crimes was established 
till 149 by the lex Calpumia de repehaidis. 



Pa in. I 

potest, I 



THE TENURE OF LAND 



in an imperfect form under the kings. The earHest legislation 
attributed to Republican times was the lex Valc?-ia^ proposed by Lex Val- 
Valerius Poplicola, which secured this right against the sentence of ^'''"' J09- 
the consul ; though another law of the same Valerius appears to ^ 
have excepted those who attempted to obtain kingly power. The 
Valerian law was re-enacted with heavier penalties on more than 
one occasion,! extended to citizens outside the mile radius from 
Rome (to which it was originally confined), and eventually saved 
Roman citizens altogether from the penalty of flogging before 
execution. These laws, however, did not prevent the infliction of 
death, without appeal, by the commander of an anny, though the 
third lex Po7'cia (184) forbade the scourging of citizen-soldiers with 
the cat or rods {vcrbera or virgac). 

Next to personal security the most imi^orlant thing to a nation Land- 

of farmers was the tenure of land. A law of Poplicola had secured '■'>'^''"^>'^' 

free markets by the abolition of market dues (yportoria) for citizens. 

But this would not be sufficient without equitable arrangements as 

to the ownership of the land itself Whether it is true or not that at 

first all land was held in common by a gens, it seems certain that 

at the beginning of the Republic private ownership existed. The 

State, however, retained certain lands in its own power, which were 

increased from time to time by territories of conquered cities. This 

land was treated in one of three ways. It was either granted in 

allotments to needy citizens, or was let on lease to possessores^ or 

was retained as common pasture. In the last two cases it was 

called agcr piiblicus. Various grievances arose regarding both 

classes of land. Allotments averaged seven ji/<^mr (about 4^ acres), 

and were barely sufticient to maintain a family. Consequently loss 

or misfortune frequently compelled the sale of sucli farms, which 

had a tendency to accumulate in fewer hands, while the numbers of 

' the landless and discontented increased. Again, the rich man 

' frequently treated the portion of the a<^rr piiblicus leased from the 

State as his freehold, inalienable and incapable of redivision ; or, 

I in the parts kept as public pasture, fed more sheep and oxen than 

' he was entitled to do. The poorer plebeian, therefore, always strove 

I to have conquered lands divided, and not kept as oorr piiblicus ; 

I while the landless men, who got allotments at a distance, were 

j inclined to regard their migration as an almost equal grievance. If 

the rich men, they argued, had not monopolised the public pastures 

^ The Valerio-Horatian laws (449) ordained that any one who procured the 

election of a magistrate sitie provocatione should be outlawed. There were on 

this subject also a lex Valeria B.C. 300 (Livy x. 9) ; two leges Porcine before i?.r. 

184. None of them, according to Cicero {de Rep. ii. § 54), added anything to 

* tlie substance of the law, only to the penalties attaching to a violation of it. 



94 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Debt. 



4gS- Coss. 
Appius 
Claudius, 
P. Servi- 
liiis. Tht 
" iirxi." 



Great ex- 
citemetit in 
the city. 



with their herds, and treated the lands which they leased at a 
nominal rental as their own, there would have been enough land at 
home to divide among those who had been ruined while serving 
their country in arms. 

But though it was bad enough to be landless, it was far worse to 
be a prisoner and a slave, and the Roman law of debt made many 
men both. The principle on which this law or custom proceeded 
was that a thing pledged as security passed completely into the 
power of the mortgagee. Thus, when the debtor's property was 
exhausted, his person was absolutely in the hands of his creditor. 
He was not yet a slave, but he was nexiis^ and custom — afterwards, 
no doubt, embodied in the laws of the twelve tables — authorised his 
creditor to load him with chains, and, after a certain period, to sell 
him as a slave. It does not appear that the sale of a defaulting 
debtor was more shocking to the sentiment of the day than was im- 
prisonment (often lifelong) for debt in recent times among ourselves ; 
and the ancient writers aver that the more brutal practice, recognised 
by the law of the twelve tables, of several creditors dividing a 
debtor's body, was never actually carried out. But the position of 
a nexus, neither free nor slave, seems to have been regarded as one 
of peculiar hardship ; and at any rate when the number of citizens in 
that position was large, and the circumstances reducing them to it 
such as to appeal to sympathy, the discontent became formidable. 

In the year 495 one of the usual levies was required against the 
Volscians. The Forum was filled with a crowd of the discontented 
plebeians, when suddenly one of these unhappy Jiexi appeared, 
clothed in rags, emaciated and deadly pale, with long shaggy hair 
and untrimmed beard. He was recognised as one who had served 
as a centurion with conspicuous bravery, and he now pointed to the 
scars of the wounds received in the wars, and the marks of scourging 
inflicted on him by his cruel creditors. He had a pitiful tale to tell. 
His farm had been ravaged in a Sabine raid ; all his cattle had 
been driven off and his homestead burnt ; he had to borrow money 
to pay the war-tax {tribiitiiDi) ; the debt had accumulated with usury ; 
and his creditors had then seized his person, tortured and imprisoned 
him in an ergasiuliim, as though he were already a slave. 

Horror and pity seized the people, and the long- smouldering 
discontent broke into a blaze. The Forum was filled with angry 
shouts ; many of the unfortunate nexi^ forcibly delivered, threw 
themselves upon the protection of the citizens, and some of the 
senators who were in the Forum found themselves in the midst of an 
excited crowd, and were roughly handled. The people demanded 
that a meeting of the Senate should be summoned, and measures 
devised for relief Some senators answered the summons of the 



THE HARSH LAWS OF DEBT 95 



consuls, but the majority were afraid, and the anger of the people 
seemed likely to end in open violence. But in the midst of the 
tumult news came that the Yolscians were on the march. The 
people at first refused to enlist. But the more moderate of the two 
consuls, Servilius, induced them to do their duty to the country by 
an edict, which was regarded as a security for the present, and as 
holding out hope for the future. " No nexus was to be hindered by Edict in 
his creditor from giving in his name to the levy; no one was relief of the 
to seize or sell the goods of a debtor while he was serving in the ^'^'^^' 
army, or to confine his sons or grandsons in security for him." Then 
the people gave in their names for the levy ; the Volscians were 
repulsed, as well as the Sabines and Aurunci. 

But border frays are soon over, and the soldiers on their return Repealed 
were enraged by a decision of the consul Appius, which placed the ^y Apptus. 
nexi in the same position as before. The power of the creditor over 
his debtor was to be exactly as it stood prior to the war. Riots Consequent 
attended the rescue of one iiexus after another as he was being led riots. 
off by his creditor ; the city was full of rumours and clamour, and 
when Appius tried to arrest a ringleader of the crowd, he was forced 
to release him on his appeal to the people. 

The resistance of the plebeians became still more formidable 494. Cass. 
next year, because better organised. Some of them met regularly ^; ^ ^^S''- 
on the Aventine, others on the Esquiline ; and the patricians saw '"Z'"^' . ' 
that these informal concilia piebis might soon arrogate an authority Meetings of 
superior to their own. But when the consuls tried to suppress them the plebs. 
by holding a levy against the Volscians, the plebeian youth firmly 
refused to give in their names. An attempt to arrest one of them 
was met by a noisy scene of violence, and finally it was determined 
that a dictator should be named to put down the disturbance and 
carry on the war. 

Happily not Appius Claudius, who was hateful to the plebeians, M\ Val- 
but Manius Valerius Volusus (brother of Poplicola) was named, '^^'^^^ ^^^' 
whose more popular sentiments were known and whose character '^^^_^'^^^'-^"^^ 
made him trusted. He induced the young men to enlist by an edict The Senate 
of protection to debtors similar to that of the previous year; and, refuse relief 
when the army returned victorious from the Volscian war, he brought ^'^ *^^^ "^^^■ 
a motion before the Senate to secure milder treatment for the jicxi. 
The motion was rejected, and Valerius abdicated his dictatorship 
rather than be the instrument of a breach of faith. "You will some 
day wish," he said to the Senate, " that the plebeians had patrons 
like me." But this made him more beloved, and enabled him to 
exercise a salutary influence in the quarrel. 

The Senate dared not disband the army lest the demands against 
which they were resolved should again cause popular tumults. So 



96 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The armed 

citizens 
retire to 
the ' 'Sacred 
Mount," 
493- 



Alarm of 
the st/Ki- 
tors. 



Alencfiius 
Agrippa. 



Tribuni 

plebis ap- 
pointed, 
493- 



Nature 
and limits 
of the power 
of tribunes. 



long as the legions were subject to the imperiuin of the consul, they 
believed that they had a firm hold upon the most formidable part of 
the population. Under the pretext therefore of a fresh danger from 
the Aequians the legions were again ordered out under the consul. 

But the soldiers were also citizens. They resolved that they 
would no longer submit to injustice. " Let us kill the consul," was 
the first suggestion, " and so be free of our military oath." But a 
crime could not annul a religious obligation : and they finally conceived 
and executed a measure, which has ever since been justly celebrated 
as the most glorious of revolutions, because unstained by bloodshed 
and violence, while effectually proving to the oppressive minority 
what they would lose by persisting in an unrighteous policy. On 
the advice of one Sicinius the armed citizen -soldiers marched in 
good order beyond the Anio, and occupied a hill, which came in 
after times, in memory of this event, to be called the Sacred Mount. 
They took nothing with them but what was necessary to support 
life ; but they fortified the usual camp, and remained quietly there 
for many days, neither attacked nor attacking. 

This famous " secession," therefore, was not the withdrawal of 
an unarmed populace, but the deliberate abandonment of the cit)- 
by the flower of the fighting force, which Rome, surrounded by 
enemies, could not afford to lose. The patres were naturally alarmed, 
and soon determined to negotiate. Menenius Agrippa was sent, and 
is said to have won over the host to moderate counsels by the fable 
of the rebellion of the members against the belly, which, being 
starved, was avenged by the decay of the seditious parts. But 
we may safely conclude that no story, however ingenious, would 
have persuaded the seceders to return without solid concessions. 
The negotiations ended in a compromise. The plebeians were to 
have officers appointed from their own ranks, whose special duty 
should be to protect citizens against the harsh sentences of the 
consuls. As the officers commanding the people under arms were 
called tribunes, so these were to be called by the same name.i 
Henceforth there would be two kinds of tribunes, the tribuni 7nilifu?n, 
elected to command the legions on service, and Tribuni Plebis, 
elected for a year to protect the people not under arms. Accordingly, 
their authority was confined to a mile radius round the pomoeriiim. 
That is, it could be exercised against the consul when acting in the 
city or holding a levy in the Campus, but not against his iinperium 
when in command of an army outside. How far it availed against 
the imperium of a dictator was a moot point. But this was of 
comparatively little importance ; for the dictator was only occasion- 



^ This point is dwelt on by Zonaras, vii. 15. 



VIII THE TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS 97 

ally appointed, usually for some special civil function, which being 
performed he abdicated immediately, or for some military expedition 
which took him at once out of Rome. At most his office lasted for 
only six months. The consuls, on the other hand, were judges as 
well as military commanders, and it was generally against hardships 
inflicted by them in that capacity that the tribunes were to act. 
They were not magistrates in the ordinary sense, and had no fixed 
sphere of duty {proviJicia). Their power was negative ; they could 
stay proceedings. Their veto or intercession stopped the action of a 
magistrate, and gradually various other public business ; while their 
right of summoning and addressing the plebs {jiis agcndi cum picbe) in 
time gave them an important legislative position. The lex Icilia (492) j^^x 
made their persons sacred, and exposed to a curse any one obstructing sacrata, 
them or offering them or their officers violence. In case of dis- 49^- 
obedience they could arrest and imprison even the consul himself,^ 
and by the lex Ate7'nia Tarpeia (454) could inflict a fine. They 
were assisted by two other plebeian magistrates, appointed at the 
same time, called Aediles, who transacted legal business confined to 
the plebs, and had charge of all documents connected with the 
plebeian concilia. As their primary duty was to give aid {auxilitwi) 
I to all citizens at all times, whether against a magisterial decision, or 
I the payment of tribute, or a military levy, the tribunes were bound 
' to keep the doors of their houses always open, and not to be more 
than one day absent from Rome except during \}i\^ fe7-iae Latinae. 

There is some variation in our authorities as to the original Number 
' number of the tribunes. Livy says two were first elected, C. of tribunes. 
Licinius and L. Albinus, who then held an election of three colleagues. 
Cicero also speaks of two being first created, but Dionysius says 
I that five were elected at once. Diodorus, again, that two were elected 
; in the first instance, and raised to four in 471.- Whatever was the 
j original number it seems certain that there were soon five, and after 
I 457 ten. If the full number was not created by the comitia., those 
I elected had to fill up the vacancies by co-optation ; and in 438 a law 
I was passed compelling the president at the election to go on with 
I the comitia until ten were elected.^ 

As difficult is the question of the manner of their election. Here 

1 They had, that is, the jus prehensionis , but not the right of summoning 
j {jus vocationis), which, however, was sometimes ignorantly e.xercised {^Aul. Cell. 

xiii. 12). 

2 Cicero, de Rep. ii. 34 ; Livy ii. 58 ; Dionys. vi. 89 ; Diodorus xi. 68. 

^ Lex Trebonia, Livy iii. 65 nt qui plebe?n Romanam tribunos plebi rogafet, 
is usque eo rogaret, dtim decefn tribu7ios plebei faceret. They entered on their 
functions on the 12th of December, and a severe punishment — even, it is said, 
burning alive — could be imposed on tribunes abdicating before the election of 
their successors. 

H 



98 



HISTORY OF ROME 



How 

elected. 



Consequent 
groivtli of 
the power 
of ple- 
beians. 



486. Cass. 

Spurius 

Cassius, 

Proculus 

Vir^inius. 



Agrarian 
law of 
Spurius 
Cassius. 



apparently was the part of the compromise in favour of the patricians. 
They agreed to recognise the plebeians as a constituent body, so far 
as to allow them to have officers of their own ; in return the plebeians 
were content that their tribunes should be elected by the cufiae, in 
which, though the clients of the patrician gentes appear to have 
voted, the patricians themselves had the determining voice. Others 
have thought that tribunes were from the first elected by the 
plebeians, though voting by curiae and not by tribes. But these 
plebeian comitia or concilia curiata are wholly unknown in connexion 
with anything else, and their existence is denied by most scholars. ^ 

The most striking effect of the appointment of tribunes — setting 
aside personal hardships which they may have prevented — was the 
rapid growth of plebeian organisation. The informal concilia of the 
plebs became more and more important, as the tribunes exercised 
their privilege of summoning and consulting them, and eventually 
obtained recognition first as an elective and then as a legislative 
coinilia. 

But the twenty-three years which elapsed before the next advance 
of the plebeian assembly witnessed also a recrudescence of the old 
difficulty as to poverty and the possession of land. In the year 486 
the consul Spurius Cassius, wise negotiator of the renewed Latin 
League, appears to have seen that this poverty demanded measures 
of rehef. In the previous year (487) the Hernici had been conquered 
and some of their lands had become the property of the Roman 
people. Instead of treating this as ager ptiblicus to be let out at 
fixed rentals, which would put it into the hands of capitalists, Spurius 
Cassius proposed to divide it in absolute ownership among landless 
men, Roman and Latin. Livy calls this the first agrarian law ever 
promulgated. But captured lands had been dealt with before ; what 
was peculiar about this law was that for the first time it proposed to 
recognise the right of Latins to share with Romans ; and, secondly, 
that it was to have a retrospective effect, for it contained a clause 
dealing with land already made ager piiblicus., but occupied by 
private owners. This land it proposed to let out at fair rents, or to 
add it to what was now to be divided among poor plebeians. It was 



^ The various theories on this subject that have found adv^ocates are collected 
by Willems, Droit public Romain, p, 280, note 4. Cicero, pro Cornelio, fr. 23, 
says distinctly mispicato postero a?ino tribu?ii plebis comitiis curiatis creati sunt ; 
and the concilia of the plebs were not "auspicato." Mommsen's theory of the 
concilia plebis cztriata is chiefly supported by Dionysius vi. 89, vefxiqdeU 6 brjixos 
els TCLs t6t€ ovaas (pparpias. cLs eKeXvoL KaXoucn Kovpias. On the other hand Livy says 
that the bill of Publilius Volero in 471 " took away from the patricians the power 
of electing by means of their clients whom they chose as tribune" — quae patriciis 
omnem potestatem per clienfitim stiffragia creandi quos vellent tribunos auferrefit 
(ii. 56), a description which could only apply to the comitia curiata. 



4Ss-47^- 



VIII DEATH OF SPURIUS CASSIUS 99 

this which made the patricians hostile to the measure ; while the 
consul Virginius skilfully used the clause admitting Latins to a share 
to excite popular prejudice against the bill and its author. 

Cassius doubtless inserted this clause in pursuance of that con- Spurius 
ciliatory policy towards the states of Latium, which had contributed so ""^^J^\)f^ 
much to the reconstitution of the League, But it was enough to take a?id put 'to 
the bloom off the gift in the jealous eyes of the citizens ; and Cassius, death, ^Sj 
therefore, lost much of the support for which he might have looked, 
when as a priv^ate person, in the year after his consulship, he was 
charged with attempting kingly power, condemned, and put to 
death.i Besides his agrarian law another measure proposed by him 
was held to support the charge. Gelo of Syracuse, it is said, had T/ie 
\ sent a present of corn to the Roman people— perhaps as a recogni- ^_^"^l"m 
tion of their hostility to the common Etruscan enemy, which should fj^^ji 
have been distributed free ; and Cassius now proposed that the low 
price paid for it should be refunded.- 

The fate of Cassius foreshadowed that of Maelius and the Patricitui 
! Gracchi, and of others who ventured to make a stand in behalf of ^^'^J[^"P ' 
! the poor and helpless against class privilege and selfishness. But 
i if it be true that the people were beguiled into a base desertion of 
I their wise champion, they were rightly punished by a long subjection 
( to the patricians. The consulship not only became more and more 
' an exclusively patrician office, but seemed gradually becoming 
i hereditary in the Fabian family. The tribunes themselves were for 
' the most part tools in the hands of the patricians. If one bolder 
j than the rest, as Spurius Licinius in 481, ventured to speak of the 
necessity of reviving the agrarian proposals of Cassius, he was 
I promptly silenced by his more accommodating colleagues. In 475 
j two tribunes had indeed successfully prosecuted T. Menenius, for 
I he was already discredited by having sustained a defeat on the 
I Cremera ; but another tribune, A. Genucius, who in 473 ventured 
j to bring a consular to trial, was murdered in his bed. 

j It was apparently this last event which led to the next advance Lcx^ 

i of the plebeians. This was the formal recognition by the lex Pub- 
I lilia Voleronis of the right of the people to elect tribunes and aediles 
] by voting in tribes (471). This was only obtained after a violent 
struggle, in which Appius Claudius again came forward as the most 

1 The formal name of the crime charged \V5S> perdue II io (see p. 92 ; Livy ii. 
41). A tradition followed by Cicero {de legg. ii. 23) represented the quaestors 
as acting the part of accusers. Others represent him as condemned by his own 
father in virtue of the patria potestas. 

- The present of corn had been made in the famine year 192. Dionysius (viii. 
70), Plutarch {Co?-ioI. xvi. ) and Livy (ii. 4) speak of the Siculum fyume?itum 
( without naming the king ; but others had made the mistake of attributing the 
gift to Dionysius (Dionys. vii. i). 



Publilia 
l^olcronis, 
471. 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Tj-ibunes 
elected by 
the comitia 
tributa. 



Results of 
lex Publi- 
lia, 4JI- 
454- 



uncompromising opponent of the plebeian demand. The senators, 
however, wisely gave way, and the law was sanctioned by their 
aicctoritas and passed. Thus the informal co7icilia plebis became 
recognised as an elective body — comitia tributa. In this the 
patricians had a right indeed to vote, but their comparatively small 
numbers would have given them little weight if they had, and for a 
time at any rate they abstained.^ The plebs also thus obtained the 
power of electing tribunes who would not be completely under 
patrician influence ; and the tribunes could legally invite the comitia 
to pass resolutions {plebiscita), which, though not binding on the 
whole popithes, had yet a great moral weight from the first, and 
gradually obtained the force of laws binding on all. Another 
advantage of thus voting in tribes was that it did not require the 
auspices to be first taken, and was therefore free from many hin- 
drances, which the patricians — in sole possession as yet of the sacer- 
dotal and augural colleges — could offer to the proceedings of the 
comitia curiata or centujiata.'^ 

The lex Piiblilia Volero?iis ^ in ordaining that the tribunes should 
henceforth be elected by the comitia tributa., at present practically 
an exclusively plebeian assembly, may have only given legal sanction 
to an existing custom, the curiate assembly seldom venturing to 
disallow the informal nomination of the co7icilium plebis. But the 
formal acknowledgment of the right was -nevertheless a great step. 
We may see perhaps the fruit of it in the greater exertions made by 
the tribunes to secure an equitable arrangement of the public land 
in 461, when the plebeians demanded allotments at home rather 
than in the territory of the newly-conquered Antium ; in the attempt 
of the tribune C. Terentilius in 462 to limit the power of the consuls 
by definite enactments as to their functions ; in the impeachment 
of Caeso Ouintius who opposed Terentilius in 461 ; in the carrying 
of the lex Icilia in 456 for redividing the land on the Aventine for 
building, involving the disturbance of many who had encroached 
on it ; in frequent interferences in the yearly levies ; and finally in 
the raising the numbers of the tribunes themselves from five to ten, 
which, though it did not turn out in practice to enhance their 



^ The comitia tributa as an elective assembly must always have included 
patricians who were like the rest assessed in the tribes. But when this assembly 
met for deliberative purposes it was at first only the old concilium plebis, and 
from it the patricians were excluded (Livy ii. 60). 

^ Dionysius iv. 49. But in later times the auspices seem to have been taken 
at the cojJiitia tributa (see Cicero, ad Fain. ix. 30). 

^ The "law" of Volero is perhaps properly to be called zl plebiscitum. But 
a. plebiscituinha-d not yet the force of a law, and it must in some way have been 
passed by the whole people. Livy (xxxix. 26) says of Volero that he tulit ad 
POPULUM, and calls it a lex (ch. 57). 



VIII PROPOSAL FOR A WRITTEN CODE loi 



power,! is an indication of increased business and importance. The 
condition which the Senate attempted to impose, that the same 
men should not be re-elected tribunes, was neglected in practice. 

But the proposal of Terentilius to limit the power of the consuls Evc7its 
by definite written enactments, after his rogatio had been fiercely leading to 
debated for ten years, was now to be carried out in a more complete ^^'^fi^^^ 
manner. The impeachment of the consuls for 455 by a tribune ^iratl 

and an aedile, and their condemnation and fining by the people 

nominally on the question of division of booty, but really, it seems, 

because they had not carried out the law for dividing the land on the 

Aventine — led to the acceptance of a compromise proposed by the 

tribunes, that a commission for drafting a written code of laws should 

be appointed. For the plebeians this would secure that the power 

of the magistrates should not be used against them illegally, and for 

the patricians it held out the hope that the tribuneship would be 

unnecessary. Hence the patricians did not persist in their resistance 

to the Terentilian proposal any longer ; and the plebeians were 

content for a time to abstain from electing tribunes, expecting that 

, their protection would, for the short time of the siispension of the 

j office, be supplied by the action of some of the new board, who were 

I meanwhile to supersede all the regular magistrates ; while the written 

I laws would strengthen the hands of the tribunes, when again 

appointed, against consular tyranny. 
I The principle of confining the power of punishment possessed Laws of 
j by the consul within definite limits had indeed been conceded by the Sp. Tar- 
I lex Tarpeia-Aternia, which limited the fine which he could impose ^^^^^ 
1 to two cows and thirty sheep ; 2 but it was also necessary that their ^2tei^'ius 
\ power should be farther limited by the laws in virtue of which the ^j-^. 
I whole administration was carried on. It was now resolved that 
such a code should be drawn up and exposed in public for all to see 
and read. 

But first certain commissioners were to be nominated to examine 453-452. 
land copy the best codes in existence among the Greeks, and especi- ^°!"'. 
•ally the laws of Soloh at Athens. Accordingly Sp. Postumius Albus, ZlTtT^"^' 
,A. Manlius, and Ser. Sulpicius set out for Greece. Athens was then Greefe. 
jat the height of her prosperity, and Pericles was her leading states- 
Iman. It is not therefore in itself improbable that her fame 
jShould have attracted those in search of model legislation. Still it 
would have been a more obvious thing for Romans to visit the Greek 

^ Because in a larger number opposite interests and opinions were more 
likely to arise ; and in fact we find the college of tribunes frequently divided and 
one party preventing the action of the other. It was this that made such a power 
workable at all (Zon. vii. 15). 
^ - Or, as some have it, thirty cows and two sheep. 



I02 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The iiatm'e 
of the pro- 
posed legis- 
lation. 



The decem- 
virate 
wholly 
patrician. 



First dc- 
cemviratc, 
451- 
The ten 
tables. 



cities of Italy, in some of which constitutions had been drawn up by 
those who made such work their special profession. Probably they 
did visit some of these towns ; and there was a tradition that a 
certain Hermodorus of Ephesus, who was then living at Rome, 
contributed to the formation of the code.i Of the visit to Athens 
there is no trace in Greek writers of the classical time ; and the laws 
of the twelve tables are not known to us with sufficient complete- 
ness to enable us to feel sure how much, if anything, was taken 
from those of Solon.- 

The demand was not for a change in the laws, much less for 
anything like a revolution, but that the secret, jealously guarded for 
so long, of what the laws were, and what was the right method of 
putting them in motion, should be the common property of all. The 
secret had been well kept, partly, perhaps, because there was little 
to keep. As in the case of our own early history, the number cf 
written laws was probably small. The government was carried on 
in accordance with ancient traditions and customs, of which the 
knowledge was confined to a few. But the authority of the magis- 
trate was a living and patent fact, from which all might suffer at any 
hour ; and now that the people had become conscious of their cor- . 
porate existence, it was natural that they should claim to know how 
far this authority extended, what it was they had to obey, what 
regulated the transactions and obligations of the market-place, the 
relation of patron and client, of master and slave, of father and son. 

The three commissioners returned in the autumn of 452, and 
thereupon the decemvirs were appointed. The claim of plebeians to 
places on the board appears to have been waived on the condition 
that the Icilian law for the division of the Aventine, and the leges 
sacratae., on which rested the inviolability of the tribunes, should be 
left untouched. Among the ten were the two consuls-elect, Appius 
Claudius and T. Genucius, who, in virtue of the office thus suspended, 
were looked upon as holding the first rank ; the three commissioners 
who had been sent to Greece ; and five other patricians. All took 
turns in administering justice, and each had the twelve lictors and 
fasces only on his day, the rest being each attended by a single 
usher {acceiisus). 

The rule of these decemvirs for their year is admitted to have 
been excellent. Justice was fairly administered, and the rights of 
the citizens duly respected. Within a few months ten tables of 
laws, which they had drafted, were exposed for public criticism and 

^ Pomponius, ap. Dig. i, 2, 2, § 4; Strabo xiv. i, 25 ; Pliny N. H. xxxiv. 



■-' A regulation as to lawful sodalitates is said by Gains [D. 47, 22, 4) to have 
been taken from a law of Solon. It is generally placed in the eighth table. 



vni THE SECOND DECEMVIRATE 103 



emendation, and after being thus improved were passed by the 
centuriate assembly. 

What followed is not very easy to understand. The code was The second 
believed to be as yet incomplete, and decemvirs were thought neces- decemvir- 
sary again for the following year. Perhaps the Senate was induced ^^^' 45o. 
to consent to this as a farther postponement of the evil day of the 
re-establishment of the tribunate ; while the plebeians, conciliated 
by the moderation of the first decemvirs, were willing to consent to 
a farther suspension of the constitution for the completion of a busi- 
ness, advantageous to themselves, asserted to be still in some 
respects defective. Livy, who represents Appius Claudius all 
through as exercising the chief influence among his colleagues, now 
depicts him as exerting himself to secure his own re-election, with 
I elaborate display of popular sentiments, and at the same time as taking 
care to replace the aristocratic members of the old board, whom he 
regarded as likely to stand in the way of the tyrannical policy which 
: he was secretly intending to pursue. According to Livy's view of Appius 
, the policy of Appius this is not unintelligible. He regards him as Claudius. 
' having been playing a part all along. He was an aristocrat, who 
; feigned popular views to secure power for himself. When this was 
I once obtained, his most formidable opponents would be precisely 
I the strongest aristocrats, who, opposed to popular equality, were still 
( more jealous of the personal supremacy of one man, though of their 
I own order. His aim, therefore, was to have colleagues whose posi- 
I tion was not high enough to give them the means of effectively 
opposing him. Three of them were plebeians, and none men of the 
first consideration. 
^ He now threw off the mask. The people were astonished to see Their 
I that, instead of each member of the board in his turn being accom- ^arsA rule. 
: panied by the twelve lictors, all appeared in the Forum with these 
attendants, whose fasces also contained the axe, symbol of power 
sine provocatio7ie, which the consuls themselves only presumed to 
adopt when outside the city. It soon became apparent that this was 
no idle change. Acts of severity followed in quick succession ; no 
man's life, no woman's honour, was safe. Instead of an authority 
rendered less oppressive by subdivision, and the tribuneship being 
replaced by the mutual check of the colleagues on each other, the 
1 plebeians found themselves under ten tyrants instead of two. The Two new 
decemvirs, it is true, justified their appointment by producing two ''^'^^^•^• 
I additional tables of laws, afterwards ratified on the proposal of the 
consuls of 449.1 But when the time came for the elections they 

^ It has been assumed that the last two tables contained oppressive or unjust 
laws, but there is no sign of this. They are ratified immediately after the abdica- 
Ition of the decemvirs, apparently without opposition. Cicero's remark about 



104 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Alienation 
of the 
patricians. 



Unsuccess- 
ful wars 
with 
Sabines 
a fid 

Acquians, 
449- 



Murder of 
Sicinius. 



Viriiinia. 



showed no intention of abdicating or holding the coiuitia for the 
usual magistrates of the next year. This was tyranny, and the feehngs 
of both orders were equally outraged. The decemvirs had already 
offended the patricians by neglecting to consult the Senate. But the 
senators were apparently afraid to protest. Most of them, indeed, 
left the city and employed themselves on their country properties ; 
and when, in the early part of 449, a threatened raid of the Sabines 
and Aequians induced the decemvirs to summon a meeting, scarcely 
enough members were to be found to make up a quorum. The 
plebeians murmured loudly that the senators deserted the cause of 
freedom from cowardice. But at last, when a fairly full meeting 
was secured, two senators, L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius 
Barbatus, giving voice to the popular discontent, ventured to attack 
the conduct of the decemvirs in strong terms, and were supported 
by C. Claudius, uncle of Appius. 

The Senate seemed on the point of voting that their office was 
vacant, and that intcrrcges should be named to hold the consular 
elections. For the present, however, the necessity of a levy stayed 
farther proceedings. Two armies were raised, commanded by eight 
of the decemvirs, while Appius and Sp. Oppius remained at Rome, 
The Roman arms were not successful, and this in itself brought fresh 
discredit on the government. But two instances of oppression 
are said to have brought matters to a climax. 

The first was the murder of the centurion Sicinius, who was 
serving in the Sabine war. He was reported to have used seditious 
words as to the necessity of restoring tribunes ; and though he had 
been long famous for gallantry in the wars, he was murdered by his 
comrades when employed in choosing a camp, and every one believed 
that it was done at the instigation of the decemvirs. 

The second was the famous case of Virginia. Her father, 
Virginius, was serving in the camp at Algidus, and Virginia was in 
the care of friends in Rome. While walking through the streets she 
had attracted the licentious eyes of Appius, so the story goes, and 
by an unjust judicial decision he adjudged her to be the slave of one 
of his own clients, whom he instigated to claim her on the plea that 
she was really the daughter of one of his slaves, and had been 
secretly adopted by the wife of Virginius. It is not altogether 
unaccountable, as has been alleged, that Appius, who was acting so 
tyrannically in many other ways, should prefer to act in this case 
with a show of legality rather than by open violence. He must 



them seems to refer solely to the matter of conubium. In regard to that he 
speaks the sentiment of a later age {dc Rep. 2, § 63). Though the plebeians soon 
tried to get rid of this particular enactment, it does not seem to have been new in 
principle, only it was now for the first time definitely expressed. 



kills his 
daui^hte 



ieclares 
against the 
decemvirs. 



VIII RESTORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 105 

have known of trhe growing feeling against him, and would not rouse 
more widespread opposition, or give his enemies more hold upon 
him than he could help. It is a favourite device of tyrants, and not 
the least galling, to cover their, oppressions under a form of law.^ 

Virginius was hastily summoned from the camp at Algidus, and Mrginius 
when he found that, in spite of his protests, Appius had formally 
assigned Virginia as a slave to his client, he seized a knife from a 
neighbouring stall and stabbed her to the heart to save her from 
dishonour. Then the popular indignation broke into fury. Appius 
was driven from the Forum, when trying to effect the arrest of 
Virginius and of Lucius Icilius, the betrothed lover of Virginia, 
after vainly attempting to make himself heard. The agitation 
spread from the city to the two camps. The armies deposed their The army 
decemviral commanders, elected ten military tribunes, and marching 
to Rome, occupied the Aventine. Hence, after some fruitless 
negotiations with the Senate, which Appius was still able to summon, 
the armed plebs repeated their former manoeuvre of marching out 
of Rome and occupying the " Sacred Mount." This brought an Secession. 
immediate concession. L. Valerius and M. Horatius, being employed 
to negotiate, agreed that the decemvirs should abdicate and tribunes 
be appointed. The Pontifex Maximus, the only existing magistrate, 
held the co7>iifia, and the election of ten popular tribunes seems at 
I once to have given an importance to the resolutions of the concilium 
plebis which it never lost. We have seen that by the lex Publilia 
, (471) the concilium had become a comitia for electing tribunes, but 
I it has not hitherto had a defined position as a legislative assembly. 
I Now we hear of its passing a resolution of amnesty for all those --^ p^^^bi- 

who had taken part in the secession (for a breach of the military ^'^^^"^ ^f 
. sacramentum had no doubt been involved), and on the motion of a 
I tribune, M. Duillius, resolving that consuls should be elected 
I cum p7'ovocatione. These resolutions {piebiscita)., though no constitu- 
I tional rule gave them the force of a law, were apparently accepted as 
I binding. 

j The Senate thereupon, in obedience to them, named i?iterreges V^^h'rio- 
I who held the election of consuls. L. Valerius and M. Horatius were 
J returned, and immediately brought in a series of laws which bear 



Horatian 
hnvs, ././g. 



\ ^ Dr. Ihne holds that Appius's real object, as shown by the plebeian element 
1 in the second decemvirate, was to heal the breach between the orders, and thus 

I make tribunes unnecessary. That this turned the strict party of patricians 
against him, who prevented the two tables being passed, as containing regulations 
they disliked. That the patricians were aljle to overthrow him, because in the 
second year he was in an unconstitutional position. That the secession took 
place after the abdication of Appius, because of a patrician attempt to prevent 
tribunes being restored. That the stories of Sicinius and Virginia were patrician 
inventions. 



io6 HISTORY OF ROME 



their name. The first was a recognition of the binding nature of 

the resolution of the plebs {ut quod tributim plcbcs jussisset populu)}i 

teneret). The second condemned to instant death any magistrate 

returning as elected a magistrate si?ie proi'ocatione. The third 

devoted to a curse all who violated the plebeian magistrates, — 

tribunes, aediles, or judges, — and dedicated their property to Ceres. 

Another plebiscitum, proposed by M. Duillius, ordered that any one 

depriving the plebs of tribunes, or " creating " a magistrate without 

provocation should be put to death. Appius Claudius was impeached, 

and committed suicide in prison. 

The result The result, then, of the movements of the years 471 to 449 were, 

of events in j^at the plebeians had secured the election of their tribunes by them- 

47'- 1 19- selves ; had obtained a written code of laws, engraved on bronze, so 

that all might know them ; had secured that the resolutions of the 

plebeian assembly should be binding on the whole populus. • It is 

not certain whether some confirmation of the plchiscita by the 

auctoritas patrum was required to make them valid after this ; 

but we know that two subsequent laws were passed on the subject, 

which would seem to imply that the effect of the first needed some- 

[Legcs Ptib- thing to complete its object. The three leij^cs rubliliae (339)^ 

liitae,j^j^).) supplied what was wanting up to a certain point : the first re-enacted 

the provision /// piebiscita omnes (Jin'rifes hticrejit ; the second 

ordered the auctoritas of the fathers (that is, a resolution of the 

Senate) to be given beforehand in favour of laws passed in the 

centuriate assembly ; the third pro\ided for the delegation of certain 

powers of the consuls to censors at such time as the plebeians should 

be admitted to both consulships. 

The ivork' This does not seem to do anything directly for the authority of 

ing and \\^^ comitia tribufa. Like the renewal of charters by successive kings 

'^"f^tj'. "T^ ^^"^ o*^^ o^^^ history, it only confirms a right already existing, but 

;.,,,/^. " which had been, or was in danger of being, infringed. But indirectly 

it does much. It took from the senators the power of stopping the 

passing of a law in the centuriate assembly, and if it left them still 

the formal power of doing so to piebiscita^ it made that power 

^ Livy \-iii. 12. For the difficult subject of the exact effect of this series of laws, 
the reader must consult larger treatises — Mommsen's H'dmische Forschungen, i. 165; 
Soltau's Die Giiltigkcit der Plebiscite ; B. Borgeaud, Histoire dii PUbiscite. Two 
articles maintaining another theory are contributed by Mr. Strachan-Davidson to 
the English Historical Review, April 1886, July 1890. Mr. Strachan-Davidson's 
theory, as 1 understand it, is this. A plebiscitum by the Valerio-Horatian laws 
went through three processes : having been passed by the plebs, the consul was 
bound to bring it before the centuriata, before which he must have an auctoritas 
patrum. The Publilian law abolished the necessity for the auctoritas patrujn, 
and forced tlie consul to bring it before the centuriata at once. The Hortensian 
law made this unnecessary ; directly it passed the plebs it became law. This may 
be so, but there is no good proof oi piebiscita ever going before the centuriata. 



VIII THE LAWS OF THE TWELVE TABLES 107 

comparatively valueless. For the auckn'itas of the Senate was now 
a mere formality : it did not regard the substance of a law, it gave 
approval in advance — in practice something like the royal assent to 
Bills that have passed both Houses in the English Parliament. 
Such being the case, the Fathers would scarcely venture to exercise 
an antiquated right (one too which probably rested on no law) as 
against an assembly whose decrees had been more than once declared 
to be of equal validity. Long afterwards the lex Horteiisia (286) 
swept away all impediments to the authority of phiu'sa'ta, whatever 
they were, and from that period the legislative powers of the two 
coiiiitia were concurrent. 

The laws of the twelve tables, however, did nothing towards It did ?iot 
equalising the orders. They were merely a codification of existing touch the 
laws and customs, with modifications suggested by inspection of l^/^./'.^^,^ 
(Jreek laws, or by proposals of the decemvirs and others while they and pkbei- 
were being drafted. Their existence had a conservative efiect on ans. 
Roman jurisprudence, and helped to preserve throughout Roman 
history a oneness of spirit in the laws affecting civil rights, which 
survived much political change. But though it was a benefit to 
every one to have definite and known enactments in place of inde- 
finite customs or unwritten laws, there was nothing in them specially 
favourable to popular rights, or tending to the relief of the poor. 
On the contrary, like our own Magna Charta, they bear the stamp of 
the property-holding legislator, whose chief object is to enable every 
man to hold his own ; and who looks upon the validity of contract as 
more important than saving individual suffering. 

Thus tiie first three tables dealt with forms of civil process and Tables 
recovery of debt, sanctioning and confirming the most extreme claim '• "• '"• 
of creditor over debtor, even to the dividing of his body among 
several creditors. The fourth and fifth confirmed the most absolute iv. v. 
patria potestas — apparently with no qualification except the freedom 
of the son after the third sale by his father — and regulated the tutela 
of women. The sixth and seventh dealt with property rights, sale, vi. 7>ii. 
encroachments, easements, rights of way, and the like. The eighth viii. 
dealt with what lawyers call " torts " — acts of an individual inflicting 
any harm on another. The principle is that of compensation, A 
broken limb may be avenged by retaliation or fixed money payment, 
according as the sufferer is free or bond, A night thief, or one who 
defends himself with a weapon, may be killed. If caught in the act 
he may be beaten or sold as a slave : if already a slave may be 
hurled from the rock. Convicted thieves pay double or treble the 
amount stolen, according to circumstances.^ Penalties, varying 

* The distinction between the punishment of a thief caught in the act and one 
afterwards convicted rests, according to Sir H. Nhiine, on tlie principle of assinii- 



lo8 HISTORY OF ROME 



tx. X. 



from infamy to death, are imposed on the patron injuring his cHents, 
the employer of incantations, the voluntary homicide, or the fre- 
quenter of unlawful assemblies, though clubs which have no illegal 
object may be formed. 

Tables The ninth forbade privilegm~—\2L\\s passed to apply to a single 

case or person ; ordained that no citizen be tried on a capital charge 
except before the co/ni/ia; punished capitally a Judex accepting a 
bribe, or a citizen inciting a public enemy or handing over a fellow- 
citizen to him. The tenth contained sumptuary laws regulating 
funerals, forbidding burial within the city, or burning gold (except in 
stopping of teeth) and other precious things on funeral pyres, or 
lighting such pyres near houses. 

xi. xii. The eleventh and twelfth, as far as we know them, dealt with the 

Calendar, public sacrifices, rights of masters over slaves and their 
responsibility for their acts. But a clause in the eleventh led to the 
next agitation. It declared that a patrician and plebeian could not 
contract lawful marriage {cojiubium) : that is, the offspring of such 
union would have no legal father in whose power he would be, and 
therefore could not be a full citizen. It is not certain, though 
probable, that custom had already impeded these marriages.^ But 
the definite enactment would be sure to embitter the grievance, which 
was now to be removed. 

Lex C anil- Early in 445 C. Canuleius, a tribune, promulgated a bill to 

leta, 44£. remove this disability. It was violently opposed, specially on the 
ground that patricians alone could take auspices, and that if such 
marriages were legalised, it would be impossible to tell who was of 
pure patrician blood, and that the auspices would be " contami- 
nated." The struggle was felt on both sides to involve Hirther 
issues. Already the claim of the plebeians to admission to the 
consulship was mooted, and the more violent of the patricians 
maintained that if the tribunician office was to remain, civil life 
would be impossible for them. The majority of the Senate, how- 
ever, were wiser. The rogatio was allowed to be put to the people 
and carried ; while the decision as to the admission of the plebeians 
to the consulship was postponed for the present by a compromise. 
It was agreed that for the next year instead of consuls there should 

lating legal punishment to what a man would natural!}^ inflict. He would per- 
haps kill a thief if he caught him, when anger cooled he would let him off more 
easily. 

^ Cicero says that the decemviri iTihutnatiissima lege sanxerimt the prohibition 
{Rep. ii. 27). The words are compatible with the existence of a similar custom, 
which is assumed in the dramatic speeches given by Livy (iv. 2-6), It is even 
likely that conubium was not at first allowed between the gentes themselves with- 
out special process, the point being that to share in the gentile sacra a man must 
be of pure blood. 



VIII THE LEX CANULEIA 



109 



be Military Tribunes with Consular Power. In accordance Tribuni 
with military precedent these would be elected by the centuriate militares 
assembly without distinction of orders. Three accordingly were '-'^"^^^^"^"^ 
created for 444, and they continued to be appointed, with occasional ^fj " ^' 
intervals of consuls, up to the year 366. Their number varied in 
different years from three to four and six : four being the usual 
number until 405, after which six was the regular number, — the 
number of tribuni in a legion. The first three elected, Livy 
says, were all patricians ; yet this is disputed, one of the names (L. 
Atilius) probably indicating a plebeian gens. If it is so, this success 
of the plebeians was not repeated until the year 400. 

The patricians had thus managed to retain the doctrine of the The qnes- 
necessity of patrician birth for the consulship. It is even alleged, Hon post- 
though on hardly sufficient grounds, that, when plebeians did ^'^"'^'■^^ 
succeed in being elected to the consular tribuneship, they were 
practically excluded from judicial functions, that department being 
left to their patrician colleagues. Such an arrangement, if made, 
must have been a source of jealousy and discord, and would not 
have been needed until 400, before which date patricians were 
exclusively elected. At best it could only have postponed the 
question ; and before long the efforts of the plebeians were centred, 
I not on altering their position as consular tribunes, but on opening 
the Consulship itself 

At the same time the patricians secured another advantage. Censors 
Certain duties attaching to the consuls were not performed by the ''/M^'^''A 
I consular tribunes, especially the giving out of contracts for public '^'^•^' 
I works and the taking of the census, which included the adjustment 
I of the tributu))i, and soon also involved the filling up the roll of the 
j senate, the knights, and the other ordi;h\\\ This was now intrusted 
, to two new patrician officers called cc?iso?rs or " assessors." They 
; appear at first to have been appointed for the whole lustrum (an 
I arrangement which Appius Claudius Caecus in 312 still declared to 
I be legal), but were restricted to eighteen months b)' the /e.v Aemilia 

I In the midst of these political changes the question of poverty Poverty. 

I did not cease to cause trouble. We hear little of the old complaint 
of the debtors. The twelve tables had not relieved them, and it does 
I not appear, as before remarked, that popular sentiment was against 
I the surrender of the person of a defaulting debtor. The former com- 

1 Livy iv. 24 ; Monimsen (i. 300) appears lo hold that the censors were first 
appointed in 435. Livy names two in 444, Init no others till 435. Hut this 
irregularity is only a repetition of consular irregularity in this business, or at any 
rate of Livy's record of it, who only twice before since the expulsion of the kings 
records a census (iii. 3, 23). 



no 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Spitrius 
Mai'lius, 
440-439- 



Cincin- 
natus 
natned 
dictator. 

Death of 
Maelius, 
439- 



A lull in 
the contest, 
439-421. 



plaints rested on the fact that the rich had taken advantage of their 
position to wrest the law in particular cases to the disadvantage and 
personal hardship of the iiexi. These cases were prevented now by 
the aiixiliiim of the tribunes. But tribunes could not prevent poverty ; 
and when this poverty provoked the charity of a rich man, he usually 
risked the charge at the hands of the jealous patricians of attempting 
to set himself above the law. 

Thus in 440 a rich eques, named Spurius Maelius, in a year of 
famine purchased corn from Etruria, which he distributed at a low 
rate among the poorer citizens. Immediately the cry was raised that 
he was usurping the functions of the praefectiis a?i7ioftae^ who had 
been appointed to superintend the supply of corn, and was aiming 
at royal power. Next year the excitement increased ; rumours were 
afloat that nightly gatherings were held at his house, and arms 
collected there ; that the tribunes were being bribed, and a revolution 
prepared. The alarm, which the patrician leaders cunningly kept 
alive, had enabled them to secure the election of consuls instead of 
consular tribunes for that year, and now also enabled them to insist 
on the nomination of a dictator, from whose authority there was no 
appeal to the people. The old hero of the Aequian wars, L, Quintius 
Cincinnatus, was named ; and he appointed C. Servilius Ahala his 
master of the horse. Ahala was sent to summon Sp. Maelius to the 
judgment-seat of the dictator. Maelius refused to follow him, and 
took refuge in the crowd of his supporters ; upon which Ahala struck 
him dead. This act was applauded and defended by the dictator, 
on the ground that Maelius had been legally summoned, and in 
refusing to submit to a legal tribunal was attempting kingly power, 
which by the law of Poplicola was punishable by instant death. It 
is constantly referred to by Cicero with approval, and does not seem 
to have excited any violent sensation at the time. The ungrateful 
people were pacified by the distribution of Maelius's store of corn at a 
low price ; and though the tribunes from time to time attacked the 
injustice of the murder, he not only had to die for an act of mercy, as 
others have had to do, but had to leave a name behind him stained 
by a groundless charge, invented by his enemies, who could not 
have believed it themselves. 

Perhaps the patricians fancied that he was aiming, not at kingly 
power, but at admission to the consular tribuneship. At any rate 
when he had been got rid of, no attempt was made to prevent 
consular tribunes being elected for the next year : and no farther 
plebeian claim was made with any effect for some time. In 428, 
indeed, the tribunes exerted their power against the consuls, even 
threatening to imprison them, but it was in support of the authority 
of the Senate; in 424 we find them declaiming against the practical 



VIII THE SENATE AND THE TRIBUNES in 

exclusion of plebeians from the consular tribuneship ; and, generally, 
they seem to watch with care the conduct of the patrician magis- 
trates in the wars. But nothing was done for the advancement 4~^- 

of the plebeian order until 421, when on the number of quaestors Qj^f^^^^^^'- 
1 • 1111 • 1 ■ • 1 -11 1 ^'^ip opened 

bemg doubled, two to serve \j\ the city, and two with the consuls to plebeians 

abroad, the plebeians claimed, and after considerable struggle sue- by lex 

ceeded in securing, that the office should be open to them. The law Papiria. 

appears to have been proposed by L. Papirius Mugillanus as interrex. 

Other contests which marked the next thirty years were not ./21-jgi. 
directly political. The poorer citizens tried on more than one 
occasion to secure that conquered land should be divided instead of 
becoming ager pttbltcus, which they found by experience was mostly 
monopolised in the interests of the rich ; but they were not generally 
successful, nor always satisfied with the distribution when made. On 
the other hand, the Senate had learnt to use the tribunician The Senate 
intercession in its own interests. It took pains to secure on its side "^''j ^^'^ 
a majority of the tribunician college, which would prevent legislation 
proposed by the other members. ^ This was rendered a more effectual 
weapon still when, about 395, a rule was introduced whereby the 
action of the college was no longer determined by a majority. From Sin<rlevefo. 
henceforth one tribune could veto a proceeding though it was 
supported by all the others. 

This right, and the advantage taken of it by the Senate, was The 
conspicuously illustrated in 395, when after the capture of Veii, the proposed 
people being dissatisfied with a division of certain Volscian lands, ""S^^^^'^" 
some of the tribunes wished to propose a law transferring a part of -,„ -. ^nj. 
the inhabitants of Rome to Veii, and giving that town equal rights 
with Rome. The patricians held that this measure would inevitably 
tend to perpetuate a division of interests already wide enough, and 
they defeated it by inducing two tribunes to forbid the rogatio. The 
plebeians, however, looked upon this as a violation of their privileges. 
The two tribunes were impeached and fined in 393, and the law was 
again brought before the assembly of the tribes. It was indeed 
rejected by a narrow majority ; but the principle was vindicated that 
the Senate should not interpose their authority to prevent measures 
being brought before the tribes. Nor did the people stop there. 
Advantage was taken of a dispute as to the distribution of the Veien- 
tine spoil to indict the victor Camillus, who had been forward in Camillus 
resisting the punishment of the two tribunes. L. Appuleius, one of ^'^^^. ^^^^ 
the tribunes for 391, accused Camillus and demanded a heavy fine. ^^^ ^' ^^^' 
He anticipated his trial by going into exile, and in his absence was 
condemned to a fine of 15,000 asses. 

^ See instance in Livy iv. 49, B.C. 415. 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Entrance 
of tribunes 
into the 
Senate. 



Progress 
interrupted 
by the 
Gallic 
invasion. 



The exercise, therefore, of the tribunician powers was apparently 
steadily increasing in frequency and effectiveness. About 448 the 
tribunes had secured the right of appearing in the Senate, though not 
of speaking or voting, A bench was set for them at the door of the 
house, from which they could watch the proceedings.^ But starting 
from this we shall find that they gradually claimed and obtained 
larger powers, — the right of preventing magistrates from summoning 
the Senate or proposing in it new laws and elections ; the right of 
preventing a senatiis coiisultian from being passed ; and finally the 
right of summoning it themselves. 

This was a later development. A calamity was now approaching 
which made a break in Roman progress, both internal and external. 
But before going on to describe the burning of Rome by the Gauls, 
it will be convenient to sum up briefly the points gained in the gradual 
equalisation of the orders. 



Summary. By the lex Valeria (508) all citizens alike were entitled to appeal 

against the sentence of the consul pronounced in the city. 

In 493, by a determined though bloodless revolution, the plebeians 
obtained the appointment of certain officers (necessarily plebeians), 
whose duty it was to protect them from harsh administration. 

In 47 I, by the lex Pubh'lia, the plebeians secured that these officers 
(5 tribunes, 2 aediles — 10 after 457) should be elected in their own 
council, now called comitia tributa. 

In 451 the plebeians succeeded (after ten years' resistance to the 
Terctitilian rogation) in securing that the laws by which the whole 
people were to be governed should be written out, engraved, and 
exposed to public inspection (x. tabulae 451 ; ii. tabulae 449). 

In 449, by the Valeria- Moral iati laws., the plebeians secured that 
their council, which as comitia tributa already elected the plebeian 
magistrates, should be recognised as a legislative body capable of 
passing orders {plebiscita) binding upon the populus, while the 
senatus consulta were committed to the care of the plebeian aediles, 
to be preserved in the temple of Ceres, and to be thus saved from 
possible tampering by the consuls and their subordinates the quaestors. 

In 445, by the lex Canitleia., the plebeians obtained the power of 
contracting full and lawful marriage with patricians. 

In 444 the patricians were forced to compromise the plebeian 
claim of admission to the consulship by substituting for consuls 
" military tribunes with consular power," among whom, on the analogy 
of the military tribunes in the legions, plebeians might be elected. 

In 421 the number of quaestors was raised from two to four, and 



^ Valerius Max. 



VIII GRADUAL PROGRESS OF THE PLEBEIANS 113 

the right conceded to the plebeians of being elected to any number 
of them, although they did not succeed in carrying any election till 
409, when three out of four were plebeians. 

The disabilities still remaining were that the plebeians could not 
be consuls, censors, members of the colleges of pontifices or augures, 
or hold certain other religious offices. The gradual removal of these 
disabilities will be treated of in a future chapter. 

Authorities. — The most continuous narratives are those of Livy ii.-v. ; 
Dionysius v.-xiii. ; Zonaras vii. 13-22. We have also fragments of Dio Cassius, 
and of Cicero's Treatise on the Reptiblic, Lib. ii., and VXuiaxch's Lives of Poplicola 
and Camillus. Most valuable of all perhaps are the fragments of the laws of the 
twelve tables preserved chiefly by Aulus Gellius and Gains. These fragments the 
student will find collected in many books — Donaldson's Varronianus ; Words- 
worth's Fragmc7its and Specimens of Ancient Latin ; Allen's Early Lati?i ; Bruns' 
Pontes Juris Romarii antiqui, ed. T. Momnisen. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CAPTURE OF ROME BY THE GAULS, B.C. 390 

The Gauls in Italy — The Senones and Lingones attack Clusium — Roman 
envoys at Clusium join in the battle — The Romans refuse satisfaction — 
Advance of Brennus on Rome — Battle of the AUia (midsummer 390) — Burn- 
ing of Rome and defence of the Capitol by Manlius — Camillus at Ardea — His 
recall and appointment as dictator— Saving of the Capitol by the geese — 
Exhaustion of the Gauls by pestilence — They overrun the Campagna — 
Recalled home by an invasion of the Veneti^ — Camillus said to have attacked 
and retaken gold and standards — Effects of the capture on Rome. 

The Gauls SOME account of the Celtic invaders of northern Italy has already 
in Italy. been given. We have seen that they had long ago expelled the 
Etruscans from the valley of the Padus, and confined them to the 
region south of the Apennines. The rich plains of northern Italy 
had attracted tribe after tribe of these barbarians from the other side 
of the Alps or from the high Alpine valleys. Those who came first 
lost perhaps some of their warlike and migratory habits as they found 
fruitful plains to settle in, and sites for permanent townships. But 
as they had seized these fair lands by arms, so were they ever pressed 
by fresh waves of immigration, and harassed by the Ligures on the 
west and the Veneti on the east, who, whether of kindred blood or 
no, were earlier comers in the country, and ready to resist any 
encroachment on their soil. 
The The earliest immigrants had settled on the upper parts of the 

Po valley, the newcomers going farther and farther to the east 
and south. The latest of the tribes to arrive appears to have been 
that of the Senones, who occupied a district on the shore of the 
Adriatic between the two streams, the Utens and the Aesis. It is 
narrow and far from fertile, for the mountains here come down 
very close to the sea, leaving but small space for cultivation. 
Naturally the restless Gaul, who would not bear the fatigue and 
monotony of continuous occupation even of good soil, but liked to 
move off to another district when he had exhausted one, looked out 



Senones. 



CHAP. IX THE SENONES AND LINGONES IN ETRURIA 115 

for wider and more generous lands. Making their way over the 

mountains into the valleys of the upper Tiber and the Clanis, the 

Senones, joined perhaps by the neighbouring Lingones, were seeking 

new territories in Etruria.^ 

Marching down the Clanis, under their king or Brennus, they The 

came upon the strong town of Clusium, situated on the crest of an ^<:'ioncs 

olive-crowned eminence at the southern extremity of the valley. It '^J\ 

■' . . ■' Lmgones 

was necessary to capture this town, if they were to have liberty to attack 

settle in the valley or beyond it as they chose. But the Gauls never Clusiujn, 

bore willingly the fatigue of a siege. The people of Clusium were 39^- 

able to maintain themselves within their walls, and to send out 

messages asking for help. It is a striking proof of the growth of 

the Roman reputation since the fall of Veil, that it was to Rome that 

this appeal was made, though nothing in the past history of the two 

cities warranted an expectation of help from this ancient enemy. 

But though the Roman government sent no troops to the relief Ambassa- 
of the besieged town, they took the opportunity of making plain the ^^^^ ^^^^^ 
fact that there were ties between the two states. Three ambassadors, '(^'^'f ^'^'^ 
all members of the great Fabian gens, were sent to warn the Gauls Gauh at 
"not to attack allies and friends of the Roman people, who had Clusium. 
done them no injury." The Gauls ansAvered "that they were willing 
to treat on amicable terms : that what they wanted was land, of 
which the people of Clusium had more than they were able to 
cultivate, while they themselves were straitened for room. If they 
refused, let the Romans stand by and see which would win the 
field ! " The Roman envoys, without deigning to answer the pro- 
posal, asked haughtily, "What business Gauls had in Etruria .^ " 
" Our title," answered the Gauls, " is in our swords. Everything 
belongs to brave men." 

The battle which followed was not decisive. But the Roman The envoys 
envoys, forgetful of the law of nations, took part in it^ and one of take part i?i 
them, O. Fabius, slew and spoiled a Gallic chieftain. The leader of ^^^^ battle, 
the Gauls at once sounded the recall, and suspending hostilities with %^^„^Jj^^ 
Clusium, sent an embassy to Rome demanding the surrender of the rcfjise rc- 
three Fabii. Not only was the demand refused, but all three were paration. 
elected among the six consular tribunes for the next year. 

It is not easy to say who was responsible for this unjust decision. 
Livy represents the Fetials as deciding that the men ought to be 

^ There is a story told by Plutarch and Dionysius that the attack upon Clusium 
was instigated by Aruns, a native of Clusium, whose wife had been dishonoured 
by a noble youth or Lucumo. Not getting redress he went to the Senones and 
induced them to attack his native city. Another version of the story attributed 
this incident to the first passage of the Gauls into Italy, which Livy says was 200 
years earlier (Plut. Catn. 15 ; Dionys. xiii. fr. 15 ; Livy v. 33). 



HISTORY OK ROME 



The Gau.'s 






delivered, and the Senate as disapprovini;- of the act o\ tlie Fabii, 
and yet hesitating- to surrender them from a class feeling- in favour o\ 
men of rank. To save themselves, therefore, from the odium of either 
decision, they referred the matter to the people, who replied by elect- 
ing the envoys consular tribunes. But as this decision was the cause 
of a great disaster to Rome, no doubt each party in the State would be 
anxious to shift the blame upon the other. Livy s account seems on 
the whole reasonable, namely that the Senate vacillated. Its vacilla- 
tion however must be held partly responsible for the decision of the 
centuriate assembly. Q. Fabius was indeed subsequently impeached 
by a tribui\e : but nothing can explain away or quite excuse the fact 
of the election. That at any rate was the act of the people. If they 
followed the lead of the Senate, so much the worse for both.^ 

These events must have occurred in the autumn of 30 1 ; for the 
elections come after the (.^.allic embassy. The Cauls apparently 
waited for i-einforcenients,- and did not start till the summer of the 
next year. They then poured down the valley of the Tiber on the 
left bank of the river, in great force, scouring the country as they 
came with a widely extended line. Where they passed, the citizens 
closed their gates and hurriedly rushed to arms, while the frightened 
rustics tied for safety to towns or mountains. Vet though they doubt- 
less plundered far and wide to supply their wants, they stayed to 
attack no walled town ; but rushed on like a torrent, shouting " To 
I\.on-»e I To Rome I " 

Meanwhile the new consular tribunes seenuxl but half conscious 
of their danger. Four legions were indeed enrolled, and were joined 
by Latin allies and others less capable of service, so that an army 
of nearly 40,000 men was encamped about eleven miles from 
Rome, near the place where the small brook called the A Ilia fell 
into the Tiber. ^^ But no special pains had been taken with the 
levies ; no dictator had been named, as was usual in times of peril ; 
no great care was shown in either the selection or the fortifying of 
the camp ; and finally the usual ceremonies in taking the auspices had 
been neglected. 

^ Diodonis (xiv. 113^ affirn\s that the Senate voted for the surrender of the 
legate i^h*^ t"*"!)' mentions one), but that his father, Q. Fabius Ambustus, who 
was cot\sul;ir Uibune, ap^-vealed to the people and carried the day. This does 
not agree with either Livy or the Fasti. 

^ Diodorus xiv. 114 TrpOLT\aS6uet'oi iraph rtor ouoeOi'd^v Svvauiv. 

^ Which jx\rticul;\r brook represents the ancient AUia is not certain. Livy 
describes it carefully : ' ' At the eleventh milestone, wliere the AUia flowing down 
from the mountains of Crustumerium in a veiy deep channel joins the Tilx>r 
close below the i-oad " (v. 37). Two streams answer more or less to this de- 
scription, one nameless brook crossing the ro;\d a mile beyond /.<? .lA/r/j^vV. 



another the .S'.\'A> iM C:-f.:.' 
mentioncv.1 bv Livv. The 



three n-.iles farther on. Neither is exactly the distance 
road " is the z's\i S^:uiria, 



IX DEFEAT OF THE ROMANS ON THE ALLIA 117 

The left of the Roman army rested on the Tiber ; their centre Battle of 
was weak, because the inferiority of their numbers made an unduly '^^^ A Ilia, 
extended line necessary to prevent being outflanked. They en- ^^^'^J^^y' 
deavoured to make their right strong by occupying some rising ^^^' 
ground with reserves, which height compensate for their defect in 
numbers. But the Gallic king directed his main force against this 
hill, carried it by an impetuous assault, and then took the Roman 
line on the flank and drove their left into the river. The rout was The 
as complete as it seems to have been all but instantaneous. So little Romans 
resistance was made that the slaughter does not appear to have been ^^^^^«- 
great. The men stationed on the left escaped across the river, 
and such loss as they sustained was occasioned by the crush of fugi- 
tives or by the stream more than by the swords of the enemy. 
, Large numbers made their way to Veil, where the empty town was 
able to afford them a refuge. The Roman right retreated pre- 
cipitately to Rome, and rushing through the city, without stopping 
even to close the gates, made its way to the Capitol. 

The Gauls were amazed at their own success. It seemed so The Gauls 
sudden as to be unaccountable. A Roman army had scattered to '^i'ait/or 
the winds almost at the sound of their shouting. They hesitated to ^^ ^'^y^- 
go on, thinking that there must be some ambush preparing for them. 
I It is thus that Livy accounts for their waiting to the third day after 
J the battle before approaching Rome. But it is also probable that 
the division of the spoil of the Roman camp, and the riotous feasting 
I in which they were accustomed to indulge after a victory, may partly 
j be responsible for the delay.i 

I Meanwhile the two days gave the population of Rome the oppor- Flight of 

I tunity of escape. The citizens who had arms, and were neither too the popula- 
\ young nor too old to use them, entrenched themselves on the Capitol ; ^^"^^ '^f 
I the unarmed, with the women and children, poured over the Sub- ^"^^' 
i lician bridge, carrying as much of their household goods as they 
j could, and made their way to neighbouring towns — Caere, Veil, and 
I others. The Vestal Virgins and the Flamen Ouirinalis, after a hasty The 
(conference, selected the most sacred objects of their worship which Vestals. 
\ they could carry with them and started for Caere, after burying the 
jrest in jars {dolioli) within a chapel attached to the flamen's resi- 
dence. The story is told that as these holy virgins were mounting 
Ijaniculum on foot, a certain plebeian, named L. Albinius, who was 
; conveying his wife and children on a waggon, came up with them. 
I Even in that hour of panic he reverenced their office and character, 
^nd, causing his wife and children to dismount, he carried them and 
the sacred objects which they bore to Caere. 

^ Flut. Catn. 20 ; cp. Polyb. ii. 19. 



ii8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The Gauls 
arrive at 
Rome, 
390- 



The 

Capitol. 



Plunder of 
the city. 
The old 
consulars. 



When the Gauls on the third day after the battle of the Allia 
arrived at Rome, they were astonished to find the gates open and 
the streets empty. As they made their way through the Forum, and 
cast their eyes from side to side upon the public buildings and 
temples which surrounded it, no sign of resistance or even of habita- 
tion met their view. Only the Capitol towered above them, strongly 
fortified and crowded with defenders. Successive accumulations from 
surrounding buildings, as well as deliberate embankments made in 
imperial times, have rendered it difficuU for a modern visitor to the 
Capitol to understand its strength, when its sides were abrupt and 
steep, and no easy ascent had been constructed for the accommoda- 
tion of peaceful citizens. At this period it presented a formidable 
obstacle to the Gauls, whose strength lay in sudden and rapid 
charges, which swept all before them in the open, rather than in 
besieging or storming fortifications. 

Leaving a detachment to guard against sallies from the Capitol, 
the Gauls dispersed to plunder the deserted town. It was not, how- 
ever, entirely empty. Certain old men, many of whom had held 
high office and celebrated triumphs, were sitting in their houses, 
clothed in the robes and ensigns of their rank, waiting for the end. 
They were too old to be useful on the Capitol, and yet had disdained 
to fly. Some even said that by a solemn formula, dictated by M. 
Fabius, the Pontifex Maximus, they had devoted themselves to death 
as a sacrifice for their country. At first the Gauls looked at them 
with a kind of reverential curiosity without doing them any violence. 
But when one, hardier or more curious than the rest, ventured to 
stroke the beard of M. Papirius, the old man in wrath smote him on 
the head with his ivory staff. The barbarian, in a flash of anger, 
slew him ; and this was a signal for the death of all the rest. 

When their first lust of plunder had been satiated, the object of 
the Gauls was to provoke the garrison of the Capitol to descend. 
They tried to do this by firing different parts of the town, or slaughter- 
ing such remnants of the population as had not been able to escape. 
But though it was a heartrending spectacle for the garrison, they 
remained firm to their purpose of holding the hill. Whether fear or 
prudence constrained them, it was doubtless the wisest policy. The 
Gauls would soon weary of waiting, and even of their work of destruc- 
tion, which would in itself naturally entail a failure of provisions. 
Accordingly, after several ineffectual attempts to storm the Capitol, 
they had to divide their forces : part staying to keep up the blockade, 
Gauls roam part scattering through the Campagna in search of food. The result 
through the Qf ^-j^-g ^^,^5 ^^^^^ ^j-^^y \q^^ j-i^^ny men, cut off in detail by the Latins, 
Campagna. ^^^^^ ^^.^^^ obliged to arm themselves to protect their lives and pro- 
perty. The exiled Camillus, for instance, who was living at Ardea, 



The 
Capitol 
holds out 



IX THE SIEGE OF THE CAPITOL 



119 



The 



steiTc 



is said to have led the people of that town in a successful night 

attack upon one of these plundering parties, and to have cut it to 

pieces. Meanwhile the Gauls left behind in Rome showed signs of 

weariness. The blockade was^ so ill kept that C. Fabius Dorso was 

able to make his way to the Quirinal, perform a sacrifice incumbent '/ ^/^t- 

on the P^abian gens, and return without being molested by the ^''^/^'^"^ ''^^ 

enemy. ^''P^ ^'P- 

Moreover, the Roman fugitives had gradually collected in formid- Romans 
able numbers at Veii ; had sternly suppressed a movement among '^^ ^^^^' 
a remnant of the conquered Etruscan inhabitants of the district, who ^^^" 
were taking advantage of the disaster of Rome to plunder her terri- 
tory ; and were looking out for some chance of striking a blow at 
the invaders. Their thoughts naturally turned to Camillus, the con- 
queror of the very town in which they were living. It was deter- 
mined that he should be summoned from Ardea as dictator. An 
active youth, named Pontius Comlnius, managed to make his way to 
the Capitol by the river, and obtain a decree of the Senate for the 
recall of Camillus and his nomination as dictator. Messengers were Camillus 
sent to summon him ; and he consented to come when the citizens sent for. 
at Veii had passed a law for his recall. 

Meanwhile the Gauls were getting daily in a worse plight. They The geese 
had made one more attempt on the Capitol, scaling it by the same ^'^ ^^f 
path as the Veientine, or some other messenger, had been observed ^'^P^^'^^- 
to do, and were on the point of making their way in, finding the 
guards asleep, when the' frightened cackling of the sacred geese of 
the temple of Juno roused M. Manlius, who hurled the leading Gaul 
down the precipitous path by a blow from his shield. His fall threw 
the advancing file into some confusion, which was completed by 
showers of javelins poured down by the now thoroughly -aroused 
garrison. One of the sentries, whose untimely sleep had thus all but 
lost Rome, was hurled down the Tarpeian rock ; the Roman dis- 
cipline being thus sternly exercised even in that hour of danger. 

The discouragement caused by these repeated failures, and by 
the losses sustained in the raids in Latium, was now brought to a Pestilence 
chmax by famine and pestilence. The famine was the natural result and famine 
of a marauding army's operations in a foreign country. In such "l'^'-'".^ Hie 
expeditions as much is spoiled and destroyed as is taken for use ; ^'^''^'' 
while cattle are driven off to places of security by the countrymen, and 
corn and other food are concealed. These causes in later times more 
than once reduced Hannibal almost to despair, though he had won 
greater victories, and had a far wider district to draw from. More- 
over, as the battle of the Allia was fought on the 1 6th of July, the 
Gauls must have been in Rome at its most unhealthy season, during: 
which all those of its natives who could afford to do so sought purer 



I20 



HISTORY OF ROME chap. 



air, 



Retirement 



We have seen how frequent were the pestilences at Rome.i 
It was likely, therefore, to fare much worse with men accustomed to 
another climate, and unused to long residence in a town ; exposed 
also to the alternations of wild debauchery, when the plunder of 
cattle, corn, and wine was plentiful, and of sharp privation when that 
failed. 

The retirement, therefore, of the invaders requires little farther 
jfthe explanation. It was their way. Sudden and violent onslaughts, 

Gaiih, which swept all before them, gave place to sullen discouragement at 

•^^°' anything like prolonged opposition and difficulty. News was brought 

them also that the Veneti were invading their territories. This 
perhaps applies not to the Senones but to the Lingones, who hved 
in the country separated by the Po from that of the Veneti. But if 
they found the Lingones determined on a return, the Senones would 
not probably be willing to stay behind. " Accordingly," says Polybius, 
"they made terms with the Romans, handed back the city, and 
returned to their own land." 
Storv of This, perhaps, is all of which we can be sure. Livy says that 

Camillus. Q, Sulpicius, One of the consular tribunes, negotiated with Bren- 
nus a payment of a thousand pounds of gold ; and that Brennus 
answered his objections to the balance brought by the Gauls by 
putting his sword into the scale, and exclaiming insolently, " Woe 
to the conquered ! " Before the base bargain was completed the 
dictator Camillus appeared. He ordered the gold to be taken away, 
answering the remonstrances of the Gauls by declaring that all public 
bargains were annulled by the appointment of a dictator. He 
proudly declared that Rome must be saved by arms and not by gold ; 
and drawing out his men in battle array, fought with and conquered 
the Gauls. They fled, but were overtaken by him eight miles from 
Rome, again defeated, and cut to pieces to a man. 

Though this picturesque story of the sudden intervention of 
Camillus is repeated in several of our authorities, it must be regarded 
as almost certainly mythical. It would be impossible without a pre- 
vious battle and victory ; and it seems certain that whatever sum the 
Gauls bargained for, they obtained and carried off with them. Some 
attack, led by Camillus, upon the rear of the retreating army may be 
the foundation on which this story, so honourable to the family of 
Camillus, was founded. 
The effects The Gauls were gone. They had swept over Rome and the 

''fj''^. Campagna like a torrent, leaving behind them ruin and desolation. 

Gallic g^^^ ^^ burning of a city cannot destroy a people. The loss of life 

among the Romans does not appear to have been great, and public 

1 Of the frequent pestilences in Rome, see p. 74. 



occupation. 



IX RETIREMENT OF GAULS — RESTORATION OF CITY i2i 

business and private industry could at once be resumed. No doubt the 
farniers had suffered severely, and the poverty of the weaker of them 
would amount in many cases to absolute ruin. Still such catastrophes 
are seldom complete. Means 'would soon be found to rebuild the 
homesteads, to sow the crops, and to renew the herds and flocks ; 
and next year the fields would hide with waving corn all traces of the 
enemy's presence. Nor can we suppose the city to have been utterly 
destroyed. No doubt the houses, small and often of wood and thatch, 
would to a great extent be burnt ; but it is certain that many of 
the temples and public buildings still remained, either whole or only 
partly consumed by fire ; the Gauls also would, no doubt, have pre- 
served some houses for their own accommodation ; and the utter 
demolition of a great city is a task which they would not have had 
the patience thoroughly to perform. Just ninety years before Athens 
had suffered a similar disaster at the hands of the Persians, yet she 
had now long been famous throughout the world for the splendour 
and beauty of her temples and works of art. Rome, too, would soon 
rise from her ashes, revived in greater magnificence by the energy 
and liberality of her sons 

Even the State documents and other perishable objects, which Loss of 
Livy thinks were destroyed by the Gallic conflagration, must in many P't^l'(^ 
cases have escaped. Some of them were on the Capitol, which was ^^'''^'''"• 
not burnt at all ; some had been removed or buried by the Flamen 
and the Vestals ; others were in temples which did not at any rate 
wholly perish. It was an obvious thing in after years to describe 
to the Gallic fire the loss of everything which the carelessness or 
violences of succeeding generations had perhaps caused to disappear. 

The work of restoration began with the temples, and an altar Restora 
was dedicated to Aius Locutius at the bottom of the Sacred Way, to 
expiate the neglect of a divine voice which was believed to have 
announced the coming of the Gauls. ^ But the ruinous state of the Veii 
city caused a renewal of the proposal to transfer the seat of govern- defeated. 
ment to Veii. It is difficult to see why the tribunes should have 
promoted this as a popular measure, unless the plebeians hoped that 

I ^ Livy also says that tlie money taken from the Gauls, which had originally 
I been contributed by the women, was declared sacred and placed in the temple o( 
[ Jupiter, and we hear afterwards of this money as lacing believed to have been 
embezzled by the patricians. But it seems almost certain that the Gauls never 
lost the ransom which they received ; and as, by Livy's own account, the women 
were not on the Capitol but at Veii and other towns, it is inconsistent with the 
rest of the account that Camillus should have allowed their contributions to be 
sent. Again, Livy states that in consequence of this public service the Senate 
decreed that henceforth a laudatio should be delivered over women at their 
funeral as over men, but Cicero {de Orat. ii. § 44) says that the first woman so 
• honoured was the mother of Catulus, about B.C. 100. 



tion. The 
proposal to 
mi£[rate to 



122 



HISTORY OF ROME chap, ix 



a removal from Rome might be an opportunity of breaking free from 
patrician privileges, inextricably interwoven with local traditions and 
rites, and starting fresh with institutions more consonant with ideas 
which had been growing up during the last century. At any rate 
the patricians, headed by Camillus, successfully resisted the pro- 
posal, and the work of restoring houses at Rome was begun. 
Unfortunately, no general plan was followed. The citizens seem to 
have carried on the rebuilding according to individual caprice ; and 
therefore the new streets were irregular and ill-planned, while the 
old sewers, originally constructed down the line of the streets, were 
now often built over by private houses, which must have proved 
unhealthy for the inhabitants, and have increased the difficulty of 
cleansing and repairing the sewers themselves. 
No im- Otherwise, this year of disaster made no positive change m the 

mediate State. The old constitution simply resumed operation ; consular 
political tribunes were duly elected for 389, and the contests of patrician and 
change, plebeian were taken up again, intensified perhaps by the greater 
*^^' poverty to which many must have been reduced by their losses dur- 

ing the Gallic occupation. Her old enemies in Etruria and Latmm, 
indeed, took advantage of her weakness to renew their attacks upon 
Rome and her territory ; but, though she suffered, she survived these 
assaults as she had survived the victory of the Gauls ; and, before 
the Gauls were able to renew their invasion, had won for herself a 
broader territory and an almost undisputed supremacy in Latium. 

Authorities.— Livyv. 34-55 ; Dionysius xiii. 7-13 ; Diodorus xiv. 113-115 ; 
Dio Cassius, fr. 25 ; Appian, Res Gall. 3 ; Eutropius i. 19 ; Plutarch, Camillus; 
Polybius ii, 18 ; Orosius ii. 19 ; Zonaras vii. 23. 



CHAPTER X 



TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LATIN LEAGUE 



COLONIES 

Satricum . . B.C. 385 

B. c. 

. B.C. 



NEW TRIBES 



Sutrium 
Nepete 
Setia . 
Antium 
Cales . 
Fregellae 



383 
383 

B.C. 382 

B.C. 338 

B.C. 334 

B.C. 328 



Stellatina 

Tromentina 

Sabatina 

Arniensis 

Pomptina 

Publilia 

Maecia 

Scaptia 



B.C. 387 



B.C. 358 



B.C. 332 



Hostilities break out against Rome after the departure of the Gauls — Camillus 
conquers the Etruscans, Volscians, and Aequians (389) — Fresh war with 
Volscians and Etruscans ; capture of Sutrium and Nepete (386) — The 
Volscians joined by sonie^of the Latini and Hernici ; colony sent to Satricum 
(385)— Pestilence — Rebellions at Lanuvium, Circeii, Velitrae, Praeneste (383- 
382) — War with Volscians and rebellion at Tusculum (381) — Cincinnatus 
conquers the rebellious Praenestines (380) — A Roman disaster in Volscian 
territory (379) — Conquest of Volscians and Latins (378-377) — The Gauls 
(367-282) — The first Samnite war (343-342) — The Latin rebellion — T. Man- 
lius Torquatus (340-339) — Dissolution of the Latin League, and last struggles 
of the Latin towns (338-336). 



The humiliation which Rome had suffered at the hands of the Wars with 
Gauls was quickly followed by attacks from her enemies. The Eh'uscans, 
Etruscans at the Fa?mm Voltiinuiae^ the regular place of meeting of 



Volscians, 
Aequians, 



the League, determined to drive the Romans from southern Etruria, jSg-jjj. 
and at once seized upon Sutrium, the first strong town south of the 
Ciminian forest, which the Romans had secured shortly before the 
coming of the Gauls. The Volscians advanced as far as Lanuvium, 
less than twenty miles from Rome. The Aequians were encamped 
at Bola, not far from Praeneste. By a series of rapid movements 
Camillus, who had been named dictator, gained a victory over all 
three enemies in succession. 

But they were far from being finally crushed. For the next 
thirteen years there was almost continuous war, and the Volscians 



124 



HISTORY OF ROME 



A new 

colony at 
Satricuni 
attacked by 
the Vol- 
scians, j8f. 



Rebellion 
at Prae- 
neste. 

The 

RoTuatis 
take the 
offensive 
against the 
Volscians, 
379-377- 



again and again advanced into old Latium, often joined by forces of 
the Latins and Hernici.i In 386 they invaded the Pomptine district, 
but on the appearance of Camilkis retired towards Satricum and 
Antium, and were decisively defeated and obliged to surrender 
Satricum. Yet they repeated the attempt in the following year 
(385), again with assistance from the Latins, among whom were 
some of the Roman colonists in Circeii and Velitrae, and were again 
defeated by the dictator, A. Cornelius Cossus. 

To secure the frontier a colony of 2000 Roman citizens was 
now sent out to Satricum, each with an allotment of two and a 
half jugera of land. But during 383 and 382 a series of rebellions 
in Latium — at Lanuvium, Circeii, VeHtrae, and Praeneste — kept 
the Romans engaged, and induced the Volscians to renew hostili- 
ties by attacking this new colony. Once more they were defeated 
by Camillus, now for the seventh time a consular tribune. But 
so widely had disloyalty spread in Latium, that even some of 
the citizens of Tusculum, long closely connected with Rome, were 
found among the captives from the Volscian host, and brought the 
fidelity of the town into such suspicion that Camillus marched an 
army against it. A speedy submission, however, and a humble 
embassy to the Senate averted any actual severity. The next year 
(380) the Praenestines were also defeated by T. Ouintius Cincin- 
natus on the banks of the Allia, and their town was surrendered,^ 

From this time the character of the war changes. The Romans 
assumed the offensive, and instead of being content with repelling 
Volscian raids upon old Latium, marched themselves into Volscian 
territory. Their first experience was unfortunate. Under two of 
the consular tribunes, Publius and Caius Manlius, the Roman army 
was caught in a disadvantageous situation, and nearly lost its camp 
(379). In the following year, however, a systematic devastation 
was carried out in the Volscian lands, and in 377 a combined 
force of Volscians and Latins, which had advanced as far as Satri- 
cum, was defeated and driven back upon Antium. The people of 
Antium, tired of the war, now surrendered to Rome. But their Latin 
allies were not disposed to submit so easily : they burned Satricum, 



* The alliance with the Latins (493) and with the Hernici (486) was still in 
force. But the bands of the Latin League seem to have been loose, and the 
various towns took their own line as to hostihty or friendship with Rome. The 
meeting-place of the League w^as the hicus Ferentinae (Livy vii. 25) ; but a smaller 
league of eight towns joined in the worship of Diana at the Nemus Aricinum 
(Cato Orig. ii. 21 ; Jord. ) 

^ Cincinnatus is said to have removed the statue of Jupiter Imperator from 
Praeneste to Rome, and to have caused to be inscribed on the pedestal, ' ' Jupiter 
and all the gods have permitted T. Quintius Cincinnatus, dictator, to capture 
nine towns" (Livy vi. 29). 



X RENEWED GALLIC INVASIONS 125 

and attacked Tusculum, as having deserted the Latin alliance. The Last Latin 
Tusculans fortified themselves in their citadel, and were speedily struggle, 
relieved by a Roman army. The Latins suffered such a defeat ^^''^^ 
and slaughter that they submitted to enter into alliance with Rome, 
to furnish a contingent to the Roman army, and seem to have made 
no serious resistance again until the great war of 340. 

The extension of the Roman territory in the course of these wars Extension 
is marked by the formation of two new tribes, the Pomptina, which of Roman 
would include the Volscian territory round Antium, and the Publilia, l^^^Zacg 
also on Volscian lands. The ten years of comparative peace, which y-^^. /^;, 
followed this thirteen years' Avar, were occupied at Rome by the years [376- 
struggles about the Licinian rogations ; and during half that time, 3^7)- 
owing to the interruption in the election of the usual curule magis- 
trates, the State was scarcely in a position to act with vigour. 

The peace was broken by a renewed invasion of the Gauls, who Gallic 
for twenty-three years had been prevented by internal dissensions ^'''"' 3^7- 
from returning to the attack, thus leaving the Romans time to 
establish their supremacy in Latium. In 367 the city was alarmed 
by hearing that they were on the march again towards Rome, and 
were encamped upon the Anio. For the fifth time M. Furius 
Camillus was named dictator, and once more returned victorious. 
There does not appear to have been a pitched battle, for the Romans 
had no time to summon allies or collect a sufficient force. But by 
seizing the strong positions near the camp of the Gauls, who had 
crossed the Anio and were near Alba, and cutting off their stragglers 
and foraging parties, he forced them once more to retire.^ 

It was the veteran's last great public service. He died two years Death of 
later, after having been seven times consul or consular tribune, (^^"^^^1"^' 
and five times dictator. He had fought with and conquered nearly ^ -^' 
all the enemies of Rome — Veientines, Volscians, Aequians, and 
Gauls. Great in peace as in war, he had not allowed the condemna- 
tion of the people, however unrighteous it might appear to him, to 
destroy his loyalty or embitter his feelings. And when the neces- 
sities of his countrymen recalled him from a dignified retreat, during 
which he had already done them good service, he had not abused the 
commanding influence thus gained by persisting in an obstinate 
opposition to the reforms which the people demanded. He had 

^ Livy, indeed, speaks of a battle, and of a great slaughter of the Gauls, who 
dispersed in every direction, some even finding their way to the extreme south of 
Italy (vi. 42). Plutarch's account seems more reconcilable with a series of skir- 
mishes {Cam. 41). Both writers seem to have had to pick their way among dis- 
cordant authorities. Polybius (ii. 18) says that there was no battle, because the 
Romans had not time to collect their allies. But he places the first renewed 
invasion, after 390, six years earlier than Livy does, and tells us nothing of the 
retreat. 



126 



HISTORY OF ROME 



New Gallic 
invasion, 
361. 
7 it us 
Alanlitcs 
Torquatus. 



Victory 
of C. Sul- 
picius, 
JSS. 



349- 

A n other 

Gallic 

invasion ; 

victory of 

L. Furius 

Cajnillus. 

M. Val- 
erius 
Corvus. 



Sixty years' 
cessation 
from Gallic 
rvars to 
281. 



Wars in 
F.truria , 
35S-35r- 



known when to yield as he had known how to resist, and his last 
civil action had been to heal a quarrel between the Senate and the 
people, and to vow a temple to Concord. 

The next invasion of the Gauls was in 361, when, in a fierce 
battle at the bridge over the Anio, Tiius Manlius conquered a huge 
Gaul in single combat, and stripping from him the gold bracelet 
{torques) with which he was adorned gained for himself and his 
descendants the cognomen of Torquatus. The Gauls retreated into 
Campania, having been helped by the Tiburtines, whom the next 
year, therefore, the Romans prepared to punish. But the Gauls 
returning from Campania, and being overthrown in a great battle 
near the Colline Gate, retired to Tibur ; from which for a year 
and a half they maintained a war of skirmishes and surprises with- 
out any great battle, though both they and the Tiburtines suffered 
more than one disaster. At length in 358 C. Sulpicius was named 
dictator. His policy, like that of the famous Cunctator of after days, 
was one of delay. Time, he thought, must bring greater and greater 
difficulties to an ill-disciplined host in a foreign country, and to an 
alliance sure to prove irksome to the city entertaining these uncivilised 
guests. His soldiers, however, headed by a centurion of the first 
rank, clamoured to be led against the enemy ; and the battle was 
finally brought about by an accidental encounter between a small 
number of Roman soldiers and some plundering Gauls. Sulpicius 
thus gained a great victory and a splendid triumph almost in spite 
of himself. 

After ten years the Gauls came again (349), and descending 
from the Alban hills, harried the plains and coasts of Latium. L. 
Furius Camillus, a son of the famous conqueror of Veil, was sole 
consul that summer, his colleague, Appius Claudius, having died. 
He maintained the honour of his name by a victory over the in- 
vaders which scattered them into all parts of Italy. It was in this 
battle that the story is told of M. \'alerius and his single contest 
with a Gaul, in which he was assisted by a crow that perched 
on his helmet and assailed with beak and claw the face of the 
barbarian. 

Then followed a long interval of freedom from Gallic inroads, 
and shortly after the end of the first Samnite and Latin wars 
(about 336) the power of Rome seemed so formidable that the 
Gauls sought and obtained a treaty ; and, with the exception of 
one brief raid, remained quiet till the time of the third Samnite 
war. 

Besides suppressing minor outbreaks among the Hernici (362 
and 358), at Tibur (361 and 355), and at Privernum and Vehtrae 
(358), the Romans were meanwhile struggling to secure their supre- 



X ETRUSCAN AND SAMNITE WARS 127 

macy in Etruria with varied fortunes. Thus in 358 the consul Mutual 
Fabius was defeated at Tarquinii, and the people ,of the town were cruelties. 
so furious that they butchered over 300 Roman prisoners on pre- 
tence of a sacrifice to their gods, — a murder avenged by equal cruelty 
four years afterwards, when, in addition to vast numbers killed in 
battle, 580 Tarquinian prisoners were executed in the Forum at 
Rome. This occurred in the course of a more than usually serious 
rising of the Etruscan League, beginning in 356. C. Marcius 
Rutilus was named dictator, the first plebeian who had ever held 
that office, and found the Etruscan forces close to the saltworks 
{Sali7iae) on the right bank of the mouth of the Tiber. Marcius 
harassed the enemy by sending troops across in boats to cut off 
foraging parties and stragglers, and at length surprised their camp, 
secured 8000 prisoners, and was allowed a triumph. But in 353 
there was again a rising in southern Etruria, and Titus Manlius 
Torquatus was nominated dictator to suppress it. The chief object 
of his attack was Caere, which, though recognised as a " friend of 
the Roman people," was now suspected of giving secret aid to the 
invaders from Tarquinii, and harbouring their plunder. The 
Caerites, however, submitted, and were compelled to make a The 
hundred years' truce, and submit to a curtailed citizenship sine Cacnte 
suffrao^io^ with the loss of half their territory, which became the pro- /''^'" "*''' 
perty of the Roman people.^ An expedition against Falerii in the 
same year returned without striking a blow, and was followed in 351 
by a forty years' truce with Tarquinii and Falerii. 

For a time Rome had peace in the North, except for the peri- The Sam- 
odical recurrence of Gallic raids. But she was now to be pitted ^^^^ '^^ 
against a more formidable enemy. The three Samnite wars, between lailfnuars. 
343 and 290, taxed the strength of the city to the utmost. Like 
the Gallic wars they served as an admirable training for the coming 
struggle with Pyrrhus, and in a greater degree than the Gallic wars 
led to an unforeseen, unsought, yet inevitable extension of Roman 
power both in central Italy and Etruria. Between the first and 
second of these wars came the last great rising of the Latins, which 
ended in the dissolution of the Latin League and the practical absorp- 
tion of Latium. 

The Samniteswere a hardy mountain race inhabiting the centre The 
of Italy, Branches of them had spread to Lucania and even farther ■Sammies. 
south, and those who remained in Samnium proper continually 
aimed at exchanging their bleak highlands for the more fertile plains 

^ This is a detail omitted by Livy, but recorded by Dion Cass. fr. 33. It is 
the first instance of a town being thus endowed with imperfect citizenship, whence 
the Caerite franchise became a common term for disfranchisement (Hor. Ep. i, 
6, 62, Caerite cera digni). 



:28 



HISTORY OF ROME 



on either coast. Thus the Hirpini, and even the Frentani, were 
perhaps offshoots of this race ; and about 423 some of them forced 
their way into Campania, and supplanted the Etruscans, who for 
some time had been hving among the native Oscans, and had built 
cities and established trading centres there. The new Samnite con- 
querors seized Capua, stormed the Greek colony of Cumae, and 
reduced a number of other Campanian tribes and towns to submis- 
sion. They did not, however, uproot or destroy the Oscan people, 
but amalgamated with them, and the two together became Campani^ 







Prucliijta I. 



J Cunnirni 



CAMPANIA 



ENGLISH MILES 



C— — ;> ^un nrinuw 



East of 14 Greenwich 



// 'al/iey G- Boittall sc. 



The Cav 
panians. 



much as Norman and Saxon became English, and with this farther 
similarity, that while the common people in the towns were mostly 
of Oscan origin, the nobility were of Samnite stock. They formed 
a loose confederacy of states, the chief of which was Capua and 
the small towns round it, but a confederacy which appears to have 
had no provision for combined action or counsel. The climate 
was soft and enervating ; the plains rich ; the shore, deeply in- 
dented with bays and facing south-west, lovely and tempting. No 
wonder that the mountaineers strove for it, and that under these 
influences they became as unwarlike and luxurious as the people 



THE FIRST WAR WITH THE SAMNITES 129 



iiitcs attack 
the 
Sidiciti i. 



Capua 
appeals to 



among whom they lived. It was a contest between these Osco- 
Samnites, now called Campani, and the Samnites of Samnium proper, 
which first brought the Romans (who by the capture of Sora on the 
Liris, in 344, were in possession of the last stronghold towards the 
Samnite frontier) into collision vVith the Samnites, and eventually into 
possession of Campania. 

In 343 the Samnites, we know not why, were attacking Teanum, The Sa 
a towai of the Sidicini, who were an independent tribe that had 
not fallen before the Samnite invaders, and had never shared (as the 
Ausones and some others had not done either) in the ties which 
connected, however slightly, the rest of Campania. But being now 
attacked by the Samnite mountaineers, they appealed to the Cam- 
panian League for help. The Campanians made a feeble attempt 
to assist them, and only succeeded in drawing upon themselves the 
arms of their kinsfolk. The Samnites seized the heights of Tifata 
which overlook Capua, and drove the defeated Campanians to take 
refuge within the walls. In their despair they sent an embassy to Rome. 
Rome to beg for help. 

The Romans were formally on terms of friendship with the First 
Samnites, who in 354 had voluntarily asked for an alliance. The Satnnite 
Senate therefore hesitated on the ground that their honour was '^"'^^' ■^^^^' 
engaged. Whether such scruples were feigned or not, they secured 
more advantageous terms. The Campanian envoys offered to give 
up their country to the Romans per deditionem^ which implied a 
complete surrender of their city and its territory to be dealt with 
as they chose. 1 It did not follow that the Romans would exercise 
the right : but it did follow that any one else who attacked the 
country would have to reckon with them. Free intercourse with 
Campania- was most important to Rome, for from its rich plains 
much of the corn supply was obtained. The Senate therefore adopted 
the plea of keeping faith w^ith a people who had surrendered to them 
to counterbalance the obligation of maintaining their treaty with the 
Samnites. Legates were sent with a conciliatory request to the 
Samnites to spare men who had surrendered to Rome. A haughty 
answer was returned, and in the hearing of the legates the military 
commanders w^ere ordered to continue the invasion of Campania. 

The Senate at once decided on war. The consul, M. Valerius 
Corvus, was. sent to Campania ; the other consul, Aulus Cornelius, 
to Samnium. Valerius advanced along the coast road to Mount 

^ ' ' Those who thus surrender themselves to the Roman authority surrender 
all territory and the cities in it, together with all men and women in all such 
territory or cities, likewise rivers, harbours, temples, and tombs, so that the 
Romans should become actual lords of all these, and those who surrender should 
remain lords of nothing whatever " (Polyb. xxxvi. 4). 

K 



[30 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Victories 
of Mount 
Gaurus, 
Suessula, 
atid Sati- 
ciila, 343. 



Advan- 
tages 
gained 
by the 
successes. 



342. Coss. 
C. Marcius 
Rutilus, Q. 
Scrvilius. 
Mutiny of 
Roman 
soldiers. 



Measures 
<f relief. 



Gaurus, just above Puteoli ; Cornelius to Saticula, on the left bank 
of the upper Volturnus, from which he might descend upon Capua, 
or operate in the interior of Samnium. The war was short and 
sharp. Three battles decided that the supremacy in Campania was 
to belong to the Romans and not to the Samnites. Valerius won a 
hard-fought battle near Mount Gaurus., and another at Suessula, at 
which place the defeated Samnites had rallied ; while Cornelius, 
after getting into considerable danger in the mountains near Saticula, 
from which he was saved chiefly by the heroism of a military tribune, 
Publius Decius, succeeded in finally inflicting a defeat upon the enemy. 

The brilliant success of the Roman arms had an immediate effect 
upon their foreign relations. The Carthaginians sent a congratu- 
latory embassy and a gold crown ; and the Latins put aside their 
design of a revolt from Rome, and turned their arms against the 
Peligni. But the solid advantage gained was the control of Cam- 
pania, into which Roman garrisons were sent to occupy Capua and 
Suessula, and perhaps other towns, in order to secure the country 
from Samnite raids. 

The allurements of this beautiful and rich district proved too 
strong for the virtue of the Roman soldiers. They contrasted the 
rich lands round Capua with their own poor allotments at home, too 
often burdened with debt ; and when the consul for the next year, 
C. Marcius, arrived at Capua, he found the Roman troops ready to 
mutiny and seize the lands and wealth of the Capuans. He endea- 
voured to cure this by giving leave of absence to the most turbulent 
of the soldiers, on the pretext of their having wintered abroad. But 
discovering his object, the remaining soldiers determined to strike 
a blov^ before they became too weak. They forced a certain T. 
Ouinctius, who, after serving with distinction and receiving a severe 
wound, was living in retirement at Tusculum, to take the lead of a 
force of malcontents collected near Anxur, and advanced within 
eight miles of Rome. Here they encountered M. Valerius Corvus, 
who had been named dictator to suppress the mutiny. He 
conciliated the men by promising to get their grievances redressed, 
and returned to Rome to give effect to his promise. 

What these grievances were is shown by the measures of relief. 
They prove that service in the army was now valuable, and no 
longer a mere burden. The new laws provided that no one, under 
a curse, should erase the name of a soldier without his consent from 
the roll when it had once been entered ; that no one should hold 
the rank of centurion after holding that of tribune — the grievance 
being that certain persons monopolised these positions, profitable 
from the extra shares in the distribution of booty. And, lastly, that 
the disparity between the pay of the infantry and cavalry should be 



X QUARREL WITH THE LATINS 131 

decreased by a lower rate of pay being given to the latter. This 
too seems to have rested on the practical ground that the share 
of booty was proportioned to amount of pay. But it is also a 
distinctly democratic demand in the direction of equality, and must 
be taken in connexion with the other movements of the period, the 
opening of offices to plebeians, and the laws against usury and 
accumulation of offices. 

The details of the war, as given by Livy, are not very clear in Practical 
themselves, though recounted with some minuteness, and for the most ^'<^^ult of 
part cannot be accepted as history. It is not doubtful, howe\ er, that ^ ^ "''^'" 
after it Roman instead of Samnite influence prevailed in Campania. 
Peace was concluded in 341. 

But circumstances now involved the Romans in a war destined Latin ivar, 
to consolidate the larger Latium as a part of Rome. It began with S4o-jj8. 
\ a union of Latins and Campanians to carry on the war against the 
' Samnites, which the Romans had abandoned by making peace with 
the common enemy in 341. The Samnites complained, and the 
Senate forbade the Campanians, as subjects of Rome, to make war 
upon the Samnites ; but professed to have no claim, by the terms 
, of their treaty with them, to lay a similar injunction on the Latins. 
' The Latins, who had already in 349 refused to furnish soldiers to The Latins 
I the Roman army, regarded this as a sign of weakness, and now demand in- 
, decided in secret consultation to recover a complete independence, "^'A'""'''''' <* 

1 1 1 • 1 • 11 1 1 -1 '"' complete 

I or to demand as an alternative to share in all the advantages gained citizenship 

by Rome in recent wars. As a first step two Latin praetors, L. 
I Annius of Setia and L. Numicius of Circeii, being summoned to Rome 
I to receive the orders of the Senate, demanded that one consul and 
I half the Senate should be Latins, and that the whole should be one 
I Republic. This demand was rejected with indignation, and Annius 
retired, proclaiming that the Latins renounced all reverence for "a 
Roman Jupiter." It was noted with a kind of exultation that instant 
, punishment, as it were, vindicated the majesty of the god : for while 
I leaving the temple where the Senate had met Annius stumbled and 
I fell down the steps, and was taken up stunned and insensible. 

The war lasted three years. The two consuls, Titus Manlius and j./o. T. 
i P. Decius, led their armies, supported by auxiliaries from Samnium, ^]f'^"'"^-^ 
to Capua, where the Latins and Campanians were united. To this j/l'^^p "' 
campaign two famous stories belong. The first is the execution of jjccius 
I Titus Manlius, son of the consul, for leaving the ranks contrary to Mm. 
orders, to fight the Tusculan Geminius, who challenged the Roman 
knights to send a champion against him. Manlius conquered and 
killed Geminius, and carried the spoils to his father. The stern 
answer, condemning his victorious son to death for a breach of /,„pcria 
military discipline, rendered the ^^hnliana ifnf)cn'a a proverb of Manliana. 



132 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Devotion 
of Decius 
Mus. 



Battle of 
Vesei-is, 
340. 



Battle of 
Trifamnn. 



Sjg. Coss. 
T. Aetni- 
lius Mam- 
ercinus, Q. 
Pub alius 
P/iilo. 

Latins con- 
centrate in 
Pedum. 



338. Coss. 
L. Furius 
Caviillus, 
C. Mae- 



terrible import for ever.i The other is the story of the devotion of 
Publius Decius Mus. He and his colleague dreamed the same 
dream. A man of superhuman size and dignity warned theni that 
on one side the leader, on the other the army itself, must perish. 
They offered sacrifice, and the entrails pointed out Decius as the 
man. Thereupon in solemn form he devoted himself to the " Manes 
and to Earth," and, mounting his horse, rode into the midst of the 
enemy and was killed. A similar story is told of his son in 295, 
and even, it appears, of his grandson.^ 

The battle took place close to Mount Vesuvius on the road lead- 
ing down to Veseris, a small town near Nola.^ The Latins were 
defeated decisively and scattered in various parts of Campania, 
eventually mustering again at Vescia, a town of the Ausones on the 
left bank of the Liris. There they managed to attract fresh levies 
from other Latin and Volscian towns, by concealing the result 
of the battle of Veseris. The consul Manlius Torquatus followed 
and took up his position at Trifanum, on the road between Sinuessa 
and Minturnae. The Latin army, little better than a raw militia, 
was again decisively beaten, and this second defeat was followed by 
the formal submission of both the Latins and Campanians. 

But though thus defeated the Latins were not reconciled. The 
offending States were heavily mulcted of land, which was divided 
out among Roman citizens, and the indignation thus caused found 
vent next year in another revolt, which centred round Pedum, 
one of the original thirty Latin towns. The consul Titus Aemilius 
advanced to attack it, while from Tibur, Praeneste, Velitrae, 
Lavinium, and Antium forces gathered to defend it. But Aemilius, 
though gaining some petty victories, did not attempt to take Pedum, 
He wasted his time in a fruitless journey to Rome to demand a 
triumph, and finally avoided farther responsibility by naming his 
colleague Publilius dictator. The Senate forced the consuls of the 
next year to greater activity. Maenius conquered a combined army 
of Aricia, Lavinium, Velitrae, and Antium on the Astura ; and 
Camillus defeated an army from Tibur and Praeneste which tried to 



^ This same Manlius was the hero of a famous story of fihal duty. His 
father, L. Manlius, had despised him and kept him in retirement in the country. 
But when the tribune Pomponius (362) gave notice of a prosecution against the 
elder Manlius for tyrannical conduct, the son hurried to Rome, entered the bed- 
chamber of Pomponius, and, drawing a dagger which he had concealed about 
his person, threatened him with instant death unless he withdrew the prosecution 
(Livy vii. 5 ; Appian, Sa^nn. 2). 2 Cicero, Tusc. i. § 89. 

^ It was long doubted whether Veseris was the name of a town or a stream. 
The discovery of some Oscan coins with the legends Fevcrep a.x\(\fense>-num seems to 
have settled the question in favour of a town (Imhoof- Blumer, Numismat. 
Zeitsch. 1886). 



X DISSOLUTION OF THE LATIN LEAGUE 133 

relieve Pedum. The storming of Pedum was followed by the reduc- 
tion of the rebellious cities of Latium. Garrisons were put in them 
and the consuls earned a triumph as having finished the war. 

The Latin League ceased to exist as a political body, though still Efidoflhe 
joining in the worship of Jupiter Latiaris. Rome was sovereign, ^'^^^^ 
and made what terms she chose with each separate town. A f"^^^' 
senatus consu/ium defined the status of each. As a rule they 'Setiatus 
retained local government, but, as regards Rome, had only the consultmn 
" Caerite " citizenship, that is, they had commercium and co7ii(biiini ^^. ^'^^^" 
with Rome, but could not vote or hold ofiice.i Moreover thev were '^"•^ ^T 
isolated : no marriage or commerce with each other, no common 
meeting was allowed ; their only market would be Rome or more 
distant places. The result was a swift decay of the towns ; while 
Roman citizens, settled in the country with full citizen rights, found 
their advantage in the restricted markets which ruined the towns, 
and thus Romanised the country. 

This was the general rule : but certain towns received special 

favour or punishment. Thus full citizenship was given to Lanuviilm, 

Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum, and their citizens coming to Rome 

could exercise all the rights of Roman citizens. Tusculum had long 

had this position, which was now confirmed, the punishment for the 

' part taken in the wars being confined to individuals. On the other 

' hand the walls of Velitrae were demolished, her senators removed in 

a body beyond the Tiber, and forced under a heavy fine to remain 

I there, while their lands were divided among Roman farmers. Tibur 

• and Praeneste, for having favoured the Gauls, were mulcted of terri- 

tory, but were allowed to remain free, with the single obligation of 

; furnishing their quota of troops to the Roman army.- 

\ The Campanians were dealt with in the same spirit. Some of Settlement 
the towns, such as Fundi and Formiae, were allowed the "Latin" of Cam- 
, right ; while at Capua, Cumae, and Suessula this was confined to the ^'^"^'^' 
I " Knights," — the upper or noble class descended from the Samnite 
I conquerors, — a measure which served to accentuate the distinction 
I between them and the Campanian Oscans forming the lower class. 
I Thus the wider Latium became Roman : and just as the distinction Larger 
'between patrician and plebeian was being finally abolished by the leges ^«^««w. 
\PubIiliae (340), a new distinction was coming into existence between 
(full and imperfect citizens, which was to lead also to political agita- 

I ^ Hence Latinitas was used to express imperfect citizenship long after it had 
I ceased to apply to Latium. 

- This obligation would apply to all the towns, and from another point of 
view the measure may be regarded as the inclusion of all these towns in a military 
eague. But as it was scarcely voluntary on their part, it may also be regarded as 
an obligation imposed by a sovereign state. 



134 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. X 



New 
Tribes. 



Samnites. 



First 
acfiftg ill 
Rome, 
363-362. 



tion in the future. For the present the increase of purely Roman 
territory was shown by the addition of two new tribes (Maecia and 
Scaptia) ; and the final destruction of Antium as an independent naval 
power by the adornment of the pillars of the speaker's platform in 
the comitium with the beaks of its captured ships. Some few towns 
indeed still offered spasmodic resistance. Cales was captured in 
334, Fundi submitted in 330, Privernum was taken in 329 ; and 
when fresh colonies were settled at Cales, Anxur, and Fregellae 
(339-336) Roman supremacy was complete throughout Latium— 
which now included the Hernici, Volsci, Ausones, and Sidicini, — and 
in Campania as far as Suessula and Atella. 

The Samnites, openly at peace with Rome, were directing- their 
attention southwards : and the movements of these mountaineers, 
leading to fresh appeals for Roman help, brought Rome step by step 
to supremacy throughout Italy. 

This period had been marked by several pestilences. And two 
years of more than usually severe visitations suggested various modes 
of appeasing the gods. Among others, the games were celebrated 
with more than usual elaborateness ; and for the first time include 
plays or interludes, acted by artists brought from Etruria, it being 
a novel experiment in Rome, and one never sincerely liked. It gave 
birth, however, to a considerable Roman literature, which has all 
perished, and to an imitation of Greek dramas, some of which has 
survived. 



Authorities. — Livy vi. -viii. ; Dionysius xiv. 12-xvi. 1-14 (fragments). 
Zonaras vii. 24-26; l-'utropius ii. 1-4; Plutarch Camillns ; Polybius ii. 18-21 
for the Gallic invasions. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR 
326-304 



COLONIES 






iNEVV TRIBES 


Luceria in Apulia . B.C. 


314 


Utentina " 


. B.C 


Suessa of the Aurunci B.C. 


313 


Falerina 


Pontiae . . .B.C. 


313 ) 






Tnteramna Lirinas . B.C. 


312 ( 


Volscian. 




Casinum . .B.C. 


312 ( 

303) 






Sora . . .B.C. 






Alba Fucentia (Aequians 








and Marsians) . B.C. 


303 







318 



Magna Graecia — Invitation from Tarentum to Archidanms (338) and Alexander 
(333) — Alexander's treaty with Rome — Palaepolis garrisoned by Samnites — 
War declared with Samnites (326) — Treaty with Neapolis — Confederacy in 
south Italy — The Caudine Forks — The Senate refuse the terms of Pontius 
(321) — Revolt of Volscian towns — Capture of Luceria, victories in Apulia 
and Lucania, revolt and recovery of Sora (320-314) — Destruction of Ausones 
and colonising of Luceria (314-313) — Victory over Samnites at Cinna (313) — 
Development of Roman power in Italy, and growth of navy (313-312) — 
Etruscan war and battle at the Vadimonian lake (311-309) — Wars with 
Samnites and Hernici (308-306) — Peace with Samnites (304). 

While they were enjoying a peace of eleven years (338-327), Magna 
only broken by one outbreak among the Sidicini, events were 
occurring in southern Italy destined there too to bring the Romans 
on the scene. The Cireek towns which fringed its shores, though ^^'^^^^ 
often quarrelling with each other, had yet been formed into a loose 
confederacy for mutual protection under the presidency of Tarentum, 
and their delegates met at Heraclea, a Tarentine colony. Such 
combination as existed had been made necessary by the attacks of 
the common enemies of them all, the Lucani, Bruttii, and Messapii,i 
while the Samnite highlanders were ever on the watch to take 

^ Diodorus xiv. loi ; xvi. 15. 



Grai'Lia 
attacked by 
Italian 



136 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xi 

advantage of these hostilities to enrich themselves from the lands of 
Greek and Italian alike. 
Help asked Tarentum, as head of the Greek League, looked out for help 

by the ^j.g^ f^oj^ ti^e mother state of Sparta: and in 338 Archidamus, a 

JX7rom' king of Sparta, had come in answer to such a call and had fallen in 
Archi"' battle.i And now in ZZ'}) Alexander, king of the Molossi, uncle and 
damns of brother-in-law of Alexander the Great,^ willingly responded to a similar 
Sparta, invitation. He landed near Posidonium, which had been the object of 
h)'fro'm special attack to the Lucanians, and at first was everywhere successful. 
Alexander. He won battles over the Bruttii, Messapii, and Lucani, and took 
king of the several towns. But the Tarentines, at whose request he had come, 
Molossi, ^yg^g presently alarmed at his designs. He had a dream of establish- 
333- jng a great Western Empire to include Italy, Sicily, and Africa, like 

that which his mighty nephew and namesake was forming in the 
East ; whereas the Tarentines wished for supremacy, not to be humble 
clients in a great empire. Accordingly they soon drew back, and 
Alexander retaliated by making terms with Metapontum and the 
Peucetii, and erecting a new Hellenic confederacy, the delegates of 
which should meet, not at the Tarentine Heraclea, but at Thurii. 
The death, therefore, of the champion whom they had themselves 
invited must have been welcome to the Tarentines. It was not, 
however, brought about by them, but by their enemies the Lucani. 
Alexander had tried to break the resistance of this nation by 
transporting 300 of their leading families to Epirus ; and by 
bestowing special honour on those of them who had been banished 
by their countrymen for espousing his cause. Two hundred Lucan- 
ians formed his body-guard. But though thus near the person of 
the king, they did not forget their country, and were ready to 
purchase restoration to it by betraying their new lord. The 
Death of opportunity soon came. Alexa'nder was occupying some hills at 
Alexander, Pandosia, near Consentia on the river Crathis, from which he 
332 or 331. ^^^^ ^^^ foragers. Here he found himself surrounded by the enemy, 
who cut off his plundering parties ; and on one occasion, when two 
of these parties had been surprised, he sallied out to their relief, 
and attacked the Lucanian force with great gallantry, killing their 

1 Archidamus III., after taking a somewhat doubtful part in the " Sacred war,' 
seems to have been glad to find work in Italy to escape a contest with Philip 
of Macedon. The battle in which he fell was near Manduria, twenty-four miles 
east of Tarentum, and is said to have been fought on the same day and hour 
as the battle of Chaeroneia (August 338) (Plutarch, Agis 3 ; Pausanias iii. 
10, 5 ; Diodor. xvi. 63 ; Theopompus ap. Athenaeum xii. 536 ; Strabo vi. 
3, 3). 

2 Alexander was brother of Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great. 
He married his own niece Cleopatra, daughter of Philip 11. and Olympias 
(Livy viii. 17, 24 ; Justin xii. e ; Strabo vi. 3, 4). 



138 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Alexan- 
der's treaty 
with Rome. 



War with 
Palaepolis, 
327-326. 



War with 
the SaiJj- 
nites de- 
cided, 327, 



War pro- 
claimed, 
3^6. 



commander with his own hand. But as he was emerging from a 
swollen stream, across which he had forced his horse, one of his 
Lucanian body-guards ran him through with his spear. 

Though the Romans were not directly concerned with Alex- 
ander's career in south Italy, yet it seems that he had found it 
necessary for the success of his plans to be on good terms with 
them, and had formed, or at least proposed, a treaty with the 
Republic ; whose growing importance in the affairs of south Italy 
was 'shown again soon afterwards by an appeal to the Senate from 
the Lucanians for help against the Samnites, who a year and a half 
before had been assisting them against Alexander, but had since 
been plundering the territories of their former allies. 

But the immediate cause of the inevitable rupture between the 
Romans and Samnites was the Greek town of Palaepolis, the name 
by which the Cumaean colony, called it seems originally Parthenope, 
had come to be known, since a more recent settlement, called 
Neapolis, had been made on the site now occupied by the eastern 
part of Naples. The Palaepolitans had plundered lands of Roman 
settlers in Campania and the Falernian district. A demand from 
Rome for compensation was haughtily refused, and war was declared 
against them (327). The two consuls, L. Cornelius Lentulus and 
Q. Publilius Philo, were both sent out with their respective legions. 
Publilius was to go direct to Palaepolis, Cornehus to the Sammte 
frontier. Both consuls sent home disquieting reports. Publilius 
informed the Senate that 2000 Campanians and 4000 Samnites had 
been sent to garrison Palaepolis, almost in spite of the Greek 
citizens. Cornelius reported that Samnium was preparing for war : 
armies were being enrolled, and the fidelity of Privernum, Fundi, and 
Formiae was being solicited. 

Legates were sent to remonstrate with the Samnites. They 
answered by alleging injuries received by themselves : " The Roman 
colony of Fregellae," they said, "had been founded in Samnite 
territory ; while the help given to Palaepolis came only from private 
enterprise, not from the Samnite government." They ended by a 
direct challenge to war, which the Romans were not slow to take up. 
Publilius was already encamped between Palaepolis and Neapolis, 
and now commenced a regular siege of the former. The end of the 
year approaching, Publilius, to the end of the war, and Cornelius for 
the following year, were continued in their commands as pro- 
consuls ; and Cornelius was ordered to name a dictator to hold 
the elections. War with the Samnites was formally declared by the 
consuls of the next year. 

Palaepolis, reduced to dreadful straits by famine, was still 
holding out. The starving townsfolk were told, indeed, that rein- 



BEGINNING OF THE SECOND SAIMNITE WAR 139 



forcements were coming from Tarentum and Samnium ; but this 

threatened an aggravation of their misery by adding fresh mouths to 

be fed. Two citizens therefore resolved to save the Hves of their 

countrymen by surrendering the town to the Romans. Their names 

were Charilaus and Nymphius. . While Charilaus made his way to Surrender 

the camp of Publilius, Nymphius contrived to induce the Samnite rf Palae- 

garrison to quit the town and descend to the shore, to assist him to ^^ "' ^" ' 

embark upon an expedition against the coasts of Latium. While 

thus engaged they heard an uproar in the city, and discovered that 

they were shut out, and that the Romans had been admitted. They 

had no resource but to make their way to their homes without arms 

or baggage. Palaepolis being thus surrendered, the people of 

Neapolis appear to have acquiesced and obtained good terms. The Foedus 

treaty by which they became a civitas foederata was so favourable in ^<^^'po^^- 

regard to the burdens it imposed, and the local liberty which it ^^'^^''''• 

secured, that when in 89 all Italian states were offered the full 

civitas^ the Neapolitans long preferred their old status. Palaepolis 

either disappeared altogether, or was merged in Neapolis, and ceased 

to be of importance. 

Meanwhile the Roman arms, under P. Cornelius, had had some Cor7ieHns 
successes in Samnium. Three border towns ^ and considerable in Sam- 
plunder were taken. Above all, the Samnites had been prevented from ^tmm, j2j- 
making a diversion in favour of Palaepolis. The Romans had been ^^ " 
fully alive to the difficult and dangerous nature of the war. In 326 a Second 
solemn lectisternipni was held. The images of the gods were exposed Samnite 
on couches, with a banquet placed before them, and throughout the city ^^'"''' J"-*^" 
prayers were offered to secure their favour. Moreover an alliance was ^^'^' 
made both with the Apulians and Lucanians, who had so often suffered 
from the Samnite raids. But the jealousy of the Tarentines overthrew 
this arrangement. They had been alarmed and irritated by the fall TheTaren- 
of Palaepolis ; and when they found the Apulians and Lucanians in tines side 
alliance with Rome they feared for the safety of the Greek confederacy, "''^^'^ ^^''' 
of which they regarded themselves as the head. They determined to '^"^"^^'■'^■ 
espouse the side of the Samnites against the power they now thought 
the more dangerous of the two. In pursuance of this policy they 
began intriguing to detach the Lucanians from Rome. Two 
Lucanian youths were bribed to disfigure themselves with blows, and The Lu- 
in this state to present themselves before a popular assembly, de- canians 
daring that they had been cruelly flogged for the presumption of ^^'-^ them- 
entering the Roman camp. The populace clamoured for war with ^^ ^'^ ^^ _ 
Rome ; and, though an open declaration was avoided, the Lucanians nites. 
made a formal alliance with the Samnites. 

The first year of the war therefore saw a formidable confederacy 
^ Allifae, Callifae, Rufrium —the last of uncerlain site. 



140 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The Vestini 

subdued, 

325- 



The Sam- 
nite war 
from J2^- 



Story of L. 
Papirius 
and his 
master of 
the horse. 



Truce for 
a year at 
the end of 
325- 



formed in south Italy, rendered still more alarming by the adher- 
ence of the Vestini, a Sabellian tribe on the left bank of the river 
Aternus, along a narrow strip of the Adriatic shore. They were not 
important in themselves, but if the kindred tribes of Marsi, Peligni, 
and Marrucini adopted their policy, Rome might find herself attacked 
on both sides, and at any rate debarred from the coast road into 
Apulia. One campaign, however (325), under the consul D. Junius 
Brutus, reduced the Vestini to submission, and they took no farther 
part in the war. 

From this period to that of the disaster at Caudium (321) it is 
not easy, or perhaps possible, to discover the true course of events. 
Livy observes at the end of his eighth book that the questionable 
statements contained in funeral orations, and the false inscriptions 
upon family busts {imagi?tes), made it difficult to be certain in assign- 
ing particular achievements to particular individuals. Thus the 
family archives of the Papirii and of the Fabii seem to be respon- 
sible for the stories of the dictator L. Papirius Cursor, and of his 
master of the horse, Q. Fabius Maximus. The dictator, it is said, 
was obliged to leave his army in Samnium and return to Rome, 
owing to some irregularity in the auspices, and on his departure 
left strict orders to his master of the horse not to engage the 
enemy. Fabius, either looking upon this order as the result ot 
jealousy, or unable to withstand a tempting opportunity, attacked the 
Samnites, and inflicted a severe defeat upon them. On his return to 
camp the dictator called a meeting of the soldiers and summoned 
Fabius before him. He was about to order his instant execution, 
when the soldiers clamoured so loudly for his pardon, and came so 
near to a mutiny, that Papirius was forced to postpone the carrying 
out of his sentence to the next day. Meanwhile Fabius escaped 
from the camp and fled to Rome. The angry dictator followed. 
Fabius threw himself on the protection of the tribunes, and appealed 
to the people. Though the authority of a dictator was above all 
such safeguards, Papirius was assailed by the intercession of senators, 
tribunes, and men of rank, for a Fabius was sure to have powerful 
friends. He at length consented to spare his life, but only on a com- 
plete submission and renunciation of all legal remedies, and the 
abdication of his mastership of the horse. Military discipline thus 
vindicated, Papirius returned to the army. The men, however, were 
sulky and would not fight with vigour, until the dictator, by assiduous 
attention, mollified their anger. Then they fought bravely and won 
him a triumph. The Samnites proposed peace ; but the Romans 
declined the terms they offered, and only consented to a truce for a 
year. 

But though the authorities which Livy followed thus gave the 



XI ROMAN DISASTERS 



141 



pre-eminence to the Roman arms, it is evident that they had not sue- The 
ceeded in impressing others with the behef in their superiority or ApuUans 
ultimate victory. In 324 the Apulians, whether of their own accord ^^^^^^^ 
or under pressure from the Samnites, left the Roman alliance— in JliaZe. 
either case showing that the Romans had lost hold. In the same 
year a rebellion at Tusculum, joined by Vehtrae and Privernum, 
proved that those once powerful states thought it a good opportunity 
to regain their freedom, or at any rate to get better terms. The State civitas 
was wise enough to yield to the demand, if such was made. The granted to 
tribunician bill for the punishment of Tusculum was rejected ; and Tusculum, 
not only was full citizenship conceded, but L. Fulvius, who had been ^^^' 
consul at Tusculum, was elected consul at Rome for the next year 
(322). Even if this was a reward for having been of the Roman 
party, it was still a measure of wise conciliation. 

The war was resumed after the truce. It was never continuous, 322. The 
and what Livy calls a truce may have been an interruption of active '^^^ '='^"- 
operations from various causes. There was fighting, however, in ^^'"^^^^• 
322, and we are told of a battle so fiercely contested that the two 
armies remained locked for five hours in a deadly grapple, neither 
giving way a foot's breadth, or finding breath to shout. At last the 
Roman cavalry defeated the Samnite horse as they were plundering 
the Roman baggage, and thus at liberty to support their infantry 
they secured a complete victory. It is said that after this battle the 
Samnites again proposed peace, offering to give up Roman prisoners 
and the heads of their own war party. The chief among these was 
Brutulus Papius, who, rather than be surrendered to the Romans, 
put an end to his life. The treaty, however, if one was proposed in 
this year, was not made. The only result of the campaign was the 
award of a triumph to the dictator, A. Cornelius Arvina. 

The next year (321) was to witness a disaster to the Roman Surrender 
arms which was never forgotten. In the summer the consul of a Roman 
Postumius was encamped near Calatia in Samnium.i The Samnite ^''^'^'^^^^^ 
imperator for the year was Caius Pontius, who was encamped near Candinle, 
Caudium, on the road afterwards called the Appian Way, twenty- j2i. Coss. 
one miles from Capua, eleven from Beneventum. By means of TitusVetu- 
countrymen, purposely instructed, Pontius conveyed to the consuls 
the false information that the Samnites had quitted their camp at 
Caudium and were beleaguering Luceria. It was of great import- 
ance to the Romans that Luceria, the chief town of Apulia, should 

1 It seems certain that Livy conceives Postumius to be at Calatia (or Caiatia) 
in Samnium, not at Calatia in Campania. Between the former and Caudium 
there is a pass vt'hich answers fairly well to his description, but not between Calatia 

n Campania and Caudium ; yet a very ancient tradition places the spot between 

hese last two, as in the map on p. 128. 



rius II. 
Sp. Postu- 
mius II. 



142 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The Roman 
army in 
flic Can- 
dine gorge, 

J2I. 



Was there 
fighting in 
the valley ? 



Pontius 
accepts the 
surrender. 



The terms. 



not be in the hands of the Samnites. The consuls therefore 
determined to march thither as quickly as possible. The shortest 
route was to strike the road at Caudium, and make for Beneventum, 
where the direct road to Luceria branched off. Between their position 
and Caudium they would have to pass through a valley closed at 
either end by a difficult gorge : but believing the Samnite army to 
be far away, they determined to risk it. 

When the Romans had passed the first gorge and marched 
through the valley, they found the exit blocked by a rampart of 
felled trees and other obstacles. Alarmed at this, Postumius 
ordered a retreat. When the legions, however, regained the gorge 
by which they had entered, they found that too blocked by similar 
obstacles and guarded by a force of the enemy. They knew now 
that they were entrapped : and though they entrenched a camp as 
usual, they saw only too clearly that they must submit to any terms 
which Pontius might impose. 

Thus Livy represents the affair, attributing to the Romans a 
mistake in strategy but no reverse in the field. Yet it seems from 
stray notices in other writers that there was some kind of battle.^ 
It took place, no doubt, on ground unfavourable to the Romans ; 
and was probably neither severe nor decisive. The fighting 
accordingly was forgotten, which the surrender of an army was not 
likely to be. All our authorities represent this surrender as the 
result of a failure of provisions. Pontius doubted for some time 
what course he should adopt towards the enemy now in his hands. 
He sent for his aged father Herennius, who advised him either to 
exterminate them or to let them all depart in peace and honour. 
By the one measure he would effectually cripple the Republic for 
many years to come : l)y the latter he would secure its friendship by 
an act of undeniable generosity. Pontius, however, decided to 
make a treaty at once with the consul. He must have known that 
to be binding such an agreement required to be confirmed by the 
people ; but he appears to have thought that this might safely be 
reckoned upon, if the consuls and military tribunes swore to the 
terms, and if he retained the 600 Equites of the legions as hostages. 

The terms agreed to were : That the Romans should withdraw 
from Samnite territory ; remove the colonies of Fregellae and Cales ; 
and make a peace with the Samnites on the basis of mutual 
independence. 



^ Cicero, de Sen. § 41 Caudino praelio ; de Off. 3, § 109 cujn male pugnatum 
ad Caudium esset. Eutrop. ii. 4 Samnites Romanos .... apud Furculas 
Caudinas angustiis locorum. inclusos ingenti dedecore vicerunt. There were no 
contemporary records (Livy viii. 40) ; and though some writers may have thought 
it worth while to pass it over, Livy himself does not usually conceal Roman defeats. 



XI SURRENDER OF THE ROMAN ARMY 143 

This involved the abandonment of everything for which Rome j2i. 
had been fighting ; and would leave the road into Latium open to 
the Samnites. Such terms would not be accepted by the people 
except after overwhelming disaster ; and the loss of even four 
legions could not be so regarded. Nor did Pontius, by allowing 
the soldiers to depart with their lives, do anything to conciliate 
Roman feeling. The restoration of soldiers who had laid down 
their arms was never valued at Rome. If they were ransomed 
it was by their own friends, not by the State. Nor could Pontius 
reckon on the men themselves, who would be among the voters, 
showing any enthusiasm for him. He had given them their lives, The 
but in circumstances which made them of little value. For he Romans 
insisted that officers and men alike should pass " under the yoke," ■^^•^^ under 
without arms, and to take nothing home with them but the clothes 
which they were wearing. 

When the disgraced army and its officers, assisted by the The Senate 

citizens of Capua, got back to Rome, they entered the city by f'^f^se the 

night, avoiding the sight of all men. Postumius, who did not '■^'"^• 

venture to act as consul, was forced to name a dictator to hold the 

consular elections ; and the new consuls appear to have entered 

upon their ofticcs earlier than usual. Postumius himself advised 

against accepting the terms to which he had sworn. Rather than 

this he urged that he and his officers should be sent back to Pontius. The return 

Two of the plebeian tribunes had, it seems, been sent to the camp to of Post um- 

join in making the agreement, and now attempted by their tribunician ^"^ ^*^ {^'^ 
^ ^ , . *' 1 T, 1 11 Satnnite 

power to stop this measure.^ Ijut they too were persuaded to ^^^^^p 

abdicate, and shared with the consuls the formal surrender to the 

Samnite, Accompanied by a Roman fetial they were solemnly 

handed over to Pontius in chains. It was even reported that 

Postumius, declaring that he was now a Samnite, struck the fetial 

with his knee, crying that he had thus given the Romans a sufficient 

pretext for making war. 

If by such poor subterfuges the Roman officers did really think Pontius 
to put themselves in the right, Pontius refused to allow them to <^ain J<^clines to 
this technical advantage. He declined to accept the surrender of ''"''"''' 
the officers or to acknowledge it as a satisfaction of their obligations ; 
demanding that, as the Romans had not accepted the treaty, the 
whole army should be replaced in the same position. 

The Roman conduct was not generous, but it was inevitable. 

^ This seems implied by Cicero [tk Off. 3, 30) ; and though the law forbade 
the absence of a tribune for more than twenty-four hours from the city, the rule 
seems to have been relaxed in special circumstances. Niebuhr suspected that 
they had been sent with a legal confirmation of the /oed us by the ])eople, which 
wab now to be disowned. 



144 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Conduct 
of the 
Romans. 



The wat 
from J20 
to 314. 

Revolt of 

Satriciini. 

Loss of 

Fregellae 

otid 

Luceria. 



Energy oj 
the Rom- 



Siege of 
Luceria, 
320. 



Pontius, who was fully aware of the distinction between a military 
convention {spo7isid) and a treaty (Jbedus\ ought in common pru- 
dence to have retained the legions until the ratification of the treaty. 
In case of its rejection he could at any rate have deprived the 
Republic of a large fighting force. The army having been once 
dispersed it was difficult, perhaps impossible, to restore it to the 
position from which Pontius had allowed it to depart. Nor was it 
altogether reasonable to expect it. By assuming that the treaty would 
be ratified, and allowing the men to go on that understanding, Pontius 
was forcing the hand of the Romans. They might fairly decline to 
be caught in the trap : and if they gave up the officers who made 
the treaty, without demanding the hostages already in his hands, 
they had some reason for thinking that they had done all that honour 
required. He had had his triumph, and had inflicted on the 
beaten army what was well understood throughout Italy to be the last 
degradation : the Romans did not feel bound to allow him to carry 
off also all the advantages of the war in return for sparing the lives 
of men, on whom he had inflicted the greatest severity in his power 
short of slavery or death. 

But though the Samnites had thus failed to get the advantages 
from the victory at the Caudine F^orks which they anticipated, they 
were evidently regarded as having the best of the struggle. 
Satricum, on the borders of old Latium, which forty years ago 
the Romans had taken from its Volscian colonists, now declared 
its adhesion to the Samnites, who were expected to advance into 
Latium (320). Fregellae, the Roman colony which had been the 
principal pretext for war, was surprised and captured by a Samnite 
army ; and Luceria, the capital of Apulia, fell into their hands. 

Yet before long the energy of the Romans restored the balance. 
The consul Publilius (320) confronted a Samnite force at Caudium ; 
the other consul L. Papirius Cursor made his w-ay by the upper coast 
road to Luceria, where the Samnites kept the 600 Roman hostages. 
He was supplied with necessaries on his road by the country people, 
who, though they had no great love for the Romans, dreaded the 
Samnite raids. Both armies are credited with victories. At any 
rate the Samnite force at Caudium left its position, followed by 
Publilius, and went to the relief of Luceria. The two consuls 
effected a junction near that town ; but the siege was left to 
Papirius, while Publilius occupied himself in securing smaller towns 
in Apulia. Details are quite wanting ; but the upshot was that 
Luceria was recoverea and Papirius allow^ed a triumph. ^ 

^ But so defective were Livy's authorities that he could not decide whether it 
was not rnther Lucius Cornelius who triumphed as dictator, with Papirius as 
master of the horse. 



SIX YEARS OF INDECISIVE WAR 145 



The war for the next three years was desultory and indecisive, jig-jid. 
But whether successful or the reverse in Samnium, Rome was con- T^vo new 
solidating her Latin territory. Much country once Volscian was in '^^^^^^• 
319 made Roman, its inhabitants being enrolled in two new tribes, 
XhQ Ufeniifia and Falerma; while provision was made for peace and Patroni i?i 
justice between the Roman settlers and the old inhabitants of Antium Antium. 
by yearly officers sent from Rome. Meanwhile the chief military s-uccess in 
operations were in Apulia and Lucania. A great part of the former Apulia ''^ 
was secured to the Roman allegiance, and a footing at least gained ^nd 
in the latter. Lucania. 

But the Samnites were more successful on their northern frontier. Revolt of 
In 316 the old inhabitants of Sora, on the upper Liris, overpowered Sora, 
the Roman colonists, and declared for the Samnites, who were now ^'^^^^^ ^f 
advancing dangerously far into Latium. In 3 1 5 the dictator Q. Fabius ^^''*''^''^' 
was recalled from Samnium to Sora. On his way he was met by '^^^' 
the Samnite army in the pass of Lautulae, between Terracina and 
Fundi; was defeated with considerable loss, including Q. Aulius, his 
master of the horse ; and for some time was shut up in his camp.i 
He managed eventually to break out and reach Sora ; but not in Sora re- 
sufficient force to storm or besiege it. That was reserved for the covered, 
consuls of the next year (314), who arrived with fresh troops to take ^^J- 
command. Sora was captured, and 250 inhabitants who had been ^p'^l]^-^' 
conspicuous in the rebellion were sent to Rome in chains and executed c'fsuT' 
in the Forum. The rest were spared, and a garrison was placed p'icius. 
in the town. 

The Ausones had now to be punished for their defection after the Destruc- 
defeat of Lautulae. The Samnites were not there to support them ; ^ion of the 
for they had been subsequently defeated by Fabius, or for some other ^''"'''^'^ 
reason had as usual not followed up their success. Some Ausonians 
also themselves favoured the Roman supremacy, and were ready to 
betray their countrymen. Their subjection, therefore, proved an easy 
task. Ausona, Minturnae, and Vescia were taken, and the people 
treated with such severity that the race seemed all but extinct. 

Meanwhile Luceria had again been occupied by a Samnite ^^^^ceria 
garrison. Its recovery, vital to Roman influence in Apulia, was ^"^'^'^'^^'^^ 
however effected by the consuls ; the Samnite garrison and the ^^•*''^^^' 
treasonable party among the Lucerini were put to the sword ; 
and 2500 Roman colonists sent out to occupy it. This was 

^ Livy (ix. 23) represents this as a drawn battle. Not so Diodorus (xix. 
72), who describes a general rout of the Roman line. The commotion which 
followed in Campania, and especially among the Ausones, shows that the truth is 
rather with Diodorus. Still as Q. Fabius arrived after all at Sora, he could not 
have been fatally damaged by the battle, and the Samnites failed as usual to use 
their victory with effect. 



[46 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Victory 
at Cinna, 

Loss and 
recovery of 
Fregellae. 



Change ift 
the state of 
the war, 
3^3' 



Roman 
power in 



Colonies at 
Suessa, In- 
teratnna, 
and 
Casinum. 

The via 
Appia. 

GroTvth of 

naval 

power. 

Colony at 

Ponza, 

3^4- 

Duoviri 

fiavales. 



followed by a judicial investigation at Capua into the disaffection 
there during the last year. Some of the leaders anticipated their 
fate by suicide ; the rest were allowed to escape. But that the 
movement should have been serious is a measure of the Roman 
difficulties and disasters. 

The Samnites were still threatening Campania, and though the 
consuls now gained a decisive victory over them at Cinna, i and were 
able to advance into the heart of Samnium and attack Bovianum 
(314), they were still able to surprise the citadel of Fregellae, com- 
manding the upper road into Campania. It was recovered however 
shortly afterwards by the dictator C. Paetilius, 

Up to this time the war had nearly always gone on close to the 
frontiers of Samnium and Campania ; and the chief object of both 
sides was to secure the command of Campania. The victory at Cinna 
(314) proved a turning-point. It was followed by no negotiations 
for peace. The Samnites remained unconquered, and often inflicted 
isolated defeats on the Roman armies in after years. But though 
Rome had soon another war on her hands in Etruria, from this time 
the policy of steadily securing by permanent settlements all that she 
won was pursued with increased regularity ; and she began also to 
develope a new element of strength by the use of ships in military 
expeditions. 

A hold upon Campania was secured by the occupation of Nola, 
Atina, and Calatia : and the road to it made safer by a colony 
at Suessa in the Falernian district. In 313 colonics were sent to 
Interamna Lirinas, which commanded the valley of the Liris, and 
to Casinum, which commanded the valley of the Volturnus. Soon 
afterwards (312-310) Appius Claudius began the great work on 
the road between Rome and Capua, which ever after went by his 
name. Thus Rome had secured one part at least of what she had 
been fighting for, the free entrance and control of Campania. 

But in 314 also a colony was sent to Pontiae {Po?isa\ an island 
off the Latin and Campanian coasts. In connexion with this we 
find a sudden interest at Rome in naval matters. In 338 all 
war vessels {?iaves longae) had been removed from Antium to 
Ostia, but for some years appear to have been neglected. It was 
not until 3 1 2 that duoviri jiavales, two commissioners for the outfit 
and repair of ships, were appointed for the first time. And in the 
next year (311) we also for the first time hear of a naval expedition 
from Rome. The ships, under Publius Cornelius as " praefect of the 
sea-coast," sailed along the Campanian shore, and a descent was made, 
not very successfully, near Pompeii. There is no idea of fighting at 

^ Livy (ix. 27) as usual mentions no name. Diodorus (xix. 76) gives the name 
Cinna, but its situation is unknown. 



THE ETRUSCAN WAR 147 



sea ; but it adds a new means of attack when troops can be conveyed 
safely from point to point of an enemy's coast in ships. For this it 
was in the highest degree necessary that the Romans should command 
the Italian waters ; and it was to secure such command that the 
colony of Pontiae seems to have been formed. 

It is such measures which explain the ultimate success of the Causes oj 
Romans. The Samnites might gain single battles or surprise import- ^^""^f' 
ant strongholds ; but they did not follow up victories or retain 
captures. The Romans, on the other hand, by these settlements of 
citizens in places of strategical importance, kept a resolute hold upon 
what they had once won, and at the same time spread Roman ideas, 
customs, and even laws through wide districts, which quickly became 
Roman in feeling ; while the plundering raids of the Samnites 
produced only hatred and hostility among the farmers whose pro- 
perty they destroyed. 

But now Rome was to find herself engaged in a double war, in Etruscan 
the north as well as in the south. While the legions were employed ^;«^ S[^- 
in some of the usual desultory operations in Samnium during the y^^^"^^^^^ ' 
summer of 31 1, a combined army of the chief towns in Etruria, north Bulmkus 
of the Ciminian forest, suddenly attacked Sutrium, which was the ///., Q. 
frontier town of Roman Etruria, and in close alliance with Rome. Acvnlms 
The consul Aemilius was promptly sent to its relief. But he found ^^ 
himself outnumbered, and, though by the gallantry of his men he 
appears to have avoided positive defeat, his army suffered too severely 
to allow of anything being done that year, or of Sutrium being re- 
lieved. When 0. Fabius, the consul for the next year (310), arrived 310. 
with fresh troops, he found it still surrounded by Etruscans. A ^'f^-^- Q- 
desperately-fought skirmish, rather than regular battle, confined the c Marcius 
besiegers of Sutrium to their entrenchments ; and Fabius conceived ruHIus. 
the bold design of effecting a diversion by crossing the Ciminian hills, Sutrium 
which formed the frontier of Roman Etruria. They were covered relieved. 

with a forest, which at this time was looked upon as dangerous \ <-^'<:'"'^ 
' , ^ . r -L • pi^^-^scs ilie 

even for peaceful merchants. Fabms however, sendmg one of his Saltus 
officers forward to reconnoitre, led his army through this wild Cimitiius. 
district For some weeks nothing was heard of him, and great 
alarm was felt at Rome, presently intensified by news of the 
defeat of the other consul Marcius in Samnium. The Senate Defeat of 
determined that Papirius Cursor must be named dictator. Whether ^-'areius 
\ Marcius had fallen in the Samnite battle was unknown ; but news ^^"^ -^ 
I had come of Fabius. He had safely passed the Ciminian forest, 
and was enriching his army with the spoil of the fertile plains of 
central Etruria. A message therefore could be sent to him announ- 
I cing the will of the Senate. But he was the Fabius whom, as his 
I master of the horse, Papirius had once wished to put to death. Would 



CHAP. XI ETRURIANS AND UMBRIANS UNITE 149 

he be induced now to name him dictator ? Fabius hesitated, but 
patriotism overcame personal feeling ; he rose in the night (as was 
usual) and named Papirius. He himself was not superseded in his 
command. The dictator remained in office without consuls through 
309, and went to Campania to take over the army from Marcius and 
drive back the Samnites, while Fabius continued the war in Etruria 
next year (309) as proconsul. 

The Etrurians had collected fresh forces at the Vadimonian lake, Battle at 
and there Fabius defeated them with dreadful slaughter, and took ^^^ ^'"^^'- 
their camp. The flower of their youth is said to have perished ; but ^"^^^'^^ 
though the slaughter was great, some of the survivors rallied at 
Perusia, where Fabius again defeated them, and put a Roman 
garrison in the town. 

His brilliant success caused him to be re-elected consul for the joS. 
next year (308) ; but he did not return to Etruria. The lot assigned Fabius 
the wSamnite war to him ; and pushing on into southern Campania ^'^"^^^i^ 
he added to his other triumphs the capture of the important town of Alfaterna. 
Nuceria Alfaterna. 

His colleague P. Decius, whom the lot sent to Etruria, gained some Victory 

slight advantages over the Etruscans, who still offered a fitful resist- ^'^^^^ . 

° ^ , „ - . . „ . J Umbrians 

ance. But when all seemed quiet m Etruria, a new danger arose ^^d Etru- 

in Umbria. An army consisting of both Etruscans and Umbrians had rians, 

collected at Mevania in Umbria, and were reported to be intending 

to march upon Rome itself Decius marched swiftly southward to 

intercept them ; and the Senate hastily summoned Fabius from 

Campania. Fabius arrived at Mevania before his colleague, and 

once more engaged and routed the enemy. All danger from 

Etruria and Umbria was for the present at an end. His command Battle of 

was again continued to him as proconsul in 307 ; and he won ^^^^^^^ 

fresh honours in the Samnite war, especially in a battle near ^^'^' 

I Allifae. 

I But the retirement of Fabius next year (306) was the signal for Samnites 

I renewed exertions on the part of the Samnites. They crossed the ^"^f ^^j- 

I Volturnus, stormed Calatia and Sora, and put the Roman garrisons ^^^^^"d. 

I to the sword. The consul P. Cornelius Arvina was sent against 

I them ; and while he attempted the difficult task of getting at an 

I enemy who had already occupied all the roads and passes, his 

, colleague O. Marcius was engaged in the easier labour of subduing Rebellion 

jthe Hernici, long favoured allies of Rome, who had been irritated by 0/ tlie 

(what they thought unjust severity towards some of their people ^^f"''^- 

found in the Samnite ranks at Allifae. They soon submitted to 

Marcius, and were dealt with leniently. The three towns which had 

not joined in the rebellion, Alatrium, Ferentinum, and Verula, retained 

by their own wish their old status of focderatae civitates with the 



ISO 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Great 
victory of 
the consuls 
P. Cornel- 
ius Arvifia 
and Q. 
Marcius 
Trent ulus 
over the 
Samnites, 
306. 



Bovianum 

take?i. 

Sora, 

Arpinum, 

and Cen- 

sennia 

recovered. 

End of the 
second 
Samnite 
war, JO 4. 



Fruits of 
the war 
to the 
Romans. 



special privilege of mutual conunercium and conubiufn; the others 
were forced to accept the Caerite citizenship, 

Marcius was now at leisure to go to the support of his colleague 
P. Cornelius. If we are to believe Livy, the Samnites who had been 
baffling Cornelius by cutting off his supplies and clinging to their 
fastnesses, without accepting his repeated offers of battle, determined 
that they must abandon all hope if they did not prevent the junction 
of the two armies. They therefore advanced to attack Marcius on 
his march. Cornelius, seeing what was happening, swiftly sallied 
from his camp, charged the Samnite column on the flank, broke 
right through it, and took the camp which they had just left. 
When Marcius therefore came upon the ground he found the enemy 
already in confusion. The sight of their burning camp, now in the 
hands of Cornelius, alarmed them still more. They were soon in full 
retreat, pursued by the soldiers of C. Marcius, who are asserted to have 
slain more than 30,000 of the enemy, besides taking a large number 
of prisoners. But the exaggeration of this account is proved by 
the fact that in spite of such a decisive victory so much was left 
for the consuls of the next year to do. It was not until 305 that 
Bovianum was taken, that Sora, Arpinum, and Censennia were re- 
covered from the Samnites. These achievements followed a more 
determined raid on Samnium itself than had been made before, ^ 
and another victory, in which twenty-one standards of the enemy fell 
into the hands of the Romans, along with the Samnite imperator 
Statins Gellius. Whatever the real facts of the campaigns of the 
years 306 and 305 may be, it seems certain that the Samnites now 
thought it time to ask for peace, and yet were able to demand and 
obtain honourable terms. The old treaty, securing mutual independ- 
ence, was renewed ; and thus after twenty-four years a varied and 
indecisive war was ended for a while. 

Though the Romans cannot be said to have conquered the 
Samnites, yet the substantial advantages of the war were with them. 
Their enemy, though independent, was confined to his natural limits. 
They had secured by permanent settlements, and by the great Appian 
road, the way into Campania, and its protection along the Samnite 
frontier. They had consolidated their own immediate territory, and 
held the towns on the debatable mountain land between Latium and 
Samnium, such as Sora and Fregellae, thus commanding also another 
road into Campania. By the possession of Luceria they dominated 
Apulia ; and by that of Nuceria Alfaterna they commanded the road 
into Lucania. Above all they had become the natural arbitrators in 
all disputes in southern Italy, to whom the Apuli and Lucani would 



^ Diodor. Sic. xx. 80. 



XI END OF THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR 151 

look for protection against the incursion of the Samnite mountaineers. 
In the course of the same period the arms of Rome had estabhshed 
her supremacy in Etruria and had spread the terror of her name in 
Umbria. She had taken a long step towards a supremacy in all 
Italy. It mattered comparatively little whether the Samnites had or 
had not from time to time defeated her legions in the field ; with 
admirable patience and persistency the Romans sent army after army 
each year, securing now one point and now another, ready to take 
every advantage by arms or diplomacy, however apparently trivial, 
and steadily advancing towards the attainment of their end : as a 
rising tide which, seeming alternately to recede and advance, con- 
tinues nevertheless steadily to roll its waters to the appointed limit. 

The Roman consul P. Sempronius had made the peace with the 
Samnites, not by the authority of the Senate and people, but at the 
head of his army. When he had satisfied himself that all was quiet 
in Samnium, he marched along with his colleague P. Sulpicius against 
the Aequi, who had in the latter years of the war sent assistance to The Aegui, 
the Samnites. They were offered but refused the Caerite citizenship, 304. 
which had been imposed upon the Hernici and others, amounting in 
fact to the position of subjects of the Republic. Their refusal brought 
upon them the whole weight of the Roman armies. They were 
beaten in the field and their whole fighting force practically exter- 
minated, and next year a colony 6000 strong was settled at Colony at 
Alba Fucentia to keep them in check for the future. Overawed by Alba 
this severity the neighbouring tribes — the Marrucini, Marsi, Peligni, ^''^'^'^''^^'^ 
and Frentani — accepted the position of federate states, by which ^^^" 
each retained its local government, but had no right to any connexion, 
warlike or peaceful, with any other states without the authority of 
Rome, to whom also each owed a fixed contribution of men and 
I money. Thus Samnium had on its north also a ring of states 
subject to Rome ; and Rome had full command of the road along the 
Adriatic coast into Apulia. 

Authorities. — Livy viii. 22-ix. 47; Dionysius, fragments of books xv. and 
xvi. ; Diodorus Siculus xiv. 101-102 ; xvi. 15 ; xix. 72, 76 ; xx. 35, 80 ; Appian, 
\Satnnit. fr. 2-5 ; Dio, fr. 36 ; Florus i. 11 ; Frontinus i. 2 ; Zonaras vii. 26; 
jEutropius ii. 4 ; Orosius iii. 15. 



CHAPTER XII 

ETRUSCAN AND THIRD SAMNITE WARS 



303-298 



COLONIES 








NEW TRIBES 


Carseoli 
Minturnae 


B.C. 
B.C. 


302 

296 


Aniensis 
Terentina 


B.C. 299 
B.C. 299 


Sinuessa 
Venusia 


B.C. 
B.C. 


296 

291 


B.C. 293 
B.C. 289 


CENSUS 

262,322 
273,000 



Events 
between the 
second and 
third 
Sam?tite 
wars, joj- 
2g8. 



Settlement 
after the 
war. 



Between the second and third Samnitc wars (303-298)— Complaint of the Lucan- 
ians and the beginning of the third Saninite war (298)— The Samnites league 
with Etruscans and Gauls (296)— Failures of Appius Claudius Caecus (296)— 
Battle of Sentinum (295)-Last five years of the war (294-29o)-The l^^iones 
linteatae—B^n\Q of Aquilonia (293)-Capture and execution of C. Pontius 
(292)— Peace with the Samnites (290), and their subsequent attitude towards 
Rome. 

The peace of 304 did not last long. But for about six years there 
was a cessation in that border warfare with the fierce highlanders, 
which had grown to be the habitual employment of large numbers 
of citizens. Like the old border warfare of English and Scot, it had 
little immediate influence on the course of hfe in the city. Its effects 
were felt afterwards in the training which the Roman soldiers had 
gained, and in the new responsibilities which the State had been led 
step by step to assume. 

The first measures of which we hear after the last war are 
towards extending and confirming the Roman dominion. The colony 
at Alba Fucentia to check the Aequi has been already mentioned. 
To Volscian Sora also, on the Liris, 4000 new colonists were sent to 
replace those fallen in the late revolt. To the Volscian Arpinum and 
to Trebula in Campania was given the Roman citizenship— the former 
sine Slip-agio; while Frusino, as a punishment for help to the 
Hernici, was deprived of a third of its lands. 



CHAP. XII OUTBREAKS IN ETRURIA AND UMBRIA 153 

These measures were quietly submitted to by all those concerned A "tmnul- 
except by some of the Aequi and Marsi. The former resisted the ^^^^" 
colony at Alba, — a resistance often imitated in after times by those ^''J^^f ^^^ 
who suffered loss of lands for the benefit of coloni. The Roman Marsi ^.- 
government never treated such conduct lightly ; Gaius Junius ^^^d«?r^ 
Bubulcus was named dictator and sent against the rebellious pa<k^'7 
and quickly suppressed the disturbance : and a similar,.,:-crtitbreak 
among the Marsi, owing to the formation of the colgjaf^of Carseoli, 
was also put down in the next year (301). ^-"''^ 

More serious alarm was caVised by a repeft in 302 that a force Movement 
was collecting at Arretium detVi"i"iined t€^ strike one more blow for inEtruna, 
Etruscan liberty. The gravity \of 'Cp^ situation is shown by the -3^- S^^- 
fact that from the middle of 302\^\he end of 301 three dictators 
were named in succession, no consuls being elected for 301. The 
second of these dictators, M. Valerius Maximus, after suppressing ^1/- Valer- 
the Marsi, led his army into Etruria. But having to return to ^"^ Maxi- 
Rome to take the auspices he left his master of the horse, M. Aemilius j/^f^^f^,. 
Paullus, in command, who sustained the loss of a foraging party cut joi. 
off by the Etruscans. ^ An exaggerated report reached Rome and 
caused great alarm, The dictator was hurriedly sent back to the 
army, where his presence restored discipline and confidence. Poind- 
ing the soldiers eager to wipe out their disgrace, he advanced into 
the territory of Rusellae, on the right bank of the Umbro. There he 
met and defeated the Etruscan forces. This restored order in 
Etruria. The outbreak had been apparently almost confined to 
Arretium, where it had originated in a popular revolt against the 
powerful family of the Cilnii, the nobles or Lucumos of the district, 
who had been supporters of the Roman influence. They were now 
restored by the dictator, and from them sprung in after times Cilnius 
Maecenas, the minister and friend of Augustus.- 

But besides the disturbance in Etruria there had been also an Umbria. 
outbreak in Umbria ; and the Romans now adopted the usual course Necpdnuin 
for keeping the Umbrians in check. After a lengthened siege the made a 
town of Nequinum, on the Nar, in the south of Umbria, was taken, ^-'^^^'^ 
the inhabitants destroyed or removed, and a Latin colony settled j^^der the 
there under the name of Narnia (299). But though an outward peace naine of 
was secured, there were still elements of trouble. Roman supremacy Narnia, 
in Etruria was supported by Etruscan nobles, but disliked by the ^99* 
popular party. The consequence was that secret meetings and 

1 This is Livy's account (x. 3). But there was another extant, making 
Aemilius master of the horse to Q. Fabius Maximus, which Livy believes to be 
a mistake arising from the common cognomen Maximus. The second dictator 
of 301, according to the Fasti, was also a Valerius, — M. Valerius Corvus. 

^ Hence the allusions in Horace to the royal descent of Maecenas : atavis edite 
regibus [Od. i. i) ; Tyrrhena reguni progetiies {Od. iii. 29, 1). 



154 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The Piceni. 



The third 

Samnite 

war. 



2g8. Coss. 
L. Cornel- 
ius Scipio, 
Cn. Ful- 
vius Maxi- 
jnus Ceti tu- 
mulus. 



intrigues caused constant uneasiness at Rome ; and especially a 
report that the leaders of the popular party had been bargaining for 
the assistance of the Gauls, who were hovering on the Etruscan frontier. 
It was this which made the Romans ready to form a new alliance, 
as they did at this time. The people of Picenum, immediately south 
of the Senones, asked and obtained a treaty, and by them the Romans 
were presently informed that the Samnites were ready to rise, and 
had solicited their alliance. 

Six years of peace had recruited the Samnite forces. They were 
returning to their old habits of plunder, and it was evident that before 
long they would be again in collision with Rome. The Romans, on 
their side, were ready to strike on the first pretext, and the opportunity 
soon came. Early in 298 Lucanian ambassadors appeared, com- 
plaining that the Samnites had invaded their country. They entreated 
the Romans to forgive past defection, and offered hostages for their 
good faith. There was no hesitation in promising help, and legates 
were sent to bid the Samnites quit the territories of the " allies of 
Rome." The Samnites refused even to receive the fetials ; ^ and the 
Romans at once prepared for war. One of the consuls, L. Cornelius 
Scipio Barbatus, went to Etruria ; the other, Gnaeus Fulvius, to 
Samnium. Scipio fought a battle at Volaterrae with doubtful result. 
Fulvius penetrated into Samnium, routed the enemy near Bovianum, 
and even took the town itself, and Aufidena on the Sagrus. If the 
inscription on the tomb of Scipio may be trusted, Scipio also was in 
Samnium during part of the year, and took two towns — Taurasia and 
Cisauna.- The first year's campaign therefore ended favourably for 
Rome, and Fulvius was allowed a triumph. 

^ So Li\y says (x. 12). Dionysius (xvi. 13) describes the Samnites as re- 
ceiving the ambassadors, and answering very naturally that the alliance of Rome 
with the Lucanians was subsequent to their own treaty with Rome : that they had 
never renounced the right of making war on other people, and therefore were not 
violating their treaty by attacking the Lucanians. 
- The inscription is in Saturnian verse : 

Cornelius Lucfus Scipio Barbdtus 
GnaivcSd patr6 progndtus f6rtis vfr sapi^nsque 

quoius formi virtutei pdrisunid fuit 

cons61 cens6r aedi'lis quei fuit apiid vos 
Taurasia Cisaiina Sdmnio c^pit 
Subigit omn6 Loucanam 6psidesque abdoiicit 
It is unfortunate that this, almost the first original historical document which 
we possess, should leave us with some difficulties. In the first place, the form 
Corneliz/'j is more recent than Cornelia on his son's tomb, and therefore there is some 
cause to suspect that the inscription may have been cut some years after his death. 
In the next place, he is represented as winning successes in Samnium, although 
Livy says nothing of his going there. The assertion in the last line that ' ' he sub- 
dued all Lucania, and brought away hostages," may be the family view of the fact 
that in his consulship the Lucanians did give hostages, though there was no v/ar. 



THE ROMANS IN SAMNIUM 



155 



The war thus begun differed in its general features from the pre- Different 

vious war. The second had been, for the most part, a border war : nature of 

fought usually on the frontiers, now of Campania, now of Latium, ^ ^'^f 

.. ,. , ,. ,,, ■ T-1, r. • \ from that 

now of Apulia. Its object had been to decide between Samnite and of the 

Roman supremacy in those countries. It was only occasionally and secojid 

towards the end of the war that the Romans penetrated into Sam- Samnite 

nium itself. But in the third war they struck at once at the heart of ^'^'' 

Samnium, and went straight to Bovianum. Only once do we read of 

a Samnite raid upon Campania. It was during the diversion caused 

by the alliance with the Etruscans (296), and was promptly repelled. 

The consuls of the next year (297) were able, owing to a tem- 2()j. Cass. 
porary lull in Etruscan disturbances, to devote themselves entirely to Q- Pa-bi^i^ 
the Samnite war. Fabius entered by the upper road leading through j^^^,""'^^ 
Sora ; Decius from the south by Sidicinum and the valley of the jy p 
Volturnus. Fabius appears to have advanced to Bovianum, which Decius 
was already in Roman hands, and to have found the enemy near -^^^^ m- 
Trifanum, separated by five miles of deep valley from Bovianum. 
They hoped to attack the Romans from higher ground as they entered 
this valley. But Fabius fell upon them unexpectedly, and defeated 
them with a loss of over 3000 men killed, and 300 prisoners. The 
other consul, Decius, had meanwhile reached Bene\cntum, and pre- 
vented some Apulians from coming to support the Samnites. Next 2g6. The 
year Decius and Fabius, as proconsuls, failed to bring the enemy to ^^^^nite 
give them battle again ; and before long were informed by scouts Y^'^.^^^^. 
that the main Samnite army had abandoned the country, and marched 
to the north. Thereupon the proconsuls, leaving the open country, 
busied themselves in attacking some of the strong towns. 

The unexpected movement of the Samnite army was in accord- Plan of 

ance with a plan of their imperator, (iellius Egnatius. He had con- Ignatius 

ceived the idea that Rome might best be struck froni the north. ^^^ f, 

"^ northern 

In Etruria he would find ready to join him not only all the popular confedera- 

party of the Etruscans, but also the Umbrians, and, above all, the tion. 

Gauls. With such a coalition threatening her from the north, Rome 

would be compelled to withdraw her legions from Samnium, or to 

leave such weakened forces there that the Samnites at home, or the 

popular parties in Lucania and Apulia, might be trusted to crush 

them. 

It was a bold policy, well conceived and gallantly carried out. Why 

It failed because a permanent combination between Umbrians Egnatius 

or Etrurians and their natural enemies the Gauls was impossible. -^^^ ^ * 

And Gellius P^gnatius had probably also overlooked the fact that the 

hostility to Rome in Etruria was confined to a party, while she could 

always count on the support of the most powerful families. At first, 

however, his prospects seemed excellent. His camp was joined by 



56 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Coss. L. 
Volumnius 
F lamina 
ViolensII., 
Ap. Claud- 
ius Caecus 
//., 2g6. 
Victory of 
Gauls at 
Camer- 



Alarm at 
Rome 
relieved by 
some suc- 
cesses of 
Volufn- 
nius. 



Roman 

marititne 

colonies. 



Etruscan volunteers from nearly all the cities, as well as by neigh- 
bouring Umbrians ; while Gallic mercenaries flocked to the prospect 
of pay and plunder. 

When news of this reached Rome, the consul, Appius Claudius 
Caecus, was despatched with two legions and troops of the allies, 
amounting to 12,000 men, and apparently found the enemy in 
Umbria. But he effected little or nothing, and indeed sustained a 
somewhat severe defeat at the hands of the Gauls near Camerinum.i 
And though, when the other consul L. Volumnius was summoned 
from Samnium to his aid, the two together are said to have inflicted 
a defeat on the Etruscan contingent and taken their camp, it is 
evident that the results of the campaign of 296 were unsatisfactory. 

There was great alarm at Rome. Kjustitium — that is, a sus- 
pension of ordinary law business — was proclaimed ; a fresh levy was 
held in which youths under the military age, and men over it, were 
enrolled, as though the city itself were in danger. The anxiety, 
indeed, was somewhat dissipated by the report of the comparatively 
great success of Volumnius in Samnium. Before going to the sup- 
port of Claudius, he had suppressed a rising in Lucania. On join- 
ing Claudius he had not been at all warmly welcomed ; for Claudius 
asserted that he had not sent for him, and did not need him ; and it 
was only in consequence of the remonstrances of Claudius's officers 
that Volumnius remained to take part in the attack on the Etruscans. 
He then returned to Samnium, where he fell in with a Samnite force, 
which, taking advantage of the diversion effected by Gellius Egnatius, 
had made a raid on Campania. He defeated them with great 
slaughter, captured their leader, Statius Minatius, and recovered 
many prisoners and much booty. 

This opportune success relieved the anxiety which was being felt 
at Rome. In one direction at any rate the Roman arms were still 
supreme. And it was determined to secure the power of the Republic 
in Campania still farther. Two new colonies, Minturnae at the 
mouth of the Liris, and Sinuessa on the frontier, between Cam- 
pania and the Falernian territory, were decided upon. These, as 
usual with maritime colonies, were to be Roman not Latin — that is 
to say, the colonists were to remain Roman citizens. But though 
those who joined the colony would thus suffer no loss of civil status, 
and would have an allotment of land, it was found difficult to induce 
men to give in their names, because it was, in fact, going to what 
seemed perpetual military service or frontier duty. 

Yet such was still the alarm at the threatened attack of Gaul and 
Samnite, in combination with the discontented elements in Etruria 



^ Polyb. ii. 19 ; Livy (x. 18) rather glosses it over. 



XII THE GAULS AGAIN IN ETRURIA 157 

and Umbria, that extraordinary exertions were being made at Rome. 2gs. Coss. 
The veteran Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus was for the fifth time Q- Fabius 
elected consul, and had at his own request as a colleague P. Decius ^^"^^^^^'^ 
Mus, who had already won victories both in Samnium and Etruria ; y ^^'^""^ 
and two armies, besides the 'tAvo usually enrolled by the consuls, p. Decius 
were levied, and placed under the command of the propraetors Cn. Mus IV. 
Fulvius and L. Postumius. L. Volumnius remained in Samnium as 
proconsul ; and Appius, the unsuccessful consul of the previous year, 
was elected praetor, that he might be retained at Rome. 

The rendezvous of the coalition armies was now in the territory Coalition 
of Sentinum in Umbria ; but the Gauls were already prepared to ^f Gauls, 

make a raid into Etruria, and attack the advanced post of the ^'^f ^'f'^^'^- 

R^ r^i ■ ^ ana Sam- 

omans at Clusunn. ^^-^^^ 

The Senate had insisted that the "province" of Etruria should Fabius in 
be assigned to Fabius without the usual drawing of lots with his i^truria. 
colleague ; and early in the year he went there with his new army, 
took over the troops of Appius, and at once began exercising his 
men by a series of marches and manoeuvres until he had arrived at 
Clusium. There he received a request from the Senate to come to 
Rome to consult as to the requirements of the war, if he could do so 
safely. Appius had caused alarm at home by his report of the 
dangerous state of affairs, and had urged that both consuls should 
go to Etruria. Fabius left L. Cornelius Scipio, the propraetor, in 
charge, and went to Rome. He deprecated the necessity of rein- 
forcement, but said that, if the Senate and people thought it safer, he 
was content that another army should come, if it might be com- 
manded by his colleague Decius Mus, or, if he could not come, by 
L. Volumnius. 

The result was that both consuls started for Clusium with a The 
second consular army. On their way they were met by the news of Senones cut 
a disaster. The Senonian Gauls had descended upon Clusium, sur- ^^ Pieces a 
rounded the propraetor Scipio, and cut a Roman legion to pieces. fj'"jf"^ 
It turned out that the report was exaggerated. A detachment had 
been cut off, but Scipio had come up with his main force and beaten 
the enemy back ; 1 and when the consuls arrived the Gauls had 
recrossed the Apennines to Sentinum, whither the consuls now 
followed them. 

Their communications with Rome were kept open by the two Position of 
propraetors. Fulvius was at Falerii, Postumius close to the city in ^^''' J^oman 
the ager Vatiamus. The former was now ordered to advance to 
Clusium, the latter to Falerii, and both of them to lay waste the 
country far and wide. This caused the Etruscans who were with 

^ Polybius (ii. 19) seems to place this affair at Camerinum. 



armies. 



58 



HISTORY OF ROME 



the Gauls and Samnites to withdraw from Sentinum, and hasten 

back to Etruria ; and all the Umbrians in the coalition camp appear 

to have also departed. At any rate, in the battle that followed it 

was almost exclusively with Gauls and Samnites that the Romans 

had to contend. 

Battle of For two days the armies faced each other, and there were 

Sentlmnn, skirmishes and counter-manoeuvrings which led to nothing decisive. 

^95- It was during these that the story is told of a stag pursued by a 

wolf running in between the two hosts. The Gauls shot the stag, 

but the Romans opened their lines to let the wolf go through, for it 

was sacred to Mars, their founder's father, and brought promise 

of victory, while the Gauls had offended Diana by slaying her 

stag. 

When at last the battle came, Fabius commanded the right wmg, 
facing the Samnites, Decius the left, facing the Gauls, For some 
time the Romans were hard pressed ; and, if only the Etruscans and 
Umbrians had been there, it would have gone ill with them. The 
Samnites proved the more dangerous enemy of the two. The Gauls 
attacked with a fury that nothing seemed capable of resisting — horse 
and foot and chariot swept down upon the foe with indescribable 
tumult of shouting men, trampling hoofs, and rattling wheels. But 
though the storm was furious it was brief. The first shock sustained, 
every recurring charge was fainter. At first, however, they seemed 
to be carrying all before them, when Decius Mus, mindful of his 
father's heroism, solemnly " devoted " himself and the legions of the 
enemy to Earth and the divine Manes. Having uttered the due 
form of words, he put spurs to his horse and charged into the densest 
masses of the enemy and perished. Livius, the pontifex who had 
dictated the form of "devotion," and to whom Decius had trans- 
ferred his lictors, loudly proclaimed that " the consul's death was in 
place of that of all the Romans, while the Gauls and Samnites were 
due to the gods below ; " and the Roman soldiers, always keenly 
alive to religious emotion, were fired to fresh courage. 
Fabiui Meanwhile Fabius had at length turned the Samnite line. He 

defeats the j^^^j patiently remained on the defensive during most of the day, and 
enemy. allowed the Samnites to tire themselves out by fruitless attacks. 

When he thought that they were exhausted, he gave the signal for 
his cavalry to charge their flank : and when they began to give way, 
brought up his reserves, which had not yet been engaged. The 
routed Samnites rushed past the Gauls on their right wing and 
made for the camp. The Gauls, seeing their allies in retreat, and 
being themselves wearied with long fighting, now formed into a 
dense mass to resist the double attack which they foresaw. Fabius 
first ordered a squadron of 500 Campanian cavalry to ride round 



Decius 

devotes 
himself to 
death. 



EFFECTS OF THE VICTORY AT SENTINUM 159 



and charge them on the rear, while the men of the third legion 
were to charge in front when they saw that the attack of the cavalry 
was taking effect. He himself — after vowing a temple to Jupiter 
Victor — went in pursuit of the Samnites at their camp. There the 
struggle was renewed ; the Samnite imperator, Gellius Egnatius, fell, 
and the Samnites were forced within their camp, which was finally 
stormed and taken. It was on the rear of the Gallic lines, and from Failure 
it the Gauls were now attacked, and the day was won. The Romans of the 
lost heavily in this battle, but the loss of the enemy, both in killed <^^'^^^^^^''- 
and prisoners, was much greater ; and above all, with the wrecking 
of this Samnite army, and the fall of Gellius Egnatius, the great 
scheme for a coalition to crush Rome from the north fell to the 
ground for ever. 

About the same time Fulvius had been severely defeating the Successful 
people of Clusium and Perusia, and Volumnius had put to flight a operations 
Samnite army at Tifernum in Samnium. Some minor efforts were '^ , ^^^1^^^ 
indeed made by the Samnites in the valley of the Voltumus, and Tiferyium, 
by the popular party at Perusia. But the former were again defeated ^95. 
in the Stellatian plain in Campania by the combined forces of 
Appius Claudius and \'olumnius, and the latter were crushed by 
Fab i us. 

On the whole this was a year memorable for the success of the Effect of 
Roman arms. The character of the war after it was changed. ^^'^^^ 
From that time the Samnites had to fight for their freedom against '' '^^' 
Roman armies in their midst. There was no longer any hope of 
carrying the war into Roman territory. 

On the other hand, there were yearly invasions of Samnium. 2^4-2^3. 

The Samnites were not yet subdued, and still made gallant and ^^^^^'^"^^ 

even desperate efforts to beat back their foe. In 294 they all but ■' 

stormed the camp of the consul Regulus, killing his quaestor, L. 

Opimius and more than 200 men. The Romans in alarm sent the 2^4. Cos$. 

other consul Postumius, and the two together had some successes. . fos^^"^- 

tus Ale- 
But when Postumius left his colleague for Etruria, Regulus was ^^n^^ jj 

again beaten at Luceria, then being besieged by the Samnites, and *v/. Atilius 

was shut up in his camp. Though he is said to have ultimately Regulus. 

repulsed the enemy, his losses were greater than theirs, and his only 

definite success was the cutting off of a body of Samnites who had 

been plundering Interamna. 

Postumius, on arriving in Etruria, won a small battle against the 

Volsinii. But Etruria was not prepared to resist any longer. The Submission 

chief towns — Volsinii, Perusia, and Arretium — submitted and received of Etruna. 

a truce for forty years, and all the towns were content to pay 500,000 

asses as reparation for their kite revolt. The Senate naturally objected 

to Postumius having a triumph for this : but by the help of some of 



i6o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



293^ 

Coss. L. 
Papirius 
Cursor, Sj>. 
Carvilius. 



The Sam 
nite 
legio7ies 
linteatae. 



Samnite 
reverses. 



Battle at 

Aquilonia, 

293- 



the tribunes, and by using his own authority as consul, he contrived 
to get one in spite of them.^ 

Thus a year of something very Hke disaster followed the glorious 
year 295. The balance \vas somewhat restored in the next year 
(293) by the consul L. Papirius, son of that Papirius Cursor who gained 
glory in the second Samnite war, and Spurius Carvilius, who proved 
himself a worthy colleague. The Samnites made a special effort 
this year. Their levy was proclaimed to meet at Aquilonia, about 
twenty miles south of Bovianum.^ Here a kind of order of chivalry 
was instituted, with solemn religious rites, after an ancient form, so 
the priest Ovius Paccius declared, which had been practised by 
those Samnites who long ago wrested Capua from the Etruscans. 
The leading men of military age, to the number of 16,000, were 
forced to take a solemn oath of secrecy as to the rite itself, and then 
to invoke the most dreadful curses upon themselves, their family, 
and race, if they either failed to obey their commander's summons 
to battle, or tied from the field, or failed to kill any one else whom 
they saw attempting to fly. They wore special arms and a lofty 
crest, and were called Ici^ioncs Unieaiae^ it is said, from the awning 
covering the place where the oath was taken. ^ 

If these solemn preparations were really made they were not 
efficacious. The year 293 was one of disaster to the Samnites. 
The consuls again entered Samnium, devastating the territory of 
Atina on the frontier, and storming two places of now unknown 
position — Amiternum and Ausonia. Carvilius then laid siege to 
Cominium, Papirius to Aquilonia, of which places also we can only 
say that they appear to have been about twenty miles from each 
other, and about the same distance from Bovianum. 

Papirius agreed to attack Aquilonia, if the omens allowed it, on 
the same day as Carvilius assaulted Cominium. When the day 
came the sacred chickens would not feed ; but the piillarius 
ventured to report falsely that they would. He was, however, him- 
self the first to fall in the battle, and therefore Papirius conceived 
the gods to be satisfied. A severe defeat, at any rate, is said to have 
been inflicted on the Samnites : the legio?ies liitteatae no less than 
the others fled before the charge of the cavalry ; the Samnite camp 
was stormed, and the outskirts of Aquilonia itself were entered. 
Nightfall prevented the Romans from venturing to go farther. But 



^ This is the account whicli Livy prefers, but as usual in matters in them- 
selves obscure, the authorities differed. Some say that Postumius was also at 
Luceria, and was even wounded there, 

^ The site of Aquilonia is uncertain. It was, it seems, in the territory of the 
Pentri, almost the centre of Samnium. 

^ More likely from their white linen tunics, cp. Livy ix. 40. 



XII LAST SCENES IN THE SAMNITE WAR i6i 

when the day broke they found that the enemy had evacuated the 
place and gone away, leaving large numbers of dead behind them. 
On the same day Carvilius also took Cominium, killing 4000 men Fall of 
and receiving 15,000 who surrendered at discretion: though a Coymnmm. 
number of others retreated in such order that they were able to 
inflict some loss upon the cavalry which assailed their rear. After 
this the consuls proceeded in their task of taking cities in Samnium, 
one after the other : sometimes by assault, sometimes only after a 
long siege ; at times with hardly any resistance, at others with con- 
siderable difficulty and loss. 

In the midst of the rejoicing at Rome caused by these successful Ne-v 
operations, complaints reached the Senate from loyal cities in ^^^^^^^_ ^^ 
Etruria that they were suffering from the attacks of those states 
which were hostile to Rome. The Senate promised assistance, 
which they were presently induced to send with the greater despatch 
because they learnt that even Falerii, which had for so many years 
been faithful, had joined the mutineers. The two consuls in 
Samnium were ordered to draw lots which of them should go to 
Etruria. The lot fell on Carvilius ; and, to the great joy of his 
soldiers, who found the mountains of Samnium very trying in the 
winter, he marched thither at once, leaving his colleague to reduce 
Sepinum, one of the few strong towns still in the hands of the Sam- 
nites. In Etruria he attacked a town named Troilius, allowed some 
of the aristocrats to depart on the payment of a heavy ransom, and 
reduced the rest to surrender. The capture of some other forts, and 
the slaughter of some thousands of the rebel forces, induced the 
Faliscans to accept a year's truce and pay a heavy fine. 

The year 293 had been one of great glory to the Roman arms, Coss. Q. 

though the joy at these successes had been dashed by a severe ^'l^"[^ 

.,,,.. , ^, , Maxtmus 

pestilence both m city and country. The next year seems to have c,jir<fcs D 

been one of anxiety. The consul Q. Fabius, son of the veteran Junius 

who had won so many victories, met with so serious a disaster that Brutus 

it was resolved to recall him. His father, however, intervened, ^^<^^^\ 

rr ■ 1 • , /-r 1 • 7 ^ T--L CC ExeCUtlO?l 

ottering to serve on his sons staff as his icgatus. Ihe otter was ^^^- ^^^,_ 
accepted, and a decisive victory gained the consul a triumph. It tins, 2g2. 
was stained by a cruel act, too often paralleled in Roman history. 
The imperator of the Samnites, Gaius Pontius, was taken prisoner, 
forced to walk in the consul's procession at Rome, and then 
beheaded. Whether this was the Pontius of the Caudine Forks we 
do not know. Livy seldom mentions the names of the Samnite 
commanders, and on this point we have only a bare record in the 
epitome of his lost books. 

The war lingered on during two more years, but in a languid 
fashion. L. Postumius, the consul for 291, found so little for his 

M 



Peace. 



162 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xii 

2()i. soldiers to do, that he employed 2000 of them on his own lands, for 

Coss. L. which he was successfully prosecuted in the following year. He is 
MegeTluT ^^^*^' however, to have retaken Cominium, — which had lapsed back to 
///., C. the Samnites, — and Venusia in Apulia ; the latter receiving a colony 
Junius in 291. For this, once more against the wish of the Senate, he 

Brutus obtained a triumph. The loss of Livy's books, however, prevents us 
ubulcus. i^nowing in detail how the war was brought to an end. The last 
2go^ Coss. blood shed seems to have been in a victory gained by the famous 
neliusRuf- ^urius Dentatus. The Samnites tried to bribe him with gold, and 
inns, M. their emissaries made their way to his farm, where they found him 
Curius cooking his own turnips. He contemptuously declined their offers, 
Dentatus. saying that he did not count it a great thing to have gold, but to rule 
those who had it. After this victory, wherever it was gained, the 
Samnites for the fourth time sought and obtained a treaty of peace ; 
and, after celebrating one triumph over them, Dentatus is said to 
have earned a second by suppressing a rising of the Sabines, who 
were granted the Latin franchise. 
The future But though the Samnites were defeated, they were not crushed ; 
"iuel ^'""' "°^ ^^^ ^^^^'^ implacable enmity to Rome abandoned. They came 
forward again and again, whenever there was a chance of striking at 
Rome or for their own independence : at the invasion of Pyrrhus 
(280) ; when Hannibal was in central Italy (216-209) ; in the Social 
war (90) ; in the war between Sulla and Marius (83). It was the 
severities of Sulla that finally reduced them to insignificance, and 
their country to pasture land thinly scattered with villages, save for 
here and there a Roman colony. A brave mountain folk fighting 
for independence naturally engages sympathy ; but we must remem- 
ber, on the other hand, that they were dangerous neighbours, and 
that the triumph of Rome meant increased peace and safety for the 
rich countries surrounding them. 

Authorities.— Livy's tenth book ends with the year 293. After that we 
have only the epitomes of his Second Decade. Of Dionysius also we have only 
fragments, xvi. 13-xvii. 14 ; as also of Dio, fr. 36, though Zonaras viii. i gives 
the substance of more of Dio's narrative. For Curius Dentatus. see Cicero 
de Senect. § 99 ; \^aler. Max. iv. 3. 4. In hardly any part of Roman history are 
our authorities so scanty and unsatisfactory. 



CHAPTER XIII 

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

39O-2S6 

The period (390-286) full of wars, and not marked by literary production — Great 
growth of Rome witnessed by increase of tribes, numbers, colonies — The 
struggles between patricians and plebeians — Proposed relief of poverty ; M. 
Manlius (385) — Measures against usury (378-297) — Abolition of nexus (326) 
— Licinian rogations proposed (376) : their purpose, resistance to them, 
carried (367) — The praetor. — Curule aedile — Decemviri sacrorum — Ihe 
comitia tributa — First plebeian censor (351) — Leges Publiliae (339) — 

j' First plebeian praetor (336) — Censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus (312- 

I 309) — His innovations and their aim — Cn. Flavius publishes the legal 
formulae (305) — Lex Ogulnia .(296) — Lex Hortensia {286) — The new 
nobility and the Senate — Stories of the wife of Licinius and of the Chapel of 
Castitas Patricia — First law against ambitus (358) — Laws against usury — 

I Sumptuary laws, 

I 

' The hundred and twenty years from the capture of Rome by the jgo-2jo. 
I Gauls to the consoHdation of Italy from the Rubicon to Rhegium '^he char- 
, are among the most important in Roman history. Unfortunately, "f^^^^f^^^ 
^ from 293 Livy's continuous history is lost. For the period 390 to 
I 293 he professes that the facts are clearer and more certain, but it 
I does not appear that his authorities, other than the official records of 
I the Fasti and pontifical books, were always either consistent or trust- 
worthy. It is a period crowded with wars. Rome has to fight the 
Volscian, the Gaul, the Etruscan, the rebellious Latins, the Sam- 
iiites, — a new and dangerous foe, — the Lucani and Bruttii, as well as 
the Greek communities supported by Pyrrhus. She emerged from 
these struggles victorious, whatever may be the truth of particular 
triumphs or disasters ; and became, for good or evil, what we see her 
to have been in the second century before Christ. 

There is little intellectual progress to record. Roman literature, Absence of 
properly so called, had not begun. The earliest writer of whom we literature. 
hear was Appius Claudius Caecus, the famous censor, who died 
about the year 276. He, indeed, is credited with having made a 



i64 HISTORY OF ROME 



real beginning of literature. He first, as far as we know, had a 
speech written out and published, composed a poem on the model 
of the Greeks, wrote, or caused to be written, a treatise on law, and 
is even credited with some innovations in spelling, as the use of R for 
intervocalic Z or S, and G for C. He was, however, two generations 
ahead of his age. Setting aside his works, whatever they were, all 
that seems to have existed before the time of Naevius (about 275- 
245) and Pictor (about 220-200) were bare statements of facts in 
the Fasti or other official records, the texts of laws and treaties, and 
the inscriptions on tombs, or, at the most, rude songs composed for 
rustic festivals. If there was more it had perished before the 
literary age, even to the speeches delivered in praise of the 
departed, if any such existed thus early. Dramatic exhibitions, the 
source of so much culture among the Greeks, were unknown in 
Rome until 361 ; and, when introduced from Etruria, did not rise to 
anything which could be called a play for more than a hundred 
years. It was not until the Romans were brought into fuller 
contact with the Greek towns of south Italy and Sicily, that the 
first impulse was imparted that slowly and reluctantly produced a 
native literature, which never shook off this first influence, or 
developed in ways truly independent and original. 
A period of It was a period, however, of intense life and continuous growth. 
vigorous xhe increase of the rural tribes from seventeen to thirty-one between 
grow . ^g^ ^^^ 241 marks the extension of the urban territory. The 
census returns represent the number of citizens capable of bearing 
arms as nearly doubled in a century and a half (459-295) ^ ; and the 
number of colonies sent out to guard the coast, to secure the 
allegiance of conquered peoples, or prevent invasion by hostile 
tribes, testifies to the growth of Roman influence. ^ 

^ The only exceptions to the expansion in the census returns, as given by 
Livy, are in the years 275 and 240, that is, at the end of the war with Pyrrhus 
and the first Punic war. It is not quite certain that the drop in either case is due 
to losses in war ; for the men actually engaged in service in the legions were not 
at first entered on the census. 

2 The colonies on the coast were generally " Roman " colonies : that is, the 
colonists retained the full Roman civitas. Before the Punic wars the " Roman" 
colonies were : — 

I. Ostia (regal period). — ^Antium (338) ; Anxur (329) ; Casinum (?) (312) ; 
Minturnae and Sinuessa in Campania (296) ; Sena Gallica in Umbria, and 
Castrum Novum in Picenum (circ. 283) ; Aesium in Umbria (247) ; Alsium in 
Etruria (247) ; Fregenae in Etruria (245). 

II. The Latin colonies, that is, in which the colonists enjoyed only the im- 
perfect or Latin civitas, were : — 

A. In Latiumand its borders. — Signia, Circeii, Suessa Pometia (regal period). 
Velitrae (494) ; Norba (492) ; Antium (467) ; Ardea (442) ; Satricum (385) ; 
Setia (382) ; Fregellae (328) ; Suessa Auranca (313) ; Pontiae (313) ; Interamna 
Lirinas (312); Sora (303); Carseoli (298); Alba Fucentia (303). 



THE NEW NOBILITY 165 



This vigorous growth is accompanied by an internal history full j nobility 
of life and movement. The civil and social struggles of the first 0/ luealih. 
century of the Republic were continued in this, and bore fruit in 
changes destined to be far-reaching. The old nobility still remained 
powerful, but v^ith the admission of plebeians to the higher offices 
was laid the foundation of a new nobility, founded on the magistracy 
and therefore on wealth, for it would seldom happen that any but 
fairly wealthy men would aspire to office or be elected if they did. 
Whether this new nobility would retain the virtues of the old, its 
faith in the destiny of the nation, its integrity, and its subordination 
of personal gain to patriotism, or no, was a question which the 
future alone could decide. Polybius was struck by two things in the 

character of the Romans, as he knew them, in the second century 

the honesty of their officials in dealing with public money, and their 

personal keenness in money - making. He afterwards confines the 

former remark to the period before their foreign conquests, and towards 

the end of his history confesses that love of money was in many cases 

overpowering public virtue.i But the mercantile spirit is a key to 

much of the history of this period. The Romans were a nation of 

patriotic soldiers ; but they were also farmers and merchants. And 

, while they exhibited some of the virtues of these classes — courage, 

I frugality, and respect for honourable dealing — they also showed 

I callousness to suffering caused in the pursuit of their objects, and a 

covetousness which exacts the last farthing which the law will give. 

( Hence the rich fought desperately to retain everything on which 

they had laid hand, and the poor w^ere forced on political agitation 

to secure that they should not pine in the midst of plenty. 

Poverty had been, increased by the damage done to farms and Measures 
i homesteads by parties of Gauls, who wandered in search of pro- for the 
I visions while their comrades beleaguered the Capitol. Among the relief of 
\ first movements after their departure, therefore, were those for relief ^^^''''^y- 
of distress. The first (387), for a fairer division of the ager Poiiip- ^ ^' 
tinns, came to nothing. Two years later (385) a more serious Manli 
I attempt to relieve debtors was made by Marcus Manlius, the hero of jS^. 
jthe Capitol. He too Avas to share the fate of Spurius Cassius and 
Spurius Maelius, with whom Cicero classes him, as he shared their 
love of the people. He began by relieving individual cases of hard- 

B. In other parts of Italy.— Sutrium and Nepete (383), Cosa (273) in 
Etruria ; Gales (334) in Campania ; Saticula (313), Beneventum (268), Aesernia 
(263) in Samnium ; Narnia (299), Spoletium (241) in Umbria ; Venusia in 
Apulia (291) ; Paestum in Lucania (273) ; Brundisium in Calabria (244) ; 
Hadria (294), Firmum (264) in Picenum ; Ariminum in Cispadane Gaul (268). 

Antium appears in both lists, having been changed from the status of a Latin 
to that of a Roman colony in 338. 

1 Polyb. vi. 56; xviii. 35 ; xxxii. 13. 



us in 



1 66 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Imprison- 
ment of 
Manlius, 



Death of 
Manlius. 



Relief of 
Debtors. 



ship. He saw a veteran led through the Forum by a creditor, and 
rescued him from impending slavery by paying his debt. He then 
sold an estate in the Veientine territory and devoted the proceeds to 
the relief of other nexi. He became a popular hero, and was eagerly 
listened to as he denounced the senators for keeping possession of 
the money collected for the payment of the Gauls. The Senate be- 
came alarmed and called upon A. Cornelius, who had been named 
dictator earlier in the year in view of one of the periodical incursions 
of the Volscians and Aequians, to come to Rome. 

There was not as yet anything like open rebellion ; but Manlius 
was nevertheless summoned before the dictator and thrown into 
prison. The populace however assumed such a threatening attitude 
at this treatment of their champion, that the Senate thought it wiser 
to set him at liberty. But similar scenes occurred in the following 
year (384). Manlius harangued the people, urging them to resist 
tyrannical powers of magistrates and legal decisions against debtors. 
The Senate raised the usual cry that ManHus was aiming at regal 
power. Two tribunes, M. Maenius and Q. Publilius, were found to 
give practical effect to a senatorial resolution by prosecuting him. 
The assembly was apparently manipulated in the interests of the 
patricians. In spite of his eloquence and of his honours, which 
included two mural and eight civic crowns, 1 the spoils of thirty 
enemies, and rewards bestowed by forty commanders, — Manlius was 
declared guilty of perduellio and hurled from the Tarpeian rock by 
order of the tribunes : and a law was passed forbidding any patrician 
to build a house on the Capitoline mount, as though it gave a 
would-be tyrant an opportunity to seize the Capitol : and an order 
was made by the Council of the gens Ma7ilia that none of its mem- 
bers should henceforward bear the praenomen of Marcus. 

Thus once more the patricians, acting with the richer plebeians, 
crushed a social reformer. But the distress of the indebted farmers 
could not thus be set aside. In 378 the usual levy was prevented by 
the tribunes, until the concession was wrung from the Senate that 
actual military service in any year should excuse the payment of the 
tributum., and exempt from legal process for debt. But the quarrel 
of debtor and creditor is eternal ; and the disturbances caused by it 
survived the Republic itself Again and again, as in 343, 340, 297, 
it breaks out and various remedies are tried by limiting the amount 
of interest, and even by forbidding it altogether.^ But such regula- 
tions necessarily proved abortive ; and the relief afforded by the 
Licinian law of 367 was in its nature temporary. All that legislation 

^ Corona muralis — a crown given for being the first to scale an enemy's wall ; 
corona civica — a crown given for saving the life of a citizen. 
- Livy vii. 42 ; Tacitus, Ann. vi. 22. 



XIII RELIEF OF DEBTORS 167 

can do in such a matter is to prevent what is essentially a social 
question from becoming political, by securing that no undue advant- 
age given to one part of the State over another shall associate in 
men's minds the idea of personal prosperity with that of political 
privilege. The plebeians did How associate these ideas ; and there- 
fore strove for political equality in the hope that, among other things, 
it might put the relations of rich and poor on a more equitable 
footing. It was not till they had practically attained this equality by 
the Licinian and other laws, that they carried an enactment which 
did more than anything else to remove the hardship inflicted by the 
law of debt. This was the abolition of 7iexus altogether by the lex Abolition 
Poetilia (326). Up to this time, at the expiration of thirty days after of nexus 
the acknowledgment of a debt or its declaration by the judge, the ^y ^^■'^: . 
debtor at once passed into the hands of his creditor. He was not ^5 ' ^'^' 
yet a slave, but he was a nexits. His creditor could load him with 
chains, and feed him on the lowest amount of food that would keep 
him alive, and at the end of sixty days, in the course of which he had 
three times been produced before the praetor, he could be sold into 
slavery. This process was abolished by the lex Poetilia^ and though 
the addictio^ or assignment to slavery of a debtor, still occurred in 
certain circumstances, it appears to have henceforth resulted only 
from a failure to comply with the formal order of the praetor {jitdi- 
cnlinn), which would probably be made on a review of the whole 
circumstances, or at an'y rate would be a matter of time. Meanwhile 
the creditor could only take the debtor's goods as security, not his 
person. This of course did not remove all hardships, or touch the 
deeper causes of distress ; but it prevented many of the miseries and 
I scandals caused by the institution of the nexus ; and whatever was 
I the exact nature of the relief, it was not secured till by the Licinian and 
I Publilian laws the plebeians had obtained a full share in civil power. 
i The measures of the tribunes C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius The 

were primarily directed to the relief of poverty. But they differed I^^^'inian 
from others in joining to a proposal for the immediate diminution of ^''j^^ "^"^' 
the burden of debt a measure meant to effect a more permanent 
relief by a fuller participation in the benefits of the ager piiblicus^ 
and a proposition that the chief disability still attaching to plebeians 
should be removed by their admission to the consulship. 

These rogaticvics 1 were originally brought in by the two tribunes 
in 376, but they did not become laws until after ten years of inces- 
sant struggle, not astonishing if we consider the interests attacked, 
and the rank and influence of those affected. 

^ The proposer of a law asked [7-ogavit) the people for their decision, a " bill" 
therefore was a rogatio before it was passed. 



1 68 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The pro- 
posed legis- 
lation. 



ReduciioJt 
of debt. 



The ager 
publicus. 



The con- 
sulship. 



The ten 
years' co/i- 
'flict, J7S- 
367- 



The propositions were (i) That from the capital sum of all debts 
the interest already paid should be deducted, and the balance paid in 
three yearly instalments : (2) That no one should hold more than 
500 jugera (about 300 acres) of the agcr publicus.'^ (3) That consuls 
should in future be appointed instead of consular tribunes, and that 
one of them should be a plebeian. 

Of these proposals the first, for the reduction of debt, was in fact 
a measure of confiscation to meet a temporary pressure by a temporary 
cure. It is difficult to justify or even understand, unless we suppose 
that the debts were not incurred as mere speculative losses, but were 
charges on land representing expenditure which in equity, if not in 
law, should have fallen on mortgagees, now practically landlords, rather 
than on indebted freeholders who had in fact sunk to the position of 
tenants. 

The proposal as to the age?- publicus ^\so would disturb what had 
come to be regarded as a right. The possessores leased the land 
from the State at a low rent, and had long looked on it as inalienable 
property on which there was a small charge. The law, therefore, 
would appear to them an unjust confiscation, and would be resisted 
by patricians and rich plebeians alike. 

The admission of plebeians to the consulship, opposed ostensibly 
on the religious ground that plebeians were incapal^le of taking the 
auspices, also touched indirectly on the financial question. For 
the richer plebeians could not be got to support it with earnest- 
ness, if it involved an interference in their occupation of public 
land. 

With such interests opposed to them, it is not surprising that 
Licinius and Sextus had to fight for ten years. For five they were 
continuously elected tribunes (375-371), and prevented the creation 
of curule magistrates. One effect of this would be to stop judgments 
against debtors ; but how the ordinary administration was carried on 
we are nipt told. The Senate and quaestors might manage the 
finances artd police ; the Pontifex Maximus would preside at religious 
functions. / But such a state of things could only be possible in a 
time of p/eace, and there was in fact no need of a levy until the end 
of this ti.me. 

^ This is the only regulation as to the ager publicus mentioned by Livy. 
Appian^'(j5. C i. 8) also adds a seeond and third clause forbidding any one to 
feed more than 100 oxen or 500 sheep on the public pasture, and ordering 
owner/ to employ as many free men as slaves on their land. But it seems very 
unlikely that the employment of slave labour had become so common at this period 
of the Republic. Appian perhaps refers regulations of the C^racchan law of 131, 
whic^h was founded on a revival of the Licinian law, to the earlier legislation. It has 
evejft been held that Appian's words do not apply to the Licinian laws at all, but 
to £ome later legislation of which we know nothing. 



XIII THE LICINIAN ROGATIONS 169 

At last a compromise secured the passing of the law. The relief The law 
of debtors and the reform in the occupation of the ager picblicus were Z^"-^^'^^' 
accepted. Some effort seems to have been made at first to enforce '^^'^' 
the regulation as to the public land, and Licinius himself was fined 
for evading it by freeing his son from the patria potestas^ that he 
might hold a second allotment of 500 jugera. Others however did 
the same with impunity, and before many years the law was practically 
inoperative. 1 

It was in the clause securing one consulship for the plebeians that The prae- 

the compromise was effected. Though frequently evaded (as in 355, ^''^'^^">- 

' and six times between that date and 342) the law remained in force, 

I and in 341 was extended to allow both consuls to be plebeians.- But 

while yielding this, the patricians secured the delegation of the 

judicial functions of the consul to a new magistrate to be called the 

praetor, who until 336 was always a patrician. He was considered a 

: colleague of the consuls, and the title was perhaps the earliest used 

, to designate the chief of the State. The derivation of the word and 

1 the term used by Greek writers to translate it (o-rpaT^^yos) point to 

I the original meaning as "head of the army." But though, when the 

^ number of praetors was increased, they at times performed military 

duties, yet a later regulation confined them during their year of 

I office to the administration of justice ; and the single praetor now 

j appointed had primarily none but judicial functions. 

( Shorn of this important sphere of action the consulship could be The 
[restored without offence. The consuls still enjoyed the highest rank, 
jif they were active and able men, they did much by initiating ''"''"'^''''P- 
I laws, publishing edicts, and restraining other magistrates. In 
'times of civil disturbance they had the chief means of restoring 
order. But in quiet times, and within the walls, they were almost 
confined to routine duties : they presided in the Senate, held the 
comitia, performed certain public acts of worship. Outside the walls 
however, and in times of war, they were still supreme : held levies, 
commanded armies, punished rebellion. If they failed, or were 
obviously incompetent, the Senate intervened, and by forcing one of 
them to name a dictator, secured a suitable commander for the 
legions. 

Besides the praetorship, the patricians in return for their con- Curuk 
cession obtained also a share in the aedileship. Two curule aediles ''"■'^^^leship. 

^ Appian, B.C. i. 8. 

- The same law prevented accumulation of curule offices by directing that a 

jyear at least was to intervene between the holding of two curule offices, and ten 

ears between two consulships (Livy vii. 42). This was suspended or neglected 

m several occasions, generally for special reasons ; but with the exxeption of 

he revolutionary times of Marius was usually respected up to B.C. 53. 



restored 



170 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Decejnviri 
sac ro rum. 



Cotnitia 
tributa, 
3^7- 



Tj-ihini 
m Hi turn. 



Riifiili. 



Plebeian 
censor^ 

351- 

I.eges Pub- 
liliae, jjg. 



A ucioritas 
patriim. 



were elected from the patricians to superintend the public games, 
and continued to be elected from patricians and plebeians alternately, 
all distinction between the two sorts of aediles, in regard to their 
functions, gradually dying out. 

On the other hand, the plebeians obtained five places among the 
decemviri sacroriim^ who took the place of the di(oviri sacris faciinidis^ 
and thus got a share in the custody of the Sibylline oracles, to which 
appeal was often made in political business. 

The laws embodying these mutual concessions were passed under 
the presidency of the veteran M. Furius Camillus, named this year 
dictator for the fifth time, to repel a Gallic raid. Henceforward the 
plebeians gained admission one after the other to all remaining 
positions in the State, and the comitia tributa became more and more 
clearly recognised as a sovereign assembly, to which legislation was 
nearly always assigned ; while the centuriate assembly continued to 
elect the higher magistrates, consuls, praetors, censors. In other 
words, when a change in the laws was to be made, the people voted 
in such a way as gave the chief voice to numbers ; when the higher 
magistrates were to be elected, the people voted in such a way as to 
give the preponderance to men of property. The aediles and quaestors 
and tribunes continued to be elected by the comitia tributa; and in 
361 the rule was enforced that the military tribunes, of whom there 
were six for each legion, instead of being nominated by the dictator 
or consul, should be elected by the same assembly, thereby bringing 
the army also more under the immediate control of the people, and 
decreasing the influence of the consul. The practice before and 
after this date appears to have been irregular, some military tribunes 
having been elected, others named. The rule was repeated in 311, 
and as late as 105 a law of Rutilius Rufus distinguished the two 
kinds of tribunes, those elected and those nominated, whence the 
latter got the name of Rufuli?- 

In 35 I for the first time a plebeian was elected censor : and in 339 
the laws named from the dictator Publilius marked another step in 
plebeian advance. They (i) confirmed the rule that the plebiscita 
should apply to all citizens alike ; (2) ordered that when a law was 
brought before the co??iitia cciituriata the Senate should give its 
formal confirmation of it before the voting began, not after; (3) ordered 
that one censor should always be a plebeian. The second of these 
laws did not apparently deprive the Senate of all power of stopping- 
legislation in the comitia\enturiata. The aiictoritas of the Senate 
was still necessary, but must be given to the magistrate proposing 

^ Livy vii. 5 ; ix. 30 ; cf. Festus, s.v. That there was now a great rush of 
"new men" to obtain office is shown by the lex Poetilia dc avdutii (358), 
forbidding canvassing on market days. 



APPIUS CLAUDIUS CAECUS 171 



the law before it was put to the people. The Senate could not, if the 
people gave a vote they disliked, step in afterwards and deprive 
the law of validity. It could prevent a proposal being brought 
before the centuriate assembly, it could not suspend its enforce- 
ment when once passed. Finally in 336 for the first time a PIebeia?i 
plebeian was elected praetor in spite of the protest of the consul praetor, 
Sulpicius. ^^ ■ 

Thus all the magistracies were thrown open to the plebeians. The The sacer- 
patricians still retained an important hold on administration from ^°^^^ ^^^ 
being alone eligible to the sacred colleges, in whose custody were the ^^f^^ -patri- 
( laws regulating the details of civil procedure, the arrangement of the cian. 
I calendar, and the proper distinction between days on which business 
might and might not be transacted. The abolition of this one 
remaining privilege was preceded by the bold innovations introduced 
\ by Appius Claudius Caecus in his censorship. 

; As in the case of other aristocrats who promoted popular measures, The cen- 

' it is difficult to assign a motive to the policy of Appius with any sorship 
■ confidence. He was no enthusiast for the rights of the plebeians, of^PP^t^^ 
I for he afterwards opposed the Ogulnian law which admitted them to ^^"^JJ'^ 
j the sacred colleges : yet he systematically disregarded the authority J12-J08. 

of the Senate, and endeavoured to lower its prestige by enrolling men 
I of inferior rank, in some cases even the sons of freedmen, and by 
j neglecting to take the usual senatorial decree for the issue of the money 
; required for his two great works,i the road to Capua {via Appid)^ and 
I the water which he brought into the city {aqua Appza). Moreover, 
( he obstinately persisted in retaining his office for four years in 
I order to complete these works, maintaining that the lex Aemilia 
i (430), which confined the censorship to eighteen months, only 
applied to the censors of that year. But the most important of his His inno- 
innovations was in regard to the urban voters. They had hitherto vation as to 

been included in four urban tribes, and therefore only counted four ^ ^,^'' ^'^ 

^ ' , -1 A • 1 tribes. 

votes as agamst twenty-seven of the rural tribes. Appius made up 

{ the list of the tribes in such a way that the people of the city were 

distributed (perhaps according to individual choice) among all the 

I tribes. The city vote, therefore, influenced that of a large number 

; of the tribes, and as the city voters were on the spot, while the 

farmers would not be willing to come in large numbers to the 

comitia, except on special occasions, it is evident that this measure 

tended to throw power into the hands of the urban population. 

But why did Appius wish to do this ? The answer seems to be 



^ "The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important 
expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every lustrum for the 
repair or construction of public buildings ; this money cannot be obtained by the 
censors except by the grant of the Senate " (Polyb. vi. 13). 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



His aim 
in making 
the change. 



The. policy 
revoked. 



The gens 
Potitia. 



On. Fla- 
vi us pub- 
lishes the 
legal 
formulae 
attd the 
calendar, 
jo-f- 



Lex Ogul- 
71 ia, 2g6. 



that his aim was to strengthen the power of the magistrates as against 
the Senate, The magistrates were to be supreme : and the only way 
to make them so was to found their power as directly as possible on 
the popular will, and the popular will represented by the urban 
inhabitants could be acted on most powerfully by the magistrate. It 
was, in fact, incipient Caesarism of the sort denounced in after times 
by Cicero, which " did nothing through the Senate, everything direct 
with the people." It was not, rightly viewed, a democratic policy ; 
but the object of its enmity was the constitutional oligarchy of which 
the Senate was the embodiment. The time, however, was not ripe 
for such a change. The consuls refused to summon the Senate as 
enrolled by Appius, and employed the roll of his predecessors ; and 
the censors for 304 upset his arrangement of the tribes by once more 
embodying all the city populace in the four urban tribes. 

He showed his free spirit in regard to religious matters by pro- 
moting the transfer of the worship of Hercules at the ara Maxima 
from the gens Potitia to a number of public slaves ; to which 
measure popular superstition attributed both the speedy extinction 
of the gens, and the loss of sight which befel Appius himself at a 
later period of his life. He also deprived the guild of tibicines., 
whose services were required at sacrifices, of their maintenance in 
the temple of Jupiter, who accordingly struck work, and migrated to 
Tibur, whence they were brought back under the effects of wine 
drunk at a banquet given them by the Tiburtines. More important 
w^as the action of Gnaeus Flavius, the son of a freedman, and a public 
clerk or scriba, who had been secretary to Appius, and under his 
influence still farther weakened the oligarchical party by making 
public, when curule aedile, the \Qg?C\. formulae or rules of pleading, and 
the methods of legal practice {actus legitimi and actioncs /egt's), as \\'ell 
as posting up the calendar or Fasti in the Forum, that all might 
know what legal proceedings were valid or invalid on particular days. 
These things had been kept as secrets in the sacred colleges, or were 
known to only a fe\v jurisconsults besides, and their revelation was 
another step tow^ards broadening the basis of liberty. Flavius, as 
Cicero says, had blinded the crows, — had taken from these sharp-eyed 
lawyers their monopoly of wisdom, and had plundered their science. 
No more \vould the pontifices be able to protect the aristocratic 
wrong-doer or baffle the lowly appellant by collusive pleas of technical 
irregularity, or to postpone justice on the ground of some mysterious 
incompetency attaching to the day selected. 

In 296 this security was confirmed by the admission of plebeians 
to the sacred colleges. The /t\v Ogiihua increased the number both 
of the augures and pontifices from four to eight, and ordained 
that four of the jDontifices and five of the augures should be 



il 



Lex Hor- 

fensia, 

2S6. 

The orders 
equalised. 



XIII FINAL EQUALISATION OF THE ORDERS 173 

plebeians. The importance of this lay in the fact that cases of 
disputed elections, — of whethei' there was a vitiuni in an election, — 
came before the augures, and the plebeians believed that a vitium 
was declared when a plebeian was elected. ^ 

In 286, when the people had for the last time "seceded" to the 
Janiculum, a law of the dictator Hortensius finally put an end to all 
important distinctions between the orders by making the couiitia 
t7'ibuta an absolutely sovereign assembly for legislatixe purposes. 
Re-enacting that the plebiscita should be binding on the whole people, 
it added that for the binding force of these resolutions the aucioritas 
of the Senate should not be required. Henceforth, although a 
magistrate often brought measures before the coviitia tributa in 
obedience to the resolution of the Senate, such a senatorial resolu- 
tion was not essential, and laws could be proposed and passed 
without it. 2 

But the opening of all the higher magistracies to the plebeians The neiv 
made the growth of a new nobility of wealth inevitable. The offices -notihty. 
were unpaid and could only be held by men in at least easy circum- 
stances. As the standard of wealth rose with the extension of the 
city, fewer and fewer men were found to combine great public 
services with the frugality and simplicity of a Cincinnalus. The change 
was reflected in the Senate, which, without legally defined powers, 
j had the chief administration in its hands. The ;f)lebiscitinn Ovinium ^ 
I (about 318-312) had transferred the duty of making up the roll of 
j the Senate from the consuls, or consular tribunes, to the censors, 
I and had directed that they should do it b)' selecting the best men of 

I 

j ^ See the case of the dictator M. Claudius Marcellus in 327 (Livy viii. 

23). 

- How the lex Hortensia differed from the lex Pubhha is a difficult question. 

Laelius Felix (Aulus Gellius xv. 37) says that the proposals brought before 

the co7nitia tributa by the tribunes were not binding on the patricians until the 

law of Hortensius, which enacted ut eo jure quod plebs statuisset omnes Qui rites 

\tenerent2ir. Yet the lex Publilia (Livy viii. 12) also contained a similar clause. 

I It is not surprising that successive laws should repeat the same enactment, just as 
our own early charters do ; and the most natural explanation of the remark of 
Laelius is, that, by the lex Publilia the plebiscita were declared binding on the 
I whole people, but that it was still considered necessary that these resolutions of 
the plebs should be made leges by going through the ordinary formalities, i.e. 
by being authorised by the Senate and passed by the comitia ce/ituriata. If that 
were not done, some people were found to deny their validity as binding patricians, 
the very protest being an illustration of the general sentiment the other way ; the 
lex Hortensia therefore finally and distinctly abolished the necessity for this 
process. 

2 The date of the Ovinian plebiscitum is nowhere stated. Willems seems to 
'|have given good reason for placing it as in the text {Le Senat i. 153 sq.). 
Though the censors ordinarily made up the roll of the Senate, on certain special 
occasions a dictator was named for the purpose, as in 216 (Livy xxiii. 3). 



174 HISTORY OF ROME 



the several orders. It soon came to be a niatter of course, not to be 
departed from without grave reason justifying the ignominia^ that the 
ex-magistrates of curule rank — consularcs^ practorii^ and aedUidi^ — 
should be put upon the roll. These offices therefore gave a life- 
membership of the Senate ; and when they were filled indifferently 
from both orders of the State and by popular election, it followed 
that the Senate consisted chiefly of men who had stood the test of 
the choice of the people. The censors indeed filled up such 
vacancies as were left by enrolling men who had obtained 
distinction in war ; and Appius Claudius Caecus, as we have seen, 
went down very low in the social scale to find members. But, put- 
ting aside this innovation, which was soon annulled, such men 
would not be influential members. As opposed to curule senators 
they would be called /tv/*^?;-//, who voted but did not speak. ^ The 
bulk of the Senate, and certainly the active and leading men in it, 
would be those who once at least had stood the test of popular 
election to curule office ; and the condition of success in such an 
election was often high birth, but nearly always wealth also. These 
men remained members for life, and their families soon came to be 
spoken of as " senatorial," though their sons had no hereditary 
claim to membership. The Senate therefore was an assembly of 
ex-officials and rich men, who formed a nobility partly of birth, 
but in an increasing proportion of wealth also, most of whom had 
had experience of public business in peace or war. The result was 
a body whose administration for more than two centuries deservedly 
earned and retained the respect of foreign nations, and generally 
speaking the loyalty of its fellow-citizens. 
The soctar The distinction between the orders legally annihilated in 286 

distinction survived for a time in social life. Two stories have been preserved 

'^ ,"' which illustrate the form which this may have taken. Thus the 

o}'ders stir- .... ^ , , . , ,,•'., ^ ... ^ 

7'i7'ed the mitiative of the movement which resulted m the Licmian laws is at- 

legal. tributed to the emulation of the two daughters of M. Fabius Ambustus. 

One of them was married to the patrician Servius Sulpicius, the other 

^ According- to Willems they were called /fc/r/r//, not, as Aulus Gellius says, 
because they voted by walking across the Senate-house, but as opposed to curulcs, 
who occupied special seats. A series of laws secured to the aedilicii, tribunicii, 
qiiaesto7-ii (who had not held curule offices) the jus dicendae sevtentiae, but there 
appears to have been nothing formally to prevent them doing so before ; only, as 
the presiding magistrate called on all the curule members before them {censorii, 
cons// tares, and praetorii), they had not in practice been accustomed to speak. 
The existing aediles, tribunes, and quaestors, — as being members of the govern- 
ment, — spoke on matters pertaining to their respective functions, but did not vote. 
All these ex-magistrates, curule or non-curule, remained members of the Senate until 
the next lectio, but were not "senators" until placed on the roll by the censors. 
Such as were placed on the roll without having held office, if there were such , 
seem to have been classed with tXm pectarii. 



XIII SOCIAL DISTINCTIONS SURVIVING 175 

to the plebeian C. Licinius Stolo. The wife of the plebeian was in the The wife 
house of the patrician, who at the time was a consular tribune, and ^^ Licinius 
was startled into showing signs of alarm when the lictor knocked ^^'^^'^' 
loudly at the door to summon the magistrate. Laughed at by her 
sister for her want of acquaintance with official ways, in her chagrin 
she appealed to her father, who promised that he would redress the 
inequality which had so mortified her. 

But nearly seventy years after the passing of the Licinian laws, chapd of 
when one distinction after another had been abolished, and when Castitas 
two generations had been familiarised with the idea of political Patricia. 
equality, the patrician ladies showed that they had not allowed their 
social ideas to keep pace with the times. There was a chapel 
dedicated to " Patrician Chastity," near the Forum Boarium, in which 
the matrons were accustomed to offer a yearly sacrifice, admission being 
confined to those whose character was unimpeached and who had 
been married to only one husband. In the year 296 the wife of the 
plebeian consul Volumnius, though of patrician birth, was excluded 
on the ground of her marriage with a plebeian. Indignant at the 
slight, she consecrated a chapel adjoining her own house in the Vicus 
Longus, admission to which was made to depend on the same con- 
ditions as that to the older shrine. Such acts of social pride how- 
ever, though galling, can scarcely be regarded as of importance : 
they were but the froth on the surface recalling the storm which had 
raged and was stilled. 

Authorities.— Up to 293 Livy's continuous narrative (v.-x.) ; from that date 
we have only the epitomes of lost books xi. and xii. Of Dionysius also (xiv. ) 
there are only some unimportant fragments. Plutarch [Camillus 36, 39) has 
some account of Manlius and Licinius. Of the latter there is a short and rather 
hostile account in Zonaras vii. 24 and Aurelius Victor xx. Appian {B. civ. iv. 7-10) 
gives an instructive account of the ager publicus ,- Paterculus (i. 14, 15) a list of 
colonies. For the censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus, see Livy ix. 29, 30, 33, 
34, 40; Diodorus Sic. xx. 36. For Gnaeus Flavius see Livy ix, 47; Cicero /r^ 
Mur. §25 ; ad Att. vii. i §8 ; de Orat. i. 186 ; Pliny N.H. xxxiii. '17 ; Piso in 
Aul. Gell. vii. 9. ' 



CHAPTER XIV 



ROME AND TARENTUM 



COLONIES 
Hatria . . .B.C. 289 

Castrum Novum, between 

B.C. 289-283 
Sena . . about B.C. 283 



B.C. 289 



273,000 



From the end of the third Samnite war to the invasion of Pyrrhus (B.C. 290-280) — 
Wars with Senones and Boii with Etruscan contingents — Defeat of the Lucani 
and Bruttii in the territory of Thurii — Quarrel with Tarentum, and the 
invitation to Pyrrhus. 



Colonies to 
secure the 
east coast 
of Italy, 
28^-283. 



War zvith 
the Sen- 
ones, 28J. 
Coss. P. 
Cornel- 
ius Dola- 
bella Max- 
imus, Cn. 
Do7nitius 
Calvinus 
Maxiimis. 



Victory of 

Cornelius 

Dolabella. 



The years immediately following" the third Samnite war were not 
marked by any memorable achievement. Yet Rome went on steadily 
securing her position. The danger which had menaced her from the 
union of the Samnites and Gauls, along with the disaffected people 
in E'Lruria and Umbria, had made evident the importance of having 
the control of the east coast. Accordingly a colony with Latin rights 
was settled at Hatria or Hadria on the southern part of the coast of 
Picenum, about five miles inland, and a short time afterwards a 
colony of Roman citizens higher up the coast at Castrum Novum. 

With the exception of an unimportant revolt at Volsinii, our 
scanty remains of history tell of no farther trouble in Etruria until 
the Senonian Gauls once more renewed their raids. In 283 they 
even besieged Arretium, and succeeded in cutting to pieces the 
Roman legions, with the praetor L, Caecilius, sent to the relief of 
the town. M'. Curius Dentatus, who had successfully finished the 
Samnite war, took his place, and sent ambassadors to treat with 
the Gauls for the restoration of prisoners. But the Gallic chief 
Britomaris caused the ambassadors to be barbarously murdered, in 
revenge, he said, for the death of his father in the last war. This 
violation of the law of nations was promptly avenged. The consul 
Cornelius Dolabella, who was to have supported Dentatus in Etrui-ia, 
on hearing the news, turned off at once from his road, and marched 



CHAP. XIV THE SENONIAN GAULS 



77 



straight through the Sabine lands and Picenum into the territory 

of the Senones, who as usual had gone home with their spoils. 

He defeated them with slaughter which almost amounted to 

annihilation. The survivors were expelled from the district, and 

the women and children sold as slaves. The country was then Sena 

secured by sending a colony of Roman citizens to the coast Gallica. 

of the Adriatic, just where the plains of tlie Po terminate, which 

under the name of Sena Gallica became afterwards the capital of 

the district. 

But the expulsion of the Senones made their neighbours the The BoH 
Boii alarmed for themselves. They quickly summoned their ctder Eini- 
warriors, swept down upon Etruria, and calling upon those ''^f; ^!"l ^ ^ 
Etruscans who still disliked the Roman supremacy to join them, pieces at 
marched through the country as far as the Vadimonian lake. There the Lac us 
they were met by the consul Gn. Domitius, and overthrown with ^^adi- 
such slaughter that only a few stragglers escaped to carry home the ^'I'i'"^' 
news ; their Etruscan allies also losing half their men in the battle. ^'^ 
The Boii, however, were not dismayed. The next year they The Boil 
entered Etruria again, and again called upon the Etruscans for aid ; ^'^g'-'^in. con- 
and were once more so signally defeated that they humbled themselves '/'^^''^'"/" 
to send ambassadors to Rome to make a peace, by which they 0S2. 
abided for nearly fifty yea^s. 

But while thus fighting for her life in the North, Rome once Trouble in 
more found herself in the presence of serious difficulties in the -^^^ig't^i 
South, The Samnites were said to be again preparing for war ; ^'^"'^^^"' 
the Lucani and Bruttii were actually attacking the town of Thurii, 
which among the Greek towns of south Italy was the most closely 
united in friendship with Rome. P^or these movements, as well as 
in part for the recent outbreaks in Gaul, the intrigues of the 
Tarentines were believed to be responsible. Thurii had been put 
into opposition and rivalry with Tarentum by the Molossian 
Alexander, and the Tarentines had now their opportunity of revenge. 

The position of Tarentum in Italy presents some striking Tarentum 
analogies to that of Athens during the Macedonian period. In cind Athens 
Athens, one party, while aiming at a supremacy among other Greek ^'^>"'P<^^'^d- 
states, had the farther object of forming a confederacy to resist the 
great and united Macedonian power ; and, to do this, was ready to 
make friends with her ancient and bitter enemy Thebes, and even 
with her hereditary foe the king of Persia. The other party wished to 
secure Athenian prosperity and peace by co-operating with Macedonia. 
So Tarentum, regarding herself as the head of an Hellenic con- Parties in 
federacy, of which the natural enemies were the Lucanians and Tarentum. 
Apulians, had to choose between making friends with them, and so 
forming a united front against the encroaching power of Rome, or 

N 



178 HISTORY OF ROiME 



submitting to the protectorate of Rome, and thus securing her- 
self against the enemies nearer her gates : and, as in Athens, there 
were two parties supporting the first and the second pohcy re- 
spectively. The Romanising party consisted for the most part of 
the older and richer citizens ; the opposition of the younger and 
more democratic, 
p^^^,^ This popular party was now in the ascendant, and its policy 

policy of was marked by singular alternations of rashness and irresolution. 
the popular The Tarentines had been the ultimate cause of the second Samnite 
P^^^y^ vvar. They had invited the Molossian Alexander to their aid, had 

^^'^' then quarrelled with him, and stirred up against him all the Greek 

cities which they could influence ; and when among other acts of 
retaliation, he had made terms with Rome, they had instigated those 
unlucky raids of the people of Palaepolis upon Roman territory, 
which brought on the collision between the Romans and the Samnites 
who aided Palaepolis. Yet, with the exception of one protest, as 
pretentious as it was ineffectual, which the Romans treated with 
deserved contempt,^ they had done nothing to help the Samnites in 
their long struggle. They had preserved the sort of neutrality 
which is really offensive to both sides, striving to seize the oppor- 
tunity, when the two powers were engaged in a death struggle with 
each other, to secure their own ends in other ways. 
They invite Nor was their resort to foreign powers successful. To crush 

the 'aid of jhe Lucanians and Messapians, while Roman and Samnite were 
foreigners, fighting, they continued to invite foreign princes to their aid. 
Thus after Alexander's death they called in (we do not know 
with what result) Agathocles of Syracuse, who had been supported 
by mercenaries from both Samnium and Etruria. Later on, in 
302, the Spartan Cleonymus came on their invitation to oppose 
the Lucanians and Romans. 2 But he at any rate did no good. 
Luxurious and dissolute, after treacherously seizing Metapontum, 
and indulging in vain schemes of Sicilian conquest, he departed to 
Corcyra, contenting himself with plundering expeditions on the 
Italian coasts, among others at the mouth of the Meduacus, where 
the inhabitants of Patavium drove him off with considerable loss. 
In each case these foreign princes, invited by Tarentum for her 
defence, had become a danger or a difficulty to her. 
Tzvo The wise policy for Tarentum, as it turned out, would have been 

possible to have secured her safety among her hostile neighbours l3y frankly 

policies for ^^yhig herself with Rome. Failing that, her only resource was to 
Tarentum. ^^^^^^ i^^ited all the peoples of southern Italy, Greek and native 

^ Livy ix. 14. ^ , 

2 Jb. X. 2 ; Diodor. xx. 104, 105 iroXe/xov txoyres irpbs AevKavovs k"' 

"PuJ/maiovs. 



XIV STATE OF PARTIES IN TARENTUM 179 

alike, and even the Samnites themselves, into a league strong 
enough to hold its own against Rome. But there was httle chance 
at Tarentum of a Demosthenes, or even an Aeschines, capable of 
conceiving or carrying out either the one policy or the other. 

All accounts which we have of the state of Tarentum at this time Sfa/e of 
present some of the worst features of a Greek democracy in its Tarentum, 
decline, when simplicity of life and intelligent interest in affairs have 
been replaced by idle luxury and the conceited meddlesomeness of 
the incompetent. There were energetic and active citizens, but they 
did not find a scope for their energies amidst the decaying Hellenism 
in Italy. They went abroad to serve in foreign armies, so that 
" Tarentines " became the well-known designation of an effective 
species of cavalry ; or they were away with the still numerous 
ships of war or commerce. These were not the men who directed 
the policy of the State. The idle citizens spent their life in the 
baths and gymnasia ; or in sauntering about the shady walks of 
the city, where they wrangled over politics, or discussed those 
precepts of the Pythagorean philosophy which they had no intention 
of carrying into effect ; or in attending the almost daily festivals and 
banquets which filled the Tarentine calendar. The great fleets had 
brought immense wealth and every luxury to the city ; there were 
plenty of slaves to do the hard work of life ; and that free citizens 
should be compelled to do anything contrary to their inclinations 
was to make them no better than slaves themselves. Yet these 
were the men whose voices settled everything in the sovereign 
assembly. And the assembly faithfully reflected their character. 
A jest, a vain boast, or burst of empty rhetoric, sufficed to determine 
the most serious business. At once prone to panic, and reckless in 
rushing upon danger, they provoked a powerful people, formed or 
broke an alliance, with equal rashness and frivolity. Eager to catch 
at any means which would secure them power without labour or 
danger, they invited one ambitious prince after another to their aid, 
blindly believing that he would consent to serve their aims rather 
than use them as stepping-stones for his own. Such were the 
people who were now to come into collision with the steady policy 
and persistent purpose of Rome. The result was not doubtful. But 
the Romans had too much on their hands from 285 to 280 to wish 
to provoke a contest, although they knew well enough that Tarentum 
was stirring up rebellion against them in southern Italy. We shall 
find them therefore unusually slow to strike, and trying by diplomatic 
means to postpone the appeal to arms. 

It was perhaps from this motive that, in the latter part of the Rotnan 
second Samnite war, they had conceded to the naval jealousy of ^^^^aty with 
Tarentum a treaty whereby they bound themselves not to sail with Tarentum. 



i8o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



282. 
Coss. C. 
Fabricius 
Luscinus, 
Q. Aemi- 
lius Papus. 
The 

Romans 
send help 
to Thia'ii. 



Attach on 
the Roman 
ships in the 
harbour of 
Tarentiim. 



Thi 

Romans 
demand 
compensa- 
tion. 



warships round the Lacinian promontory into the gulf of Tarentum.^ 
And this concession, whenever made, was destined to bring about 
the very breach which it was intended to prevent. 

Tlie rising of the Lucani in 284 had taken the form of an attack 
upon Thurii. The town was closely besieged, but the people 
managed to send an embassy to Rome to beg for help. The 
Romans were ready enough to exercise a protectorate in Magna 
Graecia; and in 282 the consul C. Fabricius Luscinus was 
despatched to the relief of Thurii. He conquered the Lucani in 
a great battle, took their camp, and placed a Roman garrison 
in the town. This was offence enough in the eyes of the 
Tarentines, who regarded themselves as the natural protectors of 
Greek towns, and the appeal to Rome as treason to the Hellenic 
cause. But this was not all. Besides the army under Fabricius, 
a fleet of ten ships under the duovir L. Valerius had been 
despatched also, which visited the Greek towns on the coast, and 
eventually appeared in the harbour of Tarentum itself. 

It seems scarcely possible to believe that the visit of these 
ships was purely one of curiosity, as the Romans afterwards, 
contended. We know that there was a Romanising party within 
the city ; and it seems natural that the intention was to lend 
support to it against the more democratic and patriotic portion of the 
population. At any rate that seems to have been the interpretation 
immediately adopted. On the motion of one Philochares, who is 
represented as a man of vile character, a fleet at once put to sea. 
Four of the Roman ships were sunk, and one was taken with all 
hands, L. Valerius himself being killed. Moreover a force was sent 
by land to Thurii, to punish that town for its appeal to Rome. 
Some of the leading citizens responsible for it were banished and 
their property confiscated, and the Roman garrison was expelled. 

The action of the popular party of Tarentum may perhaps be 
justified by the law of nations, if the Roman ships were in the harbour 
for a pohtical purpose, and if the treaty was still in force ; but it 
inevitably involved a war with Rome, and unless the Tarentines 
were prepared for that, it was in the highest degree unwise. The 
Romans, however, were still too deeply involved in other struggles 
to be willing to engage in a new one at once. The consul Q. 
Aemilius Papus was despatched with an army into Samnium, but an 
embassy only was sent to Tarentum, headed by Lucius Postumius, 

1 Our only authority for the treaty is Appian {Samn. 7). He calls it an 
"ancient treaty" {-KoXaiaX avvQr^Kai). This hardly accords with the theory 
generally held, which places it in 304 or 303. It may possibly, as indicated in 
the text, have been made when the revival of interest in naval affairs occurred in 
Rome, and diwviri na-rales were appointed, i.e. about 310; but it may also 
possibly have been very much earlier. 



XIV ROMAN ENVOYS AT TARENTUM i8i 

demanding " the return of the prisoners taken on the ship ; the 
restoration and indemnification of the men banished from Thurii ; 
and, finally, the surrender of the Tarentine statesmen responsible for 
the outrage on the Roman ships." The demands, though not un- 
reasonable, were such as Tarentum could not grant if she meant to 
maintain her position among the other Greek states ; and yet they 
were such that their rejection must necessarily mean war with 
Rome. 

The rejection was determined upon, and made more offensive by Scene in 
the scene in the assembly when it was confirmed. The Roman ih^heatrc 
ambassadors appeared in the theatre, clothed in their senatorial ^^^^^ 
robes, and delivered their message. But the volatile Hellenes 
laughed at their bad Greek and their purple -fringed togas, and 
burst nito furious exclamations at their threatening tone. Finally 
when a certain Philonides, by a disgusting act of contempt, befouled 
the toga of Postumius, the insult was greeted by clapping of hands, 
loud laughter, and applauding cries. Postumius, holding up the be- 
spattered garment, cried sternly, " Laugh on ! You will weep when 
this toga is cleansed with blood." 

The news of this insult was reported at Rome by the returning 281. 
ambassadors shortly after the entrance upon office of the consuls of Coss. L. 
the next year. War wa,s at once decided upon ; but the time for ^^^^^^^J 
beginning it was still a matter of discussion. At length L. Aemilius q Marcius 
Barbula, who had been destined for Samnium, was ordered to go Philippus. 
to Tarentum instead. He was not, however, to commence warlike 
operations at once ; but was to offer an ultimatum. Let the Taren- Roman 
tines accede to the demands of the ambassadors and peace might ulti- 
be made. The sight of the Roman legions in their territory had a ''^«^"^'- 
sobering effect on the Tarentines. They hesitated and seemed 
inclined to give in. But the popular party had one last card to play. 
Whilst Aemilius Barbula was still waiting for a reply to his ulti- 
matum, they succeeded in carrying a resolution to invite the help of invitation 
Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, whom they had themselves once aided by to Pyrrhus. 
a fleet. When Aemilius learnt that messengers had been sent to 
Pyrrhus, he at once began plundering the country round the Roman 
camp. The Tarentines sent out some troops and made a faint 
attempt to stop his ravages, but appear not to have been able to face 
the Roman legions. 

The Romanising party in the town for the moment got the upper Pyrrhus 
hand in the assembly ; and Agis, the leading member of it, was will come. 
elected dictator. He would probably soon have made terms with 
\ Aemilius : but he had not been many days in office when news 
arrived that Pyrrhus had accepted the invitation of the Tarentines, 
and promised to come shortly to their aid. The promise was con- 



i82 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xiv 

veyed by his favourite friend and minister Cineas, and produced an 
immediate revulsion of feeling. Negotiations with Aemilius were 
broken off, Agis deposed, and one of the members of the deputation 
to Pyrrhus elected in his stead. 

Arrival of Before long, as an earnest of the good faith of the king, some 

Mtlofrom troops arrived under Milo, who occupied the citadel, and undertook 
pirus. ^^ guard the town walls. The Tarentines, delighted to be saved all 
trouble, willingly supplied these men with provisions and pay. 
Aemilius, who was not in sufficient force to attack the town, and did 
not wish to winter in the country, retired northwards through Apulia, 
the Tarentines making an unsuccessful attempt to intercept his 
march. He was considered worthy of a triumph over the Tarentines 
and Salentini, as well as for his successes in Samnium. 

Arrival of Before the next spring (280) Pyrrhus arrived in person, and the 

Tarentines soon found that all was not to be so easy and delightful 
as they expected, and that King Stork had come indeed. They had 
an opportunity of appreciating the pantomime of Meton, who, after 
vainly speaking against the invitation to Pyrrhus, when the vote was 
passed, appeared in the assembly crowned with flowers and accom- 
panied by music and all the signs of revelry, and explained that it 
was well to enjoy themselves at once, for when Pyrrhus came they 
would all be slaves. 

Hopes in Y^vW at first all was confidence and jubilation. The invincible 

yrrtus. Pyn'hus would hurl back the legions of the haughty Republic of the 
Tiber, that ventured to dictate to free Greeks, and maybe would 
himself dictate his terms on the Capitol. 

The x\UTHORiTiES are mostly fragmentary. For the Gallic wars the best is 
Polybius ii. 19; cf Eutropius ii. 6; Livy, Ep. xi. -xii. For the south Italian 
affairs Dio, fr. 37-39 ; Appian, Sanni. 7 ; Dionysius Hal. xvii. 7 ; Valerius Max. 
i. 8, 6 ; Pausanias i. xi.-xii. ; Diodorus Siculus xx. 104, 105 ; Zonaras viii. 2. 



Pvrrhiis 
280. 



CHAPTER XV 



PYRRHUS 








COLONIES 






CENSUS 


Posidonia (Paestum) in Lucania 


B.C. 273 


B.C. 


280 


. 278,222 


Cosa in Etruria 


B.C. 273 


B.C. 


275 


. 271,224 


Ariminum in the agcr Gal lie us . 


B.C. 268 


B.C. 


265 


292,224 


Beneventum in Samniuni . 


B.C. 268 








Firmum in Picenum 


B.C. 264 








Aesernia in Samniuni 


B.C. 263 









Early life of Pyrrhus — He comes to Tarentum — Message to the Roman consul 
— Battles of Pandosia (Heraclea), Asculum (280-279)— State of Sicily — 
Pyrrhus goes to Syracuse — Attacks the Mamertines and Carthaginians : takes 
Agrigentum, Panormus, Hercte, and other towns — Besieges Lilybaeum un- 
successfully—Recalled to Italy (278-275) — Battle of Beneventum (275)— 
Pyrrhus retires to Tarentum and returns to Epirus (274) — The Romans take 
Tarentum and Rhegium : subdue Lucania, Bruttium, and Calabria, and the 
I Picentines, and become supreme in Italy (274-265). 

I A MORE than usual interest attaches to the prince who now came Early 
I to Italy in answer to the appeal of the Tarentines. He was not only a career of 
[gallant soldier distinguished for personal prowess in the field. He Py^^'h^^^- 
I was also a skilled tactician, had written a treatise on the military art, '^ ^ 
{ and had introduced great improvements in the method of encamp- 
ment. He had enlarged his own kingdom of Epirus, and for a time 
(had shared that of Macedonia with a rival. A certain generosity 
land humanity distinguished him fevourably among the princes and 
j generals of his time, and left feelings of liking and respect even among 
!his enemies. He was long remembered in Rome as a noble foe 

I against whom no rancour could be felt, and of whom no memory of 
bitterness remained. From his earliest years a certain halo of 
romance surrounded him. His father Aeacides lost his life in battle 
,with the Macedonian Cassander in 313; and the little Pyrrhus, 
about five years old, was saved from his father's enemies, and the 
partisans of his uncle Alcetas, by faithful slaves and nurses, who 



[84 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 



conveyed him to the house of Glaucias, king of the -Illyrians. 
When Glaucias hesitated to entertain the child, for whose life 
Cassander would gladly have paid a large sum, the little fellow 
crept along the ground to the king, and pulling himself up by his 
robe stood at his knees looking up into his face. Glaucias could not 
resist the appeal : gave the child to his wife to bring up ; refused to 
surrender him ; and, when he was still a boy of about twelve, restored 
him to his kingdom (306). From that time to his death in 272 he 
was nominally king of Epirus, a title which his father's cousin 
Alexander had first adopted from the humbler one of king of the 
Molossi. But he did not reign all that time. When he was 
about seventeen he was driven out by his enemies, and fled first 
to Demetrius Poliorcetes, in whose company he fought at the 
battle of Ipsus (301), and afterwards to Egypt, where Ptolemy 
entertained him nobly, and gave him his stepdaughter as a wife. 
Returning to Epirus about 296 he reigned for a short time in 
conjunction with his second cousin Neoptolemus. His life having 
been attempted by Neoptolemus, he caused him to be put to 
death, and thenceforth reigned alone.i He added Corcyra and 
the territory on the Ambracian gulf to his dominions, and trans- 
ferred the seat of government from the old capital Passaron to 
Ambracia. From 287 for about two years he shared the kingdom of 
Macedonia with Lysimachus, but had been then compelled to 
relinquish his hold upon it and confine himself to his ancestral 
kingdom of Epirus. 
Pvrrhus is When the invitation from Tarentum came to him, he was there- 

iiivitcd to fQj-g for the time not engaged in any great undertakings outside his 
Italy, 2S1. ^^^^ kingdom. He was about thirty-eight years old, still vigorous 
and eager for distinction, still ambitious of conquest. Like his 
predecessor Alexander he readily caught at the chance of gaining 

1 The following table will show Pyrrhus's connexion with the persons here 
mentioned : — 

Alcetas I., king of the Molossi 

ob. after B.C. 373 

I 



Neoptolemus I. Thrasybas (or Arrhybas or Arymbas). 

ob. 360. 

Alexander Olympias . Alcetas II. Aeacides = Phtheia 



ob. in Italy abt. 331 mother of Alexander disinherited by his o h. 313 

first called himself king the Great. father, but succeeded I j | 

of Epirus. his brother in B.C. 313 | | | _ 

I ob. 307. Pyrrhus Troias Deidameia 

Neoptolemus II. b. 318, ob. 272. 

(reigned jointly with 
Pyrrhus for a short 
time, 296). 



XV ARRIVAL OF PYRRHUS 185 

distinction in the West ; of conquering Italy, Sicily, and Africa, and 
so realising Alexander's dream of a great Western Empire ; and 
returning perhaps with all its vast resources at his back to once more 
establish his power in Macedonia. The Tarentines had formerly 
helped him when he was struggling with Agathocles in Corcyra ; 
and their invitation was now backed by other Greek states in 
Italy also. 

He was so eager that he had not the patience to await the pyrrhus 
usual season for sailing, but started before the winter was over, dn-ivcs at 
Consequently he was caught in a great storm, which scattered his ^■t^^^rcntum 
ships and drove him ashore on the coasts of the Messapii. He '''^.''''^^' ^" 
made his way however on foot to Tarentum with such of his forces, 'J'^^^ p 
including two elephants, as had reached land with him, and there Valerius 
the greater part of the expedition eventually rejoined him. He Laevinus, 
immediately began training the inhabitants for the serious business Tit.Cor- 
which they had taken in hand. He closed the gymnasia, the theatre, '"'''''''''''■ 
and the covered walks, diminished the number of festivals and banquets, 
and compelled the citizens of military age to give in their names for 
service and submit to drill and discipline. But though there was 
already a military class in Tarentum, which did some service in the 
ensuing years, Pyrrhus did not find the inhabitants answer cheerfully 
to his call. There were loud complaints of the conduct of the 
garrison which he had sent in advance ; and now that the king called 
upon the citizens to serve, as many as could slipped away from the 
town, and those who could not do so, or were forced by him to 
remain, grumbled at the contributions demanded of them, and at the 
billeting of soldiers in their houses. The promised contingents 
from the other towns had not come in, and the Tarentines had not 
yet made up their minds that they must themselves fight, as well as the 
prince who had come to save them the trouble, when news arrived 
that the Roman consul Valerius Laevinus was on his march towards The 
Tarentum, wasting the country of the Lucani as he came. Pyrrhus Romans 
got rid of some of the leaders of the discontented party by sending ^^nder 
them under various pretexts to Epirus, or by discrediting them in the ^jf^^^""^^ 
eyes of the people ; but he never entirely silenced the opposition, towards 
nor prevented some from putting themselves under the protection Tarentum. 
of the Romans. 

The news of the king's arrival had meanwhile been the signal 
for active preparations at Rome. Legions were enrolled, money 
collected, and guards placed in all towns where disloyalty was 
suspected. Some leading citizens at Praeneste were even compelled 
to come to Rome, and were there kept in ward. As soon as his Laevinus 
army was ready Laevinus started on his march. He was anxious "^ ^«- 
to fight as far as possible from Rome ; and at the same time to 



.am a. 



[86 HISTORY OF ROME 



prevent the Lucanians from furnishing contingents to the army of 
Pyrrhus. He therefore marched far to the south of the direct road 
to Tarentum, and entered Lucania, wasting the country as he 
advanced, preventing aid being sent to Tarentum, and securmg 
his retreat by a strongly-fortified position on his rear. When he 
had reached the bank of the Siris he was met by a despatch from 
Pyrrhus, in which he declared that he meditated no attack upon 
Rome, but was acting solely as protector of Tarentum : " Hearing 
that Laevinus was marching against Tarentum with an army, he 
bade him dismiss his troops, and come to Tarentum with a small 
company. He would arbitrate between the two states." Laevinus 
answered that, before acting as arbitrator between the Romans and 
Tarentines, he must account to the Romans for having himself crossed 
to Italy : and having caught some spies of the king near his camp, he 
ordered them to be shown the army in all its strength and to take 
back a report to their master. 
Battle of Pyrrhus still hesitated. The allies had not come in, for Laevmus 

Pandosia j^ Lucania was generally able to prevent them ; while his colleague 
{or Hera- Co^uncanius was quelling all disaffection in Etruria and conquering 
'sTrisVso the Volsinienses. The king hoped that delay would be more fatal 
to Laevinus than to himself ; for while the Romans were m a country 
in great part hostile, where supplies must in time fall short, he had 
a large town on the sea to depend on and plenty of ships to bring 
provisions. Laevinus was of the same opinion, and was therefore 
eager to engage. Pyrrhus, in spite of his desire to postpone the 
encounter, could not do so. If he shrank from meeting the Romans 
in the field, his prestige among the Italiots would quickly disappear ; 
they would in all directions make their peace with Rome, and be 
less ready than ever to join him. He therefore led out his army 
to the Siris, making his headquarters between Pandosia and 
Heraclea. Across the stream he could see the Roman camp : 
their guards carefully posted, or the men drawn up in battle array. 
" This order of the Barbarians," he said, " is far from barbarous : 
what they can do we shall soon know." He wished to wait for the 
allies. But the Roman commander forced on a battle. Sendmg 
his cavalry higher up the stream that they might cross it and get 
on the rear of the enemy, he tried to force a passage with his infantry 
in the neighbourhood of his camp, in face of the pickets of the enemy. 
This movement failed at first : but when the Roman cavalry had 
succeeded in coming in contact with the Greeks, Laevinus took 
advantage of the confusion, and successfully accomplished the 
passage of the stream. The two armies being thus at close quarters 
a furious struggle ensued, which lasted many hours and was long 
undecided, each host in turn giving way and then recovering 



XV BATTLE OF HERACLEA 187 

its ground. Pyrrhus himself had a horse killed under him. One 
of his officers named Megacles, who was disguised in the royal 
armour, was killed, and his helmet and cloak borne off in triumph 
to the Roman general to prove the death of the king, — a triumph 
soon dashed when Pyrrhus himself with bared head rode to the front. 
The day was finally won for the Greeks by a charge of elephants, The 
of which Pyrrhus had brought twenty with him.^ The novel appear- elephants 
ance of these huge beasts, the towers on their backs filled with armed ^:^fjj. 
men, and their loud trumpeting, frightened the men, and still more 280. 
the horses, who threw their riders and galloped madly away. The 
elephants trampled to death some of the fallen, and the Thessalian 
cavalry dashed in pursuit of the flying legionaries. Elephants how- 
ever seldom did harm to the enemy only. One of them being 
wounded grew wild and made the others unmanageable ; and in the 
confusion thus caused the main body of the Romans escaped across 
the Siris. The losses on both sides were heavy. As usual different 
totals were named : but the story was told that Pyrrhus replied to 
those who congratulated him, " One more victory like this, and I 
shall be ruined." And again, that the valour of the Roman soldiers 
and the sight of their dead bodies, fallen on their own ground, and 
with their wounds all in front, so impressed him that he exclaimed, 
" Had I been king of -the Romans I should have conquered the 
world ! " 

The immediate effect of the victory was to establish the prestige Effects of 
of Pyrrhus in Italy, and to attract numerous adhesions from the t^^^ battle. 
Lucanians and Samnites. He treated these tardy recruits gener- 
ously, lightly rebuking their delay, but giving them a share in the 
spoils ; being in fact pleased to have beaten a Roman army without 
them. 

Laevinus retreated upon Capua, where he was reinforced by 
fresh troops from Rome, while his colleague Coruncanius was sum- 
moned from Etruria, and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus was named 
dictator to command the troops levied to protect the city, now in 
a state of considerable alarm. For not only had the victory of Mntivy at 
Pyrrhus encouraged the Lucanians and Samnites to rebel, but a ^"■^^"'^"• 
garrison of their own, consisting of 4000 Campanian aUies under 
Decius Jubellius, placed in Rhegium the year before by Fabricius at 
the request of the people of Rhegium themselves, had mutinied. 
Under the pretext of discovering treasonable correspondence with 
Pyrrhus, they expelled or put to death some of the leading citizens, 
and seized on the city and its territory for their own. They made 

^ Hence the name of bos lucana " Lucanian cow" for an elephant. The 
Romans having first seen them in this battle in Lucania (Lucr. v. 1302 ; Varro 
L. L. 7139 ; Phny N. H. viii. 16). 



i88 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

terms with the Mamertines of Messene ; and for the rest of the war 

Rhegium was lost to the Romans : for these men, though not joining 

Pyrrhus, could look for nothing but condign punishment if the 

Romans were successful. 

Pyrrhus Pyrrhus tried in vain to seize Capua before Valerius reached it. 

fails to take Baffled there he moved upon Neapolis. Failing to take that town 

Capua and j^^ j^^ meditated making his way through the territories of the 

Neapohs. , , , ' . . t • • j a • t- • j i • 

Mission of Volscians, Hernici, and Aequi to Ltruria and attackmg Rome 

Cineas to from the north. But before trying this he sent Cineas to Rome to 
Rome, 280. offer terms. They were those of a conqueror. The Greek cities 
were to be free, and all that had been taken from the Lucanians, 
Samnitcs, Daunians, and Bruttians was to be restored, in return for 
which Pyrrhus would give back Roman prisoners without ransom. 
Cineas took with him to Rome rich presents for the leading men and 
their wives. According to one account they were unanimously declined : 
according to another he was warmly received in Roman society, and 
secured many adherents before he ventured to solicit an audience 
of the Senate. So great was the difficulty of the situation felt to be, 
that a large number of the fathers seemed inclined to yield to his 
demands, or at any rate to allow Pyrrhus to come to Rome in person 
to urge them. But Appius Claudius, now old and blind, hearing 
of this wavering in the Senate, caused himself to be carried into the 
Speech of Senate-house, surrounded by his sons and sons-in-law, and delivered 
Appius^ an impassioned speech, — the earliest Roman oration preserved in 
Claudius writing that existed in Cicero's time. " He had never before," he 
said, " been glad of his blindness : but now he could wish that he 
had been deaf also, that he might not hear their decrees which 
would destroy the glory of Rome. They had been used to boast that, 
if Alexander had come to Italy, his fame for invincibility would have 
been at an end : yet they were going to yield to a mean Epirot, the 
hanger-on of one of Alexander's field officers, who was in Italy 
because he could not maintain himself in Greece, and whose power 
had not sufficed to retain even a portion of Macedonia. If Pyrrhus, 
so far from being punished, were actually rewarded for his pre- 
sumption, they would not have freed themselves of him, they would 
only have brought upon themselves the Tarentines and Samnites, who 
would justly despise them." The old man's indignant eloquence had 
its due effect : Cineas was dismissed with the answer that, if Pyrrhus 
desired peace, he must quit Italy ; if he stayed, the Romans would 
continue the war, though he should defeat a thousand such as 
Laevinus.^ 

1 Cineas's mission is thus placed by Plutarch and Appian. Zonaras places it 
after the return of Pyrrhus to Tarentum and the visit of Fabricius and his 



XV PYRRHUS IN LATIUM AND CAMPANIA 



us 



Diplomacy having failed, Pyrrhus determined to advance upon Pyrrh 
Rome. As he marched through the country however he found him- a^i'^'^nces 
self continually among enemies. No one joined him : and though he y'^J"^-^ 
took Fregellae and Anagnia, and even, as it is stated, advanced as 280. 
far as Praeneste, only twenty-three miles from Rome, he found no 
signs of yielding. Laevinus was dogging his footsteps behind : the 
dictator Domitius was prepared for him in Rome : and he now learnt 
that the consul Coruncanius had by his conquest of the Volsinienses, 
and other measures, secured the loyalty of the Etruscans. He turned 
back to Campania, still followed by Laevinus, who would not give 
him battle, but harassed his rear. " The Roman legions grow like 
slain hydras," he exclaimed ; and after vainly trying to strike terror 
in the enemy by various military demonstrations, he put his troops 
into winter quarters and retired to Tarentum. 

He w^as visited there by ambassadors headed by C. Fabricius Mission of 
Luscinus. The king received them wqth great ceremony, and enter- ^''^bruius 
tained them royally, paying special honour to Fabricius. He expected ^^^^ 
that they had come to signify the acceptance of the terms which he 280-2^^. 
had offered by Cineas. When he found, to his disappointment, that 
they had only come to negotiate a return of Roman prisoners, he 
doubted what course to take. Some of his officers advised him to offer 
no more terms and give back no prisoners. Cineas like a true Greek 
of the Macedonian period (he had been a hearer of Demosthenes) 
advised conciliation and, alcove all, bribery. This plan Pyrrhus now- 
adopted : he offered splendid presents to the ambassadors, if they 
would undertake to advise acceptance of his terms at Rome. But 
whether he met with any success or no in the case of the other two, 
Q. Aemilius Papus and P. Cornelius Dolabella, he found Fabricius 
I deaf to all his offers. " If I ami base," said Fabricius, according to Stories of 
I the famous story, "how can I be worth a bribe? if honest, how Fabricius. 
I can you expect me to take one ? " Baffled by his integrity Pyrrhus 
'tried to work on his fears. Next day while they were conversing, 
(he ordered an elephant to be placed behind a curtain. At a signal 
jfrom the king the curtain was let down, and the animal raised his 
trunk over the head of Fabricius and trumpeted. The Roman, with- 
jout flinching, said quietly, "The beast cannot move me to-day more 
(than your gold yesterday." But though Pyrrhus could not get his 

!way, he still from policy, or from goodwill to Fabricius, tried to 
conciliate the Romans by his kind treatment of his prisoners. Accord- 
ing to some he allowed them to return to Rome on their parole to 

'colleagues to him there. Plutarch, however, differs from Appian in his account 

I of the terms offered by Cineas. According to Plutarch he demanded freedom 
for the Greek towns, and offered in that case to assist Rome against the other 
ItaHans. 



190 



HISTORY OF ROME 



279- 
Coss. P. 
Sulpicins 
Saven-io, 
P. Decius 
Mils. 

The 
consuls 
advance to 
Asculum. 



Victory of 
Pyrrhus at 
Asculum, 
279- 



attend the Saturnalia, according to o'thers he released them altogether 
without ransom. 

Whatever may be the details of these transactions, it became 
clear before the spring that the war was to go on. The Romans had 
shown no signs of panic. They had not relaxed the severity of their 
customs towards returned prisoners, however released, who were 
reduced in rank, told off to distant garrison duty, and treated 
as men under a cloud. The Republic had no lack of soldiers. 
With the spring the consuls started for Apulia. They marched 
to Malventum (Beneventum), and there left the main road leading 
to Tarentum, and took that which branched off to Canusium. 
About thirty miles short of that town, they came upon the army 
of Pyrrhus, encamped near Asculum. He had been engaged in 
securing the submission of Apulian towns, and was now in position 
on the south bank of a considerable stream. For many days the 
armies faced each other on either side of it ; and, while they 
were thus stationed, the story was afterwards told that a rumour 
reached Pyrrhus that Decius, in imitation of his father and grand- 
father, meant to "devote" himself and the enemy's legions to the 
infernal gods ; and that Pyrrhus sent him word that he had given 
orders that he should not be killed, but that, if he took him prisoner, 
he would put him to death with torture : and again, that the Romans 
offered to leave it to Pyrrhus to decide which army should cross the 
stream to meet the other, saying that, if he would come to them, they 
would retire to allow his army to cross unopposed. Such tales, what- 
ever may be their origin, do not help us to understand the battle 
which followed. It seems that in it the Romans occupied a position 
at the foot of the hills, in which was a high valley watered by a 
stream, now called the Carapella, and that this high ground saved them 
from destruction. To resist the elephants, they had prepared waggons 
with spikes fixed on them, and filled with javelin throwers. But 
Pyrrhus baffled this precaution by directing his elephants to another 
part of the field, and so turned to flight what seemed at first the 
victorious Roman line. The loss on both sides, stated at 6ooo 
Romans and 3505 Greeks, ^ shows that the fighting was long and 
obstinate ; but the Romans were saved by a diversion effected by 
some Apulians, who took the opportunity of looting the camp of 
Pyrrhus. In the confusion thus caused the Romans seem to have 
rallied sufficiently to fight their way back to safe quarters. Pyrrhus 
himself and many of his staff were wounded ; and shortly afterwards 
he retired to Tarentum for medical treatment and proper food. 

1 These numbers are given by Plutarch on the authority of Hieronymus of 
Cardia, a contemporary writer, and of some registers of king Pyrrhus himself: 
they may be therefore regarded as approximately correct. 



XV PYRRHUS INVITED TO SICILY 191 

Though the Romans, therefore, had undoubtedly sustained a Effects 
defeat in the field, it was one qf those defeats which left the victors of the 
almost as badly off as if they had been the losers. The Roman ''l' j"-^ 
army was safely entrenched, and could not be attacked ; the king 
had lost heavily, was encumbered with wounded men, and was 
wounded himself And though the Romans had suffered too severely 
to attempt any forward movement, the victory to Pyrrhus was sterile, 
and nothing more was done by him during that season. 

The Roman army wintered in Apulia, and the new consuls, C. 2^8. 
Fabricius and Q. Aemilius, came early the next year to take over the Coss. C. 
command. Pyrrhus had sent home for fresh supplies of men and l'^'^^\"^^^ 

. J^2lSCt?t24S 

money, expecting to have to renew the war in the spring. But when jj^ q^ 
he heard that Fabricius, for whom he entertained a high respect, was Aemilius 
one of the consuls for the year, he seems to have hoped for some less Pap-us II. 
warlike settlement. This hope Avas raised still higher by an act of 
Fabricius himself One of the most trusted servants of the king, 
taking advantage of negotiations between Tarentum and the Roman 
camp, visited Fabricius, and offered to assassinate Pyrrhus. Dis- 
daining to conquer by such means, Fabricius communicated the fact 
to Pyrrhus, whose generous nature was so moved that he is said to 
have at once released his Roman prisoners without ransom, and to 
have tried once more, by sending Cineas to Rome, to come to terms 
with the Republic. The Senate however proved inexorable. Their 

I answer was still that Pyrrhus must leave Italy ; and meanwhile the 

I Roman armies did not cease to attack all such towns as were in 
alliance with him. 

, Embarrassed by the increasing discontent of the very people to Invitation 

I whose help he had come, and by the growing conviction that he could ^^ Pyrrhus 
not permanently secure a hold on Italy, in face of the opposition of -^^^"^^^ 
Rome, Pyrrhus was ready to catch at any opportunity of retiring from su?nmer 
an impossible position. That opportunity was offered him by an syS. 
invitation from Syracuse and other Sicilian towns to cross to Sicily 
and deliver them from the incompetent rule of their tyrants, from the 
attacks of the Mamertines of Messene, and from the encroachments 

I of the Carthaginians. 

Sicily, like southern Italy, was fringed by Greek colonies, which state of 

j had been founded at various periods from about B.C. 735. When Sicily to 
the Greeks came to the island they found there already certain native ^^p'^'/Jy^^'^f 
Sicani and Siculi, the former said to have been immigrants from 
Iberia, the latter from Italy. These tribes mostly held the central parts, 
while at various spots on the coast, chiefly on the west, Phoenicians 
from Tyre had fixed trading centres, which were being gradually 

] taken up and occupied by the great Phoenician city of Carthage. As 
the Greek cities slowly increased in number and power, the Cartha- 



192 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 

Cartha- 
ginians. 



Defeat of . 
Hamilcar 
by Gelo, 
480. 



Hannibal 
destroys 
Greek cities 
in Sicily, 
410-40'j. 

Rule of 
Dionysius 
the elder, 
405-3^7- 



Himilco s 
victories, 
397- 



Treaty of 
383. The 
Carthagin- 
ian pale 
bounded on 
the east by 
the river 
Halycus. 



ginians retired more and more to the west of the island, but were 
always aiming at the recovery of their lost ground. The same habit 
of constant quarrelling, which proved so ruinous to the cities of 
Greece, followed the Greeks to their Sicilian homes. Yet they were 
compelled to combine to some extent, in order to resist these constant 
encroachments of Carthage ; and this resistance was organised by 
the rulers of Syracuse, the greatest and most powerful of the Greek 
towns, and depended upon her for its effectiveness. 

In 480 a great Carthaginian fleet, under Hamilcar, was conquered 
by Gelo of Syracuse, and the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily were 
confined to the towns of Motye, Panormus, and Soloeis, the original 
Phoenician settlements. In 410 the Carthaginians came again, this 
time on the invitation of the Greek city Egesta, which complained of 
the oppression of Selinus. In answer to this invitation, a fleet and 
army were sent under Hannibal, grandson of Hamilcar, which in that 
year, and in the third year after (407), inflicted ruinous damage upon 
nearly all the Greek towns on the south coast — Selinus, Agrigentum, 
Gela, and Camerina. The Syracusans had reason to fear that they 
would be the next victims. Dionysius who, in the midst of the 
alarm and commotion had made himself tyrant (405), was the one 
man who seemed capable of saving his country. But after all it 
was not he, but a pestilence, which compelled the Carthaginian armies 
to leave Syracuse untaken, and return to Africa. Between 405 and 
397 Dionysius carried the war into the enemy's own dominions, 
attacking and taking many of the Carthaginian settlements in the 
west ; until, in 397, another great Carthaginian army, under Himilco, 
descended upon the island, recovered Motye and Eryx, took Messene, 
and threatened Syracuse itself Once more Syracuse was saved by 
a pestilence. The enemy were so reduced that they were obliged 
to purchase even leave to retire by the sacrifice of their mercenary 
troops. 

But during the next fourteen years they often returned, and 
Dionysius during that time was occupied with little else than the 
repeated struggle to drive them from the island. Finally, in 383, 
an end was put to the struggle by a treaty, whereby the Carthaginians 
were left in possession of all west of the river Halycus. Dionysius 
during the rest of his reign extended the power of Syracuse, and 
interfered in many directions with the Greeks in Sicily and Italy. 
But in the reign of his son (367-344), which was interrupted by two 
periods of deposition (by Dion 356-353, and by Callippus 353-352), 
the Carthaginians again began to appear east of the Halycus, and 
even succeeded in taking the whole of Syracuse, except the island of 
Ortygia (345). From this they were driven by the Theban hero, 
Timoleon, who came to Sicily with the real purpose, which w^as only 



CARTHAGINIANS IN SICILY 



193 



the pretext of Pyrrhus, of putting down the tyranny and checking the Timoleon 
Carthaginians (345-343). Timoleon followed up his success at i^ Sicily, 
Syracuse by deposing the tyrants of Leontini and other towns ; and ■345-33°- 
then, invading the Carthaginian district, he crushed a huge Cartha- Defeat of 
ginian army on the banks of the Crimisus, probably near Segesta, in Cariha- 
340. This victory secured the Greek towns liberty and peace for g^^^'^'^^^ 
many years. Syracuse was now once more a Republic, and Timoleon, Crimisus 
honoured and beloved, lived there as a private citizen till his death j^o. 
in 336. 

The reign of Agathocles, who, some years afterwards (317), rose Agathochs, 
from the humble trade of a potter to be tyrant of Syracuse, was one 3^7--9^- 
long struggle with the Carthaginians, who blockaded him by sea and 
land. By a bold stroke he broke through the blockade, and invaded Agathocles 
the Carthaginian territory in Africa, where he had such success ^jjo-^oj ' 
that hardly any city, except Utica, remained faithful to Carthage 
(310-307). 

But in the period which followed his death (289) not only did At the 
the Carthaginians begin once more steadily to encroach on the Greek death of 
side of the island, but the greatest disorder prevailed among the fu^\f"^ ^^ 
Greek states themselves. Most of them fell again under the power ^l^g^ ^^^^^ 

\ of incompetent tyrants ; and some of Agathocles' own mercenaries Alessenc, 

j from Campania, who called themselves Mamertines (sons of Mamers ^Sg. 
or Mars), instead of returning to their native land, seized on the city ^^^^^^^ 
of Messene, expelled or killed the chief inhabitants, and possessed sicily 
themselves of their lands and houses, their women and children. An 

\ important city was thus de-hellenised, while many of the other Greek 
tyrants admitted Carthaginian garrisons into their cities, and the free 
Greeks were confined almost to the south-east corner of the island. 
Syracuse itself, nominally free, had been held by one military adven- 
turer after another, was torn by internal factions, and was powerless 

j to resist the invading arms of Carthage, whose fleet before long was 

I riding in her harbour. 

i It was in these circumstances that a party in Syracuse sought the Pyrrhus 

assistance of the first soldier of the age, who had married Lanassa, ^^'^{^^^ ^^ 

11 ri-i -A^, T^i Sicily, 27S. 

\ a daughter of their late sovereign Agathocles. Pyrrhus was to come 
I for the threefold purpose of restoring order throughout Sicily by 
I putting down the tyrants, of punishing the Mamertines, and of driv- 
I ing back the Carthaginians. His affairs in Italy were in such a 

position that he gladly accepted the task. 

The Carthaginians had expected or feared that this would be the The Car- 

case, and had early in this year sent ships to the Tiber conveying thagtnians 
] ambassadors, with a proposition for a defensive alliance with Rome, /^ 

offering " to give aid to the Romans by sea, if need arose, though Rome for 

the crews of the ships should not be obliged to serve on land." In mutual aid 

^ at sea. 



194 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Pyrrhus 
starts for 
Sicily, late 
sum7ner of 
278. 



Pyrrhus at 

Syracuse, 

27S-277. 



Pyrrhics 
(/) coti- 
qjiers the 
Ma?ner- 
tines, {2) 
attacks tin- 
Carthagi)! 
ian toiuns, 
277. 



case of war, " the Carthaginians should supply ships, and each 
nation its own men and their pay." The offer was accepted, and 
accordingly the Carthaginian fleet was ordered to intercept Pyrrhus 
on his voyage from Tarentum to Syracuse. 

It did not however succeed. Leaving Milo in command at 
Tarentum in the late summer of 278, Pyrrhus coasted down the 
Italian shore, touched at Locri, which was in the hands of a garrison 
of his own, and thence sailed straight to Sicily. At first all went 
well. When he arrived at Tauromenium (Naxos), the ruler of that 
town, Tyndarion, made an alliance with him, and supplied him with 
soldiers. At Catana, where he disembarked his land forces, he 
was received with an ovation, and presented with crowns of gold ; 
and when his fleet approached the harbour of Syracuse the Cartha- 
ginians did not venture to oppose him. Perhaps they had not 
expected him so soon ; for their squadron was not in its full force, 
thirty of their ships having been despatched for supplies. He 
therefore entered the harbour and landed at Syracuse in perfect 
security. 

He found a miserable state of division prevailing there. The 
part of the town which stood on the island Ortygia was held by one 
officer, named Thoenon ; while Sosistrates of Agrigentum, with more 
than 10,000 soldiers, occupied the rest; and Carthaginian ships 
were in the harbour. The coming of Pyrrhus restored some unity. 
Thoenon first quietly surrendered Ortygia to him : and Sosistrates 
voluntarily, or under pressure from the citizens, made terms with 
him also. The king succeeded in reconciling for a time these two 
men and their followings, and the whole of their resources were 
placed at his disposal. 

He had now a large army, vast supplies of war material, and a 
fleet of more than 200 vessels. Leontini and many other Greek 
cities signified their adhesion. The goal of his ambition seemed 
within his reach : lord of Epirus and Sicily, he might next attempt 
Africa, and return with irresistible force to drive the Romans from 
southern Italy. But first the Mamertines had to be suppressed, and 
the Carthaginians driven off Before the end of the next year (277) 
he had a series of successes : he cut off the plundering parties of the 
Mamertines, conquered their main army in the field, and captured 
several of their outlying forts. He then turned his arms against 
the Carthaginians. The great city of Agrigentum, with its thirty 
dependent townships, was handed over to him by Sosistrates, and its 
Carthaginian garrison was expelled. But he determined to be satis- 
fied with nothing less than the entire evacuation of the island by the 
Carthaginians. With an army swollen by a contingent of 8000 from 
Agrigentum, and accompanied by a great siege-train from Syracuse, 



PYRRHUS TAKES TOWNS IN SICILY 195 



he took Eryx by assault, displaying the most conspicuous gallantry 
in the action, inflicted a crushing loss upon the Carthaginian garri- 
son, and placed one of his own in it. Thence he went to Hercte, 
which he seized ; stormed Panormus ; and overran and conquered 
nearly the whole of the Carthaginian territory. One place alone held 
out. When the Carthaginians had been driven from Motye by 
Dionysius, they had fortified themselves at Lilybaeum, which had Lilvbaeum 
grown to be an important town, protected by a high wall and a deep 277. 
ditch on the land side, and by lagoons towards the sea through which 
it was difficult to steer. Some thirty-five years later it proved strong 
enough to resist the utmost exertions of several Roman armies, and 
now it defied all the engines of Pyrrhus, and all the gallantry of his 
soldiers. His failure, and the time wasted upon it, proved the ruin 
of his position in Sicily. On his return to Syracuse he found Pyrrhus 
everything going wrong, and Thoenon and Sosistrates both plotting ^"''' 
against him. Sosistrates, finding himself suspected, escaped ; but ^'Pf'^-'^y 
, Thoenon he put to death. Yet it was not only in Syracuse that '277-276I 
\ there was a feeling of discontent. In the Greek cities throughout 
j Sicily murmurs were heard that he had become a mere tyrant ; that 
1 he granted property to his friends ; put his inferior officers in every 
, post of profit ; and that his courtiers, appointed to act as judges, 
I looked to nothing but gain. He could not therefore safelv carry out 
I his design of imitating Agathocles in crossing to Africa and attacking 
j Carthage at home, with the certainty that, as soon as he was out of 
I Sicily, the divisions between the Greek towns would break out again, 
land give an opening for Carthaginian aggression. Already the 
i Carthaginians, taking advantage of his growing unpopularity, were 
I renewing their attacks from Lilybaeum. He might, in case of failure 
'in Africa, find himself cut off from return to Europe. 

The result of the difficulties thickening round him, in the latter Pyrrhus 
Ipart of 276, was that he resolved to listen to a request, which reached ^"^^''^'"^ *o 
jhim from Samnium and Tarentum, to come back to their aid in view ^^''^^'' ^'^^' 
of the alarming successes of the Romans. "What a fighting ground 
jfor Roman and Carthaginian am I leaving," he exclaimed, as his 
jship left the shore of Sicily. 

I While Pyrrhus was thus spending between two and three years The 
in his fruitless Sicilian expedition, the Romans had not been idle, ^^fnans 
Pyrrhus had left orders with his lieutenant Milo to act on the ''' f"^"^ 
defensive, and not risk a battle. Fabricius and Aemilius however /^/' ^' 
did not think of attacking Tarentum. That might be safely left to 
the future. As soon as they were informed of the king's departure, 
jthey descended upon the cities of Lucania and Bruttium, which had 
allied themselves with him, and by their successes earned the right 
to enter Rome in triumph in December. 



196 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



277. 
Coss. P. 
Cornelius 
RufinusII.^ 
C. Jiinius 
Brutus 
Bubulcus 
II. 



276. 

Q. Fabius 

Alaxitnus 

II., C. 

Gen uchis 

Clepsina. 

Pyrrhus 

returns to 

Italy. 



27S- 

Coss. M . 
Curitis 
Dentatus, 
L. Cor- 
nelius 
Lentulus. 



Un- 
willingness 
of the 
Romans to 
enlist. 



The consuls of the next year were sent to punish the Samnites 
for their warhke preparations, and for the assistance given to Pyrrhus. 
But the Roman arms met with some disaster. The Samnites 
retreated into the mountains, and CorneHus and Junius in following 
them got entangled in the difficulties of the ground, and lost heavily 
by the attacks of the enemy, who were better acquainted with the 
country. They were obliged to retire as best they could to the south, 
and separated with mutual recriminations. Cornelius then employed 
himself in laying waste the plains of Samnium ; while Junius entered 
Lucania and gained sufficient successes over the Lucanians and 
Bruttians to earn his triumph.-^ 

These expeditions were continued in the next year by the consuls 
O. Fabius and Gains Genucius. The details are lost ; but triumphs 
over Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians are again recorded, and 
the general success of the Roman arms is attested by the urgent 
messages that were sent over to Pyrrhus. 

His return checked the tide of success. The Romans could no 
longer expect to go from point to point almost without resistance, 
winning one town after another by force or fear. They must now 
look to being met by the Epirote troops from Tarentum, led by the 
famous soldier-king who had twice worsted them in the field. Pyrrhus 
indeed had not returned without suffering loss and damage. The 
Carthaginian fleet had pursued him and destroyed some of his ships : 
the Mamertines had sent a contingent across to Rhegium, which 
repulsed his attack on that town : and though he succeeded in again 
occupying Locri, which the Romans had retaken in his absence, 
and expelling the Roman garrison, yet more of his ships were 
wrecked when they left Locri for Tarentum — a misfortune which 
the pious attributed to his having plundered the temple of Demeter 
there, and carried off its wealth. Still he himself and most of his 
army arrived safely by land : and these forces, joined to those 
waiting for him at Tarentum, enabled him to start almost at once 
to the relief of the Samnites, whom repeated reverses had so 
dismayed that he found them, after all, far from eager to join his 
standard. 

Meanwhile at Rome the hardships of the war in the mountainous 
district of Samnium, or the terror of the name of Pyrrhus, made the 
service so much an object of dislike that the new consuls found a 
difficulty in raising their legions. Instead of a rush of volunteers 
making the exercise of the consul's authority unnecessary, all hung 
back, and tried to avoid giving in their names. It was not until the 

1 Zonaras (viii. 6) says that Junius remained in Samnium, and Cornelius went 
against the Lucani ; but the Fasti record the triumph of Junius de Lucaneis et 
Brutteis. The success of neither appears to have been very marked. 



PYRRHUS DEFEATED IN ITALY 197 



consul Dentatus, having directed the names of a tribe to be called over, 
ordered the property of one of its members who did not answer, and 
eventually the man himself, to be sold, that the reluctance was over- 
come. When at last the legions were ready, Dentatus marched 
along the Appian Way to Malventum, while his colleague L. Cornelius 
went southward into Lucania. Dentatus entrenched himself strongly 
near Malventum ; and before long Pyrrhus marching from Tarentum, 
along what was afterwards an extension of the Appian Way, found his 
enemy there, and himself fortified a camp not far off. The accounts Battle of 
which we possess of the battle which ensued are very meagre. At Malventum 
Heraclea Pyrrhus had owed his victory greatly to his elephants ; at {^^^even- 
• Malventum the elephants seem to have contributed to his defeat. ' A ^''"'''' ^'^^• 
young animal, being wounded, rushed among the rest seeking its 
mother, and threw them all into confusion, so that they became more 
dangerous to their own side than to the enemy. Dentatus too had 
learnt that the terrible phalanx, that is, men massed sixteen deep, 
i was useless on bad or uneven ground, and so took care to occupy 
, a position of that sort.i The victory at Heraclea, again, had been 
I gained by the king's own troops, with small admixture of Italians. 
I At Malventum, as at Asculum, his army was more mixed, being 
i arranged in alternate companies of Epirots and Italians, and may 
ithus have proved less effective for united movements.^ One 
(account seems to infer that Pyrrhus attempted a night surprise, 
I but missing his way was overtaken by daylight, and was therefore 
(Observed by the Romans at a distance in time for them to make 
Itheir preparations. Whatever the details of the battle, the result Defeat of 
*was not doubtful. The king was utterly defeated, his camp taken, Pyrrhus. 

-from which the Romans are said to have taken hints in the 
^formation of their own,— and most of his elephants captured and 
i brought to Rome to adorn the consul's triumph. Pyrrhus himself 
jfled with a few horsemen to Tarentum : whence, after a short stay, 
he crossed back to Epirus, to fall two years later by a tile thrown 
%y a woman's hand in Argos, whither he had again gone to fight 
athe battles of others. 

I To the Romans the results of the victory at Malventum were The 
;|liighly important. The prestige of Pyrrhus was destroyed ; when he Romans 
3returned to Tarentum he was only able to retain what remained of '''^'^'^^ 
Royalty there by falsely reporting that Antigonus Gonatas, king of 'jtat 
; Macedonia, had made an alliance with him and had promised to send 
him reinforcements. Without fear of interruption from Tarentum, 
therefore, the Romans were able to go on with their task of steadily 
Reducing the Greek towns, as well as the Italian nations, to obedience, 

1 Frontinus ii. 2, i. 3 Poiyb. xviii. 28. 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Colonies at 

Posidonia 

[Paestum], 

inLucania, 

and Cosa in 

Etruria, 

273- 



Embassy of 
Ptolemy 
P hi la- 
de Iph us to 
Rome, 2T4- 
273- 



Capture of 

Tarentum, 

272. 

Coss. L. 

Papirins 

Cursor II. , 

Sp. Car- 

vilius 

Alaximus 

II. 



Milo sur- 
refiders to 
Papirius. 



In the next two years (274-273) the Samnites, the Lucanians, and the 
Bruttians were subdued in a series of expeditions, which perhaps 
witnessed some disasters as well as successes. But the general 
result was a more and more complete hold of the Republic upon 
southern Italy. The Greek towns were made subject on terms as to 
contributions of men and money differing according to circumstances ;^ 
while a Latin colony was established at Paestum to secure ahold upon 
Lucania, and another sent northwards to Cosa in Etruria,- which 
commanded an important harbour (273). 

Moreover, the victory over Pyrrhus attracted the attention of an 
important sovereign. King Ptolemy Philadelphus, who had succeeded 
to the throne of Egypt the year before, sent an embassy at the end 
of 274 to Rome, desiring friendship, and loaded with gifts the Roman 
envoys who early next year repaired to Egypt bearing the consent 
of the Senate. It was the first acknowledgment of Rome as an im- 
portant power in the Mediterranean, if we except the treaties with 
Carthage ; and Egypt was destined to be of great service to the State 
in the future, both as the richest corn district in the world, and as 
having, like Marseilles, which also had been long inclined to friendship 
with Rome, a quarrel with Carthage in the disputed possession of 
Cyrene. 

The superiority of Rome in the South was now farther secured by 
the capture of Tarentum and Rhegium. 

Pyrrhus left Tarentum early in 274 under the care of Milo, with 
a garrison of Epirots. But Milo soon became exceedingly unpopular, 
and the Romanising faction led by Nicon rose against him, besieged 
him in the citadel, and sought help both from Rome and Carthage. 
The Carthaginians sent a fleet into the harbour, and the Roman 
consul L. Papirius advanced by land. Livy appears to hold that the 
action of the Carthaginians was a breach of their treaty with Rome. 
But they might fairly assert that, on the contrary, they were aiding 
the Romans by sea in accordance with the treaty ; nor do they 
seem to have made any claim to a footing on land when the town 
was in the hands of the Romans. Livy's view is that of a later date, 
when it became necessary to rake up every cause of quarrel with 
Carthage. 2 

Milo held out for a time in the citadel, but finding himself 
blockaded both by sea and land, he determined to surrender, and 
preferring to do so to the Roman Papirius, was allowed to depart with 



^ Thus we find Locri, for instance, which was specially favoured, claiming 
exemption from military service (Polyb. xii. 5). 

^ This seems the more likely ; some however take this to be Cosa near Thurii 
in Lucania. 

^ Livy Ep. xiv. ; cf. Dio Cass. fr. 43. 



XV CArTURE OF MUTINEERS AT RHEGIUM 199 

men and baggage. The Carthaginians sailed away, leaving the town 
in the hands of the Romans, which was compelled to give up arms 
and ships, pull down its walls, and submit to tribute. 

Rhegium still remained to be dealt with. Not only was it Capture 
intolerable that a town commanding the shortest passage to Sicily of the 
should be in the hands of a hostile population ; but the Roman ^^^^^J^*^^'-' 
government was bound to justify itself before its allies, and to show Cam- 
that, if they accepted a Roman garrison, they would be secured against fanians at 
similar acts of treachery. Decius Jubellius and his men had been Rhegium, 
holding the town and its territory as conquerors since 280. They ^2^' ^ 
had even expelled a Roman garrison from Croton, and had made Quintius 
an alliance with the Mamertines, 1000 of whom had come over to Claudius, 
their assistance when Pyrrhus returned to Italy. But on the consul's L.Ge?iucius 
approach these Mamertines, whose object in coming to Italy was to ^/■^""'• 
I harass Pyrrhus, and who had no wish to incur the enmity of Rome, made 
! terms with him and sailed back to Messene. Still, Genucius found 
that he had a long and difficult task before him : the Campanian 
, soldiers resisted desperately, knowing that they had nothing but 
I punishment to expect ; and Genucius would have been in great 
I straits for provisions, had not Hiero, who since Pyrrhus left Sicily 
! had made himself ruler of Syracuse, sent supplies of corn to the 
I besieging army, thereby initiating a policy which, with one brief 
I interval, he maintained throughout his life, — of looking to friendship 
I with Rome as his best protection against Carthaginian and Mamertine 
. alike. Both in the siege and the storm of the town large numbers 
I of the garrison fell fighting desperately; but at length the 300 who 
\ survived surrendered, and were taken by the consul to Rome, where 
!they were flogged and beheaded in the Forum. The old inhabitants 
of the town were restored, which with its territory remained free, 
retaining longer than almost any other Greek town in Italy its 
original Hellenism. 

Thus Rome had become supreme from the north of Etruria to ConsoHda- 
Rhegium. A local outbreak in Samnium, under an escaped Samnite tiou of the 
hostage named Lollius, in 269, was the only movement made by the f^Z^" 
Samnites after their final suppression by Carvifius in 272. The 
pacification of the Bruttii by Papirius (272) had been finally secured 
Iby the fall of Rhegium (271), while the fall of Tarentum had been 
preceded by the submission of the Apulians. In Bruttium the 
Romans acquired a vast tract of forest called Sila, containmg an in- 
exhaustible supply of timber for building ships or houses, which in 
after years would supplement the still finer timber of Latium, and 
which supplied the markets with abundant and valuable resin from 
nts pines. 

Samnium was now farther secured by a colony at Malventum, 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Colonies. 
Beneven- 
tiim [268), 
Aesernia 

Arimitium 

{268), 

Firmutn 

{264). 

Treaty 

with Apol- 

lonia. 



Occupatio7i 
ofBrundis- 
ium, 26']. 



Increase of 
wealth in 
Rome. 



henceforth called Beneventum (268), and later on by another at 
Aesernia (263). In 268 also the Picentes were finally subdued 
and their allegiance secured by a colony at Ariminum (268), while 
some of them were now, or four years later, when a colony was 
sent to Firmum (264), removed to the south-east corner of 
Campania. 

These settlements on the east coast caused perhaps the Illyrians 
of Apollonia to propose a treaty with Rome, as they did about this 
time. And this, in its turn, seems to have suggested to the Romans 
the necessity of securing Calabria, and especially the town of 
Brundisium, with its excellent harbour, the best starting - place 
for the Greek coast. In 267 therefore they turned their arms 
against the Sallentini, to whom the town belonged. They were con- 
quered by the consul M. Atilius ; and though Brundisium appears 
not to have been made a colony till 244, yet a certain number of 
Roman settlers were sent at once, to secure the freedom of the 
port. 

The conquests of the last ten years had also brought great wealth 
to Rome, and now for the first time a silver coinage was used there. 
The silver sestertius (2|- asses) and the denarius (10 asses) were called 
niimmi.^ from the word vofxos., used to indicate coins of about the same 
value in Sicily and the Greek cities in Italy. This influx of wealth 
was not long in taking effect on the public virtue of certain Roman 
magistrates. Curius Dentatus had rejected Samnite gold, and 
Fabricius had turned with scorn from the rich presents of Pyrrhus, 
though a poor man. But when in 275 P. Cornelius Rufinus, 
who had been dictator and twice consul, was struck off the roll 
by the censor Fabricius for breaking the law by owning ten pounds 
of silver plate, his real offence was believed to have been the 
appropriation of some of the spoil of the conquered cities. 

Such derelictions of duty had been rare. The aristocracy had 
as yet shown a truly patriotic spirit and a singleness of aim in the 
presence of the foreigner. The Senate had seemed to Cineas " an 
assembly of kings." But a sterner test was about to be applied to 
the virtue and high spirit of the Roman nobles. We are now 
approaching the time when the struggle for supremacy outside Italy 
with the great commercial people of Carthage is to strain to the 
uttermost the strength and courage of all classes at Rome, but above 
all of the wealthy and the highborn. From that struggle, which led her 
on step by step to a world-wide dominion, she emerged victorious, as 
she had done from former struggles nearer home ; but she emerged 
with such changes in the character of her ruling classes, and of the 
masses of her people, that to the clear-sighted the elements of decay 
were visible in the very hour of her greatness. We will pause for ' 



XV CONQUEST OF SOUTH ITALY AND ITS RESULTS 



a time to study the constitution of the state on the eve of this great 
contest, and learn something of. the magistrates who were to direct 
its fortunes, and of the army which was to secure its victory. 

The chief Authorities are Livy, Ep. xii.-xv. ; Plutarch's Life of Pvrrhus ; 
Zonaras viii. 2-6; Justinus xvi. 2-3, xviii. 2-23; Pausanias i. chs. 11, 12; Eutropius 
ii. 6-8; the fragments of Dionysius Halicarn. xvii. 15-18, xviii. xix. ; Appian, 
Samn. 9-12 ; Dio Cassius, fr. 40-48. Some details are gathered from Polyaenus 
vi. 6 ; Frontinus ii. 2, i, iv. i, 14, and the affair of Rhegium is narrated by 
Polybius i. 7. But in hardly any period of Roman history are the authorities so 
incomplete and fragmentary as from B.C. 275 to 265. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE ROMAN MAGISTRATES AND ARMY 

The limitations of consular powers, and their devolution on other curule magis- 
trates, censors, and praetors — The aediles, quaestors, praefectus urbis, and 
sacred colleges — The legion, its enrolment, numbers, officers, discipline, en- 
campment, and disposition in the field. 

rj-j^^ The popidiis Roniamis consisted of those who possessed the full 

Roman civil rights included in the word civitas.^ At the end of the third 
people. century B.C. this comprised all men born of free parents, who were 

themselves citizens, whether living in the city or in the enlarged 
ager Romanus, or in those colonies by joining which a citizen 
suffered no loss of civil rights or dinmitttio capitis ; and again, of 
those who by emancipation had ceased to be slaves, or who for 
some special reason had been invested with citizenship. The name 
had once been much less comprehensive, and many of those who 
now came under it at one time had not done so. 

To this popuhis Roma?ius, whatever that name included, be- 
longed in theory, and partly in practice, all powers of government. 
It made, unmade, or altered laws ; regulated the conduct of its 
members ; judged in cases of dispute or in accusations of crime ; 
punished or rewarded those who wronged or served the State ; 
declared war, made peace, negotiated treaties ; joined in the worship 
of the gods. 

But a people cannot act without some one to summon it to 
meet ; or, when it has met and declared its will, without some one 
to see that this will is carried out ; or, when it wishes to make war 
or peace, without some one to enrol and lead its armies, and to 
make terms with its enemies ; or, when it wishes to worship the 
gods as a nation, without some one to direct and perform the proper 
ceremonies. 
The king. The citizens therefore elected a man whom they called rex, 

^ See pp. 90, 91. 



CHAP. XVI MAGISTRATES THE CONSULS 203 

' ruler " or " king," to do these things for them. They elected him 

for life, and he soon assumed all these functions as his right, and 

was able to treat the people not as his employers but as his subjects. 

He was assisted indeed by a council of elders or " Senate" ; but he 

himself nominated the Senate, summoned it at his own will, consulted 

it on what he chose, and was not bound to take its advice. If we 

can at all trust the early story of Rome, some of the kings were more 

liberal than others, and not only took pains to consult the people 

and the Senate, but made elaborate arrangements for giving the 

people the opportunity of expressing their views, and for strengthen- 

, ing the Senate. But about 509, when a king was reigning who 

I carried the more tyrannical theory higher than any, the people put 

an end to the institution of a life-king altogether. They expelled the Abolition 

existing king, and determined henceforth, instead of electing a king of kingship. 

for life, to elect two magistrates for a year. The kingship was put 

in commission, as we might express it, with the farther limitation 

that the joint kings ruled only for a year. It is not certain what 

they called these magistrates at first, but before very long they were 

I called consuls or colleagues, and in after times the Romans spoke of 

' them as consuls from the first. ^ 

The Consuls then held for a year all the authority which the The con- 
I king had held for life. They alone summoned the people to meet stils. Their 
j in their cojfiitia, whether to elect new magistrates, or to pass laws, or /^'<^'t'^-^ ^n 
! to determine peace and war, or to try judicial cases. They alone ^'^^■^' 
j nominated, summoned, and consulted the Senate, and were free, as 
j the king had been, to take its advice or not as they chose. They 
I controlled the exchequer. They were the supreme judges in all 
disputes or in cases of criminal offences, unless they chose to refer 
[ the matter, as the kings had sometimes done, to the comitia. They 
[ could exact obedience from all citizens to their edicts ; could 
j summon any one of them to appear {I'ocatio), could arrest him 
' {J)rehe?isio) and throw him into prison, banish him, impose a fine 
upon him, order him to be flogged, or even put to death. They 
had also the power to order the citizens to enrol themselves in 
the army, and to submit to discipline and march out to war. They 
selected the tribiini of the legions ; they punished or rewarded the 
soldiers. All these powers made up what was called their impcrhivi 
or right of commanding ; and if any one resisted them, they could 
punish him as they chose, even by death. They were preceded by 
twelve lictors or " binders," who as a symbol of these powers carried 
bundles of rods {fasces)^ with which were bound axes, the instru- 
ments of punishment. 

^ See p. 89. 



204 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Limita- 
tions in 
practice. 



Limita- 
tions on 
the powers 
of magis- 
trates : (/) 
the col- 
ic ague ship. 



{2) The 
antiual 
ten ure 



(j) The 

laws. 



Now such a despotic power was never really exercised by the 
consuls over Roman citizens, except when they were at the head of 
the army on a campaign, and even in this case it was in some 
respects gradually modified. In the city itself it was almost from the 
first restrained in various ways ; and, as time went on, was so much 
reduced, that though the consulship remained the highest and most 
dignified office in the State, and though the consuls had still great 
influence both in legislation and in the executive, they actually 
performed few but formal functions in Rome itself, except in times 
of popular tumult or civil war. 

The causes which tended to reduce the power of the consuls 
were of two kinds — those which acted in restriction of all magisterial 
power as such, and those which actually relieved the consulship of 
some of its functions by delegating them to other officers. 

Of the former kind, the first was the fact that there were two 
consuls and not one. The principle of colleagueship eventually 
prevailed in all Roman magistracies. It acted as a restraining 
force on the consulship from the first. Each of the colleagues was 
equally supreme and could prohibit the acts of the other, though not 
render them invalid when done. In the city each discharged for a 
month at a time the actual administrative functions ; the consul of 
the month being preceded by the twelve lictors with fasces, the 
other either going without his lictors or being followed by them 
without fasces. This mutual power of obstruction forced them often 
to compromises, and made it possible for the people generally to 
bring influence to bear upon them. 

The next modifying influence was the limitation of the office to 
a year. While in office the consuls could not be impeached or 
deposed, — though at times such pressure was put upon them that 
they were obliged to abdicate, — but at the end of their year of office 
they became private citizens, and could be brought to such an 
account for their illegal or oppressive acts as could only be exacted 
from a life-king by a revolution. Nor could they secure themselves 
against this by immediate re-election. From the first such re-election 
was rare, and after 341 was illegal until the tenth year, although 
extraordinary circumstances were still held to justify it. 

The third limitation was the growth of a body of laws defining 
rights, and therefore restricting arbitrary acts of magistrates. The 
most decisive of all these were the laws concerning the right of appeal 
{provocalio), beginning with the lex Valeria at the very commence- 
ment of the Republic. By these laws ^ no magistrate could inflict 
on a citizen loss of life or citizenship, corporal punishment, or even 



See p. 93. 



XVI CHECKS ON THE CONSULAR POWER 205 

a fine beyond the value of thirty oxen and two sheep (3020 asses) 
without allowing him an appeal to the people. This at once cut off 
from the consuls one great branch of their functions and of their 
influence; for when such sentences could not be enforced they ceased 
to be passed, and cases which involved such punishments were 
referred to the Comitia at once. The consuls ceased therefore to 
be judges in criminal cases. 

As a sign of this curtailed power it early became the custom The hn- 
within the city for the axes to be omitted from the fasces of the A^'^-'^w /// 
consul's lictors, and, when he came into the Forum, for the lictors to '^^'^y^^'^^- 
lower the fasces themselves as an acknowledgment of the superiority 
of the people. Also, though the consul was elected by the comitia 
cc?itii7-iata^ it was always held that iviperiwn could only be conferred 
by the co7mtia ciiriata. This became a mere form, and was never 
withheld, but the form was always maintained ; and in later times 
it became the custom not to confer the ivipejimu until two months 
after the consul had entered on office. But even when it was con- 
ferred it was, though existing, in abeyance while the consul was in 
the city. There grew up a distinction between h\s poteshis as a civil 
magistrate elected by the people, and his iviperiiiin^ which he 
obtained by a different process, and which by custom he did not 
exercise to its full extent in the city. Still it is not accurate to say 
that the impe7'iiim did not exist ; there was an iviperiinn domi as 
well as iinperiiDfi 7nilitiac ] and though the former was restrained in 
various ways and to a great extent was rendered nugatory by the 
law of provocatio, it was not abolished by any definite enactment. 
Nor was the exercise of full iiupei'iinn at home, as it existed in the 
army, ever abolished by law. Like so many things in Rome, it 
became virtually abolished by custom, and only revived in extreme 
cases. 

Still there was a large class of cases in which the magisterial 
power might be oppressively used, and salutary laws evaded. 

Against such oppressions the citizens were protected by the {4) The 
Tribunes. These magistrates were a peculiar feature in the Roman ifibunes. 
commonwealth, not exactly analogous to any institutions elsewhere 
of which we have knowledge. They differed from the other magis- 
trates in this, that they had powers but no functions ; there w^as no 
department of state which was their special " province." They had, 
however, the general duty of protecting plebeians, and afterwards all 
citizens, from injustice, and, in order to enable them to do this, they 
had the power of stopping all proceedings on the part of magistrates ; 
this was called i7ite7'cessio^ which differed from the prohibitio exercised 
by one consul against his colleague in this, that it made all those 
proceedings, against which they thus interposed their veto, absolutely 



206 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Checks on 
the power 
of the 
tribunes. 



(5) The 
Senate. 



Life 

member- 
ship. 



invalid. Their power was farther strengthened by the fact that their 
persons were sacred and inviolable, protected by a law called lex 
sacrata, because a breach of it made the offender cursed or excom- 
municated {sacer). Any one who injured their persons or interfered 
with the exercise of their office would fall under this law, and they 
had the power of arresting and imprisoning any one, even the consul 
himself, who disobeyed. But such an arrest had to be made in their 
presence ; they had no right to summon an absent citizen ; and they 
were therefore escorted not by lictors but by viatores., who seem to 
have shared in their inviolability. It is evident that men possessing 
such powers must have done a great deal to circumscribe those of the 
consul ; that their power must, if freely exercised, eventually become 
almost supreme in the State. They did become very powerful, but 
there were in their case also some circumstances which prevented 
them from becoming quite as powerful as they might have been. 

The tribunes were first elected in 494. Their original number 
is doubtful ; but after 457 there were always ten, and after 471 they 
were elected by the comitia tributa., and only those who belonged 
to a plebeian gens, either by birth or adoption, were eligible. Their 
number was the first check upon them. The arrangement as to the 
veto was, it seems, at first that the whole coUegiiDn had to concur ; 
afterwards, that a majority must do so ; finally, any one of them 
could veto any proceeding. But any one of them could veto the 
proceedings of the others, as well as of other magistrates. So that 
compromises had frequently to be made between the demands of one 
party in the State backed up by some of the tribunes, and those of 
the other party backed up by the other tribunes. They were not at 
first members of the Senate, but before long they were admitted to 
sit at the door to watch the proceedings, and finally they became 
members, and an interccssio of a tribune prevented a valid senatus 
consultum being passed. Their powers did not extend beyond a 
mile outside the pomoerium, and during their year of office they 
were not allowed to be absent a night from Rome, and were obliged 
to keep their houses open, that they might at any time be appealed to 
for help.i 

Another institution which limited the power of the consuls was 
the Senatp:. We have said that the Senate was a council of elders 
nominated by the king to advise him, but whose advice he was not 
bound to take. So it was with the consuls. But the Senate had 
this great advantage, that its members were members for life. It 
did not, therefore, vary quickly, and was capable of a continuous 
policy ; and all experience teaches us that a permanent body inevit- 



^ For the manner of the appointment of the tribunes, see ch. viii. pp. 97, 98. 



THE POWERS OF THE SENATE 207 



ably gets the better of transient officials. Thus it came 
although there was no law definitely stating in what the Senate was 
to be supreme, or making its decrees {senatus consiilta) binding, yet it 
had by custom gradually absorbed certain functions and certain de- 
partments of government which for a long time no one thought of 
questioning. One of these was the control of the treasury ; it came Control 
to be acknowledged that the quaestors should not issue money from of the 
the treasury without a decree of the Senate, — though the consuls '^'''''"' "'O'- 
still retained the power of giving such an order, and sometimes 
exercised it. But as soon as the consul was out of Rome the 
Senate could hamper or assist him by refusing or voting him 
supplies ; could supersede him at the end of his year of office, or 
continue him in command as proconsul. It also assumed the 
power of allowing or disallowing triumphs, — a power which again 
followed from the control of the purse, for these shows required 
grants of money. The power of the purse gave it also a control over 
public works, for the money required for them could only be 
got by its order. Again, as Rome extended her dominion over Trials iti 
Italy, the Senate assumed the right of issuing commissions to try ^^^^h'- 
all cases of treason and felony in the Italian towns, which practically 
gave it the administrative portion of the government in Italy. 
Quarrels also between allied towns were settled or investigated by 
commissioners sent by the Senate ; and this branch of government 
we shall see still in its hands when Rome began to have foreign 
provinces. Ambassadors from other states came to the Senate, and 
from it received their answer ; and though the right of the people to 
vote on peace and war was not disputed, the matter was first dis- 
cussed and voted on in the Senate, and its decree was generally 
accepted. The particular sphere of action, again, which each Allotincnt 
of the consuls was to take was decided generally by lot, but at '/"Z''''^^- 
times the Senate assumed the right of deciding this on its own 
authority. It is to be kept in mind that these powers depended on 
no law, and could at any time be overborne by a law ; and towards 
the end of the Republic those magistrates w^ho wished to establish 
their power on a popular footing, and accordingly to lower that of 
the Senate, were in the habit of bringing much of the business that 
was usually done in the Senate directly before the Comitia. So that 
in this case again, though the " auctoritas " of the Senate curtailed 
very materially the power of the consul, yet it could not push this 
control too far, for the consul had always at hand the weapon of an 
appeal to the Comitia : there was again^ therefore, constant need of 
mutual compromise. 

But there was one way in which the Senate could effectually 
overrule the consuls. By the exercise of an authority which again 



U/ICCS. 



208 



HISTORY OF ROME 



(6) Dic- 
tator. 



Magister 
Ecjiiitum. 



The 

Dictator 
and the 
tribunes. 



Lij?tit of 
time. 



rested on no law, but on immemorial custom, they could compel one 
of the consuls to nominate a DICTATOR {dicere didatoreni). 

In its origin the DICTATORSHIP was a temporary revival of the 
single and irresponsible kingship, when circumstances seemed to 
require the rule of one man — -generally on account of some imminent 
danger in war, foreign or domestic, but not unfrequently for the 
more peaceful purposes of holding the elections when the consul 
could not be present, or even as head of the State for driving in a 
nail in the temple of Jupiter on the Ides of September, when pesti- 
lence or other misfortune demanded that it should be done with 
unusual solemnity. The consul, who was obliged to be in the ager 
Romanus — afterwards held to include all Italy — having risen in the 
dead of night and named the dictator, he was invested with imperhim 
by the comitia curiata, and immediately became supreme over 
all other magistrates, and had absolute power over the persons 
and lives of all citizens. As a symbol of this he was preceded 
by twenty-four lictors ^ with fasces and axes, as combining the 
powers of both consuls. The dictator named another magis- 
trate called the master of the horse (as he himself was sometimes 
called the "master of the people"), who represented him in his 
absence, but was as completely as others under his authority. The 
other magistrates did not cease to perform their ordinary functions, 
but they did so in subordination to the dictator and subject to his 
orders. It was an unsettled question whether the auxilium of the 
tribunes, their power, that is, of aiding a citizen against the order of 
a magistrate, was valid against a dictator. There seems to have 
been a notion that the Tribune still in some degree retained this 
power : but on the only occasions recorded by Livy, on which an 
attempt to exercise it was made, the Tribune did not venture to per- 
sist. ^ The fact seems to be that the case was never really brought 
to an issue. The dictator's tenure of office was limited to six 
months, but as a matter of fact he seldom held it so long. In the 
case of the formal dictatorships for holding elections, and the like, he 
held it only for a few days, did not generally think it necessary even 
to name a master of the horse, and abdicated directly the purpose 
for which he had been named was fulfilled. In the case of war he 
would only be in Rome long enough to perform certain religious 
functions : and in the army, to which the power of the Tribune did 
not extend, he would not have an ijjiperiiwi essentially more exten- 
sive than that of the consuls whom he superseded. When he was 



^ Or perhaps only twelve. See Mommsen, H. R. iii. 349 note. 

- Livy (vi. 16, 38) seems to indicate that in such struggles as occurred the 



dictators got the better of the tribunes, 
wav is shown bv Polvbius iii. 8 ; Plutarcli, 



But tliat the legal theory was the other 
Fab. 9 ; Antoji. 9. 



XVI DEVOLUTION OF CONSULAR POWERS 209 

named for the suppression of a sedition at home, or for safeguarding 

the city from an expected in^vasion, there would have been more 

Hkehhood of a conflict between him and the tribunes. But even 

then a time of popular excitement or terror was not favourable for 

the settlement of a constitutional question. In the early period of 

the Republic the appointment of a dictator was frequent. ^ From Dictator 

about 300 one is rarely named except for formal business, electoral rare after 

or religious ; and after the second Punic war the office seems to J^^- 

have remained in abeyance until the unconstitutional dictatorship of 

Sulla. Instead of it a custom grew up of investing the consuls and 

praetors with dictatorial powers, in case of dangerous disturbances, 

by a senatorial decree that the "consuls, praetors, etc., should see 

that the Republic took no harm." 

But besides these checks on the consular power, regular or Devolation 
occasional, it was also diminished by devolution. Many of its of powers. 
original functions, that is, devolved on other magistrates, the censors, 
praetors, and aediles. The Censorship arose from a compromise (y) Oti 
in 443, when the consulship was put in commission by the appoint- censors. 
ment of consular tribunes {tribuni militares coiisulari potestate). 
The censors were then, or soon afterwards, appointed to perform 
that part of the consular office which was concerned with the lists 
of the Senate, tribes, and other orders, and to perform the quin- 
quennial purification at the end of each lustrum. ^ At first the 
length of their tenure appears not to have been fixed ; but the powers 
which these functions gave them proved to be so formidable, or the 
public works which they had charge of so costly, that a limit was 
found necessary. By the lex Aeniilia (434) this was defined as 
eighteen months. Appius Claudius Caecus indeed (312-308) 
violated this rule on the ground that the law referred only to the 
existing censors, but he was unable to persist in his tenure for the 
whole five years, and his example was not imitated. It followed 
from the reason of the institution of the office that it should be held 
by patricians, but this restriction was removed in 350. From the Functions 
first, or soon after the first establishment of the office, the censors of the 
exercised other functions besides the making up the lists. They <^<^"^^''^- 
inspected public buildings, roads, supplies of water, and the like, 
and gave out contracts for their construction or repair, for which, on 
an order from the Senate, they drew upon the exchequer. The 
censors became thus very influential, being concerned with nearly 
every department of life and every class of persons. They should 

^ In 309, according to the Fasti, a dictator held office throughout the year 
and without election of consuls, and in 301 two successive dictators did the 
same, but this was exceptional and irregular. Livy confirms the Fasti by not 
naming consuls for those years. 

- In doing this they were said condere lustrum. 

P 



HISTORY OF ROME 



have been above and apart from political faction, yet they could and 
did influence politics by their manner of filling up the lists of the 
ordines as well as of the Senate, while we have seen that Appius 
Claudius used his powers for a political and almost revolutionary 
purpose. The office was of great dignity : it was therefore customary 
to elect only those who had been consuls (although this convention 
was more than once neglected), and by the lex Rutilia (265) it was 
ordered that no one should be twice censor. The principle of 
colleagueship was also so jealously guarded that it was held, that, in 
case of the death of one censor, the other was bound to resign, while, 
on account of the omen, no new ones were created in that lustrum. 
(:-) On the Another part of the consular functions devolved upon the 

praetor. Praetor. The title ( = " leader ") was an old one, and by some 
has been supposed to have been that originally borne by the consuls. 
But the praetorship with which we are now concerned was first 
established in 367, again as a compromise, at the restoration of the 
consular office after the admission of plebeians. The praetor was 
to be a colleague of the consuls, to transact the judicial business, 
which up to that time had been performed by them. He was next 
in dignity to them, and presided in the Senate in their absence, but 
he could not legally hold the consular elections or name a dictator. 
His business lay in Rome, but in emergencies we find him com- 
manding abroad, as in the Gallic war of 283. Originally confined 
to patricians, the office was after 336 filled indifferently from either 
order. After the first Punic war the number of aliens residing in Rome 
for various purposes became so great, that a second praetor was ap- 
pointed, to try cases between citizens and /^rif^r/;^/ (242). He was 
C2i\\edi praetor percgriJius^ and from that time the first praetor was 
called praetor urbanus. The whole civil business was in their 
hands, and when qicaestiotics were established to try certain charges 
of public crimes, one of the praetors acted in person or by deputy 
as president {judex giiaestioms).^ On entering their offices they 
laid down the legal principles by which they meant to be guided in 
a formtda^ generally adopted with certain variations from that of 
their predecessors, whence a body of common law {Jus praetorium) ^ 
arose, recognised in all courts, whether in Rome or in those pro- 
vincial towns to which d. praefectus or other officer was sent annually 
from Rome to administer law as the praetor's representative. Till 

^ When the guaestiones ferpetuae — i.e. standing courts for trying particular 
crimes — increased in number so much as to exceed the powers of even the 
increased staff of praetors, seTpdira.iQ Jiidices guaestionum were appointed, whether 
by the praetor or by the comitia centuriata does not seem clear. 

- Or jus honorariNm — including decisions of all magistrates. The formula 
edicta perpetua. That part of the edictum which remained unchanged was called 
vetus or tralaticium. 



PRAETORS AND QUAESTORS 



227 there were only two praetors, but in that year two more were 
elected. The four drew lots for their sphere of duty {provincia) ; 
two stayed in Rome, the other two went to Sicily (a province in 
241) or to Sardinia (a province in 238). Gradually more were 
required as home business and the number of provinces increased. 
From 1 99 there were six, or sometimes six and four alternately. 
After 144 all six stayed in Rome for their year of office, going to 
various provinces afterwards as propraetors. From about the year 
80 there were eight; Julius Caesar (59-44) raised the number to 
twelve and then to sixteen, of whom the praetor U7'ba7iiis and praetor 
peregrinus^ and a certain number of the others, had to stay in Rome, 
unless by special exemption of the Senate. 

Besides these magistrates who thus exercised between them the Lmvei- 
functions of the one king, there were other departments of adminis- magis- 
tration managed by yearly magistrates also, who had no part of the ^^^^'^^• 
iiiipcrium shared by these curule magistrates, and were regarded as 
occupying a lower rank in the official scale. 

The oldest of these was the Quaestorship. ^^\\^?iX oiqiiaesiores The 
Parricidii under the kings, and qiiaestores aerarii very soon after the q'<^^(-'^ior'i. 
establishment of the Republic. Whether the two functions were 
ever united in one person seems uncertain. They were certainly 
separated in very early times. The duties of the guaes/ores parricidii^ 
"trackers of murder," were merged in other judicial offices; but 
the quaestors of the treasury {aerarii) always remained, and were 
increased in number with the extension of the business and 
dominions of the Republic. At first there appear to have been 
two in charge of the treasury, from which they made payments 
on the order of the Senate or the consuls, and into which they 
received the taxes, the fines inflicted by magistrates or people, or 
the wealth brought in by successful generals. After 447 they were 
elected at the coinitia tribiita^ and in 421 their number was doubled, 
two remaining in the city and one accompanying each of the 
consular armies. At the same time plebeians were declared 
eligible, though none was elected till 409. In 267 the number 
was again doubled, four new ones being apparently appointed 
for the surveillance of the port of Ostia and naval purposes : 
and as public business increased with the growth of the Empire 
we shall find their numbers increased also. The quaestorship 
was not a curule office. The quaestors did not wear the toga prae- 
texta, or sit on a sella curulis^ and having no jurisdiction over the 
persons of the citizens, they were not attended by lictors or viatores. 

Later in the date of its institution, though superior in dignity, Acdiles. 
was the Aedilrship. There were four aediles, who all seem to have 
shared in the same duties, as magistrates in petty cases and com- 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Praefcctus 
urbi. 



Colleges of 

pontijices 

and 



missioners of police {curatores urbis\ as superintendents of the supply 
of provisions {curatores annonae)^ as managers of the public games 
{curatores ludorum solenniujn). But the history of the office is 
complicated by the fact that in name, and in the outward marks of 
dignity, two of them were superior to the other two. The earliest 
were the plebeian aediles, first appointed in 494, at the same time 
as the tribunes, to assist them in judicial business, and to keep the 
decrees of the comitia tribida and later of the Senate also, that no 
patrician might tamper with them.^ From 472 up to the end of the 
Republic they were elected by the comitia tributa, and members of 
the patrician gentes were ineligible. But at the next compromise 
between the two orders (367), when the praetorship was established, 
it was also arranged that two new aediles should be created, who 
should be patricians and curulc magistrates. Their immediate 
purpose was the presidency of the ludi I\07na?ii, to which were after- 
wards added the Megalesia. But about 366 the plebeians were 
admitted to the curule aedileship in alternate years, and shortly 
afterwards indifferently in every year. So that eventually there 
were four aediles, two of whom must be plebeians, and two might 
be either plebeians or patricians. But apparently, except as to 
the games which were assigned to the two sets respectively, their 
duties gradually became assimilated. The advantage which the 
curule aedileship retained was that up to the time of Sulla it gave an 
entree to the Senate, and was regarded as the first step in the ctirsics 
honoriun^ the scale of offices, leading to the praetorship and consulship. 

The office of praefectiis urbi was also very ancient, and was 
believed to have been used by the kings for the safety of the city 
during their absence in war. But as the custom of the consuls and 
praetor remaining in the city during their year of office became 
more constant, it fell into desuetude, except as an honorary 
appointment of some youth of high birth during the absence of the 
other magistrates at the Latin games. Under the Empire the title 
was restored, but the officer so called had more distinct and 
important duties. 

No account of the checks upon the magistrates at Rome, 
however, can be complete without a reference to the functions of 
the sacred colleges. The pontifices and augures indeed did not 
generally exercise magisterial powers, and the control of the Pontifex 
Maximus over the Vestal Virgins rested rather on the patria 
potestas J but nevertheless their influence on the course of affairs 
was of suflicient importance to make it a matter of urgency 

^ Both aediles and tribuni were probably names belonging to officers in earlier 
times, the former connected with the temples [aedes), the latter with the three 
tribes. But their offices as known in later history begin now. 



THE SACRED COLLEGES 



213 



for the plebeians to secure entrance into them, and to render 
membership an object of amlDition among statesmen of the 
highest rank. This influence was none the weaker that it was 
indirect. The pontifices had a general superintendence of all PotUijices. 
matters concerning the State religion. But they also had charge 
of the Calendar : they determined which days were/aj-// and Jiefasti, 
days on which legal business might or might not be transacted, or 
when it was necessary to intercalate days or months. They could 
therefore indirectly affect legal business and constitutional arrange- 
ments, often to the help or annoyance of a magistrate. Their 
president, X\\^ pontifex maximus, was to the people in their religious 
capacity what the king had been in the civil. He could take the 
auspices, summon a meeting, publish edicts. And though the 
actual exercise of his power was in practice confined to the priests 
and vestals (over the latter of whom he had the power of life and 
death), yet in the case of the failure of all curule magistrates he 
held comitia for elections. So again the augures. No assembly, Aumres. 
election, meeting of Senate, despatch of magistrate to a province 
|or an expedition, in fact no public business, was transacted without 
ifirst testing the will of the gods. The proper method of doing this 
kvas a science supposed to be in the hands of the college of augures, 
jWhich consequently had from time to time to decide on the validity 
of elections and laws. It is true that they had no initiative : they 
jcould only pronounce decisions when appealed to by the magistrates. 
put cases of doubt were frequently referred to them : and their 
(awards seem to have been final. 1 Lastly, up to the end of the 
pecond Punic war, the college of twenty fetials exercised considerable Fetials. 
influence from the fact that they were judges not only of the cere- 
pionies in proclaiming war, but of the validity of treaty obligations, 
(ind of the amount of provocation on the part of an enemy justify- 
ing war.2 Even the Decemviri sacris faciimdis, from having the Decemviri. 
tustody of the sibylline oracles, could at times influence the course of 
public policy, and their office was accordingly one of those which 

( 1 The College of Pontifices originally consisted of four pontifices and a 
t^ontifex Maxinius. From 300 to 80 tliere were eight (four of whom had 
!o be plebeians) and a Pontifex Maximus. Up to 104 vacancies were filled up by 
w-optatio, i.e. by election by existing members. After 104 (by lex Domitia) 
Seventeen of the thirty-five tribes selected from three persons already nominated 
W the college, which then co-opted and ordained him {inauguratio). The 
College of Augures up to 300 consisted of four augures ; after that (by lex 
Ugulnia) it was raised to nine, by the addition of five plebeian augures, and so 
[emained till 80, when Sulla raised them to fifteen. The modes of election were 
fegulated by the same laws as that to the Pontifical College. 

[ 2 After the time of Pyrrhus the old ceremony of throwing a spear into the 
jnemy's lands was symbolically represented by throwing a spear against the 
yiiimna bellica before the temple of Bellona. 



214 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Causes of 
weakness 
in the 
constitii- 
iion. 



the patricians tried to retain, and which the plebeians successfully 
invaded J 

Thus by a system of checks and devolution was established the 
constitution which Polybius regarded as the most successful attempt to 
combine the three principles of Monarchy, Oligarchy, and Democracy. 
The weak point in it, which eventually did most to break it up, was 
the absence of any central power of compulsion. It depended too 
much on custom, and on the loyalty of individuals to it. Thus the 
authority of the Senate rested on no law, and even the limit to the 
tenure of office by the magistrates depended on the voluntary 
obedience of the magistrate himself. If he did not "abdicate," the 
office was not vacant, and there was no known power to make him. 
If he disobeyed the Senate he would be crushed so long as public 
opinion supported the Senate ; but when, as in later times, he 
found that he could defy it by resting on a direct appeal to the 
people, or by supporting himself by a sufficiently large and powerful 
party of adherents, the weakness of the foundations on which the 
power of the Senate rested became manifest. 



The army. From the earliest times we find the principle accepted that all 

citizens were liable to serve in the army, levied from season to 
season as required. But as each man furnished his own arms, and 
served without pay, it was inevitable that such service should as a 
rule be confined to men with a certain amount of property, the 
richest of all serving in the cavalry, though from very early times 
with an allowance for the purchase and keep of a horse {eqiius 
pubUcus). Hence in a certain sense to serve in the army was a 
privilege as well as a burden ; and the " reform " of Servius 
Tullius was the extension to a larger number of citizens of a privilege 
as well as of a duty : and when shortly before the siege of A^eii 
Changed b\> (about 406) the system of giving pay {stipendiuni) to the soldiers was 
the system started, it was possible to employ in the service even those citizens 
of pay- ^ho were rated below the fifth class, the capite censz, down to those 

rated at only 400 asses, and even these were enrolled on 
emergencies. Thus the army was at first a citizen militia called 
out for the season when required, and dispersed when the necessity 
was over. But in the Samnite wars and the war with Pyrrhus we 
find the legions at times going into winter quarters, and serving 
continuously, and this custom, begun ::t the siege of Veii, gradually 
became the common one. Moreover when Rome had reduced 
many states, first of Latium and then of Italy, to the position of 
The Socii. subject allies, these towns had to supply a certain number of men 

^ Originally two, raised to ten in 369, of whom half after 367 were to be 
plebeians. The number was probably raised to lifteen in 98 by Sulla. 



XVI ENROLMENT AND ARMS OF THE LEGIONS 215 

according to the terms of their alHance, and we accordingly find 
socii regularly serving with the Roman armies. 

The men, when levied, were from the earliest times enrolled in The 
brigades called legions. The number in the legions probably differed legions. 
at various times, and was seldom exactly what it professed to be. 
But the average normal strength of a legion may be taken in the third 
century to have been 3000 heavy-armed infantry, 300 cavalry of 
citizens, and 1 200 light-armed infantry. The number of the socii must Numbers. 
have differed at different stages of Roman supremacy ; Polybius, at 
the time of the Punic wars, reckons the infantry of allies as ec[ual to 
the citizens in number, and the cavalry as treble, A legion, there- 
fore, at that period may be reckoned roughly as a body of 10,000 
men. 

The number of such legions enrolled each year differed according Enrolment 
to the necessity of the circumstances. But from an early period in of legions. 
the Republic two legions for each of the consuls was looked upon as 
normal. The Senate, at the beginning of the year, settled what the 
levy was to consist of, though, of course, it was liable to be supple- 
mented in case of additional dangers, or of loss in the field. The 
consuls then proceeded to enrol the men. Having given notice of a 
day on which they proposed to do this, all citizens of the five classes 
between the ages of seventeen and forty-six, who had not already 
served twenty years in the infantry or ten in the cavalry, were bound 
to appear and answer to their names when the lists of the tribes 
were read over. As a rule, the number of young men volunteermg 
for service made the exercise of the consular powers unnecessary ; 
but at times, either from political discontent or the nature of the 
particular service, this wa^ not the case ; and then the consul could, 
and sometimes did, confiscate the property of those who failed to 
answer, or even sell them into slavery, unless the tribunes interfered. 
[The first thing to do was to appoint military tribunes, six to each Tnbuni 
'legion. From 361 this was done partly by election of the tribes, milituyn. 
'though the consuls appear at times to have named some of them. 
j These military tribunes took turns in selecting suitable names until 
I their lists were full. Then the military oath of obedience {sacra- 
mejituui) was administered to the men, one repeating the formula, 
and the others signifying their assent to it. The men were then Hastati, 
divided, according to wealth and age, into hastati, principes, triarii, prindpes, 
and rorarii : and a day and place were named at which they were ^^^'^*'^^- 
bound to appear armed according to their respective ranks. The 
i poorest were assigned to the rorarii or accensi, later called velifcs, Rorarii. 
]who had to equip themselves with the light target {parma\ sword, 
light spear, and helmet without plume {galea). The hastati, principes 
and triarii were divided according to age and service, the experienced 



2l6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Rorarii, 

afterwards 

velites. 



veterans being in the last, and the youngest soldiers in the first. 
The defensive arms of all three were alike : the large oblong shield 
{scutum)^ coats of mail or breastplates {loricae or pectoralia)^ brass 
helmet and greaves {ocreae). All also had the short straight sword, 
made both for cut and thrust {gladms) : but the hastati and principes 
had besides two stout javelins or pila (some finer and slighter than 
others), which were thrown in volleys before coming to close quarters 
with the enemy. Instead of these the triarii had the long lance or 
pike {hasta), though later on all alike had the pilum. 

Maiiipuli. Each of the three orders was divided into ten companies {niani- 

puli)y One maniple of hastati, one of principes, and one of triarii 
made up a cohort : there were, therefore, ten cohorts in a legion. 
To command these men, there were, first, the six military tribunes ; 
and, secondly, sixty centurions, two to each maniple ; for the maniple 
was subdivided into ceiitu)iac^ or, as they were sometimes called, 
ordijieSy each of which was commanded by one of the centurions, 
who were thus also called ordi?iiini ductores. Each centurion also 
named a subaltern or opiio. 

The rorarii were distributed in equal numbers among the maniples 
of the heavy-armed, but afterwards were formed into a separate and 
distinct corps under the name of velites. 

The cavalry of a legion were divided into ten squadrons {turmae) 
of thirty men, each commanded by a deciirio and optio. Three 
deciiriones and optiones were selected in each squadron, but the first 
selected commanded if he were present, the second taking his place 
in his absence, and the third in the absence of the two first. The 
men wore helmet, greaves, and lorica or corslet, and carried a shield 
and lance and sword. The cavalry of the allies (900 for each legion) 
was divided into three alae instead of fiirniae., and are often spoken of 
as alarii equitcs. 

At the head of all was the consul, praetor, or some magistrate 
with consular or praetorial powers, assisted by a staff consisting of a 
c{uaestor and legaii, whose numbers differed according to circum- 
stances. These with the tribunes formed his coitciiiuni. 

Socii. The men being thus organised and officered, and joined by the 

Socii — whose levy was left to the several towns, and who were com- 
manded by their own twelve praefecii^ nominated by the consul — 

The camp, they at once formed a camp. This was always done on the same 
principles wherever they halted even for a night : though, of course, 
a camp that was intended only for temporary stoppage was nmch 
less elaborately fortified. One for two legions was in the form of a 
square, intersected, according to a regular scheme, with " roads " 

' But the maniples of the triarii contained on]\' half the number of men con- 
tained by those of the hastati and principes. 



XVI OFFICERS AND DISCIPLINE 217 

{viae) between the tents, and between the officers' quarters {^prae- 
torimii) and those of the men, ayid defended by an earthwork {agger) 
surmounted by a stockade of stakes {vaili), and a trench (fossa), the 
whole structure being spoken of as the vallum. The principles of 
its arrangement were so exact and so well known, that when the 
advanced guard had selected and marked it out, the rest of the army 
could march straight into it, each man knowing where his quarters 
were to be, and what portion of the fortification he had to construct. 
The form and construction were probably in their main features of 
high antiquity, yet the Romans are said to have taken some hints 
in improving their castrametation from Pyrrhus after the battle of 
I Beneventum, as also they introduced improvements in the arms 
of the cavalry possibly from the same source. 

The consul, proconsul, or dictator, when in the command of The com- 
the army, had absolute power over the officers and soldiers ; there mander-in- 
was no appeal, and no tribune to save a soldier, however high his '^^^'^^f- 
' rank, from the sentence of the commander-in-chief, whether the 
' sentence inflicted flogging or even death. ^ These punishments were Military 
I rigorously inflicted for certain military offences, such as cowardice or punish- 
( desertion of a post, or theft in the camp, or neglect of duty when on ^^^'^^i^- 
\ guard ; and if a whole corps was involved in the same offence, the 
offenders were punished by decimatio, every tenth man being selected 
i by lot to receive the punishment. Some crimes not punished by 
I sentence of death from the commander-in-chief were visited, under 
I the direction of a military tribune, with what amounted practically to 
the same. This was called \.\\q fiisti/ariinn, which may be described 
I as " running the gauntlet." K man convicted of certain offences, 
' especially neglect on guard, was touched by a tribune with a cudgel 
I (fiistis) : whereupon all the soldiers fell upon him with cudgels and 
j stones. If by vigorous exertions he escaped from the camp with his 
j life, he was nevertheless a ruined man. He could not return home, 
J and no one would venture to receive him. " The result," says Poly- 
I bins, "of the severity and inevitableness of this punishment is that 
I the Roman watches are faultlessly kept." The tribune could also 
inflict flogging, or money fines, on the soldiers for minor offences. 
This severity of discipline was tempered by the rewards offered for Military 
j valour. After a battle, those who had showed conspicuous bravery rewards. 
were publicly praised by the consul, and presented with prizes, con- 
sisting of arms or cups or horse-trappmgs, accordmg to his position 
or the nature of his feat. The first to mount a wall which was 
being stormed was presented with a mural crown ; those who had 
saved the life of a fellow-citizen with a civic crown : and both were 

11 Soon after the time of the Gracchi, the right oi provocatio for a citizen even 
in the army was secured. 



2i8 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xvi 

farther honoured with the privilege of wearing special ornaments at 
public festivals, and of decorating their houses with trophies. 
The Acies. The method of marshalling the Roman army in the field must, 

in many respects, have depended on circumstances and the nature 
of the ground. But certain principles pervaded the arrangement 
with whatever modifications. The earlier method had probably been 
that of the phalanx — that is, the massing together of the men to 
form a compact body many deep. But this practice had been aban- 
doned probably about the time of the siege ot Veil, and the plan 
had been adopted of stationing the maniples at such intervals as to 
give each maniple room for separate and independent manoiuvring. 
The whole force was thus arrayed in three open lines, probably in 
the form called the quincunx — 



so that each line supported the other, and yet left intervals for the 
one to retire through the other. The maniples forming the first line 
consisted of the youngest soldiers {hastati) ; the second line of the next 
oldest soldiers {principcs). These two lines were, in the period begin- 
ning about 300, armed with the pihun or heavy javelin, yet they were 
called antepilani, because at some previous time the men of the third 
line, called the triarii, appear alone to have carried \.\i&pihe7n, and the 
name remained when the reason for it had disappeared. The third 
line, the triarii^ was composed of the veteran soldiers, who were 
most to be depended upon if the two former were routed. Each line, 
if one legion was in question, consisted of ten maniples, the light- 
armed troops being distributed among the heavy-armed maniples. The 
socii were usually stationed by themselves at one or the other wing, 
and were drawn up probably on the same principles as the legionaries, 
but on this point we have no definite information. The cavalry 
stationed on either wing were principally employed to cover retreat- 
ing infantry, or to harass a retreating enemy ; though in some 
battles they played a more important part in the actual combat. In 
camp the men of the cavalry were specially employed in going 
the rounds at night, and the expeditions in search of supplies fell 
mostly to their share. 

Such was, in general terms, the organisation of the army with 
which the Romans were now to confront Carthage, and begin their 
career of conquest outside of Italy. 



CHAPTER XVII 

SICILY AND CARTHAGE 

Seeds of hostility between Rome and Cartilage — Object of the first Punic war was 
Sicily — The Phoenicians and Greeks in Sicily — The Sicani, Elymi, and Siceli 
confused by the Romans with Greek Siceliots — Character of Sicilian Greeks — 
Power of Syracuse — Carthage, its foundation, constitution, and the character 
of its people — Their possessions in Sicily — The boundary of the Halycus — 
Cause of the Romans coming to Sicily, and the results of the war to the two 
peoples contrasted — Romans and Carthaginians compared — Judgment of 
Polybius — The city and harbours of Carthage. 

Pyrrhus quilted Italy for ever in 274. In the course of the next Be^nnin<r 
ten years Rome had subdued Italy from the north of Etruria to the of the 

I south of Bruttium. She was now for the first time to embark on "^'^^^^^y of 

Rome and 
Carthage. 



conquests outside Italy, and to measure swords with the great com- 
mercial city in Africa, with whom she had already found it necessary 
more than once to secure by treaty a basis of mutual rights.. For a 
time, while Pyrrhus was a danger to both alike, Rome and Carthage 
had agreed to support each other by armed force. But even then 
there were signs of jealousy and distrust on the part of Rome, and 
perhaps of a desire on the part of Carthage to gain a foothold in 
Italy. At any rate the friendship was short-lived ; and before long 
the possession of Sicily became, as Pyrrhus foresaw, the object of a 
war between the two cities, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a 
century, and became noteworthy in the history of the world for the 
enormous resources of the combatants, for the extraordinary exer- 
tions made by both alike, and for the momentous nature of its 
results. 

The first Punic war is rightly called by Polybius a war for the The 
possession of Sicily. Such, indeed, it turned out to be. But here, possession 
as elsewhere, the Romans followed rather than guided their destiny. ^ "^^f^^y 

_,, ,.,,., , . - . ^, ., . , audits con- 

They did not decide upon an armed interference in Sicily with a sequences. 

J distinct idea of annexation. The immediate advantage in wealth 

or reputation to be gained by a war was a motive with the military 



220 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



class ; the traders hoped to recoup themselves for losses sustained in 
recent wars by finding a new field of commerce ; and statesmen, who 
looked farther ahead, saw danger to Italy if Sicily became wholly 
Carthaginian. Yet the original idea was not to substitute Roman 
for Carthaginian power over the whole island, but to confine the 
Carthaginians to their side of it, to vindicate the freedom of the 
Greek cities, and to teach them to look to Rome for protection. It 
soon, however, became evident that Sicily itself must be the prize of 
the victor in the struggle. The prize fell to Rome : but that was not 
all. The war proved to be but the first step in a series of inevit- 



Holy I. T^<^ 




= 


H^ 


''' I '-=-= 


.=.-_ 







SICILY 

ROMAN MILES 
5 10 20 40 


60 

GO 


ENGLISH 
5 10 20 


MILES 
40 









rpachijinm Pr. 



East o\ 14 (.■rccn\ 



Theinhabi- 
tanfs of 
Sicily, 
and its 
position 
to7vards 
Italy. 



able expansions which were destined to extend Roman power 
and civiHsation over nearly the whole of southern Europe. For 
Sicily itself it decided the important question whether it should 
belong to Africa or Europe, to men of Semitic or to men of Aryan 
race. 

For among the inhabitants of Sicily at this time two elements 
were still striving for mastery, as they had been striving for nearly 
300 years, the Phoenician and the Greek, the Eastern and 
the Western — an image, and perhaps a part of that struggle 
which had been fought out at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, and 
on the coasts and islands of the Aegean sea. This struggle as yet 



THE INHABITANTS OF SICILY 



22] 



had had no immediate interest for Italy or Rome. Sicily had not 
been closely connected with Italian history ; had never been Italian 
though Italians had emigrated to it ; and had never aspired to be 
the mistress of Italy or submitted to he its slave. There were Greeks 
in Italy and Greeks in Sicily : but though Syracuse strove to play 
m Sicily the part which Athens played in Greece, it was only now 
and then that her most powerful rulers, such as Hiero I or 
Dionysius, undertook to interfere in Magna Graecia, and even to 
assume the protection of the venerable and more distant Cumae 
These were passing exhibitions of power. For the most part Sicily 
remamed Sicilian, without external rule or connexions. When at 
length it was united to Italy, it was as a province of the great citv 
on the Tiber. ^ 

The Greek immigration began with the foundation of Naxos about T/ie 
735 by colonists from Chalcis in Euboea, followed in the next year Greeks. 
by that of Syracuse from Corinth. These Greek settlements were 
augmented at frequent intervals by others from Greece, as well as 
by cities founded by those already existing, till by 500 the coasts 
of Sicily were fringed by Greek communities. But these Greeks, 
though they found many sites on the coast vacant and ready for 
occupation, did not come to an uninhabited island. There had been 
at least three immigrations before them. The Sicani, an Iberian sicam 
tribe from Spain, as was believed, had built towns on heights some- 
what remote from the sea for fear of robbers and pirates. Settling 
first m the neighbourhood of Aetna, they had been frightened by its 
eruptions to the western part of the island ; where another tribe of 
unknown origin, the Elymi, were already occupying certain spots. Efymz. 
Many generations afterwards came the SiCELl, an Italian tribe Sice/i 
perhaps from Latium itself After long wars with the Sicani they at 
last came to terms with them, and agreed on frontiers. But the 
Siceh proved the most prolific or the most permanent ; and the 
island, once called by Greeks Trinacria from its three promon- 
I tones,! and perhaps by others Sicania, came to be known for all 
I time as Sicilia. When the Greeks arrived they occupied all the most 
convenient sites on the coasts, and the Siceli and other barbarians 
•pressed on both sides by Greek and Carthaginian, retreated for the 
imost part to the centre of the island. Thus in the time of 
Thucydides the distinction between these tribes and the Greek 
settlers^ was marked by the names Sicel and Siceliot (ItKeXos and 
^LKeXuoTris) ; but though the two remained distinct for some time, 
the Sicels did not succeed in maintaining a national identity. For 
a brief period, under the leadership of Ducetius, there seemed a 

L. ^^°.'" ^'^^^ '^*'"''^ ''^2 ^^ the origin of this word, see E. A. Freeman, Hisforv of 
^ictly, 1. p. 53. > y J 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 

distinction 
betiveen the 
various 
inhabitants 
ignored 
by the 
Romans. 



Greek 
/•o/o?i ies. 



chance of their becoming a nation ; but with his death (440) the 
chance passed away. The Sicel towns, mostly in the centre of the 
island gradually became Hellenised ; and by the Roman the old 
distinction between Sicel and Siceliot was almost forgotten, or only 
remembered as a matter of antiquarian interest. In recountmg the 
dealings of Rome with Sicily, Polybius, living between the second 
and third Punic wars, always calls the people Siceliots (liKeXii^yra^) ; 
though, when mentioning the immigration from Italy, he speaks of 
Siceli 1 To the Roman poets Shidi and Sica?ii afforded a convenient 
variety in naming the island or its inhabitants ; but to Roman 
historians all alike were Siculi, except the encroaching Carthagmians, 
and all alike were regarded as Greek, however much Sicel, Sicanian, 
or Klymian blood might be in their veins. 

The proportion, indeed, of cities whose inhabitants were almost 
exclusively Greek was very great. In the century and a half which 
followed the foundation of the first Greek colony at Naxos (735) 
and at Syracuse (734), new colonies sent from them or from other 
towns in Greece had fringed three sides of it as far south-west 
as Selinus and as far north-west as Himera.- Each town occupied 



•-^ Thc'principal Greek towns in .Sicily may be arranged as follows, in reference 
to their origin and approximate dates. 



I. Chalcis in Eubof.a (/tf«/«//) 
I 



Zankle 725 [Messenel 

I 



Naxos 735 [after 463 called Tmiroinenijivi\ 
i 



Himera 6(3 
Thermae 408 



My Lie (716 V) 



Catana 730 Leontini 730 



Acrae 664 



I 
Casmenae 644 



II. Corinth {Dorian) 



Syracuse 734 

__J 

I . 
Camarina 599 



I 
Aetna 466 



III. Megara(/^«/«« and Dorian jnixed) 

Thapsus, removed to Megara Hyblaea 726 

Selinus 628 

I 
Heraclea Minoa 510 

IV. Rhodes {Dorian) 



. I 
(Lindus) 

Gela 692 

Agrigentum 582 



(Cnidus) 

I 
Lipara 580 



Tyndans 395 



XVII THE PHOENICIANS IN EUROPE 



223 



as much territory surrounding it, and attained supremacy over as Its earlier 
many hamlets, as it could. Thus Sicily became for the most part inhabitants 
Hellenic : the earlier inhabitants, hemmed in from the sea between ^^1^^^'^^^^. 
Phoenician and Greek, submitted or were gradually Hellenised. 

The one non-Hellenic power of importance still remaining in the Sicilian 
island was that of Carthage. A brief sketch of the vicissitudes of <''>''^'^'-y 
the struggle between the Sicilian Greeks and the Carthaginians up '''''^ ^^'' 
to the time of the departure of Pyrrhus (275) has already been ^"inlans 
given. 1 When he left the island the Carthaginians seem quickly to MftTr" 
have repossessed themselves of all the country lying west of the river Pyrrhus. 
Halycus, which since 384 had been generally acknowledged as the 
I limit of the Carthaginian pale. Even east of this, however, their 
influence was now extending. Agrigentum was cleaving to them, 
and they were threatening the independence of the eastern half of 
the island. The one strong state which stood in their way was 
, Syracuse, with a territory including the towns Acrae, Helorus, 
I Netum, Megara, Leontini, and Tauromenium. On the death of 
' Agathocles (289) Syracuse obtained some form of democratic 5v;w?/j^ 
I government, but about 270 or 268 Hiero had used his success «W 
( in war to secure his election as king ; and it was he who pitted ^'^'''' ^^■ 
1 Roman against Carthaginian : for it was his vigorous attempt to 
crush the marauding mercenaries who had seized Messene which 
, caused an appeal from one party within that town to the Car- 
'thaginians and from the other to Rome. Hiero, indeed, soon 
\ retired from the contest, and, making a firm friendship with Rome, 
1' watched the tw^o great powers fight out the question which of them 
I was to be supreme in Sicily. 

; The Phoenicians are said to have come originally from the The ' 

j shores of the Persian Gulf. From time immemorial however they Phoc- 

I had dwelt in the north of Palestine, and Tyre had been their chief 

j town. They were active mariners and traders, and before the dawn 

I of certain history had sent out their adventurers to all parts of the 

t Mediterranean. The coasts of Asia Minor, Greece, Africa, and 

j Spain all bore traces of their presence. So also did the islands as 

I far north as Thasos, as far south as Crete and Rhodes, and as far 

, west as Sicily and Sardinia. They had even passed the Pillars of 

j Hercules, and perhaps had visited the Scilly Isles or even the 

(greater Island of Britain. Wherever there were metals to be dug, 

or goods to be exchanged, the Phoenician found his way, and left 

traces of his presence in the debris of excavated mines, or in the 

factories which had in many cases grown to be towns. Among 

these none was richer or more powerful than the famous city on the 

Gulf of Tunis. It was situated on the point of the African shore 

^ See pp. 192-194. 



mcians. 



224 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Founda- 
iion of 
Carthage 
{fli.c.814). 



Supremacy 
of Carthage 
(7) over 
other 

Phoenician 
cities. 

{2) Over 

the 

Libyans. 



where there is an ahnost soHtary break in the hne of inaccessible 
chfif, and where it stretches farthest towards Sicily, Being con- 
trasted with an older settlement called Utica, it received the name 
of the New Town — Karth-hadha, Hellenised into Karchedon and 
Latinised into Carthago. 

Both the time and the manner of its foundation are as usual 
uncertain. The tradition as to the time varied between the date 
of the foundation of Rome and a century or more earlier. Nearly 
all our authorities, however, agree in assigning its foundation to a 
band of fugitives from Tyre led by Dido, or Elissa, when she 
escaped for her life from her jealous brother Pygmalion, lid^nding 
on the coast of Africa she is said to have purchased froiii^e natives 
for the site of her city as much ground as could be- covered by an 
ox hide {pvpaa). By cutting the hide into thin shreds a sufticient area 
was enclosed, and hence the new cttadel was called Byrsa. It is true 
that Elissa is a Semitic word for a goddess, and that Byrsa is the 
corruption of another word, Bosrah, which means a "fortress." 
But tradition knows nothing of such rationalising ; and the legend, 
true or false, has at any rate been made immortal by Vergil. Per- 
haps the real truth is that the city was never " founded " at all ; but 
that a factory or emporium, like others built by the Phoenicians, was 
set up on the site of the future city, and from the advantages of its 
position gradually attracted trade and inhabitants. Its Phoenician 
origin admits of no doubt ; and the Romans showed their recognition 
of the fact by calling its inhabitants Poeni^ which, with its adjective 
Punicus., is used by their writers along with Cart/uiginietises to 
indicate the inhabitants of Phoenician Carthage. 

We do not know the steps by which Carthage attained the 
supremacy in Africa which we find her possessing at the lime of 
her earliest connexion with Rome. About the period of the 
beginning of the Roman Republic she ceased to pay rent to the 
native tribes for the site of the city : and in the course of the next 
hundred years had forced all the Libyans who were living a settled 
life in the country to become her subjects ; while the nomad tribes, 
though remaining independent, constantly supplied mercenaries to 
her armies. She had moreover established her supremacy over 
other and older Phoenician settlements in Africa, such as Tunes, 
Utica, Hippo, Leptis, and Hadrumetum. The nature of her rule over 
these dependencies seems to have been in ordinary times neither 
better nor worse than that of other great mercantile oligarchies. 
It does not appear that an invader found it easy to raise the country 
against the Carthaginian government ; and even after the first war 
with Rome, during which their subjects had been exasperated by 
increased taxation and burdensome requisitions, it was not until the 



-h 




226 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Foreign 
dominions 
of Car- 
thage. 



(/) Sicily, 
{2) Corsica 
and 

Sa7-dinia, 
[j) Spain. 



Cartha- 
giniajis in 
Sicily. 
Phoc?iician 
settlements 
at Motye, 
P anormus , 
and Soloeis. 

Lilybaeum. 



Advan- 
tages of 
the Cartha- 
ginians 
over the 
Greeks. 



mercenary war had lasted some months that certain of the towns 
w^ere induced to join the general revolt. 

But it was not only in Libya that the Carthaginians exercised 
influence or rule. Their merchants sought outlets for their traffic 
in other countries ; and when they found Phoenician factories already 
existing, or erected new ones themselves, settlers from Carthage 
were attracted and towns gradually grew into permanent import- 
ance. The earliest of such settlements were probably those in 
Sicily, followed about 500 to 480 by others in Sardinia. There 
w^ere also numerous trading centres established in Spain. But 
whereas at the opening of the Roman war Sardinia was entirely 
under the rule of Carthage, it was not until Sardinia was wrested 
from her by the Romans that systematic efforts were made to 
establish Carthaginian rule in Spain: In Sicily, as we have seen, 
the Carthaginians had firmly established themselves. Alotyc, 
Panormus, and Soloeis had been dfccupied by Phoenicians before 
them. These then were the original centres of Carthaginian 
settlement in Sicily ; and the splenaid harbour of Panormus afforded 
shelter to their largest fleets. / It was not until Motye was 
destroyed by Dionysius, in 397, teat the remnants of its Phoenician 
inhabitants took possession of tiie site of Lilybaeum and there 
erected fortifications and defences. Between that date and the 
beginning of the war with Rome/it had grown to be the strongest 
and most important city possessed by them. It was the most 
convenient point for ships coihing from Africa : it stood on a 
peninsula protected on the lancl side by a huge ditch and wall ; 
it resisted all t^e efforts of Pyi/rhus to take it ; and for ten years 
held out against, the utmost exe/tions of the Roman legions. 

Thus holding the best poinl/s on the west coast, the Carthaginians 
had for more tli^n two centuries striven for mastery over the whole 
island with the Greek settlers who had established themselves in 
other parts of it. In this struggle they had an advantage over the 
Greeks in the fact that they w^ere not merely the inhabitants of one 
Sicilian town or district contending with those of another : they 
w^ere backed by a great and powerful mother city who despatched 
and paid armies and fleets, and to whom the loss of armies as 
a rule meant the loss, not of great bodies of citizens, but of so much 
money. The Greeks had always more at stake than the Car- 
thaginians, and less power of immediate recuperation after defeat. A 
loss of a battle to the Greek cities frequently meant the loss, at any 
rate for a time, of Hberty : it often meant the destruction and 
desolation of more than one city. It was only one Greek sovereign, 
Agathocles of Syracuse, who had conceived the bold idea of 
carrying the war up to the gates of Carthage herself. To the 



Cart ha- 



XVII COMPARISON OF ROMANS AND CARTHAGINIANS 227 

Carthaginian merchants Sicily was a possession which their interests 
and their pride aHke urged them to do their utmost to retain : but 
to them the loss of one army brought no widespread mourning or 
despair ; the bulk of it consisted of foreign mercenaries who could be 
replaced by others, and whose survival at the end of a campaign was 
a matter of indifference, if not of positive disadvantage, to the home 
government. As long as their wealth held out and their fleets 
dominated the sea, there would be no hope of finally driving the 
men of Carthage from Sicily. 

Thus though the treaty of 384 fixed the Halycus as the The 
boundary of the Carthaginians, and though the victory of 
Timoleon on the Crimisus in 340 had for some years suppressed all ^^ the east 
attempts on their 'part to encroach beyond it; yet before another of the 
generation had paissed away such attempts recur again and 2ig^m. Halycus. 
Repelled by Agathocles (317-298) and by Pyrrhus (278-275), m^ 
ultimate failure or the latter once more opened a way to them. iKnd 
when the questiqn of Messene brought the Roman into SicUy, he 
found them not only safely possessed of the recognised Carthaginian 

I territory, but pus^iing their arms and influence into the e^ern half 

I of the island. ! 

( The struggle, ihowever, was not merely between the/Romans and Romans 
the Carthaginian settlers in Sicily, but between Rom&^nd Carthage, "^'^ 

'each city using ite utmost efforts and straining its/resources to the JIIjI^j] 

I full. The reasons! therefore of the final result of /{hat struggle must compared. 

(be sought in the position and character of thq'^wo peoples. Of the 
energy and public '^virtues of the Romans w€ have perhaps already 
got a sufficiently cle;ir view in following them through their struggles 
with their near nei'^hbours the La^tifis, Aequians, and Volscians, 
with the ancient civilisation of.Etruria, the intruding barbarism of 

I the Gaul, the dogged resistance of the mountaineers of Samnium, 
and the better instructed though less warlike Greek of south Italy. 
Of the Carthaginians it is less easy to gain a clear or well- 

jfounded notion. We know them almost entirely from their enemies. 

'Their literature perished with them. The conquering Roman in 
contempt bestowed the contents of the libraries of Carthage on 
the Numidian princes, and nothing survives but one short journal, 

jin a Greek version, of a naval explorer. One other book was 

(preserved and translated into Latin, Mago's treatise on agriculture, 

(and was long used as an authoritative handbook. That too has 

! perished. Even the ruins of the town are gone, as well as those of 
the Roman colony and of the mediaeval city which at long intervals of 
time occupied its site. Nature herself has aided the work of 
oblivion in altering the line of coast and changing what were once 
open bays and harbours into shallow lagoons. It is indeed a case 



228 HISTORY OF ROME 



of vae victis ! The Carthaginians grew to be a great people, spread 
their power abroad, conquered other nations and gathered wealth, until, 
coming in contact with a people stronger than themselves, they fell 
irretrievably, and with their existence as a people lost the right and 
power of making themselves heard before the world. Polybius, 
though favourable to Rome, had an admirable idea of historical 
impartiality, but though we have his narrative of the first war with 
Rome, and many valuable fragments in regard to the other two, yet 
his complete account of the constitution of Carthage has almost all 
been lost. 
Constiiu. \ He tells us that when Rome and Carthage came into collision 

tion df \ the constitution of Rome was at its zenith, that of Carthage in its 
Carthage, (decline. Constitutions, according to him, go through a regular 
cycle, beginning with kingship, which, degenerating to tyranny, is 
replaced by aristocracy — the rule of the best men. This is corrupted 
into oligarchy, and is therefore displaced by democracy. This in 
time, corrupted into mob-rule, leads once more to tyranny. In his 
view Rome was at the stage nearest to the ideally best mixture of 
absolutism, oligarchy, and democracy in which the best men bear 
sway. Carthage was at the stage when mob-rule begins. The 
degeneracy is marked by the decline in the power of the Suffetes ^ 
{Shop/ietini., "judges") and of the Gerusia or Senate, and by the 
increased interference of the people in State affairs. He cannot 
mean, however, that a formal change had taken place. There had 
always been an assembly or ecclesia, composed of all full citizens, in 
which ultimately resided the supreme power. It was a change of 
custom rather than of law. In earlier times the assembly seems not 
to have been consulted except in the case of a difference of opinion 
between the Suffetes and the Senate. It is in this respect that a 
change may perhaps be traced. It was still the Suffetes and Senate 
who received the Roman' envoys in 219, and accepted their declara- 
tion of war ; but it was apparently the general assembly which 
Hannibal persuaded to accept the terms offered by Scipio after the 
battle of Zama in 202.^ The change was a natural result of a long 
period of varying but on the whole unsuccessful war, when it would 
be impossible to suppress popular excitement, which found a vent at 
Carthage in formidable riots, and would have to be appeased by a 
reference of the measures to be taken to the popular will.^ Another 
change which had come upon the government of Carthage was in 
The the direction of oligarchy rather than democracy. The earliest 

Suffetes arrangement known to us was that by which the chief power resided 
with the Suffetes, the two "kings" elected by the people. They 

^ Always called kings {^acnXels) by Greek writers. 
" Polyb. iii. 20, 33 ; xv. 19. ^ /d. vi. 31. 



XVII CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE 229 

were not indeed confined to the members of a particular family, nor 
elected for life. But they might, it appears, be indefinitely re-elected, 
and while in office dealt with foreign states as kings ; and though 
controlled at home in some degree by the Senate,^ were supreme 
when acting as generals at the head of the army.2 But some time 
before Aristotle wrote (about B.C. 330) a change had taken place. 
Another body of 104 members, often spoken of as "the Hundred," 
had come into existence, elected originally by boards of five or 
Pentarchies. These Pentarchies had, it seems, been originally The 
elected by the people; but whether "the Hundred" filled up vacancies Hu?idrcd. 
themselves, or whether popular elections were corrupted by a vast 
system of bribery, it seems certain that by some means membership 
of " the Hundred " became like other offices the exclusive possession 
of the wealthy, and that it acquired an overwhelming power over 
every other office in the State. Like the Ephors of Sparta, the original 
function of the Hundred was to watch and control the magistrates 
rather than to administer the government itself Especially over 
the generals in command of armies, even when these generals were 
the Suffistes, their hand was heavy. It is probably a later develop- 
ment of this body that is meant by Livy in his description of the ordo 
judicum: "They held office," he says, "for hfe ; everyone's pro- 
perty, reputation, and life were in their hands. Offend one of them, 
the whole order were your enemies ; and with judges thus hostile no 
accuser was needed." It was apparently the rise of the power of 
this body that changed the position of the Suffetes. They ceased to 
command armies, and gradually became the ornamental rather than 
the real head of the State. The real power was in the hands of the 
Hundred, the body once chosen on consideration of merit, but now 
closed to all but the wealthy. The close oligarchy thus formed was 
tempered by the occasional interference of the people. But such The 
interference was not that of a body trained by the regular perform- ecdesia. 
ance of civic duties, and accustomed, like the ecclesia of a free 
Greek state, to have ordinary business brought before it. It was 
rather the occasional outburst of discontent at an incompetent or 
unsuccessful government. On the side of the governing families, 
again, there was constant jealousy of successful generals, especially 
when, as in the case of the great family of Barca, these generals 
belonged to the democratical party in the State. This jealousy 
perhaps had the useful effect of preventing the rise of a tyranny ; 
but it acted fatally in hampering and discouraging able generals, 
and preventing the growth of a feeling of civic duty, prepared to 

1 The number of the Senate is not known, but there appears to have been a 
smaller council of thirty, which practically did the business brought nominally 
before the larger body. 2 isocrates, Nico. 24. 



230 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The em- 
ployment 
of mer- 
cenaries. 



Mercen- 
aries 
compared 
with citizen 
soldiers. 



Character- 
istics 
affecting 
the result 
of the 
struggle. 



sacrifice wealth or comfort for the service or the protection of the 
State. 

This tendency was increased by the habit of employing mer- 
cenary soldiers. Some of the citizens devoted themselves to military 
affairs, and the generals were nearly always Carthaginians, while a 
larger number probably served on board ship ; but the bulk of the 
armies sent abroad were hired from other lands, from the nomad 
Africans, from Campania, Etruria, or Gaul. The advantages of a 
mercenary army are obvious. It enables a state to carry on a 
foreign war without serious interruption to business or comfort ; so 
long as victory is secured, the loss of life involved is advantageous 
rather than the reverse to the government ; the cessation of hostili- 
ties does not flood the country with a number of citizens who have 
lost taste or capacity for ordinary business or employments ; the 
men return to their own lands or to another employer, and* all obli- 
gations towards the soldiers end with discharge of the wages agreed 
upon. Such soldiers, moreover, were not liable to political influences ; 
their one object was to earn their pay, and that was best secured by 
the success of the master whom they served. On the other hand, they 
had no feeling of loyalty or patriotism, and were apt to be dangerous 
to their employers when the campaign was over, if any dispute arose 
as to the amount of pay or bounty to which they felt themselves 
entitled. Moreover, the result of the struggle with Rome would 
seem to show that after all the purchased fidelity of foreign mercen- 
aries was in the long run no sufficient match for the nobler passion 
of patriotism. "The Romans," says Polybius, "are never so dan- 
gerous as when they seem reduced to desperation." The citizen 
levies of Rome were again and again beaten by the professional 
fighters purchased by the wealth of Carthage ; the fleets of Rome 
were again and again destroyed from the incompetency of her 
navigators or the superiority of the skilled Phoenician seamen : but 
when one army perished fresh levies of citizens were ready to take 
its place ; and the waves had scarcely closed over one hastily-built 
fleet when the indefatigable Romans were felling timber and training 
rowers to form and man another. 

It is not indeed sufficient in estimating the causes of the Roman 
success to look merely to the quality of the forces that had to be 
encountered in the field. Behind these mercenary armies was a 
nation whose activity and enterprise accumulated the wealth which 
supported the fleets and armies, and the amount of whose courage 
and persistency must determine both the length and effectiveness of 
the war. When driven to bay indeed, as in the siege of their city, 
the Carthaginians showed in actual conflict a desperate courage and 
dogged resolution equalled by scarcely any people, except their 



XVII THE CITY OF CARTHAGE 231 

kinsfolk at Tyre. These qualities were not without their influence 
in protracting the long struggle with Rome. Plutarch, who is prob- 
ably copying hostile authorities, describes them as "resentful and 
gloomy, submissive to rulers, harsh to subjects, most ignoble in 
panics, most savage in wrath, p>ersistent in purpose, without taste or 
feeling for the lighter arts and graces." ^ But though their treatment 
of their Libyan subjects seems to lend a colour to one part of this 
indictment, yet neither in Sicily nor in Spain does their rule appear 
to have been uniformly disliked, and the wonderful family of Barca 
— the sons of thunder or Barak — is a sufficient proof that they could 
produce men endowed with the highest faculties both for adminis- 
tration and command. 

That in spite of great wealth and luxury, and of the possession Defects of 
of a literature, and of high skill in building and engineering, the Pi^nu. 
Carthaginians had little or no genius for art and philosophy, as S^"-'^''^^- 
understood by the Greek, seems only too likely. The Roman con- 
quered the Greek as well as the Carthaginian, but what there was 
in the Greek better than in the Roman survived and concjuered the 
conqueror. When Ambracia, Tarentum, or Corinth was sacked, 
Rome was made splendid by the works of art which the victor, if he 
did not understand, at least saw to be worth preserving. But no 
model of beauty or grace, no work of sculptor or painter, was brought 
from Carthage. No student ransacked the libraries of Carthage, and 
gave their contents in whatever new dress to Greek or Roman. No 
great teacher or reformer in thought or morals claimed Carthage as his 
i home. After all such characteristics have been taken into considera- 
I tion, whether of polity or circumstance, the ultimate reason of the 
I Roman success is best expressed by Polybius, in the memorable 
I chapter in which he discusses the causes which eventually gave the 
I Romans the victory : " The fact is that Italians as a nation are by 
I nature superior to Phoenicians and Libyans both in strength of body 
j and courage of soul." 2 That is the root of the matter, from which 
j all else is a natural growth. 

j The city of Carthage itself must at the period of the beginning The city of 

\ of the Roman war have been far superior to its rival. It was said Carthage 

I to contain 700,000 inhabitants and to embrace in its territory 

300 cities in Libya : while its foreign dominions included, besides 

j nearly two-thirds of Sicily, the Balearic Isles, Corsica and Sardinia, 

with many trading settlements in Spain south of a line joining the 

Tagus and Ebro. The hill on which was built its citadel or Byrsa 

was near the extremity of a peninsula connected with the mainland 

by an isthmus about three miles broad. To the south was the lake 

i Plut. reip. ger. praecepta, 3. ^ Polyb. vi. 52. 



dominions. 



2P 



HISTORY OF ROME chap, xvii 



bours. 



of Tunis, cut off from the open gulf by a narrow strip of land called 
the Taenia, at that time apparently with an entrance to the sea wider 
than the present Goletta, and forming an open harbour or roadstead. 
Besides this there were two artificial harbours or docks. The first 
was an oblong, nearly 1400 feet in length, surrounded by a double 
wall, with a narrow entrance from the gulf: this was called the 
" Merchants' Harbour " ; and from it again a narrow channel led 
The har- into a round harbour called the Cofhon, or " drinking cup " (also 
surrounded with strong walls), in the middle of which was an islet 
used as the headquarters of the chief admiral, and joined by a bridge 
to the road leading straight to the Forum. To the north of the 
town was a deep gulf, now also by the formation of fresh land 
become a salt lake {Salinac). Between the Byrsa and the open sea 
on the east ran a single wall, following in part a line of hills, 
which in many places required little strengthening. Towards 
the mainland the isthmus was defended, but apparently not at its 
narrowest point, by a triple line of fortifications, the outer 
wall being forty-five feet high, with towers at intervals of 200 feet. 
The spaces between the walls were occupied by barracks, magazines, 
stables for elephants, and all the munitions of war. The whole 
peninsula thus enclosed was about thirty miles in circuit, includ- 
ing the city itself and its great suburb called Megara or Magalia. 
Thus the home of the great commercial people, who were now to 
enter upon a century of struggle with Rome, at first for supremacy 
in the western Mediterranean and then for bare life, was not only a 
great city but a vast fortified and entrenched camp, stored with all 
the necessaries for sustaining a siege or carrying on war, and pro- 
tected by almost impregnable defences. 

Authorities. — The history of the Carthaginians in Sicily mostly rests on 
Diodorus Siculus xx. and onward, with notices in Strabo ii. and Plutarch's 
Thiiolcon and Pyrrhics. Our knowledge of the origin and constitution of 
Carthage, as far as they are imperfectly known, depends mainly on Polybius i. 3, 
73. 75 ; vi. 43, 45, 51, 56 ; xxvi. 4, and other passages : on scattered passages 
in Livy, such as xxviii. 37 ; xxx. 7 ; xxxiii. 46 ; his formal account of them having 
been in the lost sixteenth book, of which the epitome preserves nothing on this 
head. The most continuous narrative is that of Justin, xviii. 3-7 ; xix. 1-3, and 
books xxii. and xxiii. An important notice appears in Aristotle, Pol. ii. 11, and 
some particulars are given in Appian, Pun. 1,2; and more details as to situation 
and general history by Strabo xvii. 3 14, 15, and other passages. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR 
264-242 



COLONIES 






TRIBES 




Aesernia in Samnium 
Aesium in Unibria 


B.C. 
B.C. 


263 
247 


Velina \ 
guirina / 


B.C. 241 


Alsium in Etruria 


B.C. 


247 


PROVINCES 




Fregenae in Etruria . 


B.C. 


24s 


. Sicily . 

Corsica and Sardinia 


B.C. 241 


Brundisium in Calabria 


B.C. 


244 


B.C. 23S 


Spoletium in Umbria 


B.C. 


241 


CKNSUS 
B.C. 265 
B.C. 252 
B.C. 245 


292,224 
297,797 
251,222 



I 

'First Punic war— First Period (264-262) — Help sent to Messana at the request of 

' the Mamertini — Claudius enters Messana — Battle with Hiero, and with the 

( Carthaginians — The siege of Syracuse (263) — The consuls lay siege to Agri- 

1 gentum — Hiero makes alliance with Rome — Many cities in Italy join the 

\ Romans — Fall of Agrigentum (262). Second Period (261-255) — The 

Romans build a fleet — Loss of the consul Scipio — Victory of Duilius at 

i Mylae (260) — Relief of Segesta, siege of Hippana, Mytistratuni, Camarina 

(259-258) — Naval battle off Tyndaris (257) — Battle of Ecnomus, the 

Romans land in Africa : after successful campaign Regulus is left for the 

winter at Clupea with half the army (256) — Defeat and capture of Regulus 

(255). 

From the long struggle with the Samnite and the war with Pyrrhus Causes of 
I the Romans emerged masters of Italy from Cis-Alpine Gaul to i/w jealousy 

Rhegium. They had suffered much, but were the more vigorous: f,^^^'' 

and elate with their triumph they were eagerly looking out for oppor- "^ 
jtunities of recruiting their forces and enlarging their field of com- 
jmercial enterprise. But in whichever direction th^y turned their 

eyes for such purposes they were confronted by the power of Car- 
ithage. Her supremacy at sea was as yet beyond the thought of 
jrivalry. She had lodgment in Corsica, was supreme in Sardinia, and 
«held Lipara and other islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas, 



234 HISTORY OF ROME 



thus threatening the whole western coast of Italy. Though as yet 
Rome had no political or military dealings with Spain, yet her 
merchants, if they entered it, would find Phoenician settlements and 
Carthaginian rivalry. But it was on the south that the danger 
seemed most imminent. Half Sicily was already Carthaginian, 
and it seemed likely that the eastern portion of the island, whenever 
opportunity served, would be absorbed by the same encroaching 
power. If that were to take place, if Messana was held by a 
Carthaginian garrison, or if the ships of Carthage were to ride at 
will in the harbour of Syracuse, there would be little doubt that the 
cities of southern and south-eastern Italy would soon have to fight 
for their freedom ; and at any rate Roman commerce would be 
hemmed in and curtailed on every side. Jealousy between the two 
peoples was inevitable. It was well, after the quarrel had begun, to 
appeal to the conduct of the Carthaginians at Tarentum in 272,1 or 
to the intrigues of Rome with Hiero : the immediate excuse mattered 
little ; the two nations were bound sooner or later to decide which 
should be supreme in the western Mediterranean, and that decision 
could only be by war. 
The The actual excuse for hostilities was furnished by the Mamertines. 

At the death of Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, in 289, some of his 



Mavier 
tines. 



Marmor, the Oscan form of Mars, — seized on the town of Messana. 
Having been hospitably entertained by the Messanians they got 
possession of the citadel, massacred or expelled the fullgrown 
citizens, and retained the women and children for their own use, 
dividing the territory among themselves. This lawless occupation 
of a Greek town, and the cruel murder or exile of Greek citizens, was 
bad enough ; but they also used the town thus taken as a starting- 
place from which to plunder the country and attack cities as 
far as Gela and Camarina. The only State which was capable of 
resisting them was Syracuse. Year by year her mercenary troops 
were employed during the summer in waylaying plundering 
parties from Messana or threatening the town itself But the 
intestine disorders which generally broke out as soon as the troops 
were on the march paralysed the effectiveness of the Syracusan 
operations. It was not until a quarrel between the citizens and the 
army had resulted in the rise to power of the bold and active Hiero, 
that attacks were made upon the Mamertines sufficiently concentrated 
and formidable to make it necessary for them to look elsewhere for 
help. As soon as he had obtained supreme power in the State, 
and had got rid of the mercenary army, to which to some extent he 

^ See p. 199. 



XVIII KING HIERO AND THE MAMERTINES 235 

owed his own advancement, Hiero drilled levies of citizens, that Hicro 
he might no longer be at the mercy of the new mercenaries which becomes 
he had hired, and in two or three years felt strong enough to strike '''^^'^^ ^^^ 
an effective blow at the Mamertines^ who had been encouraged by alon^Tjj. 
long suspension of Syracusan attacks to carry on their plundering 
excursions with greater confidence than usual. On the plain of Victory 
Mylae he inflicted a severe defeat upon them, taking many important of Mylae, 
prisoners and shutting the rest up in their town, which was only f^*^- ^^^''^ 
saved from capture by the help of a Carthaginian force under ^-^^^^ ^jr 
Hannibal, of whom, however, the Mamertines appear to have got Syracuse. 
rid again shortly afterwards. This victory secured Hiero the title of 
king ; and it was gained about the same time that the Romans 
had captured the mutinous garrison at Rhegium. Whilst Rhegium 
was in the hands of men guilty of the same crime as the Mamertines 
the two towns had been in league, and had mutually supported 
each other in their depredations. This was now at an end ; and 
the Mamertines, so far from being able to plunder the country at 
will, were in constant fear for the safety of their town and their own 
lives before the ever-increasing power of Hiero. But there was a A Cartha- 
conflict of opinion among them as to the source from which help g^^"'^^^ 
should be sought. Some were for inviting a Carthaginian garrison, ^llessana 
others for applying to Rome. The Carthaginians, however, were 
the nearest ; and, whilst the application to Rome was still pending, 
Hanno arrived at Messana, and having effected a compromise between 
Hiero and the Mamertines, occupied the acropolis with his garrison. 

When news of this reached Rome (towards the end of 265) it The 
brought the negotiation with the Mamertine embassy to a crisis. ^?'7""^ 
There had been some hesitation. The Senate, it is said, had been ^^^^ ^^^. 
eml^arrassed by a conflict of feeling : on the one hand it was clearly to the 
necessary to check the spread of Carthaginian influence in a part Mamer- 
of Sicily so closely connected with Italy ; on the other it seemed '^"^•^' ^^^• 
inconsistent to help the Mamertines after having recently punished 
with inflexible sternness the crime committed by their own men at 
Rhegium. The Senate finally resolved to leave the people to take 
the responsibility of the decision upon themselves. It may well be 
doubted, however, whether it was the moral side of the question 
which caused this hesitation. The two cases were not strictly 
parallel. The treacherous garrison at Rhegium consisted of their 
own soldiers, the deed was a breach of the military oath and an 
act of mutiny, which deserved military punishment. But with the 
right or the wrong of the action of the Mamertines the Romans had 
nothing to do. It was at that time no business of the Roman 
government how a Greek town in Sicily was inhabited or deprived 
of its inhabitants. It was not the first time in the history of 



236 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Reasons/or Messaiia itself that such an event had taken place ; and many other 
hesitatio7u towns in Sicily had been at various times deprived of their population 
and repeopled by a conqueror. What was it to the Roman whether 
Greek or Campanian dwelt at Messana ? Moreover, right or wrong, 
the Mamertines had now been there twenty-four years. The genera- 
tion of the original robbers was doubtless passing away, and a new 
generation growing up, some of whom were children at the time of 
the capture, and others born since of the Greek women whom the 
Mamertines retained as captives and wives. A mixed race of 
inhabitants, only partly responsible for the crime, now held the 
town, with whom a foreign nation might have dealings without grave 
discredit in an age in which such violent changes were not un- 
common. It seems more reasonable to suppose that the hesitation 
of the Senate was caused by the importance of the step they were 
asked to take. The Romans had indeed been constantly engaged 
in struggles leading to aggrandisement; but these acquisitions of 
territory had as yet, with the exception of one insignificant island, 
been all within the shores of Italy. They were now for the first 
time to transport an army across the sea and to interfere in another 
land. Moreover, it could not fail to be clear to the Senate that, on 
whatever pretext they might go to Sicily, their act would be regarded 
as an hostile one by Carthage and would certainly involve war. It 
is true that in the commercial treaty of 306 the Carthaginian domain 
in Sicily was clearly distinguished. But Carthaginian influence 
had not been confined to definite limits, and Carthaginian armies 
had often appeared east of the Halycus ; interference by Rome in 
any part of Sicily would undoubtedly be resented by Carthage, and 
especially at Messana, for just before the occupation of the town by 
the Mamertines the Messanians had joined the Carthaginian alliance. 
Such considerations might well cause the Senate to hesitate. But 
when the question came before the people they were troubled by no 
scruples and few fears. Though the wars with the Samnites and in 
Magna Graecia had poured great wealth into Rome and enriched the 
exchequer as well as individual citizens, the farmers had suffered much 
both from actual damage and from having been obliged to neglect 
their farms to serve in the army. The recent introduction of silver 
coinage had turned their attention to commerce, for which Sicily was 
the natural sphere ; and they looked upon a distant war as likely to 
bnng wealth into the country without causing them damage, while the 
military class were eager for fresh opportunities of gaining reputation 
and ]:)lunder. The help asked for by the Mamertines, therefore, was 
promptly voted ; and one of the consuls for 264, Appius Claudius 
Caudex — the last name, it is said, being gained by the attention he 
had paid to shipbuilding — was appointed to lead the expedition. 



The people 
decide to 
help the 
Mamer- 
tines. 



XVIII THE ROMANS BORROW SHIPS 



237 



For many years past the Romans had had some sort of a navy, 264. 
and as far back as 311 two commissioners had been appointed for Coss. 
building and refitting ships. But the business had been negligently ^PP^^^_ 
performed, and at this time they not only did not possess any warships ^Caudex^ 
of the first class, but had not even a sufficient supply of transports. M. Fidvius 
It was not yet in contemplation to fight the Carthaginians at sea. Flaccus. 
The expedition to Sicily would, doubtless, lead to a struggle with ^A^^^ 
them, but it would be settled by the legions on land. Still the ^^//^J^T^ 
troops must be conveyed thither, and when coasting down the shore 
of Italy, or crossing the straits, narrow as they were, the vessels were 
liable to be attacked and destroyed by the warships of Carthage. 
They therefore hired or borrowed quinqueremes and triremes from 
Tarentum, Locri, Elea, and Naples to supplement and convoy such 
transports as they possessed. But these preparations consumed 
some time ; and meanwhile Hanno and his Carthaginian garrison 
were in occupation of Messana, and a Carthaginian fleet was protect- 
ing its harbour. To counteract this Appius Claudius despatched a 
small squadron of ships in advance, under the command of a military 
tribune Gains Claudius, to Rhegium. Gains visited the town more 
than once in a small vessel to negotiate with the Romanising party, 
but failed to obtain the expulsion of the Carthaginian garrison ; and 
when he attempted to force his way into the harbour with his 
squadron, he was caught in a storm in which several of his ships were 
driven on shore. Not discouraged he retired to Rhegium and set 
i about refitting and repairing his ships. Hanno, whose cue it was to 
I assume the attitude of a disinterested third party, and to leave to the 
I Romans the onus of beginning a war, sent back the stranded ships, 
I offered to restore the prisoners, and invited Gains Claudius to main- 
I tain peace. 

Claudius would accept nothing ; and Hanno in anger boasted 
I that he would not allow the Romans so much as to wash their hands 
I in the sea. But having repaired his fleet, and studied the nature of Gai 



the currents in the straits, Claudius at length brought his ships into 
the harbour and entered the town. He was received with enthusiasm 
by the Mamertines, already tired of their Carthaginian protectors. 
Hanno, having imprudently consented to join in the conference 
between Claudius and the Mamertine leaders, was seized, and after 
a short confinement was allowed to leave the town with his men. 
The Carthaginians put Hanno to death for thus losing Messana, and 
immediately formed an alliance with Hiero to attack the town. It 
was not necessarily a declaration of war Avith Rome, and, indeed, 
such formal declaration does not seem ever to have been made ; it 
was the Mamertines whom both they and Hiero were to attack ; it 
,was their joint interest to destroy a den of freebooters and robbers. 



I us 
Claudius 
enters 
Messana. 



238 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The consul 

Appius 

Claudius 

Caudex 

enters 

Alessana, 

264. 



Appius 
defeats 
Hiero, 



and the 
Cartha- 
ginians. 



Nevertheless from this time forward it was a struggle between Rome 
and Carthage for supremacy, and all other questions became of 
minor importance. The Carthaginian fleet was ordered to anchor 
at Pelorus, while a land force was to co-operate with Hiero, who 
had taken up a position on the " Chalcidic Mount," part of the 
range of hills extending to Tauromenium. 

This was the position of affairs when the consul Appius arrived 
at Rhegium with his main army in the summer of 264. Though the 
town was invested on one side by the Carthaginians and on the 
other by Hiero, he boldly crossed the strait by night to avoid an 
encounter with the Carthaginian fleet, and threw himself and his 
army into the town. The protection of the Roman army would not 
have availed the Mamertines long if the investment had continued, 
because the Carthaginian command of the sea made the bringing 
in of provisions hazardous, if not impossible. Appius, therefore, 
resolved to get rid of the besieging armies, if possible by negotiation, 
and, if that failed, by force. Hiero had on former occasions shown 
an inclination to be friends with Rome, and the treaty with Carthage 
was still nominally in force. It might be possible to induce both to 
retire and leave the town under the care of the Romans, who should 
be answerable for the future peaceful conduct of the inhabitants. 
Both, however, rejected the advances. The Carthaginians were 
resolved to prevent the Romans from getting a footing in Sicily. 
Hiero's chief aim was to maintain Syracusan independence ; it was 
necessary for that purpose not to break with the power likely in the 
end to prevail, and at present that power seemed to be Carthage. 

Appius therefore resolved on fighting. On the morning after the 
failure of the negotiation he led out his troops against Hiero. The 
engagement was long and obstinate, and some historians represent 
Hiero as victorious. But if so, Polybius pertinently asks, why did 
Hiero abandon his camp in the night and retire to Syracuse ? The 
fact, indeed, that he still occupied his camp in the evening after the 
battle shows that his defeat was not ruinous ; but it was sufficient to 
convince him that he could not overcome the Romans in the field. 
Elated with his success Appius resolved on attacking the Cartha- 
ginians also. Having given his men a day's rest he sallied out at 
sunrise. He was again successful ; he drove the Carthaginians from 
their position, and the survivors sought the protection of the nearest 
towns. The siege of Messana being thus raised, Appius scoured the 
country between it and Syracuse, and finally sat down before Syra- 
cuse itself. But the army was not provisioned for a long siege, and 
once more Syracuse was saved by the unhealthiness of the district 
round it. In the sallies made from the town Hiero appears to have 
been as often successful as the Romans, the consul himself on one 



XVIII THE FRIENDSHIP OF HIERO 239 

occasion all but falling into the hands of the enemy. Before break- 
ing up his camp, however, Appius ascertained that Hiero was inclined 
to make terms. Satisfied with that he led off his army, and, leaving Triumphs 
a garrison in Messana, returned to Rome, which he was allowed to of Appuis 
enter in triumph, as was also his colleague Fulvius Flaccus, who had y"^^^,^-^^^. 
been engaged in suppressing a rising of the Volsinians. Flaccus. 

Such were the results of the first year of a war destined to last 
for twenty-four. They were considered satisfactory at Rome, and it 
was resolved that the establishment of Roman influence in Sicily 
should be pushed with even greater energy in the next campaign. 
Both consuls in 263 were sent to Sicily, each with the regular con- 263. Coss. 
sular army of two legions. The arrival of this formidable force at M' . 
once gave rise to a wide-spread movement among the Sicilian cities. ^ alcnus 
Even at Segesta, long a faithful ally of Carthage, the citizens mas- ^y/-*"^"'-^- 
sacred the Carthaginian garrison and handed over the town to the otacilius 
consuls. This movement, and a defeat at the hands of the consul Crassus. 
Valerius,! convinced Hiero that the Romans were destined eventually ^^lovcmcnt 
to be the victors. He therefore determined to quit his alliance \^^^ ^^^'JJ^,. 
with the Carthaginians, which must have always been distasteful of Roman 
to him, and made offers of peace and friendship to the Romans, alliance. 
The co-operation of Syracuse was of great importance to them, Hiero 
especially as a source of supplies ; the offers were gladly accepted, makes 

and Hiero remained the active and faithful friend of Rome to the end /■''^ff^ 

.... , J with Rome. 

of his life. With great skill he maintained the independence and 

neutrality of his kingdom through all the chances and changes of 

the war, devoting himself to internal reforms, and to attracting the 

admiration of his subjects by success in the great games in Greece. 

Alarmed at the defection of Hiero, and feeling certain that Great prc- 
the Romans would not long be content with merely protecting such parations 
Greek towns as joined their alliance, the Carthaginians made great ^^^^^^^' 
efforts to increase their forces in Sicily. Fresh recruits were enlisted 
from the Ligurians, Celts, and Iberians ; and Agrigentum, as the 
strongest and most important town on the south coast, was selected 
as their headquarters. It had no harbour and stood some three 
miles back from the coast, but it was convenient for operations in 
the central districts, and into it they collected the bulk of their war 
material. Thus the second year of the war (263) passed without any 
striking event. The Carthaginians were collecting their forces : the 
Romans were securing such of the cities as voluntarily joined them. 

The next consuls took a more decided line. When Lucius 
Postumius and Ouintus Mamilius came to Sicily, the threatening 
nature of the preparations at Agrigentum could no longer be over- 
looked. They resolved that their whole energies must be directed 
^ Mentioned only by Pliny, A"^. //. 35, § 22. 



240 



HISTORY OF ROME 



262. Coss. 
Lucius 
Postumius 
Megellus, 

Q- 

Mamilius 
Vitulus. 



Siege of 
Agri- 
gent urn. 



Fall of 

Agri- 

gentum. 



to its capture. Both consular armies were accordingly concentrated 
within a mile from its walls. The citadel stood on a steep hill about 
three miles from the shore, while the town and its temples lay to the 
south-east, lower down the slope, the whole being enclosed in the 
fork formed by the union of the rivers Hypeas and Akragas. At the 
mouth of these combined streams there was merely a piece of open 
beach, with no good haven for ships. Help therefore could not be 
expected from the sea. But the commander in the town, Hannibal 
son of Gisco, showed great spirit ; inflicted more than one severe 
defeat on the Roman foraging parties ; and even made an assault on 
the camp, which was only repulsed with considerable loss. The 
consuls had hitherto been in one camp ; they now separated and 
fortified two, one on the south between the city and the sea near 
the temple of Asklepios, the other to the west of the town in 
the direction of Heraclea, from which succour would be likely to 
come to the garrison. Communication between the camps was 
maintained by a line of pickets, and the Romans drew their supplies 
from Herbessus, a small town in the neighbourhood, to which corn 
and cattle were sent by cities allied to them. For five months the 
siege went on without important incident ; but as there were 50,000 
persons in the town the food began to run short. Hannibal had 
been able however to keep up communication with Carthage, and a 
fresh army, with more elephants, was sent to join Hanno at Heraclea 
to enable him to relieve Agrigentum. Thus reinforced Hanno 
seized Herbessus, the source of their supplies, reducing the Romans 
almost to the position of a besieged garrison. They were besides 
suffering from an epidemic, and must inevitably have raised the 
siege had not Hiero contrived to throw sufficient supplies into 
their camp to enable them to hold out. For two months they 
sustained nearly daily attacks from Hanno, in one of which their 
cavalry was tempted out b/ Numidian skirmishers and suffered 
heavily. But though the Romans were in great difiiculties, the 
Agrigentines were in still worse, and Hannibal kept warning Hanno 
by signals and messages that his men were deserting, and that he 
could not hold out against the famine much longer. Hanno there- 
fore determined to risk a general engagement. The Romans were 
eager to accept it ; and, after a severe struggle, broke the Cartha- 
ginian lines, inflicted a terrible slaughter on the flying enemy, 
and captured their baggage and most of their elephants. But the 
fatigue of the battle, or the carouse after the victory, caused the 
watches of the night to be somewhat negligently kept ; and Hannibal 
took advantage of this to lead out his garrison across the Roman 
trenches. At daybreak the Romans discovered what had happened, 

They 



XVI II FALL OF AGRIGENTUM 



241 



did not however attempt a pursuit, but proceeded to occupy and 

plunder the town, from which 25,000 prisoners were sold into 

slavery. 

Thus after a siege of seven months, during which the Romans 

are said to have lost 30,000 men, — many of them perhaps Sicilian 

allies, — this stronghold of the Carthaginians passed into Roman 

hands in the winter of 262-261. Its fall marks a period in the war ; Effect of 

it settled the question of superiority on land in favour of Rome, the fall of 

The Carthaginians, in spite of some successes in detail, never had -^V 

1 1 r • • c- -1 • Ti gentum, 

a real chance of recovermg supremacy m Sicily again. Hence- 262. 

forward their hold upon the island is rather a desperate clinging to 

certain strong points on the western coast : while the Romans from 

this time steadily aimed not only at confining the influence and 

arms of the Carthaginians to their own territory, but at driving them 

out of the island. 

But the events of the next year (261), though not on the whole 261 tiot 

unfavourable to the Roman arms, showed that this aim was in- ^"^^^^^'^ 



by any 
great event. 



capable of realisation as long as the Carthaginians were masters 

of the sea. It was comparatively easy to win or force to their 

allegiance the inland towns ; but those on the western and northern 

coasts were held in terror by the Carthaginian fleets, and could not 

become Roman even if they wished it. An able commander named 

Hamilcar ^ was sent to supersede Hanno, and was active in sailing 

along the coasts of Sicily and even making descents upon Italy : 

and in spite of their defeat at Agrigentum the Carthaginians were 

now besieging the Roman garrison at Segesta ; while a detachment 

of their forces was sent to strengthen Sardinia. The Romans 261-260. 

therefore determined to build a fleet. ^^^ 

It was a resolution of singular daring in the circumstances. The , ^^'^^^^ 
vast superiority of the modern ironclad makes it difficult to conceive fi^^f 
a parallel at the present time ; a nearer analogy would be the 
English or Dutch of the sixteenth century venturing to attack the 
galleons of a Spanish Armada with vessels collected from the 
merchants of their own land. Though the Romans possessed some Their dis- 
merchant marine, and had even employed ships of war at times, advaritages 
they do not seem to have had any of the larger kind, the quiit- 'Compared 
quere7ncs, which the Phoenician builders constructed for the Cartha- (j^^.^lJ 
ginian navy. The ships in the port of Tarentum had been easily ginians. 
destroyed by the Tarentine triremes, and naval affairs seem to 
have been neglected since that time (281). Thus, when they first 
crossed to Sicily they had, as we saw, to send elsewhere for ships ; 
and now that it became necessary to build a fleet, they had neither 

1 Not Hamilcar Barcas, the father of Hannibal. 
R 



242 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



260. 

Coss. Cn. 

Cornelius 

Scipio 

Asina, 

Gains 

Duilius. 



The 
Roman 
fleet is 
launched. 



shipbuilders capable of constructing gjimqiicremes nor sailors cap- 
able of rowing and managing them. The case of the Carthaginians 
was very different. Like their ancestors at Tyre, they had long 
been renowned for the number and size of their ships, the skill 
of their rowers and pilots, and their dexterity in practising the 
manoeuvres which gave the trained crew the superiority over the 
untrained. Their navy was the source of their power, and was held 
in proportionably high esteem. It was not, like their army, served 
by foreign mercenaries. They might at times hire rowers or com- 
pel their slaves to labour at the oar, but the bulk of the crews were 
composed of citizens to whom seamanship was a life-long profession. 
Their captains and pilots were no amateurs ; long practice and 
experience had given them minute knowledge of the coast-line, the 
harbours of refuge, the bays and headlands, and the points of danger. 
They had studied the stars and the signs of the sky, and knew when 
to expect foul weather and when it was prudent to trust to the open 
sea. Thus, though they had often suffered defeat on land, no one 
for a long time past had seriously disputed their supremacy at sea. 
That the Romans, entirely without these advantages, — without pro- 
fessional seamen, and without even the practical knowledge of the 
conditions in which it was possible to sail, — should hope with a fleet 
of hastily-built ships and with half-trained crews to meet and check 
this great maritime power, must have seemed almost incredible 
presumption. 

All through the winter and early spring the preparations went on. 
The ships were built on the model of a Punic quinquereme which 
had been stranded on the Italian shore of the Straits during the first 
year of the war ; and such of the citizens as were to be employed in 
the service were trained on wooden platforms in the proper move- 
ments of rowing. The bulk of the crews however were obtained 
from maritime allies, as the name long retained by their sailors 
{socii navalcs) shows. By the spring of 260 the great undertaking 
was accomplished ; the ships were launched and put under the 
command of one of the consuls, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, while the 
other consul Gains Duilius went to Sicily to relieve the besieged 
garrison of Segesta. After a brief preliminary practice in real sea- 
rowing they started for Messana, the consul himself preceding the 
main body by a few days with a squadron of seventeen ships. 

The first encounter with the enemy was disastrous. When 
Scipio arrived at Messana he was met by an offer to put the island 
of Lipara into his hands. Conceiving that it would be a valuable 
place for stores for the fleet, he sailed thither with his seventeen 
vessels. But he had not taken into account the rapidity of the 
hostile fleet. Hannibal was at Panormus, and, the movement of 



XVIII THE FIRST ENCOUNTER AT SEA 243 

Cornelius becoming promptly known to him, he despatched Boodes 
with twenty ships by night ; and when day broke Scipio found him- 
self blockaded in the harbour of Lipara. The crews of the Roman Scipio is 
ships ran their vessels ashore and fled, and Scipio was .obliged to taken 
surrender himself and his ships. Hannibal then put out to P'''-'^^'^"^^'' 
sea with fifty ships to watch for the approach of the main Roman 'l^^^''^"'^^' 
fleet ; but falling in with it unexpectedly as it rounded a promon- 
tory of the Italian coast,i he lost the greater part of his ships 
and barely escaped with his life. The Roman fleet therefore 
arrived in good spirits at Messana ; but were there greeted with 
the news of the capture of their commander, and the loss of his 
seventeen ships. The officers at once sent for the other consul 
Gaius Duilius from Segesta, and meanwhile made active prepara- 
tions for fighting the Punic fleet. They were conscious of their 
inferiority in naval tactics. They did not understand, as the Cartha- 
ginians did, how to manoeuvre a vessel so as to bring her beak crash- 
ing into an enemy's broadside ; how to dash through the enemy's 
line, and turning rapidly to charge stern or side ; how to sweep 
away his oars by a swift rush past, or practise other feats which 
required great command over the vessel and long and laborious train- 
ing. They therefore determined on another method of fighting, 
which, however rough and unscientific, would make the victory 
depend on the fighting men on deck, of whose superiority to the enemy 
they felt confident. The object of the contrivance was to enable 
these men to board an enemy's vessel and fight as though on land. 
To effect this they constructed a wooden gangway or boarding The corvi. 
bridge on each vessel, swinging round a pole fixed in the prow. 
Its extremity was elevated by a rope which ran through a 
pulley at the top of the pole, and had on its lower side a sharp 
iron spike. The machine was so arranged that it could be swung 
backwards and forwards according to the direction of the enemy's 
ship. The plan was to run as close to an enemy as possible, and to 
swing round the boarding-bridge till its end could drop upon his 
deck. The two ships would thus be grappled together. If they 
were close alongside, the Roman soldiers would leap on board ; 
or if the spike dropped on the enemy's prow or stern, they would 
board by means of the gangway two abreast, resting their shields 
on the railing which ran along each side of the gangway. The 
machines were called corvi or "crows." 

By the time that these preparations were completed Duilius 
arrived. Hearing that the Carthaginian fleet was plundering the 

^ Polybius (i. 21) calls it " The promontory of Italy," to ttjs 'iToXirjs 
aKpwTTjpLOv. He perhaps means the promontory below Hippo, C. Vaiicano, which 
might to Sicihans be the promontory of Italy. 



244 



HISTORY OF ROME 



BaUle of 
Mylae. 



Effects of 
the victory 
of Mylae. 



coast near Mylae, he determined to sail at once to the attack. 
Hannibal was ready to meet him, feeling a natural confidence in the 
superior skill of his seamen and the better construction of his ships. 
But this very confidence turned out to the advantage of the Romans. 
On board a huge galley with seven banks of oars, which had once 
belonged to king Pyrrhus, and followed by 130 ships, he did not 
condescend to have recourse to any manoeuvres. His ships charged 
prow to prow just as they came up in loose order, without attempt- 
ing any of the usual oblique movements. The Punic captains indeed 
were puzzled at the novel appearance of the " crows," but felt so sure 
of an easy victory that they took no precautions against a danger 
which they did not fully understand. But as they steered confi- 
dently upon the Roman ships, they suddenly found their vessels 
grappled to those of the enemy, and the Roman soldiers pouring 
over the ships' sides. Thirty of the leading vessels were thus 
captured with their crews, and among these the admiral's seven- 
banked galley, though he himself escaped in a boat. Thereupon 
the other Carthaginians abandoned the direct charge, and, trusting 
to their speed, attempted to row round the Roman ships and charge 
them on stern or broadside. But the " crows," swinging easily 
round, proved again effective, and by one means or another twenty 
more Carthaginian ships were taken or sunk,i and the rest fled back 
to Panormus, from which place Hannibal took the remnants of his 
fleet back to Carthage. 

The immediate effect of this victory was to enable Duilius to 
relieve Segesta. He could now coast along the island and land his 
men near enough to reach the town easily. In nine days he forced 
the Carthaginians to raise the siege ; and on his way back to the 
fleet carried Macella by assault.^ The Carthaginians indeed had 
one stroke of good fortune. The Sicilian allies of the Roman army 
were encamped between Thermae and Paropus, — having it seems 
had some quarrel about precedence on the field, — and the vigilant 
Hamilcar from Panormus surprised and killed some 4000. Still 
the Carthaginians in Sicily were confined more closely than ever to 
their strong places on the west and north-west coast from Panormus 



^ These are the numbers of Polybius (i. 23). Those given in the transcripts 
of the surviving cobinuia rostrata are a restoration from Orosius and Eutropius, — 
thirty-one taken and thirteen sunk. Polybius says nothing of sinking vessels as 
opposed to taking them. 

^ The site of Macella is uncertain, but its capture was looked upon as of 
sufficient importance to be put upon the colunina rostrata : ". , . Aiacelamque 
opidum pucnando cepit." The fragment of Parian marble still existing at Rome 
is generally admitted to be a restoration of the Imperial time. Still, as Quintilian 
and Pliny both regarded it as antique, the inscription itself can hardly be a fanciful 
composition of an antiquary. It is very likely an exact copy of the original. 



XVIII REDUCTION OF CORSICA 245 

to Lilybaeum ; while the result to the Romans was more far-reaching. 
By the victory of Mylae Rome had become a naval power, aiid 
not only could threaten the Carthaginian position in Corsica and 
Sardinia and other islands, but might even invade their African 
home. As soon as they heard of the Roman ship-building, the 
Carthaginians had strengthened their force in Sardinia, rightly 
thinking that the Romans would begin with the islands. Thus 
we find that next year only one consul went to Sicily, while 2sg. Coss. 
the other consul Lucius Scipio was sent to Corsica. He took L. Cor- 
the chief town Aleria, expelled the Carthaginians, and forced the '''^^"' 
Corsicans to give hostages. 1 He then went to Sardinia and ^'/^j','" 
blockaded the mouth of a harbour in which Hannibal, who had been Aquilllus 
sent there from Carthage after his defeat at Mylae, was lying at Floras. 
anchor. He inflicted so much loss on the Carthaginians that they 
mutinied and crucified Hannibal. Scipio had not sufficient force to 
attempt the conquest of Sardinia; but his expedition showed the 
change in the maritine position of Rome caused by the victory of 
Mylae. It is no wonder therefore that Duilius received all the 
honours his fellow-citizens could give. His was the first naval triumph 
ever celebrated. Appius Claudius had perhaps led Carthaginians in 
his procession to the Capitol ; but the triumph of Duilius was The 
rendered conspicuous by the spoils of ships, and — what was almost triumph of 
a novelty in Rome— by great heaps of gold and silver coins (probably ^'''^''''^ 
Sicilian nuinmi\ valued at not less than 3,000,000 asses. Two 
columns, adorned with beaks of ships, were erected in his honour, 
one near the Circus and another near the speaker's platform between 
the Comitium and Forum ; and he was allowed throughout his life 
to return from public banquets preceded by a torchbearcr and 
a piper. 

While Scipio was attacking Corsica and Sardinia, his colleague 2^9. 
Florus was in Sicily. But it seems that the Roman interests in that ^^(^Hy- 
island did not make rapid progress. Hamilcar was an active and 
formidable enemy, and while Florus found the strong town of 
Mytistratus (of uncertain site) so difficult to take that he remained 
all the winter before it, Hamilcar was strengthening Drepana, to 
which he transferred the inhabitants of Eryx. At home the vast Troubles 
increase of the slaves, owing to the Sicilian victories, joined to a in Rome. 
great influx of south Italian shipbuilders, had caused an outbreak, or 
the fear of an outbreak, of a servile insurrection. The year 259, 
therefore, was not altogether a prosperous one for Rome. The next 
consulship, however, was more active. Mytistratus was taken l^y 

^ His tomb is still extant ; in the inscription we read kcc cepit Corsica 'Aleria- 
(jue urbe. 



246 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



2^8. Coss 

A. AHlius 

Calatinus, 

Gaius 

Snlpiciiis 

Paterculus. 

Heroism of 
a military 
tribune at 
Camarina. 



Beginning 
of opera- 
tions in 
Africa 
258. 



2S7- 

Indecisive 
battle off 
Tyndaris. 



2j6. Coss. 
L. Manlius 
Vulso, M. 
Atilius 
RegulusII. 
Imtnense 
fleets pre- 
pared on 
cither side. 



Atilius, and its inhabitants enslaved, while the Carthaginian garri- 
son escaped by night. Hippana (of uncertain site), Camarina, 
and Enna also fell ; but an attack on the island of Lipara was 
repulsed. These and similar achievements in 258 and 257 were 
not accomplished without difficulty and loss. At Camarina 
especially, the Roman army nearly met with a great disaster. On 
their march they fell into an ambush, and must have been cut to 
pieces but for the heroism of a military tribune, whose name is 
variously given as O. Caedicius, M. Calpurnius, or Laberius. With 
300 men he marched on to a conspicuous piece of rising ground, 
and diverted the attention of the enemy. Nearly all of the 300 
were cut to pieces, as they knew they must be, but the consul 
Calatinus was able to lead off his army. The heroic tribune, though 
covered with wounds, appears to have survived. 

A new departure was now contemplated at Rome, One of the 
consuls for 258, Gaius Sulpicius, had been engaged in some success- 
ful operations in Sardinia, and encouraged by them had sailed for 
the African coast, destroyed part of a fleet sent to oppose him, and 
made several descents upon the land, but had finally been forced by 
Hanno to retire. Next year (257) the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus 
took special pains with the navy, and in an engagement off Tyndaris, 
on the Sicilian coast, opposite Lipara, though some of his advanced 
ships were taken or sunk, captured ten of the enemy's ships and sunk 
eight. Both sides had suffered, and the battle may be considered 
drawn. But in the following year unusual efforts were made on 
both sides. The Romans were resolved to transfer the war to 
Africa, the Carthaginians to destroy the Roman fleet before it could 
reach their shores. If the Roman army once landed in Africa, they 
knew that not only would it be difficult to beat in itself, but that it 
would probably be joined by numbers of discontented Libyans and 
Numidians, and that their city must prepare to stand a siege. 
They therefore made immense preparations for a battle at sea. The 
Roman fleet was greater than ever. It consisted of 330 large 
vessels, with crews of 300 men each, carrying two consular armies 
amounting to 39,600 men. It was a mixed military and naval 
expedition, for as yet no distinction between the two services 
existed. This was specially marked on the present occasion by the 
military names given to the four divisions of the fleet. They were 
called legions^ the last being also spoken of as iriarii., and they 
were accompanied by numerous horse transports, that the Roman 
army might land in Africa with all its usual complement. The 
Carthaginian fleet was still larger, for it carried 150,000 men. It 
was also better fitted for fighting at sea, for it did not convey an 
army with all its heavy accompaniments. The ships had only their 



BATTLE OF ECNOMUS 



247 



regular equipment of fighting men, and were prepared for the pur- 
pose of a naval battle alone. 

The consuls with their great fleet touched at various points in 
the Sicilian coasts, made necessary arrangements for the safety of 
the several places occupied by the Roman forces, and finally came 
to anchor at Ecnomus, on the southern shore. From that point Battle of 
they intended, after coasting somewhat farther to the west, to P-cfomus, 
strike across the open sea to the Libyan shore. But the Cartha- '•^ 
ginian fleet had mustered at Heracleia, and meant to bar the way. 
The battle which followed, generally named from Ecnomus, seems 
to have taken place somewhat nearer Heracleia. Two of the four 
divisions of the Roman fleet were arranged in divergent columns of 
single ships, each ship taking up its position in the rear of one of 
the two six-banked vessels of the consuls, a little to the right or left 
of the ship in front of it. They formed, therefore, a wedge, at the 
apex of which were the two consular ships. The base of the wedge 
was formed by the third division (towing the horse transports) in 
line. Behind this, and parallel to it, was the fourth division, also in 
line, forming a reserve. 



HamUcar \_H 

Hanno ©••* •. ^%^ 

-»••*' w t Consul •. *- 

/ Consul 5 6S 

C ° O r, • •O/r,.' . . 



eracleia Mi 






^° 



o ooo o 
o o o ° 



.-- -"-"r'd.DWvsvon 
' °Horse transports 

o o o4 



oAgrigentum 




Walker &• Boutalisc. 



The Carthaginians, on the other hand, had drawn up their vessels 

j in a long line, so extended as to enable them to take advantage of 

I their superior swiftness to outflank the enemy and charge as suited 

(them. This was Hanno's task, who accordingly had on the right 

wing the swiftest vessels armed with beaks for charging. The 

centre was commanded by Hamilcar, while the left wing at right 

angles to the line kept close under the shore. The Roman plan was 

to charge with their two columns through the centre of the enemy's 

line, which was weak, and to trust to the confusion thus caused for 

the third and fourth divisions to make their way through also. The 



248 HISTORY OF ROME 



movetnenls. 



Three ^ght, however, resolved itself into three separate battles. A 

separate manoeuvre of Hamilcar's succeeded in separating the divisions of 
the Roman fleet. As soon as the Romans charged he ordered his 
ships to row off as if in flight. The Roman columns followed with 
exultation : and when they seemed sufliciently separated from the 
third and fourth divisions he signalled to his ships to turn and 
charge. But though the Carthaginians were the better sailors, and 
could manoeuvre their ships much more skilfully than their oppo- 
nents, yet when they came to close quarters the Roman strength 
prevailed ; the grappling irons were again used, and a hand-to-hand 
fight ensued, in which the Romans soon gained the victory. This 
was one battle. A second was brought about by Hanno from the 
Carthaginian right, who took advantage of the struggle in the centre 
to row round and attack the fourth or reserve division. A third was 
caused by the left wing of the Carthaginians, which had been posted 
along the shore, manoeuvring itself into line opposite the Roman 
third division, which was encumbered by towing the horse-transports. 
The men let go or cut the towing-cables, and the transports seem 
to have drifted back upon the fourth division and added to its 
embarrassment. 
Defeat of The first begun of these three battles, that in the centre, was the 

Havnlcar. first over. Hamilcar was overpowered and fled, and the consuls had 
leisure to come to the rescue of the ships in the rear, which were 
suffering in the other two battles somewhat severely. Regulus was 
the first to get free, and he hastened to the help of the fourth division 
which, between the charges of Hanno's ships and the necessity of 
assisting the abandoned horse-transports, were in considerable 
difficulty. Finding themselves now between two enemies, Hanno's 
ships gave way and retreated, and Regulus, being joined by Manlius, 
then went to the relief of the third division, which had been driven 
towards the coast by the Carthaginian left, though they had not 
received much damage, — the fear of the " crows " keeping the Punic 
The ships from charging freely. It was here that the Romans had 

Romans their greatest success, for they captured fifty of the enemy's ships. 
The three battles had not been quite simultaneous, and had been 
decided in different ways, but the general result was clearly in favour 
of the Romans. They had lost twenty-four ships sunk, the Cartha- 
ginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship had been taken 
with its crew, while they had taken sixty-four of the Carthaginians. 
But the best proof of their victory was that they now did that for 
which they had fought. After putting in on the Sicilian coast for 
repairs and fresh provisions, in a few days they put to sea again, and 
steered straight to the promontory of Hermaeum, which terminates 
the eastern shore of the gulf of Carthage. 



7inn the 
battle. 



XVIII REGULUS IN AFRICA 249 

The full effects of their defeat were now coming upon the The 
Carthaginians. The enemy was in their country and must be Komans 
opposed no longer with ships, in which they might still feel that """"'^y 
they were superior, but on land where they had already found that ^J'f'''' 
their troops were generally overmatched. They began preparations ^^ 
at once for the defence of the capital, employing the remains of the 
armament which had found its way home in detachments after the 
battle of Ecnomus. But an immediate advance upon Carthage 
itself was not the design of the Roman commanders. They had 
first to secure a base of operations. Coasting along the peninsula 
from Hermaeum to the south-east, they laid siege to Clupea, which 
speedily surrendered and was occupied by a Roman garrison. 
Startmg from Clupea the consuls ravaged the country towards 
I Carthage, carrying off an immense booty of cattle and slaves. The 
I Carthaginians seemed to have hoped that the Roman invasion 
was a mere raid, and that, if they kept their capital secure, the 
enemy would depart at the approach of autumn. But when they 
learnt that Regulus was to remain with a considerable part of the Reguhis 
, army throughout the winter, the other consul taking back the rest "nd part of 
, with the booty,— they understood that a real occupation of the ^^^ ""'''"y 



7'emain 
efforts to save themselves. Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, and '^Bostlrus winter hi 



country was contemplated, and that they must make strenuous dnHn'^ the 



— ^^^..^xv..^c4,i, own vji xidiinu, diiti r)Osiarus winter 

I were appointed generals, and Hamilcar, with 5000 infantry and 500 Africa, 
; horse, was sent for from Heracleia, and associated with them in the ^^^'^^S 
\ command. Through the autumn and winter they were to do their 
j best to prevent the plundering of the country and the advance of 
, Regulus towards the capital. But in this task they met with very 
Ihttle success. They were frequently defeated in skirmishes, and in 
^ endeavouring to force him to raise the siege of a town called Adys 
Ithey suffered a severe reverse, losing their camp and retreating in 
j great confusion. Polybius attributes their general ill success to bad 

tactics. Their strength lay in cavalry and elephants; they should 
(therefore have been careful to choose plains and open ground for 
jattackmg the enemy, but they timidly clung to the hills, where these 
(parts of their army were of little or no avail. The Romans, there- 
jfore, for a time carried all before them, and before long occupied Regulus 
(Tunes, which was within ten miles of Carthage itself, making it occupies 
i their headquarters for plundering the country up to the very walls of ^^"'"''■ 
jthe capital. 

The city was now in the utmost distress and terror. The 

Roman enemy was within sight ; on the other side the Carthaginians 
had to defend themselves against an attack of rebellious Numidians ; 
their generals were being beaten in the field ; many of the towns in 
jtheir territory were openly joining the Romans ; the city was becom- 



250 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

ing crowded with terrified countryfolk, and a famine seemed 
Fr7dtless imminent. In these circumstances they were glad to listen to pro- 
negotia- posals from Regulus in the spring of 255. His object in making 
lonsjor them was to prevent the credit of the surrender of Carthage, which 
2rr, ' he now considered certain, from falling to his successor in the con- 

sulship. But his terms were of the utmost severity. The Cartha- 
ginians were to evacuate Sicily and Sardinia, to restore Roman 
prisoners without ransom, and to pay a ransom for their own ; to 
pay the expenses of the war and an annual tribute ; to make no 
alliance without the consent of Rome ; to keep only one ship of war 
for themselves, but to maintain fifty triremes at the service of Rome. 
The Carthaginians naturally thought that nothing worse could be 
imposed if their city was taken, and determined to resist. The 
event justified them, and gave a stern rebuke to the over-confidence 
of Regulus, who presumed so far on his good fortune as to believe 
that a great city like Carthage could fall after a few months' cam- 
paign to what was after all but a weak army. 
Xanthippw; About the time of these fruitless negotiations there arrived at 

of Sparta Carthage, among other Greek mercenaries hired by a recruiting agent, 
a certain Spartan named Xanthippus. The prestige of the Spartan 
training and discipline had not yet died out, and Xanthippus was 
said to have been thoroughly imbued with it, and to have had large 
experience in actual war. His criticisms were therefore regarded 
with respect ; and when it became known that he disapproved of the 
tactics of the Punic generals, and believed that the enemy might 
still be defeated if those tactics were changed, popular feeling 
was violently excited in favour of entrusting him with the supreme 
command. Summoned before the magistrates he explained that 
the mistake had been in not selecting ground proper for the use of 
cavalry and elephants. It is not likely that the elementary fact of 
open and flat country being required for cavalry evolutions was a 
novelty. But either from terror of the Roman legions or from not \ 
keeping the fact firmly before their minds, the generals had more 
than once made a mistake in selecting the ground on which to ofler 
battle, or had allowed themselves to be outmanoeuvred by Regulus 
and forced to take up a position unfavourable to themselves. This 
would be enough to give point to the criticism of Xanthippus. His 
influence was enhanced by the skill with which he marshalled the 
troops and directed their movements as soon as they had quitted the 
town ; and the feelings which contribute above all to the success of 
an army, enthusiasm and confidence, were created. The Romans 
immediately noticed the change in their enemy's tactics and the 
greater skill v/ith which their ground was selected. Yet, though 
puzzled and somewhat alarmed, they had gained so many victories 



Regulus, 



xviii CAPTURE OF REGULUS 251 

over the Carthaginian army during the past months that they did 
not hesitate to attack it even now. They therefore pitched their 
camp about a mile from the enemy. 

In the battle which followed the total numbers engaged on each Defeat and 
side were not widely different. But in cavalry the Carthaginians ^aphire of 
were vastly superior ; they had 4000 horsemen, the Romans only 
500. Thus outnumbered, the Roman cavalry failed to be of any 
use to the infantry, who were still farther weakened by not being 
supported as usual by the vclites. These last Regulus posted in 
front, instead of on the wings, in order if possible by their missiles 
to frighten the elephants which Xanthippus stationed in a line in 
front of his phalanx. Elephants, as we have seen and shall have 
frequent occasion to notice, were of uncertain advantage to an army, 
and apt to become as dangerous to their friends as to their foes. 
On this occasion, however, they appear to have been employed with 
great effect. The battle began with a charge of the Numidian 
horse on both wings, before which the scanty Roman cavalry at once 
broke and fled. The result of the infantry battle was less uniform. 
The left wing drove the Carthaginian right from its ground and 
hurled it back upon its entrenchment. This part of the line was 
outside the line of elephants, and the troops opposed to them were 
the mercenaries. The Roman right and centre were not so fortunate. 
The vclites in their front were thrown into confusion by a furious 
charge of the elephants. The heavy-armed maniples behind them 
got separated. Some coming to the support of the vclites charged 
through the line of elephants only to find themselves confronted 
by the unbroken phalanx of the Carthaginian centre and left. The 
rest were obliged to face right and left to resist the victorious 
Numidian cavalry, which was now on their flanks. Both were 
utterly shattered. The advanced maniples dashed themselves to 
pieces on the Carthaginian phalanx ; those behind were broken up 
and cut down by the cavalry. The country was so flat that 
there was no rising ground near on which they could rally and 
defend themselves from the horsemen and elephants. The right 
and centre were thus practically destroyed. Regulus indeed, with 
the bulk of the cavalry managed to escape from the field ; but they 
were pursued and made prisoners. Some 2000 of the left wing, 
who had advanced so far in the pursuit of the Carthaginian right 
as to be clear of this disastrous overthrow, made good their retreat 
to Clupca. 

The army of invasion was thus rendered incapable of any longer The 
threatening Carthage : and though the Romans still held Clupea tx'omans 
they had to stand a siege even there. It proved indeed to be the '"'^"«^^« ^''^^ 
end of the invasion, for the Roman government presently resolved to 



invasion. 



252 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. XVIIl 



After 
career of 
Xanthip- 
pus. 



Punish- 
ment of the 
Libyans. 



abandon Clupea also : and this failure marks an era in the war. The 
activity of the Carthaginians in Sicily was soon afterwards renewed ; 
the struggle had to be fought out there and on the sea, and was never 
again during this war to be transferred with any effect to Africa. 

The conqueror of Regulus did not long remain in the service of 
Carthage. Successful mercenaries were often objects of suspicion 
to their employers, who were usually anxious to be rid of them as 
soon as possible. Generals were apt to inake large promises on the 
field which the home government were unable or unwilhng to fulfil ; 
and an armed body with a grievance was a formidable danger to a 
peaceful population. On this occasion many of these men are said to 
have been enticed on board ships, the captains of which had secret 
orders to abandon them if possible on some island ; while Xanthippus 
himself was to be put on a leaky vessel that he might be drowned. 
These stories, however, look like the invention or exaggeration of 
the enemy ; our best authority represents Xanthippus as retiring 
voluntarily from Carthage, knowing well the prejudices likely to rise 
against a foreigner whose great services had made him too con- 
spicuous. Yet Polybius admits that even in his time other stories 
were current as to the cause and manner of his departure. We 
know nothing more of him, except that he disappears henceforth 
from the Carthaginian service, to the relief apparently of the 
Carthaginians themselves. 

The punishment inflicted on those Libyans who had joined 
Regulus was severe. The tribute of the towns was doubled ; the 
farmers were taxed to the amount of half the annual produce of their 
lands ; and these burdens were exacted with redoubled harshness. 
But this policy only served to accentuate the fact that the Punic 
people were living among a subject race, with which they had never 
amalgamated, and produced a feeling of exasperation among the 
subjects themselves which helped to produce the outbreak at the 
end of the war that nearly proved fatal to Carthage. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR Co?lti?tUed 

255-242 

Third Period (255-251) — The Romans increase their fleet, but abandon Clupea 
— The fleet is lost in a storm (259)— A fleet is again built and Panormus is 
taken (254) — The Roman fleet is again wrecked (253) — The Romans abandon 
the sea, but Himera, Thermae, and Lipara are taken, the last by help of ships 
from Hiero (252)— Victory of Metellus at Panormus — Alleged mission of M. 
Regulus — The Carthaginians remove the people of Selinus to Lilybaeum 
(251). Fourth Period (250-241)— The Romans again build a fleet and invest 
Lilybaeum (250) — Great defeat of Claudius at Drepana — Wreck of a large 
fleet of transports carrying provisions to the camp at Lilybaeum — C. Junius 
PuUus seizes Eryx (249) — Siege of Lilybaeum continued (248) — Hamilcar 
Barcas comes to Sicily, and occupies Hercte (247) — Hasdrubal seizes Eryx 
and besieges the Romans on the summit of the mountain, and is himself 
besieged in Eryx — Frequent but indecisive engagements at Lilybaeum, Eryx, 
and Hercte (246-243) — The Romans once more build a fleet (243) — Great 
victory of LuTATius at the Aegates islands (loth March) — Peace is concluded, 
and the Carthaginians evacuate Sicily (241). 

The Carthaginians followed up their success over M. Regulus by 2ss- Coss. 
investing the remains of the Roman army in Clupea, but met with -^jrmus 
such determined resistance, that they were still before the town when 
a report came that the Romans intended to take to the sea again with 

i a formidable fleet, and to renew the invasion of Africa. All their 
forces therefore were required at home to fit out and man a fleet. Paullus. 

I New ships were rapidly built, old ones repaired, and before the 
arrival of the Romans they had launched 200 vessels. 

i The Romans, however, far from entertaining such a spirited The 

\ policy, had determined to bring off their men and abandon the Romans 

invasion of Africa altogether. They had indeed been making ^J'"^S off _ 

^, ^,,1 i.T- the rc7nains 

I vigorous exertions. The fleet that had conquered at Ecnomus was ^y^^^^y 

I got ready again for service and raised by the addition of new vessels army from 

ito the number of 250. But they expected that the defeat of Clupea. 

Regulus would bring the enemy upon Sicily or even Italy itself. 



Fulvius 
Nobilior, 
M. Aemil- 
ius 



254 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Victory 
off He r- 
maeitvi, 
235- 



Wreck of 
the Roman 
fleet off 

Camari?ta, 
July 2S5- 



The 

Cartha- 
ginians are 
encouraged 
to new 
exertiojis 
in Sicily. 



The new consuls were therefore despatched to strengthen the 
places most open to attack on the Italian and Sicilian coasts, and 
with orders to sail afterwards to Clupea and bring off the survivors 
of the army of Regulus and their ships. On its way the fleet was 
driven by stress of weather upon the island of Cossyra in the gulf 
of Carthage. Leaving a garrison there they sailed towards the 
promontory of Hermaeum, where they found the Carthaginian fleet. 
Once more the courage and number of the Roman soldiers 'on board 
prevailed over superior skill. After a severe struggle the battle 
was decided by the Romans in Clupea putting out to sea and falling 
upon the Carthaginians in the rear, who thus attacked in two 
directions lost more than half their ships. The main purpose of 
the expedition was now easily effected. The soldiers at Clupea were 
taken off and their fourteen vessels safely convoyed to Camarina. 
There was now no Punic fleet to intercept them, and indeed it seems 
hard to understand why the Romans should have abandoned a foot- 
ing in Africa which they might easily have maintained. Probably, 
if the victory ofl" Hermaeum had been known at Rome in time, this 
seemingly impolitic movement might have been countermanded. 

But presently a power greater than that of Carthage interposed. 
The Romans could drive their ships against the enemy and win by 
sheer force ; but they could not conquer wind and wave ; nor had 
they the knowledge and experience of the Carthaginian pilots to 
serve them on a dangerous coast and in a dangerous season. They 
were duly warned : but the warning fell on deaf ears. The southern 
coast of Sicily is remarkable for the absence of good harbours, and 
Camarina, at which the Roman fleet had touched, was no exception. 
It was also the season (about the end of July) particularly liable 
to storms. In spite of every warning the Roman consuls, elate with 
their success on the African shore, determined to coast along 
southern Sicily and crown their achievements by taking certain 
towns which still held by Carthage. They were caught in a terrible 
storm, in which 284 out of the 364 vessels were lost. The coast was 
strewn for miles with corpses and wreckage ; and the great Roman 
fleet, which had survived two hard-fought battles, was practically 
annihilated in a day. 

The news of this disaster to the Roman ships naturally 
raised the spirits of the Carthaginians. The year before they had 
defeated a Roman army; the storm had now left them again 
masters of the sea. Their fleet was rapidly got afloat, the 
Roman garrison was expelled from Cossyra, and Hasdrubal again 
landed at Lilybaeum with an augmented army and 140 elephants. 
He set to work to train his men, and had high hopes of striking 
a decisive blow at Roman supremacy in Sicily. But the Romans 



XIX THE ROMANS TAKE PANORMUS 255 

were by no means beaten or fatally discouraged. As soon as they 
heard of the loss of their ships they began building enough new ones 
to raise the number of their fleet, with the eighty which had survived 
the storm, to 300. 

The ships were got ready with marvellous rapidity, and 2^4. 
despatched to Sicily under the command of the consuls of the next ^^^^- ^"• 
year (254), one of whom was the Scipio Asina who had been taken ^^jpj^ 
prisoner at Lipara in 260, but had in the meantime been released Asina II., 
or ransomed.! He now redeemed his previous mismanagement or Aldus 
misfortune. The fleet sailed straight to Panormus, which with its ^tihus 
magnificent harbour was still in the hands of the Carthaginians. The jj ^^,_ 
lower or new town soon yielded to the battering-rams which were ture of 
brought to bear upon it from two directions ; and though the old Panormus. 
town, which stood farther from the sea, made a longer resistance, 
it eventually yielded. Thus the Carthaginians were excluded from 
one of the finest harbours in Sicily, which had long been their 
starting-point against Italy and the north of Sicily, and from which 
they could wait in security to intercept the Roman ships coasting- 
down the Italian shore. This confined them still more closely to 
their positions on the west coast ; but for the present the loss was 
lightened by the rise of Lilybaeum, a more convenient place of arrival 
from Africa and more capable of defence. Henceforth therefore we 
shall find it to be the policy of the Carthaginians to strengthen 
Drepana and Lilybaeum ; and, when other towns became indefensible, 
to remove their inhabitants to one or the other of these. 

The capture of Panormus marks the highest point in the good 2^3. Coss. 
fortune of Rome in the third period of the war. It hampered ^'^• 
Hasdrubal in his contemplated raids from Lilybaeum ; and though CaeliT^C 
his fleet inflicted some damage on that of Rome, it could not pre- Sempron- 
vent the consuls of the next year from sailing to Africa and making iusBlaesus. 
descents upon the coast. No great success, however, was gained Another 
by them. Their ships got aground in the Lesser Syrtis, and though •^"/'^''^'^ '• 
they were floated again, they were caught in a great storm on their 
way home and more than half were lost. 

Discouraged from farther attempts at sea the Romans resolved 2^2. Coss. 
to concentrate their efforts upon Sicily, Accordingly the consuls of ^/ A''"'^^- 
the next year (252) were both sent thither with their armies, p <^^^.^]'i 

ius Caepio. 
^ The Roman government again and again refused to ransom prisoners. But 
they were sometimes exchanged and sometimes ransomed by their friends. That 
Scipio should not have incurred disgrace at Rome, and should even have been 
elected consul for the second time, lends some colour to the assertion of some of 
the later authorities that his capture had been the consequence of some breach of 
faith on the part of the Carthaginian admiral, or at least that such was believed at 
Rome to be the case. 



256 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Capture of 
Thermae, 
H inter a, 
and 

Lipara , 

2J2. 



251-^ 

L. Caecil- 
ius 

Metellus, 
C. Fur ill s 
Pacilus. 



Victory of 
the Romans 
at Patior- 



Triuviphof 
Metellus. 



The 

Cartha- 
g'inians 
propose 
terms of 
peace. 



accompanied by sixty ships to secure supplies. But during two 
years (25 2-2 5 i ) little of importance was done. Himera and Thermae 
indeed, in the immediate vicinity of Panormus, fell into the hands of 
the Romans, and the island of Lipara was taken by aid of ships 
borrowed from Hiero — achievements considered sufficient to gain 
the consul Aurelius Cotta a triumph. But the Carthaginians, still 
confident in their superiority at sea, and still strongly posted at 
Drepana and Lilybaeum, could not be ejected, while the terror of 
their elephants kept the Roman army from the open country. The 
legions clung to the hills, and though often tempted by the enemy to 
give battle, always refused. 

At length, towards the end of the summer of 251, when one of 
the consuls had as usual gone to Rome to hold the elections, 
Hasdrubal determined to make a great effort to draw the Romans 
from Panormus. He marched as if to attack that town, plundering 
the country as he went. But the consul Caecilius Metellus suffered 
him to destroy and burn almost up to the walls unopposed. Panormus 
stands between two streams little more than half a mile apart. When 
Hasdrubal with his elephants had crossed one of these streams, and 
was in this narrow strip of country, Metellus determined that his time 
was come. He posted archers on the walls, and javelin-throwers 
along the outer edge of the moat, ordering all the armourers in the 
town to pile up supplies of missiles ready for use outside the walls. 
Men on the walls were of course out of reach of the elephants, while 
those on the edge of the moat had only to step down its bank to be 
also secure from them. The arrows from the walls and the javelins 
from the light troops outside so galled and irritated the beasts, that 
they turned upon their own troops with irresistible fury, broke their 
ranks, and threw the whole army into confusion. As soon as Metellus 
saw this, he led out his infantry by a gate opposite to the left wing 
of the enemy. His troops were fresh and charged an enemy already 
disordered ; and the Carthaginians were soon in headlong flight, 
leaving a large number of their men on the field. Ten of the 
elephants were captured on the spot, and the rest shortly afterwards. 
Metellus's triumph was one of the most splendid ever yet witnessed 
at Rome, and was adorned by thirteen high Carthaginian officers 
and 120 elephants. 

The repulse of the attack upon Panormus left the Romans 
undisputed masters of Sicily, except on the narrow strip of shore 
between Drepana and Lilybaeum. So serious did their position 
seem to the Carthaginians, that they made proposals for peace. It 
was on this occasion that the celebrated mission of M. Regulus was 
believed to have taken place. No story is more often told by later 
writers, and yet Polybius mentions neither the proposal for peace 



RETURN OF REGULUS TO CARTHAGE 



257 



nor the mission of Regulus. Modern historians seem to admit the Alleged 
former and reject the latter, though "both rest on the same authority, tnissiun of 
The story, not mentioned by any writer before Cicero, is this, When ." '^'" 
the ambassadors came from Carthage Regulus was sent with ^-i] 
them under an oath that, if he did not obtain the peace and inter- 
change of prisoners from the Senate, he would return to Carthage. 
When he arrived at Rome he refused, as being no longer a citizen, 
to enter the city or to visit his wife and children. The Senate met 
outside the walls ; but instead of pleading the cause for which he was 
sent, he urged them by no means to make terms or to exchange the 
prisoners, for though his body belonged to the Carthaginians by 
right of war, his spirit was still Roman. And this advice he gave 
although he knew that death awaited him at Carthage, When some 
wished to save him by making peace, he declared that he had taken 
a slow poison and must perish in any case. Then thrusting aside 
clients, wife, and child, he set out upon his return to Carthage. There 
it was said that he was subjected to exquisite tortures. His eyelids 
were cut off, and after confinement in a dark dungeon he was 
suddenly exposed to the blinding sun, fastened in a pillory studded 
with sharp nails, that he might perish slowly from agony and sleep- 
lessness. Therefore at Rome two noble Carthaginian captives were 
given into the hands of his wife, who revenged her husband on them 
by cruel imprisonment and starvation ; till one died, and the other, 
after being shut up for several days with the corpse, was released by 
the order of the magistrates. 

Such was the story which, with some variation of detail, has been Doubt as to 
recounted by numerous writers. If we are to reject it entirely, we ^'^'^ Story. 
may at least on the same grounds be glad to be rid also of the horrid 
revenge wreaked on the innocent captives by the wife of Regulus. 
True or false, it touched the imagination of the Romans, and they 
loved to tell of the country gentleman, unwillingly detained from his 
farm for the winter campaign in Africa, who while covered with a 
noble shame for the loss of freedom, did not forget the love of 
country or the dignity of a Roman ; and the ringing verses of Horace 
will keep the tale alive as long as the Latin language is understood.^ 

^ fertur pudicae conjugis osculum 
parvosque natos ut capitis minor 
a se removisse et virilem 

torvus humi posuisse voltum, 
donee labantes consilio patres 
firmaret auctor nunquam alias dato, 
interque moerentes amicos 
egregius properaret exul. 
atqui sciebat quae sibi barbarus 
tortor pararet ; non aliter tamen 

S 



258 HISTORY OF ROME 



230-242. 



If the embassy, however, was ever sent its prayer was rejected. The 
war went on, but from this period the interest centres round Lilybaeum. 
For eight years (250-242) the Romans persisted in the siege, and 
though the chief struggles were at times at Eryx and Hercte, the 
main object throughout was the capture of Lilybaeum. But after all 
it was never taken : the war was decided at sea, and Lilybaeum 
passed to the victors there. 

This FOURTH PERIOD of the war begins with defeat and ends 
Last period with victory at sea. The slow progress made in 252 and 251 
of the war. convinced the Romans that the only chance of ending the war was 
to become masters of the sea. Accordingly the consuls for 250, one 
of whom was the brother of M. Regulus, were placed in command of 
200 ships. Taking the consular armies on board they at once 
made for Lilybaeum, which they invested by sea and land. The 
town was exceedingly strong both from the lagoons, which made 
navigation difficult at the entrance of its harbour, and from the 
vastness of its artificial defences on the land side. It had in 276 
successfully resisted the attack of Pyrrhus ; it had lately been enlarged 
by the removal to it of the citizens of Selinus ; and it now had within 
its walls a garrison of 10,000 Carthaginian soldiers commanded by 
Himilco. The consuls pitched separate camps under its walls united 
25-0. Coss. by a stockade, ditch, and wall, and immediately began operations. 
Every contrivance known to ancient warfare — trenches, mines, mantle, 
penthouse and battering-ram — was put in practice. The assault was 
chiefly directed against the fortifications at the south-western corner 
L. Manlius of the city, where as many as six of the towers were before long 
Vuho II. battered down. But though the work was carried on with extraordinary 
energy by the Romans, it was met with equal energy and courage by 
Himilco. As soon as the enemy demolished one line of fortifications, 
he found himself confronted by another erected nearer to the city. 
The Carthaginians met the Roman mines by countermines; interrupted 
the construction of batteries by frequent sorties, in which the loss 
inflicted was often as great as in a pitched battle ; and again and 
again nearly succeeded in burning the Roman engines. When 
imperilled by the treason of some of the officers of his mercenaries, 
Hnnilco suppressed the threatened mutiny and desertion by the aid 
of a Greek officer named Alexion ; and, in spite of the straits to which 
both garrison and people were reduced, continued to hold out until 

diniovit obstantes propinquos 
et populum reditus morantem, 
quam si clientum longa negotia 
dijudicata lite relinqueret, 
tendens Venafranos in agros 

aut Lacedaemonium Tarentum. — Od. iii. 5. 41 sqq. 



Gains 
Ati litis 
Regu - 
lus II., 



Siege of 

Lilybaeum 

be^im. 



XIX RUNNING THE BLOCKADE AT LILYBAEUM 259 

the arrival of provisions and reinforcements under Hannibal, son Lilybacum 
of Hamilcar, who eluded the blockade, and entered the harbour before revictu- 
so strong a wind that the Romans did not venture to put to sea to "!j^ ^^ 
j resist him. Availing himself of this encouragement, Himilco made ineffectual 
I a sortie in force. It failed in its object of firing the Roman engines sortie by 
and destroying the siege works ; for the Romans defended them with Himilco, 
desperate courage, and on the whole maintained their position and ^^'^' 
inflicted greater loss than they sustained. But though he thus missed 
his stroke, he kept up the defence of the town, while Hannibal again 
I eluded the Roman ships and sailed away to Drepana, which now 
became the headquarters of the Carthaginian navy in Sicilian waters. 

In the course of the same year Lilybaeum was frequently vie- The 
tualled by privateers who ran the blockade. The example was set Khodian. 
by a Rhodian named Hannibal, who offered to relieve the anxiety of 
the government of Carthage by entering the harbour and bringing 
back news. The success with which he did this again and again on 
board his own private trireme not only induced others to do the same, 
who learnt from him the secret of the way to enter the harbour, but, 
what was of still greater importance, kept up communication with the 
home government. All danger of assault for this year, however, was 
'removed by the destruction of the Roman works and artillery. A Destruction 
jstorm of wind of extraordinary violence hurled down wooden towers, '^fj^^ 
, penthouses, and screens: and the besieged took advantage of the ^\y7//^r 
(confusion to make an attack. They succeeded in throwing lighted 
torches upon the woodwork, and the fire was soon blown into fury by 
•the wind, setting full in the faces of the Romans and blinding them 
I with heat and smoke, while it blew away all obstacles from the 
(sallying party, and enabled them to take easy and deliberate aim 
with javelins and arrows. The destruction was so complete that the 
towers and carriages of the battering-rams were burnt to the ground, 
.and the Romans were obliged to give up all idea of assaulting the 
J town. They still persisted, however, in the siege and blockade, 
strengthened their camps, and determined if possible to starve out 
the garrison. 

The next year (249) was more disastrous to the Romans than 24^. 
(the last. Publius Claudius, one of the new consuls, arrived early in ^.^""' Z'' 
I the summer with 10,000 men to make good the losses in camp and Puj^hcr L 
'fleet. He determined, however, to strike a blow elsewhere than at Junius 
Lilybaeum, where nothing was ready for an assault, and where there Pullus. 
'seemed no prospect of anything but a long and wearisome siege from 
which little credit was to be got. The Carthaginian fleet under 
Adhcrbal was in the harbour of Drepana, — a long inlet of the sea 
enclosed by the sickle-shaped peninsula which gave it its name. 
Claudius was rash and impetuous, and, like his father, the famous 



:6o HISTORY OF ROME 



at Drc 
panel, 2jf.g 



censor, apparently unsuccessful in war. He determined to attack the 
Carthaginian fleet, and explained to his council that the recent losses 
of the Romans would be likely to have put Adherbal off his guard, 
and that therefore a sudden attack would have every chance of success, 
if made before Adherbal learnt that the Roman army and fleet had 
been reinforced. The officers cordially approved. The ships were 
quickly manned, and the flower of the new troops selected to serve 
as marines, the men eagerly volunteering for a service which promised 
a short voyage and a speedy battle. 
Defeat of Appius reckoned on surprising Adherbal in the harbour where 

Appius there would be no room for manoeuvring : ship would crash upon 
Claudius ^ ^^^ ^^ legionaries would settle the result. He did not wait 
therefore to train the new crews, or to fit the ships with " crows " ; but 
starting at midnight to avoid detection by the enemy's outlook 
vessels, hoped to be at Drepana before Adherbal knew that he was 
coming. He had, however, miscalculated the time required. Day 
broke while he was still some distance from the mouth of the harbour. 
Adherbal became aware of his approach, got his men on board, and 
his ships out of the harbour under the rocky shore of the peninsula. 
The Romans on the leading ships failed to observe this, and rowed 
steadily into the harbour. But when Claudius found it empty, he 
understood what had happened, and that he was on the brink of being 
caught in a trap. The enemy were only waiting until the whole 
Roman fleet were inside to swoop down upon the entrance of the 
harbour and block it up. He at once gave the signal for his ships 
to return. This sudden reversal, however, caused great confusion. 
The ships in front, in trying to leave the harbour, fouled those that 
were still entering, often breaking their oars, and throwing their rowers 
into disorder. Yet by strenuous efforts the captains at length got 
their ships out, and formed them in line along the coast south of the 
harbour, with their prows toward the open sea. Claudius himself, 
who had been the last to leave the harbour, passed down the line and 
took up his position on the extreme left. But while these difficult 
movements were in progress, Adherbal had got his ships clear of the 
opposite shore, facing the Roman ships in a Hne sufficiently long 
to outflank the Roman left and prevent it from escaping to Lilybaeum 
without breaking through his cordon. The chief disadvantage of the 
Roman position was that, being close on land, they could not retire if 
attacked ; while the Carthaginian ships, having the open sea on their 
sterns, and being superior in speed and the excellence of their crews, 
could retire, swing round, and charge as they chose. 

In a short time the Romans were in distress all along the line. 
Many of their ships got fast in the shallows or were completely 
stranded ; others were sunk by the rapid charges of the Carthaginian 



XIX DEFEAT AND RECALL OF APPIUS CLAUDIUS 261 

ships, which, splendidly handled and vigorously rowed, dashed in 
and out, stavnig in the sides of the lumbering and helpless Roman 
vessels, and easily avoiding their ill-directed attacks. Seeing all was 
over, Appius with thirty ships took to flight. By keeping close in 
shore, he managed to reach Lilybaeiim in safety ; but the remaining 
ninety-three were captured, most of them with their crews, though 
in some cases the men ran their ships ashore and escaped. 

Claudius was immediately recalled, and was ordered to name a Claudins 
dictator, a measure which had not been resorted to for nearly thirty ^'ccalkd 
years. Unabashed by his disgrace and the popular feeling against him, ^"^ fi^''^'-''-^ 
he showed his contempt by naming a freedman called M. Claudius dictator, 
Glicia. Such an outrage on Roman feeling could not be endured. 24^. 
Glicia was compelled to abdicate, and A. Atilius Calatinus was named. 
No punishment could be inflicted on Claudius during his year of office, 
but soon after it came to an end he appears to have been brought to 
trial. Polybius says that he was heavily fined ; later writers assert 
that he anticipated condemnation by suicide. He was certainly dead 
before 245, for in that year his sister Claudia was fined for exclaiming, 
when annoyed by the crowd leaving the games, " Oh that my brother 
. were alive and in command of ships ! " His defeat was attributed 
, by some to his neglect of religion. For when the keeper of the 
I sacred chickens reported that they would not eat, which was an evil 
omen for his expedition, he ordered them to be thrown overboard, 
I exclaiming that if they would not eat they should drink. Such 
\ stories commonly follow an unsuccessful general. Claudius's real 
I crime was failure ; but to that failure his own haste and neglect of 
j due precautions, and the presumption of pitting raw levies against 
1 trained seamen, mainly contributed. 

] On Claudius's recall the other consul L. Junius Pullus was sent The fleet 
J with fresh warships, which, when joined by the survivors of the ^'^^^^fo^^^^d. 
I battle and others already in Sicilian waters, amounted to 120, 
for the purpose of convoying a fleet of 800 transports carrying 
) provisions for the camp at Lilybaeum : so far were the Romans 
from giving signs of discouragement or of an intention to relin- 
quish the war. But the disasters of this year were not yet complete. 
^ After the victory at Drepana Adherbal despatched Carthalo with 
thirty ships to Lilybaeum. Carthalo succeeded in destroying 
or towing off the remains of the Roman fleet still stationed there, 
'while from within the town Himilco issued forth to attack the troops 
as they were trying to rescue their ships. No great harm was done 
to the Roman army, but Carthalo coasted round to Heracleia, ready 
to intercept the transports which were bringing it provisions. 

Lucius Junius was not with the ships which first came into view. 
He was still at Syracuse awaiting the arrival of the whole flotilla, 



262 



HISTORY OF ROME 



IVrec/i of 
the Roman 
fieet and 
transports, 

249- 



The 

Romans 

abandon 
the sea. 



L. Junius 

occupies 

Eryx. 



and had sent forward a detachment under the command of the 
quaestors. Learning from his outlook ships that they were approach- 
ing, Carthalo joyfully put out to sea from Heracleia, expecting an 
easy prey. But the quaestors had also been warned of the enemy's 
approach by light vessels sailing in advance ; and, knowing that they 
were not fit for a sea fight, made for a roadstead belonging to a 
small town subject to Rome, and beaching their ships, fortified a 
naval camp, defended by balistae and catapults obtained from the 
town. Carthalo did not venture to anchor his ships, or land at a 
place where there was no harbour, for he knew the danger of storms 
on the south coast of Sicily. He therefore moved his fleet into the 
mouth of a river and waited. In a short time the consul himself 
approached with the rest of the fleet, in complete ignorance of what 
had happened. He had only just rounded Pachynus when Carthalo 
got information of his whereabouts and put to sea, hoping to engage 
him before he reached the place where the first ships had taken 
refuge. Junius did not venture to await the attack, but steered 
strafght upon the coast, though it was rocky and dangerous, pre- 
ferring the risk of shipwreck to the certainty of falling with all his 
men and stores into the hands of Carthalo. The Carthaginian was 
better advised than to attack him there. It was getting late in the 
year, and the practised Punic pilots saw signs which they knew to 
portend stormy weather. They urged Carthalo, at all hazards, to 
round Pachynus, and take harbourage at the first secure place. On 
the east coast he must have been in the midst of enemies, but the 
storm which now arose made such considerations of minor import- 
ance. The chief thing was to be clear of the south coast. With the 
utmost exertion and difficulty, the Punic fleet was got safely round 
Pachynus : but the storm caught the two Roman fleets in full force. 
They were simply annihilated. The advanced squadron in its open 
roadstead, or drawn a little way upon the beach, and the rear 
squadron under Junius, were alike dashed into fragments. So com- 
plete was the destruction that not one of the wrecks was sufficiently 
whole to admit of repair. The loss of life does not seem to have 
been great, for a large number of the men, with the consul him- 
self, were on shore ; but the ships were all lost, and with them the 
supplies meant for the camp at Lilybaeum. The discouragement at 
Rome was so great, that, for the next four years, the government 
contented itself with sending supplies across the Straits, and thence 
by land to Lilybaeum, and once more abandoned the idea of fighting 
at sea altogether. 

Junius did not, however, give up all hope of achieving somethmg 
which might atone for this misfortune. He proceeded to the camp 
at Lilybaeum, and did his best to cheer the spirits of the besiegers, 



XIX FIGHTING AT LILYBAEUM AND ERYX 263 

thus forced again to wait for the promised supphes from Rome. The 
suppHes came at length ; but Junius was eager to do something 
more. Watching his opportunity, he led part of his army to the 
foot of Mount Eryx, some miles to the north of Drepana, It is an Mt. Eiyx, 
isolated peak, rising 2184 feet, in. the midst of a low undulating ^^9- 
plain, which gives it the appearance of a still greater elevation, and 
caused it to be wrongly regarded as, next to Aetna, the highest moun- 
tain in Sicily, On its summit was a famous temple of Venus (per- 
haps originally the Phoenician Melcarth), and just below the summit 
was a town also called Eryx, which had been captured by Pyrrhus, 
but had again fallen into the hands of the Carthaginians. In 260 
Hamilcar had removed the greater part of the inhabitants to Drepana ; 
but it was still partially inhabited, and its occupation would give the 
Romans a good base of operations against the Carthaginian troops 
in Drepana. He seems to have met with no opposition. Both 
temple and town were occupied and strongly garrisoned, and a 
numerous guard was also posted at the foot of the steep ascent on 
the road from Drepana. 

Thus the two antagonists were apparently at a deadlock. The 248-242.. 
Carthaginians were holding Lilybaeum and Drepana, and presently Constant 
the impregnable Hercte, and commanded the sea : the Romans were f^l^^^^'S <^-^ 
investing Lilybaeum and were securely seated on Mount Eryx ; and, ^/^ ^^^^^ 
with the whole island east of these places under their power or allied He?-cte. 
with them, were in no want of supplies. But they could not take Exhaustion 
Lilybaeum or Hercte, or move from Eryx upon Drepana. For six ^f ^^^'^ ^^^ 
weary years a kind of fencing match went on between the two powers 
at these three points — Lilybaeum, Eryx, Hercte : every day had its 
ambuscade, skirmish, sortie, or assault : now the one scored a suc- 
cess, now the other. Polybius compares them to two boxers, equal 
in courage and condition : " as the match goes on, blow after blow 
is interchanged without intermission. But to anticipate or keep 
account of every feint or stroke is impossible alike for combatants 
and spectators." The Romans showed an extraordinary dogged 
persistence ; but the Carthaginians maintained the combat with no 
less courage and perseverance. The Carthaginians were the richer 
people, but they had a twofold expenditure to meet in a fleet and Exhaus- 
a mercenary army. The Romans for four years did not support ^^'"' ^J 
a fleet ; and their citizen army, though expensive, must have been ^'^"'^'^'^^• 
less so than that of Carthage. Yet their financial difficulties also 
were growing formidable ; and the war, which had been voted six- 
teen years ago with a light heart, must have now become a weary 
burden, requiring all their pride and courage to endure. 

The year 247 witnessed the arrival from Carthage of a really 
great man. Hamilcar Barcas, father of the still greater Hannibal, — 



264 HISTORY OF ROME 



24J. who was born in this year, — was now put in command of the fleet. 

Hamilcar After making some descents upon the coasts of southern Italy he 
sailed to Panormus, and boldly seized the great limestone rock known 



Da re as 
coffies ii> 



Sicily. ^^ Hercte {Monte Peiegnno\ which forms the northern boundary of 

Hamikar ^^^ '&^^^ '■> ^^*^ though too far from the town, which lies about three 
encamps on miles to the east, to be its acropolis, forms a most important outpost 
Hercte. to it. Alike towards sea and land it rises sheer, and can only be 

ascended by two paths from the interior and one from the sea. The 
easiest is that on the south towards Panormus, which the Romans 
seem to have left unguarded. But Hamilcar possibly used the steep 
and difficult path from the bay which it encloses, now called the bay 
of Sfa Maria. Its top is flat, and of considerable extent, not too high 
to afford valuable pasture, and high enough (1950 feet above the 
sea) to make it exceedingly healthy. The bay of Sfa Maria sup- 
plied a small but secure harbour, not approached from the land 
except over the mountain which dominated the surrounding country, 
and was eminently suited for an encampment in the middle of 
enemies. Here Hamilcar entrenched himself. For provisions he 
would have to depend wholly on what could be brought by sea, 
except for the cattle which he found grazing on the mountain ; for 
the Romans pitched a camp near the entrance to the southern path, 
and the other was Ill-suited for bringing up heavy stores even if they 
could be obtained ; and, if he forced his way down the southern 
path, he had not sufficient force to maintain himself permanently in 
what would be a completely hostile district. Still for five years he 
held the mountain, sending out plundering expeditions to the shores 
of Italy as far up as Cumae, and harassing the Roman camp by 
frequent sorties and surprises. It was a bold move, conducted with 
consummate ability, and served to divide the Roman forces and 
compel them to keep a large garrison at Panormus. But though he 
could annoy, he could not hope to crush them ; and he might, per- 
haps, have done more real service to the cause by helping to relieve 
Lilybaeum. The war, in fact, now depended on the command of 
the sea. If that were lost, Hercte would be a trap or a prison. 
The war at Meanwhile a furious struggle was going on elsewhere. When 

Eryx, ti-^e consul Julius in 248 seized Eryx, he occupied both the summit 

247-^43- \^\\\\ its temple, the town immediately below it, and the foot of the 
path leading to Drepana. But Hasdrubal, who commanded at 
Drepana, evaded the lower guard, and, mounting by another path, 
contrived to seize the town. The Romans retired to the summit, 
to which supplies could be brought from the other side ; while the 
Carthaginians found themselves between two bodies of enemies, those 
on the summit and those on the lower path. The track by which 
they had ascended communicated with the sea, and was still under 



XIX ANOTHER ROMAN FLEET 265 

their control, but it was unfit for the carriage of provisions, and they 
soon found themseh^es reduced to great straits. But the same 
obstinacy which prolonged the struggle at Lilybaeum and Hercte 
was displayed by both sides at Eryx. Ruse, ambuscade, and pitched 
battle were tried again and again on both sides, but without giving 
a decisive superiority to either. No loss and no privation, both 
of which fell heavily on Roman and Carthaginian in turn, proved 
sufficient to dislodge either. 

At length it became evident to the Roman government that, if 243. The 
they were to finish the war, they must again strike for the mastership ^"^^mnns 

r ■, ^ ^ 1 1 1 ? T 1 • resolve 

of the sea. But the w^ar as a whole had been enormously expensive. ^„-^„„ f^, 

Fleet after fleet had been built and lost ; armies had been for years ludid a 
permanently maintained in Sicily. The treasury was empty, and there fleet. 
was no means of building more ships. In this crisis private muni- 
ficence loyally supported the State. Some of the richest citizens 
undertook to supply a quinquereme each, while others of less wealth 
clubbed together in groups of two or three to furnish one between 
them, the money thus expended to be regarded as a loan to the 
State, repayable when success made it possible. The commercial 
spirit was strong at Rome even now, but in this crisis of its fate 
patriotism and a noble confidence in the destiny of the city were 
stronger still. 

A fleet of 250 quinqueremes was ready early in the year 242. 242. 
They were built on an improved model furnished by the vessel of the ^'"*'- ^"^^^^ 
Rhodian, which had at length been captured at Lilybaeum, and <^--J^^^/// 
were put under the command of the consul Gains Lutatius Catulus. a. Posfian- 
It can hardly have escaped the knowledge of the Carthaginians that ins 
a fleet was again being built at Rome ; but, by extraordinary exer- ^I^'t-h"^- 
tions, the vessels were ready for the sea much earlier in the year than 
could be anticipated, and when Lutatius arrived off the coast of 
Sicily, the yearly contingent of ships had not yet come from Carthage 
to Lilybaeum and Drepana. The harbours of both were empty, or 
only contained a few guardships. He was, therefore, able to occupy 
both unopposed. Keeping a good lookout for the fleet which must 
be shortly expected from Carthage, he employed the interval in 
practising his crews, and~in throwing up earthworks against the town 
of Drepana. The Carthaginians in Eryx therefore found their one 
source of supply insecure, and could only be released by the destruc- 
tion or evasion of the Roman fleet. The garrison of Lilybaeum was 
in the like case. Victory at sea alone could save the one or the 
other. Lutatius himself was fully alive to this, and took as much 
pains to keep his fleet in a high state of training as to maintain the 
siege of Drepana. 

The news of the early arrival of Lutatius naturally caused alarm 



266 HISTORY OF ROME 



moves 

to Ac^usa. 



loihMarch 



Alarm at at Carthage. The usual preparation of the fleet was hastened, the 
Carthage ships were laden with provisions for the besieged garrisons, and 
and the speedily despatched under the command of Hanno. His plan, since 
despatch of ^^'^^ harbour of Lilybaeum was in Roman hands, was to make straight 
their Jlcct. for Eryx, and not to engage Lutatius until he had lightened his ships 
l3y unloading the supplies. To do this he must evade the Roman 
fleet at Drepana, which Lutatius was resolved to prevent. The 
Carthaginian fleet touched at Holy Isle, the most western of the 
Aegates. Thence Hanno designed to make straight for the Sicilian 
Lutatius coast at the foot of Eryx. Lutatius divined his intention, and took 
prompt measures to frustrate it, and force him to fight while his ships 
were still heavily loaded. He brought his fleet to Aegusa, the south- 
eastern island of the Aegates, from which he would be able to throw 
himself in the way, whether Hanno made for Lilybaeum or Eryx. 
After some skirmishing Lutatius, who had been wounded at Drepana, 
but lay on a couch on board, determined to fight the next morning. 
Battle of When day broke on the loth of March there was a strong breeze 

^^S'f^^; , blowing on the stern of the Carthaginian vessels, and the sea was 
rough and boisterous. It would be difficult for the Romans in the 
teeth of such a wind to charge with any effect. Yet it was of the 
first importance to them to bring on the engagement at once, while 
the enemy's ships were still too heavily burdened to admit of the 
manoeuvres practised with such effect at Drepana, and while they 
were far from the support of their land forces at Eryx. The relative 
conditions of the two fleets were unlike those that had existed at the 
battle of Drepana, The early start of the Roman fleet had caused 
that of Carthage to be despatched with hurried preparations. The 
four years' abstention from naval warfare by the Romans had induced 
a corresponding slackness in naval affairs at Carthage, and the crews 
now put on board were raw and inexperienced ; the ships were heavy 
and lumbering from the freight which they carried, and Hanno was 
by no means the equal of Adherbal. The Romans, on the other 
hand, had the advantage of ships of improved construction ; their 
crews had been some weeks at sea, and were in a good state of 
training ; the marines on board were picked men from the legions ; 
and Lutatius was a man of courage and prudence. The result, there- 
fore, was that of the battle of Ecnomus rather than of Drepana. 
When the ships came to close quarters, the superiority of the Romans 
was soon apparent ; and, though the Carthaginians fought desper- 
ately, they were beaten all along the line. Seventy of their ships 
were taken with their crews, fifty sunk ; the rest, favoured by a 
sudden change of wind, escaped to Holy Isle, and thence home. 
EJict of The eflect was immediately recognised at Carthage. The garri- 

sons at Lilybaeum and Eryx must be left without supplies, for 



the battle. 



XIX THE CARTHAGINIANS LOSE SICILY 267 

Lutatius would be able to intercept them. Drepana apparently had 
already passed into Roman hands, and the only hope was to make 
peace. Hamilcar, though safe in Hercte, could do nothing for the 
generals at Eryx and Lilybaeum. Still he was as yet secure, and 
the Carthaginian government sent a hasty message, leaving the 
decision in his hands. He saw that the only thing to be done was Hamilcar 
to make terms, and accordingly opened negotiations with Lutatius at wr/Zv.? 
Lilybaeum. Lutatius knew better than Hamilcar that peace was "'''"'*' ^''^' 
necessary for the Romans also. This did not, however, prevent him 
from exacting such terms as he thought would satisfy the people 
of Rome. In addition to the usual demand for the restitution of 
prisoners without ransom, and for a war indemnity of 2200 Euboic 
talents in twenty years, the Carthaginians were to wholly evacuate 
Sicily, and undertake not to make war upon the king of Syracuse 
and his allies. 

The terms were generally approved by the commissioners sent The Car- 
from Rome, though they raised the amount of indemnity to 3200 ihagmtans 
talents to be paid in ten years, and added to the evacuation of Sicily ^^f^J^ ^ 
that of all other islands between it and Italy — meaning the Liparae. 
Corsica had been already lost. Thus the result of the twenty-four 
years' war to Carthage was the diminution of her outlying possessions ; 
and, what was far more serious, the loss of her supremacy at sea. 
Spain might make up to them for Sicily ; but, if the Roman fleets 
held the sea, they could have no security of traffic even there. 

The Romans had gained in Sicily an invaluable source of corn 
supply ; and the weakening of the naval power of their rivals not 
only opened the sea to their commerce, but rendered the southern 
and western shores of Italy more secure. 

For Sicily itself the gain was very doubtful. It was but a change Effect on 
of masters ; and the extensive movement in the island in favour of ^^'^^fy- 
the Carthaginians at the beginning of the second Punic war seems 
to show that the Sicilians had not found the change wholly for the 
better. The island, with the exception of the kingdom of Hiero, 
was henceforth under the rule of a praetor sent annually from Rome. 
It was the first country outside of Italy to become a "province," and A province. 
there were no precedentsr on which to go. Commissioners were sent 
from Rome, and the principle of the settlement made by them Avas 
that of taking over Sicily as nearly as possible in the state in which 
they found it, substituting Roman for Carthaginian supremacy. The 
states in it were to retain their own laws and local institutions, but 
were to pay to Rome what they had paid to Carthage or Syracuse, 
namely, a tenth of the yearly produce, and 5 per cent on exports 
and imports. An appeal would lie from their courts to that of the 
praetor, and they were forbidden to go to war with each other, or 



268 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xix 



maintain an armed force. But though this was the general arrange- 
ment, certain towns which had been distinguished for early or con- 
stant adhesion to the Roman cause were admitted to the rank of 
civitates foedei^atae^ and were free from the payment of the tenths or 
the customs. Their one obligation was the supply of ships and 
socii navales^ as at Messana or Mamertina, or of troops to serve as 
allies in the Roman army, as at Segesta, Halicyae, Centuripa, Alaesa, 
and Panormus. 

Thus the first " province " was formed outside Italy ; and thus 
Rome established herself as a naval power in the Mediterranean. 



Authorities. — The earliest and best is Polybius i. 7-63. Born about forty 
years after the end of the war, he used earlier authorities, such as Timaeus, 
Philinus, and Fabius Pictor. All other accounts are secondary, derived either from 
Polybius or from writers later than Polybius, They are : the Epitomes of the 
lost books of Livy xvi.-xix. ; Appian (ist cent. A. D. ) Res Pun. 3-5 ; Res Sic. 
1-2; Florus (2nd cent. A.D. ) i. 2 ; Diodorus Siculus (end of ist cent. a.d. ) 
fragments of books xxiii. and xxiv. ; Dio Cassius (2nd cent. A.n. ) fragments 43- 
46 ; Eutropius (3rd cent. A.D.) ii. 18. A more valuable compilation is that of 
Zonaras (about the 12th cent. A.D. ) because he used the part of the complete work 
of Dio Cassius which is lost. Something is also to be gleaned from Orosius, 
Hisioria adversus Paganos, iv. 7- 11 (5th cent. A.D.) 



CHAPTER XX 

BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS 
241-218 



COLONIES 




CENSUS 




Spoletium in Urabria 


B.C. 241 


B.C. 220 . 


270,213 


Cremona 1 
Placentia / 


B.C. 218 


PROVINCES 

Sicily . 


B.C. 241 






Sardinia and Corsica B.C. 


231-225 



Progress in Italy during the first Punic war — Six days' campaign against Falerii 
(241) — Mutiny of mercenaries in Carthage — The " truceless war " (241-238) 
■ — Sardinia surrendered to Rome (238) — Wars with Ligurians and Boii (239- 
237) — Temple of Janus closed (235) — Illyrian war (229-228) — Embassies to 
Aetolian and Achaean Leagues (228)— Agrarian law of Gaius Flaminius (232) 
— Gallic war (225-221) — The Via Flaminia (220). 

Though the chief energies of Rome had been devoted to the Conjirtn- 
struggle for Sicily, the consohdation of her Itahan supremacy had <^fion of the 
not been wholly neglected. In the first year of the war (264) a '^'"'^^^ . 
colony had been sent to Aesernia, eighteen miles from Bovianum, on jf^iy 
the Volturnus, which did good service in the most trying period of during the 
the second Punic war. Aesis in Umbria, Alsium and Fregenae in f^'^^ . 
Etruria, received Roman colonies a few years later (247-245), the 
first commanding an important road and bridge over the Aesis into 
the territory once held by the Senonian Gauls, and the last two 
securing the coast immediately north of the Tiber's mouth. More 
important still was the colony sent to Brundisium in 244, after the 
place had been in the possession of Rome for more than twenty years. 
By it the Romans secured a basis from which to command the 
Adriatic, to protect their merchants from piracy, and to cross to the 
opposite peninsula. Lastly, in 241, southern Umbria was still 
farther strengthened by the Latin colony of Spoletium, which com- 
manded the road to Ariminum, and proved strong enough in 217 to 
resist the attack of Hannibal. 



270 HISTORY OF ROME 



The war The hold of Rome upon Italy had not been interrupted by any 



with 
Falerii 
241. Coss. 



Lutatms 
Catulus. 



surrender 
of Sardinia 
to the 



outbreak during the first Punic war. The last spark of resistance 

in Etruria had been stamped out at Volsinii in 265, It is therefore 

A.Manlius surprising that at the very moment of victory one town in Etruria 

Torquatus ventured to revolt. Falerii had been reduced in 293, and for now 

//., Q- more than fifty years had remained in quiet submission. What real 

or fancied wrongs induced the Faliscans to renew at this time their 

old hostility we do not know, but whatever it was their resistance 

was short-lived. In six days the consuls earned their triumph, and 

the Fahscans were compelled to abandon their town and build one on 

lower ground, though the ancient temple of Juno was allowed to remain. 

The Meanwhile Carthage became involved in a struggle with her 

mercenary niutinous mercenaries, which led to a widespread revolt of her Libyan 

Carthao-e subjects. It lasted for over three years, and was distinguished by 

[241-238), every circumstance of horror, threatening the city itself with famine and 

and the destruction. As soon as Hamilcar Barcas had arranged the peace 

with Rome, and had caused the Carthaginian troops at Eryx to remove 

to Lilybaeum for transport to Africa, he withdrew his own army and 

Romans. A^et from Hercte, abdicated his command in Sicily, and left the task 

of transporting the troops to Gesco. To avoid danger Gesco shipped 

them in detachments, that they might receive their pay and be got 

rid of in detail. But the exchequer at Carthage was low, and the 

government deferred a settlement, hoping to make a favourable 

bargain with the whole army. An idle soldiery, however, fresh from 

the privations of a campaign, soon became intolerable in the city. 

Outrages were of daily and nightly occurrence, and the government 

at length removed them to Sicca, a Numidian town on the Bagradas, 

with a temple of Astarte or Venus, renowned for its licentiousness. 

Here the soldiery lived without restraint, and among other things 

employed their leisure in calculating, always to their own advantage, 

the amount of pay due to them, and the claims founded on the 

promises made from time to time by the generals. Though a mixed 

multitude of Iberians, Celts, Ligurians, Balearici, half-bred Greeks, 

deserters, and slaves, without feelings in common or knowledge of 

each other's language, they were all united in the one aim of getting 

as much as they could from the government. Their attitude soon 

became so menacing that the Carthaginians were obliged to negotiate. 

Hanno was first sent to them. But the soldiers felt no confidence in 

him ; he had not served with them in Sicily, and did not therefore, 

they thought, understand their claims. They determined to overawe 

the government. They seized Tunes, and from that vantage-ground 

daily raised their demands. At length Gesco was sent to Tunes' 

with money to settle with them. But it was too late. The mutineers 

had found leaders as able as they were desperate and unscrupulous. 



XX THE MERCENARY WAR AT CARTHAGE 271 

The first was a fugitive slave named Spendius, for whom surrender Spendius 
' to his Roman master would mean crucifixion ; the second a Libyan ^"^ 
' named Mathos. Under the influence of these men the wildest state ^^ '^^' 
' of disorder began to prevail. Any one who ventured to act or speak 
" contrary to their sentiments was forthwith killed. Though the 
' different nations did not understand each other's language they all 

became acquainted with one word, " throw " (/3dX.Xe), and as soon as 
' that cry arose the obnoxious officer or soldier was overwhelmed by a 
' shower of stones. Before long Gesco offended some applicants for 
' pay by telling them roughly that they had better apply to Spendius 

and Mathos for it. He and his staff were seized, their baggage and 
' money plundered, and themselves put under close guard. 
• Spendius and Mathos, thus committed to open mutiny, now set MuHijeers 

themselves to rouse the country people. Glad of an opportunity of joined by 
^ shaking off the yoke of Carthage, doubly severe since their league L'bya?is, 
^ with Regulus, the Libyans joined the mutineers in every direction. ^^^' 
" Two towns, Utica and Hippo Zarytus, remained loyal, and were accord- 
'* ingly at once besieged. Cut off thus from the country supplies which 
^ fed the city, from the tribute that paid soldiers, and with their hired 
\ army in arms against them, the Carthaginians were in dreadful 
\ peril. But though the citizens prepared to defend their homes and 
1 their lives with desperate courage, their first attempts proved entirely 
j unsuccessful. Hanno, the first general appointed, did not succeed 
I in driving the mutineers from Tunes, or in relieving Utica, or in 
•1 defeating them in the field. He was therefore deposed, and Hamilcar 
\ Barcas placed in command. Hamilcar again showed great qualities ; 
'I he not only twice routed Spendius in the field, but by wise acts of 
I conciliation attracted many of the defeated troops to his standards. 
^ Early in 239 Spendius and Mathos retaliated by the torture and 
^ murder of Gesco and his staff, determined to involve their men in 
^Isuch unpardonable guilt as to deprive them of all hope except in 
" victory. From this time no quarter was given or received, no 

proposal for terms or for the release of prisoners entertained ; it 
' became a " truceless war " (TroAejUo? ao-TrovSo?), and was marked by 

atrocities on both sides. The mutineers tortured and killed; Hamilcar 

exposed his prisoners to'^be trampled to death by elephants. It was 

farther protracted by disputes between Hamilcar and the incompetent 

Hanno, who was again in part command, and at last even loyal 

Hippo and Utica joined the revolt. 

Spendius and Mathos, thus masters of the whole country, threat- End of the 

ened Carthage itself It was saved by the masterly tactics of nmtiuy. 

Hamilcar, who had now a competent colleague named Llannibal, 

and by supplies and other assistance sent by Hiero of Syracuse. 

The Romans too, after the settlement of a diplomatic quarrel in the 



272 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Fall of 

Spe7idius 

and 

Mathos, 

238. 



The revolt 
spreads to 
Sardinia, 
240. 



The 

Romans 
i)iiervcni 
23S. 



previous year, had shown some disposition to act in a friendly spirit. 
They allowed their merchants to carry goods to Carthage, but forbade 
the exportation of provisions to the mutineers. Still the war dragged 
on. It was not until the early part of 238 that Spendius and a 
Gallic chief named Antaritus found themselves obliged to sue for 
peace to Hamilcar. He offered to grant terms on condition that he 
might have the choice of ten men to keep as hostages. Spendius 
assented, whereupon Hamilcar quickly replied: "Then I choose the 
emissaries here present.'' They were at once arrested, and Hamilcar, 
considering himself free from honourable obligations to men of such 
desperate character, immediately proceeded to attack the rest, 
dismayed at the loss of their leader, and cut them to pieces. 
Whatever may be thought of the morality of such a proceeding it 
was eminently successful. The back of the revolt was broken, and 
it only remained to force Mathos, closely besieged in Tunes, to a 
similar surrender. He offered a desperate resistance, defeated and 
killed Hannibal, but was himself finally defeated and captured by 
Hamilcar. Hippo and Utica were next reduced with comparative 
ease :.the rest of Libya submitted, and was heavily punished by an 
increase of tribute and other severities. 

When the mutiny had been going on for about a year in Africa, 
the mercenaries serving in Sardinia followed the example, and put 
their general Bostarus, with all other Carthaginians they could lay 
hands upon, to death. An army, under another general named Hanno, 
was sent from Carthage to quell the mutiny. But no sooner had 
he arrived in Sardinia than his men crucified him, and joined the 
revolted garrison. They then proceeded to seize the other towns 
in the island, killing or expelling all Carthaginians they could find. 
Thus the Carthaginians had lost Sardinia, and were too much 
pressed at home for the next two years to make any effort for its 
recovery. But though the mercenaries had taken possession of the 
island they could not hold it. The native Sardinians rose against 
their tyranny and forced them to depart. They came to Italy, and 
had the assurance to apply for help to Rome. The Romans readily 
availed themselves of an excuse for taking in hand the pacification 
of Sardinia at a time when it might plausibly be asserted that the 
Carthaginians had ceased to be in possession. The mercenaries 
were not dealt with, but an expedition to Sardinia was at once 
undertaken. The Carthaginians, hoAvever, had now (238) triumphed 
over the revolt at home, and clainiing a prior right to settle the 
island began preparations for sending troops. The Romans replied 
by a declaration of war on the ground that, as they had undertaken 
the pacification of Sardinia, these preparations were directed against 
themselves. The Carthaginians were in no position to dispute the 



XX TROUBLES WITH THE GAULS 273 

claim, and were glad to compromise by a formal renunciation of 
Sardinia, and by an additional payment of 1200 talents. 

Sardinia thus became a Roman possession, but did not by any Rcduc- 
means submit at once to its new masters. A consular army was Hon of 
employed there nearly every year, and campaigns are mentioned, ^''''^^'"^'^' 
' followed by the usual triumphs in 235 and onwards, the rebellion 
being set down to Carthaginian agents. The final reduction of the 
island was ascribed to Manlius Torquatus in 235 : but both consuls 
were engaged there in 232 ; and though in 227 two additional 
praetors were appointed, with the idea that one should govern Sicily 
and the other Sardinia, still the consul Gaius Atilius was sent there 
with his army in 225 ; and it was not until about that time that 
Sardinia, with Corsica annexed, can be looked upon as regularly 
j reduced to the form of a province, while even then trouble was from 
I time to time experienced from the wilder tribes in the centre. 

But though the Roman territory was now in peace, there was Wars in 
trouble in the north of Italy. The Boii, either because they antici- ^^^': "^'''^^^ 
pated that the Romans would eventually attack and displace them, ^{ ^'^' 
j as they had done to the Senones, or from natural restlessness, began Lic-urians 
\ to show signs of a movement southward. They were joined by afid BoH, 
j certain tribes of the Ligurians, who perhaps saw danger to themselves ^3^-233. 
j in the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica, and the growing use made 
(by the Romans of the port of Pisae. One of the consuls for 238, 
1 Sempronius Gracchus, appears to have gained an easy victory over 
I the Ligurians, while the other consul, Publius Valerius Falto, also 
I defeated the Boii, but after sustaining some reverse himself In the 
(next year (237) L. Cornelius Lentulus earned a triumph over the 
I Ligurians, but his colleague, O. Fulvius Flaccus, appears to have 
' had ill success against the Boii, who went so far as to send an 
! embassy to Rome demanding the cession of Ariminum. The alarm The Boii 
was increased by the news that some Gauls from beyond the Alps ^"'"''^^^ 
had been induced to cross into the territory of the Boii to aid them ^/^.-L^^ 2-^6 
against Rome, but was quickly dissipated by an act of self-destruction 
on the part of the Gauls themselves. The Boii suspected the motives 
of their own chiefs in sending for the Transalpini, put two of them 
to death, and attacked the newcomers. The loss mutually sustained 
in the fight was sufficient to render them innoxious for several years : Victory 
but another campaign was needed in 233 against the Ligurians, ^^^'^^^^^ 
who were conquered by O. Fabius Maximus, afterwards the cele- ^^^'"'^^"''^' 
brated Cunctator, who won his first triumph in this war. 

For a short time in 235 there was an appearance of such profound The 
peace, that for the second time in the history of Rome the temple of ^^6'^'^^« 
Janus was closed. But the lull in the troubles from Gaul gave the ^^^g ^^^' 
Romans the opportunity of bringing to a successful close another 

T 



274 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Illyrians 

plunder 

Greek 

coasts, 

231-230. 



The Rom- 
ans send 
commis- 
sioners to 
Teuta, 230. 



task which their leading position in Italy entailed upon them. From 
time immemorial the Illyrian pirates had infested the Adriatic, and 
plundered ships sailing between Italy and the opposite coast. The 
coast of Dalmatia has innumerable indentations, and is flanked by a 
vast number of small islands, offering every facility for the protection 
of the light craft used in these lawless expeditions. Though com- 
plaints had reached the Romans from time to time, they had no 
warships to use against pirates, and had not yet conceived the idea 
of extending their jurisdiction so far east. But in 230 the depreda- 
tions of these scourges of the sea had been brought very prominently 
under their notice. Taking advantage of a quarrel between the 
Aetolians and the people of Medion, near Montenegro^ the Illyrian 
king Agron had possessed himself of that town ; and, though he died 
soon afterwards, his widow and successor Teuta, delighted with the 
plunder obtained, had allowed her subjects to ravage the coasts of 
Elis and Messenia and to seize Phoenice, a town standing some few 
miles up a river flowing into the Adriatic on the coast of Chaonia. 
An attempt on the part of the Epirotes to rescue Phoenice failed, 
and an appeal was then made to the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. 
Thus the two chief powers of Greece were brought into the conflict. 
Phoenice, however, was not saved by them, but by an insurrection in 
the dominions of Teuta herself, especially in the island of Issa, which 
forced her to recall her troops. 

The Romans now found themselves appealed to in two direc- 
tions. The Illyrians, while blockading the mouth of the river on 
which Phoenice stood, had frec^uently plundered Italian merchants 
in the Adriatic, from whom many complaints reached Rome ; while 
from Issa came an offer of submission to the Romans if they would 
save the island from Teuta. Commissioners, Gains and Lucius 
Coruncanius, were sent to remonstrate with the queen. They found 
her engaged in the blockade of Issa, and in a high state of exulta- 
tion at the amount of booty brought home by her ships from the 
Greek coast. She was not inclined, therefore, to conciliation. She 
promised to restrain her own ships and of^cers from piracy, but dis- 
claimed all power of preventing private subjects. The younger 
Coruncanius exclaimed with some warmth that "in that case the 
Romans would undertake to improve the relations between the 
sovereign and the people of Illyria." Exasperated by this reply, 
Teuta is said to have secured the assassination of the speaker on 
his way home, and early in the next year (229) she sent another 
fleet along the Greek coast. Though it failed in an attack upon 
Epidamnus, it laid formal siege to Corcyra, which, after a vain 
attempt at relief by the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, had to receive 
an Illyrian garrison under Demetrius of Pharos. 



XX THE ILLYRIAN WAR 275 

But the Romans were not likely to allow this defiance and the 229. 

murder of their ambassador to pass unnoticed. Teuta, indeed, when Coss. L. 

she heard of preparations being made at Rome, had attempted to Postmums 

avert the danger. She had sent Demetrius with promises of sub- ^ ^^^^ *' 

mission, and an assurance that the murder of Coruncanius had been Fulvius 

the deed of a pirate, for which she was not responsible, while other Ccntum- 

charges referred to circumstances which had happened in her ^^"^- ^^ 

army and 



husband's lifetime. But in spite of this pacific message the expedi- 



Jleet setit 



tion was pushed on, and the Romans, having arrived at a private aa-aimt 
understanding with Demetrius, appeared at Corcyra with a fleet of Teuta. 
200 ships of war under the consul Gnaeus Fulvius, whilst the other 
consul Postumius marched to Brundisium ready to cross. Corcyra 
was already in the hands of the Illyrians, but the traitor Demetrius, 
who had fallen out of favour with Teuta and feared her vengeance, 
connived at the surrender of the garrison. The Corcyreans hailed 
the Romans as deliverers, and were admitted to their " friendship 
and alliance." The fleet, with Demetrius on board, then sailed to 
Apollonia, where they found Aulus Postumius just arrived from 
Brundisium. The Illyrians besieging Epidamnus fled, and Epidam- 
nus also became an " ally and friend " of Rome. The fleet coasted 
along parallel with the army until it arrived at Issa, which was still 
blockaded. At its approach the queen fled to a fortress called 
Rhizon, and Issa was delivered. Meanwhile the army was march- 
ing up the country, subduing some tribes and receiving the voluntary 
surrender of others, without meeting with any check except a slight 
repulse at Nutria. The consul Postumius wintered in Illyria, and Siibmission 
early in the spring of 228 queen Teuta signified her submission, of Teuta, 
She was allowed to retain a small portion of her dominions, but the ^^ ' 
rest was handed over to the nominal authority of her young stepson 
Pinnes, really to the care of Demetrius of Pharos as his guardian. 
A fixed tribute was imposed, and it was agreed that no Illyrian ship 
of war should sail south of the promontory of Lissus. 

The subsequent expeditions to Illyria were brought about by Demetrius 
Demetrius, who proved as unfaithful to Rome as he had been to the of Pharos, 
queen. He endeavoured to establish his position by making ^^ '^^■^' 
alliances with the king of Macedonia, and served in the army of ' 
Antigonus Doson in the expedition against Cleomenes of Sparta 
(224-222). In the year 222 he intrigued with the Aetolian League, 
and went on a piratical expedition, not only south of Lissus, but 
round the coasts of Greece and the islands of the Aegean. In these 
movements he had been aided by the Istri, who inhabited the tongue The Istri, 
of land at the head of the Adriatic still called I stria, and accordingly 221. 
in 221 the consuls, P. Cornelius Scipio and M. Minucius Rufus, 
were sent. to subdue them. In 219 the consul Lucius Aemilius was 



276 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Demetrii 
escapes. 



Embassy 

to the 

Actolian 

and 

.Ichaean 

Leagues, 

228. 



The Gallic 
loar, 22^- 



sent to Illyria to crush Demetrius. He took Pharos, and won a 
triumph : but Demetrius escaped to the court of PhiHp V. of 
Macedonia, with whom he remained for some years, in spite of 
demands made by Rome for his surrender. It was he that instigated 
some of Phihp's worst deeds in his deahngs with Greece, and it was 
on his advice that PhiHp also resolved to take up a position of 
hostility to Rome : and accordingly his restoration was guaranteed in 
the treaty between Hannibal and Philip in 21 5. He is said by some 
to have subsequently ventured to return to Illyria, and there to have 
been captured and put to death by the Romans ; but Polybius says 
that he perished in an attack upon Messene, which must have been 
shortly after this treaty. 

The submission of Teuta in 228 led to the first diplomatic rela- 
tions between Rome and Greece. The best organised governments 
at that time in Greece were the Aetolian League in north-west 
Greece and the Achaean League in Peloponnese. Both had been 
asked for and had given aid against the Illyrians, and the Roman 
consuls recognised their position by sending legates to acquaint them 
formally with what had been done and to read their treaty with 
Teuta. The legates were received with great respect, and carried 
back a vote of thanks from both bodies. At Corinth, indeed, where 
they met the magistrates of the Achaean League, they were treated 
with special honour, being even admitted, as though of Hellenic 
descent, to share in the Isthmian games ; while the Athenians pre- 
sented them with the freedom of their city, and allowed them to be 
initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was the first circumstance 
that made the Roman power practically known in Greece, and it was 
not long before a party existed there which looked upon Rome as a 
possible champion of Greek interests against Macedonia. Among the 
Romans, on whom Greek thought and Greek fashions had long been 
making themselves felt, it brought into fashion a kind of chivalrous 
Philhellenism which they never quite forgot, even when they becanie 
the stern masters of the land which they professed to liberate. 

Since the suicidal quarrel between the Boii and their transalpine 
kinsfolk in 236 there had been no actual outbreak on the part of the 
Gauls. Still, danger was always expected from them, and various 
precautions were taken. Thus, after the expulsion of the Senones 
from their territory (283) the coast-hne had been secured by the 
colonies of Sena (283) and Ariminum (268). The colonists of these 
two towns had of course had grants of the abandoned land, but there 
was still much unassigned and belonging to the State. One of the 
tribunes for 232, Gains Flaminius, destined to perish at Thrasymene, 
brought in a law for dividing this land among the citizens. We 
know nothing of the conditions on which the division was to be 



XX AGRARIAN LAW OF FLAMINIUS 277 

made, but the proposal was strenuously resisted by the nobility, The 
headed by Q. Fabius Maximus, and was passed in spite of the Agrarian 
Senate refusing to sanction 'it. Such propositions were always ^^".°J 
resisted by the conservative nobles. There is no evidence to show Flaminins 
that the opposition arose from their having already illegally occupied 2j2. 
this land themselves. Rather it seems that it was founded on the 
dislike to the settlement of citizens at a distance from Latium, where 
they would be comparatively free from the influence of the nobility, 
as tending to shift the centre of power from the city to the country, 
and to destroy the idea of a strictly urban government. When 
Polybius judged it to be " the first step in the demoralisation of the 
people," he appears to regard it as an encouragement to an idle part 
of the citizens to look for wealth from sudden windfalls rather than 
ordinary labour. His judgment may have been coloured by associa- 
tion with the upper classes at Rome, but there probably was reason 
to fear any measure which tended to draw the country people to the 
city for the sake of possible bounties whether of corn or land : and 
there was no security, if the land fell to the idle, that they would not 
cjuickly sell it and return to the city in hopes of something more.i 

The immediate effect of the measure is more certain. The Effect of the 
Gauls of the Po valley were alarmed, and expected that similar treat- ^^"'^ ^f 
ment would be applied to them if the Roman power increased. A (^"y-nms 
league, therefore, was formed between the Boii and Insubres ; and a Cajils 
tribe of free-lances called Gaesatae were invited from the Rhone 2ji-22^. 
valley to join in attacking Rome. The rumour of a Gallic invasion 
I spread, and the Romans made haste to prepare. Their attention 
1 had been lately turned elsewhere, Hasdrubal, the successor of 
I Hamilcar in Spain (229), had made a progress which roused their 
I alarm and jealousy. The founding of New Carthage (228) was 
apparently answered on the part of Rome by an alliance with the 
rich city of Saguntum, and it seemed likely that before long the two 
peoples would contend for Spain as they had for Sicily. But when, Treaty 
after the close of the Illyrian war, the danger from the Gauls became '^"'^^'■ 
Imore threatening, the Romans put away for a time all thought of i^^'^^p"- ^ 
armed interference in Spain, contented themselves with making a treaty 
(with Hasdrubal binding the Carthaginians not to come north of the 
:Ebro in arms, and devoted themselves to prepare for the Gallic war. 
It is even recorded that, in consequence of a prophecy that Gauls and 

^ For the agrarian law of Flaminius, see Cic. Acad. ii. 5 invito scnatu ; de 
Invent, ii. 17 invito senatu contra voluntatem omnium optimatinm per sedi- 
tionem ad populuin legetn agrariam tulit. De Sen. § 11 "resisted by Q, Fabius," 
though in this place Cicero assigns it to the second consulship of Fabius, i.e. 228. 
.Valerius Max. (v. 4, 3) has a story of the father of Flaminius having induced 
his son to leave the rostra while speaking for the law. Anyhow it was passed. 



278 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



22S. 

Coss. L. 
Aemilius 
Papus, C. 
Atilius 
Regulus. 
The Gatils 
begin the 
invasion. 



Greeks were to possess the city, two Greeks and two Gauls were buried 
alive within the walls in order to fulfil the terms of the prediction. 

The Boii and Insubres had taken some years to make their pre- 
parations. It was not till 225 that the Gaesatae had been brought 
into the valley of the Po, and meanwhile the Romans had secured 
the friendship of the Veneti and Cenomani, which would compel the 
Boii to leave a considerable force to protect them from attacks on 
their rear and to defend their territory. The consul L. Aemilius 
Papus was sent to Ariminum to block the coast road ; one of the 
praetors went into Etruria with an army of Sabines and Etruscans to 
guard the inland road which led through Faesulae and Clusium ; 
and the other consul Atilius was summoned from Sardinia. That 
he should have been sent there at such a time seems to show that 
after all the actual movement of the Gauls was a surprise. Yet 
preparations had been made of unusual magnitude. Stores of 
provisions, weapons, and other war material had been collected 
in Rome, and the Italian allies were volunteering m every 
direction to avert the common danger. There were soon over 
170 000 men actually serving in the field, while a reserve of 50,000 
foot and 5000 horse was kept at Rome. At the same time re- 
turning officers, or conqidsitores, were sent round to the Italian 
communities to revise the lists of men of military age, who re- 
ported an available force of 220,000 foot and 32,000 cavalry. 
The roll of citizens in Rome and Campania fit for service showed a 
total of I 50,000 foot and 6000 cavalry, besides two legions actually 
serving at the time in Sicily and Tarentum. Supposing these all to 
be available, as they would be against a Gallic invasion, Rome found 
herself able to draw upon a force of over 600,000 infantry and 70,000 
cavalry, a force far surpassed in modern times, but which had then 
been equalled by no great empire since that of the Persian kings. 1 

1 Polybius (ii. 24) makes up the list thus : — 



Two consular armies of two legions each 

(allies) . 
Sabine and Etruscan volunteers 
Umbrians and others 
Veneti and Cenomani 
Reserves at Rome (citizens) 

(allies). 
Two legions at Tarentum and vSicily . 

Total actually serving 

Military rolls of Italian States . 

, , of Rome and Campania 

Grand Total 



INFANTRY, 

20,800 
60,000 
50,000 
20,000 
20,000 
20,000 
30,000 
8,400 



CAVALRY. 
1,200 
4,000 
4,000 



3,000 

2,000 

400 



229,200 

250,000 
150,000 



14,600 

35,000 
23,000 



629,200 72,600 



THE GAULS INVADE ETRURIA 279 



The Gauls took the central road through Etruria, and marched, Fighting in 
as their fathers had done, upon Clusium. Thither the praetor with Etmria in 
his Sabine and Etruscan militia followed. The Gauls won the first ^^•^• 
battle by a ruse. During the night they left their camp in charge 
of the cavalry and retired some distance along the road towards 
Faesulae. Finding next morning that the cavalry were alone the 
praetor attacked. The enemy retreated, and the praetor's army 
pursued, but suddenly found itself in the presence of the main body 
of the Gauls. After a fierce battle, in which they lost 6000 men, 
the survivors of the praetor's army entrenched themselves on some' 
rising ground, and were there besieged. Never good at such opera- 
tions, the Gauls left the task of watching the refugees to a squadron 
or two of cavalry, while the rest feasted and slept. 

But the tidings of the route taken by the enemy had reached the 
consul Aemilius at Ariminum. He had started in pursuit, and 
now appeared upon the scene soon after the defeat of the praetor. 
The beleaguered troops on the hill saw his watch-fires, and contrived 
to let him know what had happened. He resolved to attack next 
morning. But the Gauls had no mind to fight a regular Roman 
army. They had taken a great booty, and on the advice of the king 
of the Gaesatae, determined first to convey this safely into their own 
territories, and to return and fight, if they must fight, disencumbered 
of the burden. 

They could not retreat along the same road by which they came Retreat of 
without fighting Aemilius ; they therefore made for the west coast, tfie Gauh 
intending to march along the Ligurian Bay, which would at any rate 
bring the Gaesatae to the entrance into Transalpine Gaul. Aemilius, 
having reinforced his army by the men whom he had rescued, started 
in pursuit, not intending to fight a pitched battle, but to dog the 
footsteps of the Gauls, harassing them at every opportunity, and 
wresting from them such booty as he could lay hands upon. The 
retreating Gauls reached the Etruscan coast near Telamon ; but, as 
they marched northward, suddenly found themselves face to face 
with another Roman army. 

Summoned from Sardinia Gains Atilius had landed at Pisae with 
his troops, and was marching down the very road on which the Gauls met'^by tlu 
were. Falling in with their advanced guard he took the men ^''f''^ 
prisoners, and learnt the state of the case. He put himself at the Atilius. 
head of his cavalry, and hastened down the road to seize some rising 
ground by which he knew the enemy must pass, leaving orders with 

Polybius adds up his figures wrongly, and must of course be speaking in round 
numbers, as the later authorities do, Livy, for instance, speaking of the army in 
foot as 300,000. Fabius Pictor reckons 800,000, of whom 448,200 foot and 
26, 600 horse were Romans and Campanians. 



to the west 
coast. 



They are 



28o HISTORY OF ROME 



the infantry to advance in fighting order. When the Gauls saw the 
Roman cavahy making for the hill they at first imagined that the 
horse of Aemilius had outstripped them in the night, for they knew 
Great nothing of the army in front. They sent their cavalry and some 

defeat of light infantry forward to dispute the possession of the hill, and pre- 
tlie Gauls, ^^^^^^ learnt the truth. Aemilius also first knew of the approach of 
^^^' the army of Atilius by seeing the cavalry fight in front. For some 

time the infantry looked on while the cavalry of Atilius and the Gauls 
contended for the hill. After an obstinate fight, in which Atilius 
fell, the Romans prevailed, and nothing now prevented the infantry 
from coming into collision. The Gauls were numerous enough to 
show two strong fronts in opposite directions, and presented a strange 
and terrifying spectacle. The Gaesatae came stripped into battle, 
though ornamented with every kind of barbaric device. Their horns 
and clarions made a hideous din : their flanks were protected by a 
barricade of waggons and chariots. Their naked bodies, however, 
suffered severely from the volleys of pila, and their retreat caused 
some confusion ; but when the Romans charged the Boii, Insubres, 
and Taurisci, sword in hand, these tribes— better protected by their 
leather jerkins — offered a stout resistance. Here, however, the 
superiority of the Roman weapons helped to decide the result. The 
pointless Gallic swords were no match for the cut-and-thrust blades 
of the Romans, and were also of such inferior metal that they easily 
bent and were often useless after the first stroke. Forty thousand 
Gauls are said to have fallen on the field; 10,000 were taken 
prisoners with Concolitanus, one of their kings. The king of the 
Gaesatae, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers, but only to end 
his life by his own hand. The cavalry for the most part got away. 
Invasion of This success determined the Romans to attempt offensive opera- 
Gaul, 224. tions. The Boii submitted to the consuls of the next year (224) 
without a struggle, but an unusually wet season prevented farther 
00. coss operations. The consuls of the next year, C. Flaminius and P. 
'Gaius ' Furius, for the first time crossed the Po, near its confluence with the 
Flaminius, Addua. They were opposed by the Insubres, and lost so heavily, 
P. Furius ^^^^1^ ^j^jjg crossing the river and while pitching their camp, that they 
Philus. ^^^^^ obliged to make terms with the enemy and quit their territory. 
They marched eastward down the left bank of the Ollius until they 
had crossed its tributary, the Clusius, into the territory of the friendly 
Cenomani. The Insubres found that the enemy, whom they had 
thus allowed to escape them, were securing reinforcements of Ceno- 
mani to attack them again. They therefore made a grand effort. 
The golden standards, called the " immovables," were taken down 
from the temple of their goddess, which were only to be used in the 
last resort, and a great host was collected to resist the returning 



CAPTURE OF MEDIOLANUM 28] 



army. Even now, by unskilfulness or ill-fortune, the consuls gave Defeat of 
the enemy battle in a dangerous position. Distrusting the fidelity of ihe In- 
their Gallic allies, they placed them on the opposite bank of the ^'''^^^^' 
river on which they were posted, and broke down the bridge between ^"^' 
them. The Romans thus fought with a river on their rear which 
they could not pass, and were forced to conquer or perish. Flaminius 
declined to listen to an announcement of unfavourable auspices, or 
even, it is said, to open a despatch from the Senate forbidding him to 
fight, and gave the signal for battle. Success alone saved him from 
impeachment by his aristocratic enemies. Victory was attributed in 
part to an innovation in the usual Roman tactics. The hastati were 
armed with the pike instead of the pilum, and charged with the rest 
of the line. The Gauls exhausted themselves in striking with their 
swords at an enemy a spear's length distant, and when the Romans 
threw down their pikes and began to use their swords resistance was 
almost at an end. 

The Insubres now again got help from the Gaesatae, and next 222. Coss. 
year the consuls once more invaded them. They first besieged ^^"- ^or- 
Acerrae on the Addua, while the Gauls retaliated by investing Clas- ""'''."f 
tidium, seven miles south of the Po. Claudius went with the cavalry c'fi^l, ^/ 
to relieve Clastidium, defeated the Gauls, and won the spolia ophua Claudius ' 
by killing their king Viridomarus. Acerrae having fallen, the Gauls Marcellus. 
made their last stand at Mediolanum. Scipio followed them there. Fall of 
but, not thinking himself strong enough to take the town, was retiring ^^^'i'^'- 
tovvards Acerrae. The Gauls sallied out to harass his rear guard, ^'""""' 
which turned upon them with such fury that they retreated, and 
Scipio, following up the success, carried Mediolanum itself This 
ended the war for the present. The Insubrian chiefs hastened to 
submit, and the consuls traversed the country to the foot of the 
Alps. 

The Gauls were not now expelled from their territories, but the Military 
Romans at once began to secure the country by taking hostages and colonies 
establishing colonies in places of strategic importance. Thus Cremona ''"'^ '''^^^^^ 
and Placentia were at once resolved upon, and the colonists were 
being settled in them in 218, when the news of Hannibal's march 
encouraged the Boii to attack them. Bononia, Parma, Mutina, 
and other strong towns, afterwards also colonised, were secured by 
Roman garrisons. Moreover, one of the three great roads con- 
necting Rome with the north, the via Flami?iia, was now (220) 
made fit for the passage of an army as far as Ariminum, under the 
auspices of Gains Flaminius as censor. It did for Rome in the 
north-east what the via Appia did in the south-east. It was meant 
especially to keep communication open between Rome and the 
Gallic territory ; and, by its conception and construction, formed a 



282 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xx 

noble memorial of Flaminius, whose opposition to the optimates as 
tribune in 232, and failure at Thrasymene in 217, have helped to 
leave an undeserved impression of a demagogue without greatness 
as a statesman or ability as a commander. 

Authorities. — For the mercenary war at Carthage, Polybius i. 66-88 ; for 
the lUyrian war, ii. 2-12 ; for the Gallic wars, ii. 14-35 '< Livy, Ep. xx. ; 
Plutarch, Marcelhis iii.-iv. Some farther notices are to be found in Appian, 
Gall. xi. ; Diodorus fr. of book xxv. ; Dio Cassius fr. 50 ; Eutropius iii. 2 ; 
Florus ii. 3-5 ; Zonaras viii. 18 ; Orosius iv. 13. The best of all is Polybius, 
who, especially in his account of the mercenary war, is graphic beyond his usual 
style. 



CHAPTER XXI 

CHANGES IN ROME BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND 
PUNIC WARS 

241-218 

Social distinctions — Apparent change in character and influence of Senate and 
the aristocracy — Increase in number of slaves, and consequences of it — The 
Libertini and Peregrini — The games — Gladiators — Funerals — Women and 
divorce — New nobles— Greek influence on personal habits, and on literature — 
Livius Andronicus — Cn. Naevius — Absence of prose writing. 

When the complete equality of the orders, gradually established by Survival 
a series of laws, had been consummated by the election in 253 of a "f ^"'^_^<^i 
plebeian as Pontifex Maximus, there were yet signs that socially .'.^ ^"^' 
the distinction had not disappeared. We have already noticed the 
exclusion of a plebeian lady from the chapel of Patrician Chastity ; 
and the fact that the plebeian aediles thought it worth while to punish 
the petulance of Claudia, is a proof that social pride on the one 
hand, and jealousy on the other, was not extinct. Similar sentiments Opposition 
survived in the Senate. Though it could not eventually stop popular <^fihe 
legislation, it clung obstinately to its old position of obstructing '^''''^'^• 
political change and the claims of the lower orders. This is illus- 
trated by the opposition to the proposal of Gains Flaminius in 232 
to divide the Gallic land instead of making it ager publicus ; and by 
the Senate's unfriendly attitude to him in the Gallic campaign of 
222, when a party in the house tried to secure his recall on the 
grounds of a vitium in his election, while its loss of influence is 
shown by his successful defiance. The Senate, indeed, which had The 
impressed the envoy of Pyrrhus as an " assembly of kings," and Senate's 
whose influence increased during the second Punic war, seems, ^^"^«^^- 
nevertheless, during this period, to show signs of decadence. Hence, 
perhaps, the unusual severity of the censors of 252, who struck 
thirteen names off the roll ; ^ while, three years afterwards (249), 

^ The personal character of the nobles generally was still high. The im- 
peachment of M, Livius Salinator and L. Aemilius Paulus, consuls for 219, and 
the condemnation of the former on a charge oi peculatus, grounded on alleged 



2S4 



HISTORY OF ROME 



2./1-21S. 

Increased 
number of 
slaves. 



Effect on 

country 

life. 



Lihertini. 



Tax on the 
sale of 
slaves. 



Claudius ventured to beard it by nominating a freedman dictator, 
when ordered by the Senate to supersede himself. 

A striking feature in the social condition of the people at this time 
was the increase in the number of slaves. This was chiefly brought 
about by the enormous number of unfortunate persons reduced to 
servitude in the course of the wars in Cisalpine Gaul, Magna Graecia, 
and Sicily, 25,000, for instance, having been sold at one blow after 
the fall of Agrigentum in 262. The slave market, therefore, must have 
been overstocked, and the price of slaves low. This accelerated the 
tendency, always perhaps existing, to leave the country and crowd 
into the city, where there was a greater opportunity of using capital, 
of obtaining profitable employment, or of sharing in public benefac- 
tions : for the land could be worked to greater advantage by cheaply 
purchased slaves, who were not taken away by the levies. When 
Regulus was in Africa (255) one story represents him as wishing to 
be recalled, because the hired servants {inercciiarii) on his farm were 
cheating him ; but when Cato wrote on farming (about 1 80), he 
assumes that all the work is done by slaves. Free or cheap distribu- 
tions of corn, indeed, were not yet so frequent as to tempt the poor 
or the thriftless to the city in such large masses as in after times : 
yet they did occur. Hiero, on his visit to Rome in 237, brought 
with him a large cargo of corn for free distribution ; and the assign- 
ment of land by the lex Flaminia (232) must have substantially bene- 
fited the landless urban populace. The increase in the number of 
slaves is also illustrated by the fact that it was thought worth while, 
in 238, to forbid the purchase of them from the Gauls, lest the 
revenue thus obtained should assist preparations against Rome ; and, 
again, by the growing importance of the liberti7ii.^ the necessary 
accompaniment of slavery. For some time emancipated slaves became 
citizens on the same terms as others as far as the law was concerned, 
though custom excluded them from office and other advantages. 
The State took no cognisance of the matter beyond formally attest- 
ing, in certain cases, the act of emancipation. But in 257, either 
with a view to check emancipation, or because the numbers of such 
transactions made it worth while, a lex Claudia imposed a tax of 
5 per cent on the selling value of the emancipated slave, which, under 
the name of aiiruni vicessiniarium., was kept as a reserve in an inner 
chamber of the treasury. And, whereas on emancipation the freed- 
men had been accustomed to enrol themselves in any of the tribes, 
either according to their places of residence or that of their emanci- 
pators, their numbers became so important an element in influencing 
the votes that, in 222, a law ordained that they should be enrolled 

unfairness in dealing with the Illyrian booty, is almost the first instance recorded 
of real or suspected dishonesty on the part of a member of the aristocratic families. 



XXI GROWTH OF THE POPULATION OF ROME 285 

in one of the four city tribes, thus confining their influence on an 241-218. 
election to narrower limits. 

But the libertini were not the only additions to the inhabitants /ncy-ease in 
of Rome. The appointment gf a second praetor {pn^cgrifms) in pcregnni 
244, to adjudicate in cases arising between a citizen and an alien, ^^"^^: 
is a farther proof of the growth of the population and the attractive- '^^ ^~^^-^- 
ness of Rome as a place of business or residence. The number 
of full citizens was also growing. The census of men of military 
age shows a steady increase up to 252 ; between that and 245 
there is a sudden drop of over 46,000. This may be accounted for 
partly by great losses in Sicily, and by the greater number of men 
actually serving in the army, who were not counted in the census ; 
and partly by the settlement of citizens in colonies with Latin rights, 
in joining which they suffered a dijnimctio capitis and ceased to be 
entered on the Roman lists. 1 However that may be, the next census 
of Roman citizens recorded (220) shows a recovery of 20,000. 

And as Rome was thus gradually assuming the dimensions worthy Gladiators. 
of the capital of the world, so those tastes and pastimes were coming 
into use which, for good or ill, marked the Roman character in after 
times. The games in the circus had from the first been the favourite 
amusement of the people, and what the citizens were proud to display 
to foreigners. King Hiero's visit in 237 had been professedly for 
the purpose of being present at them, and there was no surer title 
to higher office than the splendour with which the aediles pro- 
vided them. Accordingly, the popular Gains Flaminius, when 
censor in 220, besides his great work the 7>id FIa?ni?iia, also con- 
structed a new circus in that part of the Campus Martius which 
was nearest the Capitol, and was already called pi'ata Flamiiiia. 
But besides these games, a new amusement began about this time, 
which exercised a hardening and demoralising effect upon the 
people. In 263 for the first time an exhibition of gladiators was 
given by Decimus Junius Brutus in honour of his departed father. 
This seems to have set the fashion, not only of training and using 
slaves from the North for this purpose, but also of the extravagant Funa-ats. 
outlay upon funeral ceremonies generally, in spite of the Twelve 
Tables, against which occasional protests in after times were made, 
as by M. Aemilius Lepidus, six times named princeps senatus, who, 
in 154, ordered his sons on his death-bed to carry his body out to 
the pyre on a simple bier without fine linen or purple, and not to 
spend on the rest of his funeral more than ten asses. 

In some other ways this age witnessed a departure from the 

^ The counting of the coloni in Campania, in 225, seems to have been a special 
and exceptional measure (Polyb. ii. 24). But later on steps were taken to include 
those on service in the census. 



286 



HISTORY OF ROME 



241-218. 



Wotnen 

and 

divorce. 



Neiv nobles. 



Greek 
injluejice. 



Literature. 



simpler manner of an earlier time. Women were profuse in ornaments 
of gold and gay -coloured dresses, and rode in covered carriages, 
which it was thought necessary to forbid in a plebiscitiitn proposed 
by the tribune Q. Claudius in 228, and by the lex Oppia in 215 ; 
and it is specially noted by subsequent writers that in 231 for the 
first time a wife was divorced. Regulations for divorce were con- 
tained in the laws of the Twelve Tables, which implies its existence 
even earlier ; but Sp. Carvilius put away his wife on the ground of 
barrenness, not of immorality ; and he thereby set a precedent which 
was before long eagerly followed with results disastrous to family life. 

Another innovation of less importance was the permanent wearing 
of decorations won in military service, — thus marking men off as a 
kind of life-nobles. We have seen that Duilius, the victor of Mylae 
(260), retained for life the honour of the torch -bearer and the 
piper; but in 231 we hear for the first time of wearing the triumphal 
ornaments at the public games, after the day of triumph, by Papirius 
Maso, who had conquered the Corsicans ; while M. Valerius Corvus, 
consul in 263, set the fashion of adopting a title or second cognomen 
from the name of a conquered town or country, calling himself 
Messala for his victory over Messana. 

In such things generally we see natural development of Roman 
habits without appreciable influence from without. Of the time when 
Hellenic habits and thoughts began first to influence the Romans it 
would be impossible to speak with precision. It probably may be 
traced to the earliest days, and to the A/^fy rudiments of their 
civilisation and their religious habits. Greek had apparently before 
this time superseded Etruscan ais the staple subject of the education 
of the young. But a great impulse was given to this influence by the 
closer contact of the Romans with the cities of Magna Graecia and 
Sicily in this period. This influence showed itself in various ways, some 
of them trivial, — the custom of shaving the beard, for instance, being, 
it is said, introduced by barbers from Sicily in 300 ; while the first 
physician from Greece, Archagathus, was imported from Peloponnesus 
in 219, and was eagerly welcomed, a place of business being 
purchased for him at the public cost, — perhaps as superseding those 
charms, incantations, and concoction of simples which seem to have 
characterised the medical art in Latium, and still to have been practised 
in the country when Cato wrote. ^ But a more important and more 
permanent influence was that exercised by the Greeks on literature, 
and first of all upon that part of it which could reach even uneducated 
people through the theatre. Acting, we have seen, had been intro- 
duced in Rome nearly a hundred years before the first Punic war 

^ Thus medical terms were generally derived from Greek, e.g. hepatarius 
morbus (Plaut. Cure. 2, i, 24). 



XXI INFLUENCE OF GREEK LITERATURE 287 

(361). For some time it Seems to have consisted principally of the 241-218. 
recitation of rude songs afid dances, or at the most of coarse comic 
dialogue between the daiices, with some allusions to topics of the 
day, but without connefcted plot {fabula). But the career of a 
Greek captive from Tai-entum in this century not only shows that Livms 
the value set upon education was rising, but led the way for an amuse- ^ndro- 
ment more refined and artistic. Andronicus was brought as a slave "^"^^' 
to Rome about 275, ^nd being afterwards manumitted by his owner, 
M. Livius Salinator,/whose sons he taught, was thenceforth called 
Livius Andronicus, He was able to make a livelihojad by teaching, 
both in Latin and Greek, and for the use of his pu^^s translated the 
Odyssey into Latin/ Saturnians.^ He wrote aj,80 hymns to be sung 
at festivals or at times of public rejoiciiw^j^r one of which in 207 
he was rewarded by a grant of residei^ee for himself and other poets. 
He was not indeefd the first to com^se in Latin on Greek models, 
for Appius Claudkis Caecus had'''^done so before ; ^ but he seems to 
have first made a professiojr of writing, which partly at any rate 
maintained him ; and if the translation of the Odyssey was made for Trans- 
pupils, it indicates a consitlerable advance in education. But besides ^^^t^o''^ ^f 
this, Andronicus was an actor, and as an actor he composed his own y^^^y- 
parts. He is said to have taught a slave to recite his poem, which 
then for the first time contained a continuous story, while he accom- 
panied the recitation with appropriate gestures. He also made the 
next step. He was the first to exhibit translations of Greek plays, Greek 
principally tragedies, which required other actors than himself, whom plays. 
he had to train and teach. The first was exhibited in 240 ; and his 
example was soon followed by others. Thus the scanty old literature 
of Fescennine verses, religious songs, oracles, magic formulae, and rude 
miscellanies called Saturae, if it was not superseded in popular 
favour, had at any rate a rival literature formed on a better model, 
which attracted the most refined tastes in Rome, and gave a direction 
to Latin poetry never destined to be materially changed. But we must Difficulties 
not think of it as immediately successful. Many of the upper classes in the zvay 

objected to acting as undignified and frivolous, and to Greek literature ^ '^^^ 

•^ . . ° ^ . ,^.,', ,., Graeco- 

as an mnovation^, preferrmg real Latm plays, however poor ; while j^^^i^ 

the common people cared much more for rope dancers, pugilists, and drama. 

gladiators.3 Still an audience was found, and Livius was soon 

^ A few lines have been preserved, e.g. — 

Viriim mihi, Casmena | insect versutum 
and 

ibi man^ns sedcto | ddnicum videbis 

me carpentd veh^ntem | eu domum venisse. 

2 One line of Appius Claudius is preserved — 

Est unus quisque faber | ipse sua6 fortunae. 
^ Plautus, Pocii. pr. 15 ; Terence, Hecyra, pr. 2, 25 sq. 



prose 
ivritifnis 



288 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xxi 

Cn. followed by another poet. Cn. Naevius was a Latin, though living 

Naevius. \^^ Campania. He fought in the first Punic war, and lived till near the 
end of the second. Five years later than Andronicus (235), he too 
began to exhibit Latin plays, modelled on, or translated from, the 
Greek. As Andronicus was a Greek by birth, Naevius may be regarded 
(excepting Appius Claudius) as the first native writer of Latin whose 
works can claim to be literature. He did not write plays only. He 
composed a Saturnian poem in seven books on the first Punic war ; 
and also Saturae, in which he commented so freely upon the public 
characters of the day that he incurred bitter personal enmities, and 
ended his life in exile at Utica (204).! 
Ahse?icc of We may therefore note the period between the beginning of the 

^^" ;^ ^^''^^ fi^^^ Punic war and the second as that of a new departure in Roman 
literature : in which new influences were acting, new fashions begin- 
ning to prevail, and much that was afterwards specially characteristic 
took its rise. We have not yet to discuss prose writings. A speech 
of Appius Claudius Caecus delivered in the Senate on the question 
of making terms with Pyrrhus was extant in Cicero's time, and 
perhaps others, and was regarded as the earliest piece of Latin 
prose in existence. Some laiidatioiics or other family records may 
have existed even earlier : but they did not survive to the literary 
age ; and when Fabius Pictor, who lived in the time of the second 
Punic war, wished to write a history of Rome, he seems naturally to 
have used the Greek language, much as an English writer of the 
thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, or even later, would almost certainly 
have used Latin. The same seems also true of another writer of 
history, nearly contemporary with Pictor, L. Cincius Alimentus, and 
of P. Cornelius Scipio, son of the elder Africanus. A laudatio of 
Marcellus by his son (about 206) survived for a time ; but the 
earliest writer of history in Latin, beyond the bare entries in the 
A?t?tales Maximi^ seems to have been Cato the censor. 

■^ His banishment was chiefly, it appears, contrived by Metellus and his 
friends ; probably the Q. CaeciUus Metellus who was consul in 206. The line 
particularly offensive to liim has been preserved — 

fato Met^lli Romae | consules fiunt, 
which Metellus or some partisan answered by another Saturnian — 

dabunt malum Metelli | Naevio poctae. . 



^ CHAPTER XXII 

! THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 

Second Punic war — First Period, from 219 to spring of 217 — Origin of the war, 
; Carthaginian expansion in Spain, Hamilcar, 238-229; Hasdrubal, 229-221; 
i Hannibal, 221-218 — Roman treaty with Hasdrubal confining the Carthaginian 
I supremacy in Spain to the country south of the Ebro (228) — Founding of New 
I Carthage about the same time — -The Romans make treaty of friendship with 
the semi-Greek communities of Emporiae and Saguntum- — Hannibal becomes 
general of the Carthaginian forces in Africa and Spain (221) — He subdues the 
Olcades (221), the Vaccaei (220) — The Saguntines in alarm appeal to Rome 
— Roman commissioners visit Flannibal in the winter 220, ordering him to 
abstain from attacking Saguntum, or from crossmg the Ebro — They then go 
to Carthage — The second Illyrian war (219) — Hannibal takes Saguntum after 
a siege of seven months (219) — The Romans send an embassy to Carthage 
demanding the surrender of Hannibal, and on the refusal of the Carthaginian 
Senate Fabius declares war (219-218) — Hannibal starts from New Carthage 
in the early summer of 218 — Subdues Spain north of the Ebro, and puts it 
under the care of Hanno ; crosses the Pyrenees and arrives at the Rhone while 
Scipio is still only at Marseilles (September, 218) — P. Cornelius Scipio 
I finding himself too late, sends on his brother Gnaeus to Spain, returns him- 
self to Italy with a few men, and takes over the legions of the praetors and 
awaits Hannibal on the Po — Hannibal crosses the Alps and descends into 
the basin of the Po, takes Turin and defeats Scipio's cavalry on the Ticinus — 
Scipio (wounded) retires to the Trebia near Placentia, south of the Po— He 
is joined by the other consul Sempronius Longus from Ariminum — Defeat of 
Sempronius on the Trebia — the Romans go into winter quarters at Placentia 
and Cremona — Meanwhile Gnaeus Scipio defeats and captures Hanno in 
Spain, and secures the country north of the Ebro (summer of 218). 

The first Punic war arose from a dispute in Sicily, its result Tke origin 
had been the acquisition of the greater part of Sicily, the adjacent ^^'^ result 
islands, and all Sardinia and Corsica. The second Punic war ^ ^^'^^ 



arose from a dispute in Spain, and its result was to hand over Punic 
to Rome the rest of Sicily and a great part of Spain. The immediate 
pretext for it was the capture of a town in alliance with Rome, but it 
jhad been rendered inevitable by a chain of events which more and 
more brought the interests of the two peoples into collision. 

And as the causes of the war are to be sought in events prior to 

U 



war. 



290 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

remoter 
con- 
sequences of 
the war. 



Their 

importance. 



The 

extension of 
the Cartha- 
ginian 
pinver in 
Spain. 



Ham Hear 
Barcas in 
Spain, 

2j8-22g. 

His 

hostility to 
Rome. 



the actual pretext for it, so its effects were extended beyond the 
immediate results. Hannibal's plan for the humiliation of Rome was 
to use against her the hostility of the Gauls in Italy, and the discontent 
which he believed to exist among the Italian allies. But he also 
schemed to bring an enemy upon her from the East, and was soon in 
communication with the court of Macedonia. The conquest of 
Illyricum had made the Roman arms a source of alarm to Macedonia ; 
and the expulsion of Demetrius of Pharos (218) had placed in the 
court of the young king Philip V a crafty and unscrupulous adviser, 
inspired with deadly hatred to Rome. Thus Rome was brought into 
conflict with Macedonia, and thence obliged to interfere in Hellenic 
politics. This again involved her in a quarrel with Antiochus, which 
took her armies and her ambassadors into Asia. 

The war therefore is the best known and most famous of all the 
Roman wars, and deserves to be so. For it is the central fact of 
the history of the Roman Republic, from which radiate those gradual 
extensions of its power which were not deliberately sought, but were 
to all appearance forced upon it one by one, — each step forward 
being the inevitable consequence of that which preceded it. 

When the Carthaginians had at length quelled the terrible mutiny 
of their mercenaries, and the revolt among their Libyan subjects, 
they looked about for means to recoup themselves for the loss of 
Sicily and Sardinia. There was one country, in which they already 
had commercial settlements, that might be made more profitable than 
either. Spain could be reached by the Straits of Gibraltar without 
the assistance of a large fleet of warships, and its mineral wealth 
offered a grand field of enterprise. However much or little truth 
there may be in accounts by Roman writers of the contests between 
the parties of Hanno the Great and the family of Barcas, it is clear 
that the services of Hamilcar Barcas in Sicily and the mercenary 
war had been too great to allow of his enemies ruining or thwarting 
him. He was elected general of the armies at home and abroad, 
and was commissioned or allowed to secure the north coast of Africa 
as far as the Pillars of Hercules, and to cross to Spain with the 
object of extending and consolidating the Carthaginian power in that 
country. 

But whatever may have been the view of the people of Carthage, 
Hamilcar himself had a purpose in his own mind beyond the mere 
acquisition of wealth and the extension of empire. He had regarded 
himself as unconquered in Sicily, and it was with extreme bitterness 
of feeling that he had come to the conclusion that the victory of 
Lutatius at sea had made a peace with Rome necessary even at the 
price of the evacuation of Sicily. He had triumphantly maintained 
himself on Hercte, had boldly harassed the Italian coasts, and had 



XXII HAMILCAR AND HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN 291 

handed over his troops at Lilybaeum unstained by defeat or disaster. 
His spirit was unbroken, and he burned to be revenged. This bitter- 
ness was increased to intense hatred when Rome took advantage 
of the weakness of Carthage to demand the cession of Sardinia. 
It was therefore with the set purpose of creating a power in Spain 
strong enough to defy, or eventually conquer Rome, that he set sail 
for Cadiz, Long afterwards Hannibal told the famous story of the Hat/nibars 
oath exacted from him by his father on this occasion. Hamilcar was '^'^^^'' ^3^- 
engaged in offering sacrifice to the supreme god of Carthage before 
; embarking. His son Hannibal, then nine years old, was standing 
by : and his father suddenly drew the lad aside and asked him 
whether he would like to accompany him to Spain. The glad 
assent was given with boyish enthusiasm ; whereupon Hamilcar 
. caused him to lay his hand upon the altar and swear never to be 
\ friends with Rome. With this purpose ever before him he spent 
] nine years (238-229) of ceaseless exertion and almost constant com- 
; bat in Spain. It is only a later Roman tradition which represents 
j him or his successors as aiming at the establishment of a Spanish 
' kingdom independent of Carthage, or of acting contrary to the 
' feelings of the majority of his countrymen. 

I We know hardly any details of his achievements in Spain. He Hamilcar s 
I extended the Carthaginian power as far north as the Saltiis catnpaigns 
Castiilo7iensis {Sierra iMorc?ia), and appears to have founded Acte ^"^"^^^^"^ 
j Leuke, near the modern Alicante, to be the capital of Carthaginian "'^ 
, Spain, which however was superseded by the later foundation of New 
I Carthage {Carthagc?ia). But he was not only a conqueror. His 
army, unlike previous Carthaginian armies, was not a miscellaneous 
collection of soldiers hired from Italy, Gaul, and Greece ; but con- 
sisted of Libyans, Numidians, and Spaniards : and he seems to have 
encouraged the two former to amalgamate with the natives, to marry 
their daughters, and acquire property in Spain. He himself took 
pains to develop the natural wealth of the country, and to intro- 
duce better methods of mining ; while by attacking the strongholds 
in the interior held by plundering tribes he secured the safety of the 
more peaceful and industrious tribes under Carthaginian protection. 
He lost his life in one of these expeditions, and by an act of 
generous self-sacrifice. Poinding himself outnumbered and over- 
powered he secured the safe escape of his son and his friends by 
taking the enemy's pursuit upon himself, and was drowned in trying 
to cross a river. 

His son-in-law and successor Hasdrubal continued his work. Hasdrubal 
He seems indeed to have been more inclined than Hamilcar to <-'ommander 
depend upon the arts of diplomacy and conciliation, even in the 2^0-221 ' 
case of the hated Romans. Yet force was used when necessary, 





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CHAP. XXII HANNIBAL COMMANDS IN SPAIN 293 

and his young brother-in-law Hannibal, now his second in command, 
was generally employed for that purpose. By skill or arms the 
Carthaginian power was pushed farther north, almost up to the 
Ebro, while a new town was founded in a better position than Acte Founding 
Leuke, which under the name of New Carthage ^ was to be the of New 
capital of this great and rich dependency. Its foundation excited Carthage, 
some prejudice at home ; and it roused the jealousy of the Romans, ^ °^^ ^^ ' 
who readily listened to alarming messages from the allied cities of 
Emporiae and Saguntum, warning them of the encroaching policy 
I of Hasdrubal. But they were engaged in the Illyrian war, and were 
beginning to be alarmed at movements among the Boii. They 
therefore contented themselves with exacting a treaty or under- 
taking from Hasdrubal, that the Carthaginian armies should not go 
north of the Ebro. Whether Saguntum was mentioned in this 
arrangement was later on a matter of dispute. It seems almost 
certain that it was not. The Romans rested their case afterwards 
I on the principle that a town in alliance with Rome could not be 
I attacked with impunity, whatever might be the status of the surround- 
I ing country. For the present Hasdrubal was left without farther 
interference, and during his eight years of command extended the 
I Carthaginian influence right across the Peninsula, and fell at length 
I by the hand of a slave, whose master had been put to death by 
I his order. 

It seems probable, in spite of some statements to the contrary, Hannibal 
I that Hannibal had been in Spain continuously since his arrival with ^^<^omes 

, his father in 238. At the death of Hasdrubal he was in his twenty- ^^ ^J^ . 
li -' . . _ ^ in bpam, 

I seventh year, and had been trained in all the accomplishments of 221. 

a camp under two wise and able commanders, without neglecting 

hmore liberal culture, including the study of Greek. Under his 

! brother-in-law Hasdrubal he had been constantly employed when- 

j I ever the use of armed force was necessary, and had proved him- 

jself to possess the qualities which endear a commander to soldiers. 

He shrank from no fatigue or hardship : he shared the labours and 

'privations of his men: he was the first to undertake a dangerous 

service and the last to retreat : he could sleep on the ground with no 

covering but his cloak, or go without sleep as long as it was 

necessary : he was an excellent horseman, but fought and marched 

on foot with equal cheerfulness, whether under the blazing summer^ 

sun or through the frost and snow of winter. As a commander he 

was as careful as he was bold, and took infinite pains to acquaint 

[himself not only with the nature of a country into which he was 

1 Hasdrubal probably called it simply "Carthage," the epithet " New " was 
added by others to distinguish it from the African city. " Carthage " itself means 
'" New town." Nova Carthago, therefore, is " New New-Town." 



294 HISTORY OF ROME 



elected 
by the 
armv, 221 



going, but with the character and abihty of the commanders he was 
to meet. Whether these high qualities were, as Livy in his famous 
sketch asserts, counterbalanced by inhuman cruelty and monstrous 
perfidy, we shall have occasion to see hereafter. Enough that he 
won the hearts of the miscellaneous army which he led in Italy, and 
in all his triumphs and difficulties never lost its fidelity or affection. 
Ihuuiibal On the death of Hasdrubal there seems to have been a 

disposition in the Senate at Carthage to regard Hannibal's youth 
as unfitting him to succeed to the command, or perhaps the party 
of Hanno thought it a good opportunity to effect his recall. But 
while the question was being debated at Carthage, the army in Spain 
had practically settled it : and when news came that the soldiers 
had elected him, the people insisted on confirming the action of 
the army. 

With the energy and genius, as well as the youth of Napoleon, 
Hannibal had the advantage of a position something like that of 
a Governor-General in India before the days of rapid steamers and 
telegraphs. He was of course subject to the direction of the home 
government, but those directions would come slowly, and often too 
late to forbid a siege or prevent a campaign. His father and 
brother-in-law had acted with a free hand, satisfying the people at 
home by sending shiploads of booty, and by pointing to the exten- 
sion of the Carthaginian power as the justification of their measures. 
Hannibal was not likely to be less active or self-reliant. He in 
Hannibal f^ict immediately set about fresh enterprises. The summer of 221 
S7ibducs the was spent in subduing the Olcades, a tribe of central Spain ; and 
Olcadcs, after wintering at New Carthage, and devoting himself to the training 
^^^'' and strengthening his army, he started at the beginning of the next 

and the season for the territory of the Vaccaei, which lay farther north on 
laecaez, the upper course of the Ebro and the Douro. The capture of their 
220, principal town Arbucala cost him a long and wearisome siege ; and 

he was afterwards obliged by an attack of another tribe, the Carpesii, 
to retreat south of the line of the Tagus. Here, however, he inflicted 
a severe defeat upon the barbarians as they tried to cross the river 
to attack him, and continued his return march to New Carthage in 
safety. 
Sagitntnm. Meanwhile the Saguntines, believing that their turn would come 

next, had been sending messages to Rome asking for help. Though 
the Romans had no army in Spain, and no real footing there at all, 
except perhaps at the port of Tarraco, they had for some time past 
been in alliance with Saguntum, and at the invitation of a party 
among its citizens had acted as arbitrators in some civil disputes 
within its walls ; and had apparently caused the execution of some 
of the leaders of the anti-Roman party. This was enough to give 



XXII HANNIBAL AND THE ROMAN ENVOYS 295 

Hannibal the pretext he desired. He had hitherto abstained from 
interfering in Saguntum, following his father's policy of avoiding 
collision with Rome until he was strong enough to brave her. But 
now he was goaded into taking active measures. 

When he returned into winter quarters at New Carthage towards Roman 
the end of 220 he was met by some Roman commissioners, sent at embassy to 
last in answer to appeals from Saguntum, to see for themselves the ^^^«'"'''«A 
state of affairs. There they had doubtless listened to the party most J^^ ^^ '^ 
opposed to the Carthaginians, and had come on charged with a mes- 
sage from the Senate couched in the most peremptory terms. " He 
I was to leave Saguntum alone, and not to venture to cross the Ebro." 
We may imagine the feelings with which the still youthful general, 
flushed with success, and with the memory of the humiliations of his 
country, and his father's passion for revenge burning in his heart, 
saw the ambassadors of the hated enemy in his camp, and listened 
to their imperious words. He answered them with a fierce outburst 
of indignation. He charged the Romans with treacherously using 
I their position as arbitrators at Saguntum to put citizens opposed to 
( them to death, and declared that the Carthaginians would not suffer 
( such oppression in a Spanish town. Without farther answer the 
Roman legates were dismissed, and Hannibal determined at once 
to strike at Saguntum. He, however, strengthened himself by first 
I obtaining authority from home, where he represented that the Sagun- 
I tines were oppressing certain tribes under the protection of Carthage, 
' and that the Romans were intriguing in Saguntum with the design of 
ejecting the Carthaginians from Spain. 

The Roman commissioners left Hannibal fully convinced that war Dilatori- 
1 was inevitable, and sailed to Carthage to enter a protest. But though ''<•" of the 

this was known to the Senate, there was no idea in the minds of the ^"'''" 
I Roman people or government that the war would be m Italy. They f„^„f 

assumed that it would be in Spain, as the former had been in Sicily, 
I until they should be able to transfer it to Africa. There was, there- 
. fore, no need for haste ; they could take their own time, and mean- 
while would secure themselves against danger arising from the east 
while their attention was fixed on Spain. And such a danger was Second 
j menacing them from Illyricum. Demetrius of Pharos, who had some ^ilynan 
* years before been put in charge of the country as guardian of the young ^'^'^ ^^"\ 
king, had acted as an independent sovereign ; and, relying on the of Pharos), 
difficulties of Rome with the Gauls and Carthage, had broken his 2ig. 
compact by sailing with warships beyond Lissus, had plundered 
the coast and islands of Greece, and attacked cities which had 
. accepted the protection of Rome. He was also forming intimate 
relations with the king of Macedonia ; and though as yet the 
( Romans had had no reason to expect Macedonian hostility, they 



296 HISTORY OF ROME 



were aware that Hannibal hoped to secure help from Philip ; nor 
could the position of the Macedonian king towards Greece have been 
unknown, for the Romans had recently formed diplomatic relations 
with the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues. That they should have 
devoted their energies to the comparatively insignificant war with 
Demetrius, rather than to the relief of Saguntum, and the precau- 
tions necessary to check Hannibal, no doubt contributed to shake 
Roman credit in Spain, and to facilitate Hannibal's march. The 
l^^ll very success of Aemilius Paulus in capturing Pharos, and driving 

influence of Demetrius from his Illyrian dominions, helped to bring on the hos- 
Demetrms tjiity of king Philip, of which they were afraid. For Demetrius took 
on Philip. ,.gfygg j^t the Macedonian court, and there exercised a sinister 
influence, both on Philip's conduct to Greece, and on his policy 
towards Rome. Still the time was not wholly wasted, and the terror 
of the Roman fleets prevented Philip from sending ships across the 
Adriatic to the coasts of Italy. 
Ilafinibal Meanwhile Hannibal had struck the blow which the Roman 

fakes embassy of 220 had been designed to avert. He started from New 

Saguntum, Carthage in the spring of 2 1 9, and marched straight upon Saguntum. 
^^9- Yhe capture of that city was necessary for his safety in the design 

which he had already formed of anticipating a Roman attack by 
transferring the war to Italy : w;hile it was important to leave no 
enemy in his rear. The town held out for more than seven months 
in spite of a siege pressed on with frantic energy, in which Hannibal 
displayed the highest qualities of a commander. His spirit and 
cheerfulness inspired a corresponding enthusiasm in his army ; and 
his men were ashamed to show slackness or timidity when they saw 
their general working like a common soldier, or exposing his life with 
unflinching courage to the weapons of the enemy. Still expecting 
the help from Rome which never came the Saguntines endured the 
extremities of famine ; and \vhen they saw that their city must fall, 
the men, after burning all the property which could be collected, 
perished in a last desperate sally or by their own hands ; while the 
women killed their children and threw themselves from the walls. 
Hannibal obtained a booty from the city rich enough to serve his 
purposes. The money supplied him with means for the projected 
Italian expedition ; the portable property was shipped to Carthage, 
and helped to silence his opponents there ; the captives were distri- 
buted among his soldiery, and their services, or their price, enriched 
and gratified the army. He then retired to New Carthage for the 
winter. 

The news of the fall of Saguntum produced a great sensation at 
Rome. With the indignation of the citizens there must have been 
mixed a feeling of shame at their own supineness. While they had 



XXII DECLARATION OF WAR 297 

been sending missions and remonstrances, Hannibal had acted, and Effect of 

had inflicted a severe blow on Roman prestige. How could they the fall of 

hope to gain partisans among the tribes in Spain if this was to be . "^""^^"^ 

the fate of their friends ? And if an allied city could thus be besieged 

for months without interference from Rome, why should Hannibal 

hesitate to throw aside the agreement of Hasdrubal, and march 

across the Ebro ? 

There could be no doubt, however, as to what was to be done Surrender 

now. Legates, with O. Fabius Maximus at their head, were sent to (f Hanm- 

Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal, the members of the '" 'J' 

. ... manded. 

Senate, and other chief officers with him ; and, in case of refusal, 

to declare war. The Carthaginian Senate answered the demand by 

elaborate arguments, proving from various treaties between the two 

peoples that the Romans were the aggressors. They rejected the 

alleged agreement of Hasdrubal as having never been ratified by the 

people; and as to the treaty of 241, in which it had been agreed 

that neither should attack the allies of the other, they argued that it 

covered only the case of allies existing at the time, and that therefore 

the Saguntines were not protected by it. But it was in vain that Dcclar- 

they demonstrated the justice of their position, and read the text of ^^^^^^ "f 

treaties. The Romans replied that such arguments might have had ^ply^^ 

some value while Saguntum was intact : they were too late now that winter of 

it had been taken and plundered. The two alternatives were again sig. 

stated, and a reply demanded. The Carthaginians renewed their 

arguments at even greater length. The Romans listened for a time 

without speaking ; at length Fabius stood up, and, pointing to the 

folds of his toga, said that in them he carried peace and war : he 

would produce whichever they bade him. The sufifete replied that 

he might produce whichever he chose. " 71ien," said he, shaking 

out the folds, " I give you war." The majority of the Carthaginian 

Senate cried out with enthusiasm that they accepted it. 

There was no doubt on either side. But while Hannibal had a HatinibaVs 

plan of amazing boldness which he had spent the winter in maturing, -^^"" ^^"' 

the Romans seem to have had at first little or no idea of what was 

to come. They expected to meet him in North Spain, and to be 

able, at the same time, to distract his attention by invading Africa. 

The envoys, on leaving Carthage, had gone to test the feelings of 

the Spanish tribes. But the fall of Saguntum was naturally pointed 

to as indicating what the friends of Rome had to expect, and a 

demand that they should refuse Hannibal a passage through their 

country was received with disdain. Still no suspicion of the truth Leisurely 

seems to have occurred to the Roman government. The usual pre- P'^^P'^^'' 

1 • 1 rr^i 1 T^ ^- ,• , at ions at 

parations were not hurried. The two consuls, P. Cornehus and ;^^;„^, 

Tiberius Sempronius, entered upon their office on the ides of March, in 21 8. 



298 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Coss. P. 
Cornelius 
Scipio, Ti. 
Sevipnm- 
ius Longus, 

2fS. 



The Boii 

attack 

Flaccntia 

and 

Cremona. 



Hannibal's 
prepar- 
ations, 
2ig-2r8. 



The day 
for the 
march is 
arranged. 



and enrolled the regular consular armies of two legions each. 
Cornelius was ordered to proceed to Spain, Sempronius to Africa 
with a fleet. But farther delay was caused by alarming news from 
the basin of the Po. Three commissioners, one of whom was Gaius 
Lutatius, the consul of 220, had been sent to allot land among the 
settlers in the new colonies of Placentia and Cremona, while the 
praetor, Gaius Manlius, was stationed with troops in the district 
to protect them. Encouraged, doubtless, by their knowledge of 
Hannibal's intended invasion, the Boii, disregarding the safety of 
the hostages held by the Romans, suddenly attacked the colonists. 
Unprepared as yet to resist they fled to Mutina, which was occupied 
by a Roman garrison.^ Manlius marched to the relief of Mutina, 
but fell into an ambuscade, and lost a consideral)le number of men. j. 
The survivors took refuge in Tannetum, eight miles from Parma, and 
were there besieged by the Boii. On this being known at Rome one 
of the legions enrolled by Cornelius was despatched to Tanne- 
tum, under one of the new praetors, Gaius Atilius. Consequently, 
Cornelius had to enrol a new legion, and his departure for Spain was 
considerably delayed ; it must have been past midsummer when at 
length he embarked his troops at Pisae and sailed for Spain. 

Meanwhile Hannibal had also met with so much to delay his 
expedition that a few days earlier Scipio, who touched at Marseilles, 
would have frustrated his design of marching to the Alps without 
fighting a Roman army, and beginning the campaign in the midst of 
friendly tribes. 

At the end of the previous year Hannibal had sent his Spanish 
troops to winter in their several cities, with orders to muster in the 
spring at New Carthage. During the winter he made elaborate 
preparations to secure the safety of Carthage as well as Spain, for 
both of which he was responsible. With a view of securing the 
fidelity of the Spaniards, he made an interchange between the two 
armies, sending some of his Spanish troops to Carthage, and bringing 
some of the Libyan army over to Spain. 

After diligent inquiries as to the route into Italy, and the nature 
of the country into which he would descend from the Alps, messages 
were sent to the Gallic tribes on both sides of the mountains urging 
them to join him against the common enemy. Receiving favourable 
replies from the Gauls, and assured by the reception of the Roman 
embassy at Carthage that he would be supported at home, he at 
length communicated his design to his officers. It was received with 
approval, although the difficulties and dangers were pointed out to 
him ; but when he took the army into his confidence, he was met 

^ Polybius (iii. 40) speaks of Mutina as a Roman colony {airoLKia), but it 
appears to have been made a colony first in 183 (Livy xxxix. 55). 



XXII HANNIBAL STARTS FOR ITALY 299 

with a display of such enthusiastic devotion that he at once named 
the day for the march. 

It is at this time, we are told, that falHng asleep, with his thoughts Hannibal's 
full of his great adventure, he saw a youth of divine aspect who told dream. 
him that he was sent from God to guide him into Italy. "There- 
fore," said he, "follow me and turn not thine eyes aside." Filled 
with awe he followed the spectral guide for a time without looking 
round ; but at length, compelled by irresistible curiosity, he looked 
behind and saw an immense dragon following him, and heard the 
crash of the woods through which it past, and rumblings of thunder 
in the heaven above, and a voice proclaiming the " devastation of 
Italy," and bidding him go forward nor seek to pry into the secrets 
of fate. 

On the appointed day, leaving his brother Hasdrubal with a con- Hannibal 
siderable force of men and ships in command of southern Spain, -f^''^^-^ ^" 
Hannibal started from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 foot, Jf 218"^ 
12,000 cavalry, 37 elephants, and a long train of ammunition and 
I provisions. It was not a mere march to the Alps that was thus 
I begun. The district north of the Ebro had to be subdued, and when 
' this was done with considerable losses, he had to detach 10,000 
foot and 4000 horse under the command of Hanno, to protect his 
, heavy baggage which he left behind in Spain, and to hold the 
' country. Much precious time was thus lost, and the summer was 
wearing away when he at length crossed the Pyrenees by the line of 
j the modern road from Rosas to Perpignan, and found himself in 
I Gaul. Though his army was now much diminished in numbers, it 
( was in a high state of training, enthusiastically confident in its general, 
I and ready to "go anywhere and do anything." After marching 
I along the western coast of the Gulf of Lyons he turned to the north- 
j east and struck the Rhone somewhere near the modern town of 
I Orange, about seventy miles from the mouth, and immediately began 
I making preparations for crossing it. 

j In spite of all delays he had outmarched Scipio. When the Scipio loo 

] latter arrived at the mouth of the Rhone he ascertained that Hannibal ^'^^^ ^o slop 

\ was crossing the Pyrenees, and therefore disembarked his troops, for 

j he felt sure that the march through the intervening tribes would 

\ occupy a long time, and give him opportunities of offering battle. 

j Suddenly he learnt that Hannibal had passed him and had reached 

the Rhone. Hardly crediting the intelligence, he sent out some 

cavalry with Gallic guides to reconnoitre. They rode up the left 

bank of the river to within a few miles of the Carthaginian camp. 

I There they fell in with a party of Gallic and Numidian horse sent 

I out by Hannibal for a similar purpose. They drove these men in 

] with considerable slaughter, rode on near enough to the Carthaginian 



him. 



300 HISTORY OF ROME 



camp to see and examine it, and then returned at full speed to Scipio 
with the news, Scipio immediately started in pursuit ; but it was too 
late. When he arrived at the passage of the Rhone, Hannibal had 
been gone three days, and the direction of his march, as well 
perhaps as information olitained from natives, must have shown 
Scipio at last that he intended to descend into Italy by one of these 
passes through which the Gallic hordes had so often come before. 
Scipio s Scipio was obliged to decide promptly what to do in these altered 

^>^a«^<? of circumstances, and the plan which he adopted showed both spirit and 
2j§' military ability. The expedition to Spain must not be given up, but 

his own presence in Italy was necessary. Marching back to his ships, 
therefore, he sent his brother Gnaeus with most of them and the bulk 
of his army to Spain, while he himself, with a small part of his forces, 
sailed back to Pisae. Thence having made his way to the neigh- 
bourhood of Placentia, he took over the legions of the praetors, and 
crossed the Po to receive Hannibal on his descent, still with imperfect 
information, it appears, as to the valley by which he would come. 
Hannibal's From the Pyrenees to the Rhone Hannibal had not met with 

march. much opposition from the native tribes. Some few, indeed, he had 

been obliged to terrify or force into allowing him to pass, but many 
others he had been able to conciliate by bribes. When he arrived, 
however, at the point of the river at which his guides told him he 
could cross, he saw a large number of barbarians collected on the 
other side prepared to hinder his passage. He was in considerable 
danger. He did not know as yet how far off Scipio was, and if he 
stayed there he might be obliged to offer him battle at a disadvan- 
tage ; while to cross the river in the small boats which he had been 
able to purchase from the friendly tribes, or to construct others with 
the timber they had allowed him to cut, in the face of a numerous 
enemy, seemed extremely venturesome. He halted for two days 
uncertain what to do. On the third night, however, he sent a 
detachment under Hanno, son of Bomilcar, with some native guides 
about ten miles higher up stream. There the river is divided by an 
eyot, and the men found sufficient wood to enable them to construct 
rough rafts, on which they contrived to cross. No one appeared to 
stop them, and seizing on a position which seemed secure they rested 
for the remainder of the day, and at nightfall began their march down- 
stream. 
Passage of Hannibal, calculating the time at which they would arrive, had 

pushed on his preparations for crossing on the second morning. The 
larger craft, which he had hired or purchased, were filled with the 
cavalry, the horses being forced to swim at the sterns, and were 
ordered to cross somewhat higher up, that they might in some degree 
break the force of the current for the small canoes used by the 



the Rhone. 



THE MARCH TO THE ALPS 



301 



infantry. The barbarians, seeing these preparations, left their camp 
and drew up along the bank to prevent their landing. But a column 
of smoke rising on their rear showed Hannibal that the detachment 
sent out forty-eight hours previously had arrived. He at once gave 
the signal, and, amidst the cheers of their comrades, the first flotilla 
pushed out into the stream. The cheers were answered by defiant 
yells from the Gauls ; but while their enemies were still in mid-stream 
the barbarians were alarmed by flames rising from their camp. 
Many of them rushed back to save their tents, while those who 
remained offered an ineffectual resistance to the troops of Hannibal 
now forming on the bank. The whole army got 'safely across, and 
the detachment of Numidian cavalry was despatched on the recon- 
naissance which, as we have seen, brought them into collision with 
the cavalry of Scipio. 

On the left bank Hannibal was met by emissaries of the Boii, Legates 
who urged him not to wait to fight Scipio, but to push on for Italy, -^'^''f ^^'^ 
offering to be his guides and to share his dangers. Cheered by these 
|assurances he encouraged his men by a spirited address, and having 
(completed the transport of the luggage, despatched his infantry next 
'morning on their journey, while he himself stayed behind with the 
cavalry to superintend the passage of the elephants. This was a The 
matter of considerable difficulty, for the animals were restive at the ^^^phants 
'sight of water, and had to be tempted on to rafts elaborately con- ^'f"^"^ ^'^^ 
'cealed by a covering of earth. When they had been induced to 
|follow a female elephant on to these, the moorings were cut and they 
iwere towed over, and though some of the animals became frightened 
;and plunged into the stream, drowning their riders, they eventually 
lall reached land. 

I Four days' march brought the army to the junction of the Isere. March 
jThe country in the fork of the two streams, called the " island," was from the 
jinhabited by Allobroges, among whom two brothers were contending P^^^^.^^ of 
ifor the chieftainship. The elder invited Hannibal's help or arbitra- ^ °^'^' 
jtion, and rewarded it, when successfully given, by liberal supplies for 
jthe army, — an army that had now been more than four months on 
the march. He also supported and guided them during the ten 
days' march through the territory of the Allobroges up to the foot of 
the pass. There he left them, and Hannibal had henceforth to trust 
the guides who had accompanied him throughout, or, if these failed, 
to such as he could obtain on the spot. 

It is not possible now to name with absolute confidence the pass The passage 
|by which Hannibal entered Italy. Up to the junction of the Isere of the Alps. 
land the Rhone all is clear ; after that our two chief authorities differ, 
|or seem to differ, in their accounts. On the whole, the balance of 
probability seems in favour of the theory that Hannibal crossed the 



302 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



2lS. 



Conjlicts 
ivith the 
natives. 



Is^re and continued to ascend the Rhone to a point somewhat above 
Vienne, and thence commenced the ascent with the Mont du Chat, 
following a track which would lead him over the Little St. Bernard 
into the Val d' Aosta.^ Up to the beginning of his ascent he had 
experienced little or no hindrance from the natives ; but as soon as 
he was fairly in the mountain district he found hostile natives on 
either side or above him on the zigzag path. He avoided coming 
into conflict with them as long as he could. They retired to their 
mountain villages in the evening, and Hannibal took care to occupy 
the strong points in front during the night. His long train of 
sumpter beasts, however, was easily thrown into disorder with 
disastrous effects. Wounded or frightened horses galloped back or 
plunged over the precipices, throwing the whole line into confusion, 
and causing other animals, helpless with their burdens, to fall from 
the narrow path ; and when at length Hannibal found it necessary 
to turn back to his heavy-armed infantry on the rear and lead them 
to attack the enemy, the movement, joined with the hurry and noise 
of the contest, caused still greater dislocation and more numerous 
losses. Thus for two days they struggled on amidst grievous suffer- 
ings. They were somewhat relieved, however, by the capture of a 
fortified village, in which a supply of corn and cattle was found 
sufficient for a few days, and the capture of which inspired some 
terror in the enemy. After a day's rest they resumed their marc li 
under the guidance of some natives who had submitted and given 
hostages. But other tribes were dogging their path, and from ridges 
above them were rolling down great boulders, which killed horses 
and other beasts of burden and threw the line into confusion. When 
night came Hannibal and his heavy-armed infantry were separated 
from the baggage train, which was still struggling on in front in a 



1 This seems the route intended by Polybius. Livy seems to have conceived 
him to have turned back from the Isere and to have followed the course of the 
Durance, which would have led him over the Col de r Argentiere or Mont 
Genhvre. Polybius, some fifty years after Hannibal's march, went over the pass 
himself, and his authority would therefore be far higher than that of Livy, who 
does not seem to have had any personal knowledge of the region. But unfortu- 
nately Polybius has not described the pass in a manner to make its recognition 
certain. This is not very wonderful, if we reflect what a crossing of the Alps 
must have been before mountain roads were made, and without maps or com- 
pass. Other passes that have found supporters are the Mont Cefiis and the Col 
du Clapier. One thing seems clear to me, which has not been, I think, dwelt on 
before, that Hannibal did not cross by the pass he had intended, and that con- 
sequently he had to trust to guides who were strangers rather than to those he 
had brought with him. The presence of Scipio near Marseilles was unexpected, 
and caused him to go farther north, and his actual route seems to have been 
suggested by the Allobroges. The difificulties also were evidently greater than he 
had expected. 



• XXII THE PASSAGE OF THE ALPS 303 

miserable plight, and had to bivouac under a "white" or "bare" The head of 
Tock. Next day, the ninth of the ascent, he rejoined his cavalry and the pass 
'baggage and the head of the pass was gained. 7h'^^'^-^ th 

^ There they rested two days, a rest which at that late season ^^^^ 
'must have been both gloomy and painful. Yet to those who 

remember the first glimpse of some sunnier valley on the Italian 

side of the Alps, it will not be difficult to understand how cheering 
" even the smallest indication of the land of promise must have been First vie%v 

after so much toil and suffering; and Hannibal seized the oppor- of Italy. 
'tunity offered by the distant view of some valley or plain to encourage 
'his men by pointing to it as the rich land of Italy, and as the way to 
' Rome. There seems to be some difficulty in identifying any spot 

• where such a view could have been obtained. At best it must have 
' been but an illusion. The descent was to prove in some ways even 

more trying than the ascent, though free from the aggravation of 
' hostile attacks, which ceased from this time ; but six more da}s of 
- difficulty and peril were to be passed before the poor remains of 
\ the fine army, which nearly five months ago had marched out of 
1 New Carthage, were to find themselves on the plains. 
^ During the rest at the head of the pass the camp was rejoined 
' by some stragglers, as well as by horses and beasts of burden which 
i had followed the tracks of the army, and the third day the descent 
I began. 

I It was accomplished in seven days, almost at the beginning of The 
j which the army was brought to a standstill by finding the narrower descent. 



eleventh to 
eighteenth 



track recently destroyed for nearly a furlong by avalanches or land- 
slips. After trying in vain to avoid the difficulty by making a detour, ~day~ 218. 
which was rendered impossible by a fresh fall of snow upon the 
glacier, he was obliged to pitch a camp and engineer a new road. 
j The entire army was set to work in relays, and after working a 
I whole day they had made a track practicable for the horses and beasts 
1 of burden, which were sent across and let loose to find what food 
i they could. But the elephants had to wait three more days in a 
] state of starvation. All, however, were at last got over, and on the 
1 third day afterwards they reached the foot of the Alps. 

j His object was gained, but at great cost. Of the 90,000 infantry Hannibal's 

I and 12,000 cavalry with which he left New Carthage, he had arrived ^^^^es. 

at the Rhone with only 38,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry, the rest 

having been lost in the contests with the natives of North Spain, 

fallen out from fatigue and sickness, or left with Hanno to maintain 

his hold upon the country. But even of those who reached the 

I Rhone little more than half were now encamped in Italy, and they 

I too in a miserable state from exposure and fatigue. Hannibal, if we 

follow Polybius, reached the plains by the Val d' Aosta, in which the 



304 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



2t8. 

Hannibal 

conquers 

the 

Taurini, 

and takes 

Turin. 



Scipids 
movements. 



Alarm in 
Rome. 
Sempron- 
ius recalled 
from 
Sicily. 



robber tribe of Salassi lived. He does not seem to have experienced 
any trouble from them, however, except from occasional thefts, and 
he was enabled to pitch a camp and rest his men. 

This rest, however, did not last long. It was necessary for 
Hannibal to be among friendly tribes, and to strike terror into such 
as were unfriendly ; and the Ligurian Taurini, whose territory was 
near his camp, were disposed to be suspicious of him, chiefly perhaps 
because they were on ill terms with the Insubres, who were known 
to be his friends. Hannibal first tried to conciliate them, but, when 
that failed, he attacked their chief city ; took it in three days ; and 
put to the sword those who would not submit. 

This rapid success did a great deal to determine the Gallic tribes 
to join Hannibal : but Scipio was now too near to allow the movement 
to extend very far south with safety. For, equally to the surprise of 
both, Hannibal and Scipio were now almost within reach of each 
other, both having been more rapid than they anticipated. The 
march of Hannibal from the Rhone to the Italian foot of the Alps 
had occupied thirty-nine days, and not less than ten can be allowed 
for the rest absolutely required for his army and the subsequent 
capture of Turin. And this was by no means an excessive time to 
allow for Scipio's movements. He had marched three days' journey 
up the Rhone, and had been three days behind Hannibal. Therefore 
by the time he could return to the coast, despatch his brother to 
Spain, and take shipping with his small detachment, at least eight 
days of Hannibal's march were accomplished. Then the voyage back 
to Pisae ^ had been unfavourable, and must therefore have taken five 
or six days, and his journey across the Apennines to the Po valley, 
there being as yet no good military roads, as many more. Then he 
had to wait to be joined by the praetor's army from Mutina. So 
that we cannot suppose that he had long crossed the Po when 
Hannibal arrived among the Taurini, 

Hannibal's presence on Italian soil caused great alarm at Rome, 
and a message was despatched to Sicily to recall the consul Sem- 
pronius from his meditated expedition to Africa. On his arrival at 
Messina he had found the war already in progress. King Hiero's 
ships had captured some Carthaginian vessels sent to harass the 
coasts of Italy, and the praetor M. Aemilius, while engaged in strength- 
ening Lilybaeum, had inflicted a defeat upon another Carthaginian 
fleet. Sempronius had proceeded to capture Malta, and thence 
went to the Lipara Islands in search of the enemy, who, however, 
had crossed to Italy and were threatening Hipponium. As he was 
preparing to pursue them he received the message of recall. He 

^ According to Polybius (iii. 56). Livy (xxi. 32) says he landed at Genua, a. 
better place for his march to the valley of the Po. 



3o6 HISTORY OF ROME 



left his legate Sex. Pomponius with twenty-five warships to protect 
Hipponium, and at once sent his army by sea to Ariminum, and 
followed himself after taking some measures for the safety of Sicily. i 
Skirmish Meanwhile Scipio had crossed the Po, and was on the east of its 

on the tributary, the Ticinus. He heard of Hannibal near Vercellae, and 

Ticinus. determining to meet him, passed the Ticinus by a bridge of boats 
^wounded, a^d marched up the right bank of the Po. Hannibal, prepared to 
218. ' give him battle, was also marching to meet him. On the second day 
each was informed by his scouts of the proximity of the other. On 
the third both continued the advance, with cavalry and light-armed 
infantry in front. But though Scipio's army marched slowly, Hanni- 
bal's cavalry advanced at a brisk pace, and the two bodies of horse 
came into collision too quickly to allow the Roman light -armed 
infantry time to pour in their volleys of javelins. They retired 
through the intervals of their cavalry, and left the fighting to the 
horsemen. The combat, however, was not an even one. The 
Numidians outnumbered and outflanked the Gallic horse employed 
by the Romans ; and though there was a sharp struggle, some of the 
men dismounting and fighting on foot, the cavalry of the Romans 
finally fled, while the victorious Numidians crushed the light-armed 
infantry, which had not had time to get away. The consul himself, 
though wounded, was conveyed safely back to the camp by a body 
of cavalry which still remained unbroken. His life was saved by the 
gallantry of his son, afterwards the famous Scipio Africanus, who, 
then eighteen years old, was serving his first campaign. Seeing his 
father wounded, and with only two or three horsemen near, he 
cheered on his men to the rescue, and when they hesitated led the 
way himself, dashing into the midst of the enemy and throwing 
himself in front of his father. His squadron was ashamed not to 
follow him, and he had the satisfaction of dispersing the enemy and 
bringing his father off.^ 

It was after all but a cavalry skirmish, but it convinced Scipio 
that he was in a wrong position. The enemy was strong in cavalry, 
and a flat open country was in his favour. His own wound made it 

1 This is Livy's account (xxi. 51). Polybius asserts that the men were sent 
by land under oath to muster at Ariminum on a fixed day, that they took forty 
days on the journey, and that Sempronius and some of his troops went to Rome 
first and thence to Armiinum (iii. 61, 68). This seems highly improbable in 
itself, and certainly would have made Sempronius too late m arriving at the camp 
of Scipio to take part in the campaign, unless the message of recall was sent a 
considerable time before Hannibal's actual arrival. 

2 Coelius (Livy xxi. 46) ascribes Scipio's rescue to a Ligurian slave. But 
Polybius was told the story in the text by Laelius, who must have known. Still 
a Ligurian may also have done something to protect the wounded man before his 
son came up. 



XXII THE GAULS JOIN HANNIBAL 307 

impossible to undertake a forward movement with effect, and he Scipio 
'determined to retire beyond the Po, and wait to be joined by his >'<^tircs to 
colleague from Ariminum. He recrossed the Ticinus and the Po, ^^^'^ ''^^^'^ 
breaking down the bridge over the latter behind him, and encamped fj^^ }d/ 
on the left bank of the Trebia near its junction with the Po, satisfied 218. 
that with the protection of Placentia, which was a few miles on the 
other side of the Trebia, he could choose his own time for fighting 
again. Hannibal followed as far as the Po, but finding the bridge 
already broken he gave up any idea of crossing there, though he 
took prisoners a detachment of 600 men who had been left behind 
by Scipio to destroy the bridge. He then ascended the north bank Hannibal 
of the river in search of a crossing. His success in the cavalry crosses the 
/engagement on the Ticinus had brought in numerous adhesions from ^'^• 
'Gallic tribes; and when after two days' march he came to a point 
on the river at which it could conveniently be bridged, he left the 
task of getting the army across to his subordinates, and employed 
^himself in receiving the ambassadors of these tribes, and accepting 
jthe provisions and troops which they brought. 

• Continuing his advance down the southern bank he drew out his fi,cipio ivill 
Wmy in sight of Scipio's fortified camp and offered battle. Scipio, notjight. 
[however, did not stir, and, after waiting for a time, Hannibal drew 
'bff and fortified a camp about six miles to the west of the Roman 
position. But a new move soon became necessary. The Gauls in Treachery 
khe Roman army were in their hearts favourable to Hannibal, and a ofjh^ 
iconsiderable body of them, amounting to 2000 infantry and 200 ^"/ 

SCTUttl^ I ft 

^cavalry, suddenly rose in the dead of night, killed the Romans ^/^^ Roman 

'quartered next them, and marched off to Hannibal's camp. About army. 

-|the same time the Boii, who had attacked the colonists of Placentia 

land Cremona, bringing the three Roman commissioners whom they 

Ihad taken, came to Hannibal. He received them warmly, but would 

'not keep their prisoners, pointing out that they would need them 

'jto exchange against their hostages. 

The treason of the Gallic troops seemed to Scipio to forebode a Scipio 
Igeneral rising of the Gauls in the neighbourhood, and he concluded moves 
that it was not safe to remain on the flat ground opposite Placentia. ^S!'^^- ^^'^ 



I 



He therefore broke up his camp and marched up the Trebia until 
e came to the high ground forming the commencement of the 
(Apennines, from which that stream flows northward into the Po. 
jHannibal, on hearing of this movement, sent his Numidian horse to 
[harass their line of march. But finding the Roman camp deserted, 
|the Numidians stopped to plunder and burn it, and this gave the 
jRomans time to get over the Trebia, though even so their extreme 
jrear suffered considerably as it was crossing. The main Cartha- 
jginian army followed and Hannibal pitched his camp about five 



3o8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



On the 
Trebia, 
218. 



Sempron- 

ius joins 
Scipio. 



Clastidium. 



Hannibal' s 
position 
demands 
promptness. 



Sempronius 
skirmishes 
with 
Hannibal. 



miles from the new quarters occupied by Scipio, though not, it 
appears, on the same side of the stream, 

Scipio was now defending the Hne of the Trebia. On his left 
were the high slopes of the Apennines, on his right the fortress of 
Placentia. He was in a good position, and though, when news 
reached Rome of the defeat of the cavalry on the Ticinus, there was 
a strong feeling of uneasiness, yet the people were comforted by the 
belief that the infantry was still intact and safely posted, and that 
the junction of Sempronius with his colleague would quickly decide 
the war. 

The junction was effected early in December, apparently without 
any attempt on Hannibal's part to prevent it. That this should 
have been so seems to prove conclusively that he was not on the 
right bank of the Trebia or to the east of Scipio, as some have sup- 
posed. Perhaps he was engaged at Clastidium, for just about this 
time this town (the modern Castcggio) fell into his hands by the 
treason of its commander Dasius, a native of Brundisium. It was a 
serious loss to the Romans, for it contained a large store of provi- 
sions, and reduced them to the necessity of depending for supplies 
on what could be brought up the Po : it was a great gain to Hanni- 
bal, not only as providing him with stores, but as impressing the 
Gauls with his superiority, and as commanding the westward road. 

He was anxious to follow up his success by inducing Scipio to 
give him battle. But delay was to the interests of Scipio. His 
wound was not yet healed, and he could not therefore hope to take 
part in a battle. Moreover, though the Gauls readily supplied 
Hannibal with all that he wanted at present, it was quite certain 
that they would soon grow tired of doing so. They had joined him 
from hatred of Rome and the hope of plunder ; they would soon 
abandon him if, in the place of plunder, they found themselves sub- 
ject to continual requisitions. There were not wanting signs of 
Gallic treachery already. A tribe living in the angle of the Trebia 
and the Po, while professing goodwill to the Carthaginians, was 
discovered to be corresponding with Scipio. Hannibal inflicted 
condign punishment on them by ravaging their lands, but there 
was little doubt that failure or even delay would be the signal for 
similar treason elsewhere. 

Meanwhile the terrified natives came to the Roman camp for 
help, and their request gave Sempronius the opportunity he was 
desiring. He sent out his cavalry with 1000 light-armed infantry, 
who crossed the Trebia and drove off the Numidians and Gauls ; but 
when the Romans pursued they were driven back by the outposts of 
the Carthaginians, and in their turn chased up to their camp. 
Sempronius sallied out with the rest of his cavalry and light-armed 



XXII BATTLE OF THE TREBIA 309 

infantry, brought in his men - in safety, and scattered the enemy. Sempronius 
Hannibal then came out in person and restored the order of his w/-f-^^j to 
cavahy, but would not continue the fight on that day. The skir- -''^<^^^' 
mishing had on the whole been favourable to the Romans, and 
Sempronius was so much elated that he resolved to hazard a general 
engagement. Scipio was still opposed to it. Recent events had 
confirmed his opinion that they had everything to gain, Hannibal 
everything to lose, by delay. He probably also felt no great con- 
fidence in his colleague, who, on the other hand, was eager to fight. 
Sempronius would soon have to go to Rome to hold the election of 
the new consuls. If the battle were postponed to the spring he 
would most likely be superseded before it took place, but by fighting 
now, while Scipio was still disabled, he would have all the credit 
of the victory. Besides, he believed that he would succeed, and 
knew that his countrymen at home expected him to do something. 
He had not come all the way from Sicily to sit idle whilst Hannibal 
was plundering the allies or consolidating his power among the 
Gauls. 

Hannibal had therefore little difficulty in provoking a battle. Hannibal 
For this he prepared by forming an ambuscade in the bed of a Pj^'o'^okes a 
stream, between the two camps, thickly covered with brambles, in 
which he concealed 1000 infantry and a like number of cavalry 
during the night. At daybreak he despatched his Numidian horse 
to ride up to the Roman lines and provoke the consul to attack 
them, while the rest of his army were early afoot with orders to get 
breakfast and prepare themselves for action. 

Sempronius fell into the trap. He sent out his cavalry to drive The battle 
I off the Numidian horse; and despatching 6000 light-armed infantry °fj^^_ 
I in advance, he got his whole army in motion at once, without waiting 
j for his men to get their breakfast. It was a bleak miserable day ; ^'^' 
I there had been many hours of cold rain mixed with sleet, and the 
! Trebia was so swollen that the men had to wade through it with the 
J water breast-high. They arrived, therefore, on the ground hungry, 
I wet, and cold, to meet men who not only had had a good meal, but 
had oiled their bodies and put on their armour over their camp fires, 
i Moreover, they had to fight on ground chosen by Hannibal, and, 
I though they did not know it, with a strong body of the enemy lying 
j concealed in their rear. In these circumstances the result could not 

I be doubtful. That the disaster was not greater was due to the 
courage and discipline of the Roman soldiers themselves. 
Finding that his cavalry could not deal effectively with the The Roman 
Numidian horsemen, trained to scatter and rapidly reform, and that cavalry^ 
it was disorganised by the Balearic slingers and the terror of the 
horses at the sight of the elephants, Sempronius recalled it to its 



Trebia, 
December 



recalled. 



3IO 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The velites 
retire. 



Advn7ice of 
the Punic 
horse. 



The 

Roman 
centi-e holds 
its own. 



Feelings 
at Rome. 



Winter of 
2r8-2iy. 



regular place on the wings of the infantry, which consisted of four 
legions — 16,000 citizens and 20,000 allies. 

The battle was begun by the 6000 light-armed, who had been 
sent out early at the first appearance of the Numidian horse. They 
were, however, tired, and had expended most of their missiles 
already. Their attack, therefore, was not effective, and they soon 
retired behind the heavy-armed infantry. The next move was made 
by the Carthaginian cavalry, which easily drove back that of the 
Roinans, thus leaving the flanks of their infantry exposed, which 
were immediately attacked by the Numidian horsemen and light- 
armed troops, who passed by their own lines to do it. 

In spite of these disadvantages the main body of the Roman 
heavy-armed made an obstinate resistance. Even when they found 
themselves attacked in the rear by the, 2000 men from the ambus- 
cade, when their wings were driven in by the elephants, the cavalry, 
and the light-armed of the enemy, the Roman centre, still keeping 
close order, cut its way through the Gauls and Libyans opposed to 
it, and seeing that it was hopeless to return to the camp, marched 
straight to their old quarters on the Trebia opposite Placentia, and, 
being now no longer harassed by the enemy, cjuietly passed the 
stream and entered that fortified town. Many of the infantry on the 
wings were cut to pieces whilst trying to recross the Trebia, but a 
considerable number, with the greater part of the cavalry, succeeded 
in crossing, and entered Placentia with the 10,000 of the centre. 
They owed their safety in a great degree to the violence of the rain, 
which prevented an effective pursuit, and gave the wounded Scipio 
also time to lead out the men left in the camp and rejoin his 
colleague at Placentia. 

Sempronius, indeed, sent home a report that " the storm had 
prevented a victory." But facts were too strong for him. It soon 
became known at Rome that the camp had fallen into the enemy's 
hands, that the army was shut up in Placentia and Cremona, that 
all their provisions had to be brought up the Po, and that finally all 
the Gallic tribes had joined Hannibal. It had been a real disaster, 
and the way into Etruria was open to Hannibal. 

The winter, which was a severe one, prevented any more opera- 
tions of importance. Sempronius, indeed, with a small escort of 
cavalry, made his way with considerable difficulty and danger 
to Rome to hold the consular elections, and returned to his 
army's winter quarters at Placentia ; but he was only able to barely 
protect himself from various harassing attacks of Hannibal, who, 
finding it impossible, owing to the weather, to pass over the 
Apennines, devoted himself to annoying the Roman quarters and 
securing his hold over the Gauls. That their fidelity was little to be 



XXII GNAEUS SCIPIO IN SPAIN 311 

trusted, and would soon yield to the burden of supporting an army, 

was quickly made manifest. So much did he fear treachery, that 

during the months which followed the battle of Trebia he is said to 

have constantly disguised himself by the use of false hair, that he 

might not be recognised by would-be assassins. 

Thus ended the first year's campaign. It had been on the whole Result of 

unfavourable to the Romans, but not disastrous. They had lost two fi'-^t year 

battles, but not of the first importance or very decidedly. They still *?/ J"''* 

held Placentia, Cremona, and Mutina in the Po valley, from which 

Hannibal's attacks, in one of which he was wounded, had not 

succeeded in expelling them. For Hannibal the greatest advantage 

gained was the adhesion of the Gauls and the opportunity offered 

him of conciliating the Italians by discriminating between Italian 

and Roman prisoners. The latter were subjected to rigorous 

imprisonment and scant fare, the former were indulgently treated 

I from the first, and finally dismissed without ransom, and bidden to 

I tell their friends at home that Hannibal had come to restore freedom 

to the Italians and recover the lands which Rome had taken from 

j them. 

1 The Romans might still hope to prevent Hannibal's march south. Moderate 

I but the idea of fighting in the Po valley was abandoned. The pre- p^^epar- 

I parations at Rome, when the true state of the case became known, "J-^^^ '^^ 

( though not on a scale denoting panic, were yet m.ade somewhat earlier 21S-217, 

land more carefully than usual, and were directed to the object of 

^blocking Hannibal's road. Garrisons were strengthened at various 

'points in Etruria, magazines collected at Ariminum and Arretium, 

and a request was sent to king Hiero for assistance, who immediately 

I despatched 500 Cretan archers and 1000 light-armed mercenaries. 

I For the rest the usual arrangements were made for defending Sicily, 

{Sardinia, and Tarentum ; and the consuls only levied sufficient men 

'to fill up the legions of the previous year, which were to be kept on 

jfoot. A fleet of sixty triremes, however, was ordered to be made 

'ready for service. 

' Meanwhile Hamiibal's success in North Italy was somewhat Gnaei/s 

counterbalanced by events in Spain. Gnaeus Scipio, as we have Comehus 

een, had been sent there with the fleet of his brother from the mouth J!- ^^ 

. . . Spain, 

f the Rhone. He sailed direct to Emporiae, and thence coasted 21S. 

southward as far as the mouth of the Ebro, making descents upon 
lithe shore, besieging towns which declined, and providing for the 
ipafety of those which offered, submission. He then landed his army, 
land being reinforced by a considerable number of native troops, 
inarched inland, taking several towns on the way, until he found 
jiHanno encamped near Cirsa, a town apparently to the west of the 

picoris {Seg7'e). There he not only defeated the Carthaginian army, 



312 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xxii 



Victory but took Hanno himself prisoner, as well as an important Spanish 
overHan7io. chieftain named Indibilis. The camp also fell into his hands, and 
with it the heavy baggage of Hannibal's army, which he had left in 
Hanno's charge. Hearing of what had happened, Hasdrubal sailed 
northwards. He found the Roman fleet at the mouth of the Ebro 
carelessly guarded, while the crews wandered inland in search of- 
plunder. He cut off a considerable number of these foraging parties, 
and then retired to the south of the Ebro, and marched back to 
winter quarters in New Carthage, strengthening various fortresses on 
his way. Scipio, after vindicating Roman discipline by the punish- 
ment of those whose carelessness had caused the loss, took his fleet 
and men into winter quarters at Tarraco, where the division of the 
vast booty he had taken rendered his army eager for the campaign 
of the next year. 
Result of Thus, though no victory of first-rate magnitude had been won, 

operations Hannibal's work of the early summer, by which he trusted to have 
tn pain, j^^^ ^^ entirely friendly Spain on his rear, was undone ; and he was 
more than ever left dependent on success in Italy. The wisdom of 
Publius Scipio's plan of defence, when he found himself outstripped 
on the Rhone, was amply vindicated. 

Authorities. — Polybius, books iii.-xv. Livy xxi.-xxx. Of the books of 
Polybius iii. to v. are complete. They are of the first value. He took pains to 
study original sources of information in Rome and Italy, to examine the sites of 
battles, and even to cross the Alpine pass used by Hannibal. He knew also the 
sons of many of those actually engaged ; and had before him the writings of men 
contemporary with the events, such as Fabius Pictor and Philinus of Agrigentum 
— writing from opposite points of view, Silenus (the Greek secretary of Hanni- 
bal), Sosilus and Chaereas, Caelius Antipater who had been a prisoner in Hannibal's 
camp, and others. Livy often uses Polybius, sometimes translating his very 
words, but he also made independent use of these same authorities, and therefore 
frequently gives a different account of details. When the two are irreconcilable, 
it is generally safest to stand by Polybius, who must have had better means of 
ascertaining the truth. Livy's narrative becomes of the highest importance to us 
at the point at which the continuous narrative of Polybius is lost, i.e. after the fall 
of Syracuse in B.C. 212. Our possession of two such authorities makes that of 
other and generally later writers comparatively unimportant, except so far as they 
may contain extracts from earlier writers, such are Cornelius Nepos, Life of 
Hannibal ; Plutarch's Lives of Fabius Maximus and Marcellus ; Appian, Bellum 
Hannibalicum, Res Punicae (5-67), Res Ibericae (4-38); Dio Cassius, fr. 57; 
Zonaras viii. 21-ix. 14 ; Diodorus Siculus, fr. of xxvi.-xxvii. ; Eutropius iii. 3-13- 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR — Continued 

From 217 to the Battle of Cannae (216) 

Flaminius enters upon his consulship at Ariminum (217) — Hannibal marches into 
Elruria — His sufferings in the marshes of the Arno — Battle of the Thk asymene 
LAKE — Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (Cunctator) baffles Hannibal, who 
enters Campania, but finds it unsuitable for winter quarters — He makes his 
way back to Apulia by a stratagem, and encamps near Gerunium — Minucius 
made equal to Fabius, but defeated by Hannibal — Preparations in the winter 
of 217-216 — P. Terentius Varro — The Battle of C'ANNAE-^Courage and 
activity of Varro after the battle — His return to Rome. 

When the day for the new consuls to enter upon their office 21'j. Coss. 

arrived (15th March), Servilius was at Rome and performed the G»eius 

usual formal duties ; but his colleagfue Flaminius had already left the ^/^^'f ^'^^ 
TT 1 1 1 • • • 1 1 deminus, 

city. He had bitter enemies in the Senate, and he seems to have Qaius 

feared that some pretext of evil omens or informality in his election Flaminius. 

might be found to prevent his taking over the command which had 

fallen to his lot. It had been arranged that Servilius was to command 

at Ariminum, and Flaminius at Arretium. But the legions had been 

j brought from Placentia and Cremona (perhaps by water) to 

I Ariminum ; and thither Flaminius went a few days before the ides 

I of March, determined, in spite of custom, to enter on his consulship 

\ there. The Senate sent commissioners to order his return ; but there 

was no law compelling him to do so, and he refused to obey. He 

took over his own part of the troops, and led them to Arretium, 

whilst his colleague Servilius took his place at Ariminum. It was 

not known by which road Hannibal would enter Etruria ; but the two 

1 chief routes were thus defended. 

As soon as the weather became open Hannibal started. He was Hannibal 

\ in haste to begin his march, partly because his Gallic allies could not 

be trusted unless they had a speedy prospect of action and plunder, 

t and partly because he wished to find Flaminius unsupported by his 

! colleague. He was informed of his arrival at Arretium, and he had 



eniers 
Etruria. 



314 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 

marshes of 
Faesn/ae, 
217. 



Flaminius 
determines 
to follow 
Hannibal. 



Thrasy- 
fnene. 



also satisfied himself that he was a general who might be outwitted and 
crushed. He abandoned the usual road over the Apennines, which 
descends the valley of the Macra to Luca, partly perhaps to avoid 
delay from attacks of the garrison there, and took a shorter though 
more difficult route. Descending the valley of the Auser {Serchio) 
he reached the plain of the Arno with comparative ease. But from that 
point the road led through marshes extending between the Apennines 
and Faesulae, which were in a state of unusual flood. Four days and 
three nights 'his army struggled through sloughs and quagmires. 
There was no ground dry enough to lie down upon for rest ; nothmg 
showed above the water but the bodies of beasts of burden that had 
slipped in the slime and perished. All the elephants but one died ; 
and Hannibal himself lost an eye from violent ophthalmia. The 
Spanish and Libyan troops fared best, for being in the van they did 
not find the ground trampled into deep mud ; but the Gauls behmd 
them suffered greatly, and would perhaps have turned back if the 
cavalry on their rear' had not prevented them. Still Hannibal, who 
was forced by his sufferings to ride on the one surviving elephant, 
had gained his object. He had come upon Flaminius before he was 
expected ; and now marched past the Roman camp, wasting the 
country for and wide, feeling sure that he would irritate Flaminius into 
following him. 

He had not misjudged the man. The sight of the smoke rismg 
from farm and villa was more than Flaminius could bear. His officers 
advised against fighting an enemy strong in cavalry on such ground, 
and argued that he should at least wait for Servilius, who had started 
from Ariminum on the news of Hannibal being in Etruria. "What 
would the people at home think," he indignantly asked, " if I remamed 
encamped in the rear while the enemy wasted the country up to the 
walls of Rome .? " He promptly gave the signal for starting, with the 
same blind confidence as had crowded his camp with traders,— almost 
more numerous than the soldiers, who had provided themselves 
with chains and fetters for the prisoners who were to enrich them by 
sale or ransom. 

Hannibal meanwhile was marching southwards. Leaving the 
direct road which led by Clusium (afterwards called the via Cassia), 
he turned to the left towards Perusia, with Cortona on his left and 
the Thrasymene lake on his right, a route which would eventually have 
brought him on to the via Flaminia. A spur of the mountains of 
Cortona {Monte Gualandro) descends to a point on the north-west 
bank of the lake, leaving only a marsh and a narrow path between, 
and separating the plain of Cortona from the lake. At this pomt is 
the modern village of Borghetto, and from it the mountains form an 
arch coming down to the lake again, eight miles off, at the village of 



THE THRASYMENE LAKE 



315 



Passignano. This arch is intersected about half-way to Passignano by 
an eminence covered with wood, on which is the village Tuoro 
sloping down towards the lake. , Hannibal at once saw the advantages 
offered by this site for an ambuscade. 

He concealed his Balearic slingers on the eastern slopes of 
Gualandro, and sent his cavalry and other Gauls to hide themselves 
on the western slopes, so that their extreme right was almost at the 
entrance of the pass. He with his main army took post on the hill 
of Tuoro, which roughly divided the plain. 

The same evening Flaminius arrived at the shore of the lake, and 
encamped there for the night. Nothing was seen of the enemy ; and 




next morning, without making reconnaissances, he proceeded on his 
march towards Perusia by the shortest road along the shore of the 
lake. When his line debouched into the plain, Hannibal was 
discovered on the hill of Tuoro on their left front. But a heavy mist 
was rising from the lake, which interrupted their view, and prevented 
them from seeing- distinctly even those of the enemy who were 
immediately in front of them. Hannibal now gave the signal for 
attack all along his line, which could be seen by the troops on the 
higher ground above the mist, though not by the Romans ; who thus 
found themselves attacked on all sides at once. Six thousand of the 
vanguard cut their way through towards Passignano, and finding 
themselves on higher ground, halted to learn the fate of the others. 
Suddenly the mist lifted, and they saw a terrible sight. The main 



217. 

Hannibal 
concealed 
in the 
valley and 
hills north 
of the lake. 
Fla7ninius 
follows him. 



The 
Roman 
army 
destroyed. 



3i6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



217, 



Death of 
Flaminius. 



The six 

thousand 

surrender. 



The 
■Roman loss. 



body of the army on sighting Hannibal had turned to the left to 
receive his attack ; but found themselves assaulted not only in front 
by Hannibal, but on the flank by the light-armed troops from the 
eastern slopes of Gualandro, and with hardly time to draw their swords 
or get ready their spears, were being killed or driven into the lake ; 
while the rear columns were caught by the cavalry actually in the 
defile leading from Borghetto, and were being helplessly cut to 
pieces. Some of these last tried to escape by swimming in the lake, 
but finding the distance too great, returned to the shallows, and there, 
after vainly begging quarter with uplifted hands, were despatched 
by the horsemen riding in after them, or in some cases killed them- 
selves or begged the favour of the fatal stroke from their friends. ^ 
Flaminius himself, however much he may have been to blame for 
the disaster, exhibited high courage and heroism in this hour of 
despair. He exerted himself with hand and voice to rally his men, 
and encourage them to extricate themselves, until he fell fighting at 
the hands of a company of Gauls. 

The day was irretrievably lost. And the six thousand, closing 
their ranks, pushed on with the utmost speed they knew not whither. 
At last they found themselves in a village, which they might hope to 
hold for a time. But they had no means of getting supplies, and no 
hope of outstripping the enemy ; and soon after the battle, being 
besieged by Hannibal's Spanish light-armed troops under Maharbal, 
they were compelled to surrender on a promise of their lives, a 
promise which Hannibal fulfilled, though protesting that he had given 
no authority for it. Fifteen thousand in all fell Into his hands ; among 
whom he discriminated, as before, between Romans and Italians, 
keeping the former in close custody, but liberating the latter without 
ransom. His own loss had been comparatively small, although the fall 
of I 500 Gauls testified to a desperate resistance at one part of the field. 

The Roman army was annihilated. The consul with 15,000 
men lay dead on the field, and many died afterwards of their wounds. 
Fifteen thousand were prisoners. Ten thousand more had in various 
directions effected an escape, and found their way back to Rome ; 
where the news of the disaster was soon too well authenticated to be 
concealed by the government. 

It was better to face the truth. Summoning; the citizens the 



^ The site of the battle of Thrasymene is much disputed, and the descriptions 
in Livy (xxii. 4-6) and Polybius (iii. 82-84) appear to point to different places. 
The site as described in the text, on the north of the lake between Borghetto and 
Passignano, seems to suit Livy best ; while from Polybius it has been inferred, . 
though not without considerable difficulties, that the narrow pass was that between 
Passignano and Torricella, and the chief fighting in a combe between Torricella 
and Magione. Some even place the battle still farther to the east of Magione. 



XXIII HANNIBAL MARCHES SOUTH 



317 



praetor briefly announced, " We have been beaten in a great battle." 
The Senate rose to the occasion. In prolonged sessions they dis- 
cussed the measures to be taken and the means of defence. But 
three days later the alarm was intensified by the news of a fresh Fresh 
disaster. Servilius, hearing at Ariminum that Hannibal had entered disaster. 
Etruria, started to join his colleague. But the case was pressing, and, 
in order that Flaminius might know that help was on the way, he sent 
4000 cavalry under Gains Centenius in advance. Informed of this 
Hannibal despatched Maharbal with cavalry and light-armed troops to 
intercept Centenius, and the whole force was killed or taken prisoners. 

Now indeed it seemed as though Hannibal might be at their Q. Fabius 
gates before many days. It was no longer safe to trust to the ^^a^imus 
ordinary magistrates. But there was a constitutional difficulty in ""''"^^ 
appointing a dictator, who could properly only be named by a consul. '^Jfj'^''''^ 
Now one consul was dead, and with the other it seemed impossible 
to communicate. But the extremity was held to justify an irregu- 
larity, and Fabius was elected dictator by the centuries.^ 

The battle of Thrasymene would seem to have opened the way Hannibal's 
' to Rome for Hannibal ; yet he did not take it. Quitting the f"arc/i 
I Flaminian road he turned to the left through Umbria To Picenum, ^^''""''^f" 
[wasting the country, killing the inhabitants, and driving off their ^helasV'' 
(cattle, until by the time he arrived on the coast of the Adriatic his coast! 217. 
army was hampered with more booty than it could drive or carry. 
'He marched down the coast to Arpi, on the borders of Apulia, and 
I there refreshed his men and horses, worn out by the winter cold and 
(the toils of the campaign. The wealth of the country enabled him 
jto get them into condition and to cure an attack of scurvy which was 
emaciating both. It was perhaps this which had decided him not 
to advance on Rome. But a prolonged siege would in any case 
have been dangerous with an army largely consisting of Gauls, 
always impatient of such operations, and when he had not yet induced 
a single Italian State to join. Notwithstanding his victories and 
the terror which his march must have inspired, his great design of 
.raising Italy against Rome seemed as far from accomplishment as 
lever, and without it he could not venture to attack the city. 
] But there was one possible ally of Hannibal whose secret hos- 
tility to Rome was confirmed by the battle. As Philip of Macedonia 

^ That Fabius was dictator and not pro-dictator seems certain from Polybius. 
The reading pro-dictatoretn in Livy xxii. 8 is probably wrong. Still Livy (xxii. 
31) thought the annals wrong in calling Fabius "dictator," and there may have 
been legal purists at the time and afterwards who spoke of him as a pro-dictator. 
[The question was raised again in 49, when Caesar wished to be able to hold the 
[consular elections, and a lex was needed to enable the praetor to name him 
''ictator for that purpose (Cic. Alt. ix. 15 ; Caes. B.C. ii. 20, 21). 



CHAP. XXIII Q. FABIUS MAXIMUS CUNCTATOR 319 

was watching the Nemaean games at Argos a courier put a letter Philip V 
into his hands. The king showed it to no one except Demetrius of hears of 
Pharos, the bitter enemy of Rome, bidding him say nothing to any ^^^'^j^^^^^ 
one. It contained the news of Thrasymene and of Hannibal's prepares to 
possession of Italy. Demetrius urged Philip to give up his war invade 
with the Aetolians and hasten to attack Illyricum, and so gain a basis i^^^ly- 
from which to invade Italy. The advice chimed in with the king's 
secret wishes. A council was summoned, peace with Aetolia proposed, 
and shortly afterwards ratified at Naupactus, and Philip started for 
Illyricum. There he was brilliantly successful, and Italy, always 
in his thoughts and even in his dreams, seemed at length within 
reach. 

Meanwhile at Rome Fabius was preparing to start in pursuit of Fabius 
Hannibal. The alarm in the city had as usual turned men's thought ^^^kes 
to the gods. The Sibylline books were consulted, a " sacred spring" '^'^J'""^^^ 
vowed, a lectisternium held for three days, sacrifices performed on a ^ij 
vast scale, and all the resources of superstition brought into play. 
Fabius then enrolled two legions, and summoned the consul to meet 
him by the Flaminian road. At Ocriculum he took over the army, 
I sending Servilius to command a fleet at Ostia and attack a Punic 
' squadron, which was cruising on the coast of Etruria and had captured 
some Roman transports on the way to Spain. He himself advanced to 
I Praeneste, and thence by cross roads came upon the via Latina^ by 
i which he reached Daunia and encamped within sight of Hannibal's 
quarters at Arpi. Hannibal at once offered battle. But Fabius had Follows 
resolved on a policy to which he obstinately clung in spite of much Cannibal, 
(Obloquy for many years. It gained him the name of Cimctator^ but "i^'.,f 
• was rewarded eventually by the acknowledgment of his having been 
the one man who restored the fortunes of the State. This was to hang 
I about Hannibal's army, in camp or on the march, watching every 
I opportunity of harassing or annoying him, but rigorously to decline 
I battle. He rightly felt that Hannibal had all to lose by delay. The 
i Romans had immense resources from which to draw: Hannibal 
[depended entirely upon plunder, which must become less and less pro- 
jductive every month he stayed in Italy. Like all narrow and rigorous 
( plans, it might be pushed too far, and Fabius could never reconcile 
himself later on to the forward policy of Scipio : but for the present 
lit baffled Hannibal. Fabius kept his men in camp, and con- 
(tented himself with dogging his steps, cutting off stragglers and 
Imarauders, and habituating his troops to the fatigues and discipline 
lof war. 

I Daunia being exhausted, Hannibal crossed the Apennines into Samnlum. 
JSamnium, overran the territory of Beneventum, and took the rich 
town of Telesia. Wherever he went Fabius followed, one or two days' 



320 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Hannibal 
goes into 
Campania. 



Harinibal 
out-man- 
auvres 
Fabius. 



march behind, making careful reconnaissances and keeping on safe 
ground. Finding that Fabius was not to be induced to fight, 
Hannibal determined to advance boldly into Campania. Passing 
over the hills by Cales he encamped on the right bank of the 
Volturnus, and sent out foraging parties in all directions. Fabius 
followed, still resolved to avoid battle. But such a resolution was 
necessarily a most irksome one to his army. The soldiers skirted the 
mountains with the Carthaginians in view, but were not allowed to 
descend and drive the plunderers from the rich Falernian plains. It 
was the more exasperating because the Roman officers themselves 
believed Hannibal to be in a trap, and were as eager as the men for 
battle. The discontent found a mouthpiece in the master of the 
horse, Minucius, who had all along wished to fight, and had now the 
feelings of the army with him. Fabius, however, believed that he 
was in a position to starve Hannibal out. His troops at Tarracina 
barred the Appian Way to Rome ; Casilinum and the road over 
Mount Tlfata by which Hannibal had descended were guarded; and 
while the Romans could draw supplies from home, from Capua, and 
from Samnium, Hannibal would be forced to winter, inadequately 
provisioned, in the marshy ground between the mouths of the Liris 
and Volturnus.^ The difficulty was to get back as he came, and this 
he accomplished by a bold manoeuvre. 

A detachment of 4000 men held the gorge between Tifata and the 
Volturnus, and in anticipation of Hannibal's retrograde movement 
Fabius moved his main army to within a short distance of this 
position. But Hannibal, taking advantage of a dark night, ordered 
a herd of cattle with burning torches attached to their horns to be 
driven up the mountain. Behind them were some light-armed troops 
instructed to assist in driving them part of the way, and then to pass 
them at the double and make for the ridge, with all possible noise 
and commotion. The ruse succeeded in drawing the 4000 men from 
the gorge, who fell in with some of the enemy and skirmished for 
a time, and finally ensconced themselves on the mountain and 
waited for light. Meanwhile Hannibal, who had his army ready 
for the start, marched through the abandoned gorge. The nocturnal 
alarm- had not induced Fabius to leave his camp, and in the morning 
he found that the enemy had escaped him. 

After making a feint of advancing towards Rome through 
Samnium, Hannibal turned south-east from the territory of the 



^ According to Livy, Hannibal had got into a situation he had not intended. 
He had aimed at reaching Casinum on the Latin road to cut oft" troops coming 
from Rome ; but his guide, misled by his foreign accent, had taken him past 
Casilinum and down into the Falernian territory. He knew at once that it was 
too much enclosed, and was not fit for winter quarters. 



XXIII HANNIBAL AND MINUCIUS 321 

Peligni, re-entered Apulia, and seized Geronium, near Larinum. The Hannibal 
inhabitants resisted but were taken prisoners or put to the sword, returns to 
and the buildings reserved for the army and stores. It was in the ^/""^' 
course of this march that he is said to have tried to discredit Fabius 
by ordering one of his farms to be spared by his foragers. Fabius, 
however, frustrated the device by sending his son home to sell the 
farm and devote the price to the ransom of prisoners. Hannibal 
seems to have meant his return to Apulia to be the end of the 
campaign ; but Fabius still hung on the skirts of the neighbouring 
hills, and being obliged to go home to conduct certain sacrifices 
left strict orders with M. Minucius, encamped near Larinum, to follow 
the same tactics and not give Hannibal battle. 

Minucius had other thoughts. The strategy of Fabius, always M. 
unpopular, had been farther discredited by the failure to intercept Mimicius 
Hannibal's return from Campania ; and Minucius now began to look ^-J}^)^,' 
out for the opportunity of striking a blow. For a few days he still command, 
kept on high ground ; but when he found that Hannibal had taken provokes 
Geronium and was collecting corn from the country, he descended to Hanmbal. 
the foot of a hill (called Galena) three or four miles west of Geronium. 
Hannibal gladly went to meet him, and pitched a camp on some 
rising ground Vv'ithin sight, sending out as usual about a third of his 
army to forage. To provoke him still farther he caused about 2000 
light-armed troops to occupy a hill between the two camps. At 
daybreak Minucius assaulted and carried this hill and transferred his 
camp to it. The two armies remained thus close for some days with- 
out stirring. But the collection of stores for the winter was necessary 
for Hannibal ; and he was compelled to divide his forces, sending 
out two-thirds for corn and fodder. The remainder were insufficient 
to enable him to accept battle, which Minucius took care to offer at 
the hour at which he knew the foraging parties to be out. Hannibal's 
apparent timidity filled the Roman soldiers with such confidence that 
they even attempted to storm the camp, and only desisted on the 
arrival of Hasdrubal with a strong detachment recalled from the fields. 
Meanwhile a portion of the Roman army had cut off some isolated 
foraging parties ; and altogether Hannibal found the position untenable 
and withdrew to Geronium lest it too should be attacked in his absence. 

Exaggerated accounts of these movements reached Rome and Minucius 
caused great exultation. Fabius's policy was more unpopular than ^"^^e 
ever ; Minucius became the idol of the hour. A vote of the people ^^ ^ ^^' 
was even obtained, giving him equal powers with Fabius, ^ who on 

^ It was altogether an unprecedented measure. To have two dictators was an 
absurdity. But Polybius (iii. 103, 104) speaks of Minucius as a "dictator," and 
this is confirmed by an inscription, C.I.L. i, 1503 Heixolei sacrom M. Minuci\us'\ 
C. F. dictator vovit. 



322 HISTORY OF ROME 



Fab ins 

saves 



rejoining the army, therefore, found himself unable to carry out his 
plans, and offered Minucius either to take supreme command on 
alternate days, or to divide the legions and occupy separate camps. 
Minucius chose the latter alternative. 

Hannibal took advantage of this by again seizing a hill between 
their camps and tempting Minucius out. But this time he prepared 
an ambuscade ; and while Minucius was intent on the struggle for 
the hill, in which Hannibal himself took part in strong force, the men 
in ambush suddenly charged the flank and rear of the Romans. 
Their ranks were broken, a considerable number fell, and a retreat 
began which threatened to become a flight, accompanied by a heavy 
loss if not annihilation. But Fabius had been watching the combat 
and came up at the right moment with his fresh forces, and, covering 
Minucius. ti-,e retreat of the beaten army, forced Hannibal to retire. This . 
caused a reaction of feeling, and with universal approval Minucius 
resigned his powers into the hands of Fabius, reunited the camps, 
and henceforth followed his orders. Nothing farther was done on 
either side that season. 
Cn. Scipio Meanwhile events in Spain and at sea had been more favourable 

tn Spam, j^q Rome. Early in 2 1 7 Cn. Scipio had taken twenty-five of the forty 
^^^' vessels with which Hasdrubal had come to the mouth of the Ebro, 

A fresh Carthaginian fleet of seventy vessels had touched at Sardinia 
and Pisae (near which they seem to have expected to find Hannibal), 
but had been chased back to Africa by Servilius with a fleet of 1 2 5 
war vessels. Servilius went as far as the African coast, and though 
he seems to have suffered some loss while attempting a descent upon 
it, he exacted a contribution from the island Cercina, off the Lesser 
Syrtis, and plundered Cossyra on his way back to Lilybaeum. These 
were no great achievements, but the presence of a powerful fleet 
prevented any despatch of reinforcements from Carthage either to 
Spain or Hannibal. Twenty ships were then sent to Spain under 
the command of Publius Scipio, whose imperiuvi had been extended. 
He joined his brother, and for the first time a Roman army advanced 
to the south of the Ebro. The native tribes were overawed, and 
when Scipio arrived at Saguntum the treachery of Abilyx gave him 
an opportunity of which he made prompt use. The governor of 
Saguntum had in charge some young Spanish hostages entrusted to 
him by Hannibal. Abilyx, though he had the reputation of being 
warmly Carthaginian, had secretly concluded that the Romans were 
the more likely to win, and now offered to put these hostages into 
Scipio's hands. He deluded the governor Bostar by pretending 
that he should have the credit of restoring them, and led them 
straight to the Roman camp, whence they were despatched to their 
homes. Thus before going into winter quarters the Scipios could 



XXIII PRErARATIONS FOR ANOTHER BATTLE 323 

feel that they had impressed the natives in favour of Rome, both by 
the destruction of a Punic fleet and by displaying a generous 
confidence in the Spanish chiefs. 

The spirit of renewed hope at Rome was shown by the election 216. Coss. 
of Gains Terentius Varro to the consulship, who had been the chief ^■''"'" 
supporter of the measure for making Minucius equal to Fabius. In f'^" "^-^ 
spite of the resistance of the nobles, he alone obtained a majority of Ae^niUus 
the centuries, and had to hold the election of his colleague Paullus, Paullus II. 
the conqueror in the Illyric war of 219. Varro is said to have been 
the son of a butcher, and to have assisted his father in a menial 
capacity. Whatever may be the truth, he had gained the ear of the 
I people, who believed in his will and ability to meet Hannibal. To 
select a military commander by popular vote, and on the ground of 
civil ability, is indeed hopelessly absurd. The wonder is that such 
, men so often succeeded, not that they often failed. In regard to 
Varro the popular feeling seems to have had some solid ground. He 
lost Cannae, indeed, but he showed courage and ability in repairing 
the disaster, and was almost constantly employed with respectable 
: success afterwards. Fabius and his colleague Minucius laid down 
I their office. The consuls of the previous year, ServiHus Geminus 
j and Atihus Regulus (successor to the slain Flaminius), had their 
i imperiiim extended, and were sent to the army in Apulia ; while the 
I new consuls, in consultation with the Senate, were employed in 
! enrolling men to fill up the gaps in the old legions and to form new 
I ones. For it was determined that a battle must be fought. The 
j praetor, Postumius, was sent into Gaul to effect a diversion, with the Postumius 
\ hope that the Gauls serving with Hannibal might be thereby induced '^^ Gaul. 
I to return home. The fleet was recalled from Lilybaeum, and sup- 
plies sent to Spain. Offers of aid from various quarters served to Offers of 
I farther encourage the Romans. From Naples and Paestum came ^^'^• 
I large presents of gold plate ; from Hiero a golden figure of victory, 
j large quantities of corn and barley, with promises of more, and 
I 1000 archers and slingers. The gold of Naples and Paestum, with 
j the exception of the smallest cup, was declined with warm thanks ; 
but Hiero's contributions were gratefully accepted, and twenty-five 
( quinqueremes were sent to reinforce Titus Otacilius in Sicily, who 
; was authorised to cross to Africa if he thought it expedient. 
j The proconsuls, according to their instructions, had maintained Hannibal 

\ the Fabian policy during the summer months. But when harvest -^^^-^^-^ 
I time approached, Hannibal was obliged to move in order to collect ''■""^^• 
\ supplies. Breaking up his camp at Geronium he seized Cannae, a 
j small town on the right bank of the Aufidus, about eight miles from 
I its mouth. It had been damaged, if not destroyed, the year before ; 
j but its citadel remained, and had been used by the Romans as a 



324 



HISTORY OF ROME 



// is 

decided to 
give 

Hannibal 
battle. 
The consuls 
go to the 
seat of war, 

2Z6. 



Different 
views of 
Aemiliiis 
and Varro. 



A skirmish 
encourages 
Varro. 



Two 

Rotnan 

camps. 



magazine. Hannibal, by its capture, not only got a rich supply, but, 
as he intended, made the proconsuls eager to fight before he got 
complete command of the district. They sent frequent messages to 
Rome for instructions ; and, after anxious deliberation, the Senate 
decided that they should give Hannibal battle, but should wait the 
arrival of the consuls. 

Aemilius and Varro were ordered to make all despatch, and 
to join the proconsuls with their armies, thus raising the force to 
eight legions, amounting, with allies, to about 80,000 men. The 
hopes of the Senate were centred in Aemilius, whose military career 
had been brilliant. They neither liked nor trusted Varro, and their 
sentiments are dramatically represented by Livy in the form of a solemn 
warning delivered by Fabius to Aemilius, on the eve of his departure, to 
beware of his colleague's rashness not less than of the enemy's forces, 
and to keep resolutely to the policy which he himself had followed. 

There seems no doubt, however, that the consuls went to the 
seat of war with instructions to fight ; and Aemilius's address to the 
soldiers, on his joining the army, assumed that a battle was to be 
sought with all speed. Still they would have to exercise discretion 
as to the ground on which to fight ; and on this point Aemilius soon 
found himself at variance with Varro. When after two days' 
march they came in sight of Hannibal's position at Cannae, Aemilius 
at once observed that the country was too flat and open to engage 
an enemy superior in cavalry. They must first try to draw him to 
ground more favourable to themselves. Varro thought differently. 
He knew that to fight was what was expected of him at Rome. He 
had had no experience of actual warfare, and perhaps thought that 
eight Roman legions formed so overpowering a force that victory was 
secure. When both consuls were at the seat of war it was customary 
for them to take the chief command on alternate days. The day 
after they arrived within about six miles of Hannibal's camp, it was 
Varro's turn to command, and he immediately ordered an advance. 
Hannibal hurled his light-armed troops and cavalry at his line, and 
a somewhat severe struggle ensued, only ended by nightfall, and, on 
the whole, not unfavourable to the Romans. 

Next day Aemilius could no longer draw off his army as he 
would have wished. He set himself, however, to secure his position 
as far as he could. He fortified one camp on the left bank of the 
Aufidus, in which he placed two-thirds of the army, while the remain- 
ing third was entrenched in a smaller camp on the right bank, near 
the ford, less than two miles from the enemy. His object was to 
have protection for his own foraging parties, and a means of attack- 
ing those of the enemy, while this smaller camp was sufficiently 
within reach of the larger to secure mutual support. 



XXIII BATTLE OF CANNAE 325 

Hannibal formed a camp on the left bank of the river also, and Hannibal 
gave every sign of wishing for a battle. In fact, a battle was neces- provokes 
sary to him. As long as the present position continued, he could ^ ^<^til^- 
neither collect supplies nor march elsewhere without being attacked. 
Aemilius, however, still thought the place unsafe. He felt sure that 
Hannibal would soon be obliged to shift his quarters, and could be 
better attacked in the process, or on other ground. But next day 
Varro was in command, and resolved to fight. On the previous 
evening their watering parties had been harassed by the Numidian 
cavalry, and the soldiers were as eager for battle as the consul, and 
when they rose in the morning rejoiced to see the red flag flying 
over his tent. 

The men from the greater camp crossed the Aufidus, and were Roman 
drawn up facing south, with 2000 Roman cavalry on their right, f^^^^^- 
resting on the river, and 4000 allied cavalry on the left. There 

. were 70,000 infantry on the ground, 10,000 being left to guard 
the camp. The heavy -armed were in column, with less space 

d than usual between the maniples ; the light-armed were slightly in 
advance. 

On Hannibal's right was a body of Balearic slingers and light- HannibaVs 

\ armed javelin-throwers ; on his left, close to the river, and facing the order. 
Roman cavalry, were 4000 Spanish and Gallic horse ; on his right, 

I facing the allied cavalry, 6000 Numidian light horse. His line was 

(I formed of his heavy-armed Africans in two bodies on the right and 
left, with Spanish and Gallic infantry in the centre. His line was 
about the same length as that of the Romans ; but after a while he 

\ moved the Spaniards and Gauls forward, and so graduated the posi- 

\ tion of the companies to the right and left of them that the whole 
presented somewhat the appearance of a crescent, with the convex 
towards the enemy. The object of this arrangement was that the 
African troops, who were well armed with Roman weapons taken in 
previous battles, should form a reserve, while the worse armed and 
less trustworthy Gauls and Spaniards should receive the first attack 
of the enemy. 

The battle was begun by an engagement between the light-armed The battle 

\ troops in front of the respective lines, and was for some time unde- ^f Cannae, 
cisive. But presently the 4000 Spanish and GalHc cavalry on the ^^^ , ^^^^ 
left joined in the attack upon the Roman light-armed, dismounting 
and grappling with their enemies, who were utterly routed. The 
greater part fell on the ground, and when the survivors fled towards 
the river the cavalry pursued, cutting them down, and giving no 
quarter. The Roman heavy -armed then advanced to the ground 

j abandoned by the light-armed, and, closing their ranks and reducing 
the space between the maniples, charged the Carthaginian centre in 



CHAP, xxiii ANNIHILATION OF ROMAN ARMY 327 

a solid wedge. Their immense weight told at once, and they cut 
their way through the thin line of Spanish and African infantry. But 
this success proved fatal to them. They pursued too far, and the 
two Carthaginian wings faced to left and right, and charged their 
flanks. Thus surrounded they fought gallantly ; but their line was 
disordered, and each maniple, or even each soldier, fought as, and 
where, he best could. Aemilius had already been engaged in the 
disastrous fight with the cavalry. He now rode up to the centre and 
led the charge in person, Hannibal also being in the centre of his 
own line. For some time the struggle went on, until Hasdrubal, 
who commanded the left cavalry, returned from chasing the light- 
j armed, and after assisting the Numidian cavalry to drive off the 
cavalry on the left of the Roman line, returned to the centre and 
charged the legions on the rear. 

Then all was lost. Aemilius fell in the thick of the fight, and the The 
consuls of the previous year, Atilius and Servifius, soon shared his Romans 
fate. The bulk of the soldiers fighting doggedly to the last were «''^'^^«^^«. 
, gradually reduced by continual charges on every side to a disordered Aernilius 
I mass of fugitives, most of whom were cut off in detail, though some killed. 

escaped along the road or across country towards Venusia. The 
( cavalry had dismounted and fought on foot ; but some of them 
managed to regain their horses and escape. As Cn. Lentulus was 
I galloping off the field he saw Aemilius, we are told, sitting on a rock, 
I bleeding from numberless wounds. He would have given him his 
( horse to secure his escape. The consul refused, preferring to die 
1 with his men ; but he bade Lentulus hasten to Rome to warn the 
* Senate to strengthen the defences of the city, and to tell Fabius that 
' he had not forgotten to follow his advice. 1 

' Terentius Varro, with about seventy horsemen, escaped to Venusia. Varro 
But the Roman army was annihilated. Out of the 70,000 infantry escapes to 
! actually engagjed on the field little more than 3000 escaped to the 
neighbouring towns, though almost as many more appear to have 
wandered about in the country, and eventually rejoined ; while on 

ithe field lay piles of dead, among whom was one of the consuls for 
the year, the two consuls of the previous year, beside other con- 
sulars, the quaestors of both consuls, twenty-nine out of forty-eight 
i' military tribunes, numerous ex-praetors and ex-aediles, and eighty 
senators. Some 600 from the lesser camp, under a military tribune, 
P. Sempronius Tuditanus, closed their ranks and made their way to 
the larger camp, and, being joined by a detachment from it, fought 
their way to Canusium. The 10,000 guarding the greater camp 
had made early in the day an ineffectual attempt to storm the Car- 

' This is not mentioned by Polybius, and is hardly consistent with his narra- 
I tive. 



Venusia. 



328 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Spirited 
conduct of 
Varro, and 
of Scipio 
and others, 
216. 



Hannibal 
after the 
battle. 



thaginian camp ; they were now surrounded by Hannibal's victorious 
army, and, after losing 2000 men, were compelled to surrender. The 
number of the prisoners was swollen by those taken on the field, and 
by about 2000 stragglers brought in by the Numidian cavalry, which 
scoured the country round. 

That all was not lost was greatly due to the fortitude of Varro, 
and to the patriotism of four military tribunes — Fabius Maximus, 
son of Cunctator, Publicius Bibulus, P. Cornelius Scipio [Africanus], 
Appius Claudius Pulcher. These four young nobles had made their 
way to Canusium, some five miles from the field, with others, among 
whom counsels of despair prevailed. Rome was lost, they thought ; 
it was better to escape over sea where their swords might find them 
a new career, L. Caecilius Metellus actually proposed to do so. 
But Scipio and the other three came to the place in which they were 
deliberating, and with drawn swords forced them to swear that they 
would not desert their country. Meanwhile Varro, at Venusia, 
twenty-eight miles from Cannae, had been exerting himself to collect 
the scattered remains of his army. Before long he mustered between 
4000 and 5000 infantry and cavalry, which were almost daily in- 
creased by fresh arrivals, until he had again something like a con- 
sular army. The refugees at -Canusium had been furnished with 
necessaries by a lady named Busa ; those at Venusia were supplied 
by the municipality with money, clothes, and arms, besides receiving 
many private benefactions. After hearing from Scipio, Varro led his 
men to Canusium to await orders froni home. 

The Carthaginian army was no longer threatening them. After 
making arrangements as to booty and captives Hannibal marched 
westward into Samnium towards Compsa, in the territory of the 
Hirpini, on the upper course of the Aufidus, to which he had been 
invited by a man of influence named Statins Trebius. There seems 
to have been a feeling among his army that he might advance at once 
against Rome, instead of attending to this and similar invitations. 
Cato recorded that Maharbal, his captain of the horse, assured him 
that if he would only send him on at once with the cavalry he should 
" on the fifth day feast as conqueror on the Capitol." The question 
why Hannibal refrained was long a theme for declamation, and may 
perhaps be still regarded as a problem. We must remember that 
his object was to rouse the Italian states, and attack Rome with all 
Italy at his back. Would it be wise, before securing that object, 
with an army wearied and diminished (for he had lost 6000 men in 
the battle), to attack a strong city, still rich in resources and filled 
with a warlike and desperate people? "You know how to win a 
victory, Hannibal " — Maharbal is represented as saying — " but not 
how to use it." Perhaps he might more truly have said that 



xxin DISMAY AT ROME 329 

Hannibal knew the limitations of his powers, and what he could and 
could not do J 

The rumour of disaster reached Rome before any official report, Measures 
and as usual even exaggerated the blow, heavy as it was. Both of defence 
consuls, it was reported, had fallen ; their armies had been utterly at Rome, 
destroyed. Hannibal was master of Apulia, of Samnium, of nearly 
all Italy. The city was without an army or a general. Hannibal 
himself would before long be at their gates. 

The praetors summoned the Senate to discuss the defence of 
Rome. It met in such excitement, and amid such sounds of 
' mourning, that for a time it seemed impossible even to discuss or 
suggest a plan. At length Q. Fabius Maximus proposed that some 
horsemen should be sent along the Appian and Latin Roads to 
question stragglers and to discover where Hannibal was ; that 
sentinels be posted at the gates to bring all fugitives to the praetors, 
and to prevent a flight of men from the city, — to convince all that their 
one hope of safety was to defend their homes. The voice of decision 
is always acceptable to men dismayed and puzzled. Fabius's proposal 
I hushed the tumult. The magistrates recovered their presence of 
!mind, and with the help of the senators forced the excited crowds 
J from the Forum. Presently a horseman entered the gates with a Despatch 
I despatch from Varro, announcing the death of Aemilius and the fro7n 
jdestruction of his army. But it added that "he himself was at /'"^■'■^. 
jCanusium gathering the wrecks of the disaster, and had already 
Jnearly 10,000 men, though grievously disorganised. Hannibal was 
jat Cannae still, trafficking for prisoners and booty, unlike a great 
Iconqueror or general." 

Another outburst of grief followed the announcement of the list 
lof dead. Not a single matron but was placed in mourning, and 
Ithereby prevented from joining in the rites of Ceres which were 
^celebrated about this time by the Roman ladies. ^ The feeling of 
Iterror was heightened by the receipt about the same time of a 
message from Titus Otacilius, asking for more ships to protect the Fresh 
[kingdom of Hiero, which he was unable to do because a second disasters. 
(Carthaginian fleet was threatening Sicily, Reports of portents 

^ The famous story of Maharbal's proposal and comment is not noticed 
I by Polybius, though he records the feehng in the Carthaginian army in favour of. 
attacking Rome. Livy (xxii. 51) is said to have taken it from Caelius, who copied 
it from Cato (Gell. x. 24, 6). The later authorities tell it with variations. Florus 
(i. 22, 19), Valerius Max. (ix. 5), Zonaras (ix. i) agree with Livy. Plutarch 
{^Fab. 17) gives the advice to " his friends " and the comment to " Barcas." Silius 
«Italicus (x. 375) makes Mago the spokesman. 

^ The Ludi Cereales were on the ides of April. The battle of Cannae seems 
certainly to have been fought in August. These later cerealia seem to have been 
mysteries celebrated, like those of the Bona Dea, by women alone. 



330 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. XXIII 



High 
spirit of 
the Senate, 
2i6. 



Varro 
returns to 
Rotne and 

is well 
received. 



spread from mouth to mouth, and, to crown all, two Vestal Virgms 
were convicted of unchastity. One of them forestalled her fate by 
suicide; the other underwent the cruel punishment of living burial, 
while her lover was beaten to death in the Forum. The Sibylline 
books were consulted, Fabius Pictor sent to Delphi, and, without 
waiting for the answer of the oracle, two men and women, Gaul 
and Greek, are said, as before, to have been buried alive in the 
Forum Boarium. 

But the Senate took other and more reasonable steps. Marcellus, 
commanding the fleet at Ostia, was ordered to relieve Varro. Sending 
1500 marines for the defence of Rome, and despatching the legion 
belonging to the fleet to Sidicinum on the Latin Road, he handed 
over the command of the ships to M. Furius, and hastened to lead 
his men in the direction of Canusium. On the order of the Senate 
M. Junius Pera was named dictator, who, with Ti. Sempromus as 
master of the horse, proclaimed a general levy. Youths below the 
military age were enrolled, and 8000 slaves freed at the pubhc 
expense on condition of serving in the army. By these means four 
legions, with 1000 cavalry, were made up, and the usual complement 
demanded from the Italian towns. 

The unbroken spirit of the Senate was farther shown by the 
stern answer to the prayer of the prisoners taken at Cannae that 
they might be ransomed. Though besieged by the mournful relatives 
and friends of the prisoners, the Fathers refused to depart from the 
ancient rule which left the Roman soldier no hope but to conquer or 
die. One of the envoys, who had given their oath to return, had 
made some excuse for going back to Hannibal's camp, and, pretending 
to have thus fulfilled his promise, endeavoured to remain behind at 
Rome, but was detected and sent back in chains to Hannibal. 

Nor was this the only sign that the people and Senate were not 
utterly carried away by panic. A despatch was sent to Varro, 
ordering his return to Rome as soon as was consistent with the good 
of the State. When he did return the people gave a generous proof 
that neither anger nor terror had blinded them to the value of his 
services since the battle. He was met by a procession of all classes, 
as he, might have been if his fasces had been wreathed with the 
laurel of victory, and he was publicly thanked because he had not 
•despaired of the Republic. A people calm enough to be just in the 
midst of such disasters is not conquered. A general whose popularity 
survived Cannae cannot have been a mere empty demagogue. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR — Continued 

Hannibal, after Cannae, is joined by Italian towns — Enters Campania, recoils 

from Naples, but is joined by Capua — Movements of Marcellus — The Castra 

Claudiana. Spain — Defeat of Hasdrubal and diversion of Carthaginian 

reinforcements from Italy (216) — Hannibal winters in Capua (216-215) — 

' Takes Casilinum (215) — Fall of Postumius. Sicily — Death of Hiero — 

j Hieronymus joins Carthage— -Revolution at Syracuse and death of Hieronymus 

1 (215) — Hippocrates and Epicydes at Syracuse defy the Romans — Marcellus 

' in Sicily — Siege of Syracuse (214-212) — The inventions of Archimedes — 

* Hanno at Agrigentum (212). Italy (214-207) — Hannibal in Campania — 
I Goes to Tarentum (214) — Fabius takes Arpi — Hannibal takes Tarentum 
I (212) — Livius holds the citadel (212-210) — Siege of Capua — Hannibal's 

march on Rome — Fall of Capua and settlement of Campania (211) — Fall 
j of Cn. Fulvius at Herdonia — Three days' fighting in Lucania — Marcellus 
I confined to Venusia (210) — Fabius recovers Tarentum (209) — Fall of Mar- 
I cellus (208)— Defeat of Hasdrubal on the Metaurus (207). 

^ Unsurpassed as a commander and strategist in camp or field Effects of 
I Hannibal never, except at Saguntum, won a great success against ^^^^ hattle 
\ walled towns. It is likely, therefore, that he was right in rejecting J A^^"f^' 
: the suggestion of an advance upon Rome. His troops would follow 
! him anywhere and fight any one, but his veterans from Africa were 
j reduced in number, and neither Spaniards nor Gauls would have 
\ endured the fatigues of a great siege. Meanwhile the results of 
Cannae answered his expectations. Revolt from Rome spread through 
I the Italian towns, and he soon might hope that the Republic would 
be reduced to the old limit of Latium, shut off from the south by a 
chain of free states, and from the north by the Gauls, without the 
intervening posts which had been gradually formed in Etruria to 
resist them. The states of Bruttium, with the one exception of 
j Petelia, joined Hannibal. All Lucania, all the Samnites except the 

* Pucetii, the Campanian Calatia and Atella, some of the towns of 
; Apulia, were ready to shake off the Roman yoke even at the cost of 

accepting a Punic garrison. Always fated to take the losing side 



332 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Hannibal 

i7iclined to 
viake peace, 
216. 



Hannibal 
in Cam- 
pania. 



Capua. 



Nola. 



the Greek Tarentum, Metapontum, Croton, and Locri hastened to 
renounce allegiance to Rome. 

The movement was so general that Hannibal seems to have 
thought that the Romans might be already willing to yield, and he 
is said to have sent an emissary to Rome with the deputation of 
prisoners, with authority to treat. But to complete the isolation of 
Rome it was necessary to occupy Campania, Leaving his heavy 
baggage at Compsa, in the territory of the Hirpini, to which he had 
been invited immediately after Cannae, and detaching a force under 
Himilco to secure Lucania and Bruttium, he entered Campania and 
approached Naples. A seaport was necessary to him for the recep- 
tion of the reinforcement and supplies which he hoped the victory 
would bring from home. But the sight of its lofty walls deterred him 
from attempting a storm, and the citizens showed no disposition to 
open their gates. He turned aside to Capua, where he knew the 
majority were prepared to welcome him. In most Campanian towns 
the aristocracy wished to stand by Rome ; the populace, in hopes 
of more complete autonomy, were inclined to Hannibal. This was 
specially the case at Capua, where the " knights " enjoyed conubium 
with Rome and were connected with Roman families, while 300 
of them were actually serving in the army in Sicily. But a 
revolution of the previous year had given the popular party the 
upper hand, and though a regard for the safety of the 300 in 
Sicily induced them to send offers of assistance to Varro at Canusium, 
the emissaries were so convinced of Rome's weakness by Varro's 
eager acceptance, that on their return they persuaded the people to 
open communications with Hannibal. He consented that they should 
retain their autonomy ; that no Campanian should be under the 
jurisdiction of a Carthaginian magistrate or serve against his will in 
the Carthaginian army ; and, to relieve the anxiety of the " knights " 
for the safety of the 300 in Sicily, he handed over 300 Roman prisoners 
as hostages. But there was to be a Punic garrison in Capua, and 
the futility of all stipulations for independence was at once shown 
by Hannibal's arresting and shipping to Carthage the leader of the 
Romanising party, Decius Magius. 

Fixing his headquarters at Capua, Hannibal endeavoured to 
secure other strong places in Campania. The first object of attack 
was Nola, about twenty-one miles south of Capua. Here the same 
division of feeling existed, but the aristocrats were still in the 
ascendant and contrived to communicate with Marcellus, who had 
now left the command in Apulia to the dictator, and established 
himself at Casilinum, which controlled the bridge over the Volturnus. 
He marched up that river, crossed it near Saticula, and skirting 
Mount Taburnus came in sight of Nola. Hannibal retired along the 



XXIV HANNIBAL IN CAPUA 333 

road towards Naples, and turning- to the left appeared before Nuceria, Nuceria. 
sixteen miles from Nola. Here he must have spent some time, for 
the inhabitants only yielded to famine, and were allowed to depart 
with their lives, dispersing into other Campanian towns, while their 
own was plundered and burnt. He then again approached Nola, 
now occupied by Marcellus, and trusting to an arrangement with the 
democratic party made preparations for an assault. But Marcellus Repulse at 
had discovered the intrigue, and so disposed his forces as to bring ^'^^''• 
them out from three separate gates, and attack the Carthaginians 
— who expected to find the town divided by a contest between 
the two parties — on three points at once. There was nothing left 
but to retire. Some loss was inflicted on the enemy, but the chief 
satisfaction was that for the first time Hannibal had sustained some- 
I thing like a check. 1 The siege of Nola was abandoned, and the 
traitors within the walls punished. 

Hannibal next attacked Acerrae, but the people escaped, and Hannibal 
1 instead of securing another state friendly to himself he could only '^^^t^f^ at 
■plunder and burn a deserted town. He then retired into winter ^^^t'- 
I quarters at Capua, after first vainly attempting to secure Casilinum, 
j then occupied by a garrison of men from Praeneste, Perusia, and 
I other towns, who had been too late to join the army at Cannae. 
1 These men maintained an heroic defence through the winter months, 
j and only surrendered eventually when reduced to the last extremity 
j of starvation ; and it was not until the beginning of 2 1 5 that the 
j town was handed over to the people of Capua and occupied by a 
I Punic garrison. Thus though Hannibal was in the heart of Cam- 
I pania he had secured no harbour town, and was watched and 
! threatened from the Castra Claudicnia^ which Marcellus had fortified 
above Suessula, and was debarred from Latium. 

Besides a somewhat favourable answer brought from Delphi by Good news 
Fabius Pictor, the Romans were encouraged by good news from from Spain 
Spain before the beginning of the next consular year. Hasdrubal ^y^,^-^ 
j had been hampered in the early part of 2 1 6 by a revolt in southern ^^^ 
Spain, over which he triumphed with difficulty ; and when he ad- 
vanced later in the year to the Ebro he was under orders to make 
his way to Italy, which impaired his prestige in Spain and made it 
[ probable that the country behind him would rise. He found the 

^ This and other achievements of Marcellus are doubted, chiefly on the 
authority of a fragmentary sentence of Polybius (Plutarch, Cofnpar. Marc, et 
Pelop.), "Marcellus never conquered Hannibal." But Polybius seems to mean 
" in a pitched battle." Livy's narrative does not here or elsewhere attribute such 
j a victory to Marcellus. In this instance it does not seem certain that Hannibal 
was personally engaged, and a check, however slight, to any part of his forces 
would in the then state of alarm seem almost a victory. 



334 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Fall of 
Postumius 
in Gaul. 



Death oj 
Hiero, 
winter of 
216-21S. 



21^. Coss. 
C. Postujn- 
iusAlbinus 
occ, Tib. 
Sempron- 
ius Grac- 
chus, M. 
Claudius 
Mairellus 
abd., Q. 
Fabius 
Maxim us 
-III. 



Scipios on the Ebro, and after a few days' skirmishing was com- 
pletely defeated, escaping from the field with only a handful of men. 
This not only prevented his reinforcement of Hannibal, but was 
followed by a general defection of the Spanish tribes. It also 
diverted the expedition to south Italy from Carthage, which had 
been sent in consequence of Mago's report of the victory of Cannae, 
when he had poured out upon the Senate- House floor a large 
measure of gold rings taken from the hands of Roman knights and 
senators, and had bidden them judge from that the number of the 
common soldiers slain. When the news of the Spanish disaster 
came, he was bidden to take to Spain the money, elephants, 
and Numidian cavalry which had been voted for Italy, while another 
expedition was fitted out for Sardinia, said at that time to be ready 
to revolt from Rome. 

The elections were therefore held with more cheerful feelings ; 
but they were scarcely over when fresh dismay was caused by the 
news that one of those elected, C. Postumius, had fallen in the valley 
of the Po. He had been sent in 216 as praetor to effect a diversion 
among the C^auls, but had fallen into an ambush in the Silva Litana^ 
near Bononia, and had perished with nearly his whole army. Thus 
the hold of Rome upon northern Italy was seriously weakened. 
From Sicily and Sardinia also came appeals for provisions and 
reinforcements, which the Senate had not the means to supply, while 
they were even obliged to say in answer to similar appeals from Italian 
towns, such as Petelia in Bruttium, that they must consult for their 
own safety. To crown all, Hiero of Syracuse died during the winter. 
He had been the consistent and liberal friend of Rome since 263, 
and he was succeeded by his youthful grandson Hieronymus, whose 
policy was unknown, but whose father Gelon had belonged to an 
anti-Roman faction. 

Roman life, however, went on as usual. We hear of the dedica- 
tion of a temple of Venus, an exhibition of gladiators, and the annual 
games. Even the jealousy of the orders survived. Marcellus was 
elected in place of Postumius, but was forced to abdicate on the 
report of bad omens, really because of the still existing prejudice 
against two plebeian consuls, and was succeeded by Fabius Cunctator. 
The plan of the campaign, under the influence of Fabius, was again 
to be one of caution. Marcellus, as proconsul, commanded in the 
Cast7-a Manliaiiaj Fabius and Gracchus, the former with the 
veterans who had wintered at Teanum, the latter with an army 
composed of slaves who volunteered in Apulia, and of allies, — en- 
camped the first near Casilinum, the second at Liternum, near Cumae. 
Pitched battles were avoided, but every chance was seized of cutting 
off stragglers, foraging parties, or messengers. Apulia and Tarentum 



HANNIBAL ABANDONS CAMPANIA 335 



were guarded by legions brought from Sicily, where they were re- 
placed by those disgraced at Cannae, and by twenty-five ships under 
the praetor Valerius ; Q. Fabius guarded the coast of Latium with 
'twenty-five ships ; Varro went to Picenum to levy troops. 

Against this strategy of Fabius and Gracchus Hannibal effected Reported 
nothing of importance. The Roman writers dwell on the demoralisa- de7noral- 
tion of his army by the luxuries of a Capuan winter. The men '-^^'"'^^ ^f ^ 
could not bear the hardships of the camp any longer, and stole back 
to the town at ever}^ opportunity. Hannibal's losses in battle had 
not been supplied by reinforcements from home ; the Italian allies 
could scarcely have been enthusiastic ; and the attack on walled 
towns which was necessary in Campania was that in which he was 
least successful. Thus he was baffled in an attempt upon Cumae ; 
his lieutenant Hanno sustained a defeat near Grumentum at 
the hands of Sempronius Longus, which appears to have confined 
him to Bruttium ; and the praetor Valerius recovered the revolted 
towns of the Hirpini. Meanwhile Fabius had been taking various 
strongholds in northern Campania, and had even marched past Hanni- 
Ibal and effected a junction with Marcellus near Nola. It was not 
jtill towards the end of the summer that Hannibal learnt that Hanno 
had been reinforced and could join him. He determined upon Reinforce- 
|striking one blow for the possession of Campania by attacking Nola, wt-^/j 
Jexplaining to the Hirpini, who begged for his aid, that he would be ^''''^'^ 
jthus rendering them the most effectual assistance. But Marcellus 
'had already occupied Nola in force, and defended himself with Repulsed 
(spirit. After one unsuccessful sortie he seized an opportunity for before 
^attacking Hannibal's army when weakened by the detachment of ^''"''• 
■foragers, and drove it back on its camp with heavy loss. This was 
Ifollowed by almost the only instance of any important desertion from 
1 Hannibal's army, and before long he raised the siege, removed to 
lApulia, and went into winter quarters near Arpi. 

1 Thus the tide seemed on the turn. During the same season a Sardinia 
iCarthaginian fleet and army had been beaten in Sardinia; and and Spain. 
(though Scipio had written towards the end of the season asking for 
llarge supplies of men and money, and describing the pressing wants 
of his army, yet his despatch also contained accounts of fresh suc- 
Icesses ; and the poverty of the exchequer had been relieved by the 
'voluntary contribution of syndicates of wealthy men, who advanced 
the money for the service in Spain on the faith of the public credit. 

Hannibal had, on the other hand, been encouraged by the ofTer Treaty 
of alliance from Philip of Macedon. Twice the ambassadors who between 
I came from the king fell into the hands of the Romans : for having ^^^ ^• 
I eluded their captors on their way to Hannibal by the cunning of Hannibal 
kheir leader Xenophanes, they were again taken on their return 



336 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Sicily, 

2iy2I2. 

Hierony 
mus 

repudiates 
the Roman 
alliance. 



Assassin- 
ation of 
Hierony- 
mus, 214. 



journey. But a second body of envoys was more successful, and 
returned to Macedonia with a treaty sworn to by Hannibal, in which 
Philip promised all assistance to the Carthaginians in Italy, which 
was to be left to them after the war ; while Hannibal in return agreed 
to prevent the Romans invading Macedonia, or exercising power in 
Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Pharos, and guaranteed the 
interests of Demetrius of Pharos. But the capture of the first envoys 
had enlightened the Romans, and had prevented Philip from attempt- 
ing the invasion of Italy for that year (215) with his fleet of 200 
vessels which he had in readiness. Nor indeed, though remaining 
nominally at war with Rome till 205, did he ever intervene with 
effect. His hostility, however, compelled the Romans to keep a 
fleet in the Adriatic. 

A new phase in the war now begins, and the interest is in great 
degree transferred to Sicily. The will of Hiero of Syracuse had 
committed his young grandson Hieronymus and the state to a 
council of thirteen. Two of them, Andranodorus and Zoippus, sons- 
in-law of Hiero, were opposed to the Roman alliance, and persuaded 
the king that he had sovereign rights over all Sicily, as grandson of 
Pyrrhus, which he might secure by negotiation with Carthage. 
Hannibal promptly sent legates to Syracuse, among whom were 
Hippocrates and Epicydes, sons of a Syracusan exile in Carthage, 
who at once gained great influence in the court and army. The 
praetor Appius Claudius sent a warning to the young king, who, 
however, treated the Roman legates with contumely; taunted them 
with the defeats in Italy ; and reproached the Romans for having 
dared to send a fleet into Syracusan waters during his grandfather's 
lifetime. Nor did he stop here. He at once sent envoys to 
Carthage to sign a treaty in which the Himera was acknowledged as 
the boundary of the Carthaginian territory in Sicily. As it was 
about to be signed, however, another envoy arrived claiming the 
whole of Sicily. But the Carthaginian government, though thus 
enlightened as to the nature of their new ally, thought it too import- 
ant to secure the hostility of Syracuse to Rome to allow them to 
stand on trifles. If they won, Hieronymus could be dealt with after- 
wards. The concession was therefore made. 

riieronymus farther committed himself by telling the Roman 
envoys sent to remonstrate that he would abide by his grandfather's 
treaty, if the Romans repaid the gold and corn supplied by Hiero, 
and acknowledged all Sicily east of the Himera to be Syracusan. 
This meant war, and preparations were immediately made for it. 
Epicydes and Hippocrates were sent to attempt towns held by 
Roman garrisons, and the king at the head of an army started for 
Leontini. As he was entering the town, however, he was assassinated 



XXIV MOVEMENTS IN SICILY AGAINST ROME 337 

[by conspirators, who, whether acting from private motives of ven- 
,geance or on a hint from their Cai-thaginian friends, pacified the 
,army and the citizens of Syracuse by dilating on the " liberty " thus 
jsecured. Andranodorus, who had been left in charge of Syracuse, 
,ensconced himself in Ortygia, shut off from the rest of the city by 
strong fortifications, but next day submitted to the orders of the 

Senate and people, and was elected one of the " generals " to whom 

the government of the city was now to be assigned. But Hippo- Hippocrates 

,crates and Epicydes presently returned to Syracuse, and by spread- '^^^_ 

ing a report that Andranodorus was aiming at tyranny, secured his ^''^^ ^^' 

assassination in a riot, along with the survivors of the royal family 

jand their partisans, and were themselves elected generals. 

The election of these agents of Hannibal showed that Republican 
^no less than Royal Syracuse meant to renounce the Roman alliance. 
jThey did not, however, openly avow this purpose, though deprecat- 
■ing a mission which had already been sent to the Roman camp. A 
^oman fleet off Murgantia was watching events, and for a time they 
(remained quiet and allowed the negotiation with Marcellus, the new 
|consul who had now come to Sicily, to go on. But when a Cartha- Outbreak at 
j^inian fleet appeared rounding Pachynus, they threw off their disguise Syracuse. 
|and denounced their colleagues as ready to sacrifice their new free- 
dom to Rome. The appearance of the Roman fleet at the mouth 
bf the harbour seemed to confirm their words. The excited mob 
(rushed down to the beach as though to oppose a descent of the 
(enemy, and were with difficulty persuaded of their impotence and of 
ithe necessity of continuing negotiation. 

I But Hippocrates and Epicydes were resolved to commit Syracuse The 
jto open hostility with Rome. The Leontines had made some raids Leoitines 
bn Roman territory, and had refused restitution, affirming that they P^^''^ 
jwere not bound by Syracusan treaties. The Syracusans sent an army 
jostensibly to enforce their remonstrance ; but meanwhile Marcellus had 
jtaken Leontini, where he found and executed 2000 Roman deserters. 
Hippocrates had been on a mission to Leontini, and escaping, joined 
jEpicydes and the Syracusan army at Herbessus, which they horrified 
jby an account of the severities of Marcellus at Leontini. They then 
worked on the jealousy of the mercenaries against the natives, and 
on the gratitude to Hannibal Xii some Cretans who had been released 
after Thrasymene. The Syracusan generals had to fly for their 
lives, and the feelings of the mercenaries were still farther inflamed 
by the production of forged letters from them to Marcellus, congratu- 
lating him on the capture of Leontini, and begging him to expel all Hippocrates 
mercenaries from Sicily. The army followed Hippocrates and ^^ 
picydes to Syracuse, forced the gates, were joined by the mob, and Ji^ 

laving massacred the generals and their adherents, re-elected Hippo- generals. 



338 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Siege of 

Svracuse, 

214. 



TopO' 
graphy of 
Syracuse. 



crates and Epicycles joint generals amidst a scene of universal 
licence, in which slaves were freed and the prisons thrown open. 

The Romans could not see Syracuse in the hands of their 
bitterest opponents with indifference. Marcellus at once occupied 
the Olympieum, a mile and a half from the city ; and his demand 
that the authors of the massacre should be given up, exiles restored, 
and a free government established, having been rejected, began the 
siege by land and sea. 

Syracuse was fortified in three compartments. The citadel was 
the island Ortygia, stretching south towards Plemmyrium, and 
enclosing a deep bay, five miles in circumference, which formed the 
Great Harbour. A chain of forts protected its coasts, and strong 



r ---" / / ' '■h 



Archi- 
medes. 




ENGLISH MILES 



IValker &• BoutaUs^c 



walls the entrance to the bridge, from which a road led across level 
ground to a lofty plateau called Achradina, separated from another 
plateau called Epipolae by a slight depression. A wall running 
north and south from sea to sea defended the west of Achradina, 
which was farther secured by a wall on the north and east nearly 
touching the sea. The whole of Epipolae was enclosed by a wall 
varying in height according to the nature of the cliff. It included 
three quarters, Epipolae proper on the west, Tycha on the north, 
and Neapolis on the south, Tycha was entered by a road from 
Leontini through a gate called Hexapylon. 

The place was too strong to be taken by assault, and the defence 
was conducted with extraordinary vigour. The famous Archimedes 
employed all his engineering and mechanical skill in constructing 



XXIV BLOCKADE OF SYRACUSE 339 

machines to harass the besiegers and destroy their artillery. Huge 
balistae threw immense stones upon the ships, while smaller ones 
cannonaded all within reach, and through innumerable apertures in 
the walls sharp missiles called " scorpions " were continually dis- 
charged. When the Roman vessels, lashed in pairs, approached the 
sea walls, that their archers, slingers, and javelin-throwers might 
pick off those who manned them, lofty cranes swung round and 
dropped iron grappling-hooks weighted with lead, which, catching 
the prows, raised the vessel ouli of the water, and letting it suddenly 
fall, caused it to ship a quantity of water or threw the sailors over- 
board. These and many sin ilar contrivances baffled Marcellus, Marcellus 
who resolved to turn the siege nto a blockade, disposing his ships blockades 
to prevent provisions being bro ight in by s^ea. Meanwhile he took y^^^^^^- 
other smaller places, such as t elorus, Hferbessus, and Megara, and 
surprised and defeated Epicydel at Aci^fllae. But he failed to anti- 
cipate Himilco at Agrigentum, i^ho a^ived with a strong reinforce- 
ment, and marched to the reliefipf Syracuse, encamping eight miles 
off on the Anapus, from which hV captured the Roman magazines at 
Murgantia. Though a Carthagi^aA fleet under Bomilcar about the 
same time failed to break the Wockade, the success of Himilco 
caused revolts from Rome in many parts of the island, in which 
Roman garrisons were expelled or massacred. The movement was 
exasperated by the conduct of L. Pinarius at Enna, a town to which 
peculiar sanctity attached as the home of Ceres and Proserpine. 
Finding the people ready to revolt, and demanding the keys of the 
citadel, he summoned them to an assembly and caused his soldiers 
to attack them. In the confusion which followed as many are said 
to have perished in trying to escape as by the sword. But though 
the horror excited by this severity caused many adhesions to 
Carthage in other parts of the island, it prevented farther defections 
in the neighbourhood. Himilco fell back upon Agrigentum, Epicydes 
on Murgantia, and the blockade was not interrupted. It dragged 21 j. The 
on during the next year, in which Marcellus continued the command blockade 



as proconsul, without visible result. The genius of Archimedes 
pervaded the defence, and every point had its engine or elaborate 



continued, 
but not 
effective. 



contrivance for baffling the besiegers ; while the blockade at sea 
seems not to have been sufficiently complete to prevent provisions 
being thrown from time to time into the town. 

It was the capture of a blockade-runner named Damippus which 212. 
led to the discovery of a weak point in the fortifications, of which Escalade of 
Marcellus was quick to take advantage. In negotiating the release ^P^P'^^'^^^ 
of Damippus the Roman envoys met those of Syracuse near the 
north wall of Epipolae, now called Scala Gracca^ where there is a 
break in the cliff, and where the wall seemed to them capable of 



340 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Reinforce- 
ments from 
Carthage y 



Pestilence. 



A 7iew fleet 
from Car- 
thage fails 
to arrive. 



being scaled. One of them roughly calculated its height by count- 
ing the layers of bricks, and reported that ladders of moderate 
length would suffice. Waiting until he learnt from a deserter that 
the Syracusans were celebrating a three days' festival of Artemis, in 
which from the scarcity of other luxuries wine would be freely 
taken, Marcellus prepared a night attack. The walls were scaled, 
the guards surprised at their cups or in the heavy sleep of intoxica- 
tion, and put to the sword. At daybreak Hexapylon was forced, 
and the Roman army entered. Epipolae, with the exception of the 
western fortress Eur^'alus, \\ as thus taken. It was a great advantage, 
but, owing to the separation of Achradina and Ortygia, did not 
involve possession of all Syracuse. The garrison in Ortygia did not 
even know distinctly what had happened. Epicydes thought that 
some few Romans had climbed into Epipolae under cover of night, 
and came expecting to drive them out easily ; but finding the enemy 
in force retired to Achradina. 

From the heights of Epipolae Marcellus gazed on one of the 
fairest cities of the world. He had some knowledge of Greek 
letters ; and the memory of the Athenian fleet which had perished 
in the harbour, and of the Athenian armies ruined beneath its walls, 
as well as the glories of its kings and its heroic struggles with the 
Punic foe, brought tears to his eyes. But the city was not yet won. 
His rear could be harassed from Euryalus, the walls of Achradina 
still defied him, and Ortygia was still intact. Euryalus surrendered 
after a few days in despair of relief But while Marcellus was 
besieging Epicydes in Achradina, Bomilcar arrived with the rein- 
forcement from Carthage. Thereupon Hippocrates and Himilco 
encamped on the low ground between the city and Olympieum, and 
attacked Crispinus, who commanded the Roman camp, while Epicydes 
prevented Marcellus coming to his relief by sallies from Achradina. 
But before long the pestilence, so often fatal to Carthaginian armies 
on the same spot, broke out in their camp, situated on low marshy 
ground, through the deadly autumn season. Both Hippocrates and 
Himilco fell victims to it, together with all the Carthaginians in the 
army, while the Sicilians for the most part escaped by rapidly dis- 
persing. The Romans suffered, but less severely, for they were on 
higher ground, and had become inured to the climate. 

Epicydes was still holding Achradina in hopes of a fresh 
squadron of relief which Bomilcar had returned to Carthage to fetch, 
and encouraged by finding that the Sicilians, who had retired from 
the plague-stricken camp, were collecting stores and soldiers in 
neighbouring strongholds. But though the new Punic fleet reached 
Pachynus, it was prevented from rounding the promontory by con- 
trary winds ; and Epicydes, unable to bear the suspense, set sail in 



XXIV SACK OF SYRACUSE 341 

search of it, and was followed by Marcellus in spite of the inferiority 
in the number of his ships. At last the east wind dropped, and 
Bomilcar stood out to sea to round Pachynus : but when he sighted 
the Roman fleet he sent back his transports to Africa, and coasting 
along Sicily made the harbour of Tarentum, while Epicydes fled to 
Agrigentum. 

The Syracusans thus abandoned were ready to submit in hopes The 
of saving their lives ; some of Epicydes' officers were assassinated, Romans 
new generals elected, and envoys from the city and the Sicilian camp ^'^^ 
outside were sent to Marcellus. Certain Roman deserters, who ex- ^i„a 
pected no mercy from him, combined with the mercenaries in trying 212. 
to suppress the movement, and murdered some of the citizens. But 
the Spanish Moericus, commanding in Achradina, was soon con- 
vinced that his safest course was to make terms. The Romans 
were admitted into Achradina, and found little to resist them ; while 
another division found Ortygia so weakly guarded, that they landed 
without difficulty and took the citadel. A guard was sent by 
Marcellus to protect the treasury, and sentries were posted at the 
doors of those citizens who had been in the Roman camp. The rest 
of the city was given up to the soldiers to plunder, though with orders 
to take no life. But such orders could not prevent all violence, 
and among the victims of it was the famous Archimedes himself. 
Intent, it is said, on some diagrams of a problem in geometry or 
mechanics, he failed to answer the rough address of a soldier, 
perhaps asking who he was, or, more likely, demanding money or 
treasure, and was cut down by the angry ruffian, — to the chagrin of 
Marcellus, who had specially wished that he should be spared. 

The wealth of the city was great, and its works of art numerous Works of 
and splendid. These were for the most part removed to Rome, to (if't '« 
adorn the triumph of Marcellus, and to be finally deposited in the ^y^^"*^^- 
temples of Honor and Virtus, which he had vowed during the Gallic 
war. I Marcellus was not personally avaricious, and is said to have 
refused any portion of the spoils with the exception of the sphaera 
of Archimedes. But the exhibition of these spoils was an offence to 
Greek visitors to Rome, and gave an impulse to the passion for 
adorning private houses, as well as temples, with Greek works of art, 
which had already begun with the spoils of Magna Graecia and 
Capua. 

The capture of Syracuse was followed by the submission of nearly 
all Sicily ; and Marcellus was engaged for some months in settling 

^ Apparently Marcellus did not live to " dedicate " these temples (Livy xxvii. 
25). Livy observes that his act of plunder was punished by the after destruction 
of the very temples in which it was stored. They seem to have been repaired and 
rededicated by Marius. 



342 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Settlement 
of Sicily by 
Marcellus, 



Agrigen- 
turn. 



Marcellus 
ifi 

diffic7ilties 
on the 
Hitnera. 



Winter, 

212-21 1. 

Italy. 



214. Cass. 
Q. Fabius 
Maxim us 
IV., M. 
Clatidius 
Marcelhis 
III. 



the terms on which the various cities were to belong to the Roman 
alhance — terms varying in hberality or severity according to their 
fidehty to Rome in the late war. Both Livy and Plutarch praise the 
equity of his arrangements ; but they did not, and perhaps could not, 
give universal satisfaction, and the Syracusans especially sent deputa- 
tions to Rome to complain. 

But Epicydes and Hanno still held Agrigentum, and from it 
forays were made by the Numidian cavalry under Hippocrates or 
Mutines, who had been sent by Hannibal. They even ventured to 
march out and pitch a camp on the Himera, and the still existing 
loyalty to Carthage seemed once more about to declare itself 
Marcellus therefore decided that he must strike a final blow. Pie 
marched to the Himera, but was assailed so fiercely by Mutines, 
who hastened across the river to meet him, that he almost sus- 
tained a defeat ; and when the engagement was renewed on the 
next day his advanced guard was again driven within the lines. 
From this dangerous position he partly owed his deliverance to 
divisions among the enemy. While Mutines was absent at Heracleia 
trying to recall the mutinous Numidians who had retired thither, 
Hanno and Epicydes, against his advice, crossed the river to attack 
Marcellus. But the Numidians refused to fight in the absence of 
Mutines, and Marcellus won an easy victory, the enemy fearing to 
stand a siege, and dispersing in wild confusion into ever)' part of the 
country. He did not, however, venture to besiege Agrigentum. 
The year was drawing to a close ; he had fought his last battle in 
Sicily, and his eyes were fixed on home and his expected triumph. On 
his departure the scattered Carthaginians rallied and collected again 
in Agrigentum, which held out for two more years. This was looked 
upon as a fatal objection to Marcellus enjoying a regular triumph. He 
had not finished the war ; he handed over his army to his successor, 
and that successor found an enemy still within his province. 

Meanwhile the war in Italy had been carried on with varied 
fortune. At the end of 2 i 5 Hannibal had retired into winter quarters 
at Arpi. Here slight skirmishes took place between him and the 
consul Sempronius (iracchus, who had followed him, but no decisive 
battle. In the spring of 214 he returned to the camp at Tifata on 
the urgent entreaty of the people of Capua, who trembled at the vast 
preparations made at Rome for the next yearns campaign. Though 
the Roman exchequer was exhausted, wealthy men had liberally con- 
tributed to a loan on the credit of the State, and an extraordinary 
property-tax for the fleet had been cheerfully borne. There were to 
be eighteen legions, or about 1 80,000 men, on foot ; and Fabius 
Maximus, whose hand had been heavy on Campania in 215, was 
again to command there as consul. 



XXIV HANNIBAL HOPES FOR TARENTUM 343 

As soon as he heard, of Hannibal having quitted Arpi, Fabiiis Ha7inibal 
hastened to join his legions near Casilinum, ordering Gracchus, now ag<:iin in 
proconsul, to advance to Beneventum, Hannibal, however, did not ^^^^P^"-*^^ 
stay the whole summer in Campania. He attempted to surprise 
Puteoli by a feint of going to offer sacrifice at the lake Avernus : 
once more approached Nola, and was once more baffled under its 
walls by Marcellus with some loss. But while near the lake Avernus 
he had been visited by certain young men from Tarentum, who 
assured him of a party there ready to admit him. The bait offered Invited to 
by the acquisition of such a harbour as that of Tarentum was too Tarentum. 
strong to be resisted. Casilinum and Capua were left to their fate, 
and he marched away to Apulia. Both consuls (for Marcellus was 
not yet ordered to Sicily) united in the assault upon Casilinum, which 
soon fell, and with it the principal bridge over the Volturnus again 
passed into Roman hands — an advantage not afterwards lost. In 
many ways the Carthaginian cause was at a low ebb. In Spain the 
Roman arms were prospering. Philip of Macedon had taken Oricum, 
but lost it again to Valerius ; and had been surprised while besieging 
' ApoUonia, and forced to fly for his life. Fabius was reconquering 
I Samnium. Bruttium was entrusted to Hanno, who had secured 
, Locri and Croton, but had failed to take Rhegium ; and when in 214 
( he tried to intercept (iracchus at Beneventum, he had been decisively 
beaten, and an advantage which he afterwards gained over a detach- 
' nient of (iracchus's army in Lucania led to nothing. 

I All the more was it necessary for Hannibal to strike some brilliant Disap- 
( blow at Tarentum. But on his arri\al he was disappointed in the Pointed at 
hope of finding treason within the walls ready to co-operate with him. '^"^" ""'^ 
On the contrary, the Roman garrison had been reinforced under 
M. Livius Macatus from Brundisium, and he was obliged to fall back 
' on Salapia, where he prepared for the winter by collecting corn from 
Metapontum and Heracleia, scouring the district of the Sallentini 
with his Numidian cavalr>'. But neither during the winter nor the 
next summer (213) was any material progress made in the great 
, object of taking Tarentum. The consul Fabius (son of Cunctator) 21J. Q. 
' possessed himself of Arpi, once the winter quarters of the Cartha- ^'^^^'"^ 
' ginians, and Hannibal spent the whole summer in capturing petty *. '^^i,""' 
places in the territory of Tarentum or in fruitless demonstration against sempron- 
I the town itself A year of precious time was lost ; some of the Cireek 
j towns in Lucania were returning to their allegiance to Rome, and in 
, Campania the leading citizens of Capua were making secret overtures 

I to secure their pardon. 
But early in 212 the long-delayed blow fell. The Tarcntines 
and Thurians had been forced to give hostages for their fidelity to 
' Rome, who had been kept in somewhat careless custody in the 



tus 

(.'iracchus 

II. 



344 



HISTORY OF ROME 



212. COSS. 

Q. Fulvius 
Flaccus 
III., A p. 
Claudius 
Pule her. 

Plot to 
hand over 
Tar en turn 
to 
Hajtnibal. 



Atrium Libertatis. Induced to attempt an escape, they had been 
caught at Tarracina, brought back, and scourged and hurled from the 
Tarpeian rock. This severity roused indignation at Tarentum and 
Thurii, and two young men, named Nico and Phikimenus, undertook 
to deHver Tarentum to Hannibal. They obtained an intei-view by 
allowing themselves to be caught by his sentries while hunting, and 
agreed on a plan. Philumenus, pretending that the presence of the 
Punic army made it dangerous to return from his expeditions before 
nightfall, made a practice of bringing his dogs and game to one of 
the smaller town gates after dark, so that the sentry might be accus- 



HARBOUR OF TARENTUM 



ENGLISH MILES 




Walker Sr Boutall sc. 



tomed to admit him when he whistled. Nico stayed in the town to 
answer Hannibal's fire signal. Feigning sickness to account for 
remaining so long in one camp, at the time agreed Hannibal sent 
forward some light infantry and cavalry along the road to Tarentum, 
who were to force back all whom they found going towards the town, 
and kill those coming from it. When this was reported at Tarentum, 
Livius, thinking it one of the ordinary raids, sent some cavalry at 
daybreak to stop it. But by a forced march Hannibal had already 
caught up his skirmishers with his main army about fifteen miles 
from the town, and, being joined by Philumenus, started at midnight 



XXIV HANNIBAL ENTERS TARENTUM 345 

under his guidance. Arrived at the walls, Philumenus with one 
division went to his usual gate, Hannibal with the other to the 
eastern or Temenid gate leading to the street of tombs or 
Batheia. 

A small peninsula almost closes the mouth of an inlet of the sea, Tarentum. 
the Mare piccolo^ six miles in length, and between two and three in 
breadth, which constituted the harbour of Tarentum. It is rocky and 
somewhat elevated, and on it was the citadel. The town, enclosed 
by walls, had spread to the lower ground south of the harbour, but 
the peninsula was so fortified as to be a stronghold independent of 
the town, while its northern extremity commanded the entrance to 
the harbour. 

There had been a festival and banquet, and Livius and his retinue Hannibal 

returned home late at night. The licence of the feast enabled the ^titers the 

conspirators to remain in the streets in apparent mirth, so that, when '^""'' '^'' 

Hannibal's fire signal was given and answered, some of them went at 

once to the Temenid gate, overpowered and killed the guard, and 

forced it open to receive Hannibal, who marched down the Batheia 

i to the Forum. At the same time Philumenus with 1 000 men appeared 

I at his usual gate. He was admitted even more quickly than usual, 

as he explained that he had brought so huge a boar that the bearers 

j were impatient. As the sentry turned to look at it, he transfixed 

him with his hunting spear. Some of his men then rushed through 

I the wicket and forced open the gate to admit the rest, who at once 

I joined Hannibal in the Forum, The principal streets were occupied 

( at either end, and orders were given to kill all Romans, but to 

promise citizens that if they would keep indoors they should not be 

* hurt. The silence of the night was broken by these mo\ements, and 

' Livius, roused from sleep, escaped in a boat across the harbour to Livius 

the citadel, and was there joined by such Romans as also managed to escapes. 

escape, and by those Tarentines who were faithful to Rome. The 

people, who only learnt what had happened by seeing in the morning 

the corpses of the Romans about the streets, were summoned to a 

meeting in the theatre, and assured by Hannibal that they had nothing 

\ to fear ; he had come to deliver them from their Roman tyrants. 

\ Every citizen was to mark his door with chalk, and it would be un- 

' injured ; but he would punish with death, as an enemy, any who so 

! marked a door where a Roman dwelt. 
Livius atoned for his supineness or credulity by the gallantry with M. Livius 
which he maintained himself on the citadel. Hannibal soon gave up '^^"''!^['^^ 
the idea of a storm, and attempted a blockade. He erected earth- ^^y^^^./_ 
works across the neck of the peninsula to prevent sallies of the 212-20^. 
I Roman garrison, and, inducing the citizens to drag their ships from 
'the harbour over the flat space between it and the open sea, en- 



346 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



212. Siege 
of Capua. 



A convoy 
of corn i?i- 
tercepted. 



Victory of 
Hannibal 
at 

Herdonea, 
late in 212. 



deavoured to stop provisions being throwTi into the citadel. This 
blockade never seems to have been effective, and Livius held the 
citadel until Fabius recovered the town in 209, the use of which to 
Hannibal was greatly diminished, if not destroyed, by his exclusion 
from the harbour. 

Meanwhile the people of Capua felt their fate approaching. One 
Roman army was entrenched at Suessula, another held the bridge- 
town of Casilinum. The country had been thoroughly pillaged by 
Fabius and the autumn sowing prevented ; and though partly pro- 
tected by the Punic camp on Tifata, they were in danger of starvation. 
In answer to urgent appeals Hannibal ordered Hanno to collect corn 
for the town. But the consuls were in Samnium, and, hearing that 
Hanno was encamped near Beneventum for this purpose, Fulvius 
entered that town at night, learned that Hanno was absent on a 
foray, and that the camp, under the command of a subordinate, was 
crowded with peasants sent with 2000 carts from Campania to fetch 
the corn. He started soon after midnight to attack it, and, in spite 
of the strength of the position, and the determined resistance of the 
Carthaginians, succeeded in storming it. Six thousand of the enemy 
are said to have been killed, and the carriers with their waggons and 
beasts of burden fell to the victors, along with much other booty 
collected by Hanno. The consuls then united their forces and marched 
from Beneventum along the Appian road into Campania, ordering Tib. 
Gracchus the proconsul to leave Lucania and reinforce the Roman 
garrison at Beneventum in their rear. Gracchus, with one cohort, 
fell iiTto an ambush and perished ; but the bulk of his army under 
the quaestor Cornelius eventually arrived in Campania. Hannibal 
himself now found it necessary to return to the camp on Mount 
Tifata ; but he did not succeed in bringing the consuls to a battle, 
and presently darted upon a Roman force in Lucania commanded by 
M. Centenius, who had persuaded the Senate to entrust him with it. 
This was easily crushed, and Hannibal hurried into Apulia, where 
he annihilated the army of the praetor Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea, 
which had been plundering Apulian towns. Content with these 
successes, he took up winter quarters in Apulia, once more leaving 
Capua to its own resources. The consuls had now begun the siege 
in earnest. Magazines were established at Casilinum and a fortress at 
the mouth of the Volturnus ; Puteoli was garrisoned to secure supplies 
of corn and war material by sea ; and the praetor Claudius Nero 
ordered up from the Castra Chiudiana : so that three Roman armies 
were besieging Capua at three points at once. The citizens, however, 
still relied on help from Hannibal, with whom they had again com- 
municated before the lines of investment were complete; and they 
contemptuously rejected the offer from Rome, allowing any one who 



XXIV HANNIBAL FAILS TO RELIEVE CAPUA 347 

chose to quit the city taking his property with him before the next 
ides of March. 

Through the winter and spring, therefore, Fulvius and Claudius, Hannibal 
whose imperhan was extended until they should have taken Capua, attempts to 
continually drew their lines closer and closer round the doomed city ; ^^'^'^'*^ 
. and though the superiority of the Campanian horse enabled the be- ^/f "^' 
sieged to make up somewhat for the defeat of their infantry in their 
sorties, 1 the investment was so strictly kept that it was with great 
difficulty that, at length, a Numidian soldier, who volunteered the 
service, was able to carry a message to Hannibal imploring help. 
He had to choose between two needs almost equally pressing. To 
take the citadel of Tarentum was necessary in order to acquire a 

Fain i large and safe harbour ; while the loss of Capua involved that of all 
£ Campania. He decided, however, to relieve Capua first, because he 
found that the eyes of all Italian peoples were fixed on it, and that 
on its fate depended the side which they would take. He hastened 
to Tifata with a picked body of men, in advance of his heavy-armed 
and baggage, and concealed himself in one of the valleys until he 
had communicated with the besieged garrison, in order that a sortie 
from the town might be made simultaneously with his own attack. 
The accounts which Livy followed differed as to the nature and 
importance of the struggle ; but it seems clear that, though Hannibal 

i»]i I eventually withdrew his men, the Romans could not pursue. Ap. 
Claudius, the proconsul, was severely wounded, and one of the Roman 

rr^i \ camps nearly taken. 

mi 1 Still, both Hannibal and the Campanians had lost heavily, and 211. Coss. 

2^1 the Roman lines of investment were not broken. It was reported, ^^'• 

also, that the new consuls were, before going to their provinces, to '" ^"'-^ 
undertake operations near Capua, which might cut Hannibal off from ,fiaius, P. 
retreat. He accordingly determined on a bold stroke, — no less than Sulpicius 
an advance upon Rome itself. Even if he effected nothing against the Cialba 
city, he expected to cause so much alarm that at least one of the ^<^ximus. 
proconsuls would be recalled, and the strain on Capua be lessened. 
A hardy Numidian made his way into the town with a letter, bidding 
the garrison not to be alarmed at his departure, for he was gone to 
Rome to divert the Roman legions from Capua. Seizing a number 
of boats on the Volturnus, he got his army across the river on the 

' It is said that the disasters of the Roman cavalry led to a change in the army. 
The rorarii (light-armed) had to accompany the cavalry, each horseman carrying 
one of them behind him on to the field ; and henceforth it was found convenient 
to mix them with the several maniples, instead of forming them in a separate 
corps with separate officers. They were only after that officially called velites (Livy 
xxvi. 4). though Livy loosely uses the term before for what were properly called 
rorarii (see p. 216). 



^ 



348 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



march on 
Rome, 

211. 



Hannibal s fifth day after his arrival before Capua, and was soon in full march 
along the line of the via Latifia, though often diverging from it, and 
being careful to avoid towns and strong places. His only stoppages 
were caused by the need of rest or supplies. Thus, after leaving 
Cales, his first point north of the Volturnus, we hear of a two days' 
halt at the foot of Mount Casinum, and another of perhaps somewhat 
longer duration in the territory of Fregellae, where the road twice 
crosses the winding Liris by bridges which the inhabitants had broken 
down, thereby causing the enemy some delay, but bringing upon 
themselves a more severe devastation. Having effected the two 
crossings, he kept along the same line of road till he came under the 
walls of Tusculum. The Tusculans closed their gates, and Hannibal, 
having no means or time for assault or siege, pressed onwards. He 
now, however, quitted the line of the Latin road, and, turning to the 
right, descended upon Gabii. He was thus about thirteen miles from 
Rome by the via Prae?iestina. From this point Livy's account is 
very difficult to follow. Hannibal is said to have entered the territory 
of the Pupinian tribe, and to have pitched a camp on the Anio, only 
three miles from the city, from which position he rode up to the 
walls with a few horsemen, and surveyed them from the Colline gate 
to the temple of Hercules. If so, he must afterwards have crossed 
to the right bank of the Anio, and recrossed it from his camp to 
offer battle. 1 

Meanwhile at Rome the utmost alarm prevailed. News of 
Hannibal's advance had been hastily sent by Fulvius Flaccus, and 
the Senate had bidden him use his discretion whether he could come 
to the city without risking the siege of Capua, which was not to be 
abandoned.2 But before it was known at Rome what he meant to 
do, a messenger arrived from Fregellae, who had travelled night and 
day with tidings of Hannibal being already on the Liris. Though 



Prepaj-a- 
tions at 
Rome. 



^ The position on the right bank of the Anio is more easy to understand if 
we accept Polybius's account, who sends Hannibal to Rome " through Samnium, " 
which would bring him to the right bank of the Anio by the via Salaria or via 
Nojnentana. But the fragment of Polybius (ix. s) is a very brief summary ; and he 
seems to have adopted the error, shared by Coelius, of confounding Hannibal's 
line of march to Rome with that of his return. It seems difficult to believe that 
in an expedition, in which so much depended on speed, he should have gone 
so far round, or that the first news received at Rome of his march should have 
been his appearance on the Anio. To make Livy's account possible, we have to 
assume that, after leaving Gabii, and surveying the walls, Hannibal crossed the 
Anio, so as to have that river between his camp and the enemy. 

2 Some difficulty has been also made about this, as though there was not time 
for the communication. But the via Appia was open, and the distance to Rome 
(124 Roman, about 112 English miles) could be done by a horseman probably in 
two days, while Hannibal was marching with several divergences and halts along 
the via Latina (145 Roman, about 130 English miles). 



XXIV HANNIBAL AT THE WALLS OF ROME 349 

this intensified the alarm, neither people, Senate, nor magistrates 
were wanting to their duties, and active preparations were made for 
defence. The new levies, some of them destined for Spain, and 
others for Macedonia, were in the city, and were now at the disposal 
of the consuls. They were farther encouraged by the arrival of 2000 
troops from Alba Fucentia, who had hurried to Rome when they 
heard of Hannibal's march, and by the news that Q. Fulvius was on q, Fulvius 
the way from Capua, along the Appian road, with a considerable arrives at 
detachment. He would be certain to outstrip Hannibal ; for not only ^^^^. 
was the distance shorter than that by the Latin road ; but, as he was ^^^' 
marching through friendly towns and country, the people of which 
were eager to assist him, he was not obliged to stop to collect pro- 
visions or levy contributions. By the time that he arrived at the Porta 
Capena it was known that Hannibal had left the Latin road, and 
was approaching Rome along the line of the Anio. He therefore 
marched through the city, and with the consuls encamped between 
the Colline and Esquiline gates. 

The battle which Hannibal offered, crossing the Anio from his Hannibal 
camp, is said to have been twice prevented by violent storms, although dis- 
I on each day the weather cleared immediately on his return to camp, ^ouraged. 
! This seemed to be ominous of failure, as though his attempt were 
' displeasing to the gods ; and he was still more irritated and depressed 
to find that he was making no serious impression on the confidence 
of the people. In spite of his presence the contingent of troops was 
\ despatched to Spain, and he was told that the very meadow on which 
' he was encamped had been put up to auction, and purchased at its full 
I value. He retaliated, indeed, by offering for sale the silversmiths' or 
I bankers' stalls round the Forum ; but in fact he made up his mind 
; that an assault upon Rome was hopeless ; and that all he could do 
I was to return to Capua with his immense booty, in hopes of being in 
I time to take advantage of the absence of Fulvius and his army. He 
I retired, therefore, towards the river Tutia, a tributary of the Anio. 
I But a return by the direct route by which he had come was not Hantiibal's 
j easy. The consul Publius Sulpicius had caused the bridges to be return. 
j broken down along the Anio, and Hannibal had to march higher 
j up the river in search of a ford, the consul marching parallel 
I to him up the left bank. Fording a stream in the presence of an 
j enemy, though protected by his Numidian cavalry, his army suffered 
(considerably, and a great part of the booty was recovered by the 

1 Romans, who hung upon the rear of the retreating army, — keeping 
on higher ground indeed, and only cutting off stragglers, but yet 
annoying Hannibal so much that, at the end of five days, he suddenly 
(turned upon his pursuers, inflicted a severe loss upon them, and 
drove the rest back to their camp. But he could take no immediate 



350 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Hannibal 
does not 
return to 
Capua. 



Fall of 
Capua, 

211. 



Punish 
inent of 
Capua 



advantage of this success, beyond continuing his retreat through 
Samnium unmolested. He had now learnt that his movement had 
failed to raise the siege of Capua. Appius had never quitted his 
position, and Fulvius had returned thither with all speed. He there- 
fore made for the west coast by Reate, Amiternum, and over the 
Apennines into the territory of the Marrucini. From this point down 
into Apulia he was marching through territory for the most part in 
his interests or subject to his power ; and he consoled himself for the 
loss of Campania, which he was thus abandoning, by a dash into 
Bruttium, to secure Rhegium as compensation for the harbours of 
Campania. His march was so rapid, and his presence thus far south 
so unexpected, that he all but took the town, and, at any rate, 
thoroughly wasted the territory, and captured many of the inhabitants. 
But Rhegium stood firm ; and Hannibal was again compelled to look 
for the harbour, which it was imperatively necessary that he should 
have on the Italian coast, to the chance of taking the citadel at 
Tarentum. 

Meanwhile Capua, deprived of its last hope, had nothing but 
surrender and punishment to expect. So deeply did the people feel 
that they had sinned beyond forgiveness, that a message from Flaccus 
again offering amnesty to any citizen who, before a fixed day, trans- 
ferred himself to the Roman camp met with no response. They pre- 
ferred the desperate chance of the ofificers of the Punic garrison being 
yet able to communicate with Hannibal, and induce him to come once 
more to their rescue. But the Carthaginian emissaries were inter- 
cepted, and sent back into the town, scarred with Roman rods and 
with their hands cut off. The desperate people turned to the nobles, 
whom their internal disputes had reduced to impotence, but could 
get no help from them. Vibius Virius, who had been the author of 
the revolt, had nothing better to offer than to invite all members of 
the Senate to a final banquet, to be followed by a common draught 
of poison. Even for that the dispirited senators had not the 
courage. Seven -and -twenty only appeared to share the poisoned 
cup : the rest sent messengers to the Roman camp, offering uncon- 
ditional surrender. Next day the gates were thrown open ; the Car- 
thaginian garrison were made prisoners ; and the members of the 
Senate were ordered to proceed to the camp, where they were at 
once cast into chains. All arms were given up, and all gold and 
silver handed over to the quaestors. 

The punishment to be inflicted on the town was referred by 
Fulvius Flaccus to the Senate. But he at once proceeded to wreak 
vengeance on the Capuan senators. Twenty-five of them were at Cales, 
twenty-eight in Teanum. He proceeded to both these places, con- 
demned the men, and witnessed their execution, without waiting, accord- 



XXIV THE SETTLEMENT OF CAMPANIA 351 

ing to one story, for the answer of the Senate, or even refusing to open 
it at the moment of the execution ; and according to another, avaiHng 
himself of a clause in the answer which seemed to leave the matter to 211. 
his discretion. For the rest a senatiis consultiwi^ passed after con- ^^"^^"^ 
siderable discussion, ordained that the town of Capua was to be ^^ Cam- 
left standing, but its people wholly removed. Some of the nobles pafiis, 
were reserved in custody of Latin towns, the rest of the citizens Livy xxvi. 
were sold as slaves. The territory was made public land, in which -34- 
Roman tenants {aratores) were to be settled. Public buildings were 
to be the property of the Roman people. The town was for the 
present to be occupied by freedmen, artisans, and such others as, 
not being citizens, had not shared in the guilt. They were to have 
no local magistrates, no assemljly, no corporate existence ; but a 
-praefectus was to be sent annually from Rome to administer justice 
{juri dicu7ido). As to the cities lately under the jurisdiction of The other 
Capua — in them distinctions were made between whole towns, Campan- 
families, and even individuals, according to the ascertained extent ^"^^ towns. 
of their loyalty or treason. Those who had not themselves, or whose 
parents had not been in the enemy's camp, were to be free, but 
to be for ever debarred from either the full Roman citizenship or 
Latinitas. All who had been in Capua when its gates were closed 
to the Romans were, within a fixed date, to remove north of the Tiber. 
Those who, without being in Capua or other revolted towns, had yet 
not openly joined the Romans, were to live north of the Liris. Those 
who had come over to the Roman camp before Hannibal's arrival 
might hve between the Volturnus and the Liris. No one, to which- 
ever of these categories he belonged, was to have house or land 
within fifteen miles of the sea. Those removed beyond the Tiber 
were not to acquire property or build houses except at Veii, Sutrium, 
or Nepete, or hold more than sixty jugera of land. The property 
of all who had held office at Capua, Atella, or Calatia was to be sold. 
The material prosperity of Capua soon revived, but it remained a 
mere market town without local government {pngt(s or co?id/iabuIinii) 
until the Social war (90), or perhaps till made a colony by Julius 
Caesar in 59. The Campanian plains, in spite of agrarian laws, 
remained agcr pub lieu s^ paying a rent to the State, till Caesar settled 
citizens and veterans on them with freehold allotments. 

For the next two years the war in Italy centred round the citadel 2io-2og. 
of Tarentum, The obstinate defence of it by M. Livius, whose Tarentum. 
negligence had lost the town, was of grave detriment to Hannibal. 
City after city returned to its allegiance, and Hannibal was unable 
to detach sufficient troops to restrain or punish them. And though 
a fleet of Roman ships, which endeavoured to victual the citadel, was 
scattered by some Tarentine vessels under Democrates ; and though 



352 



HISTORY OF ROME 



2IO. 

Coss. M. 
Clauduis 
Marcellus 
IV. , M. 
Valerius 
Laevinus. 



Three days 
fighting 
near 
Canusium, 

20(p. 



Q. Fabiris 
Max. v., 
Q. Fulvius 
Flacciis 
IV. 2og. 

Fabius 
retakes 
Tarentum. 



Hannibal 
too late to 
save 
Tarentum. 



Cn. Fulvius the proconsul was defeated and killed by Hannibal at 
Herdonea, Marcellus, who had taken Salapia, was still confident. He 
followed Hannibal over the borders of Lucania, and at Numistro, near 
Volcentum, fought him without failure, if without marked success, 
following him to Apulia as he retired on the night after the battle. So 
also when next year the veteran Fabius resolved to attempt the 
recovery of Tarentum and the relief of the citadel, Marcellus was able 
to keep Hannibal in play and cover the attack. Of the three days' 
fighting at Canusium, the result of the first was doubtful ; and though 
Hannibal gained a partial victory on the second day, both suffered 
so severely on the third, that Hannibal broke up his camp in the 
night and again retired to Bruttium ; while Marcellus retreated to 
Venusia, from which he did not venture out again for the rest of 
the summer. 

Meanwhile the consul Q. Fulvius was recovering the Hirpini, the 
people of Volceium, and other Lucanians, who dismissed their Punic 
garrisons and accepted his clemency : and Fabius was steadily advanc- 
ing on Tarentum. He had already taken a town of the Sallentini when 
the commander of the Bruttian garrison placed in Tarentum by 
Hannibal offered to betray the town to him. The intrigue was con- 
ducted by a Bruttian serving in the Roman army, whose sister was 
beloved by the commander ; and its result was to allow the Romans 
to scale the wall unresisted where the Bruttian guards were stationed. 
Some stand was made by the Tarentines in the Forum ; but when 
their leaders fell, an indiscriminate slaughter of Tarentine and 
Carthaginian began, and those citizens who survived, to the number 
it is said of 30,000, were sold into slavery. Besides the price of 
these captives vast stores of silver and gold and works of art fell 
into the hands of the victors. The deportation of these last to 
Rome does not appear to have been so complete as at Syracuse, for 
Fabius exclaimed contemptuously, " Let us leave them their angry 
gods " ; but a colossal Hercules was transferred to the Capitol, and 
probably a large proportion of other statues and pictures.^ 

While this severe blow to his hopes was being struck, Hannibal 
himself was far off at Caulonia, which he had relieved from a siege 
undertaken at the suggestion of Fulvius, by a mixed force of free- 
booters and Bruttians collected in the previous year by Laevinus at' 
Rhegium. Hearing of the danger of Tarentum, he hastened thither, 
but found that all was over ; and, retiring slowly to Metapontum, 
tried to tempt Fabius into an ambush by means of a feigned offer 
from the Metapontines to surrender. But when the day came for 

^ Plutarch {Marc. xxi. ) expressly contrasts his conduct with that of Marcellus, 
and the same is implied in Fab. xxii. and Livy xxvii. 16. Yet it may be that he only 
spared what it was inconvenient to take (Pliny A^. H. xxxiv. § 40, Strabo 6, 3, i). 



XXIV HANNIBAL CONFINED TO LUCANIA 353 

Fabius to go the omens were unfavourable, the haruspex warned him 
against " the fraud of the enemy," and Fabius did not start ; and 
catching some of the Metapontine agents sent to inquire the reason, 
forced them by threats of torture to confess. For the rest of the season 
Fabius pursued his old waiting game, and Marcellus had not suffi- 
ciently recovered from his three days' battle with Hannibal to venture 
from Venusia. Fabius's success at Tarentum shielded him from the 
discontent at Rome at the slow progress of the war, but Marcellus 
was vehemently assailed as prolonging it for his private advantage. 

He defended himself triumphantly and was re-elected consul 208. Coss. 
for the fifth time ; though the difficulties thrown in his way by the ^'^^• 

pontifices show the animus of his enemies. However, great ^J^'^^'^'^f 
^ . J ^ , . ^ . ^ Marcellus 

exertions were made. 1 wenty-one legions were on foot ; in every y j^ 

direction the war was to be maintained. Marcellus returned to Venusia Qidnctius 

with a reinforcement ; and the consuls were eager to distinguish Crispinus. 

their year of office by the final expulsion of Hannibal from Italy. 

And this seemed now far from unlikely. The fall of Capua had cut 

him off from Campania, the recapture of Tarentum from Apulia. 

He seems to have been almost confined to south Lucania, and to 

have depended chiefly on Croton and other Greek cities of the 

coast. The consul Crispinus, who had succeeded to the command of 

Fabius's army, wished to emulate his achievement at Tarentum by 

the capture of Locri, one of the chief of these Greek cities. But Hannibal 

Hannibal moved down to relieve it and was already encamped on the ^'^ ^^^ 

Lacinian promontory. Crispinus abandoned the siege to effect a ^-^'^^"^^" 

junction with Marcellus starting from Venusia. This was effected ^^^^^"^ 

between Venusia and Bantia ; but the combined army could not 

move southwards upon Locri, because Hannibal, who had followed, 

was encamped a few miles off. They endeavoured, however, to 

promote the siege by ordering L. Cincius to come from Sicily, and 

by obtaining a detachment from Tarentum. The latter was 

intercepted by some of Hannibal's troops who lay in wait for it on 

the road from Tarentum ; and the consuls themselves soon fell into 

a similar snare. 

There was a wooded knoll between the Roman and Carthaginian 
camps which seemed to the Romans a good basis of attack if properly 
occupied. Before doing this, however, the consuls started to recon- Deaih of 
noitre it personally, accompanied by a small body of cavalry and by two Marcellus. 
or three officers, among whom was the consul's son M. Marcellus. 
But Hannibal had also observed the advantages of the post, and had 
taken care to station near it some of his Numidian cavalry : or, as 
Polybius says, the Numidian cavalry, whose constant duty it was to 
be lying in wait to cut off skirmishers, happened on that day to be 
concealed at its foot. As soon as their scouts told them that a body 

2 A 



354 HISTORY OF ROME 



of the enemy were coming over the brow of the hill, they ascended by 
a more circuitous route and got between the consuls and their camp. 
Finding that they were after all but a small party, they charged them 
down hill. The consul Claudius with many more was killed, his 
son and the other consul Crispinus were wounded, and the sur- 
vivors with difficulty regained the camp. 
Character Thus fell Marcellus, a great soldier if not a great man. His 

of Marcel- character was a subject of dispute among his contemporaries, and 
his achievements were very early depreciated. He represents a 
class of Roman officers which was about to be superseded by another 
more cultivated if not more able. The friends and admirers of the 
Scipios could see little that was admirable in a man whose soldier- 
like roughness and perhaps cruelty were not relieved by the dis- 
criminating taste for art and literature which was becoming the 
fashion. Polybius indeed, the friend and panegyrist of the Scipios, had 
learnt from them to disbelieve entirely in his victories over Hannibal ; 
yet though they were doubtless made the most of in his son's 
His con- laudatio^ on which the accounts in Livy and Plutarch may have been 
tests tvith founded, it seems certain that, if he did not beat Hannibal, he 
anni a . ^-^^-^^^^^ q^ every occasion to avoid disastrous defeat himself If 
he did not win a Zama, neither did he lose a Cannae. A Roman 
generg.1 who in a contest with Hannibal left the result only 
doubtful did in effect win a victory. For to Hannibal time and impres- 
sion were everything. If he was to have any hope of keeping his 
position in Italy his career of victory must be unbroken. Every 
month which saw him only at a standstill encouraged cities to fall off, 
diminished an army which was hardly ever recruited from home, and 
brought him nearer to the end of his resources. Certainly the so- 
called victory on the third day's fighting at Canusium was such 
that the victor had to let the conquered general move off unopposed, 
and was obliged to shut himself up within walls for the remainder 
of the season. Still Hannibal did withdraw for the time, and made 
no farther attack. He had destroyed no Roman army, and had 
His con- gained no fresh adherent. Nor were the severities in Sicily shocking 
duct hi to the feelings of the time : the execution at Leontini of 2000 Roman 
btcily. deserters was not much worse than that of the garrison of Rhegium in 

the previous war ; and the massacre at Enna — of which he was not 
the author, although he expressed approval of it — might have been 
defended on the grounds of necessity, in the case of a populace 
determined on defection. His reputation indeed at Rome suffered 
less from any of these things than from the imprudence which cost 
him his life ; and those who could not deny him the merit of a 
brave and successful soldier, could plausibly refuse him the reputation 
of a careful general. Hannibal himself did not undervalue him : 



XXIV HASDRUBAL COMING FROM SPAIN 355 

and gave evidence of his respect by being careful that his body 
should receive decent burial. 

Hannibal now made one last attempt in Apulia. He used the 20S. 
signet ring of the dead consul tb induce the people of Salapia to open Hannibal's 
their gates as though to Marcellus. Previous information, however, '/^f ^• 
had reached the Salapians and the ruse failed. He approached 
the town : his first line of Roman deserters called out in Latin to 
the sentries to " open to the consul," The portcullis was slowly 
hauled up, the Roman deserters rushed in, — suddenly it fell with a 
crash. The faithless Romans were trapped and easily killed ; while 
the rest of Hannibal's army was overwhelmed by every kind of 
missile and weight from the walls, and had to retire. He returned, 
however, unmolested and raised the siege of Locri. 

Still he was in a situation which admitted but one solution. He 2ot. Coss. 
must be reinforced with men and money, or he must abandon all ^-^i'^i^*^ 
but the southern extremity of Italy and perhaps Italy itself. It jj ^ 
was therefore with keen anxiety that he looked forward to being ciajidius 
joined by his brother Hasdrubal, who was said at length to be on his Nero. 
way from Spain with an army and a great sum of gold to hire 
mercenaries. The rumour of his coming caused corresponding Hasdrubal. 
anxiety at Rome. The two consuls for 207 were M. Livius Salinator, 
who had in 219 distinguished himself in the war in Illyricum, but 
had been (it seems unjustly) condemned for malversation in dealing 
with the spoil, and had retired to the country in dudgeon, and C. 
Claudius Nero, who had served as legatus under Marcellus at 
Canusium. The two men were at enmity ; but yielded to the advice 
of Fabius Maximus and the remonstrances of the Senate to lay 
aside their private quarrel in the interests of the State. They were 
assigned separate provinces. To Livius was allotted the north of Italy, 
to oppose Hasdrubal ; to Claudius the command in south Italy, against 
Hannibal. They were allowed to select for their service any of the 
legions then on foot, and to " supplement " them by fresh levies at 
their discretion. Every effort was made that the consuls should be 
early in the field ; but even so, before they had started, letters were 
received at Rome from the praetor L. Porcius, who was in Cis-Alpine 
Gaul, announcing that Hasdrubal was on his way. 

He quitted Spain late in 209, leaving his brother Mago and 
Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, in charge. He had been unable to cross the 
eastern Pyrenees, as Hannibal had done, because the Romans held \og and 
the north-eastern corner of Spain. He therefore crossed into south- remains in 
western Gaul, and spent the year 208 there, going apparently as South 
far north as the Arverni (Auvergne), collecting allies and hiring 
mercenaries. He probably crossed the Alps by a comparatively easy 
pass, either that of Mont Gen^vre or Col de I'Argentiere. At any rate, 



Hasdrubal 
crosses the 
Pyrenees, 



Gaul, 208. 



356 



HISTORY OP^ ROME 



Crosses the 
Alps early 
in 207. 



Early 
summer of 
207. 

Fighting at 
Grumen- 
tum. 



The 

messengers 
of Hasdru- 
bal inter- 
cepted. 



Nero s 
plan. 



he did not suffer as Hannibal had done. He must have crossed 
somewhat early in the season ; but he had friendly natives all the 
way, and probably better information and guidance ; and accordingly 
he arrived in Italy sooner than either the Romans or Hannibal 
expected him. Moving down the valley of the Po, unfortunately 
for his own success, he was induced to spend a considerable time in 
attempting to reduce Placentia, instead of pushing on to Ariminum. 

Meanwhile Hannibal had drawn his troops from their winter 
quarters, and had advanced to Grumentum, in the centre of Lucania, 
and pitched his camp close to its walls. The consul Claudius Nero 
was at Venusia, connected with Grumentum by a good road, a distance 
of about fifty miles. Carefully reconnoitring in advance, the Roman 
came down this road, and pitched his camp about a mile from that 
of Hannibal, with a stretch of plain between. No regular battle took 
place, but after several skirmishes, one of which nearly amounted to 
a battle, he arranged an ambuscade whereby he inflicted something 
like a defeat upon Hannibal. He, however, lost i 500 men in the 
fight, and Hannibal was able to elude him and march off in the night 
towards Venusia, in the very direction from which the consul had 
come. Thither Nero followed, and another skirmish took place, in 
which the Carthaginians lost heavily, and retired on Metapontum. 
Still Hannibal was able with reinforcements obtained there once 
more to advance on Venusia and Canusium, Nero following on his 
heels, but not venturing to attack him. 

But greater events were at hand. Four (iallic horsemen were 
galloping down south, and hearing that Hannibal was retiring towards 
Metapontum, endeavoured to follow him there. But they lost their 
way, and found themselves at Tarentum instead. They were caught 
by a Roman foraging party and taken to the propraetor Q. Claudius, 
Threatened with torture, they confessed that they were carrying a 
letter from Hasdrubal to Hannibal, and were immediately sent to the 
consul Nero. The despatch announced that Hasdrubal was on his 
march from Ariminum, and expected Hannibal to meet him in 
Umbria. After sending a message home urging that a force be 
posted at Narnia, which commanded the road through Umbria to 
Rome, Nero resolved upon a step, which though it involved the 
irregularity of leaving his province, would, if successful, bafifle 
Hasdrubal and destroy Hannibal's hopes. This was to march away 
without Hannibal's knowledge, and join Livius in resisting Hasdrubal, 
whom he had already met in Spain and had reason to respect. 

He left men to defend his camp and keep up appearances, and 
starting by night, sent forward a message to Livius announcing his 
approach. His soldiers had been eager to volunteer, and the Italian 
allies on the route aided him with enthusiasm. Livius was near Sena, 



XXIV NERO JOINS HIS COLLEAGUE NEAR SENA 357 

with Hasdrubal within a mile of him ; and, that his enemy might not 
know that he had been reinforced, he sent a message to Nero begging 
him to march into camp by night. On his arrival he would have 
had him wait some days to ' refresh his men ; but Nero's plan 
demanded haste. He wished to defeat Hasdrubal, and march back 207. 
to his camp at Venusia before Hannibal was aware of his absence. Ro^^n 
The praetor L. Porcius Licinus who had been hanging on -^""''^^^ 
Hasdrubal's rear, keeping on high ground, and annoying the enemy, Metaurus. 
had joined a few days before ; so that the Romans probably had at 
least six legions, or about 60,000 men. The council of war after a 
long debate decided on immediate action ; the signal was given on 
the day after Nero's arrival, and the troops drawn out for battle. 

Hasdrubal's experienced eye at once detected what had happened. Hasdrubal 
He noticed the signs of a long march in the worn arms and the thin ^^'^^\ ^° 
horses of troops which he had not seen before, and noted the ^^l^^^^ 
increased numbers. Yet he could not discover that the camps were 
enlarged, or increased in number. As before, there was the consul's 
camp and the praetor's. But he had had experience of Roman discipline 
in Spain, and he noticed that in the consul's camp two trumpets 
sounded to arms instead of one ; and he knew that this indicated the 
presence of the other consul. What if it also indicated that Hannibal 
had been conquered and perhaps slain ? Or that his letter had been 
intercepted by the Romans 1 Overcome with anxiety, he ordered 
instant preparations for breaking up the camp and marching away 
by night. In the confusion of the darkness his guides deserted, and He fails to 
when day broke he found himself still on the south bank of the cross the 
Metaurus marching up stream in search of a ford which he seemed ^^t<^^^^' 
to have no chance of finding. The banks of the river seemed to get 
higher and higher the farther he got from the sea, and the windings 
of the stream kept him so long on the march without accomplishing 
any sensible distance that the enemy had time to catch him up. 

Wearied and harassed by their attacks, he tried to fortify a camp Hasdrubal 
on some rising ground near the river. But both consuls were now stands at 
upon him, and he was forced to fight. Thus caught at a disadvantage, ^"-y- 
he showed high qualities both as a tactician and a soldier. He 
availed himself of some rough hilly ground to place the Gauls on his 
left out of danger of attack by the Roman right commanded by Nero ; 
while his right and centre (in which he took post himself), having 
a somewhat narrow ground to cover, were more than usually deep, 
and were protected by a line of elephants, immediately behind whom 
were his brave Ligurian allies ; while his extreme right, engaged with 
the Roman left, consisted of his veterans from Spain, who had often 
fought with Romans before. 

The battle began by a charge of elephants. For a time they threw 



358 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Battle 
of the 
Metaurus, 
207. 



Nero's 
return 
south. 



Joy at 
Rome. 



the Roman antisignani into confusion and made them give ground ; 
but presently in the heat of the combat these animals became 
unmanageable, and as usual did as much harm to their masters as 
to the enemy. Nevertheless the struggle was violent and protracted, 
and the loss on both sides severe. It was finally decided by a move- 
ment of Nero. He had in vain tried to get at the Gauls on the 
enemy's left. They were too securely protected by the rough ground 
to be reached in front ; and after some fruitless efforts he suddenly 
wheeled his men to the left and executed a flank movement on the 
rear of the whole line, marching steadily to the left, past the Roman 
left flank, till he found himself in a position to charge the veterans 
and Ligurians on the rear and flank ; and even reached the Gauls on 
the enemy's left. Hasdrubal's army had made a gallant fight, but 
many were worn out by night-marching and sleeplessness, and were 
now cut down almost without resistance. He himself fought with the 
utmost courage to the last, cheering on his men, encouraging the 
weary, and recalling those who attempted flight ; till, seeing that all 
was lost, he put spurs to his horse, and rushing upon a Roman 
cohort died sword in hand. Ten thousand of Hasdrubal's army fell, 
and a large number were taken prisoner. The spoil also was rich, 
for Hasdrubal had plundered the country, and was conveying large 
sums of gold and silver for his brother's use. As many as 4000 
Roman captives were said to have been released. The Gauls and 
Ligurians in large numbers found means to cross the river and 
escape, Livius refusing to pursue them, that they might carry to 
their countrymen the news of their defeat and of Roman valour. 

On the same night Nero started on his return march, carrying 
with him the head of the brave Hasdrubal, which on his arrival he 
caused to be thrown in front of the Carthaginian lines, while some 
African prisoners were also displayed, and two of them allowed to 
go to Hannibal with the news. The brutality of the treatment of 
Hasdrubal is a contrast, not creditable to Roman feeling, with Han- 
nibal's respectful treatment of the corpse of his great opponent 
Marcellus. The Romans were fighting for life and freedom with an 
invader, and an invader is apt to be regarded as a wild beast rather 
than an honourable enemy. 

Naturally the news was received at Rome with a transport of 
joy. At first people could not believe it, from the intensity of their 
wish that it might be true. It had been felt that a crisis of the 
utmost importance was at hand : if Hannibal were reinforced and 
enriched the war would have to be fought again, and bitter experience 
had proved his superiority in the field to any living Roman. The 
anxiety therefore had been extreme, and the relief was in proportion. 
In the midst of preparation for the supreme effort to save their homes 



tnjiuence 
of the 
battle on 



XXIV EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS 359 

and lives they suddenly found themselves safe from all chance of 
attack, and with hopes— rendered exaggerated by the reaction— of 
driving the dreaded enemy from the land. Nor were they wrong. The 
Hannibal himself at once recognised the gravity of the disaster, and dechive 
withdrawing to Lacinium, concentrated there all his available forces, 
taking with him the Metapontines whom he could no longer protect! ^^^^'^ 
And whether or no he really said, as Livy represents, that he " recog- Hannibal's 
nised the fortune of Carthage," words which Horace has embalmed position. 
in his spirited lines — 

Occidit occidit 
spes omnis et fortuna nostri 

nominis Hasdrubale interempto — 

, the words express a fact. His chance in Italy was over. The war Hannibal 
\ was from that time to be decided in Spain and Africa. Hannibal -^^^^^ ^P 
indeed stayed three more years in Italy ; but he seems to have ''/' ^^.^ 
almost confined himself to his quarters near the temple of Juno on the 
Lacinian promontory, where he left that engraved record of his 
achievements and the numbers of his troops, in Greek and Punic 207-203. 
characters, which Polybius saw^ and copied. 

Even at this low ebb of his fortunes he showed his extraordinary 
I qualities as a commander of men. Without adequate money or 
• means of supply he kept his heterogeneous army together, untroubled 
, by mutiny or serious desertion ; and though he struck no farther 
, blow of any consequence, he remained almost unmolested— a lion at 
j bay whom the hunters dared not stir. It w^as the course of events 
I elsewhere, and the imminent peril of his own country, which did 
I what the Roman armies could not do, and forced him to leave 
(Italy. 



Laciman 
prom 071- 
tory, 



CHAPTER XXV 

SECOND PUNIC WAR Co7lcluded 

■ From the Battle of the Metaurus (207) to the Battle of 
Zama (202) 

Change in the location of the war— Events in Sicily from 210 and settlement of 
the island— The war in Spain from 215 — Recovery of Saguntum— Syphax — 
Fall of the Scipios (212)— Gallantry of L. Marcius— C. Claudius in Spain out- 
witted by Hasdrubal (21 1-2 10)— Character of P. Cornelius Scipio— Elected 
proconsul for Spain (211)- His first year in Spain spent in negotiations (210- 
209)— Capture of New Carthage and release of hostages (209) — Battle of 
Baecula and departure of Hasdrubal for Italy (208)— Battle of Ilipa— Scipio's 
visit to Syphax : his illness, and the mutiny on the Sucro— His interview with 
Masannasa— The defeat of Indibilis and Mandonius (207-206)— Scipio returns 
to Rome (206-205)— Scipio elected consul has Sicily as his province, and 
prepares to invade Africa (205) — The disturbance at Locri and accusations of 
Scipio (205-204) — He crosses to Africa, is joined by Masannasa, and winters 
near Utica (204-203) — Storm and burning of the camps of Hasdrubal and 
Syphax (203)— Hannibal returns to Africa (203)— Negotiations for peace 
broken off— Hannibal's interview with Scipio — Victory at Zama and terms 
imposed on Carthage (202). 

Sicily, When Marcellus quitted Sicily he did not leave it clear of Car- 

2TI-2IO. thaginians. Agrigentum still held out, and was presently reinforced 
from Carthage, which caused the defection of certain Sicel (not 
Greek) towns, such as Morgantia, Hybla, and Macella. They were 
easily reduced by the praetor, and their territory divided among 
Roman adherents. Still the war was not finished, and Marcellus 
was refused a triumph. ^ He was, however, elected consul for the 
fourth time for 210 with Laevinus, lately engaged with Philip of 

^ He was allowed a triumphal procession up the Alban mount, but only an 
ovatio in the city (Livy, xxvi. 21). In the oz'atio there was no chariot or laurel 
crown ; the general entered on foot crowned with myrtle. The locus classicus 
on this subject is Gellius v. 6. Plutarch {Marc. xxii. ) attributes the refusal of a 
triumph to jealousy. But the technical objection was valid (though not always 
maintained) that a general to triumph must bring home his army on the com- 
pletion of a war, and not hand it over to a successor in his " province," 



CHAP. XXV FALL OF AGRIGENTUM 361 

Macedon. The lateness of the return of Laevinus from Greece 210. 
caused a delay in the allotment of provinces, but finally Sicily and Coss. M. 
the fleet fell to Marcellus, Italy to Laevinus. But envoys from Claudius 
Syracuse were in Rome, and they expressed the utmost consternation jy ^^ 
at Sicily being again governed by Marcellus. " He had been Valerius 
ruthless before, what would he be with the knowledge that they Laevinus. 
come to Rome to complain of him ? Better for the island to be 
destroyed by the fires of Etna or sunk in the sea ! " To many at 
Rome indeed, remembering the life-long fidelity of Hiero, the fate of 
Syracuse had seemed cruel in spite of subsequent defections. But 
the envoys could not fairly plead that these defections had been 
wholly the work of their rulers ; and the Senate, after listening to 
them and to Marcellus, confirmed his " acts," while promising in 
general terms to take the fortunes of Syracuse into kindly considera- 
tion. But, however stern in Sicily, Marcellus now proved willing to 
make a graceful concession. He affirmed indeed that the deputation 
had been got up by his personal enemy the praetor M. Cornelius ; 
but before the passing of the decree he had exchanged provinces 
with Laevinus, and undertaken the campaign against Hannibal, 
which was to be his last. 

No warlike movement was made in Sicily until the autumn. Fall of 
When Laevinus at last arrived his first care was to relieve the Agrigen- 
distractions and miseries of Syracuse. He then marched against ^'^"'' "^^• 
Agrigentum, from which Hanno's Numidian cavalry was scouring the 
country. At his approach Hanno was promptly betrayed by Mutines, 
whom Hannibal had sent to take the place of Hippocrates at the head 
of the cavalry. Hanno deprived him of this command, and Mutines 
revenged himself by opening communications with Laevinus, and 
throwing open the gate nearest the sea to the Roman troops. Hanno 
and Epicydes escaped to the beach, and crossed in a small vessel to 
ICarthage ; but the Punic garrison, and such Sicilians as were in 
I arms, were cut to pieces as they endeavoured to fly through the 
[gates ; the leading men in the city were executed, and the other 
"inhabitants sold as slaves : a terrible example which caused the Submission 
ispeedy surrender of twenty other towns, six more being reduced by of Sicilian 
(force. These were treated with greater or less severity according ^^"^' 
'to their conduct, but in all of them Laevinus induced or forced the 
inhabitants to abandon arms and devote themselves to agriculture. 
jSicily was to be the granary of Rome. There was to be no more 
'local independence of small sovereign states, warring with each 

i other or joining external powers. Though certain local laws and 
franchises were retained all were to be under the praetor. One 
element of mischief the consul removed altogether. He took to 
(Italy a mixed crowd of different nationalities, bankrupts, exiles, and 



362 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Sicily 
wholly 
Rom a 71, 

2IO. 



Destruc- 
tion of 
Funic 
ships off 
Lilybaeum , 
207. 



The Will- 
in Spain, 
2iy2o6. 



Division of 
Spain. 



criminals, who to the number of 4000 had been long living on 
plunder at Agathyrna. These we have seen settled near Rhegium, 
and employed in harrying its territory and besieging Caulonia. 

The close of 210 therefore witnessed the final expulsion of the 
Carthaginians from Sicily, and its entire submission to Rome. 
Henceforth its regular military establishment consisted of two legions 
made up of the disgraced survivors of Cannae and Herdonea, kept 
there in perpetuity till the end of the war, without being able to 
count their years of service or enjoying the usual privileges of 
furlough.! Even the naval force was temporarily diminished by 
thirty triremes being sent to Tarentum, while the remainder were to 
make descents upon the African coast. But a permanent reduction 
of the naval force at Lilybaeum was not thought possible until in 207 
Laevinus — who had returned to Sicily in the previous year after the 
recovery of Tarentum, and now had a fleet of 100 vessels — had 
made the seas safe for the corn ships by a decisive victory over the 
Carthaginian ships. He had been ravaging the coast near Utica, 
and on his way back to Lilybaeum fell in with the Punic fleet of 
seventy sail, of which he took seventeen and sunk four. After this 
the winter of 206-205 was uneventful ; the greater part of the fleet 
was taken home, and it was not till P. Scipio's arrival in 205 that 
Sicily again became the scene of military preparations as a stepping- 
stone to Africa. This last was the natural sequel of his achievements 
in Spain, and we must therefore go back to trace the events in that 
count'"y. 

We have already seen that the operations of Gnaeus in 217, and 
of the two brothers Gnaeus and Publius in 216-215, had secured the 
Roman position north of the Ebro. Tarraco was their regular winter 
quarters, and the Roman position there was never seriously in 
danger. The course of the campaigns of the next ten years (2 i 5-206) 
is not clear either as to its chronology or geography, but some 
general facts may be grasped. Spain (excluding Lusitania) may for 
our purpose be roughly divided into three parts : the district north 
of the Ebro ; that between the Ebro and the Saltus Castulonensis 
{Sierra Moreno) ; and that between these mountains and the sea. 
The first, as yet without distinctive name, was inhabited by several 
powerful tribes, of which the chief were the Ilergetes. The second 
— afterwards called Tarraconensis — contained the Celtiberi, Car- 
petani, Oretani, Bastetani, and others. The third — Baetica — we may 
regard as bounded on the west by the Anas {Guadiaiia\ and watered 
by the Baetis {Giiadalquiver\ which divides it almost in half The 



1 Their igno7ninia was farther marked by the censors of 209, who deprived 
the equites among them of the eg ui pub ltd, ordering them to supply their own. 



XXV THE SCIPIOS IN SPAIN 363 

Romans, as has been said, held the first of these districts or part of 
it, but the Carthaginians were supreme in Baetica, The tribes of 
the intervening district joined fimt one side and then the other, as their 
fears or their interest dictated. Some were never subdued by either ; 
some had given hostages to Hannibal or Hasdrubal, and were only 
restrained by fears for them from joining the Romans ; many cared 
for neither, and only wished to be left to their strongholds and 
predatory habits. On the coast of this middle district were the 
cities of Saguntum and New Carthage, and the possession of these 
(especially of New Carthage) was of the first importance as impressing 
the native tribes, and as offering facilities for the advance of the 
Romans from the north or of the Carthaginians from the south. 
Baetica contained rich silver mines (as weW perhaps as New Carthage 
itself), from which the Carthaginians drew the means of supporting 
the war. It was therefore a great object to drive them out of it, and 
in the varied fortunes of the next ten years' war we shall see that, 
when the Romans are most successful, the fighting is on or south of 
the Baetis, and the intervening tribes favour the Roman cause ; 
when the Romans are unsuccessful, the Punic arms force the 
adhesion of the central tribes, and push the war up to the Ebro. 
When the Roman cause is lowest of all, the Ilergetes on the north 
of the Ebro break off. 

The next year and a half was marked l^y an addition to 2/J-2/1. 
the native allies, and by abortive negotiations with Syphax, king i-^^^ 1 1 of the 
of western Numidia, with a view to an invasion of Africa. But ' ''^"^■^• 
it was barren of military achievement. The Carthaginians in- 
creased their forces in Spain ; prevented Syphax from joining the 
Romans by instigating Gala, the father of IVlasannasa, to attack 
him ; and engaged Masannasa himself to take over a body of 
Numidian cavalry. The Romans, on their side, had secured a 
force of 20,000 Celtiberians, and had prevented Hasdrubal's march 
on Italy ; but they found themselves now confronted b\' three 
powerful armies, and it was not until late in 212 that they deter- The three 
mined to attack them. Mago and Hasdrubal, son of C^isco, were Punk 
close together ; Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, was separated by a «'''""• 
considerable distance from the other two. (Geographical details are 
quite uncertain, but it seems that all three were at no great distance 
from the Ebro, which in itself shows that the previous inactivity of 
the Scipios had been compulsory. The\- now decided to make a 
simultaneous attack on the two Carthaginian positions. Publius, 
with two-thirds of the army, was to attack Mago and Hasdrubal 
Gisconis ; (inaeus, with the rest of the veterans and the Celtiberian 
allies, Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar. But as Gnaeus approached the 
enemy the Celtiberians were tampered with by Hasdrubal, and 



364 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Publius 
falls, 
212. 



Gnaeus 
falls. 



Heroism 

ofL. 

Marcius. 



suddenly abandoned the Roman camp ; and nothing remained for 
the weakened army but retreat, which Gnaeus at once attempted, 
followed closely by the enemy. Publius was still more unfortunate, 
or imprudent in his choice of ground. He found himself harassed 
by Masannasa's cavalry, of whose arrival in Africa he seems not to 
have known ; his fatigue parties were cut off, and he was kept in 
constant alarm and want of necessaries. To make matters worse, 
he heard that Indibilis was on his way with 7500 Suessetani to 
join Mago. He resolved to quit his camp and intercept this rein- 
forcement. It was a desperate move, for unless he eluded Mago's 
observation he would be between two hostile forces, away from the 
protection of his camp. And, in fact, when he had all but defeated 
Indibilis, he suddenly found his rear attacked by the Numidian 
cavalry. Thus caught he exerted himself gallantly, but before long 
fell mortally wounded. For the heavy -armed soldiers to escape 
cavalry was impossible, and nightfall alone prevented the slaughter 
from being complete. Happily for the survivors the Carthaginians, 
instead of pursuing, hurried away next morning to join Hasdrubal 
son of Hamilcar against Gnaeus. This junction was not effected for 
about three weeks, but yet before Gnaeus had heard of his brother's 
fall. He divined it, however, from observing the increase in the 
enemy's numbers, and endeavoured to retreat under cover of night. 
But the cavalry caught him up, and a slight eminence in a generally 
flat country offered the only hope of defence. There was no time 
for entrenchment ; the packs of the sumpter beasts and other baggage 
were piled up to form a rampart, but soon fell before an enemy 
flushed with victory and confident in superior numbers. Gnaeus 
seems to have fallen almost at the first charge with many of his 
men. The greater part found protection in a neighbouring forest, 
and eventually reached the camp fortified by Publius. 

The Scipios had exercised great influence in Spain, and their 
loss seemed a deathblow to the Roman cause. That the disaster did 
not in fact prove utterly ruinous was due to the energy of L. Marcius, 
a young eques in the army of Gnaeus. He collected the fugitives, 
drew reinforcements from places in which there were Roman 
garrisons, and having effected a junction with Fonteius, whom 
Publius had left in charge of his camp, led the combined army 
across the Ebro and encamped in safety. Hasdrubal Gisconis 
followed, hoping to sweep the Romans out of Spain ; but L. Marcius 
inspired his men with such enthusiasm, exhorting them not to 
lament but to avenge their beloved commanders, that when the 
enemy's bugles were heard, the excited soldiers, almost in spite of 
their leader, burst from the camp upon the foe advancing in loose 
order and expecting an easy prey. The attack was so unexpected 



XXV L. MARCIUS SAVES THE ROMAN ARMY 365 

and desperate that the Carthaginians halted, wavered, and finally 
broke into full retreat. Marcius, with the prudence of a practised Marcms 
commander, exerted himself with voice and hand to prevent pursuit, -^"^^^ ^^^^ 
which might easily have proved fatal to such inferior numbers, and '^'^^^y- 
brought back the excited soldiers into the camp. The Carthaginians, 
who had yielded to a sudden panic, soon recovered themselves when 
they found the pursuit stopped, and returned leisurely to their own 
camp. Livy found various accounts of the subsequent achievements 
of L. Marcius, and prefers that which represents him as capturing 
two Punic camps and killing many thousands of the enemy. But if 
the Carthaginian camps had thus been stormed, we should hardly 
expect the Romans to have been confined, as they were, to a narrow 
district north of the Ebro ; or that there should have been a general 
defection, as there seems to have been, throughout Spain. On the 
other hand, it is clear that Marcius must in some way have checked 
the Carthaginian advance. For when in the late summer of 2 1 1 
the praetor C. Claudius Nero arrived, he found the army encamped 
on the Ebro, and the headquarters at Tarraco undisturbed, and 
, no forward movement on foot on the part of the Punic generals. 
I Nero, destined to be famous afterwards on the Metaurus, effected c. Cland- 
nothing in Spain. He had been sent with a considerable force after ius Nero 
I the fall of Capua, and taking over the army of Marcius advanced 
into Baetica, and succeeded in catching Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar 
I in a wooded valley near Ilitergis, but was outwitted by a pretended 
I negotiation for the evacuation of Spain, while Hasdrubal withdrew 
( his men from their dangerous position. The Senate determined to 
i supersede Nero by some officer of experience. But it was difficult 
* to find any one willing to undertake the task. Spain was now, as 
' later, apt to become the grave of military reputations, and the recent 
fall of the Scipios enhanced the feeling against the undertaking. 
I The ordinary magistrates were perhaps fully employed elsewhere, 
' and at any rate some special appointment was thought necessary and 
I was referred to the comitia. But when the comitia met, no one had 
' given in his name. It was at this crisis that P. Cornelius Scipio, />. Cornel- 
I son of the Publius who had recently fallen in Spain, proclaimed his his Scipio 
\ willingness to undertake the command. He was only twenty-four (^Z' 
' years old, and custom — though no law as yet — confined the consular 
rank to men nearly twenty years older. But Scipio had before bid take the 
I defiance to such restrictions, and had already given proof of courage command. 
and energy. In 218 he had saved his father's life on the Ticinus ; 
in 216 had prevented the contemplated desertion of young nobles 
after Cannae ; and when elected aedile for 2 1 2 had replied to objectors, 
that if all the centuriae named him, that would make him old enough. 
« His good looks and a certain dignified reserve impressed people with 



tn i>patn, 
211. 



lrt- 
canus) 
offers to 



366 HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



confidence, enhanced by the popular behef, which he at least did not 
discourage, that he enjoyed in some special way the favour and 
intimacy of the gods. At times his face was said to glow and his 
whole form to expand, as from divine afflatus, and the soldiers who 
saw him caught some of his enthusiasm and felt assured of victory. 
With all this he was wary and calculating, leaving nothing to chance, 
and taking all precautions of a prudent general. He had also the 
faculty of gaining the respect of equals and enemies. It was chiefly 
owing to him that Masannasa became a firm ally of Rome, that 
Syphax wavered in allegiance to Carthage. From Hannibal himself 
he extorted warm admiration, and upon Prusias and Antiochus exer- 
cised commanding influence. His greatness showed itself in his 
appreciation of good qualities in others. L. Marcius, neglected by 
Nero, was honoured and employed by him, and the disgraced soldiers 
of Cannae were freely admitted to his army of Africa. Though not 
specially connected, like the younger Africanus, with literary men, 
he was highly educated, and represented the more refined and liberal 
class of nobles, as opposed to the party whose typical hero was 
Fabius, and who were displeased even at success if it involved 
breaches of custom or tended to trench on senatorial dignity. Such 
was the man who now came forward with the confidence of youth, 
yet with the gravity becoming his rank. His election was carried 
with enthusiasm. And when doubts arose on account of his age 
and the unfortunate associations attaching to his name in Spain, he 
calmed the feelings of the people by a speech which soothed alarm 
and inspired hope. 
P. Cornel- Late in 2 11, or early in 210, he reached Spain with a reinforce- 

ius Scipio nient of men and ships. But the year 210 witnessed, it seems, no 
in Spam, ^yarlike operations : it was taken up with negotiations and visits to 
allies, whose deputies had waited upon him almost immediately on his 
arrival at Tarraco. However, he did not neglect the army already 
in the country, or show jealousy of L. Marcius. He treated him 
with all honour ; and visiting the men in their quarters, praised them 
for the courage with which they had defended the province and allies; 
and by word and deed inspired that feeling of confidence which in 
war largely contributes to its own fulfilment. He found that he had 
three Carthaginian armies with which to reckon. Mago was in 
the vicinity of Carteia (Gibraltar), Hasdrubal Gisconis at the mouth 
of the Tagus, Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar in Central Spain among 
the Carpetani, — a position of things which shows that Marcius had 
been on the whole successful, which is farther confirmed by the 
fact that Saguntum was still occupied by a Roman garrison and its 
restored inhabitants. Scipio had made careful inquiries as to the 
state of things in Spain before leaving Rome. Still it was not easy 



2ri-2IO. 



XXV SCIPIO RESOLVES TO TAKE NEW CARTHAGE 367 

to decide to what point to direct his attack. If he marched against His plan of 
the nearest of the three, Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar, he might be attacking 
met by a combination of all. Hasdrubal son of Gisco might march ff^\, 
up the Tagus, and Mago through the now friendly tribes of the south, winter of 
If he avoided this and marched south to attack Mago, a junction of 2io-2og 
the two Hasdrubals might shut him off from return. But there was 
one town, the chief seat of Carthaginian power, from which all three 
camps were at a considerable distance, the nearest not less than ten 
days' march. If New Carthage became Roman instead of Car- 
thaginian it would serve as a headquarters as safe as Tarraco, 
commanding the south and the nearest crossing to Carthage. He 
had therefore privately resolved to leave all three generals alone and 
make straight for it. Extreme secrecy was needed lest the Punic 
commanders should anticipate him. During the winter, therefore, 
he quietly informed himself of everything concerning it, the use and 
conveniency of its harbour, the nature of its defences, and the number 
of its garrison. So secure had it seemed to the Carthaginian leaders, 
that though their magazines, their money, and all their Spanish 
> hostages were there, though it was the place of landing for all stores 
I and reinforcements from home, it was only protected by a garrison 
I of 1000 men, while its numerous inhabitants consisted for the most 
j part of mechanics and fishenrien, wholly unaccustomed to arms. 
1 The bay on which New Carthage stood was an indentation of AVtc- 
I about a mile in length, forming a good harbour, and partially closed Carthage. 
I by the island Skombraria. At the bottom of this bay was a Cher- 

isonese, on which were two elevations of 201 and 123 feet respect- 
ively, one called the mount of Asclepius, on the east, and the other 
the mount of Hasdrubal (who had built a palace on it) on the west 
I side. The depression between these two towards the sea was pro- 
tected by a wall. On the north of the town were three hills, which — 
taking them from west to east — were called Mons Saturni (151 feet), 
Mons Aletis (144 feet), and Mons Vulcani (168 feet). The city wall, 
forming a circuit of between two and three miles, followed the line of 
these hills. But besides this, two-thirds of the wall was protected 
by a great inland sea or lagoon (now dry), which, communicating The lagoon. 
with the harbour to the west of the town, swept round the north and 
\ part of the eastern walls, leaving a neck of land of about a third of a 
\ mile in extent. Here was the natural approach to the city, and along 
I this space therefore the walls were lofty and strong. That part of 
them which was washed by the lagoon was comparatively low and 
less carefully guarded, as not being open to escalade. Scipio, how- 
ever, had learnt from native fishermen that at certain states of the 
tide the lagoon was shallow enough to allow an approach to the 
walls, and had a plan ready which he carried out successfully. 



368 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Arrival of 
army and 
fleet at New 
Carthage, 
2og. 



Siege of 

New 
Carthage. 



Sally from 

New 

Carthage. 



Crossing 
the lagoon. 



Laelius, his life-long friend, who alone was in the secret of the 
expedition, was directed to be at New Carthage with the fleet on a 
fixed day, to assist in the assault, and to take off the troops in case 
of failure. The men generally were easily kept in the dark, for the 
veterans were accustomed to march south into Baetica, and when 
Scipio led them across the Ebro there was nothing to show to what 
point their march was directed. The distance between the Ebro and 
New Carthage, about 300 miles, was rapidly accomplished.^ And 
it was not until they were encamped in sight of the city walls that 
Scipio explained to his men the object of their march. 

The fleet under Laelius arrived in the harbour simultaneously 
with the army, and Scipio lost no time in commencing operations. 
His camp was pitched opposite the city gate, in the lofty walls 
which faced to the north-east upon the neck of land between the 
lagoon and the sea. He drew lines of defence on his rear, but left 
the front of his camp open. He was not afraid of the weak garrison 
of the town, but an attack of any of the three Punic generals who 
might arrive to raise the siege must be provided against. Mago, the 
commandant of the Punic garrison, was taken by surprise, but 
organised a resistance with courage and skill. He divided his 1000 
men between the part of the walls attacked by Scipio and the citadel. 
He armed 2000 of the most available of the citizens, and placed 
them at the gates fronting the Romans, ready to sally against the 
enemy, Scipio drew these men out by sending a detachment to 
threaten an escalade, covered by 2000 of his best troops, whom he 
would be able to support all the more promptly that his men would 
not have to file out of a narrow gate, but could start from all parts 
of the camp at once. Their approach to the wall was met by a sally, 
which they repulsed with great loss to the enemy. The garrison had 
advanced a quarter of a mile to attack the besiegers, their supports 
could only come up slowly through the gate, and when beaten back 
they had all to crowd through the same narrow entrance, losing 
almost as many in the crush as on the field. The Romans all but 
forced their way in with the fugitives, and at least were able to fix 
their ladders on the walls, which however proved to be too high and 
well defended to be thus taken. But to the mortification of the 
defenders the attempt, from which towards the afternoon the Romans 
had desisted with some loss, was renewed later in the day. This, 



^ Polybius (x. 11) says that he arrived on the seventh day, without clearly 
stating the point of departure from which he is reckoning. Livy (xxvi, 42) says 
outright "on the seventh day from the Ebro." It is clear that for an army to 
march 300 miles in seven days is practically impossible. Livy is simply copying 
Polybius, and the only solution seems to be to suppose an early corruption in the 
text of the latter. 



XXV FALL OF NEW CARTHAGE 369 

however, was only to cover another movement. IVTen had been 

standing by the side of the lagoon furnished with ladders, and the 

time was now come at which Scipio had learnt that its waters would 

ebb. They were in fact visibly sinking, and he bade the men step The lagoofi 

in without fear and make for the low part of the wall. It was passed. 

successfully scaled and found to be almost deserted, the garrison 

being attracted to the other Roman assault. The few guards met 

by the Roman soldiers, as they made their way along the walls, were 

easily overpowered ; and presently the gates facing the Roman camp, 

already assaulted from without, were reached and forced open. Thus 

the city was in the hands of the Romans, by the aid it seemed of 

that Neptune who, as Scipio had told them, had appeared to him in 

his sleep and suggested the plan. 

Hanno, who had retired to the citadel, presently surrendered on Surrender 
promise of his life, and the indiscriminate slaughter, which had been ofHamw. 
permitted as long as any part of the city held out, was stopped, and ./^ j f 
the soldiers were confined to taking booty. They were ordered to i^g town, 
collect it in the market-place, and to bivouac by it for the night. It 2og. 
was extraordinarily rich. The gold and silver, coined and uncoined, 
with cups and plate, amounted to more than 600 talents (;{![ 144,000), 
and was handed over to the quaestor. But besides this, and a vast 
miscellaneous booty, which was divided among the army, Scipio 
obtained a great store of war material — arms, missiles, and catapults ; 
immense granaries of spelt and barley, 18 vessels of war and 113 
merchant vessels, many of them laden with corn or naval stores, and 
10,000 captives of full age. These last were not sold. Those who 
seemed suitable were drafted into the navy, now increased by the 
addition of the captured vessels ; while those skilled in handicrafts, 
especially armourers and the like, were encouraged to carry on their 
industries under the superintendence of a Roman overseer to each 
thirty of them, with the promise of liberty at the end of the war if 
they deserxed it. At present they were to be slaves, not of any 
individual, but of the Roman people. Laelius was sent home with 
the news, carrying with him Mago and fifteen Carthaginian senators. 
Scipio remained at New Carthage, seeing to the restoration of the 
fortifications, drilling his men, and practising his ships till it was time 
to return to Tarraco. 

The wealth thus olDtained was of great imj^ortance in sparing the Importance 
exhausted treasury at home, but he had also secured a base of opera- of the 
tions in the heart of the enemy's country, which he was converting ^^^"^^ V 
into a " workshop of war " to supply his own needs, while he deprived Cartha^e 
them of their best port and source of supplies. What this did for 
the Roman cause in Spain was shown by the deputations which met 
Scipio on his return march proffering submission and alliance. These 

2 B 



370 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

hostages. 



Impression 

through 

Spain. 



Scipio in 

Baetica, 

208. 



envoys of native tribes were told to meet him at Tarraco, where he 
meant to hold a congress of representatives of Spain north and south 
of the Ebro alike. Scipio had also found at New Carthage a means 
of winning the regard and gratitude of the chiefs. There were 
there 300 hostages, some children, both boys and girls, some young 
men, some grown women. These he treated with fatherly kindness, 
presenting them with suitable presents, and promising them an early 
restoration to their homes, A special appeal for protection against 
the licentiousness of their Carthaginian guards from the wife and 
daughters of Mandonius was courteously answered by Scipio, who 
caused them to be carefully guarded to Tarraco ; and the self-control 
which he exercised in the case of a beautiful girl taken prisoner by 
Roman soldiers, whom he restored to her father without ransom, still 
farther enhanced his reputation among the Spaniards. His winter 
quarters at Tarraco were thronged by chiefs who came to receive their 
relatives and declare their adhesion to the Roman cause. The move- 
ment was begun by Edeco, chief of the Edeloni. But presently it was 
joined also by the leaders of the Ilergetes, Indibilis and Mandonius, 
who were serving in Hasdmbal's camp, but were discontented at the 
overbearing conduct of the Carthaginians. The news of Scipio's 
kindness to Mandonius's wife and daughters confirmed a resolution 
to which they had been coming. They quitted Hasdrubal, and, en- 
trenching themselves separately, waited an opportunity of joining 
Scipio, with whom they were already in communication. 

They accordingly did so when in the following year Scipio 
marched into Baetica to attack Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, who 
seems to have moved there after the fall of New Carthage, to supply 
himself with money from the mines as a preparation for his march 
into Italy, for which the low state of the Carthaginian fortunes in Spain 
made him think the time had come. Hasdrubal neither expected 
nor wished to get away without fighting Scipio, and seems to have 
been desirous of putting this last chance to the test. His camp was 
at Baecula, but on Scipio's approach he shifted his quarters to a 
more favourable position, where his rear was protected by a river and 
his front by a steep ascent. Strong, however, as the position was, 
Scipio attempted to storm it ; and though he did not entirely succeed, 
the result of the fighting seems to have decided Hasdrubal against 
farthet risk. He had sent on his elephants and money towards the 
Tagus to meet Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, and during the night following 
the assault marched after them. But Scipio, though he was able to 
occupy the abandoned camp, had won no such victory as enabled 
him to follow, in the face of two other unconquered armies, which he 
knew to be within a moderate distance. Hasdrubal therefore marched 
off undisturbed towards the lower Tagus, where he effected a junction 



XXV . LAST EFFORTS OF CARTHAGINIANS IN SPAIN 371 

with Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, and Mago. After some rearrange- Hasdrubal 
ment of forces he continued on his way to the western Pyrenees, and goes to 
thence into Gaul, to prepare for his march into Italy which was to Gaul, late 
find its catastrophe on the Metkurus. 

Scipio had thus let his enemy slip, and could only make up for 
this by warning the government at home, as soon as he had ascer- 
tained, by sending horsemen to watch the retiring army, the direction 
of their march. After remaining some time in the camp of Hasdrubal, 
and farther conciliating the Spaniards by dismissing Spanish prisoners winter at 
to their homes, he led his army back to winter quarters at Tarraco. 208-207. 
The remaining Carthaginian generals made no attempt to molest him. 
Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, went to Lusitania to raise fresh recruits, 
and Mago to Cades, a Punic settlement which had now become their 
headquarters and port of landing from Africa, and as yet had had no 
experience of Roman arms. 

The arrangement of events during the next two years (207-206) 207-206. 
is not clear, but as the war was practically brought to a conclusion Gradual 
by the end of 206 it must be that on the whole the Roman arms ««'"^«^^^'/ 
were steadily progressing throughout. P. Scipio first opposed Has- artff;. 
drubal, son of Cisco, in Baetica ; Silanus confronted Mago in Celtiberia; 
and the proconsul's brother, L. Scipio, was among the Bastitani, a 
powerful tribe on the south-east coast. The Carthaginians at home now 
resolved upon a greater effort, A new army was sent to Spain under 
Hanno, which, joining Mago and his Celtiberian allies, was checked 
if not beaten by Silanus ; while L. Scipio took Aurinx near Munda, 
and sufficient success was obtained to warrant his being sent home 
with captives and a triumphant despatch. The Carthaginian cause 
was everywhere failing. Hasdrubal had fallen on the Metaurus : the 
armies in Spain had been steadily pushed southwards, until a small 
district from Cades to Carteia was all they could count their own. 

But another effort was to be made. In the latter part of 207 Battle of 

Masannasa appears to have crossed to Spain again with Numidian ^'''A^. 206. 

cavalry. Mago had been able to raise 50,000 infantry and 4500 

cavalry, for the Spaniards have always shown a curious faculty for 

! renewing a lost war by endless local efforts ; and just when their 

fortunes seemed lowest Mago and Hasdrubal found themselves at 

I the head of a large army. Scipio, who had also obtained reinforce- 

1 ments from a chief named Colichas, marched southward on hearing 

that Hasdrubal had ventured again into Baetica and was encamped 

near IHpa on the Baetis. He pitched his camp near Baecula, and 

after suffering some annoyance from Masannasa's cavalry and spending 

some days in skirmishing, led out his army and offered battle. He 

I distrusted his Spanish troops, however, and took care that the results 

i of the battle should depend upon the Romans. These were placed 



372 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CPAP. 



Effects of 
the battle 
of Ilipa. 



20J-2.06. 
Scipio 
visits 
Syphax. 



on his two wings and advanced at a brisk pace, while the Spaniards 
in the centre were ordered to advance slowly. His two wings therefore 
engaged and defeated the two wings of the enemy, whose men, 
having been forced out of camp very early by the Roman cavalry 
skirmishing up to their lines, were hungr>' and weary. The Car- 
thaginian centre could not aid the wings, because they could see 
Scipio's Spaniards advancing, and yet could not get into contact 
with the enemy. By thus " refusing his centre " Scipio secured that 
the best soldiers of the enemy should never be engaged at all. The 
rout of Hasdrubal's wings infected the centre, and he was soon in 
full retreat. The Romans were said to have been only prevented 
from storming the camp by a violent storm of rain. 

The loss of the battle was followed by the desertion of many of 
their allies, and the wearied Carthaginian soldiers, who had had to 
spend much of the time imperatively needed for rest in strengthening 
their defences, before daylight next morning had abandoned the 
camp and were in full retreat. The Romans followed, hoping to cut 
them off at the passage of the Baetis, to which natives had guided 
them by a shorter route. But Hasdrubal, finding the river closed to 
him, abandoned any attempt to force a passage, and turning south- 
ward made for the coast of the ocean, which was reached, though 
with much loss at the hands of the pursuing cavalr>'. Finding some 
ships ready he made his way to Gades, from which he sent back 
the ships to bring off Mago and some of his men. The great army, 
collected with such pains, was utterly dispersed and broken up. 
Many had perished in the battle and the retreat, many more deserted 
to the Romans, and some of the remainder found refuge in the 
neighbouring towns. But to all effective purposes the Carthaginians 
were now driven from Spain, and Lucius Scipio was again sent home, 
with many captives of rank, to carry the joyful news. 

Between this time and the end of 206 there was indeed some 
fighting with natives, and some difficulties to overcome with the 
Roman army itself. Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, and Mago were still in 
Spain, but they were confined to the island and district of Gades, while 
Adherbal still commanded some ships in its harbour. But Scipio felt 
satisfied that he could leave the rest of the campaign to Silanus, while 
he concerted measures for his great plan of transferring the war to 
Africa'. Returning to Tarraco he sent Laelius with presents to 
Syphax, king of the Massaesylians, to detach him from Carthage, 
and when Laelius reported that he was well inclined but desired to 
negotiate with the general personally, Scipio resolved to go. He 
arrived on the coast of Africa in the dominions of Syphax almost 
simultaneously with Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, who was sailing home 
from Gades. Syphax entertained both with equal courtesy. Scipio 



MUTINY IN THE ROMAN ARMY 



373 



lay on the same couch with Hasdrubal at supper, who was much 
impressed by his digniified courtesy. " Scipio seemed to him," he 
said, " even more admirable in conversation than in war." Syphax 
himself also was won over, or pretended to be so, and made some 
terms with Scipio which were satisfactoiy at the time, though he 
proved in the future a fickle and worthless ally. 

On his return to Spain Scipio found that L. Marcius had reduced Illness of 
Castulo, Illiturgis, Astapa, and other places which had declared for Scipio. 
the Carthaginians, and he 'now celebrated his triumph at New 
Carthage by feasts and gladiatorial shows. But the fatigues of the 
war had been too much for him ; he became seriously ill, and a 
report was circulated of his death. The effect was remarkable. 
Indibilis and Mandonius, whose hopes in joining the Roman alliance indibilis 
had not been fully gratified, led their peoples, the Ilergetes and a?id Man- 
Lacetani, across the Ebro and descended upon central Spain. Even ^'^'^^J^^ 
some Roman troops, stationed on the Sucro to overawe the central 
tribes, growing licentious from long inactivity, broke out into mutiny, Mutiny of 
drove their tribunes out of the camp, and elected two private soldiers Roman 
to command them, who assumed the ensigns of the highest military ^^oops, 
rank. They alleged arrears of pay, and hoped to recoup themselves 
by unrestrained plunder. When the new commanders had for a 
short time enjoyed their power and the men their license, it became 
known that the rumours of Scipio's death were false, and even the 
severity of his illness exaggerated. The feeling of uneasiness and^ 
alarm began to take the place of over-confidence, and presently the 
camp was visited by seven military tribunes, who invited the soldiers 
to come on a fixed day separately or in a body to New Carthage to 
receive their pay, with which Scipio had taken care to provide himself. 
They resolved to go in a body, and were confirmed in their belief 
that the proconsul meant to treat them gently by meeting the advanced 
guard of an army leaving New Carthage for a campaign against 
Indibilis as they arrived at the gates of New Carthage. But, though 
they did not know it, these troops returned to the town in the 
evening ; and their own leaders, to the number of thirty-five, after 
being entertained by officers in the town, had been arrested. At 
daybreak next morning, being summoned to a meeting, they went 
in high spirits, expecting the satisfaction of their demands. Assembled 
I before the tribunal, they found themselves surrounded by the men 
I whom they believed to have left the town : but, though rendered 
uneasy at the sight, they did not know what was really going to 
I happen. Presently Scipio himself appeared in the tribunal and 
j addressed them, and his words must at once have warned them that 
I their high hopes were vain. He pointed out that their alleged 
grievances were groundless ; that the arrears of pay should have 



374 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The ring 

leaders 

punished. 



Mago 
leaves 
Spain for 
Italy. 



been asked for from himself with proper respect and submission ; 
that in any case it did not justify rebelHon against their country and 
joining with her enemies ; that their idea of becoming masters of 
Spain under such leadership as they had adopted was ludicrous ; and 
that their only excuse lay in the fickleness and gullibility of a crowd, 
which, " like the sea which is in itself safe and quiet, but when winds 
fall violently upon it, takes the character of the blasts which lash it 
into fury." Therefore, he concluded, he should pardon them, but 
should show no mercy to the leaders* who had seduced them to 
mutiny. Thunderstruck by the severity of the general, and by the 
sudden clashing of swords and shields from the troops surrounding 
them, the men looked on with silent terror while the thirty-five ring- 
leaders were brought out, stripped, and bound, and submitted to the 
usual military punishment of scourging and beheading. Without a 
word or movement of resistance, the cowed mutineers took the 
military oath of obedience and received the promised pardon. 

Meanwhile L. Marcius had been suppressing some fresh attempts 
of Hanno, an officer of Mago's, in the valley of the Baetis ; and 
Laelius had in vain tried to take advantage of treason from within 
to seize Gades. This failure, with the news of the movement of 
Indibilis, and of the mutiny, had encouraged Mago to send home 
asking for reinforcements. But the Carthaginian government had 
abandoned hope in Spain, and ordered Mago to go by sea to Liguria, 
and create a diversion for Hannibal by rousing the Ligurians and 
^Italian Gauls. He accordingly set sail, furnished with money from 
home and by exactions in Spain, and after touching on the coast 
near New Carthage, from which he was driven by the Roman garri- 
son, and vainly attempting to return to Gades, finally arrived at 
Minorca, and wintered there in preparation for the crossing to Italy 
in the spring. 

Scipio was to go home at the end of 206 ; but had still to repress 
Indibilis and Mandonius. A fourteen days' march brought him from 
New Carthage into the valley of the Ebro, where the Ilergetes appear 
to have been easily defeated, though Mandonius and Indibilis escaped. 
They shortly afterwards submitted, and Avere allowed to compound 
for their treason by a fine ; but under Scipio's successors started 
another movement which cost them their lives. This defeat of the 
Ilergetes had not only convinced Mago that he had no more to 
Adhesion of hope for in Spain, but had also decided Masannasa on the plan of 
joining Rome, to which his interests in Africa, opposed by Syphax 
and Carthage, had also been bringing him. He had for some time 
been in communication with the propraetor, M. Silanus, but wished 
to have an interview with Scipio himself; and accordingly when, 
under pretence of acquiring more room for his cavalry he had crossed 



Scipio 
prepares 
to return 
home, 206. 
Defeat of 
the 
Ilergetes. 



Masan 
nasa. 



XXV SCIPIO'S RETURN TO ROME 375 

from the islands of Gades to the mainland, Scipio thought it worth 
while to journey across Spain to meet him. For being now wholly 
bent on his expedition against Carthage, every alliance in Africa was 
of value in his eyes. Masannasa was completely won by Scipio, and 
promised the utmost help in his power. Solemn pledges of friend- 
ship were interchanged, and Scipio returned to Tarraco with the 
assurance that the famous Numidian cavalry would be at his service 
whenever he landed in Africa. 

He might, perhaps, have wished to go there without returning to Scipio 
Rome. But the Senate was jealous of farther military command rettims to 

being in the hands of one who had not held the highest office at J^^^ ^J . 
..- , , -111 11 the end of 

home. His successor was already appointed, and as he could not 206. 
look for a farther extension of imperiwn in Spain, with leave to go to 
Africa, he wished to hand over his province at once, and arrive in 
Rome in time for the consular elections. He was received by the 
Senate sitting in the temple of Bellona, that he might claim his 
triumph before losing his i7npe7'iuin by entering the pomoerium. He 
reported that he " had fought with four generals and four victorious 
armies, and had not left a single Carthaginian {i.e. Carthaginian sol- 
dier) in Spain." The triumph was refused on the technical ground 
that he had held no regular magistracy ; he had had proconsular 
power, but had been neither consul nor praetor. 

Scipio cared little for the triumph. He felt certain of getting 203. Coss. 
from the people what he wanted, in spite of senatorial jealousy, -f- ^^^"^!' 
Accordingly at the next Comitia all the centuries named him consul, ^p\i^inius 
the crowd of voters being unusually great. His colleague was P. Crassus. 
Licinius Crassus, who, as pontifex maximus, would be unable to 
leave Italy.^ It was clear, therefore, that whatever foreign " province " 
was assigned to the consuls would have to be his. That the people 
supported his wishes was made clear by the crowds which frequented 
his house, or followed him when he appeared in public, and the con- 
fident predictions heard on all sides that he would finish the second 
Punic war, as Lutatius finished the first. Sicily and Bruttium were 
the provinces assigned to the consuls ; but there was no need for 
them to draw lots ; as Crassus could not leave Italy, it followed that Contro- 
Scipio must have Sicily. But as he also desired authority to extend his ^^^'^ 
operations to Africa, if it seemed good, he brought this question before "^ ^ 
the Senate at its first meeting under his presidency ; and let it be known ^^ Scipids 
that, if the Senate refused its sanction, he would appeal to the people proposal, 
for a law giving him the required permission. Thus he had two parties March 
in the Senate opposed to him. One, to whom the extension of the war ^^•^^ 
into Africa seemed a dangerous deviation from the Fabian policy of 

^ A rule first violated by L. Crassus in 131, and often afterwards. 



376 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Scipio 
authorised 
to iiivade 
Africa, 
20S- 



Vol It 71 tee rs 
from 
Etruria. 



caution ; the other, who were jealous of transferring to the people the 
arrangement of the provinces, which, by a well-established convention, 
had been left to the Senate. The view of the former was stated by 
the aged Fabius himself, who, in an elaborate speech, pointed out 
the risks and dangers of an expedition into Africa while Hannibal was 
still in Italy ; and declared that a consular army was not enrolled to 
serve the private ambition of the consul, but to guard Italy and the 
city. Scipio answered that the expedition to Africa would force 
Hannibal to leave Italy more effectually than an attack on him there, 
and that it was due to the dignity of the Roman people that the 
enemy should at length suffer what they had so long been inflicting. 

The other olDJection was stated by Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the victor 
of Capua, who had been dictator and four times consul. He asked 
the consul directly whether it was his intention to lea\e the arrange- 
ment of the provinces to the Senate and abide by its decision, or 
to bring a rogation before the people ? And on Scipio's replying 
evasively that "he would act for the best interests of the Republic," 
Fulvius appealed to the tribunes to protect him if he refused to vote, 
when he knew that the consul would not abide by the vote of the 
majority if against his wishes. The tribunes decided that, if Scipio 
determined to refer the matter to the people, they would protect any 
senator refusing to vote. Next day Scipio, after a conference with 
his colleague, gave the required assurance, and the Senate on their 
part compromised the matter by allowing him the province of Sicily, 
with permission to cross to Africa " if he should consider it to be for 
the interests of the Republic." He was, in fact, in the same position 
as the commanders on the Greek coast had been during the last 
few years. Their province is sometimes described as " Greece," as 
" Greece and Macedonia," sometimes simply as the " fleet " ; the truth 
being that a discretion had to be allowed, and the exact bounds of 
such a " province " could not be defined. 

Moreover he was not sent to Sicily as a provincial governor ; 
the annual praetor would go there as usual. It was a military com- 
mand, — which was now only needed in Sicily as a base for farther 
operations. Though the Senate had thus given in, it did not refrain 
from showing its jealousy. Scipio was refused authority to levy troops 
beyond those already serving in Sicily, which, together with the ships, 
were put under his command. This, however, did not trouble him. 
He could not well be forbidden to employ volunteers, and of these he 
soon had 7000 from various cities in Etruria, some of which offered 
new ships and every kind of material for their outfit, and large sup- 
plies of corn. Thus furnished with a considerable force, without 
expense to the treasury, he sailed to Sicily, leaving the Senate to 
concert resistance to Mago, who had seized Genua and Savona, and 



SCIPIO IN SICILY 377 



was collecting a large army of Ligurians, with the hope of marching 
south to join Hannibal. 

Scipio spent the remainder^ of this autumn and the winter following Scipio in 
m Sicily, collecting provisions and stores, repairing and refitting Sicily, 
ships, and organising his army for his meditated expedition into ^os-204. 
Africa. He had been accompanied to the island by 300 equites, for 
whom the Senate refused equipment. But he used his power of 
enforcing the service of inhabitants of Sicilian towns to equip them. 
Summoning out 300 Sicilians, he offered to allow them to abstain 
from the service on condition that they gave their horses and arms to 
his Italians as their substitutes. The offer was gladly accepted, and 
Scipio had thus a body of cavalry in which he felt confidence. ' His 
popularity in Sicily was f[irther increased by the equity with which 
he decided disputes between the Sicilians and Italian settlers ; and, 
though he did not go to Africa himself this year, he sent Laelius Prepar- 
with a fleet, who was immediately joined by Masannasa, and returned ations in 
laden with spoils from the African coast. This expedition had caused ^^^^thage, 
the greatest alarm in Carthage, where a fleet was hurriedly sent out ^°^- 
to attack Laelius at Hippo ; preparations for raising an army and 
victualling the city were hastily made ; and messages sent round to 
the neighbouring Libyan tribes to ask for help ; while money was 
despatched to king Philip of Macedonia to induce him to effect a 
diversion by invading Italy. 

The success of Laelius and the ascertained fidelity of Masannasa Troubles 
made the Roman army eager to cross at once. But Scipio had at Locri, 
apparently determined not to make his expedition till the following -^J- 
sprmg, and was at any rate detained for a time by the prospect of 
wresting an important Greek town in Italy from the Carthaginians. 
Locri had early revolted to the Punic side, driving out its aristocrats, 
who were generally favourable to Rome. These men had found a 
refuge at Rhegium ; and they now, at the head of a force of mis- 
cellaneous refugees, made their way thither and effected an escalade 
in the night. The Punic garrison still held one of the two citadels, 
while the other was occupied by Q. Pleminius, the propraetor, who 
had been ordered by Scipio to support the invaders from Rhegium. 
The two citadels were thus the bases from which sallies were made 
for some days by the opposing forces. Hannibal was said to be 
approaching to relieve the Carthaginian garrison ; and Scipio, being 
told that Pleminius was in danger, crossed at once to Locri. Hanni- 
bal had ad\anced from his position on the Lacinian promontory to 
the bank of the river Butrotus, and had even approached the walls of 
the city so close, it is said, that a missile killed a man at his side. 
But, as usual, he could not or would not attempt an attack upon 
walls, and hearing that Scipio was in the town he retired, sending 



378 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Miscon- 
duct of 
Pleyninius 
at Locri. 



204. 

Coss. M. 
Cornelius, 
P. Sem- 

pronius. 
The 

complaint 
of the 
Locrians. 



Charges 
against 
Scipio. 



word to Hamilcar to provide for his own safety. Hamilcar accord- 
ingly abandoned the citadel during the night, and hastened to unite 
himself with Hannibal's relieving army. Scipio then put Pleminius in 
charge of the citadel and town, and returned to Messana. 

But quarrels arose between the garrison under Pleminius, which 
he had brought from Rhegium, and the soldiers whom Scipio had 
placed in Locri, under the command of some tribunes. Pleminius 
took the side of his own men, arrested and flogged the tribunes, and 
was almost killed himself in the military riot which followed. Scipio 
hurried across again, and summoned both Pleminius and the tribunes 
before him. He acquitted Pleminius, and ordered the tribunes to be 
sent in chains to Rome to be judged by the Senate. But directly he 
had returned to Syracuse Pleminius vented his anger by putting 
them to death in circumstances of atrocious cruelty, and cast out 
their bodies unburied. Nor was this all. He treated the natives 
with abominable violence, especially those whom he discovered to 
have complained of his conduct to Scipio, while he made the Roman 
government scandalous by licentiousness and extortion. 

The Locrians sent legates to lay their case before the Senate, 
especially complaining of Pleminius's sacrilegious avarice in plundering 
the temple of Proserpine. The Senate asked them whether they 
had reported their grievance to Scipio. They replied that they had, 
but that he was wholly occupied in his preparations for his voyage 
to Africa ; and that, moreover, when he had heard the case before, 
he had condemned the tribunes to imprisonment, and had left 
the guilty Pleminius in power. This was too good an opportunity 
to be passed over by Scipio's enemies. Fabius demanded that 
Pleminius should be brought in chains to Rome, and that Scipio 
should be recalled for having left his province. Other rumours 
asserted that he was leading an idle if not luxurious life in Syracuse, 
amusing himself with sports or literature, while his army was ener- 
vated by the delights of the town, and Carthage and Hannibal were 
forgotten. There was for the moment a strong feeling against him. 
Yet wiser counsels prevailed. On the motion of the consular Q. 
Caecilius Metellus it was resolved to recall Pleminius, and to send 
ten commissioners with an aedile and two tribunes of the plebs to 
investigate the case, and if it should appear that what had gone on 
at Locri was by the wish or order of Scipio, to bring him back to 
Rome, even if he had already crossed to Africa. 

Meanwhile Pleminius appears to have been already arrested by 
Scipio's order, and the Locrian envoys disclaimed any intention of 
accusing Scipio of anything beyond not having been sufficiently 
moved by their miseries. 

The Fabian party in the Senate, however, seems to have thought 



XXV SCIPIO CROSSES TO AFRICA 379 

that, though thus reheved from compHcity with Pleminius, Scipio Scipio 
would be found to have neglected the preparations for the invasion of acquitted. 
Africa. But the commissioners found everything in Syracuse in the 
highest state of efficiency. The fleet and army were splendidly 
trained and disciplined, the arsenals were full of stores, and Scipio 
was content, without condescending to defend himself, that they 
should judge with their own eyes. Their report left the Senate no 
excuse. A decree was passed sanctioning his immediate invasion of 
Africa, and authorising him to select for the purpose whatever troops 
in Sicily he thought fit. 

An emissaiy from Syphax had informed Scipio that no help must Scipio 
be expected from him. The king had in fact made terms with crosses to 
Carthage, and had married Sophanisba, daughter of Hasdrubal, son ^ P'^'-^' 
of Cisco, whose influence secured him to the side of Carthage. The 
army, however, was not admitted to the knowledge of this dis- 
couraging circumstance, and the arrangements with the praetor in 
Sicily as to what troops were to be taken were made without difficulty. 
Scipio warmly welcomed volunteers from the armies of Cannae and 
Hcrdonea, and mustered a force variously estimated at 10,000 foot His forces. 
with 2200 cavalry and 16,000 infantry with 1600 cavalry. The 
transports, the provisioning of which had been entrusted to the 
praetor, were convoyed by sixty war-vessels in two divisions — one 
under Scipio and his brother Lucius, the other under Laelius and his 
quaestor M. Porcius Cato — distinguished from the transports by 
carrying only one lantern instead of two on their prows. The start 
from Lilybaeum was solemn and impressive. The inhabitants 
crowded down to the harbour ; legates from Sicilian cities were there 
to offer good wishes ; and the soldiers who were to be left behind 
came to bid their comrades good -bye. At daybreak a herald The 
proclaimed silence, and Scipio, standing on the prow of his ship, departure. 
offered a solemn prayer to the gods of sea and land, performed the 
usual sacrifice, and cast the entrails of the victims into the sea. 
Then he gave the word, a trumpet sounded, and the start was made. 
The point aimed at was the coast of the Lesser Syrtis, in the neigh- 
Ijourhood of which Masannasa was ready to welcome them with a 
force of cavalry. But the plan seems to have been changed during 
the voyage. They had started in fine weather and with a fair wind, 
but towards noon a fog had come on, lasting through the next night. 
At daybreak it was dispersed by a brisk breeze, and the shore of 
Africa was seen for the first time in the distance. But again at noon 
the fog thickened and lasted through the night, so that the ships had 
to lay-to until daybreak, when Scipio ordered the pilots to make for 
the nearest point. This proved to be the " Fair Promontory," — 
name of good omen, — and there the troops were landed and pitched 



38o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Prepar- 
ations in 
Carthage, 
204. 



Scipio 
plunders 
the country 



Masan- 
nasa. 



Hasdrubal 

with 

JO, 000 

infantry 

a/id jooo 

cavahy, 

and 

Syphax 

with 

SO, 000 

infantry 

and s 000 

cavalry 

oppose 

Scipio. 



their camp on some high ground, while the fleet was sent on to 
Utica. 

The alarm at Carthage was naturally great. Many temporary 

descents had been made on the African coasts by Roman forces, but 

Scipio's landing was a real invasion, such as had not been known 

smce the days of Regulus, and the city itself was in danger. 

The gates were closed, the walls manned, pickets set ; while 500 

cavalry, sent out to reconnoitre Scipio's position, fell in with his 

skirmishing parties and suffered some loss. His first movements, 

however, were practically unopposed. He harried the country^ 

took fortified places, and sent off booty and captives by the 

thousand to the transports. Best of all he was joined by Masannasa 

and his cavalry, influenced perhaps by admiration for Scipio, but 

still more by his personal interests. His father Gala, king of the 

Massylians, had died whilst he was engaged in Spain, and in 

his absence the kingdom had been secured for his boy- cousin 

Lacumaces, whose tutor Mazetulus practically ruled it. Mazetulus 

was in the Carthaginian interest, and Masannasa had therefore to 

look elsewhere for help to recover his rights. By the aid of Bocchus, 

king of Mauretania, he drove Mazetulus and his ward to take refuge 

in Carthaginian territory. They were afterwards induced to return 

and acknowledge Masannasa's rights. But at the instigation of 

Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, their cause was taken up by Syphax ; and 

Masannasa, beaten in the field, fled to the mountains, where for 'some 

time he led an adventurous life, plundering Carthaginian lands, and 

hunted by the troops of Carthage and Syphax. He was looking 

forward to Scipio's arrival as a means of recovering his dominions, 

and seems to have been waiting for him in the neighbourhood of the 

Lesser Syrtis {inter Pimica Emporia): but when Hasdrubal and Syphax 

were recalled from their operations against him to prevent Scipio's 

advance on Carthage, he was able to make his way to the Roman 

camp near Utica. 

He had already assisted in repulsing the skirmishing attack of 
Hanno's cavalry, which had been sent in advance in the vain hope 
of saving the country from plunder, when Hasdrubal and Syphax 
arrived in view of Scipio's quarters, and encamped within sight of 
each other, and at no great distance from the Roman camp. Scipio 
had now selected his winter quarters, after convincing himself that 
Utica could not be carried by assault. The ships continued the 
blockade, and those that were drawn up on shore were protected by 
the army, which was encamped on a promontory to cover them. 
But Scipio's position during the winter months of 204-203 was not 
satisfactory. He was shut up in a somewhat confined space by two 
armies greatly superior in numbers to his own. At Carthage 



XXV BURNING OF CARTHAGINIAN & NUMIDIAN CAMPS 381 

advantage was being taken of the respite to prepare a powerful fleet Wi?iter of 
to intercept his supplies, provision the city, and threaten the blockade 204-203. 
of Utica. Not thinking himself therefore strong enough to offer 
battle to Syphax and Hasdrubal combined, he resolved to detach 
Syphax by negotiation. All through the winter legates went back- 
wards and forwards between the Roman and Numidian camp. 
Syphax wished to play the part of mediator, and perhaps was not 
strongly on either side. But he was still under the influence of 
Sophanisba, and would not abandon Carthage altogether. He went 
back again and again to the proposal that the Romans and Car- 
thaginians should agree, the one to evacuate Africa and the other 
Italy, leaving all places between the two as they were. These 
negotiations, however, were without result ; and when spring came. Spring of 
Scipio, knowing that the Carthaginians had employed the winter 20J. 
months in fitting out a great fleet, and having come to the conclusion 
that Syphax— who had been strengthening his army by fresh recruits, 
had seized a town containing Roman stores, and had first tampered 
with and then tried to poison Masannasa — was not prepared to 
change sides, but was still under the influence of his Carthaginian 
wife, made up his mind to put in practice what he had been preparing 
all along. 

He had taken care that among the legates sent from time to time Scipio 
to Syphax there should be some of sufficient military experience, prepares to 
disguised in various ways, to be capable of reporting on the position ^^^^^'^ 
and strength of the enemy's camp. He now gave Syphax a hint J^^ '^^ 
that he was ready to listen to his terms. Syphax entered eagerly Hasdrubal, 
into the negotiations, and the messengers between the camps became 20J. 
still more frequent, till Scipio obtained all the information he required. 
The huts in the two camps he found were of wood and thatched 
with reeds, while those of the Numidian reinforcements were of still 
lighter material, and for the most part were outside the camps. Such 
huts could easily be burnt, and this Scipio determined to attempt. 
But he took care first to distract the enemy's attention. At the 
beginning of spring he began launching his ships and getting the 
engines on them into working order, as though he meant once more 
to assault Utica, When all his preparations were complete he sent 
a final message to Syphax, desiring to be authoritatively assured that 
the Carthaginians would ratify the terms proposed by Syphax if he 
accepted them for Rome. Syphax obtained the assurance from 
Hasdrubal, and thenceforth behaved as if peace were certain, relaxing 
all the usual precautions, and allowing his men to go backwards and 
forwards to the camp as if there were no enemy near. His exultation 
indeed was dashed by a second message from Scipio informing him 
that, though anxious to confirm the peace himself, the majority of his 



382 



HISTORY OF ROME 



council disagreed with him. Still such preparations as Syphax saw 
going on in the Roman quarters seemed to point to a leisurely 
resumption of the siege of Utica, and he was wholly unprepared for 
an attack upon himself. This, however, was what was impending, 
unknown to the Roman army itself. 
Burning of The tribunes most in Scipio's confidence were ordered on a 



the camp 
of Syphax, 

20J, 



and of 
Hasdrubal. 



certain day to see that their men had their evening meal served out 
early, that when the usual bugles sounded at supper-time they 
might be prepared, instead of eating, to march out at once without 
exciting suspicion. It was early in the year, and by the end of the 
first watch it was possible to march out without being observed. 
Soon after midnight the whole army had covered the seven miles 
between their camp and the enemy. The Roman army was then 
divided. One half, under the direction of Laelius and Masannasa, 
was despatched to the camp of Syphax, while Scipio himself led the 
other towards that of Hasdrubal, the more distant of the two. 
Masannasa and Laelius advanced in two divisions, the former leading, 
as being better acquainted with the locality, and Laelius occupying 
the rear as a reserve. Masannasa stationed men at all possible 
outlets, and in a short time the huts outside and immediately inside 
the camp were blazing. The fire once alight caught row after row 
with marvellous rapidity, and a scene of indescribable confusion 
followed. The Numidians could not understand what had happened, 
nor were Syphax and the men within the camp better informed. 
Thinking it an accidental conflagration they leapt out of bed, or 
sprang up from their camp fires where they were feasting and 
drinking, sometimes with the cup still in their hands, and rushed 
towards the burning tents. Numbers of them were trampled to 
death in the crowd, or perished in the flames, while those who 
escaped these dangers fell into the hands of Masannasa's pickets, 
and were killed before they had time to understand what had 
happened. 

Meanwhile the men in Hasdrubal's camp, observing the con- 
flagration in that of Syphax, which they imagined to be accidental, 
either started to render aid, or stood unarmed outside the gate gazing 
at the dreadful spectacle. Both alike were speedily attacked and 
put to the sword by Scipio's division, which also forced its way 'into 
the camp and fired the huts. Both camps were now suffering equal 
horrors. The flames spread so rapidly that the surging mass of 
panic-stricken men could not force its way along the pathways, 
choked by horses and other beasts of burden, consuming in the 
flames, or in a state of frantic terror. Defence in such circumstances 
was not to be thought of, and escape all but hopeless. Syphax and 
Hasdrubal indeed, accompanied by a few horsemen, did manage to 



THE CARTHACIINIANS REINFORCED 383 



make their way out, as well as some others. But the vast majority 

of those two great armies, with their immense trains of horses, beasts 

of burden, and slaves,, either perished in the flames or fell unarmed 

and defenceless under the Roman sword. 

Whatever we may think of the morality of such an operation The effects 

undertaken in the midst of negotiations, its effect was signal, of the 

, . , . , , 1 destruction 

Instead of watchmg their enemy shut up on a promontory and ^^^^^ 

exhausting his strength on the siege of Utica, which they could view camps, 
with comparative indifference, the Carthaginians were now in daily 203. 
expectation of seeing the Roman standards from their own walls. 
They gratified their wrath indeed by condemning Hasdrubal to death 
in his absence, — for he knew only too well what to expect, and was 
hiding in the country, where he soon collected a band of followers. 
But, that done, they anxiously debated their next step. Should they 
send for Hannibal ? Should they ask for a truce from Scipio to 
discuss terms of peace ? Or should they still hold out and induce 
Syphax once more to rally to their aid ? 

The last and most courageous course was decided upon, princi- The 
Daily, we are told, by the influence of the Barcine faction, to whom Cartha- 

T 1- n 1 t-- .I.- £[imans, 

war with Rome was an hereditary policy, as well as by this time a ^^^ ^^^ 

matter of life or death to themselves. There were also reasons arrival of 
against despair. Syphax was still at the head of a considerable Celtiberian. 
force, having escaped Scipio's pursuit, and was said to be safely ^'^^^^f^J^^ 
established at Abba, collecting scattered fragments of his army. He ""^^^^^ 
was indeed meditating a farther flight into his own dominions, but if still to 
he could be induced to remaija, there might still be hope of preventing resist. 
Scipio's approach. They and Syphax were presently encouraged by 
the arrival of more than 4000 Celtiberians, who had been hired 
by Carthaginian recruiting agents. Their numbers were exagger- 
ated at Carthage, and their warlike qualities much vaunted. The 
spirit of the people revived, and it was resolved once more to try 
their fortunes in the field. Within a month Hasdrubal again led 
out an army from Carthage, and joined Syphax and the Celtiberians 
on the " Great Plains." 

When Scipio, who was preparing to press on the siege of Utica, Scipio goes 
heard of this new rally of the enemy he threw everything else aside J^J^^^^^ 
in order to meet and crush it. His imperiimi was now extended till 
the end of the war, and having received reinforcements and supplies 
of corn from Sardinia, Sicily, and Spain, he could more easily divide 
his forces. Leaving troops to support the ships in blockading Utica, 
he marched to meet the enemy in the Great Plains. 

On the fifth day he pitched his camp on a hill between three and 
four miles from the Carthaginian camp ; on the next descended into 
the plain and encamped within a mile of the enemy. Two days 



3^4 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Battle on 
the Great 
Plains, 
24th June, 
20J. 



Scipio 
advances 
to Tu?ies, 



Hannibal 
and Mago 
summoned 
to Africa. 



Capture of 
Syphax. 



were then spent in cavalry skirmishes, and on the fourth both sides 
drew out for battle. Scipio followed the tactics which he had 
employed before. The chief part of the fighting in the early part of 
the day was left to the cavalry on the two wings, and it was not 
until he found himself successful on both that he brought the heavy 
armed troops in the centre into contact with the enemy. Here the 
Celtiberians offered a stubborn resistance, inflicting considerable loss 
on the Romans, and though they were eventually cut to pieces, the 
delay enabled Syphax and Hasdrubal to escape from the field. 
Syphax hurried off with his light horsemen to his own dominions, 
soon to be pursued and taken by his bitterest enemy. 

Leaving Laelius and Masannasa to follow Syphax, Scipio advanced 
towards Carthage, receiving the submission of town after town, and 
carrying those which resisted by assault. He found little indeed to 
withstand him. The government of Carthage had been forced, owing 
to the protracted war, to levy heavy imposts of men and money, and 
the wretched Libyans welcomed a change of masters, which could 
not, they thought, be for the worse. Finding himself after some 
weeks gorged with booty, Scipio despatched it to the camp on the 
sea near Utica, and, thus lightened, marched to Tunes, pitching his 
camp in sight of the walls of Carthage. 

The Carthaginians, however, were not yet at the end of their 
resources. They had sent to Italy to recall Hannibal and Mago ; 
and meanwhile diverted Scipio's attention from themselves by de- 
spatching a fleet to attack the Roman ships at Utica. From Tunes 
Scipio and his officers could see the ^eet leaving the harbour and 
steering for Utica. Alarmed for his own ships, he broke up his 
camp, and made a rapid march to Utica also. There he found, as 
he expected, that the Roman ships were in no situation to fight. 
They were moored under the walls, and heavily laden with machines 
for assaulting and battering them, and would be helpless before a 
well-managed fleet of war vessels, able to move at pleasure, to charge 
and retire, and practise all their skill. He was obliged, therefore, to 
protect his ships of war by a triple or quadruple ring of transports, 
from which, as from an entrenchment, the lighter craft might dash 
out to annoy the enemy, and behind which they might again retire 
for safety. The dilatoriness of the Carthaginian fleet had given time 
for these hasty arrangements ; and, when it at last arrived, it found 
the bustle of preparation over, and all in readiness to receive them. 
The Carthaginians, however, inflicted some loss on the Romans, and 
by means of long poles, to which great hooks were suspended by iron 
chains, dragged off six of the transports. 

But whatever satisfaction this slight advantage may have caused 
in Carthage was outbalanced by the success of Laelius and Masan- 



XXV DEFEAT OF MAGO IN ITALY 385 

nasa against Syphax. While Scipio was engaged on his march to 

Carthage they had pursued the unfortunate king into Numidia. He 

had there been able again to collect an army, but had been defeated, 

and was now a prisoner in the Roman camp ; whilst Masannasa 

recovered his own dominions with part of those of Syphax. 

Thus deprived of hope from Numidia, the Carthaginians sent The 

ambassadors to Scipio to ask for terms. They might, at any rate, by Cartha- 

so doing obtain sufficient delay to allov/ for the return of Hannibal ; ^^^^^'" 

,.^,. ... . ,. - ,, negotiate. 

and, 11 his presence did not improve their prospects, they would not 

be any worse off than before. They accordingly made no difficulty 
about the conditions, which, besides the usual stipulation for re- Terms 
turn of captives, deserters, and runaway slaves, demanded the with- demanded. 
drawal of Carthaginian armies from Italy and Gaul ; the renunciation 
of all claims in Spain ; the evacuation of all islands between Africa 
and Italy ; the surrender of all but twenty ships of war ; an imme- 
diate supply of 300,000 modii of spelt and 300,000 of barley, and 
an indemnity of 5000 talents. 

, A three months' truce w\as granted to obtain the ratification from Defeat of 
jRome, and a few deserters and runaways were handed over to Scipio ^lago m 
!to prove the sincerity of the Carthaginian government. The Roman ^^^^'■p^^ 
(Senate was not, however, in a mood for concession. Laelius, accom- 
panied by agents of Masannasa, had already informed the fathers of 
(the true state of affairs in Africa, and any anxiety which might have 
jbeen felt from the presence of Mago in Italy was dissipated by the 
jvictory of Quintilius Varus and M. Cornelius. Mago had advanced 
5nto the territories of the Insubrian Gauls, but had been completely 
^defeated, and was himself so severely wounded that he died on board 
'ship off Sardinia, while most of his ships were captured by the Roman 
squadron stationed in Sardinian waters. The entire recovery of Roman 
'influence in Italian Gaul was farther testified by the long-delayed release 
jof Gains Servilius and Gains Lutatius, the triumvirs seized sixteen 
tyears previously by the Gauls in the attack on Placentia. 

To satisfy the Roman expectations at this time, therefore, a very The 
complete submission on the part of the Carthaginian legates would embassy 
jhave to be made. But when they appeared before the Senate they Z'^""- 
Iprofessed to have no farther commission than to explain that the sole 
responsibility of the war rested on Hannibal, and to ask for peace on 
Jthe terms arranged at the end of the last war with the consul Lutatius 
(241). They were promptly dismissed without being allowed to 
enter the city.^ 

^ This is not inconsistent with the assertion of Polybius that the Senate signi- 
lied to Scipio that they would accept the terms he had imposed. The Punic 
jenvoys were dismissed, it appears, because they did not ask for these terms, but 
or something else, viz. , the status qtio at the end of the first Punic war. 

2 C 



386 



HISTORY OF ROME 



P. Sem- 
pronius 
Tuditanus 
defeated by 
Hafinibal, 
204. 



Hannibal 
leaves 
Italy, 20J. 



Serviluis 
wishes to 
pursue 
Hannibal. 



Meanwhile the resolution of the Carthaginian Senate had been 
communicated to Hannibal, and he knew that his career in Italy was 
at an end — that wonderful career of brilliant victory, of indomitable 
resolution, of almost ceaseless activity. It was only in the previous 
year that he had for the last time defeated a Roman consul, and 
driven him back with the loss of 1200 men into his camp ; and even 
if it is true that Sempronius had been able to retaliate shortly after- 
wards by a similar defeat of Carthaginian skirmishing parties, nothing 
had happened which gave his enemies any hope of dislodging him 
from Lacinium, where, for nearly three years, he " greatly stood at 
bay." Now all was to go for nothing. That his victories had been 
fruitless was very greatly due to the niggardly support which he had 
received from home. And now he was recalled to save it from the 
dangers which that dilatory and jealous policy had done so much 
to create. But however keen his regrets or just his resentment, 
Hannibal recognised the inevitable duty of obedience, and indeed 
had, for some time past, been silently preparing for the necessity which 
he foresaw. Ships had been got ready in the harbour of Croton ; 
the less useful part of his forces had been drafted on various pretexts 
into towns still under his influence in Bruttium ; and it is asserted by 
Livy — perhaps from malignant rumour, which constantly attributed 
cruelty to Hannibal — that a number of Italians who had taken refuge 
in the sanctuary of Juno in Lacinium, to avoid the campaign in 
Africa, had been slain in violation of the sanctity of the place. What- 
ever may be the truth of such stories, it is easy to believe that 
Hannibal embarked in obedience to the summons with keen feelings 
of disappointment ; that, casting his eyes back upon the retreating 
shores of Italy, he thought of what might have been had he led his 
soldiers to Rome straight from the bloody field of Cannae, and had 
not spent time and strength in the pleasant lands or round the walled 
towns of Campania. 

The great enemy was gone : and the consul Cn. Servilius 
Caepio, exulting at the thought that Italy had been freed in his year 
of office, and while the war with Hannibal was his special province, 
was eager to crown his glory by pursuing him to Africa. But in 
Sicily he was overtaken by an order to return. The anxiety at Rome 
was still great, and the Senate had compelled his colleague to name 
a dictator for the express purpose of summoning him back by the 
authority of his majus iviperium. 

Hannibal, meanwhile, crossed safely to Africa, and disembarked 
at Leptis.i He seems to have spent the winter in negotiating alliances 

^ Of Hannibal's proceedings in Africa it is impossible to get a reasonable 
view from Livy. Perhaps he found no account in his authorities, yet both Appian 
and Zonaras give at least an intelligible narrative. According to Livy Hannibal 



XXV THE LAST PROVOCATION FROM CARTHAGE 387 

with Numidian princes, whose jealousy of Masannasa he sought to Hattnibal 

stir up, and in collecting stores, horses, and Numidian cavalry. For in Africa. 

in spite of the Senate having approved the terms offered by Scipio "^^ P^^- 

,_-.. . '^ .... „,, "^^^ parations, 

to the Carthagmians, a campaign was now mevitable. ihe Senate 203-202. 

had left Scipio full discretion ; and an incident had since happened 
which, in his view, amounted to a breach of the truce on the part of 
the Carthaginians. 

A large fleet of transports, laden with provisions for the Roman The seizure 
army, and convoyed by thirty war vessels under Cn. Octavius from of Roman 
Sardinia, was blown by a storm upon an island in the bay of Car- ^"-^P^' ^^^3- 
thage, within sight of the city. The opportunity was too tempting 
to the citizens, who had been suffering from short supplies ; and, in 
spite of remonstrances from those in favour of maintaining the truce, 
the people voted for seizing the prey. Scipio at once despatched 
envoys to remonstrate ; who, after an audience of the Senate, were 
introduced to a public meeting, and reproached the citizens with the 
breach of a treaty which they had themselves sought with such 
abject humiliation, and had now infringed because they believed 
themselves safe under the protection of Hannibal. The people were The 
\ again divided in opinion ; but the majority, both of the Senate and Cartha- 
\ the people, were against restoring the booty, and were irritated at the S^^"'^"-^ 
haughty tone of the Roman legates. The war party once more reparation 
gained the ascendant, and even contrived a plot which would make and infure 
the renewal of hostilities inevitable. The Roman envoys were sent ^^^ Roman 
back to the Roman camp near Utica without an answer, but under ^^^ ^^' 
the safe conduct of two triremes. But these triremes were only to 
convoy them within sight of the Roman lines ; and a message was 
sent to Hasdrubal, the admiral of the Punic fleet at Utica, to have 
vessels ready to attack them as soon as the convoy withdrew. The 
order was obeyed, and the legates barely escaped captivity, while 
many of their crew were killed or wounded. 

This was the signal for the recommencement of the war, and in The war 
a fiercer and more angry spirit than before : the Romans incensed ^'<^newed, 
by the outrage, the Carthaginians rendered desperate by the con- 
sciousness that they had fatally committed themselves. 

Accordingly Scipio now treated the inhabitants of Carthaginian 
territory with great additional severity. Towns were no longer 

lands at Leptis in 203 (xxx. 25) : in 202 he goes to Adrumetum, rested his soldiers 
there for a few days, ad rejiciendum ex jactatione marifiitta — as though they had 
just landed ! — and starts at once by forced marches for Zama (xxx. 29). Then 
follow the incidents of the Punic spies spared by Scipio, the interview with Scipio 
himself, and the speeches, different from and much longer than those in Polybius 
(xxx. 29-31), and the battle next day (xxx. 32). There is no word of the 
winter's preparations or the campaign before the battle, and no chronological 
data, except the two years. 



HISTORY OF ROME 



202. 

Campaign 
of Scipio in 
Cartha- 
ginian 
territoty. 



Scipio 
restores 
the Cartha- 
ginian 
envoys. 



Hannibal 
will choose 
his own 
time. 



Meeting of 
Hannibal 
and Scipio. 



admitted to terms on their submission, but were ruthlessly stormed 
and their inhabitants enslaved, and every preparation made for the 
decisive battle which he now saw was inevitable. Masannasa had 
departed in the previous autumn to secure his own dominions, with 
the addition of a great part of those of Syphax ; but he was now 
summoned to return to the help of the Roman army with all the 
cavalry he could muster. He was ready to do this, for his existence 
and his power now depended on Roman success, as Hannibal was 
careful to point out to rival Numidian princes. The return of the 
Carthaginian envoys also gave Scipio an opportunity of putting him- 
self diplomatically in the right. Not knowing what had happened, 
they came to the Roman camp at Utica, and were detained by 
Baebius, the officer in command, awaiting Scipio's instructions. 
Scipio immediately ordered them to be sent home uninjured : a 
respect for international and religious obligation which made the 
desired impression, and was commended by Hannibal himself. 

But the people of Carthage were impatient once more to try the 
fortune of war, now that they had at the head of their forces the 
famous general who had so often defeated the Romans in the field. 
But he declined to be hurried. In answer to urgent messages he 
bade the citizens " attend to their own affairs, and leave him to choose 
his own time of fighting." In the course of the summer, however, 
he moved to the neighbourhood of Zama, and attempted to recon- 
noitre the position and forces of Scipio. His spies were caught, and, 
by Scipio's orders, shown everything and sent back unharmed. A 
cavalry skirmish took place, which resulted in favour of the Romans : 
and then Hannibal seems to have wished to treat. It seems that he 
still had hopes, based partly, perhaps, on the moderation of Scipio 
and his own exceptional renown, that some conditions might be 
obtained which would content the Romans without rousing too 
fiercely the passions of the war party at home. Thus, if the Romans 
would accept the absolute cession of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, with 
a pledge on the part of Carthage that she would never take up arms 
for their recover)^ and a larger indemnity for the captured ships ; 
and, in return, would remit some of the more galling of the pre- 
liminaries, a peace might be made honourable to both sides. But 
this hope proved abortive in two ways. In the interview which he 
sought and obtained with Scipio (of the truth of which there is no 
reasonable ground for doubting) 1 he was given clearly to understand 



^ Ihne, of course, rejects it as a fairy tale. But we cannot suppose that of 

matter so interesting in the history of the Scipios Polybius should have not 

had means of knowing the truth. No doubt many inaccurate versions of it got 

about, and the writers of so-called histories exercised their ingenuity in inventing 

speeches. But if any one will compare those given by Polybius with those in 



XXV BATTLE OF ZAMA 389 

that the Romans held that they had alTeady got by their own exertions 
and victories all that he offered as a concession, and that the late 
action of the Carthaginian government had rendered indulgence im- 
possible. In the second place the war party in Carthage was irre- 
concilable. A popular outbreak had taken place at the very mention 
of peace, and the vengeance of the people had fallen on Hasdrubal, 
whom they believed to have prolonged the war from deliberate treason 
as much as from incompetence. Hannibal had demanded on his 
arrival in Africa that he should be pardoned, and he was living in 
retirement at Carthage. In the excitement now aroused by the sug- Death of 
gestion of making submission to Rome he was again sought out, and Hasdrubal. 
would have been torn to pieces or crucified, had he not taken refuge 
in the mausoleum of his family, and there poisoned himself 

There was nothing for it, therefore, but to fight. It was getting Battle of 
late in the year,i and Scipio was impatient to end the war. For the Z.a7na 
adverse party at home had shown a disposition to snatch the credit ^ -.\ . 
from him, and, in spite of a popular vote assigning Africa still to 202. 
; Scipio, the Senate had allowed the consuls to draw lots for it, and 
had arranged that Tib. Claudius Nero (to whom it fell) should cross 
; thither with a fleet of fifty quinqueremes, and enjoy equal powers 
with Scipio, the result of which would be that, as consul, the triumph 
I would be his. 

I The battle which followed the abortive negotiation was probably 
! fought several days' march from Zama, which has supplied its name, 
and which was, it seems, the scene of the previous cavalry skirmish : 
' and from one at least of our authorities it would appear that Scipio 
' managed to force Hannibal to fight on ground unfavourable to 
' himself, having come up with him while in the act of changing camp. 
I Hannibal had an army broadly divided into five classes : there was Hannibal's 
' his veteran " army of Italy," on which he could thoroughly rely ; «''»y- 
I secondly, there was a considerable body of Numidian cavalry, secured 
; during the previous winter ; thirdly, there were, besides a corps of 
' Macedonians, i 200 mercenaries, partly Europeans, — Celts, Ligurians, 
I and Baliarians — and partly natives of Mauretania ; fourthly, a newly 
' raised force of Libyans and Carthaginians ; and, lastly, a large number 
; of elephants. The mercenaries were to occupy the front rank in the 
centre covered by the elephants, while on either wing were the Cartha- 
ginian and Numidian cavalry ; and on the rear of the whole were 
stationed the veterans of the "army of Italy." 

On this occasion, as often, the elephants proved disastrous to 

, Livy, he will see the difference between a sober amplification of data supplied and 
a piece of rhetorical fine writing (Polyb. xv. 6-8, Livy xxx. 30, 31). 

^ The date of the battle has been fixed on i8th of October, because of an 
eclipse. 



390 



HISTORY OF ROME chap. 



The their own side. The Romans had got used to them, and provided 

elephants, against them by the simple expedient of leaving space for them to 
run through. Their order was in three lines as usual, but instead of 
the maniples being arranged in the quincunx, like the spaces on a 
chessboard, they were drawn up immediately behind each other, so 
as to leave spaces in the lines. ^ These spaces were at first filled 
with the light-armed or velites, who, when the elephants charged, 
first irritated them with missiles, and then stepped aside behind the 
maniples. Some of the animals at the very beginning got unmanage- 
able, being frightened by the noise of trumpets and horns sounding 
the charge, and rushed back upon the Numidians ; others, though 
they did charge the enemy and inflicted some damage, got so pelted 
with missiles that they either ran straight away down the spaces 
between the Roman maniples and were of no more use, or turned 
and rushed off the field between the two armies. At the best they 
had done little good to their owners. The Numidian cavalry also 
on Hannibal's left wing were routed by Masannasa, and the Cartha- 
ginian cavalry on their right by Laelius. 
Defeat of It remained to be seen which of the two bodies of heavy-armed 

Hannibal s ^^,^^ ^|-^g stronger. The miscellaneous mercenaries of Hannibal met 
in a death-grapple with Roman legions, but, though they fought 
well, they were inferior both in strength and in the excellence of 
their weapons. Moreover, in the melee the Romans supported each 
other well, the rear ranks pressing on those in front, filling up the 
places of those that fell, and adding their weight to the impact ; but 
in the case of the enemy the mercenaries did not find themselves 
backed up by the Carthaginians in their rear. These last, probably 
raw levies, lost heart and did not advance, until the mercenaries, finding 
themselves overpowered, and believing that they were betrayed by 
their own side, turned upon the Carthaginians and began to cut 
their way through them. The Romans followed close, and the 
Carthaginians, thus driven to bay, and finding themselves engaged 
with two enemies, fought for their lives with such desperation that 
for a time they threw the Roman hastati into some disorder. This 
was, however, quickly rectified ; and eventually the field was thickly 
strewn with the bodies both of the Carthaginians and mercenaries slain 

1 Not * * « 



but 



mercen 
aries 



XXV THE END OF THE WAR 391 

by each other or by the Romans. The survivors endeavoured to 

take refuge in the Hnes of the yeterans whom Hannibal was keeping 

in reserve, but he ordered his men to lower their spears and repulse 

them, and they accordingly escaped as they best could off the field 

to the ground lately occupied by the cavalry. 

The last combat was with the veteran reserve. The Romans Final 

could not charge over ground encumbered with the debris of the struggle 

fight, with dead and dying : the front line, moreover, was in disorder, "^,1 ., „ 
, . . . *'- , ^ . . ' , , ' Hannibal s 

havmg gone m pursuit of the nymg mercenaries. These obstacles, ^jeterans 

probably also prevented an advance of Hannibal's veterans, which it 

might have been difficult to withstand. At any rate they did not stir : 

and Scipio had time to have the wounded removed to the rear, and 

to rally the hastati by sound of bugle. The principes and triarii 

were then brought slowly up so as to fall into line with the hastati^ 

and, thus formed, the whole line advanced to the charge. It was 

the most severe fighting of the day. The veterans stood their 

ground with obstinate valour without giving way a step, each man 

that was killed falling in his place. The battle was only won at 

j length by the return of the cavalry under Masannasa and Laelius 

J from the pursuit of the enemy's horse. They now fell upon 

I Hannibal's rear, and in a short time the whole was in confusion. 

Many were killed where they stood, nor had those who fled much 

! chance of escape, for the country was flat and open, and the horse- 

I men easily caught and cut them down. Twenty thousand are said 

I to have fallen, and almost as many to have been taken prisoners, 

I while the Roman loss is set down as 1 500. Hannibal himself 

' escaped with some cavalry to Adrumetum and thence to Carthage, 

! but his camp fell into the hands of Scipio, and the country between 

it and Carthage itself was at the mercy of the Roman general. 

The war was at an end. As far indeed as the objects for which End of 

it had been undertaken were concerned it had been over long before, ^^^ "'^^' 

I From Spain and Sardinia the Carthaginians had been finally expelled. ^'~'^' 

\ The attempted combination of the north Italian peoples against Rome 

i had fallen to pieces with the retirement and death of Mago ; and the 

I more formidable and once all but successful rising of the southern 

H Italians and Greeks had collapsed with the recovery of Campania, 

the fall of Tarentum, and the final retirement of Hannibal. For the 

j last two years the Carthaginians had been fighting, not for the 

extension of territory, but for bare existence. That too was now 

over. They had no new army to put in the field, and an auxiliary 

force of cavalry under Vermina, son of king Syphax, which arrived 

after the battle, was cut to pieces by the victorious Romans. Nor 

'1 were the Carthaginian ships, especially in the presence of a Roman 

fleet, sufficient to keep their harbour open and the sea safe. 



392 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Carthage 

submits, 

202. 



Roman 
terms. 



Their 
severity. 



They must take what terms they could get if they would avoid a 
siege. 

Accordingly when Scipio, having sent on his main army under 
Cn. Octavius to Tunes by land, returned to Utica, and thence with 
a fleet, lately strengthened by a squadron under P. Lentulus, started 
for Tunes, he was met by a ship decked with olive branches and 
all the other signs of submission and peace. He would not 
receive the ambassadors then, but appointed them to meet him at 
Tunes. 

The answer they received was brief and haughty. " They 
deserved nothing at his hands but condign punishment," he told 
them, " yet the Romans had resolved to treat them with magnanimity. 
They must, however, thankfully receive any terms offered them." 
These were of course of increased stringency, but yet such as left 
Carthage still a nation and free. The territory in Africa held before 
the war they were still to possess with all appurtenances. They 
were to enjoy their own laws and have no Roman garrison. But 
they were to return the ships and goods taken during the truce in 
full, with all captives or runaway slaves ; to hand over to the 
Romans all their elephants, and all war vessels except twenty ; to 
wage no war outside Africa, and none within it without permission of 
Rome ; to restore Masannasa all his dominions and property ; to 
pay 10,000 talents in yearly instalments within fifty years ; and to 
give 100 hostages for their good faith, selected by the Roman 
general among youths between fourteen and thirty years of age. 
Lastly, as a preliminary, they were to supply the Roman army with 
provisions and pay for three months, or until such time as a ratifica- 
tion should come from Rome. 

The money fine (about ;^2, 400,000) was not an excessive one 
when spread over fifty years, and the limits assigned to the territory 
in Africa were reasonable. The two points which were almost 
intolerable to the Carthaginians, even in their present state of 
humiliation, were the surrender of the ships — without which their 
commerce and their wealth must be ruined — and the prohibition of 
war in Africa without permission from Rome. This would subject 
them to constant encroachments from the Numidian princes, galling 
to their feelings as well as ruinous to their agriculture, especially as 
their enemy Masannasa was to be established on their frontier with 
additional power. It would be, moreover, a standing witness that 
they were not really a free State, but were under the dictation of 
another government. 

Some spirits, braver or more reckless than the rest, were still 
found in Carthage to urge the rejection of the terms at all hazards. 
But Hannibal was present, and in plain words warned his country- 



XXV TERMS OF THE PEACE ACCEPTED 393 

men that they had no choice, and had reason to be thankful that the Hannibal 
terms were no worse. He even roughly pulled down one of the insists on 
senators who rose to speak on the other side, excusing himself by ^^. ^^^^^ 
saying that he had been so long time abroad with the army that he accepted. ' 
had forgotten the habits of civil life. 

Both Scipio and Hannibal in fact were acting wisely : Scipio, 
in not wishing to destroy a great and populous city, and to drag on 
a war which had already pressed on his countrymen for sixteen 
years ; and Hannibal, in counselling submission rather than the 
endurance of a long siege, which, even if it ultimately failed, must 
entail suffering and ruin beyond calculation. 

The legates returned to Scipio signifying the acceptance of March 

the terms. The only point still to be settled was the amount due ^^^- '^^^^ 

for the stores on board the ships captured during the last armistice. ^". ^" 
^, 1 • 1- • 1 • , 1 T • gimans 

They were now scattered m every direction, and it would be im- accept the 

possible to recover them, but the valuation of the amount due on terms. 
them was left to Scipio to arrange. The envoys were immediately sent Coss. 
off to Rome, where they were received not unkindly, and allowed to Gncrus 
select about 200 of their countrymen, who were prisoners there, Cornelius 
to take back with them to Africa, with a message to Scipio that the p^'^JI^i^^ 
Senate desired that, on the conclusion of the peace, they should be paetus, 
set free without ransom. There was still some caballing at Rome 2or. 
to share the triumph of Scipio ; Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, one of the 
consuls — who by a combination of circumstances were elected late 
this year — insisted on having Africa as his province, and the Senate, 
as a compromise, gave him the fleet, with orders to go to Sicily, 
and, if any renewal of the war took place, to cross to Africa. But 
nothing changed the minds of the people. The question being put 
to them they voted to extend Scipio' s iinperiuni in Africa, and that 
the Senate should solemnly (Jurati) decide as to who was to preside 
at the making of the peace {dare paceni\ and bring home the 
victorious army. The sentiments of the people on this head, how- 
ever, were so clear that the Senate could but assign both honours 
to Scipio. Fetials were sent to see that the proper ritual was 
I observed in making the peace, at which he presided ; and then, 
having caused the Carthaginian fleet of 500 vessels to be burnt, 
jand having taken over and punished deserters, and installed 
JMasannasa in his new dominions taken from Syphax, he prepared 
to depart. 

These various arrangements had been made with the assistance of Scipio s 
ten commissioners sent out, according to precedent, to the conquered ''^^^^^"- ^^ 
[country to assist the proconsul. When they were finished he 
jsent Cn. Octavius to Sicily to hand over the fleet to the consul 
jCornelius, and put his men on board the remaining transports. 



394 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xxv 

At Lilybaeum he parted with his troops, sending them by sea to 

Rome, while he went by land to Messana, and crossed to Rhegium. 

His His journey through Italy was a triumphal progress. The people 

triumphant ^^ ^^ cities poured out to greet the conqueror ; the country folk 

recep^ ion ^m^di the roads as he passed, and he was everywhere greeted as the 

saviour of Italy. The journey was crowned by a magnificent triumph 

at Rome, followed by splendid games, lasting several days, for which 

he supplied the money. It seems doubtful whether king Syphax was 

in the procession, as Polybius asserts. Livy says that he died at 

Tibur shortly before, but that his public funeral about the same time 

served to bring his defeat and capture prominently before the people. 

He had not been treated ungenerously, and his son Vermina was 

afterwards restored to part of his father's dominions. Scipio hence- 

Africanus. forth adopted the cognomen of Africanus, which descended to his 

family. It was not, as Livy says, the first instance of a name taken 

from a conquered country, for M. Valerius Maximus had assumed 

the title of Messalla from his conquest of Messana in 263, but it 

seems to have set a fashion afterwards widely followed by many who 

had less claim to such honour. 

The joy at Rome was well grounded. The long agony of 
Hannibal's occupation of Italy was at an end. The dreaded enemy 
had not only been driven from Italy, but had been beaten in his own 
country. Italy was free ; Spain was open to Roman trade and 
Roman arms ; the islands of the western Mediterranean were 
occupied by Roman fleets and soldiers ; and the great question had 
been settled for ever, whether western Europe was to be Latin or 
Semitic. 

Authorities for the second Punic war, see p. 312. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AFTER THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 

Settlement of Italy after the second Punic war — Changes in Roman life during 
the epoch — The Senate — The army — Tendency to leave country life — Litera- 
ture : Ennius, Plautus — Their illustration of city life — Their identification of 
Greek and Roman gods — Cato and country life. 

At the end of the Hannibahan war Rome was supreme in Italy, but Settlement 

her supremacy had to be secured, and the traces of the struggle of Italy. 

wiped out. The Italian towns generally returned to the position of 

socii without change of status or additional burdens. But to this 

rule there were some exceptions. The Bruttii had set the example of The 

revolt to Hannibal, and were now punished by being degraded, at any Bruttii. 

rate for the present generation, from the position of socii j they were 

not enrolled with the army, being only allowed to serve magistrates 

as lorarii ; and their whole country was assigned as a provmce to one 

of the praetors. But the Greek cities fringing the southern shores 

of Italy secured more indulgent treatment. Even Tarentum, which The Greek 

some wished to degrade to the position of Capua, appears to have re- cities. 

mained a civitas foederata on terms not worse than those enjoyed by 

the loyal towns Naples and Rhegium, whereby local freedom was 

secured on the payment of a fixed stipendiiwi., and the supply of 

a fixed number of soldiers or seamen upon conditions differing in the 

different states.^ 

In Campania the amount of punishment had been carefully Campa?iia. 
apportioned to the degree of guilt, distinctions being drawn not 
only between whole towns but also between families and individuals. 
As a rule the existing generation was deprived of all civil rights but 
was not enslaved. Excepltions were towns which had remained loyal 
and had suffered at Hannibal's hands. Such was Nuceria, the 

i ^ Thus we find the Locrians claiming exemption from service out of Italy, and 

apparently getting their claim allowed (Polyb. xii. 5). 



396 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Nuceria, 
A tell a, 
Acerra. 



Etrnria. 



Colonies, 
194- 
Liter num, 
Salernum, 
Voltur- 
num, 
Venn si a, 
Sipofitum, 
Tempsa, 
Croton, 
Copia. 



Disloyalty 
of twelve 
Latin 
colo7iies 
punished. 



inhabitants of which, having abandoned the town rather than submit 
to Hannibal, were now allowed to transfer themselves to Atella (the 
Atellani being removed to Calabria), and to retain all rights and 
privileges enjoyed before. In like manner the people of Acerra 
returned to their town and rebuilt its ruins (210). Nuceria was 
repeopled by other loyalists, and in the next generation was again 
an important town. With these exceptions the Campanians were so 
moved about and split up, that there was nothing to fear from them ; 
and a large tract of their country was retained as ager publicus and 
leased to Roman tenants. 

In Etruria no special measures seem to have been taken. Towns 
like Arretium, where signs of revolt had been manifested, were over- 
awed by arms, and their senators forced to give hostages. This had 
proved so effectual that towards the end of the war they were wholly 
pacified ; and it was Arretium among other Etruscan towns which, 
in 205, furnished Scipio with such voluntary contributions as enabled 
him to go well equipped to Sicily. 

For the rest, two methods were employed for Romanising Italy. 
Confiscated lands were divided among Roman citizens, and colonies 
were sent out to various parts with full civil rights. Thus we hear 
of a commission of ten to divide the ager publicus in Samnium and 
Apulia, in 201, among the veterans of Scipio's army, while a great 
batch of colonies was decided upon immediately after the war, and 
actually formed in 194. In Campania were thus settled Liternum, 
Salernum, and Volturnum ; in Lucania, Buxentum on the site of the 
Greek Pyxi ; in Apulia, while Venusia received a supplementum, 
Sipontum was newly founded ; in Bruttium Tempsa and Croton were 
made Roman colonies. " Latin " colonies were also established at 
Thurii under the name of Copia, and at Vibo under that of Valentia. 

Thus communities of Romans were being established in all parts 
of Italy. But the war had also tried the fidelity or shaken the pros- 
perity of those already existing. In 209 twelve Latin colonies 1 
refused to contribute men or money. They excused themselves 
indeed on the ground of inability, but the Senate believed that they 
desired to abandon the empire. Affairs in Italy were then in too 
critical a state to allow of compulsion or punishment ; but in 204, 
when the fall of Capua and Tarentum, and the retirement of Hanni- 
bal to the Lacinian promontory, had removed the tension of the war, 
the Senate resolved to show its sense of their disloyalty. Their 
magistrates were summoned to Rome and were informed that each 
colony must furnish twice the usual number of infantry with 120 



1 They were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba Fucentia, Carseoli, Cora, Suessa, 
Circeii, Setia, Cales, Narnia, Interamna (Livy xxvii. 9). 



XXVI SETTLEMENT OF ITALY 397 

cavalry. If cavalry was impossible, three foot soldiers were to be 
sent in lieu of each cavalry man, while in addition to the property 
tax or tributum, on the same scale as that raised from Roman 
citizens on the valuation of. the censors, each colony was to pay 
yearly a percentage to the Roman treasury. In case of non-compli- 
ance the magistrates were to be retained as hostages. As the 
colonies had avoided military service for six years they had no real 
difficulty in obeying. Other Latin colonies had not shown a similar 
disloyalty, and Livy enumerates eighteen which had been conspicuous 
for their good services. 1 Even the maritime colonies of Roman Coloniae 
citizens submitted in 207 to the suspension of their exemption from fnanhmae. 
military service so long as an enemy was in Italy.^ 

In the north the two Latin colonies, Placentia and Cremona, Placentia 
had suffered severely from the Gauls while the Roman arms "«^ 
were engaged elsewhere. Their lands were wasted, and the <^^'^'''^'^^- 
number of colonists diminished by losses in the field and by the 
departure of whole families in search of safety. In 206 the 
Senate tried to remedy this state of things by ordering all absent 
coloni to return, and by sending an army under a praetor to protect 
them. But in 200 we find a mixed body of Gauls and Ligurians 
again invading them. Placentia seems to have been partly de- 
stroyed, but Cremona closed its gates and held out till it was 
relieved by the consul Aurelius Cotta. It was not until 195 that 
the two colonies were finally restored to prosperity and their enemies 
crushed by the consul Valerius Flaccus ; and more wars had to be 
fought before the Romans had a firm hold upon the valley of the Po. 
But from Etruria southward Italy was now secured, and the grievances 
which afterwards led to the Social war, though arising from the nature 
of this settlement, were of a different kind, and more analogous to the 
old quarrel of patrician and plebeian. 

Meanwhile some changes, political and social, had been develop- changes in 
ing themselves in Rome itself. Of the former, perhaps the most Ro^ne. 
striking was the growth of the power of the Senate. There was no Incrmsed 
formal alteration of its functions ; it had no more legally defined ff^^\;g„ate 
powers of control over the magistrates than before ; its decrees could 
always be overridden by a lex or plebiscitum. But in practice nearly 
the whole administration was directed by it. While magistrates 

^ Livy xxvii. 10, 

2 The maritime Roman colonies had this privilege [vacatio militiae), though 
they were bound to furnish men for the fleet (Livy xxxvi. 3). In 207 Ostia, Alsium, 
Antium, Anxur, Minturnae, Sinuessa, and Sena all applied to be allowed to 
maintain this vacatio militiae, but with the exception of Antium and Ostia were 
refused. In these two last men of military age were forced to take an oath not 
to pass a night outside the walls of their towns (Livy xxvii. 33). 



398 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Depart- 
ments left 
to the 
Senate. 



The Senate 
filled with 
ex-officials, 
mostly of 
plebeian 
origin. 



were loyal to the unwritten constitution, and anxious that the respon- 
sibility of their acts should not rest wholly on themselves, questions 
of every kind were referred to the Senate ; and the number of such 
questions largely increased in a time of war, and when the relations 
with other states were numerous and complicated. Thus certain 
administrative departments were tacitly allowed to fall into the hands 
of the Senate. It received and answered foreign ambassadors, 
directed the movements of commanders in a campaign ; and, above 
all, the interference of the Roman government in the internal affairs 
of the Italian socii, sometimes very minute and strict,^ was wielded 
entirely by it. Again, the " provinces " of the magistrates were, as 
a rule, settled by lot ; but the Senate decided for which of these 
provinces the several colleges of magistrates should draw, and in 
cases of special importance assigned the provinces without lot. Its 
claim to do so was generally admitted, and if now and again some 
consul or praetor resisted, it was politic enough to give in, or, to 
avoid responsibility by referring the matter to the people. In a few 
cases, such as that of Terentius Varro and Publius Scipio, where 
popular feeling was strongly opposed to the wishes of the senators, 
they yielded with no great show of reluctance. And such conces- 
sions were frequently rewarded by the strengthening of their own 
hands ; for it often happened that when the Senate referred a matter 
to the people, the popular vote remitted it to the judgment of the 
Senate. The people and Senate, in fact, were as yet on the whole 
of one mind ; and it had not yet occurred to any statesman to call 
out the dormant powers of the people to defeat the Senate for his 
own purposes. 

Not less remarkable was the gradual change which had been 
taking place in the composition of the Senate itself Briefly, it had 
ceased to contain a preponderance of members drawn from the old 
patrician gentes^ modified by an admixture of plebeian magistrates 
and ex-magistrates. It was now filled in an overwhelming majority 
with an official class drawn from plebeian families ; a result arising 
partly from the natural decline in the number of the patrician genies^ 
partly from the increase in the number of magistrates, who thus 
generally sufficed to fill up the vacancies. If they did not, as the 
Dictator appointed in 2 1 6 to make up the Senate found to be the 
case, then those vacancies were supplied by men distinguished in the 
army, who were as likely to be plebeians as patricians. In the next 
eight lectiones (from 214 to 179) no such measure was necessary, the 
ex-magistrates being found sufficient to fill the places, so that the 
Senate was steadily recruited from the middle ranks of the citizens, 



^ See the case of the " Bacchanalia." 



XXVI THE SENATE AND THE ARMY 399 

and consisted of an official class, the members of which had all had 
experience in the practical work of government. ^ As consuls or 
dictators, they had commanded armies ; as praetors had transacted 
legal and judicial business ; as aediles had been responsible for police 
and internal order; as quaestors had learnt the management of finance. 
They formed a new nobility, which for the next century and a half The new 
was to conduct the multifarious business of an already mighty empire, 'nobility. 
It is their gradual deterioration under the temptations to luxury at 
home, and peculation or oppression abroad, which led to the revolu- 
tions of the future. Already they were beginning to rouse 
popular suspicion. The tribune who fulminated against Marcellus 
in 209 included the nobility generally under the charge of protract- 
ing the war for selfish purposes ; and the plebiscitu7n Claudium 
(218), which forbade a senator or his son owning a vessel of more 
than 300 amphorae burden, illustrates both the ideal of a senator's 
position, which should be above the temptations of mercantile trans- 
actions, and the suspicion already aroused that the senators did not 
act up to it. 

In the army no important change in formal constitution had The army. 
taken place, beyond the organisation of the roj'arii, the light-armed 
men formerly distributed among the maniples, into a separate corps 
under the name of velites. Service in the legions was still theoretic- Velites. 
ally a privilege of those included in the five classes. But the needs 
of the time had occasionally caused freedmen, or slaves manumitted 
for the purpose, to be employed ; and the socH from the Italian Socii. 
towns became a regular element in every Roman amiy, equalling in 
number the citizen soldiers of the legion. Serving side by side with 
them the Roman soldier became less Roman and perhaps somewhat less 
amenable to discipline.- Long service abroad also, often without fur- 
lough,'* made men unfit for ci\il life, and at any rate prevented them 
from providing for themselves. The military class, therefore, became The 
more distinctly marked off, and those settlements of veterans on con- veterans. 
fiscated lands were begun which in after days offered many oppor- 
tunities to the promoters of civil war. 

Though some instances of fraud are letailed by Livy during this Decline in 
period, the high standard of official honesty, so admired by Polybius, numbers of 
was not yet seriously impaired. Rich men were still patriotic enough 

^ In the list of the Senate for 179, ingeniously and laboriously compiled by 
Willcms {le Sc'?iat, ch. xi. ),^of 304 members 88 only belong to patrician gentes, 
216 are plebeians ; all are members in virtue of having held office. 

2 Mutinies were rare, but it may be noticed that the mutineers in Spain (206) 
selected two Italians, not Romans, to command them. 

^ The mutineers in Macedonia (199) complained that they had served con- 
tinuously in Africa, Sicily, and Macedonia, and had not seen Italy for many 
years (Livy .\.\.\ii. 3). 



citizens. 



40O 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Abandon- 
ment of 
country for 
citv. 



Importa- 
tion of 
works of 
Greek art. 



Literature. 
(/) Ennius 
\23g-16g) ; 



to supply the needs of the state ; and no elements of disorder were 
brought to light by the critical position of the city.^ Yet two effects 
of the war was somewhat disquieting. The first was a serious 
decline in the number of the citizens, amounting between 222 and 204 
to more than 50,000 ; the second was the increased tendency of the 
farmers to leave the country and come to Rome. Once there it was 
difficult to induce them to return. Their farmhouses had perhaps 
been burnt, their cattle driven away, their free labourers enrolled in 
the legions, and their slaves run away. It was too much to expect 
them to leave the city, with its occupations and amusements, and take 
up again the toils of country life, which seemed to promise only 
bankruptc)'. The opening of the vast wheat fields of Africa, Sicily, 
and Sardinia lowered the price of corn and made farming in Italy 
unprofitable, except perhaps on a large scale, and by means of slave 
labour. The constant tendency, therefore, of the small farmer would 
be to sell his holding and come to Rome, there to invest his capital 
in commerce, and trust to cheap food and the chances of city life. 
This tendency, which had existed long before the second Punic 
war, seems to have at least received some impetus from it, and was 
in the future to increase to an alarming extent. For the present we 
are told that the consuls exerted all their authority to induce the 
farmers to return to the country. 

This age also not only saw an extension of the taste for the 
objects of Greek art, consequent on the large importations of such 
things from Syracuse, Capua, Tarentum, and other towns, but also 
the definite establishment of a literature based on (^reek models. 
Livius and Naevius had set a fashion which soon found followers ; 
and two writers should be noticed now who confirmed this tendency, 
and, with one who resisted it, did much to fix Latin as a literary 
language, and in different ways illustrate Roman life. 

Q. Ennius was born at Rudiae in Calabria, and was 
brought to Rome by Cato, who met him in Sardinia in 203. From 
that time, with the exception of a second service in the army of 
Nobilior in 191, he lived principally at Rome, where he supported 
himself by teaching — being acquainted with Oscan, Latin, and Greek 
— and by writing. He was the chosen friend of Africanus and other 
nobles, and professed to be a disciple of the Pythagorean school of 
philosophy. He seems, however, to have been imbued with the 
rationalising spirit of the Epicureans ; for he translated the ' Sacred 
Treatise ' of Euhemerus, in which he applied the account of the gods 
as originally great kings and captains to the Latin divinities ; and 



^ A fire in 210 created some feeling of uneasiness, but it was eventually put 
down to certain Campanians, and was very likely accidental. 



XXVI ENNIUS AND THE ROMAN NOBLES 401 

his favourite tragedian was Euripides, whose plays he translated for his works; 
the Roman stage. 1 He wrote also Saturae and epigrams, a pane- 
gyric of Scipio, and other poems. His most famous work was the 
Annales^ a history of Rome from its foundation to his own day, in 
hexameter verse, in which he freely used the early legends, and 
doubtless did much to fix them in the popular imagination. Among 
the fragments of this poem there is one which may help us to realise 
the growing influence of the Greek man of letters among the nobles 
of the day, who, like Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey in a later age, 
usually entertained one or more such about their persons. He his descrip- 
speaks of the great man after delivering some public oration as tioti of the 
" Calling for him in whose company and conversation at table he ^'''^'^^ ^^^<^- 
took delight, when wearied with public business for more than half 2^^^^' 
the day in the broad Forum or the sacred Senate ; one to whom he 
could confide his secrets, small and great, and safely utter whatever 
rose to his lips, good or bad ; one with whom he could share his 
relaxations in public or private. Such a man must be of the strictest 
honour ; not Hkely to make mischief either from levity or malice ; 
learned, loyal, pleasant, witty ; content with his own and seeking 
nothing more ; with tact to seize the moment for speech, brief and 
to the point. He must be skilled in antiquities and history, ready 
with piecedents, ancient and modern ; and above all, must know 
when to be silent," ^ 

If this gives us a glimpse of the manners of the great, from {2) Phn/tNs 
another poet, a considerable part of whose work has come to us, [254-^ ^4)- 
we may learn something of common life. T. Maccius Plautus 
was born about 254 at Sassina, in Umbria. We know little of his 
life beyond the fact that his parents were poor though free, and that 
coming to Rome as an actor he lost the money there gained by 
speculation, and became so reduced that he was obliged to work for 
hire in a mill. 

Though the plays, some of which were composed in the intervals 
of this servile work, were, like those of his predecessors, translated 
from the Greek of the later comedy, yet he used his models more 
freely, and, without attempting originality in plot or generally in 

^ A passage in one of his translations contains a statement of Epicurean 
doctrine, which he probably would have softened if he had not agreed with it. 
Trag. 354, ed. Vahlen : — 

Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam coelitum, 
Sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus. 
Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest. 

^ Ennius, Annales, 239, ed. Vahlen. A comparison with similar maxims of 
Horace for intercourse with the great {e.g. Epp. i, 7, 46 ; i, 18) will show how, 
with externals not much changed, the superiority in dignity and simplicity is with 
the earlier age. 

2 D 



402 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Popular 
prejudices. 



Greek 
terms 
employed 
by Plautus. 



dialogue, introduced Roman allusions and expressions which almost 
for the first time in surviving Latin literature seem to show us the 
people and their thoughts and opinions. Thus, though the Punic 
wars are only once alluded to, the national prejudice against the 
double-faced Carthaginians comes out in the description of a char- 
acter in the Poenuluss who " knows everything and pretends to know 
nothing — a true Carthaginian " ; just as another national prejudice as 
to the morals of the Greeks is betrayed by the use of pergraecari 
and co7tgraecari to indicate loose and luxurious habits. ^ 

Again, the signs of the growth of a foreign element in Rome may 
be detected in the terms for which Plautus found no ready equivalent 
in Latin. Thus the banker is called trapezita^ and, like other Greek 
men of business, was supposed to be a cheat, cunning at evading the 
laws.2 So also ternis connected with shipping are mostly Greek. The 
merchant adventurer, sailing in his own ship, is 7iattc!crus^ though 
the speculator in such gear is a fucraitor, and sea-sickness is nausea j 
for, in spite of the naval efforts of the first Punic war, the Romans 
had not become a sea-going folk ; and socii navales, as a tenn for 
their sailors, witnesses to the source from which they got them.^ 

Certain luxuries also appear to have had no Latin name in use. 
The maker of fancy-bread or rolls was artopta;^ the refreshment 
bar was a thermopoHum ;^ the best perfume was murrha^ the per- 
fumer viyropola or myrobreccharius., and his shop a myropoliwii ; 
while the perfumed douche after the bath is described by a hybrid 
expression as imguentum ecchciimataS' Ladies did not live apart in 
a Roman house as at Athens, and there was no equivalent for the 
Gx^^V gyncEcacum to the time of Cicero." Nor was there any word 
in Latin for the needy hanger on, the parasitiis or sycophanfa, a con- 
temptible connexion far removed from that of cltcfts and patronus ; 
and while he uses a Latin word for dice {alea) the throw is constantly 
expressed by the Greek bolus. 

Again, the early Roman was exercised in arms, in real or mimic 
war, and the manly exercises of the Campus,^ without the more artificial 
arrangements common in Greece. The palaestra and gymnasium 
therefore could only be described by their Greek names, though they 
speedily became acclimatised, along with the bath and its luxuries, 
while the larger private houses already had the ambulacrum and 
por/icus, which served some of the purposes of the palaestra. 



1 Poen. pr. 112 ; Cist, i, i, 21, 61 ; 4, 3, 21 ; Bacch. 4, 6, 15 etc. 

2 Pseud. 2, 4, 67 ; Cure. 4, 2, 23. But mensa for a bank is used, Cure. 5, 3, 4. 

3 Mil. 4, 3, 15 ; Asin. i, i, 55 ; Merc. 2, 3, 54. 

^ Aul. 2, 9, 4. ^ Cure. 2, 3, 13. 

^ As. 5, 2, 79; Cas. 2, 3, 10; Aul. 3, 5, 37; Amph. 4, i, 3; Poen. 3, 3, 88. 

^ Bacch. 3, 3, 24 ; Most, i, 2, 67. 



^, —J J -^ , „ — _, ^j — , ^ 

^ Most. 3, 2, 68 ; Cicero, 2 Phil. § 95. 



XXVI SLAVERY AMONG THE ROMANS 403 

The value of eloquence, and the rise of the new nobility by Eloquefice 
popular favour gained in pleading causes, are illustrated by the «^«^ ^^^ 
advice given to the young jnan in the Trinumus^ " to serve his ^^ 
friends in the Forum if he wishes for public office " ; and by another '^ ^^"' ^' 
passage describing the growing desire of such men to have round 
them a body of well-to-do clients, without much regard to their 
character. These are the " clients " of the later Republic, not heredi- 
tary dependents, but men whose interests centred round some leader, 
statesman, or general, and formed the nucleus of the coming revolu- 
tions. ^ Closely allied is the appearance of bribery, as office began Ambitus. 
to be valuable from the foreign provinces. The first law against 
ambitus was not passed till 181, but the thing itself was becoming 
notorious, and the tipsy slave in the Triiiumus is made to moralise 
with solemnity on the growing scandal.^ 

A still graver feature in Roman life, copiously illustrated by Slaves iri 
Plautus, is the number and ill-treatment of slaves. Though Greek comedy and 
in name and in the parts they sustain in the plays, yet the extra- ^ J^' 
ordinary fertility of expressions, wholly Latin, for their torture or 
punishment, throws a lurid light on the position of these unfortunate 
men and women. '^ The cat {Jhigriau) and the rods {virgae) are the 
usual implements of punishment. But there are numberless worse 
modes of torture. The poor wretch was sometimes hung by his 
hands to a beam, with weights attached to his feet, while his flesh 
was pierced with goads. Sometimes a heavy fork of wood was 
placed on his neck, to the ends of which his hands were bound, and 
he was flogged or goaded as he staggered under the weight ; and if 
he stole he was branded with the letters FUR.* A punishment Slaves in 
much dreaded was the being transferred to the country establishment, ike country. 
and there being forced to work in chains on the land, to grind at 
the mill, to hew wood and draw water, or labour in the stone 
quarries, imprisoned during the night in the hateful crgastulum. 
Finally their masters coiild, and sometimes did, punish them by 
execution on the cross. The honest slave in the Miles (2 4, 19) 
is made to say, " I know that a cross will be my grave. That was 
the sepulchre of my father and grandfathers to the fourth genera- 
tion." After making allowance for comic exaggeration, it seems 
clear that, if such language was to have any point at all, it must 
indicate a vast growth in the number of slaves, whose masters 
believed that they could -only hold them in subjection by the utmost 
severity ; and particularly that the hardest labours of the farm were 

^ Trin. 3, 2, 25; Men. 4, 2, 1-30. 

"^ Trin. 4, 3, 26. 

^ For severities to women see Merc. 2, 3, 77; True. 4, 3, i-io. 

* For list of slave punishments see particularly Asin. 3, 21 ; Men. 5, 6, 8. 



404 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP 



Street life 
as described 
by Plautus. 



I dent iji ca- 
tion of 
Roman 
and Greek 
divinities. 



now performed almost entirely by them. When this began we can- 
not tell exactly ; but the Punic wars, in flooding the markets with 
slaves, doubtless largely extended it ; and as the Roman citizens 
became more and more averse to the dulness of the country these 
large gangs of slaves became a real danger to the State. 

Of the daily life of the streets it is not so easy to get a view. A 
passage in the Curculio i will show us the Forum and its neighbour- 
hood — the comitiuni crowded with electors listening to the profes- 
sions of candidates, as well as a spot on the north of the Forum near 
the altar of Venus Cloacina ; the street near the Basilica haunted by 
idlers and loose women ; the fishmarket full of purchasers, eyed 
anxiously by hangers-on watching for an invitation to dinner. The men 
of wealth do business in the part of the Forum nearest the capitol. 
Close by the lacus Ciirtius men are hawking wine. Near the vetcres 
iabernae, on the south side, congregate the money-lenders. Near the 
temple of Castor and the 7'icus Tusciis are more loose characters ; 
while the Velabrum is full of tradesmen's shops, such as butchers 
and bakers ; and the Suburra is lined with eating-houses and 
taverns. At the porta tn'gcmina, and all along the road to Ostia, 
stand or crouch the beggars with which every visitor is well 
acquainted to this day.^ In the midst the acdiles exercise the office 
of police and petty magistrates : see that the streets are cleaned ; 
regulate the markets ; test the soundness of the goods offered for 
sale ; and, when the games are coming on, give out contracts for 
theatrical properties, and exercise control over the actors, who are 
mostly slaves, punishing those who do ill.'^ 

Lastly, in both Ennius and Plautus we see the identification of the 
Greek and Latin gods all but complete. It was perhaps the exigences 
of translation that helped on the process, which doubtless had also 
other determining causes. At any rate, Ennius gives the list of the 
twelve gods of the Greeks under their Latin titles,* which is also 
repeated by Plautus, with some variations and additions, such as 
Summanus ( = Pluto), and others, most of whom had temples in 
Rome. A number of rural deities were still locally worshipped, 
who had no Greek analogues ; ^ but the State religion was henceforth 



^ Cure. 4. I. The genuineness of the passage is doubted because of the men- 
tion of the basilica, for the Basihca Porcia was built in Cato's censorship, B.C. 
184, the year of Plautus' s death. But as sub-basilicani occurs in Capt. 4, 2, 36, 
it seems better to believe that the name was attached to some building earlier. 
At any rate the passage, if an insertion, is old enough for our purpose. 

^ Cist. I, 2, 3; Capt. I, I, 22. 

^ For the various functions of the aediles see Stich. 2, 3, 29 ; Men. 4, 2, 25; 
Capt. 4, 2, 34; Rud. 2, 3, 43; Trin. i, 3, 80; 4, 2, 148. 

* Ennius, Annates, i fr. ; Plautus, Bacch. 4, 7, 31. 

^ Enumerated by Varro, R.R. i. 



XXVI CATO AND COUNTRY LIFE 405 

confined to the worship of these deities, with certain additions, such 
as that of the Bona Dea or Magna Mater, introduced from Asia in 
205. Thus Roman theology,, if not now for the first time settled, 
received its first definite expression in literature. ^ 

Thirdly, from M. PORCIUS Cato, who stoutly resisted the fashion (j) Cato 
of writing or copying Greek, and who was prolific in speeches and {2j4-i4g). 
histories, we have a treatise on the management of a farm of about 
100 jugera, from which something may be gathered of the country 
life at this period, — all the more interesting from the consideration 
that in no other sphere is custom so persistent, and that therefore in 
many respects we may feel sure that what we read applies equally to 
Latin farmers many generations before. In his preface he praises Praise of 
farming above other industries. In ancient times, he says, the f^'^''"""S- 
highest compliment was to call a man a good farmer. It is farmers 
who are the mainstay of the state : they are the bravest men and 
the best soldiers ; their trade is not open to the risks of the merchant 
or the odium of the money-lender. Farming, however, must not be 
treated as of secondary importance : a man should make his chief 
residence in the country, only lodging in the city for the sake of 
public duties. Those done he should, like Cincinnatus, return to 
his farm. In Cato's time the actual work, once performed by the 
fanner and his free labourers, was done by slaves, for whose manage- 
nient, allowance of food, dress, and wooden shoes he gives minute 
directions. But the old habits and customs still remained, especially 
in the methods of securing the favour of the gods for the operations 
of the farm. The first thing the owner must do on arriving at his Country 
house is to greet the Lar Familiaris : before a sickle can be put into S^ds to be 
the corn an offering of incense must be made to Janus, Jupiter, ^'^^^^ 
and Juno, and a pig sacrificed to Ceres, to whom also first-fruits 
must be given when the crops are about to be stored in the barn. 
When the grain is sown a daps is to be given to Jupiter. When the 
oxen are turned out into the meadows an offering is to be made to 
Mars Silvanus. If a woodland is to be cleared a pig must be 
offered to the deity inhabiting it, and another when the ground is 

^ The list of the twelve gods jn Ennius is contained in the distich : — 

luno Vestci Minerva Ceres Diana Venus : Mars 
Mercurius lovis Neptunus Volcanus Apollo. 

Mars, who in the Latin rehgion was the god of death and destruction, here repre- 
sents Ares, the god of war. PFautus adds Latona, ISpes, Ops, Castor and Pollux, 
Virtus, Hercules, Submanus, Sol, Saturnus, all of whom, e.\cept Latona and Sub- 
manus, had temples at Rome. The worship of Apollo, which seems at first not 
to have caught on at Rome, though he had a temple since 413, was much pro- 
moted by the establishment of the ludi Apollinares in 212. There was no 
temple of Latona, yet her name was joined with that of Apollo in a Icctisternium 
held in 396 to avert a pestilence (Livy v. 13). 



4o6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Divisions 

of the far 7n 

and 

animals 

employed. 

Food. 



The 
market. 



The 
holidays. 



first broken by the plough. Mars, in this rustic hierarchy, was 
god of Wight and murrain to crop and flock, and a form of prayer 
is given to be used to him by the farmer. ^ Such a farm 
would contain plough-land, meadow, garden, olive-grove, orchards 
of apple, pear, and figs ; with woodland, in which the chief 
trees were elm, poplar, cypress, oak, ilex, and willow for basket- 
work. The beasts used on the farm were oxen, mules, and asses 
for the mill ; horses seem seldom employed for agricultural 
purposes. The food used in the farm - house is shown by the 
directions to the villica, who is always to have a good store of 
poultry, eggs, dried-peas, service-berries, figs, raisins, wallnuts, and 
preserved or dried fruits of various kinds, and must be skilled in 
grinding fine or coarse meal or groats. Nothing is to be wasted : 
the worn sagum served out to the slave is to be returned before a 
new one is given, in order to make patchwork coverlets. The wind- 
falls of the olives are to be collected to make pnhnentiuium for the 
slaves, and the skins of the pressed grapes to make their wine or 
posca. Every eighth day the farm produce is to be taken to Rome 
or elsewhere for market, while at certain seasons there were fairs 
{)nercatus\ such as that at the gro\e of Feronia at the foot of Mount 
Soracte. Wet weather was to be utilised for clearing or repairing 
the oil or wine vessels and other implements ; while the olive crop 
was gathered by bands of Icgiili or pickers at a special rate, or 
sometimes sold on the trees at a valuation. The four great holidays 
in the year were the Lupercalia in March, the Palilia in April, the 



^ The formula of the Arval Brethren for this purpose is preserved in an 
inscription discovered in 1778 : — 

Enos, Lases, iuvate (ter) 

Neve lue rue, Mannar, sins incurrere in pleores. (ter) 
Satur fu, fere Mars. Limen sali. Sta. Berber, (ter) 
Semunis alternei advocapit conctos. (ter) 
Enos, Marmar, iuvato. (ter) 
Triumpe, Triumpe, Triumpe, Triumpe. 

Which the Bishop of Sahsbury thus translates : — 

Help us, oh Lares, help us. Lares, help us I 
And thou, oh Marmar, suffer not 
Fell plague and ruin's rot 
Our folk to devastate. 

Be satiate, oh fierce I\Lars, be satiate I 
(Leap o'er the threshold ! Halt ! Now beat the ground) 

Be satiate, oh fierce Mars, be satiate ! 
(Leap o'er the threshold ! Halt ! Now beat the ground) 

Be satiate, oh fierce IVfars, be satiate ! 
(Leap o'er the threshold ! Halt I Now beat the ground I) 
(Call to your aid the heroes all, call in alternate strain ! 

Call, call, the heroes all, 
Call to your aid the heroes all, call in alternate strain !) 
Help us, oh Marmar, help us, Marmar, help us I 
(Bound high in solemn measure, bound and bound again. 

Bound high and bound again !) I 



XXVI THE HABITS OF FARMERS 407 

Saturnalia in December, and the Compitalia in January. In the 

two last named the slaves were specially permitted to share ; but 

from religious functions of the family generally they were jealously 

excluded. On other holy days, though work did not cease, it was of 

a lighter kind, or \vas bestowed upon the highw^ays on the demand of the 

authorities of the pagus. Many recipes for country dishes, simples, 

and fomentations were traditional among the farmers, who still 

believed that even a dislocated limb would yield to a charm recited 

with the cabalistic w^ords, of which Cato gives a specimen. ^ Such 

was the life that in its primitive simpHcity still lingered in the 

country districts of Latium and Campania, while in mountainous 

districts the shepherds formed a distinct and hardy class, and in the Shepherds 

woodlands and forests there were large bands of swineherds, of a'td snn?ie- 

whose methods and habits Polybius has left us some curious ''^^'''^•^• 

particulars. 2 It was such men that formed the backbone of the 

nation : it was from them that the armies which conquered the world 

were replenished. And even in regard to the intellectual life of the 

state, it will be observed that of the three men here mentioned as 

representatives of literature one was a South Italian, the other an 

Umbrian, and that the third, though a Latin and a Roman citizen by 

birth, lived chiefly in the country. Rome had the power (the true note 

of a nation) of absorbing and inspiring all with her spirit ; but the 

best of the raw material was found not in the city but in the country-. 

1 Motas vaeta daries dardares astatarics dissiinapitcr^ R.R. 160. 
^ Polybius xii. 4. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR 

214-205 

The state of Asia and Greece from 323 to 215 — The development of the three 
great kingdoms of Egypt, Asia, and Macedonia — The lesser Asiatic powers, 
Pergamos, Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Galatia — The extent of the Macedonian 
influence in Asia and Greece^The Achaean and Aetolian Leagues — The ac- 
cession of Philip V. — He conceives the idea of invading Italy— His treaty with 
Hannibal — The Romans declare war with him (215) — His defeat at Apollonia 
— -His vigorous measures and victory over the Aetolians at Lamia (209) — 
The war languishes for some time (208-206), but the Romans, by the advice 
of Sulpicius, are unwilling to make peace — The Aetolians therefore make a 
separate peace with Philip : followed by general pacification at Phoenice (205). 



The 

importance 
of the 
MacedoH' 
ian wars. 



Divisions 
of the 
Eynpire of 
Alexander 
323-301. 



Among the incidents of the struggle with Hannibal had been a 
collision with the king of Macedonia. What is called the first 
Macedonian war (214-205) was not marked by any great battles or 
important changes of territory, but it pledged the Romans to a certain 
protectorate and the maintenance of a definite state of affairs in 
Greece and Asia Minor. This led to the second war with Philip 
(200-197), and to the extension of that protectorate over all Greece ; 
and this in its turn involved the war with Antiochus and the 
Aetolians, and another large extension of Roman responsibility (193- 
188). The Romans thereby took their place in the development of 
a world-wide history. The affairs of Africa, Italy, Greece, and Asia 
became inextricably involved ; and our narrative can no longer be 
confined to the rise or fortunes of an Italian power : it becomes part 
of the history of the civilised world. It is necessary, therefore, to 
obtain at least an outline of the political state of the world at the 
time. 

The victories of Alexander the Great had for a brief period welded 
into one huge empire the Greek peninsula, nearly all Asia up to the 
Punjaub, the Islands, and Egypt. At his death (323) disintegration 
imniediately began. For a time the whole remained nominally under 



CHAP. XXVII THE DISRUPTION OF ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE 409 

his successors on the throne of Macedonia or their guardians. But 
the generals or native princes who retained or undertook the adminis- 
tration of the several provinces, nearly thirty in number, were bent 
on establishing practical independence, and were for the most part in 
continual hostility with each other. 

From this confusion there emerged in 306 five great powers, the The six 
rulers of which then for the first time called themselves kings — Egypt ^^^'S^^ 306. 
under Ptolemy, son of Lagus ; Syria under Antigonus ; Upper Asia 
under Seleucus ; Thrace under Lysimachus ; Macedonia under Cas- 
sander. In addition to these, Demetrius Poliorcetes (a son of 
Antigonus of Syria) also assumed the title of king, though without 
definite dominions, his chief work during the next few years being 
to pose as the champion of Greek freedom, guaranteed by treaty in 
311 against Macedonia, in the course of which he received the title 
of general (yye/xtov) of all Greece. 

The ambition of Antigonus caused a general combination against joi. The 
him. In 301, at the battle of Ipsus, he was defeated and killed, and battle of 
his dominions were divided. There were now four great kingdoms — formation 
Egypt under Ptolemy ; Syria (or, as it was called, Asia) under Seleucus ; of four 
Thrace and Asia Minor under Lysimachus ; and Macedonia under great 
Cassander. Demetrius Poliorcetes still kept the title of king and the kingdoms. 
possession of Cyprus and part of Phoenicia, though, after he had been 
defeated with his father at Ipsus, the Athenians refused to admit 
him within their walls. 

In 297, however, he determined to reassert himself in Greece. Macedonia 
He took Athens after a long siege, and was proceeding to make A^^'' ^97 
himself master of Peloponnesus when he was recalled to greater '^ ^^^' 
hopes. Cassander, king of Macedonia, died in 296, and was suc- 
ceeded by his son Philip IV., who within a few months also died, 
and was succeeded by his two brothers Antipater and Alexander. 
The joint kings soon quarrelled, and the younger one, Alexander, 
asked help both of Demetrius and Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. Pyrrhus 
was the first to arrive. He drove out Antipater and established 
Alexander on the throne ; and when Demetrius came later he found Deinetri/ts 
himself coldly received. He even believed, or affected to believe, 
that Alexander was attempting to have him poisoned. He therefore 
anticipated the treachery by causing him to be assassinated, and was 
himself proclaimed king (294). But his ambitious policy in Greece, 
Thrace, and Asia ended m final overthrow at the hands of Seleucus 
in 286. Three years later he died in captivity. For ten years (286- Ten years 
277) Macedonia was the scene of constant confusion and revolution, 
now divided between Lysimachus of Thrace and Pyrrhus of Epirus, 
now seized by various pretenders whose hold on power was short and 
stormy. The confusion seemed rendered hopeless by the wave of 



2()4-2S6. 



anarchy, 
2S6-2JJ. 



4IO 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Gallic 
invasion 
and rise of 
the Atiti- 
gonid 
dynasty, 
280-277. 
Philip V. 
succeeds in 
22g : but 
does not 
reign till 
220, 

The Mace- 
donian 
kingdom 
and Greece 
in 220. 



The 

Thracian 

kingdom 

disappears, 

281-280. 



Pergamus. 



Gallic invasion which swept over the country, and in which king 
Ptolemy Ceraunus lost his life (280) ; until in 277 Antigonus Gonatas, 
son of Demetrius, obtained peaceful possession of the crown ; and in 
a reign extending (with two brief interruptions) over thirty-eight years, 
guided the country back into paths of order and material prosperity. 
He was succeeded by his son Demetrius II. (239), who on his death 
in 229 left a son eight years old named Philip, under the guardianship 
of his cousin Antigonus Doson, who, while treating the boy with all 
kindness, practically remained king until his death in 220. In that 
year Philip V. began his real reign ; and it was with him that the 
Romans came in contact. 

The Macedonian kingdom thus transmitted was something more 
than the territory known geographically by that name. Though 
Greece was nominally free, Macedonian influence was widely ac- 
knowledged in a large part of it, and Macedonian garrisons were 
stationed in many of the towns, especially in the three " fetters of 
Greece " — Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acro-Corinthus, which controlled 
Thessaly, Euboea, and Peloponnesus respectively. It is true that 
even in Thessaly the people were supposed to enjoy their own con- 
stitution and laws, and not to be subjects in the same sense as the 
Macedonians ; but practically they were entirely at the orders of the 
king or his ministers, as were also the people of Locris, Phocis, 
and Doris. Even in Attica and Peloponnesus there were several 
towns in which a Macedonian garrison was placed, and in which, 
therefore, the orders of the Macedonian government were paramount. 
Moreover, the superior vigour and energy of the Macedonians 
gave them a special prestige, not only in Greece, but among the 
less manly subjects of the other kings also. It became the fashion 
to imitate their manners and dress, no less than their military 
tactics and methods of drill ; and although they were content 
with, and even proud of their monarchical government, they 
retained and exercised a privilege of free speech and blunt re- 
monstrances with the king that moved the surprise and envy of more 
servile peoples. 

The Thracian kingdom of Lysimachus disappeared with the death 
of that monarch in 281 in a war with Seleucus of Syria; who was 
himself assassinated in the course of the next year (280) at the 
instigation of Ptolemy Ceraunus. From that time Thrace ceased to 
be among the great powers. It fell into a state of complete anarchy. 
The cities of the Chersonese were claimed by the king of Egypt and 
actually annexed by him in 247 ; while Asia Minor passed to the 
kings of Syria, or maintained a virtual independence. Thus we find 
at Pergamus a wealthy citizen named Attalus assuming in 241 the 
title of king, and his kingdom at one time embracing a large part of 



xxvii EGYPT, SYRIA, AND MACEDONIA 411 

Asia Minor, at another reduced almost to the single city of Pergamus 
and its immediate territory. 

The government of Egypt had throughout these changes remained Egypt 
firmly in the family of the Lagidae. Up to 205 four Ptolemies had peaceful 
succeeded each other in peaceful succession, and established their ''""^ 
authority in Cyrene, Cyprus, and the Cyclades, while the possession ''' '' ^^'' 
of Coele-Syria and Palestine was a constant source of dispute between 
them and the Seleucid kings of Asia. The dynasty, however, 
remained Greek, and gathered round it in Alexandria Greek or 
Macedonian troops, Greek writers and libraries, and Greek artists, 
and never amalgamated with the people, who then, as now, were 
apparently content, though with occasional outbursts of fanatical 
violence, to produce the wealth of that extraordinary soil on the sole 
condition of being allowed to live and serve. But though the 
Ptolemies did not aspire, like the kings of Asia, to world-wide 
conquests, they attracted the commerce of the East and West to 
Alexandria, and had the influence which accompanies wealth. 

The Seleucid kings of Syria or Asia regarded themselves as Asia, 
occupying the place of the old Persian Empire, as organised or 301-220. 
subdued by Alexander. All Asia belonged to them in theory. Yet 
large parts of it had really become divided into separate independent 
kingdoms, and those parts which were nominally satrapies of the 
kingdom were in real truth constantly in rebellion. Little more than 
Cilicia, together with Syria Superior or Phoenicia, was practically in 
the hands of the king ; and even here the possession of coast towns 
was often disputed by the king of Egypt. Of the attempts of 
Antiochus the (ireat to make his kingdom of Asia a reality we shall 
have to speak hereafter. 

The result of these developments was the existence of three large Three 
powers — Syria or Asia, Egypt, and Macedonia ; while in Asia the ^'^'^S^ 
great king's dominions were fringed by a number of smaller king- ^^^°^^ 
doms or states — Pergamus, IMthynia, Cappadocia, and Pontus, ruled Egypt, 
by kings ; and a region on the Halys, in which the wandering Mace- 
Gauls had found a home and established a polity since about 250, donia. 
and which obtained the name of Galatia from them. It was to their Five 
couraireous resistance to these marauders that Attains chiefly owed ^^'^o^dary 
his royalty and Prusias of Bithynia his reputation. In the far East pef^amiis 
the Bactrians and Parthians successfully resisted the attempts of Bithynia, 
Antiochus to annex them ; and lastly, throughout Asia there were Cappa- 
a number of Hellenic settlements, independent or semi-independent, docia, 
which tended to keep alive a certain culture, and at any rate the Q^i^fi^ 
knowledge of the Greek language, in the various dynasties with which ojj-iSj. 
Rome afterwards came in contact. 

While the kingdoms of the East were thus breaking up and 



412 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Greece at 
the end of 
the third 
century 

B.C. 



The 

freedom of 
Greece 
nominally 
respected. 



Change in 
the centres 
of power in 
Greece. 

Athens. 



Thebes. 



reforming, Greece in some of its essential features remained what it 
had always been. It was still a race and not a dynasty that was 
meant by that term. No man called himself king of Greece : no 
body of men, whether hereditary or elective, could speak for all 
Greece. The love of local autonomy had survived ruinous internal 
strife, commercial disaster, and foreign conquest. Yet there was a 
real unity in this disunion. A common origin, language, and religion 
still caused the Greeks to stand out before the world as a distinct 
nation, representing a culture and civiHsation in which all wished to 
share, and which all recognised as Greek and Greek alone. 

It must partly be attributed to the sentiment excited by their 
character and unique intellectual position that the freedom of the 
Greeks had been so often, at least in name, respected. Philip II. 
and Alexander the Great had both been content to accept the title 
of their "general" [-/yye/xwi/], and had posed as champions of Hel- 
lenism. The same position was taken up by Antipater in 321 as 
guardian of the Macedonian kingdom, and in 3 i 2 by Cassander, who 
explicitly confirmed the freedom of Greece. Demetrius Poliorcetes, 
indeed, in 307, made himself master of Athens ; but he took the 
same title as did Philip II. and Alexander, and professed to champion 
Greek freedom against Macedonia. When he became king of 
Macedonia (295-287) his rule over Greece was continued, and for 
that period, more nearly than at any other, Greece was formally part 
of a kingdom. But in the confusion in Macedonia which followed 
his defeat in Asia, to the succession of his son Antigonus Gonatas 
(287-277), Greece became for the most part again practically free ; 
and though in some cities there were still Macedonian garrisons, in 
the majority the old autonomy remained, and also, unhappily, the old 
divisions and quarrels. 

But the centres of power and influence were not the same as of 
old. The Asiatic Greek cities had grown in wealth and importance 
beyond those in Greece proper. And in Greece proper itself there 
had been a great change. Athens still retained her walls and the 
walls of the Peiraeus, though the long walls which united the two had 
fallen into ruin ; but of her wide possessions outside Attica nothing 
remained. She still attracted the admiration as well as the benefac- 
tions of various kings and princes, but of political power or influence 
she had become wholly bereft, and was content to rest upon the 
glories of her past and the reputation of her schools of philosophy. 
Her dread of the power of Macedonia caused her to be closely allied 
with the Aetolians, and inclined from the first to welcome the Roman 
alliance. 

Thebes had never recovered from the vengeance of Alexander, 
and with Boeotia generally was in a feeble and demoralised state. 



THE AETOLIAN LEAGUE 



413 



without patriotism or public spirit, its old institutions only existing in 
the form of meaningless and demoralising celebrations and banquets, 
and was disposed to rely wholly on the Macedonian protection. 

Sparta, far from retaining her old ascendency, had been reduced Sparta. 
to the narrow limits of the ancient Laconia. With the flight of 
Cleomenes (222) she had lost the semblance of her peculiar consti- 
tution, and had fallen into the hands of a series of tyrants, the last of 
whom, called Nabis (207), made himself formidable by collecting 
round him a body of mercenaries gathered from all the worst ele- 
ments of Greece, and by joining in close alliance with the pirates of 
Crete. From enmity to the Achaean League, which was inclined to 
Macedonian protection, Sparta, like Elis and Messenia, was during 
this period in sympathy rather with Aetolia, and against the political 
union of Peloponnesus. 

The confederacies (Kotm) of Epirus and Acarnania were of no Acamania 
political importance. The Romans had already obtained a footing and 
at various points in their territories, as at Corcyra and Dyrrachium ; ^P^''^'^- 
but as a rule they were inclined to cling to Macedonian protection 
against the piracies or the encroachments of the Aetolians. 

In the midst of this general decay two powers had gained and The 
for some time had maintained something like consistence and life. AetoUan 
These were the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues. 

The Aetolians had in ancient times been little known in Greece. 
Strange stories were told of their wild and savage life, their raw food, 
I and their open mountain villages. Yet when the Athenian Demos- 
I thenes invaded them in 426 they had shown that they could combine 
[ for self-protection ; and both Sparta in her day of power and Philip 
i IL of Macedonia had had to reckon with them. They first appear as 
I taking a distinct part in Greek politics in the Lamian war of 322. 
i The presence of their soldiers at Crannon brought upon them an Services 
I invasion of the Macedonian generals, which they baffled by retreating of the 
1 to their mountains ; and their reputation in Greece was much extended ^'^^"^i"^''^- 
I by their services against the invading Gauls in 280-279. It was they 
1 who defended Delphi, and did most to cut to pieces the barbarous 
1 horde. From this time they stood out as one of the chief powers in 
I Greece. They joined to their League parts of western Acarnania, 
( southern Epirus, many cities in Thessaly, as Pharsalus, Echinus, 
I Demetrias, Hypata, and Herecleia ; in Peloponnesus, as Mantinea, 
j Tegea, Orchomenus, and others ; in Thrace, as Lysimacheia ; in 
I Asia Minor, as Cius and Chalcedon. The exact nature of the rela- 

Itions between the League and these outlying towns is somewhat 
obscure ; but it at least involved the obligation of protection against 
^ the attacks of others ; and though the League government was not 
^always able to supply that protection with sufficient promptitude, it 



and 

Achaean 

Leagues. 



414 HISTORY OF ROME 



predatory 
habits 



The was never absolutely refused. ^ At home there was a regularly con- 

governmetit stituted government capable of speaking in the name of the whole 
of^^^^. people. A Strategus, assisted by thirty counsellors or Apocleti, a 

^Leasm hipparch, and a secretary were elected every year. The assembly of 
the people was held at Thermus for this election, and at other times 
and places as required by puWic business. The decisions of this 
assembly were of absolute authority ; but the general policy of the 
League was much influenced by the views and character of the 
strategus for the time being. That policy seems on the whole to 
Their have been highly oppressive to their neighbours. The system of 

piratical private or public piracy was openly recognised ; private citizens main- 
^^^, tained the ri^ht of hiring themselves out in bodies to fight for any 

government that would pay them ; and wherever war was gomg on 
they professed to have the right of carrying off spoil from either of 
the contending parties, whether friends or enemies. 
The The second important power in Greece at this time was the 

Achaean AcHAEAN LEAGUE. Twelve cities of Achaia, the northern district 
League. ^f Peloponnesus, had formed a league long before Herodotus wrote. 
ikmentr^ It had not been one of the great powers in the days when Sparta and 
Athens were the leading states in Greece, yet it had always enjoyed 
a special reputation for good faith and disinterested conduct, which 
led to its being selected to arbitrate in more than one dispute between 
Greek towns. During the Macedonian period it had shared the 
general decHne. Many of its towns were occupied by Macedonian 
garrisons ; some had by natural causes become deserted or fallen 
into complete insignificance ; and the old federal union or govern- 
ment was at the beginning of the third century B.C. scarcely more than 
The revival a memory or tradition. A revival, however, had been begun in 284 
of the by four cities of the old federation — Dymae, Patrae, Tritaea, Pharae 

League in ^^^j^ forming a league for mutual assistance. These were soon 

^ ^' afterwards joined by three others, and for twenty-five years (279-255) 

these seven cities constituted the entire League, electing two strategi 
annually in turns. In 255 the dual office was abolished, and for the 
first time Margos was elected sole strategus. From this date the 
League rose rapidly in importance. About three years later it was 
joined by Sicyon under the influence of Aratus, the true founder of 

1 An inscription (C. I. G. 2350) containing the terms made with the island 
Keos (about B.C. 240-220) will show something of what was implied in such an 
arrangement : ' ' The Aetolians think it good to preserve the existing friendship 
with the Keians, and that no Aetolian shall plunder the Keians from whatsoever 
port he may sail, either by land or sea, either on the score of an Amphictyonic 
decree or any other — the Keians being now Aetolians. But if any one shall 
plunder the Keians the strategus of the time being shall have power to decide upon 
goods brought into Aetolia, and his assessors shall have authority to levy the fine 
for the Keians upon those who plundered them. " 



XXVII THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 415 

the new League, who expelled the tyrant from his native town, and 
on being elected strategus of the League for the second time, in 243, 
set himself to persuade the oth.er cities of Peloponnesus also to expel 
their tyrants and Macedonian garrisons, and to join the League, 
which implied free democratic institutions in each of its members. 
Corinth and Megara joined in 243 ; and when the death of king 
Demetrius (229) seemed to weaken the influence of Macedonia, there 
was a wide-spread movement among the tyrants of Peloponnesian 
states to resign their powers, and add their cities to the League. 
Thus it was at this time that Megalopolis, Argos, Hermione, and 
Phlius gave in their adhesion ; and the League came now to include 
all Peloponnesus except Elis and Laconia, and some towns in Arcadia 
which were members of the Aetolian League. 

The great adversary of this revived Achaean League was Cleomenes The war of 
of Sparta, whose hostility was supported by the jealousy of the Aetol- the League 
ians. The Cleomenic war (227-221), while it ruined Cleomenes ^^^^^^^^^^ 
and enfeebled Sparta, introduced again the influence of Macedonia 22^-221, ' 
in Peloponnesus. Antigonus Doson responded to the invitation of and the 
Aratus to assist the Achaeans against Sparta in 224, crushed Cleo- renewed 
menes at Sallasia (221), and then returned home to die. His death !-^^,^^^^^ ^z- 
(220) was foUowecl by renewed activity on the part of the Aetolians. Macedonia. 
Under Dorimachus they had for some time been employed in infest- 
ing Messenia from Phigaleia in xA.rcadia, which belonged to their 
League ; and now (220) the same man, along with a restless soldier 
named Scopas, induced the existing Aetolian strategus, Ariston, who 
was a man of no military talent or force of character, to sanction a 
regular war, — though without any formal diplomatic breach. The War %vith 
youth of the new sovereign of Macedonia, Philip V. (then seventeen ^^^ 
years old) encouraged the belief that active steps would not be taken ^^^ 
by the Macedonians. It was always an object of the Aetolians to 
establish or extend their power in Acarnania and Epirus, and Messenia 
was the constant field for their depredations. In all directions, there- 
fore, their privateers went forth, damaging their enemies and enriching 
the State. The Achaeans, under the influence of Aratus, proclaimed 
war. But though Aratus had many of the highest qualities of a 
statesman and military organiser, he was ineffective in the field. The Philip V. 
Achaeans suffered many reverses ; and in the meeting of the League invited into 

in the summer of 220 it was resolved to solicit the alliance of Epirus, ^^^ ^^^^' 

. poTinesus. 

Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip of Macedon against the com- 
mon enemy. In the war which followed (220-217) the youthful king 
Philip showed both energy and skill beyond his age, and the Aetolians 
were glad in 216 to negotiate a peace, which was suggested by 
emissaries from the sea powers Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and 
from king Ptolemy of Egypt. 



4i6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Philip 

conceives 

the 

ambition of 

invading 

Italy. 



Influence of 
Det?ietrius 
of Pharos. 



Philip 
makes 
peace with 
the 
Aetolians. 



Prepar- 
ations for 
the Italian 
war, 2IJ- 

2/6. 



A Roman 
squadron of 
observa- 
tion, 
216. 



But if the Aetolians were prepared for peace so was king Philip. 
In the course of his great campaign his ambition had become roused, 
and the ideas of Empire which had inspired previous kings of Mace- 
donia had taken possession of him. He soon ceased to be merely the 
champion of Achaean independence and of Greece against Aetolian 
wrong-doing. His eyes were turned, like those of Alexander and 
Pyrrhus of Epirus, to the West. The suggestion came from Demetrius 
of Pharos, who had taken refuge with him in 219 after the victories 
of Aemilius Paullus in the Illyrian war. Polybius assigns the deteriora- 
tion in Philip's character to the influence of this unprincipled adven- 
turer, whose objects in the advice given to the king were purely 
selfish. He desired the humiliation of Rome to gratify his personal 
vengeance, but still more because by that means alone could he hope 
to recover his lost dominions. He therefore constantly instigated 
Philip to leave Greece, where he was now sufficiently strong, and to 
turn his attention to conquests in Illyria as a stepping-stone to Italy. 
In the summer of 217, as Philip was watching the sports at the 
Nemean festival, a courier arrived with the news of the Roman defeat 
at Thrasymene (22nd June). The king showed the letter at first to 
no one except Demetrius, who at once urged him to seize the oppor- 
tunity of pushing his designs upon Italy. Philip found no opposition 
in his council when the measure w\t,s proposed to them. Aratus 
could not deny that the successes won by the king were sufficient to 
enable him to make peace with dignity ; and others were eager for 
any arrangement which would unite Greece in the presence of the 
growing power of Rome. 

Philip immediately set about his preparations. In the winter 
of 217-216 a hundred galleys were built for him by Illyrian ship- 
builders ; and by the summer of 216 they were afloat, and their crews 
in training. But the Romans were not wholly unprepared. Scerdi- 
laidas, one of the princes who had been established by Roman in- 
fluence or consent in part of the dominions of Queen Teuta, had 
given information at Rome of the suspicious preparations of Philip, 
and had asked aid for himself. 

The Romans, however, were wholly bent upon the struggle with 
Hannibal, and the preparations for the battle of Cannae. They 
therefore merely sent an order to the commander of the fleet at 
Lilybaeum to detach a squadron of ten ships to watch the Illyrian 
coast. But as it happened, this proved sufficient to alarm Philip. 
He was about to enter the mouth of the Aous when some vessels 
arrived in haste with information that the Roman fleet was at Rhegium 
on its way to Apollonia. Philip and his fleet were seized with a 
panic, and sailed back day and night until they reached Cephallenia. 
There he endeavoured to excuse his ignominious flight by pretending 



XXVII PHILIP AND HANNIBAL 417 

that he had been invited to carry out some operations in Peloponnesus. 
But he had lost a great opportunity in Illyria ; and it was not till 
after the battle of Cannae and Hannibal's advance into Campania 
that he ventured on farther steps. 

At Rome, meanwhile, it had become clear that Philip was dan- The 
gerous, and that the origin of his policy was the advice of Demetrius, Romans 
for whose surrender accordingly an embassy was sent just before dem^^^<^ 
the battle of Cannae. The news of that disaster, however, decided ^.^^^^^ ^ 
Philip to openly join the Carthaginians. We have seen how his Demetrius, 
ambassadors fell into the hands of the Romans with the text of the 216. 
treaty, thus giving them timely warning of what was going on. 

It was not till 215 that Philip learnt what had happened, and Philip 
despatched new emissaries to Hannibal. These last succeeded in makes a 
bringing to him a copy of the treaty to which Hannibal had sworn ; ^^/^^^i ^ 
but even then he took no immediate measures in aid of his new ally. 2ij. 
Either the Roman fleet now permanently stationed at Brundisium 
alarmed him, or his thoughts had been recalled to Greece. A revolu- 
tion in Messenia had given him an opportunity of getting rid of the 
oligarchical party opposed to him there : and for two years (2 i 5-2 1 3) 
he was more or less engaged in this country. His evil genius, Philip's 
Demetrius of Pharos, fell in 2 14 during an assault on Mount Ithome ; ^oss of 
but Philip continued the attack upon the Messenians afterwards in Popularity 
person ; in the course of which, m addition to many other acts ot 214-213. 
cruelty, he was believed to have got rid of Aratus by poison. These 
proceedings, however, did much to ruin his popularity among the 
Greeks, and disposed even the Achaeans, who owed so much to the 
Macedonian kings, to attach themselves to Rome. 

At the time, therefore, at which Philip provoked the enmity of The 
Rome, the hostility which he had roused against himself in (jreece, eletnents 
and the mutual animosities of the Greeks themselves, afforded a ^f j^Yzi?^ 
I ready means of forming a combination against him. Sparta, indeed, ^^ philip. 
I chiefly from hostility to the Achaean League, and because its tyrant 
I found every man's hand against him, was ready to maintain alliance 
I with Philip. But the Achaeans, his usual allies, had been deeply 
'; offended by his proceedings in Messenia and stood aloof. The 
I Aetolians desired extension of territory at his expense, and were 
I especially jealous as to Acarnania and the Thessahan and Asiatic 
; towns which belonged to their League. The lUyrian princes, Scerdi- 
j laidas and his son Pleuratus, owed their position to Roman favour, 
\ and were always apprehensive of Macedonian encroachment. The 
ruler of the Athamanians, Anaxymander, had also reason to fear his 
more powerful neighbour, and was glad to join the Roman attack ; 
while in Asia Minor the king of Pergamus from the first was ener- 
\ getically on the side of Rome : for Philip was encroaching in the 

2 li 



4i8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

Romans 

determine 

upon war 

with 

Philip, 

215- 



M. 

Valerius 
Laevinus 
in com- 
mand of 
thejleet 
from 214 
to 211. 



Valerius 
makes a 
treaty with 
the 

Aetolians, 
211. 



Confeder- 
acy against 
Philip. 



Thracian Chersonese and even in Asia itself, and, moreover, was a 
friend and relation of Prusias of Bithynia, his own constant enemy. 
Antiochus the Great had secured the chief power in Asia Minor by 
the capture and death of his cousin Achaeus, who had taken it from 
Attains, but was at present (212-205) engaged in his expedition into 
Upper Asia, and did not as yet affect Greek politics. 

The terms of Philip's treaty with Hannibal, by which he engaged 
to exclude the Romans from Corcyra and Illyria, determined the 
Roman government to proclaim war against him, although they were 
engaged at the same time in their life and death struggle with 
Hannibal. But little was done on either side for the first three years. 
A fleet indeed, with one legion, was stationed at Brundisium, under 
the propraetor M. Valerius, with general orders to keep guard against 
an invasion, but at first had little to do. In 214 a message from 
Oricum informed Valerius that Philip, with i 20 ships, had sailed up 
the Aous ; was attacking Apollonia ; and was likely to attack Oricum 
also. These Greek towns in Illyria were convenient places of landing 
from Brundisium, the latter at the mouth of the Aous, the former 
some seven miles up the stream, and were already closely allied with 
Rome. Valerius, therefore, acted promptly. Leaving T. Valerius 
in charge of Brundisium, he crossed with his main fleet to Oricum, 
expelled the Macedonian garrison, and then advanced by land to 
Apollonia. He threw himself with 2000 men into the town by a road 
which the king had neglected to guard, and joined the Apolloniates 
in a sally upon the king's camp. Philip escaped with difficulty, 
abandoning his camp and siege artillery, which was appropriated to 
the defence of the town. 

M. Valerius wintered in Oricum, and his imperhun was prolonged 
through 213 and 212. We have no details of his operations in those 
years, though he is said to have been successful both by land and 
sea. He concluded a treaty with the Aetolian League (211), which 
was to include, if they wished it, the Eleans, Lacedaemonians, king 
Attalus, and the Illyrian princes Pleuratus and Scerdilaidas, in virtue 
of which the Aetolians undertook to make war on Philip and to 
supply a minimum of twenty-five quinqueremes to the Roman fleet ; 
and in return were to be allowed to take Acarnania, and retain all 
towns that might be taken as far north as Corcyra. The Aetolians 
at once commenced operations, and Valerius took Zathynthus, which, 
with Oeniadae and Nasus in Acarnania, he caused to be assigned to 
the Aetolian League. Corcyra itself was held as a dependency of 
Rome. 

Philip, threatened by this formidable combination, retaliated by 
a rapid march upon the territory of Apollonia. From thence he 
hurried into Thessaly to secure the loyalty and co-operation of the 



the 
Aetolians 
at Lamia, 



xxvn THE LEAGUE AGAINST PHILIP 419 

Thessalian towns. From Thessaly he was recalled to defend his Philip's 

frontiers from an invasion of Thracians and Maedi ; and while vigoroHs 

engaged with them he heard that the Aetolians were invading Acar- 'f"-^^^^'-^^^- 

nania. He hurried off to the rescue, but learnt on the way that 

they had retired. 

In the spring of 210 Valerius sailed from Corcyra to Naupactus, 210-20S. 

and took Anticyra in Locris ; but while there was recalled to Rome Sulpicius 

to enter upon his consulship. His successor P. Sulpicius Galba ^ ^ ^^, 
,.,,., ^ T^ • 1 • ,/-,,• f. . , command 

did little at first. But in this or the following year king Attalus of the fleet. 

purchased the island of Aegina from the Aetolians for thirty talents, 
and made it the headquarters of his fleet. There Sulpicius joined 
him, and the two projected an attack upon all points in eastern 
Greece in the hands of the king of Macedonia. Philip replied to Victory of 
this move by taking Echinus, a strong town on the coast of Phthiotis P^^^^P o'^^^ 
belonging to the AetoHans, in spite of the efforts of Sulpicius and the 
Aetolians to relieve it. He then resolved to proceed to Peloponnesus 
and recover the friendship of the Achaeans by helping them against 2og. 
their enemy Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta. The Aetolian army, sup- 
ported by some troops of Attalus and a thousand Roman soldiers, tried 
to prevent him, but were beaten with considerable loss at Lamia. At 
the harbour town of Lamia, called Phalara, legates from Ptolemy, The mari- 
Rhodes, Athens, and Chios met the king and endeavoured to induce timepoivers 
him to make peace. Their efforts, however, were in vain, and he /'^^'^^^^'^"'^^ 
continued his march into Peloponnesus, strengthening and securing ^^ 
Euboea on his way against a possible attack of Attalus. He resided 
at Argos during the following autumn and winter, attended another 
abortive peace conference at Aegium, and gained a small success 
over a Roman force which was making a raid upon the territory of 
Sicyon. But the licentious conduct of the king and his court during 
the winter still farther alienated the feelings of the Achaeans, and he 
returned to Demetrias in the spring of 208 to find himself beset with 
appeals from every quarter, testifying to the activity of his enemies, 
while he had done much during the past months to deprive himself 
of his friends. Thus the Achaeans called for help against an impend- The 
ing attack by Machanidas of Sparta and the Aetolians ; the Boeotians expected 
and Euboeans against Attalus and the Romans ; the Acarnanians ^A^'^^^^'" 
and Epirotes expected to be attacked by Aetolians or by Scerdi- 
laidas and Pleuratus ; whilst the frontiers of Macedonia itself were 
threatened by hostile Thracian tribes, and Philip was cut off from 
the south by Aetolian troops holding the pass of Thermopylae. 

In the presence of these various and formidable dangers Philip Philip's 
showed his highest qualities of courage and vigour. The several energy. 
delegates were dismissed with promises of aid, which, as far as his 
means extended, was promptly given. A garrison was sent to the 



420 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

Romatis 
and king 
Attahis in 
Euboea. 



Attains 
retires to 
Asia, and 
the war 
languishes . 



Philip dis- 
appointed 
of support 
from 
Carthage, 
208. 



Philip 
orders a 
new fleet to 
be built ^ 
208-20"/. 



island of Peparethus to intercept Attalus when he came as usual to 
Aegina ; other troops under Polyphontes were sent to Boeotia and 
Phocis ; others under Menippus to Euboea. He himself advanced 
to Scotussa, on the borders of Phthiotis, with the intention of inter- 
rupting a conference summoned by the Aetolians at Heracleia, 
immediately to the north of Thermopylae. He was too late to 
interrupt the congress, but he left a strong force at Scotussa and 
retired to Demetrias, as the best centre from which to keep watch 
over Peparethus, Phocis, and Euboea, between which places and 
Demetrias he established a system of fire signals or beacons, whereby 
he would at once become aware of any attack made upon any one of 
these points. 

Meanwhile king Attalus, after leaving the conference at Heracleia, 
joined Sulpicius at Aegina, and the combined forces made an attack 
upon Euboea. Oreos on the north of the island was taken, but 
Chalcis was successfully held by the Macedonian garrison, and the 
rest of the campaign was unfavourable to the allies. Attalus, while 
attempting a descent upon the coast of Opuntian Locris, was sur- 
prised by Philip, who had been warned by his beacons of the danger 
to Euboea, and was marching southward. Attalus was obliged to 
fly back to Oreos, whence he was recalled home by the news that 
Prusias of Bithynia was invading the Pergamene territory. Sulpicius 
also remained inactive at Aegina : while Philip continued his march 
towards Peloponnesus, after again rejecting proposals of peace 
suggested by envoys from Egypt and Rhodes. 

In Peloponnese his ostensible object was to assist the Achaeans 
against Machanidas of Sparta. But he also hoped to find a squadron 
of Carthaginian ships in the harbour of Aegium, where he attended 
the autumn assembly of the Achaean League. The Punic admiral, 
however, had feared to enter the Corinthian Gulf lest he should be 
caught there by Sulpicius, who, as he was informed, was shortly to 
be expected at Naupactus. 

Finding, therefore, that he must depend on his own resources 
for continuing the war at sea, Philip ordered one hundred new ships 
to be built at Cassandreia (Potidaea). But of the operations of the 
next two years (207-206) we have no details. Stirring events in Spain 
and Italy distracted the attention of the Romans from Greece ; the 
Aetolians professed to feel themselves neglected by their aUies ; and 
the absence of king Attalus, who was detained in Asia by troubles 
at home, helped to cause the war to be carried on slackly. On his 
side Philip had some reason to desire an accommodation with the 
Aetolians. The Achaeans, under the inspiring leadership of Philo- 
poemen, gained a great victory over the Spartans at Mantinea, in 
which the tyrant Machanidas was killed (207) ; and Nabis, who 



PACIFICATION OF PHOENICE 



421 



contrived to seize the tyranny in succession to him, devoted the 
earlier part of his reign to strengthening his position in Sparta, and 
left the Achaeans alone. It did not suit Philip's policy that the 
Achaeans should be independent of his aid. He is said to have 
tried to get Philopoemen poisoned ; and at any rate circumstances 
combined to make both the king and the Aetolians ready to listen to 
suggestions of peace. 

Accordingly negotiations for a general pacification were more Negoti- 
than once renewed, with the good offices as before of Egypt and the ations for 
maritime powers, in the years 207 and 206, and were only (^ general 
prevented from succeeding by the opposition of Sulpicius, who f^^^^ ^ 
persuaded the Senate that it was for the Roman interests that Philip Sulpicius, 
and the Aetolians should remain at war with each other. P. Sem- 206. 
pronius was therefore sent out in 205 with a reinforcement of 10,000 
infantry and 1 000 cavalry. But when he arrived to relieve Sulpicius The 
he found that the Aetolians had already accepted a separate peace Aetolians 
with Philip. By so acting they violated the treaty of 211, and for- ^^^^e a 
feited the advantages secured to them by that arrangement ; but the ^^^^'^ ^ 

° . / . . ° ' peace with 

immediate result was that in a few months negotiations were renewed, phUip. 

and a suspension of hostilities, at least for a time, for all who had 

been parties to the war was agreed upon. 

The advent of the Roman army under Sempronius had been the Peace of 
signal for the rising of the Parthini and other lUyrian tribes, to Phoenice, 
counteract which Philip invaded the territory of Apollonia, hoping to ^^•^■ 
provoke Sempronius to come out of that city and give him battle. 
He failed to do this, and while he was still there he was approached 
by legates of the Epirotes. There was a general weariness of the 
war, which had now dragged on for nine years without producing 
much definite result ; and the Epirotes induced Philip to consent to 
meet Sempronius, and the representatives of other nations interested, 
at Phoenice, in Epirus. The only condition exacted from PhiHp, 
beyond the undertaking not to molest states in alliance with Rome, 
seems to have been the surrender to Rome of his suzerainty over the 
Parthini and certain towns in Epirus, with the reservation of Atin- 
tania for future consideration. No question of all that had induced 
the various parties to the war to join in it was settled or, apparently, 
discussed. It was a peace on the basis of the status quo atite^ and 
could hardly be anything better than an armistice. 

The real importance of the treaty, as expressing the results of Importance 
the nine years' desultory Warfare, was that it clearly defined the two ^f ^^^ 
sides, — the protectorates of Macedonia and Rome,— for the safety ^^^ y- 
of which they were respectively pledged. On Philip's side the The two 
parties to the peace were Prusias of Bithynia, the Achaeans, the confeder- 
Boeotians, Thessalians, Acarnanians, Epirotes ; on that of the ^""' 



422 



HISTORY OF ROME chap, xxvii 



hostilities. 



Romans, the people of Ilium/ king Attains, Nabis of Sparta, the 
Eleans, Messenians, and Athenians. Having already made their 
own terms with Philip, the Aetolians were not parties to this treaty, 
and were not pledged, as were the others, to resent an attack upon 
a member of either body of allies. They would have to be dealt 
with separately at any future outbreak of hostilities ; but they did 
not consider their treaty with Rome of 2 1 1 to be abrogated, and we 
shall find them hereafter claiming the possession of captured cities 
The in virtue of it. For the Romans the war had served its immediate 

prospect of object, which was to prevent Philip from giving help to Hannibal, 
renewed y^^^ j|. -^^^ jgfj- j^-g legacy of responsibility and therefore of danger for 
the future. Each of the parties to the treaty on the Roman side 
would be certain to appeal to Rome in case of encroachment or 
injury of any sort from Aetolian or Macedonian ; and to such appeals 
neither honour nor interest would allow the Senate to turn a deaf 
ear. Troubles of this sort were only too likely to arise ; Philip 
was neither beaten nor dismayed. The Achaean League had not 
approached its great object of combining all Peloponnesus in one 
confederacy, and had continually to fear the encroachments of the 
Spartan tyrants and the hostility of the Aetolians. The outlying 
towns joined to the Aetolian League would be a constant source of 
quarrel between them and the sovereign of Macedonia. It must 
have been evident to all prudent men that a renewal of the war was 
not far distant, and that the question of Roman or Macedonian 
supremacy on the east of the Adriatic would have to be decided by 
arms. 

^ That is New Ilium, which was believed to represent the ancient Troy, or at 
least a restoration of it on a closely contiguous spot. It had some time during 
this war applied for Roman protection on the ground of the Trojan descent of 
Romulus, and a strong sentiment in its favour had been roused at Rome, though 
its inhabitants were really Aetolian Greeks. We shall see the same sentiment 
influencing the part taken by the Romans again ; and at any rate it seems to be 
the first Asiatic city enjoying the direct protection of Rome. 

Authorities. — The history of this war is given in a fragmentary manner by 
Livy in the intervals of his account of the Hannibalian war (xxii.-xxix. ). A very 
full account of Philip's character and his policy in Greece is given by Polybius, but 
of the actual war with Rome the surviving fragments contain only a few details. 
There is an interesting account of Philip's first idea of joining in the struggle (v. 
loi), and the text of his treaty with Hannibal (vii. 9), but little more. The influ- 
ence of Demetrius of Pharos, on which Polybius lays stress, is dwelt upon by Trogus 
(Just, xxviii. ); an account of the peace of Phoenice is given by h.\)^\'AXi,Macedon. 11. 
But the usual secondary authorities pass over this war very lightly. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

THE SFXOND MACEDONIAN WAR 
200-195 

The conduct of king Plnlip during the peace of 205-200 — His league with 
Antiochus against Egypt (205), and his attacks on the Cyclades and Thracian 
Chersonese of Asia (202-201) — The Rhodians and king Attains declare war 
with him (201) — Appeals from Ptolemy and the Greek states to Rome — The 
Roman commissioners in Egypt and Greece (203-201) — The Romans pro- 
claim war (200) — P. Sulpicius Galba lands in Epirus and sends aid to Athens 
— Ineffective campaigns of 200 and 199 — Arrival of T. Quintius Flamininus 
(198) — Victory of Flamininus in the Antigoneian Pass and his march through 
Greece — The Achaean League join Rome (198) — Peace congress of Nicaea 
fails (198-197) — Campaign of 197 and battle of Cynoscephalae— Freedom of 
some Greek states proclaimed at Isthmian games (196) — War with Nabis of 
Sparta, settlement of Greece and triumph of Flamininus (195-194). 

When the treaty of Phoenice was referred to the Senate no difficuhy The peace 
was made as to its ratification. The attention of Government and 0/20^-200. 
people alike was fixed upon Africa and the final conflict with Provoca- 
Carthage. But from the very first Philip committed himself to Hons of 
measures which were neither unnoticed nor forgotten at Rome, ^'^S 
although for the moment they were ignored. ^' 

About the very time at which the peace was being settled he had A Mace- 
received an application from Carthage, now in desperate straits, to doman 
effect a diversion in its favour by invading Italy or Sicily. The king ■^/,^/^^jJ/ 
could not openly renounce his new alliance ; but he either commis- {„ Africa. 
sioned one of his nobles, named Sopater, to raise, or connived at his 
raising, a body of 4000 men to cross to Africa. These men fought 
at Zama under Hannibal, and many of them became prisoners of 
war to the Romans. This fact could not be denied ; but it was done 
in such a way as to enable the king to disavow it ; and though the 
truth was thoroughly understood at Rome, there was no disposition 
at present to allow anything to interfere with the complete settlement 
of the quarrel with Carthage. 



424 



HISTORY OF ROME 



League of 
Philip 
with 

Antiochus 
to divide 
the 

dominions 
of Ptolemy 
V. of 
Egypt, 
205. 



Operations 
among the 
Cyclades 
and at 
Rhodes, 
204-202. 



Philip 
in the 
Thracian 
Chersonese 
and Asia, 
202. 



But more than this, Philip almost at once began a series of 
aggressions in Greece and Asia. Antiochus had returned in 205 
from his great expedition into central Asia, flushed with success, 
and with a reputation for personal gallantry and military capacity 
which had gained him the title of the Great, hardly justified by his 
conduct in the subsequent struggle with Rome. Towards the end 
of the year he entered into a flagitious bargain with Philip to divide 
between them the outlying dominions of the youthful king of Egypt, 
Ptolemy Epiphanes. His own share was to be Coele-Syria and 
Palestine, with parts of Gyrene and Egypt itself; Philip's was to be 
the Gyclades and the cities and islands of Ionia. 

In order to carry out his part of the arrangement Philip was 
obliged to strengthen his power in the Aegean, and this at once 
involved him in hostilities with Attalus of Pergamus, and with the 
powerful naval state of Rhodes. He employed for his purposes 
Heracleides of Tarentum, who had been guilty of double treason 
during the conflict of Hannibal and the Romans for that town, and 
Dicaearchus, an Aetolian pirate. 

He began with an attack upon the Cyclades, the reduction of 
which was at once commenced by Dicaearchus with a squadron of 
twenty ships. To Heracleides was committed the task of preventing 
the Rhodians, the naval guardians of the Aegean, from interfering to 
protect the Islands. This he did first by aiding the Gretans in a 
war against Rhodes, in which their piracies had involved them, and 
secondly by a piece of congenial treachery. He crossed to Rhodes, 
pretending that he had abandoned the service of Philip, and having 
gained the confidence of the authorities, found an opportunity of 
setting fire to the arsenal and burning enough of their ships to cripple 
for a time any expeditions for the relief of the Gyclades. 

Philip himself marched at the head of an army towards the 
Hellespont, and seized Lysimacheia, which commanded the entrance 
of the Thracian Ghersonese, and had for some time been a member 
of the Aetolian League, though formerly belonging to the king of 
Egypt. He then crossed to the Asiatic side and took two other 
towns, which were also at that time in political connexion with the 
Aetolians, Ghalcedon and Gius, and annexed them to the dominions 
of his brother-in-law Prusias of Bithynia. But in the case of Gius it 
was only an empty town which he thus handed over. The Gians 
made a stout resistance, and when at length, in spite of the 
remonstrances of envoys from Rhodes, he succeeded in taking 
the place, he broke his promise of granting impunity to the people. 
They were sold as slaves and their property treated as spoils of 
war, — a cruelty inflicted also on the people of Thasos on his way 
home, although they had surrendered without a struggle. 



and 
devastates 



xxviii PHILIP AT WAR WITH ATTALUS AND RHODES 425 

These acts were not intended as a provocation to the AetoHan The 
League. They were done in pursuance of his bargain with Rhodians 
Antiochus, in virtue of which Phihp claimed all places that had ^^^ ^^"S' 
belonged to the king of Egypt in the Aegean and the coasts of proclaim 
Europe and Asia. But they at once aroused the fears and anger of war 
Attalus and the Rhodians. The fate of Cius had been watched against 
with great anxiety at Rhodes, but by messages of pretended ^^^^^^P^ 
moderation Philip had prevented active measures for its relief. 
When the news of its fall and the treatment of its people became 
known, both Attalus and the Rhodians determined upon war, and 
a powerful fleet was prepared for the spring of 201. 

But Philip once more displayed the greatest spirit and activity. Philip 
Early in 201 he invaded the territory of Attalus, and advanced invades 
up to the walls of Pergamus itself. Being unable to take the city he 
ravaged the suburbs, sparing neither house nor temple. But in spite ^/SJ' 
of this plunder, and the sack of Thyatira and the neighbouring territory of 
lands, he soon found himself short of provisions ; nor did Zeuxis, Pergamus. 
Antiochus's satrap at Sardis, supply his wants as he had hoped. He 
therefore went on board his fleet to attack the islands. 

He had already taken Samos and was besieging Chios when the Battle of 
I combined fleet of Attalus and Rhodes appeared. Finding the siege Chios, 

of Chios long and difficult he resolved to retire to Samos, and to ^^^' 

j do so was obliged to elude or conquer the allied fleet. Failing to 

elude them he was forced to fight. His ships on the whole got the 

worst of the battle : yet Attalus himself was all but captured, and 

with difficulty escaped to Erythrae, with the loss of his own ship and 

\ others attending it. The losses, indeed, on both sides were serious, 

I including the chief admiral of both fleets. 

« But if the battle of Chios was of doubtful result, the same could Philip's 
I not be said when it was renewed shortly afterwards off Lade. Here ^^^"^^^^ ^^ 
I Philip's victory was decisive, and was followed by the occupation of 
j Caria and the reduction of the Rhodian Peraea. But while he was 
1 thus employed on land, Attalus and the Rhodians had repaired and 
i increased their fleets, which were now strong enough to prevent him 
I from attempting to return to Macedonia. He therefore wintered in 
( Caria, although reports reached him of disturbances in Macedonia 
i which made him anxious to be at home. Again his provisions ran 
I short, and he was reduced to humiliating supplications for supplies, 
\ and was compelled to allow his army to live on simple robbery. In 
I the spring, however, he eluded the hostile fleets, which, after vainly 
j chasing him for a time, put in at Aegina (200). 

I From Aegina Attalus crossed by invitation to Athens. The 

I Athenians had already had cause of complaint against Philip for 

assisting a raid of Acarnanians upon their territory ; and, therefore, 



426 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Attains 
secures the 
alliance of 
Athens, 
200. 



The 

Romans 
undertake 
to protect 

Egypt, 
204. 



Farther 
appeals to 
Rome, 
204-201. 



Philip's 
envoys in 
Rome, 
20 J. 



Answer of 
the Senate 
to Philip's 
envoys. 



their usual anti-Macedonian feelings were at their height. Attalus 
was received with enthusiasm ; every honour which words could 
bestow was lavished on him, his name being even given to a 
new tribe, as though he were one of the eponymous heroes. An 
alliance with him and Rhodes was unanimously voted, and full civil 
rights bestowed on all Rhodians. There was also at Athens at this 
time some legates from Rome, who took advantage of the enthusiasm 
of the hour to enrol Athens among the "friends of Rome," whom 
they were now seeking to combine against the king. 

For by this time it had been resolved at Rome that war must be 
made on Phihp. As early as 204 legates from Alexandria had 
come to Rome denouncing the nefarious schemes of Antiochus and 
Philip, and begging for assistance. The Romans had experienced the 
friendship of Egypt during the Punic war, and had learnt the value 
of its corn fields ; they were therefore quite ready to guarantee its 
independence. Three legates were sent to order the two kings to 
abstain from attacking Egypt as a friend of Rome, one of whom, M. 
Aemilius Lepidus, remained in Alexandria for some years as a 
guardian of the young king's interest. 

But other complaints also had been pouring in from the allied 
states, alleging acts of aggression on the part of Philip's officers, 
almost from the month in which the treaty had been made. These 
complaints became so frequent that in 203 three more commissioners 
— C. Terentius Varro, C. Manilius, M. Aurelius Cotta— were sent to 
Greece to investigate the matter on the spot. Philip replied by 
sending ambassadors to Rome in the course of the year 201. But 
though they offered explanations and excuses on some points, they 
also lodged formal complaints as to acts of hostility, of which they 
alleged the Roman commissioners had themselves been guilty ; and 
finally demanded the restoration of Sopater and the other Macedonians 
taken prisoners at Zama, whom they spoke of as private citizens 
serving for pay in Hannibal's army. 

The senators listened to this message with indignant surprise. 
Aurelius had also sent an agent to represent the case of the com- 
missioners, who assured the Senate that they had in every case 
acted only in defence of an allied state ; and that, so far from being 
a mere private mercenary, Sopater was a man high in the king's 
confidence, one of his purpurati, and had been sent by the king 
with men and money expressly to assist Hannibal. The Senate 
therefore answered sternly that the king had doubly broken his 
treaty, first in assisting the enemies of the Republic, and secondly 
by injuring its allies ; Scipio and Aurelius had both done only their 
duty, the former in taking the Macedonian soldiers prisoners, the 
latter in defending Roman allies from the hostile acts of the king's 



XXVIII THE ROMANS INTERPOSE IN GREECE 427 

officers. " It was plain," they added, " that the king desired war, The 

and he should speedily have it." The war, however, was not popular Romans 

at Rome. The people had but just emerged from the long agony ''^^^"^^'^^^^7 

of the struggle with Carthage,' and it was difficult to persuade them ^^^. 

to enter upon another, especially where the interests to be defended 200. 

were not those of Romans, but of Greeks, of whom they knew little Coss. P. 

that did not inspire contempt. It was only when the consul ^^P^^^'f 
,, , . . . . , , .-.'-... ■' . . . Galea II., 

Sulpicms msisted that, if they wished to prevent another invasion ^ Aurel- 

of Italy, they must fight the king of Macedonia in his own lands, ius Cotta. 
that they were induced to cancel the vote forbidding the war. But Prepara- 
before its formal declaration the Roman commissioners in Greece tionsfor 
had warned the various allied states of what was coming. We have organising 
seen how they had secured the alliance of Athens. They were still 'f^^pf"r^ 
there when a Macedonian force under Nicanor entered Attica and 
advanced as far as the Academy. They sent a herald to him for- 
bidding him to molest that or any other city allied to Rome ; and 
Nicanor did not venture to disobey, for the breach between his 
master and Rome was not yet openly avowed. They then left 
Athens and visited the other allies, — the Epirotes at Phoenice, 
Amynander in Athamania, the Aetolians at Naupactus, and the 
Achaeans at Aegium, — assuring each that any attack by Philip upon 
them, or upon any state allied to Rome, would be followed by 
instant war. About the same time a Rhodian fleet sailed among 
the Cyclades and obtained the adhesion of all but three — Andros, 
Paros, and Cythnos, in which there were still Macedonian garrisons. 

But Philip also was well prepared, and even before war was Energy and 
declared sent Philocles with 2000 infantr)^ and 200 cavalry to invade activity of 
Attica again : while he himself marched to the Thracian Chersonese ; "5^/f^-^'. 
received the submission of nearly every town on his way and in the ^/w^^ ' 
Chersonese itself; and, being met at Maroneia by his fleet, crossed 
to Asia and laid siege to Abydos. The defence was long and 
desperate, though the citizens received little help from outside ; for 
only a small garrison and a single quadrireme was supplied by the 
Rhodian fleet stationed at Tenedos ; whither also Attains came on 
hearing of the siege. Diplomatic interference was indeed tried, but 
Philip contrived to allay the alarm at Rhodes while he turned a deaf 
ear to all remonstrances, even to those of the Roman commissioners, 
who on hearing at Rhodes of the siege of Abydos, sent one of 
their number, M. Aemilius Lepidus, to deliver to the king in person 
the last orders of the Republic : " He must abstain from attacking The 
any Greek town, leave untouched all places under the power of Roman 
king Ptolemy, and submit to arbitration the indemnities claimed by ''*^^^' 
Attains and the Rhodians for injuries done by him." The king 
answered that the Romans had been the aggressors. Aemilius 



428 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Fall of 
A by do s, 
and 

exasper- 
ation 
against 
Philip, 
200. 



The consul 
P. 

Sulpicius 

lands in. 

Epiriis 

and 

despatches 

Claiidius 

Cornelius 

to defend 

Athens, 



Romans 
su7'prise 
and 

partly burn 
Chalcis, 



bluntly interrupted the royal speech by exclaiming : " But what about 
the Athenians and the Cianians ? And what about the Abydenians 
at this moment? Did any of them begin hostilities?" The king 
kept his temper at this unceremonious address, remarking with 
ironical courtesy that he excused Aemilius for three reasons : " he 
was young and unused to conducting such business, he was very 
handsome, and lastly he was a Roman." He added, however, that 
for his part he demanded of the Romans that they should not break 
the treaty and make war on him ; if they did, he would by God's 
help defend himself as best he could. 

The king had his barren diplomatic triumph ; and presently a 
more substantial advantage in the fall of Abydos. The citizens 
resisted to the last, fighting desperately upon the ruins of the walls 
which his battering rams had thrown down, and finally killed their 
wives and children, and then themselves, rather than fall into 
his hands. But though he had thus secured his passage into 
Asia, he had exasperated his enemies, and confirmed them in their 
resolve to join their fortunes with those of Rome. The Rhodians, 
Attains, and the Athenians at once warmly espoused the Roman 
alliance, and were preparing in their several ways to contribute 
active assistance. 

Shortly after the capture of Abydos news reached the king 
which compelled him to return to Greece. The consul P. Sulpicius 
with his army and fleet had crossed to Epirus somewhat late in the 
summer, and would probably not make any important movement 
that year. But the land force was to winter at Apollonia, and the 
fleet under L. Apustius at Corcyra : the Romans, therefore, were 
preparing to carry on the war continuously, and the king must 
reckon upon an invasion of his western frontier. But besides that, 
when Sulpicius landed at Dyrrachium he was met by envoys from 
Athens, announcing the invasion of Philocles, and begging for help. 
The consul had at once detached a squadron of twenty ships and a 
military force under C. Cornelius Centho, who had not only saved 
Athens, but had also made a descent upon Euboea ; surprised 
the king's chief stronghold, the town of Chalcis ; killed the 
royal commandant Sopater ; burnt the royal stores, and set free a 
number of captives whom the king had deposited there. The 
Romans, indeed, had not been in sufficient force to retain Chalcis 
without abandoning Athens, and had therefore retired after doing 
all the harm they could ; but the king was eager for revenge, and 
resolved on an immediate attack upon Athens. SaiHng to Chalcis 
he crossed the Euripus into Boeotia, and marched into Attica, 
hoping to surprise the city. 

The Athenians, however, had had timely warning, and when 



xxviii OPERATIONS ON THE FRONTIER OF MACEDONIA 429 

the king arrived he found the gates closed, the walls manned, Battle 
and every one on the alert ; while on the road leading to the opposite 
gate called Dipylum were drawn up a mixed body of Athenians ^^Py^^^ 
and Pergamenians. These he attacked with great fury, and drove ^^oo^^^"^' 
them with heavy loss within the walls. But though he had shown 
conspicuous personal gallantry in the charge, he did not succeed 
in effecting an entrance ; and next day, finding that the garrison 
had been reinforced by Roman soldiers and more troops of Attains 
from the Peiraeus, he retired towards Eleusis, wasting the country 
as he marched, and hoping to seize the fort and the temple 
of Demeter. But the fleet from the Peiraeus appearing off Eleusis, 
he abandoned Attica and marched by Megara to Corinth, and thence 
to Argos to attend a meeting of the Achaean League. 

He was anxious to retain the loyalty of the Achaeans and to Phmp and 
induce them to commit themselves to his side against Rome. And the 
the moment seemed opportune, for he found them consulting on Achaean 
measures to be taken for defending themselves against Nabis, tyrant ^^^^^^^' 
of Sparta. He offered to undertake this business, and relieve them of ^Zo"^" 
all anxiety, on condition of their supplying a sufficient garrison for 
Oreum, Chalcis, and Corinth. This would have secured the double 
I object of weakening the League by removing the flower of its troops 
\ from Peloponnesus, and committing it to hostility with Rome. But 
the strategus Cycliades prudently avoided the snare by alleging the 
, League law, which prohibited any measure being brought before 
j an assembly other than that for which it was summoned. Thus Destruc- 
I baffled Philip returned to Attica, where he was joined by a reinforce- tion of the 
ment under Diodes ; and though he failed to take either Peiraeus ^^^i^^rbs of 
; or Athens, he made terrible havoc of the temples, tombs, and farms ^^'^^"■^• 
in the neighbourhood, and then, as the season was growing late, 
returned to Macedonia through Boeotia. 
I Thus in the first year of the war the king had been by far the Results of 
I most active and apparently the most successful. But he had not the first 
I really improved his position in Greece. The Achaeans, his natural y^^^ ^f ^^^ 
! allies, had avoided committing themselves. The fleets of Rhodes ^^^' 
\ and of Attains, stationed at Aegina, protected the islands and 
I threatened his movements in southern Greece. The Romans them- 
I selves had as yet done little beyond protecting Athens. The consul 
; P. Sulpicius had fallen ill and was unable to direct any great move- 
I ment, even if such had been desired at so late a period of the season. 
' Still the frontiers of south-west Macedonia had been devastated, and 
I some border fortresses captured which commanded the passes over 
) the mountains ; and a defeat had been inflicted upon a Macedonian 
I force under Athenagoras, who attempted to cut off the legatus L. 
I Apustius while he was crossing a stream. 



430 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

Roman 

■winter 

quarters 

visited by 

many 

envoys, 

200-igg. 



Philip's 
prepar- 
ations. 



Ineffective 
campaign 
of 1 99 . 



The 

Aetolians 
join the 
Romans, 
igg. 



The winter of 200-199 was passed by the consul in quarters 
between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, where he was visited by envoys 
from the aUies and the tribes round Macedonia hostile to the king. 
Pleuratus, son of Scerdilaidas from Illyria, Amynander, king of 
the Athamanes, and Bato, prince of the Dardani, all came for 
instructions; while legates from Attalus anxiously inquired what 
help their master was to expect in the spring. Pleuratus and Bato 
were told to be ready to assist in an invasion of Macedonia early 
the following year; Amynander was commissioned to rouse the 
Aetolians ; the legates of Attalus were promised that the Roman 
fleet should join their master at Aegina in the spring. 

But the king was also taking active precautions. The islands of 
Peparethos and Sciathos, which might be used by the enemy as the 
basis of an attack upon Demetrias, were dismantled, and rendered 
useless for that purpose. The king's son Perseus was despatched to 
guard the north-west frontier against the Dardani ; and envoys were 
sent to dissuade the Aetolians from breaking their treaty with Philip 
and joining the Romans. The Aetolians avoided immediate decision ; 
the issues were not simple in their eyes. Philip was undoubtedly a 
hindrance to Greek freedom, and had many ideas as to the extent of 
his territories which militated against their own ; but, on the other 
hand, they had begun already to fear that the victory of Rome would 
mean a greater danger still to freedom and to their own ambition. 

In spite of promises and preparations nothing effective was done. 
Sulpicius moved into the country of the Dassareti in the spring of 
199, and later on into Eordaea. Philip encamped in the same 
neighbourhood, cut off foraging parties, and attempted to draw the 
Romans into a general engagement. It was his first experience of 
a regular Roman army, and he is said to have been deeply impressed 
with the formidable nature of the camp ; while his soldiers were 
dismayed by observing in the frequent skirmishes how much more 
effective than their own spears were the Roman swords, which lopped 
off limbs and made horrible gashes. But the campaign died away 
in indecisive skirmishes, — in one of which indeed the king had a 
horse killed under him, and was himself wounded and only saved 
from capture by the devotion of a soldier, who dismounted and gave 
up his horse to him, falling himself under the swords of the enemy. 

The superiority of the Romans in the field, however, had been 
sufficiently demonstrated to convince the Aetolians in the course of 
the year that they had better take part against Philip. In conjunc- 
tion with Amynander they invaded Thessaly and advanced within a 
short distance of Demetrias. But the king surprised them near 
Gomphi, as they were returning and wasting the plain of Thessaly, 
and they were only saved from annihilation by Amynander's 



XXVIII T. FLAMININUS ARRIVES IN GREECE 431 

knowledge of the mountain passes into Athamania. At the same Repulse of 
time the king's general Athenagoras (who accompanied Perseus) ^^^ 
repulsed the Dardani in the North and compelled them to retire ^''"^'^^• 
with considerable loss. 

In the West therefore Philip had held his own with considerable 
success. In the East the naval war had been of a similarly desultory 
character, but on the whole had been less favourable to Philip. The Movements 
Roman fleet under L. Apustius, after wintering at Corcyra, joined of the 
that of Attains at Aegina, and attacked such of the Cyclades as were 'f^^^'^^/^^''-^ 
still held by Macedonian garrisons, — Andros, Cythnos, and Paros. Aegean, 
At Andros they were successful, at Cythnos they failed. Thence, 799. 
being joined by twenty Rhodian ships, they coasted as far as the 
Chalcidic peninsula and returned to Euboea laden with spoil. But 
such piratical expeditions were not of great importance, any more 
than the violent decrees passed at Athens against Philip, or the 
destruction of his statues and erasing of inscriptions in his honour. 
The most useful achievement was the capture of the strongly 
fortified town of Oreus in the north of Euboea, which fell just 
before the Roman fleet had to return for the winter to Corcyra. 
Nor were the indecisive movements of 199 improved by the advent of ^99- 
the consul P. Villius, who superseded Sulpicius late in the summer c^y^eiius 
of that year ; and, like his predecessor, seemed intending to put off Lentulus, 
all active operations till his second year. P; Villius. 

It was not destined, however, that he should have the chance 
of success or failure. The consul for 198, T. QuintiusFlamininus, 
resolved not to waste his year of office by staying at Rome for 
ceremonial observances, but to go at once to the seat of war.^ T. 
With the arrival of Flamininus the war received a new impetus. Qj^^^t\^^ 
He found Villius encamped at the foot of the Antigoneian pass, ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ 
which led from Chaonia into Macedonia by the valley of the Aous. over the 
The Roman point of attack had therefore been changed from the command 
north-west to the south. It was a more difficult way of entering 
Macedonia, though the nearest for troops coming from Corcyra. 
Philip was defending the upper end of the pass, where a narrow 
gorge — the Stetta Aoi — connected it with the valley of the 
Aous. He was in a very strong position, and when Flamininus 
arrived with 8000 fresh infantry and 800 cavalry, and had sent Villius 
home, he found himself in a great difficulty. To remove to 
the old point of attack was to waste the whole summer, and yet 
it seemed impossible to turn the king's position. For forty days 
the two armies remained within sight of each other without 

^ Since about 205 it had become the custom of the consuls not to leave Rome 
till after the games of Apollo (July 6-13). The new consul, therefore, was generally 
too late to do much till the next season. 



in the 
spring of 
jq8. 



432 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



A fruitless 
conference. 



The king's 
position 
betrayed, 
ig8. 



Flight of 
Philip into 

Thessaly. 



moving, and some of the leading men in Epirus even suggested a 
conference with a view to peace. A meeting actually took place 
between the consul and the king, but led to no result. Flamininus 
demanded as a preliminary that the king should withdraw his 
garrisons from all Greek towns, without any distinction between 
those which he had found already so guarded when he came to 
the throne and those to which he had himself sent garrisons 
for the first time. When asked for a more distinct definition 
the consul began by naming all Thessalian towns. But it was in 
Thessaly that the king's supremacy had been the most complete 
and unquestioned : with some exceptions it was practically a part of 
Macedonia. He at once broke off the conference, exclaiming 
indignantly, " What harder condition could you have imposed if 
you had beaten me on the field .? " 

The war of skirmishes between outposts therefore was continued ; 
and though the Romans could beat the enemy in the open, they were 
always foiled when they tried to force their way up the pass, which 
had been strengthened by balistae set at every available point. But, as 
usually happened in mountain warfare, a superior knowledge of the 
ground did what mere force could not do. A shepherd offered to 
show Flamininus a track which would enable him to get on the rear 
of the enemy. With some hesitation, and on the assurance of the 
chief men of Epirus, he despatched a picked body of 4000 infantry 
under his guidance, supported by 300 cavalry, as far as they could 
go. Their movement was covered by extra activity on the part of 
the skirmishers. On the morning of the third day the signal that 
the 4000 had reached their position was given by smoke ; and 
Flamininus at once ordered a general advance. The king's troops 
came out to meet them, in full confidence in their impregnable 
position. On this occasion the Romans advanced so far up the pass 
that the Macedonians believed that they had got them in a trap, 
when a shout in their rear showed them that they were themselves 
being attacked on both sides. In sudden panic they fled in every 
direction : while those who could find no escape were surrounded 
and cut to pieces. The slaughter, however, does not appear to have 
been great, for pursuit in the unknown mountain ways was scarcely 
attempted : but with some difficulty the royal camp was reached and 
occupied by the Romans for the night. 

The king at first fled precipitately ; but finding that he was not 
pursued he recovered his presence of mind, halted on an eminence, 
and collected his scattered troops. Only 2000 were eventually found 
to be missing ; and thus with his main army still intact he marched 
up the valley of the Aous. Where the roads branched to Macedonia 
and Thessaly he halted for several days, unable to make up his mind 



XXVIII FLAMININUS ENTERS GREECE 433 

which route to take. Eventually he determined in favour of the 
latter : and descending to the valley of the upper Peneius arrived at 
Larissa. His aim was Demetrias, but, being refused entrance into 
Pherae, he turned northward again and finally intrenched himself at 
Tempe. 

The effect of this victory in rousing the allies to action was Sufferings 
immediate, and the war fell at first with full weight on the unhappy ^/ *^^ 
Thessalians. In the course of his march Philip burnt or dis- . ^^^'^ ' 

'■ tans. 

mantled many of the towns through which he passed to prevent 

their affording shelter and food to Flamininus : while by the southern 

pass the Aetolians and Athamanians again poured into the country, 

plundering and destroying as though in an enemy's land. 

Flamininus seized the opportunity of showing the different spirit The march 
in which he meant to treat Greeks. Having admitted the Epirotes, ^f P^'^^^^- 
whose Macedonian inclinations had been changed by the victory in 
the Antigoneian pass, to friendship and alliance, he started leisurely 
in the track of Philip. But he refrained from pillage or even 
severe exactions, exhorting his soldiers to regard the country as their 
own, and was received almost everywhere with signs of enthusiastic 
welcome. He furnished himself with supplies by trains of carts 
from his fleet of transports which lay at anchor in the Ambracian 
Gulf, whence the stores could be brought through the pass to 
Gomphi. But as he advanced eastward, until brought to a stand by 
the stout resistance of Atrax, about ten miles west of Larissa, he 
found that he was too far from his supplies, and that the Ambracian 
harbour was inadequate for the number of transports necessary. 
The vessels were therefore ordered to come to Anticyra on the 
Corinthian Gulf; and having abandoned the siege of Atrax he 
marched to the south. Here again most of the cities opened their 
gates to him, or were easily compelled to do so, and found that the 
consul was always ready to grant them full freedom on condition of 
expelling their Macedonian garrisons. In some indeed the Mace- 
donians were able to offer more resistance. Thus Daulis, strong in 
its lofty position, was only taken by a stratagem ; and Elateia kept 
him at bay for a considerable time. 

While he lay opposite Elateia he received the adhesion of the The 
Achaean League — an event especially welcome, as it made it more Achaean 
easy than ever to carry out his policy of acting as champion of Greek -^J^^"^^ 
liberty. In the previous winter Philip had felt great anxiety as to Romans, 
the attitude of the Achaeans, and had tried to propitiate them by autumn of 
restoring certain towns which had been held by his troops.^ The ^9^- 
Eleans were mollified in the same way ; and his own subjects gratified 

^ Orchomenus, Heraea, and Triphylia. The Achaean decree for the admis- 
sion of Orchomenus is extant {Hicks, p. 321). 

2 F 



434 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The debate 
hi the 
Achaean 
assembly. 



Offer of the 
allies. 



Reply of 
Philip's 
legates. 

Answer of 
Athen- 
ians. 



The 

second day 
of the 
meeting. 



by the imprisonment of the unpopular Heracleides of Tarentum. 
These measures, however, seem to have been regarded rather as 
evidences of his fear than of his benevolence ; and when the com- 
bined fleets of Rome, king Attalus, and Rhodes— after taking Eretria 
and Carystus in Euboea, and making prisoners of war of their 
Macedonian garrisons — dropped anchor at Cenchreae, the eastern 
port of Corinth, and began making preparations for the siege of 
Corinth itself, held since the time of the Cleomenic war (222) by a 
Macedonian garrison, the time seemed to have come when the 
Achaean League must decide whether to stand by Philip at all costs 
or make terms with the stronger party. 

It was in fact an important crisis in the fortunes of the League 
and of Greece ; and the manner in which it was treated in the open 
assembly of the people is interesting. L. Quintius Flamininus, 
the brother and Icgatiis of the consul, was in command of the Roman 
fleet at Cenchreae, and it was he who proposed negotiation. Aris- 
taenus, the strategus of the year, was known to be inclined to the 
Roman side ; and Cycliades, the leader of the Macedonian faction, 
had lately been expelled and had taken refuge with Philip. Accord- 
ingly Lucius sent L. Calpurnius, supported by legates from Attalus 
and Rhodes and Athens, to the meeting at Sicyon, where Philip also 
was represented by ambassadors. The envoys of the various allies 
spoke first, beginning with the Roman Calpurnius. They offered the 
tempting bait of entire freedom from Macedonia ; and, as an earnest 
of that, the expulsion of the Macedonian garrison from Acrocorinthus, 
and the restoration of Corinth to the Achaean League. Then the 
legates of Philip were heard, who recalled the services of the 
Macedonian kings to the Achaeans in their struggles with the 
Aetolians and with Sparta. Lastly, the Athenians replied to the 
royal legate, dwelling on the king's treachery and cruelty, and all 
they had suffered at his hands. These speeches lasted all day. 
The whole case was laid before the people in the best way, by hearing 
the advocates of all the parties interested put their own case. The 
next day was to be devoted to a debate between the two factions on 
the statements thus put before them. 

But when in the next morning's assembly the herald made the 
usual proclamation inviting any one who wished to speak, instead of 
the usual orators coming forward eager to get the ear of the assembly, 
there was a profound silence — a silence of perplexity and fear. On 
the one hand the Lacedaemonian tyrant, their constant enemy, was 
a friend of the Roman ; on the other, if they resisted Rome, they had 
too much reason to fear that her arms would prove too strong both 
for them and Macedonia. To the Macedonians they were bound by 
many obligations, by gratitude for protection in the past as well as 



ASSEMBLY OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 435 



taenus. 



the present ; yet the actual wearer of the Macedonian crown had 
lost their confidence by his treachery to the Messenians, and by his 
suspected compHcity in the murder of both Aratus the father and 
Aratus the son. The conflict' of feelings was too strong ; no one 
was found bold or decided enough to come forward with advice. 

At length Aristaenus, after vainly attempting to rouse them by speech of 
taunting allusions to the contrast between the violent language heard Aris- 
every day in their social or political gatherings and their silence 
now, delivered a set speech. He pointed out that the Romans, with 
Attalus and the Rhodians, were asking their active alliance, while 
Philip only asked for their neutrality. The reason of this difference 
was that Philip was diffident of being able to return their services by 
protecting them against Sparta and Rome ; while the allies, con- 
fident in their position and in their power to resist the Macedonians, 
felt themselves competent to repay them for their support. The 
Romans in the former war with Philip had been hampered by their 
struggle with Carthage ; from that they were now relieved, and the 
successes of Titus Flamininus had conclusively proved how much 
they were the stronger. Putting aside therefore all question of 
Philip's own conduct at Athens and in Messenia, at Cius, and Abydos, 
it was plain that he was not able to defend them from the depreda- 
tions of the allied fleet, or the hostility of Nabis, much less from the 
two combined. No less evident was it that they were unable to 
defend themselves against these enemies. Therefore, though the 
Romans asked for their alliance, they could really compel it : they 
had better therefore grant it at once, and avoid the discredit of 
merely waiting on fortune. The opportunity of doing so with grace 
would not recur ; they might now be free from Philip ; but they 
must decide now once for all whether the Romans should be their 
friends or their enemies. 

The speech was received with mingled shouts of approbation and The 
disapproval. A motion had to be brought forward by a board of ten 
magistrates called Demiurgi ; and they were divided as to the legality 
of putting this question, for a decree had been passed rendering it 
unlawful, not only to vote, but to put to the vote any motion hostile 
to Philip. When the third day, however, came, the Demiurgi had 
decided to put the vote. The voting was by nations, and by common 
consent the Dymaeans, Megalopolitans, and Argives abstained. 
The Argives, partly from the traditional sentiment in favour of a 
dynasty, whose founder -U^as believed to have come from Argos, had 
always had peculiarly intimate relations with Philip ; the Dymaeans 
owed the restoration of their citizens, who had been made prisoners by 
the Romans three years before, to the generosity of the king ; while 
the people of Megalopolis could not forget the services of Antigonus 



decision. 



436 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Corinth 
and Argos 
remain 
loyal to 
Philip, 
i()8. 



Flamin- 
inus 

winters in 
Greece, 
ig8-ig7. 

Philip 
wishes to 
treat. 



Doson in restoring them to their city, from which Cleomenes had ex- 
pelled them. The rest of the assembly voted in favour of an alliance 
with Attains and the Rhodians. The question of an alliance with Rome 
was left undecided until a confirmation should arrive from the Senate. 
The accession of the forces of the Achaean League to those 
already investing Corinth did not bring about the downfall of that 
place. Nor were the hopes of help from the Corinthians themselves 
fulfilled. The Macedonian garrison was apparently popular there, 
and its commander, Androsthenes, had been made a citizen and 
elected chief magistrate. Moreover, there was a large number of 
deserters from the Roman fleet within the walls, who knew that they 
could expect no mercy if it were surrendered to the allies. There- 
fore, when a reinforcement was successfully thrown into the town by 
Philocles, the Macedonian commander of Chalcis, the siege on the 
advice of Attains was abandoned. Having saved Corinth Philocles 
proceeded to Argos. The breach with Philip was exceedingly 
unpopular there, as had been shown since. It had been the custom 
at the ordinary assemblies for the herald to join the name of Philip 
with the names of the protecting gods of the city. But the omission 
of his name in consequence of the decree of Sicyon caused such a 
storm of indignation, that the herald was obliged to repeat the 
formula with the name of Philip restored to its place of honour. 
Satisfied, therefore, of popular support, some of the leading men 
arranged to put the town into the hands of Philocles, the Achaean 
garrison being allowed to depart unharmed. Thus, though the 
Achaean League had formally joined the allies, Argos and Corinth 
still remained Macedonian. 

Meanwhile, having taken Elateia, Flamininus put his army into 
winter quarters in various towns of Locris and Phocis, within reach 
of his supplies at Anticyra ; while the fleet under his brother Lucius 
retired as usual to Corcyra. Philip was not yet beaten, and still 
held the " fetters of Greece " — Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinthus 
— yet it was evident that Roman influence was growing to be para- 
mount, not only in Greece, but in Asia also. In the course of this 
year Roman legates had demanded from Antiochus that he should 
abstain from attacking the territories of Attalus, and had been 
obeyed, though the king was fresh from a conquest of Coele-Syria. 
In other ways Rome was finding the profit of her extended empire. 
Masannasa had shown his gratitude by the despatch of Numidian 
cavalry, elephants, and corn to the seat of war ; while Sicily and 
Sardinia supplied in abundance the food and clothing required for 
the army. A desultory war had been going on with the Boii and 
the Ligurians ; but it had not required more than the normal con- 
sular armies, and had not weighed heavily on the people, and had 



XXVIII CONGRESS AT NICAEA 



437 



often indeed added to the wealth poured into the treasury from 
Africa and Spain. Philip must have felt conscious that he was 
engaged in resisting a power of almost inexhaustible resources. At 
any rate in the course of the winter (198-197) he sent a herald to 
Flamininus, inviting him to attend a congress of the several states 
concerned with a view to a peaceful settlement. 

To Flamininus the suggestion of a congress was welcome. It Flamin- 
need commit him to nothing; and if he were superseded in 197 he ^'^"-^ 
might return to Rome with the credit of having finished the war. ^^"■^^^^^^' 
If his hnperium were prolonged, he might renew operations, should 
the king prove unreasonable, without any additional difficulty. He, 
however, granted as a favour what in fact he desired, in order that 
the king might not feel himself at an advantage. 

The place of meeting was fixed at Nicaea, on the Malian The 
gulf, between Phocis and Thessaly. The king came by sea congress of 
from Demetrias, with the Boeotian Brachylles and the Achaean ^^'f^^^^- 
Cycliades. Flamininus was accompanied by king Amynander, and ^'^^^_^^^^/ 
there were legates from Achaia, Rhodes, and Aetolia. Philip 
declined to leave his ship, and on Flamininus asking of what he was 
afraid, answered proudly that he feared nothing except the gods, but 
that he distrusted the Aetolians. " If there is a chance of treachery," 
said Flamininus, " the danger is common to us all." " There you 
are wrong," replied the king ; " the risk is not the same. If 
Phaeneas perished there are many Aetolians who could be strategus ; 
if I fell there is no one to be king of the Macedonians." 

Flamininus waived the point, and at once asked for the king's 
demands. Philip, however, professed that it was rather the part of 
the consul to state on what terms the Romans would cease to attack 
him. Thereupon Flamininus declared that the king must evacuate all 
Greek towns : must restore prisoners and deserters to their several 
states : hand over to Rome all parts of Illyria seized since the peace 
of Phoenice (205), and to Ptolemy all cities taken since the death of 
Philopator. To these demands the envoys of Attalus added the 
restoration of ships taken in the battle of Chios, and the repair of 
temples round Pergamus. The Rhodians asked for the evacuation 
of the Peraea and certain other towns in Caria, the restoration of 
Perinthus to Byzantium, and the withdrawal of Macedonian garrisons 
from Sestos, Abydos, and all ports and harbours in Asia. The 
Achaeans demanded Argos and Corinth ; the Aetolians that Philip 
should evacuate Greece, and especially should restore to them the 
cities which had belonged to their League.^ 

^ The principal cities meant are Cius and Calchedon in Asia ; Lysimacheia in 
the Thracian Chersonese (Polyb. xv. 23) ; Pharsalus, Larissa Cremaste, Echinus, 
and Phthiotid Thebes in Thessaly (Polyb. xviii. 3). 



438 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Three 
months' 
truce to 
consult the 
Senate. 

Stern 
anstver of 
the Senate. 



The war is 
continued. 

Duplicity 
of Nabis. 



Philip's 

difficulties. 



The king replied to these demands — summed up by Alexander 
Issius, an Aetolian — in a clever and sarcastic speech, which seems to 
have amused and interested Flamininus, and roused some sympathy 
with the king in his mind. He promised to satisfy some of the 
demands of Attalus and the Rhodians, but he refuted with pride the 
arguments of the Aetolians, and bitterly reproached the Achaeans 
with ingratitude, though he offered to restore Argos to them. Finally 
he announced his intention of dealing with Flamininus alone, and 
demanded that the several claims should be handed to him in writ- 
ing. " He was alone, and must have time to consider them." "Of 
course you are alone," said Flamininus : " you have put all your 
friends worth consulting to death." The king only replied by a grim 
smile to this sarcasm, and the conference broke up for the day. On 
the second day he came designedly late, and demanded a private 
interview with Flamininus. The result was a proposition which 
failed to satisfy fully any of the claims, except that of the Achaeans, 
to whom he offered Argos and Corinth ; and, finally, on the third 
day he proposed that the whole matter should be referred to 
the Senate — a proposition which Flamininus, with some difficulty, 
prevailed upon the allies to accept. A truce for three months 
was arranged on the king consenting to withdraw all garrisons 
from Locris and Phocis, and giving a written undertaking to make 
no attack meanwhile upon any state allied to Rome. 

The tone of the Senate, however, was uncompromising.* They 
listened to all the deputations with patience, but to the king's envoys 
they simply put the question, "Would Philip surrender the three 
towns ? " 1 And when the envoys replied that they had no authority 
to make such a promise, they were at once dismissed. The iinperium 
of Flamininus was continued, with full discretion as to making peace : 
no embassy was to be again received from Philip unless charged with 
the promise of evacuating all Greece. 

War was therefore to be continued, and Philip exerted himself to 
strengthen his army and secure allies. Abandoned by the Achaeans 
he turned to their bitterest enemy, Nabis of Sparta, offering him 
Argos as the price of his alliance. After some show of scruple Nabis 
occupied Argos, from which he and his wife exacted money with more 
than their usual cruelty, but immediately opened communications 
with Flamininus, and even supplied him with some Cretan archers, 
at the same time making a four months' truce with the Achaeans. 
In recruiting his army Philip found increased difficulty. His 
numerous wars had drained the country, and he had to enrol men 
under and over the military age to fill up his thinned ranks. How- 



^ That is, Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth. 



XXVIII FINAL COMBAT BETWEEN PHILIP AND ROME 439 

ever, by the end of March he was at Dium, on the south-eastern 
coast of Macedonia, and there set vigorously to work to train and 
drill his troops. 

Flamininus, too, was early on the move. At the beginning of First 
spring he broke up his quarters at Anticyra and entered Boeotia. movements 
The Macedonian inclinations of the Boeotians were notorious ; y annn- 
but still their fears caused the Thebans to meet him in a com- '' 

plimentary procession, by which they hoped to avoid an actual 
visit to their town. But ignoring their real wishes Flamininus, who 
had a considerable body of troops close behind, entered the gates 
with the deputation, and, accompanied by king Attains, attended 
there a meeting of the Boeotian League. The arguments which he 
brought forward silenced, if they did not convince, the Boeotian 
deputies, and in a few days he was able to set out to join his main 
army at Elateia, feeling that he left no enemy on his rear.i 

Philip, too, had by this time entered Thessaly, and was encamped The two 
at Larissa. The two armies were not ill-matched in point of num- armies m 
bers, though the Romans were somewhat stronger in cavalry. The ^^^^^ y- 
flower of the king's army was a body of 16,000 heavy-armed men, 
who were to be drawn up in the famous Macedonian phalanx, sup- 
ported by about 7000 light-armed troops of various nationality, and 
2000 cavalry. The Roman army of two legions with their usual allies 
was increased by about 6000 Aetolians, infantry and cavalry, who 
joined at Heracleia, just north of Thermopylae, whither Flamininus 
had come to attend a meeting of the Aetolian League. His army 
was farther swollen by 800 Cretan bowmen (procured apparently 
1 by Nabis) and 1 200 Athamanians under king Amynander. 

The two armies were marching by different roads, and for some The two 
\ time did not get information of each other's whereabouts. Philip at ^''"'^^^ on 

Larissa was on the inland road leading through Pharsalus ; Flamininus, ^ ^^^J^^ 
I advancing from the south, was on the coast road leading by Phthiotid 
' Thebes to Pherae. At length, hearing that Flamininus was between 
I Phthiotid Thebes and Pherae, Philip took the left-hand road from Larissa 
I leading to Pherae, and encamped about four miles north of it. The 
i two armies were separated by a low range of hills {Mofts Chalcodomos\ 
which concealed them from each other. Their cavalry, sent out to make 
( reconnaissances, came into collision from time to time, the advantage 

I ^ It was at this meeting that king Attalus was struck with paralysis as he 

was beginning his speech. He lingered for a few months, and was taken home 
to Pergamus to die, and was succeeded by his son Eumenes II. The character 
of this "burgess sovereign," as Moninisen calls him, is presented to us in most 
attractive colours by Polybius and Livy. The good faith to his pubHc engage- 
ments was united to a homely affection in the character of husband and father 

\ unusual in the history of royal families of the age. 



440 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



generally remaining with the allies, chiefly owing to the valour of 
the Aetolians. But neither general was satisfied with his position. 
Philip presently moved to the west, wishing to get into the plain 
of Scotussa, both as being better suited to the phalanx, and as 



THESSALY & SOUTHERN MACEDONIA 




n 'alker &■ Boutall sc. 

ENGLISH MILES 
O 5 10 20 30 40 



supplied with abundance of corn. Flamininus divined his intention, 
and moved in the same direction, but on a line considerably 
south of the king. Thus Philip came down into the plain of 
Scotussa from the north, round the foot of a range of hills called, from 



BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE 441 



their shape, the Dogsheads {Cynoscephalae), to a spot called Melan- 
tium ; Plamininus entered the same plain by the south, and encamped 
on the road to Pharsalus, near a temple of Thetis. Philip being 
anxious to reach Scotussa left the hills, and, in spite of violent rain, 
continued his advance and pitched his camp in the plain, sending 
back a reserve to occupy the ridge of Cynoscephalae. 

These operations had taken three days. The next morning a An 
thick mist following the rain obscured the view, and Flamininus sent engagement 
out some cavalry and light infantry to reconnoitre the enemy's posi- ^"- ^ ^"^^' 
tion. These men came unexpectedly upon the Macedonian reserves 
on the slopes, the mist having effectually concealed both from each 
other. Reinforcements were sent for in haste by both to their re- 
spective camps, the Macedonians at first getting the better of the 
encounter, owing to their position on higher ground ; while the 
Romans were at one time only saved from decisive disaster by the 
gallantry of the Aetolian cavalry. 

Philip had not expected battle on that day, and had, in fact. The battle 
detached a large force to forage. Moreover, it was not a ground of Cynos- 
^ favourable to the phalanx : they were too near the hills, which Jf ^l/""^' 
I were rough, and in places precipitous. The phalanx required an ^autumn 
I open country, and it was chiefly because of the obstacles presented of igj. 

by walls and gardens and streams that he had abandoned his posi- 
I tion near Pherae. To accept battle on the mountainous ground, 
I where the fighting was now going on, would be even worse. 
I It was the first time, at any rate since the days of Pyrrhus, The 

i that the Romans had encountered the much-dreaded Macedonian phalanx. 
, phalanx ; and though they presently learnt how to dislocate 
: and defeat it, the alarm which it inspired was long in dying 
out. Thirty years later L. Aemilius, the victor at Pydna, con- 
] fessed that he had never beheld anything more terrible. The 
I numbers forming the phalanx of course varied according to circum- 
I stances; but its normal arrangement consisted in massing 16,000 
I men in close order, sixteen deep, involving a space of open ground at 
I least 1000 yards in breadth. They were armed with long spears 
j called sarissae, of length var>'ing from sixteen to fourteen cubits, held 
I in such a manner that those of the first five ranks projected in front, 
; and presented a bristling wall of steel. The sarissae of the remaining 
1 eleven ranks were held in a slanting direction over the heads of the 
I ranks in front, and formed some protection against missiles. These 
j eleven ranks, though they did not add to the number of spears pre- 
sented to the enemy, added enormously to the weight of the charge. 
I Such a body of men, moving in a compact mass, would come with 
, irresistible force upon anything opposed to it. The disadvantages 
were, in the first place, the difficulty of finding sufficient extent of 



442 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Disadvant- 
ages of the 
phalanx. 



accepts 
battle 
against 
his better 
judgment, 
and is 
defeated, 
197- 



Results of 
the battle. 



perfectly unimpeded ground on which it could act ; for ditches, banks, 
or other obstacles dislocated it at once. In the next place, it was 
effective only in front. The men were so closely locked together 
that they could not turn either to flank or rear, and the unwieldy 
length of the sarissae made them useless except for the one move- 
ment. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Romans, with their 
more flexible order and more convenient arms, soon found how to 
harass and defeat the phalanx. When it charged through their lines 
the Roman maniples learnt to open out and let it pass, and, unless it 
was supported by cavalry or light -armed troops, could attack it on 
flank or rear, when their short strong swords could be used with 
deadly effect on men encumbered with the huge and burdensome 
sarissae. 

Philip was quite aware of the disadvantage of accepting battle 
on this ground, but was over -borne by repeated messages from 
the field, describing in exaggerated terms the repulse which 
the Romans had sustained, and urging him to strike at once. 
Reluctantly he got his men out of camp, and occupied the 
ground from which the advanced guard of the Romans had been 
driven, and there massed as much of his phalanx as there was 
room for. This was his right wing, which he commanded in 
person, and it proved strong enough by charging downhill to scatter 
the Roman left. But his left wing could not keep together, or form 
up in time. The Roman right was upon them while still dislocated 
by the nature of the ground. A rapid charge, led by Flamininus 
and preceded by the elephants, at once put them to flight ; and the 
Roman right being thus victorious, one of the military tribunes by a 
brilliant manoeuvre settled the result of the whole battle. Instead of 
joining in the pursuit he led his division to the rear of Philip's right 
wing, which had defeated the Roman left, and charged. The king 
was surprised to see his men, when apparently victorious, suddenly 
throwing away their arms and turning to flight, and the lately defeated 
Romans facing round. Gaining some high ground he saw that they 
were being attacked on both sides, and knew that all was lost. He 
rallied some Thracian and Macedonian cavalry, and fled at full speed 
along the road to Tempe. 

The immediate effect of the battle was to put an end to Mace- 
donian influence in Greece. Henceforward it would be to Rome 
and not to Pella that controversies would be referred and applications 
for help made. And to this Philip seems at once to have made up 
his mind. He had collected the remains of his army, and effected 
his retreat within his frontiers. The loss had not been numerically 
great in comparison with other important battles, but the moral effect 
he knew would be Ov^erwhelming; he therefore immediately sent a 



XXVIII TERMS SETTLED AT TEMPE 443 

herald asking for a truce to bury his dead and for a personal inter- 
view with the proconsul. Flamininus, scorning the insinuation of the 
Aetolians that he was influenced by royal gold, granted an armistice 
of fifteen days, and agreed to meet the king at Tempe. 

The king came to this meeting with the knowledge of other reverses Other 
to his arms and allies. In Peloponnesus Androsthenes, commandant ^'^"'^^^^es of 

at Corinth, had sustained a severe defeat from the Achaeans stationed J*^ ^"^ ^ 
' . . troops in 

at Sicyon ; in Asia the Rhodians had recovered the Peraea m Caria pelopo/i- 
and other cities close by ; and lastly the Acarnanians, who still clung nesus, 
to him— partly from loyalty and partly from hatred to the Aetolians C^^^". 
— had been forced to submit to the fleet under Lucius Flamininus. '^^camania 
On all sides therefore Philip found his cause depressed and that of j^j 
Rome triumphant, and he must have felt that the very existence of 
his dynasty now hung on the moderation of the proconsul. 

Flamininus had no disposition, however, to push the king to ex- Moder- 
tremity, or to destroy Macedonia. He represents the best and ation of 
most honourable phase of Roman policy towards Greece. He P^'^'"^>^- 
seems really to have wished for its liberty and prosperity ; and, like /^;„,,;,.^/j- 
some of the wisest Greeks themselves, regarded a strong Macedonia Philip, 
as a necessary bulwark against the northern barbarians. Nor did afid his 
he intend that Philip's place in Greece should be taken by the ^'^^/^/J''"'' 
Aetolians, who were likely to be equally oppressive to other Greeks Aetolians. 
and more dangerous to trade on the seas. He had been annoyed 
by the arrogance with which they claimed the credit for the victory 
at Cynoscephalae, and still more by their cupidity in plundering the 
king's camp before any Roman troops arrived, and he did not dis- 
guise his resentment. He refrained from consulting Aetolian officers, 
and declined to admit their claim under the treaty of 2 1 1 to the 
possession of all towns taken, since they had forfeited it by making 
a separate treaty with Philip in 205. And now to their disgust he 
showed every intention of treating Philip with moderation. 

Philip did not appear at the conference of Tempe till the third Cotiference 
day, when the allies had already discussed the terms to be offered <^i Tevipe. 
him. Flamininus declared his intention of enforcing nothing more 
than had been demanded before — the evacuation of all (ireek towns; 
and this had been approved by all except the Aetolians, who main- 
tained that the freedom of Greece could only be secured by his 
deposition. When Philip arrived he anticipated all demands by at 
once offering this evacuation. Thereupon the Aetolian Phaeneas 
somewhat roughly asked why the Thessalian towns — Pharsalus, 
Larissa Cremaste, Echinus, and Phthiotid Thebes — were not at 
once restored to the Aetolian League. Philip replied that they were 
welcome to take them. But here Flamininus interposed. These 
towns, except Thebes, had voluntarily submitted to Rome : their 



444 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Flamin- 
inus 

winters at 
Elateia, 



Te7i com- 
missioners 
sent to 
Greece, 
ig6. 



General 
principles 
of the 
settlement 
of Greece. 



The com- 
missioners 
at Corinth, 
i()6. 



position would have to be decided by the Senate. Thebes had 
resisted and been captured, and the Aetolians might therefore take 
that, but only that. The Aetolians, who had hoped to regain all 
they had lost, exclaimed, that by the fall of Philip Greece had only 
got a change of masters. In spite, however, of their discontent, 
a four months' truce was arranged, to allow of the necessary 
reference to Rome, and the king having paid 200 talents and 
given his son Demetrius and others as hostages (to be restored should 
the senates refuse ratification), Flamininus went into winter quarters 
at Elateia, sending delegates to Rome along with the ambassadors 
of the king. 

The news of the victory of Cynoscephalae caused great joy at 
Rome, and the peace was exceedingly welcome. Flamininus was 
continued in his command for another year ( 1 96) — though the new 
consuls both desired the province — and ten commissioners were 
named to proceed to Greece and settle the details of the new arrange- 
ment in consultation with him. 

The Senate, however, laid down general principles. Greek cities 
in Europe and Asia were to be free and autonomous ; but those at 
present under the authority of the king, or in which there was a 
Macedonian garrison, were to be surrendered to the commissioners 
before the next Isthmian games (July), to be dealt with separately. 
The Greek states in Asia, which had been occupied by Philip,^ were 
to be set free at once, and the restitution of Cius demanded from 
Prusias. Farther, the king was to restore all captives and deserters, 
surrender all but three war-vessels, — besides his own sixteen-banked 
galley, — and pay 1000 talents (about ^{^2 40,000), half at once, and the 
rest in ten annual instalments. The object of the distinction between 
the Greek towns in Asia (which were at once to be set free) and 
those in Europe seems to have been that the case of Demetrias, 
Chalcis, and Acrocorinthus might be reserved. It was not clear 
whether these "fetters of Greece" could as yet be safely abandoned. 
This was a point that Flamininus and the commissioners would have 
to decide. 

The Roman commission opened its session at Corinth in the 
spring of 196. In spite of the loud remonstrances of the Aetolians, 
and, as it seems, against the advice of Flamininus, the commissioners 
resolved for the present to retain the three towns. They had been 
warned before leaving Rome of the danger threatening from the 
possible interference of Antiochus in the affairs of Greece. He had 
taken Coele-Syria from the king of Egypt, had secured Ephesus, and 
had only been prevented from giving active aid to Philip in Europe 

^ Euromus, Bargylia, lasus, Abydos, Myrina, Perinthus, and the island of 
Thasos. 



xxviii PROCLAMATION AT THE ISTHMIAN GAMES 44S 

by the threatening attitude of the powerful Rhodian fleet ; and in 
197 had crossed to the Thracian Chersonese and taken possession 
of the nearly abandoned town of Lysimacheia. At any moment 
intrigues in Greece might invite him farther south. The com- 
missioners therefore could only be induced to grant the town of 
Corinth to the Achaean League. Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and 
Demetrias were still to have Roman garrisons. 

As the time for the Isthmian games approached the excitement Prodama- 
throughout Greece as to the decision of the commissioners rose high, ^^'^'^ ^{ *^^ 
and drew an unusually large number of spectators to Corinth. The ^^J^g]^^'^ 
most various and contradictory rumours had been spread abroad, ^j^iy jgd. 
and the announcement from Flamininus was awaited by the crowd 
in the stadium with the greatest anxiety. The herald's trumpet 
suddenly sounded, and his voice was heard proclaiming silence. He 
then read the decree : " The Senate of Rome and T. Quinctius, pro- 
consul and imperator, having conquered king Philip and the Mace- 
donians, declare the following peoples free, without garrison or 
tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their respective countries, 
namely, Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of 
Phthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebians." 

These included the districts and towns which had been more or Feelings 
less under control of Philip, and as to which it had not hitherto been excited by 
known whether the Romans meant to retain rule over them or to set ^ * 
them free. The sentence therefore which announced their freedom 
was received with such a storm of applause that the full list of names 
I was not heard, and the herald was compelled to repeat them. 
In the wild outburst of joy at what seemed the realisation of their 
I best hopes, the people overwhelmed Flamininus with the expression 
; of gratitude. He was almost crushed to death by the crowds that 
I pressed round him to touch his hand, and almost smothered under 
I the garlands and flowers which they showered upon him.^ 

I It was a great work done efl'ectively and with honest intention. Full effects 

I and it was not Rome but the Aetolians who afterwards brought its '^f ^^^ 

I results into jeopardy. No doubt, when the first flush of enthusiasm 

1 was over, there seemed something in what the Aetolians were always 

] saying, that Greece could not be free with foreign garrisons at the 

, three "fetters." But even this pretext for discontent was before long 

removed by Flamininus. Nor did his settlement show any jealousy 

of Greek confederations. Phocis and Locris were joined again to the 

Aetolian League, and Corinth with some other towns was adjudged 

1 This famous scene is often alluded to as a proclamation of the freedom of 

Greece. It will be observed that its application is limited to those parts of 

f Greece which had been in the hands of the king of Macedonia. Of the rest of 
Greece there was no question. 



446 



HISTORY OF ROME 



to the Achaean League. The outlying towns indeed, which had once 
been in poHtical union with Aetolia, were to be free and autonomous, and 
the AetoUans were specially annoyed at not being allowed to have 
Division of Pharsalus and Leucas. But it was in Thessaly that the commissioners 
Thessaly. had most to do, for it had more than any other part of Greece been 
absorbed in Macedonia. Four communities were erected or restored 
which had been loosely included under that designation — Perrhae- 
bians, Dolopes, Magnesians, and the remainder to be called Thessaly. 
Each of these four were to be autonomous. The wishes or claims of 
particular towns within these districts had to be considered separately, 
and we find traces of disputes and arbitrations in such cases extending 
for some years onwards.^ In Euboea it was proposed to give Oreus, 
Eretria, and Carystus to the king of Pergamus ; but finally they too 
were declared free. Some rectifications of the Macedonian frontier 
toward Epirus and Illyria were also made. Thus the Orestae were 
declared autonomous ; the Illyrian towns Lychnis and Parthus were 
given to Pleuratus ; and others to Amynander. The general tend- 
ency was to consolidate nationalities, and to discourage distant pos- 
sessions, or the holding of isolated towns in one district by the people 
of another. When the awards were completed, the commissioners 
separated to the several districts assigned to them, to see that the 
arrangements were carried out, both in Europe and Asia Minor. 

Those who had undertaken Caria afterwards visited Antiochus at 
Lysimacheia, in the Thracian Chersonese, where they were met by 
some of the other commissioners who had already been in Egypt. 
They expressed their surprise that he should have crossed to Europe 
with so large an army and fleet, and demanded that he should evacuate 
all Greek towns taken from Ptolemy, or which had been subject to 
Philip, and attack none already autonomous. The king declined to 
admit the right of Rome to interfere in Asia ; and maintained that he 
was in the Chersonese to recover what was rightfully his, and was at 
that moment engaged in restoring Lysimacheia, left to the mercy of 
surrounding barl^arians, who had plundered and depopulated it. As 
to Ptolemy, he had already made peace with him, and confirmed it by 
a matrimonial alliance. The embassy led to no result, and was 
presently interrupted by a false report of the death of Ptolemy, 
in consequence of which Antiochus dismissed the ambassadors 
and -hurried off to Cyprus, leaving his son Seleucus in charge of 
Lysimacheia. 



Visit of 
the com- 
missioners 
to 
Antiochus. 



^ For instance, in an inscription lately discovered containing the final decree 
of the Senate in a dispute between Narthakion and Melite in Thessaly, which 
had been decided by Flamininus, then referred to the arbitration of the Samians 
and other states, and finally laid before the Senate. — Bulletin de Correspondance 
Helldnique, vi. 364. 



XXVIII CONFEDERACY AGAINST NABIS 447 

For the present no farther step was taken. A nearer if not a Flajnhi- 
greater danger threatened the tranquillity of Greece in the person of «'««-f ^^^^^ 
Nabis tyrant of Sparta. The imperium of Flamininus was again ex- ^'^ Greece, 
tended for the year 195 : for though Philip had not only submitted, ^^ 
but had asked to become a " friend and ally " of Rome, there was 
still business to be done in (Greece, and the army was still there. 
The commissioners in their report, while warning the Senate of the 
danger impending from Antiochus, had declared the pretensions 
and conduct of Nabis to be the most immediate peril. The question 
of peace or war with Nabis therefore had been committed to the 
discretion of Flamininus. Early in 195 he proceeded to Corinth 
and summoned a conference of Greek states and allies. They were 
unanimous in favour of war with the tyrant, who, besides his other 
numerous acts of aggression, was in occupation of Argos, — a city of 
the Achaean League. The only discordant note came from the 
Aetolians, who wished the war to l^e left to themselves, and that the 
Roman troops should be immediately withdrawn from Greece. The 
rest, howe\er, were ready to co-operate with Flamininus : Eumenes, Confed- 
the Rhodians, and king Philip all sent ships or men, and cavalry ^'"'^O' 
was raised in Thessaly. L. Quintius brought the Roman fleet from ^^^l"^ ^f 
Corcyra and blockaded Gythium, the chief port of Laconia, while sparta, 
Titus himself proceeded to attack Argos ; and when Argos showed igs- 
no signs of wishing to get rid of its Spartan garrison, he transferred 
the attack to Sparta itself. Sparta was no longer, as in old times, 
an open town ; it had been fortified in the early days of the Diadochi, 
and Nabis had now a strong force of Cretans guarding the walls. 
Yet he was soon reduced to negotiate ; and could urge that he was Siege of 
no worse than when the Roman proconsul had accepted his alliance Sparta. 
against Philip. But Flamininus replied by pointing to his subsequent 
cruelties at Argos and the piracies of his fleet ; and declared that, the 
Romans being determined to complete their task of freeing Greece, 
he must submit or stand a siege : he might, however, have a truce 
in order to send ambassadors to Rome, on condition of immediately 
evacuating Argos and other towns in Argolis ; restoring all ships 
taken from maritime towns ; surrendering all his own ships except 
two galleys ; restoring exiles to their property and civil rights ; dis- 
missing his mercenaries ; abandoning all possessions in Crete, and 
refraining from external alliances and wars ; withdrawing garrisons 
from all towns which sought the protection of Rome ; building no 
more forts either in his own or other territory ; and, lastly, on pay- 
ing 150 talents. Nabis naturally wished to reject such terms, which 
would reduce him to the position of a petty inland prince surrounded 
by enemies. The allies, on the other hand, were against allowing 
him even that alternative : and were only persuaded by Flamininus 



448 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Freedom of 
Argos 
proclaimed 
at the 
Nemean 



winter of 
^95- 



Return and 
triumph of 
Flamin- 
inus, ig^. 



Restoration 
to liberty of 
enslaved 
Rotnans. 



The 

dangers 
ahead. 



pointing out to them the heavy requisitions which a long siege 
would bring upon them all. After a short experience of the siege 
Nabis submitted, and at the next Nemean games there was a repeti- 
tion on a smaller scale of the scene at the Isthmian games of the 
previous year, — the freedom of Argos, once more joined to the 
Achaean League, being proclaimed amidst the applause of the 
spectators : the Aetolians again murmuring that with a tyrant still 
at Sparta the freedom of Greece was a sham. 

The work of Flamininus was now all but done. After another 
winter spent at Elateia in deciding points of dispute as they rose, he 
summoned a final meeting of the free states at Corinth. To them 
he addressed a farewell speech, in which he recapitulated the history 
of the Roman occupation of Greece, its motives, and its result on the 
freedom of the Greeks. He tried to allay the one feeling which 
marred the enthusiasm with which his speech was received by point- 
ing out that, in the case of Nabis, the choice lay between leaving 
him so weakened as no longer to be dangerous and practically de- 
stroying a great historic town. His farewell exhortation to harmony 
and moderation drew tears from his emotional hearers ; and their 
feelings were still farther stirred to their depths when he finally an- 
nounced his intention of withdrawing the garrisons from Acrocorin- 
thus, Chalcis, and Demetrias, and bade them judge between Roman 
faith and Aetolian malignity. 

When the applause had died away he added that there was one 
favour they could do him which he should value above all others. 
There were in Greece large numbers of Romans who had been sold 
into slavery as prisoners during the Hannibalian war. They could 
give him no more pleasing proof of their gratitude than by searching 
out and redeeming these men. Before the conference broke up the 
Roman soldiers were seen defiling down from Acrocorinthus ; and 
when Flamininus — after withdrawing the garrisons from Chalcis, 
Oreus and Eretria in Euboea, and from Demetrias in Thessaly — 
arrived at Oricum, on the coast of Epirus, to take his army across, 
he found awaiting him 1200 Roman captives redeemed by the 
Achaeans at the cost of 100 talents. Others were redeemed in other 
parts of Greece, and these ransomed citizens formed the most glorious 
feature of his triumph. 

The good faith and disinterested poHcy of Flamininus had raised 
the reputation of Rome, and caused (we are told) applications from 
peoples and sovereigns in all directions for his protection. If in 
their subsequent dealings with Greece the Romans may be justly 
charged with harshness or insincerity, the honest attempt to establish 
its liberty of this true philhellene ought to be remembered to his 
and their honour. The wisdom of the entire withdrawal of Roman 



XXVIII DEPARTURE OF FLAMININUS 449 

troops may fairly be questioned. The elements of discord were not 
destroyed, and in a few years the Romans had a great part of the 
work to do over again. But if Flamininus erred, the error rose 
partly from a generous confidence in the people, whom he believed 
himself to have served to the best of his power ; and partly from 
failing to take sufficiently into account that spurious patriotism which 
prefers national disaster to the least diminution of a hollow inde- 
pendence ; which grasps at the shadow and misses the substance ; 
and places the gratification of local or private pride and resentment 
before the good of a whole country. It was to the Aetolians, and 
their tool and victim Nabis, that Greece owed the next disturbance 
of her peace. 

Authorities. — Our most continuous source of information is still Livy 
(xxxii.-xxxiv.), who in this period makes use principally of Polybius, often 
simply translating from him. The surviving fragments of Polybius himself are 
also of the utmost value (xv. 20-24; xvi. 1-13, 24-37; xviii. 1-52). For this period 
also the secondary authorities — Diodorus fr. 28 ; Appian res Macedonicae ; 
Plutarch Titus Flamininus; Zonaras ix. 15-18 (see Dion Cass. fr. 58) ; Orosius 
iv. 20, Eutropius iv. 1-2, — are rather fuller than usual, and all contribute some- 
thing. 



2 G 



CHAPTER XXIX 



WARS WITH THE BOH AND LIGURES, AND IN SPAIN 

200-178 

PROVINCES COLONIES — continued 

[Hispania, Citerior and Ulterior] Parma ^ 

B.C. 197 Mutina J- . . B.C. 183 

Gallia Cisalpina . . B.C. 181 Saturnia j 

Graviscae . . B.C. 18 r 

COLONIES Aquileia . . . . B.C. 181 

Bononia . . B.C. 189 Luna 1 

Pollentia \ b c 18 ^''''^^ ^ ' ' ^•^- ^^° 

Pisaurum J " ... 4 Luca .... b,c. 177 

I. The Boii — The importance of the struggle with them and the Ligures — The 
Boii attack Cremona and Placentia (199) — The Insubres help the Boii, and 
are defeated by C. Cornelius Cethegus (197) — Marcellus takes Felsina (196) 
— L. Cornelius Merula defeats the Boii, but is refused a triumph (193) — Scipio 
Nasica finally conquers the Boii (191) — The province of Gaul informal from 
191, formal from 181 — Road made from Bononia to Arretium, and the 
construction of the via Aemilia (187) — Colonies at POLLENTiA, PiSAURUM, 
Bononia, Parma, Mutina, and Aquileia (189-183) — Ligures: The 
Friniates and Apuani threaten Pisae and Bononia (187), defeat Q. Marcius 
(186), but are defeated by M. Sempronius Tuditanus (186), and finally 
crushed by L. Aemilius PauUus {181), and are transferred by M. Baebius to 
Samnium (180) — Colonies at Pisae and Luna. IL Spain — Extent of Roman 
power in Spain — The limits of the provinces of Hispania Citerior and Ulterior — 
Hostility of the Celtiberi (205-198) — Appointment of two additional praetors 
for Spain (197) — Serious risings (197-196) — Cato comes to Spain as consul, 
defeats the Spaniards near Emporiae, and advances to Tarraco- — Causes the 
towns to throw down their walls — Assists the praetor of Hispania Ulterior — 
Takes Vergiuni Castrum (195-194) — Reverses of Sex. Digitius (194-193) — P. 
Cornelius Scipio Cn. f. conquers the Lusitani — C. Flaminius the Oretani 
(193-192) — Twelve years comparative peace in Spain (191-179) — Great 
Celtiberian rising (181-179) — Victories of Tib. Sempronius Gracchus and his 
settlement (179-178). 

The wars with Philip and the settlement of Greece by Flamininus 
were followed closely by the struggle with Antiochus (193-190) ; 
and these led by slow but inevitable steps to the formation of a 



CH. XXIX SUBJECTION OF SPAIN, THE BOII AND LIGURIANS 451 

Roman empire in the East. But meanwhile in the West also the The 

Romans were making steady progress, were consolidating their consoH- 

power in Italy, and laying the foundation of a new Romanised ff^^^J^^ 

Spain ; though it was not till the end of the Numantine war (133) 200-181 ' 

that the Spanish provinces were fully established ; and even then 

the Lusitani still gave trouble, and the Cantabri and Astures remained 

a constant source of danger till their defeat in the time of Augustus 

(20). In Italy the Ligurians on the north-west, and the Boii in 

the Cispadane valley, often assisted by the Insubres on the north of 

the Po, had caused frequent alarms during the Hannibalian war ; 

and their hostility continued when that war was at an end. If the 

Romans were to be masters of the whole of Italy south of the Alps, 

, and to command the Riviera as an approach to Spain, it was necessary 

to pacify or crush these tribes. It was therefore in Spain and in 

North Italy that during this period, and for many years afterwards, 

the most persistent efforts of Rome were maintained. Making less 

noise in the world than the more sensational victories in Macedonia, 

Greece, or Asia, the Spanish and Italian campaigns, renewed year 

after year, now with conspicuous success and now with disheartening 

I failure, not only best illustrate the dogged persistence of the Roman 

I character, but also resulted eventually in forming the most permanent 

: and solid basis of the empire. 

The nucleus of the Roman power in the valley of the Po was T/ie Boil 

' formed by the colonies of Cremona and Placentia, established in ^"^ 

1218 after the great Gallic war of 224-222. These colonies had '^ !^^ 

\ been the chief object of attack in the rising of the Boii and Insubres Cremona 

in 200, which had been promoted by the Carthaginian Hamilcar, a and 

survivor of the forces of Hasdrubal or Mago. Prompt orders were Placentia, 

sent to Carthage to recall Hamilcar; and though the Carthaginian ^"j^^^^, 

, , , , ■ , 1 1 defeated by 

government had no power to do this, they endeavoured to save ^_ FuHus 

themselves from Roman vengeance by declaring him an exile and Purpurea, 
. confiscating his property. The question, however, was settled by a 200. 
] decisive victory gained over the Gauls by L. Furius Purpureo, in 
, which Hamilcar perished. From that time forward year by year 
a praetor or a consul, or sometimes both consuls, had the duty 
1 allotted to them of continuing the struggle. 

I And side by side with this was the struggle with the Li- 77ie 
jgurians, — hardy mountaineers of the rugged Apennines or Ligurians. 
audacious pirates on the seas, — who had also during the Hanni- 
balian war remained faithful to Carthage, and were now always 
ready to help the Boii. They had joined in the attack upon 
Cremona and Placentia in 200, and were continually invading 
or threatening the territory of Pisae, which for some period 
'previous to 225 had been closely allied with Rome — the port for 



452 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



jgg-iq8. 

Baebius, 

and 

Lentulus, 

and 

Paetus. 



igy. The 

Ligurian 

Ilvates, 

afid the 

Boii. 

Coss. C. 

Cornelius 

Cethegus, Q 

Mi?iucius 

Rufus. 



her ships sailing to Spain, and the base for her military operations 
in north-west Italy. There was, therefore, every motive on the 
part of the Romans to force the Ligurians to submit or at least to 
remain passive within their frontiers. We find accordingly that 
during this period the consular armies are almost constantly divided 
between them and the Boii. The two wars go on side by side : 
when the Ligurians are quiescent or sustain a heavy defeat, the 
Roman legions are led off to assist those engaged with the Boii : 
when the Boii are forced to hide themselves in their villages or 
woods, the legions engaged wdth the Ligurians are reinforced by 
those from the valley of the Po. The consuls had, as the phrase 
went, the "province of Italy," and their duties were not always 
defined more closely. 

In the year after the repulse of the attack upon Cremona and 
Placentia (199) the praetor Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus sustained a 
severe defeat at the hands of the Insubres, then in alliance with the 
Boii ; nor did the consul Lentulus, who took over his command, 
contrive to wipe out the disgrace by any brilliant exploit ; nor the 
consul of the following year (198), Sextus Aelius Paetus, though 
supported by the army of the previous year in addition to his own, 
under the praetor Gains Helvius. The presence of the two armies, 
however, overawed the Boii and their allies, and the consul had only 
to continue the measures of his predecessors for the restoration of 
Cremona and Placentia. There seemed profound peace throughout 
Italy, broken only by a servile outbreak at Setia, which, though 
causing great alarm at Rome, was easily suppressed. 

Yet in 197 both consuls, with full consular armies, were 
employed in North Italy ; for fresh outbreaks were threatened both 
in Liguria and the valley of the Po, and the Insubres were preparing 
to cross the river, in conjunction with the Cenomanni, to assist the 
Boii. But the Cenomanni had long been faithful allies of the 
Romans, and in the battle with C. Cornelius which now took place 
on the Mincius, deserted their kinsfolk and joined the consul, who 
entirely defeated and scattered the Insubrian forces. The other 
consul, Minucius, failed to bring the Boii to a pitched battle ; but 
finding them dismayed by the defeat of their allies, and therefore 
abstaining for the present from any hostile demonstration, he was 
able to lead his forces against the Ilvates, the only Ligurian tribe at 
the moment in arms. The Ilvates submitted ; and these operations, 
the details of which are very obscure, were considered to justify a 
four days' suppHcatio at Rome. 

Yet how little had been really accomplished was shown next year 
when both consuls were sent against the Boii, who inflicted a some- 
what severe defeat upon Marcellus (son of the famous opponent of 



XXIX WARS IN NORTH ITALY 453 

Hannibal), forcing him to remain for some time within his entrenched ig6. Coss. 
camp. They had not, however, sufficient endurance to persevere in ^- J^urius 
beleaguering a camp, and soon dispersed. Whereupon Marcellus ^^/^^^^' 
crossed the Po, entered the district of Comum, and gained a great Claudius 
victory over the Insubres. He took the town of Comum, and forced Marcellus. 
the Insubres to scatter into their villages, and then being joined by After some 
his colleague L. Furius, the two returned to the territory of the Boii ^f^^^^^^ 
and received the submission of Felsina (Bononia). Thence he takes 
marched against the Ligurian tribes, the Laevi and Libici, who were Felsina 
again in arms. But the Boii hung upon the rear of the Roman ^^^^ defeats 
army, and as it was retiring from Liguria ventured to attack it. ^^^^ ^°^^- 
They were repulsed with great slaughter, and Marcellus was allowed 
a triumph over them and the Comenses. 

The next year was not marked by any great event. One of the 195. Coss. 
consuls (Cato) went to Spain. The other (Valerius Flaccus) fought ^- ^<^l^rius 
a successful battle with the Boii at the silva Litana, between .f/'^p^^' -^ 
Bononia and Placentia, the scene of the defeat and death of 'c'ato. 
Postumius in 216. It seems not to have been till the spring of the 194. Coss. 
next year (194) that he crossed the Po and met another combined ^- ^^^pio 
army of Boii and Insubres near Mediolanum. When he had de- ■^'^'^!!^^ 
feated them he was summoned south of the Po again to join the new Sempron- 
consul Sempronius Longus, his own impcrium having been pro- ius Longus. 
longed for a year. Before he could effect a junction with him, 
Sempronius had been attacked by the Boii, and had retired with 
considerable loss to Placentia. According to some authorities 
he was relieved by his colleague Scipio ; but the fact seems to be 
that nothing of importance occurred during the rest of the year, 
and that when his impcriiun as proconsul was extended for the 
year 193 Sempronius was still at Placentia and unable to make 
any farther movement ; and that, as a result of this failure, a 
great rising for the year of 193 both of Ligurians and Boii appeared 
imminent. 

A force had been sent to Pisae in 195 under P. Porcius Laeca, 193. 
and was still there under the command of M. Cincius. From the ^o^^- ^: 
latter came a despatch in the spring of 193 which dissipated any ^f^^f^^^Q 
hopes of peace which might have been entertained. It announced Mht^ucius 
that " meetings of the Ligurian confederation were being held ; that Thennus. 
the territory of Luna had been ravaged ; the territory of Pisae ^f'^/^^ 
entered ; and the whole coast was being plundered." The alarm was ^g^"^^{j 
farther increased by a despatch from the proconsul Sempronius Ligurians. 
Longus, announcing that i 5,000 Ligures were all but at the gates of 
Placentia, and that the Boii were on the point of rising. The Senate 
declared a tuinulttcs in Gaul. Minucius, who had appointed his 
levy to meet at Arretium, was ordered to his 'province' of Liguria 



454 



HISTORY or ROME 



Minucius 
at Pisae, 
igj-192. 



Victory 
over the 
Ligures. 



L. 

Cornelius 
overco7)tes 
the Boii, 



ig2. 



Cornelius 
refused a 
triumph. 



at once. Two of the praetors were to have an additional army 
of 3000 foot and 100 horse, together with 5000 foot of Socii and 
200 horse. All applications for furlough were postponed ; and the 
other consul, Cornehus, was directed to relieve Placentia. 

Minucius met his army at Arretium, and marched down the 
valley of the Arno to Pisae. He found that city surrounded 
by a great host of Ligurians, which was daily being increased by 
fresh arrivals attracted by the hopes of plunder. He succeeded ni 
crossing the river and entering the town ; but does not seem to have 
done more than barely hold his own for the rest of the summer, 
having been indeed on one occasion only saved from absolute 
disaster by the gallantry of his Numidian cavalry ; and when the 
time for holding the comitia came, a duty which had been allotted 
to him, he urged the Senate by letter to transfer the task to his 
colleague, who had by this time practically finished the w^ar with 
the Boii. It was not till towards the end of his year of office, the 
spring of 192, that he brought the enemy to a pitched battle, in 
which he defeated them with considerable slaughter, occupied their 
abandoned camp, and was able to enter southern Liguria and 
storm villages and strongholds, which he found filled with the plunder 
of Etruria. 

L. Cornelius had meanwhile been more quickly successful agamst 
the Boii. He had begun the campaign by laying waste their 
territory with fire and sword, without being able to induce the enemy 
to leave their strongholds and give him battle. At length, laden 
with booty, he was retiring upon Mutina, marching somewhat care- 
lessly as though through a country now thoroughly subdued. Taking 
advantage of this, the Boii passed his position by night and occupied 
some narrow ground in front of him, closed in by marsh or forest. 
The consul, however, gained intelligence of the movement, and 
ascertained their position by sending out his cavalry to_ reconnoitre. 
Leaving the triarii in charge of his baggage and booty, with directions 
to strengthen the camp, he marched in battle order upon the Gauls, 
who were thus by the failure of their own stratagem forced to fight. 
The Romans won the battle, but lost heavily themselves, and did not 
effectively pursue and annihilate the enemy ; so that when the consul, 
on his return to Rome to hold the comitia, demanded a triumph, he 
found the senators prejudiced against him by a letter sent to many 
of them by his legatus, M. Claudius. In this letter the large losses 
were ascribed to the incapacity of Cornelius, who had only been 
saved from disaster by the extraordinary valour of the soldiers. 
Whether these criticisms were deserved or not, they sufficed to 
induce the Senate to refuse Cornelius a triumph ; though, without 
judging of the facts, it based its refusal on the ground that 



XXIX REDUCTION OF CISALPINE GAUL 455 

Cornelius had not brought Marcellus with him to Rome to sub- 
stantiate the charge, but haci preiferred to leave him in command 
of the army, whereas his legate Sempronius still enjoying imperium, 
it would have been more natural to have entrusted the command 
to him. 

The next consuls did little : but in 191 the Boii were crushed by '^^• 
the consul Scipio Nasica, whose colleague Glabrio was engaged in Cornelius 
Greece. Scipio inflicted an immense slaughter upon the enemy, Scipio 
boasting that he had left only old men and boys alive. The whole Nasica, 
tribe were forced to become Roman subjects, and to see half ^"^ • 
their territory become domain land open to colonisation and division ^/^^^^-^ 
at the will of the Roman government. The magnitude of the Final 
destruction inflicted upon the Boii was testified by the number of subjugation 
captives and horses, arms, standards, and every kind of spoil which <rf t^^^ Bon. 
adorned the conqueror's triumph. Among other things, Scipio is 
said to have caused 1470 gold bracelets or chains, such as the 
wealthier of the Gauls wore on neck or arm, to be carried in the 
procession, witnessing to the number which had fallen ; while the 
treasury was enriched by vast quantities of gold and silver, worked 
and unworked, and the soldiers rewarded by large prize-money. 

It has been usual to date the formation of the province of Cisalpine The 
Gaul from this year. But this requires some qualification. The /^^^"'^<^ 
word province in its original application (whatever its derivation), '^ 
denoted, as we have often had occasion to see, the sphere of duty of 
a magistrate. Thus it applied equally to the praetor urbanus, the 
praetor peregrinus, and the praetors who went to Sicily or Sardinia 
or Spain. Thus too the consuls, who year by year had been sent 
against the Ligures or the Boii, were said to have Italy as their 
'province'; and during the late wars we hear of consuls or Use of the 
praetors having Macedonia or Greece or the fleet as their " province." '^o'-d 
When foreign countries fell under the power of the Roman Z^^^^'^^^^- 
people, and were regularly administered by Roman magistrates 
according to a constitution or formula settled by a decree of the 
Senate or a plebiscitum, they naturally retained the name used to 
express the sphere of duty of a magistrate ; and thus arose the 
more technical and restricted use of the word most familiar to us. 
Of such provinces, the first two were Sicily and Sardinia, and for 
their administration two additional praetors had been annually elected 
since 227 ; although, if it seemed necessary, one or both of the 
consuls might also have their sphere of duty assigned to them in 

I these countries, and would be, at any rate for military purposes, 
superior to the praetors for the time being. But in an empire built 

j up gradually by successive conquests, there was naturally an inter- 
mediate stage between more or less continuous occupation and 



456 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Time 
between 
conquest 
and organ- 
isation. 



Via 
Aemilia. 



Praetors 
in Gaul 
from i8i. 



complete provincial organisation. Such was the case in Spain. 
Since 205 it had been divided into two provinces, to which each 
year two proconsuls elected specially — extra ordinem — were sent, 
with two legions for each. But it was not until 197, when two 
additional praetors began to be yearly elected for governing the two 
Spanish provinces, that its regular provincial administration may be 
said to have begun : nor even then was the organisation complete till 
the end of the Numantine war (133). We shall find hereafter a still 
longer interval in the case of Achaia between its practical and 
formal reduction to the status of a province ; and thus in the case 
of Cisalpine Gaul we cannot doubt that from 191 onwards some 
provision was annually made for holding and administering the 
country, though we have not the names of the magistrates so em- 
ployed every year from that period. In 190 one of the consuls, 
Gaius Laelius, was assigned the 'province' of Italy, and his iin- 
perimn there was extended to the following year (189), in the course 
of which he strengthened the colonies of Cremona and Placentia, 
and secured a senatus consultum for the foundation of a Latin colony 
at Felsina, under the name of Bononia. In 188 one of the consuls, 
Gaius Livius Salinator, has Gaul as his ' province,' but no record of 
what he did there remains. In 187, after the suppression of a rising 
in Liguria, one of the consuls, Gaius Flaminius, employed his men 
in constructing a road from Bononia to Arretium ; while the other, 
M. Aemilius Lepidus, constructed a road from Placentia to Ariminum, 
where it joined the via Flaminia. This was the famous via Aemilia 
which traverses the whole of Cispadane Gaul to this day, and along 
which all places of importance in the district are found. But though 
the country was thus being organised and secured, it is not till 181 
that we hear of a praetor having Gaul assigned as a ' province.' O. 
Fabius Buteo, who is thus mentioned in 181, had his office extended 
for a second year, and probably for a third (179) ; and in 177 two 
praetors go to Gaul, which is now divided into two ' provinces.' 
By the system of extending when necessary the imperium to a second 
or even a third year, and electing six praetors each year, there were 
always magistrates sufficient for extra provinces ; and as yet no 
danger was apprehended from leaving a capable magistrate for 
several years in the same province. We may regard Gallia Cisalpina, 
therefore, from at least 181, as a regular province, though we have 
not a record of the succession of governors. 

The hold of Rome upon it was, as in other parts of Italy, con- 
firmed by the establishment of a number of colonies. POLLENTIA 
in Picenum and Pisaurum in Umbria (184) helped to secure the 
great north road to Gaul; while BONONiA (189), MUTINA, and 
Parma (183) along the via Aemilia. were established in the very 



XXIX LAST STRUGGLES OF THE LIGURIANS 457 

heart of the territory of the Boii. The Roman power was also Colonies : 

asserted in the north-east.^ Some transalpine Gauls in 186 Pollentia, 

made their way over into Venetia and began founding- a town, but '^"^^^''^• 
o 11 111 /-T-.- r Bononta, 

were m 183 compelled by threats of Roman mterference to return, Medina 

and a Latin colony was planned and shortly afterwards established Parma, 

on the site of this new Gallic town, under the name of Aquileia. Aquileia. 

Moreover, Marcellus asked and obtained permission in 183 to extend 

his expedition to Istria, the inhabitants of which had long been 

troublesome by their piracies. It was their opposition, however, to 

the foundation of Aquileia that led to their ultimate subjection 

in "^11- 

Meanwhile the struggle with the Ligurians had been continued The 
from year to year. The year which had witnessed the final sub- Ligurians. 
mission of the Boii (191) had been marked also by a victory of the 
proconsul Minucius over the Ligurians ; and for a few years we hear 
no more of general risings on their part, or of conspicuous victories 
on the part of the Roman generals. But that the nation was by no 
means subdued became evident again towards the end of 188 or the 
beginning of 187, when a rumour of a movement on a great scale iSj. 
in Liguria caused both the consuls to be sent there. The Friniates Coss. M. 
(on the north slope of the Apennines) and the Apuani (on the -^^''"^^^-^ 
border of Etruria) were threatening Bononia and Pisae, and it ^;^„^^j ' 
required the full force of two consular armies to disperse them. The Flaminius. 
Friniates seem to have been effectually subdued and compelled to Great 
surrender arms ; but the Apuani only dispersed into their villages ^'-^^'^^/'^ 
and the mountain fastnesses on the borders of Etruria, and in '^* " 
186 inflicted a severe defeat on the consul Q. Marcius with a loss i86-i8j. 
of 4000 men and three standards. The consul M. Sempronius The 
Tuditanus again dispersed them in 185, while his colleague Appius ^P"'^^"^ 
Claudius won a victory over the warlike tribe of the Ingauni, who /,i[rauni. 
inhabited the west coast of the gulf of Genoa, putting the leaders 
of the rising to death and capturing some of their strongholds. 
Neither tribe, however, were completely subdued ; and in the succeed- 
ing year both consuls are engaged in Liguria. In his consulship 
he had some successes, but it was not till 1 8 1 that the proconsul 
L. Aemilius Paullus finally crushed the Ingauni in a great and 
bloody battle, after having been in extreme peril himself This 
was followed by the submission of most of the Ligurian tribes. 
They were forced to surrender their piratical vessels, and in many 
cases to throw down the walls of their towns. But their con- 
tinued existence in a certain degree of strength was desired as a 
bulwark against invasions from Gaul, and therefore the people were 
not generally treated with severity. The Apuani, however, were still 
objects of alarm, until in the following year (180) the proconsul M. 



458 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Trans- 
ference of 
the Apuani 
to 
Samnuim, 



Colonies of 
Pisae and 
Luca. 



The long 
resistance 
of the 
Ligurian 
tribes. 



Via 

Aemilia 

Scauri. 



Spain t 
20S-I77- 



Baebius transferred them, to the number of 40,000, to a lowland 
district in Samnium, the vacant plains round Taurasia, which had 
been confiscated and made ager publicus during the third Samnite 
war. This was a policy which had already been adopted in regard 
to a portion of the Piceni, who had been transferred to the south- 
western corner of Campania, and had become under the name of 
Picentini a flourishing community. In like manner the transferred 
Apuani, reinforced next year by 7000 more who had at first been 
allowed to remain in Liguria, settled down peacefully in their new 
homes, and became prosperous and contented, — known until late 
times among the communities of Samnium as Ligures Corneliani 
et Baebia?ii. 

The hold on Liguria, thus deprived of a disturbing element, was 
confirmed by the foundation of the colonies of Pisae and Luca in 
180, the latter being renewed in 177. Still there were tribes not 
yet fully subdued. Almost yearly wars are recorded by Livy up to 
the time to which his history remains (167), and afterwards in the 
epitomes of the lost books, as in 166-164 and 154. We can see 
that it was only with immense difficulty that the Roman arms sub- 
dued tribe after tribe — Statielli, Decictae, and Salluvii — all of 
which are mentioned at different times as affording subjects for 
Roman triumphs. The last recorded was in 117; but even after 
that desultory wars seem to have gone on. The final subjugation 
and organisation of the country may perhaps be dated from 109, 
when M. Aemilius Scaurus made the road from Pisa to Vada 
Sabbata {via Aemilia Scatiri), and thence across the Apennines by way 
of Aquae Statiellae to Dertona, thus connecting the via Aurelia, 
along the western shore of Italy to Pisa, with the great via Ae7nilia 
Lepidi which joined Ariminum to Placentia, whence there was 
a road to Dertona. This established a military connexion between 
the plains of the Po and the highlands and coast of Liguria, which 
made that district effectively a part of Italy. 

While the Roman hold on northern Italy was thus being pain- 
fully and laboriously maintained, that on Spain was costing hardly 
less continuous effort. The retirement of Scipio in 205 was followed, 
as we have seen, by the revolt of Indibilis and Mandonius, and their 
suppression and death at the hands of his successors, L. Cornelius 
Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus. These two officers were con- 
tinued in the command until 201, when Lentulus returned to Rome, 
and was allowed an ovation, Acidinus apparently remaining another 
year with C. Cornelius Cethegus as his colleague. In 199 they 
were relieved by Cn. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Stertinius in 
Hispania citerior and ulterior respectively. Lentulus was allowed an 
ovation on his return, and though Stertinius did not seek a triumph 



XXIX GRADUAL ORGANISATION OF SPAIN 459 

or ovation he is said to have paid large sums into the treasury. Of 

the details of the actions of these successive commanders we have Period of 

really no knowledge. From 205 to 198 there appears to have been compara- 

no general rising against the Roman power, though the Celtiberian ^^J^^ qutet, 

tribes in the centre were unsubdued, and were constantly making 

attacks upon the towns and districts allied to or settled by the 

Romans, which consisted generally of the country between the great 

central range of mountains and the eastern coast, and that between 

the Sierra Morena and the southern coast. The division between the 

' provinces ' of the two Roman magistrates was at first at any rate 

the Ebro ; later on it seems to have been the Saltus Castulonensis, 

forming the northern barrier of the valley of the Baetis. In these 

' provinces ' the proconsuls were practically military governors or 

despots : there was as yet no provincial constitution, and they had 

to conduct the business of defence and government as best they Roman 

could, each having a Roman legion serving continuously for the full soldiers 

number of years which men were bound to serve, and " supple- ■^^^'^^f ^'^ 

mented " from time to time by fresh drafts of men to take the place ^^^"' 

of the veterans who had served their full time — a system which in 

the end did much towards Romanising Spain ; for many of these 

men had become used to the country, had married Spanish wives, 

and preferred to settle in Spain when their service was over. 

It was not till 197 that a regular provision for the government of igj. Two 
the two Spains was made. In that year for the first time two praetors 
additional praetors were elected (raising the number to six), and ^ZT^^ /^ 
Nearer and Farther Spain became regularly two of the ' provinces,' ^-^^ Spain. 
for which the praetors drew lots. In some cases, when the praetors 
were wanted for other duties, those already in Spain were continued 
for one or more years ; but as a rule from this time tv/o of the six 
annually elected proceeded to the Spanish provinces. The two first 
years of this arrangement (197, 196) were marked by a more than 
usually serious rising in farther Spain. Additional troops were sent 
to the praetors, and for the first time there was a " Spanish war," as 
distinguished from a war against the Carthaginians in Spain. 

Affairs seemed so serious that in 195 one of the consuls, M. ^^j-. m. 
Porcius Cato, was sent with a consular army in addition to the two Porcius 
praetors and their regular establishment of two legions. Cato ^J^^oin 
had already distinguished himself for his administration of the '^'^"^' 
province of Sardinia as praetor. He had shown himself there, praetor Ap. 
though somewhat stern and unsympathetic, to be in the highest Claudius 
degree just and incorruptible. His personal habits were simple ^^^'^ "\ 
and economical, and he avoided imposing upon the provincials even Jlf^i^l'^ 
the ordinary expenses which the Roman magistrates could by law or 
custom exact. Now that he was consul he did not alter his 



460 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Catos cam 
paigns in 
Spaitij 
^9S- 



frugal habits. His retinue of slaves was small beyond example, 
and he shared the rations and thin wine served out to the soldiers. 
Hither Spain, however, was not a peaceful province, in which he 
had only to show the virtues of a disinterested magistrate. It was 
in open and almost universal rebellion, and he seems to have 
regarded himself as entering an enemy's country ; on landing at 
Emporiae, after expelling a Spanish force from Rhoda (Rosas), he 
sent home the contractors, who had followed him with the 
view of making their profit by supplying the army with corn pur- 
chased in the country, and declared that the war should support itself. 
Emporiae. The name Emporiae included two towns, one close to the sea, which 
was mainly Greek— a colony from Massilia, — and had long been 
closely allied with the Romans ; the other, some three miles farther 
inland, which was wholly Spanish, and was now in the possession 
of the enemy. Cato at once entered the Greek town, and evading 
the necessity of dividing his forces in answer to a request for help 
from the Ilergetes, spent the first month after landing in collecting 
the corn stored in the granaries in 'the country round. The enemy 
shut themselves up in fortified towns or casdes, and did not venture 
out to oppose him or to attack his entrenchments near Emporiae. After 
a while, however, they mustered in large numbers and encamped in 
the neighbourhood. Resolving to force them to give him battle, Cato 
marched past the Spanish camp by night and seized some advan- 
tageous ground in the enemy's rear. The Spaniards fell into the 
snare ; they issued out of their camp, thinking to bar him from return- 
ing to his entrenchments, and were beaten with great loss. The 
Romans plundered the Spanish camp ; and Cato, released, as it appears, 
from a position of some danger, advanced to Tarraco, receiving the 
submission of nearly all the tribes north of the Ebro. But he was not 
content with simple submission which, as he well knew, was not security 
against a renewal of war by all or any of the tribes as soon as they 
saw an opportunity. He determined that the towns should no 
longer offer security to rebels and robbers. He sent an order, there- 
fore, to each of the towns to pull down its walls. The despatch of 
the messengers was so arranged that each town received the order 
on the same day, and believing or fearing that it would be alone in 
resisting the command, proceeded to carry out the instructions. 
The northern province was thus within a short space of time reduced 
to obedience. But Cato's work was far from being done. Seldom 
successful in pitched battles, the Spaniards then, as in their subse- 
quent history, were extraordinarily pertinacious in detailed re- 
sistance ; and Cato's task after the pacification of the north was to 
suppress petty or local outbreaks, which often amounted to little 
more than brigandage. He had also to support the forces in the 



Walls of 
the towns 
demolished. 



XXIX CONTINUED STRUGGLES IN SPAIN 461 

south under the praetors who were engaged in a struggle with the 
Turdetani, in the extreme south-west of the peninsula, supported by 
a large mercenary force of the Celtiberian inhabitants of the centre. 
This was perhaps the least successful part of his campaign ; but Robber 
though he did not succeed entirely in compelling the Turdetani to castles. 
disband their forces, he enriched his army wdth abundant spoil and 
took a great number of fortified towns and castles in the country 
through which he passed, — boasting at the end of his year of office 
that he had taken more towns than he had been days in Spain. 
The inhabitants were not usually treated with severity or deprived 
of liberty ; but a heavy yearly tax was laid upon the produce of the 
iron and silver mines, to the development of which Cato is said to 
have largely contributed. Towards the end of his government, 
however, he struck a blow at the brigandage which disturbed his 
province by the capture of its principal seat, called Vergium Castrurn, 
identified by some with the modern Berga. In this case no mercy 
was shown. With the exception of some few of the chiefs and people 
who had helped to deliver the place to him, the inhabitants were 
sold as slaves and the robbers or bandits themselves put to death. 

Cato's command in Spain was not continued for a second ig^-igj, 
year, owing it is said to the opposition of Africanus, but he was Farther 
awarded a triumph, and paid large sums into the treasury. That ^^^ubles in 
the pacification of Spain, hoAvever, which he believed himself to ^^^^" 
have secured, was far from perfect, was shown by the troubles 
which awaited his successor Sex. Digitius, who lost so many men 
that he had a mere fragment of an army to hand over to his suc- 
cessor Gains Flaminius. His colleague in Hispania ulterior, P. 
Cornelius Scipio, son of the Gnaeus Scipio who had fallen in Spain 
in 212, was eventually more successful. He won a great victory 
over the Lusitani, in which with a small loss to himself he inflicted 
a very severe slaughter on the enemy : while Gains Flaminius in 
193, with troops collected from Sicily and Africa, also had some 
successes against the Oretani, who lived just north of the Saltus 
Castulonensis, as w^ell as against the more important tribes of 
the centre, the Vaccaei, Vectones, and Celtiberians. Next year 
(192) he and M. Fulvius, as propraetors, followed up these 
successes by the capture of isolated castles or towns. But no 
great or decisive battle was fought. Year after year the Roman 
generals are said to have won one or more battles, or sustained 
more or less serious reverses. But nothing occurred seriously to Period of 
increase or diminish the Roman hold in Spain, or to interest Roman indecisive 
feelings at home. The personal character of the praetor for the ^^^^§S^^^< 
time being seems to have had great influence in diminishing or ^ ^' 
exasperating resistance ; but on the whole the result was progress 



462 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



iSi-ijg. 

Fulvius 

Flaccits. 

Great 

Celti- 

berian 

rising. 



The 

victories of 
Tib. Sem- 
pronius 
Gracchus, 
Tjg-TjS. 



The 

settlement 
of 

Gracchus, 
178. 



rather than the reverse for the Roman power. Yet in the southern 
province there were continual struggles with the Lusitani ; and in 
the north any tribe which, impelled by restlessness or a sense of 
Avrong or a desire for better territor\% ventured to break away from 
the Roman supremacy, cotild reckon on the aid of the warlike 
Celtiberians of the centre. 

Movements of this sort culminated in the year 181, The 
praetor O. Fulvius Flaccus, on arriving in farther Spain, found 
himself confronted by a serious rising of the Celtiberians, \^accaei, 
and \'ectones, who mustered in great force in the territory of the 
Carpetani (round Toledo), and were defeated by him with great 
slaughter near a town named Aebusa or Lipara, some few miles 
south of the upper Tagus, and again near the town of Contrebia, in 
the vicinit}- of the modem Albarracin. 

In spite of these victories the next praetors, L. Postumius 
Albinus and Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, found the Celtiberians still 
in arms, and besieging the town of Cararis on the Ebro. Gracchus 
succeeded in relieving this town ; but it was not until the next 
year (178) that, having made an arrangement with Albinus, the 
propraetor of the farther province, to go against the Vaccaei and 
Lusitani, Gracchus penetrated to the extreme south, took Munda, 
Certima, and Alces, and for a time subdued the Celtiberians, — one 
of their most powerful princes even taking service in the Roman 
army. His victories and the number of towns and castles which 
surrendered to him, or fell before his assault, gained him a well- 
deser\-ed triumph ; and his victories were rendered more com- 
plete by those of his colleague Albinus over the \'accaei and 
Lusitani. But it was as an organiser rather than as a conqueror 
that he earned a permanent reputation in Spain. \Yith the instinct 
of a statesman he perceived that, if the Romans were to continue 
to hold Spain, their rule must in some way be brought into harmony 
vnlh. the feelings and interests of the subject peoples. There was 
a land question to be settled there ; and he set himself to redress 
the grievances of those whose poverty and want of land had been 
the origin of their restlessness and revolt. \Yhen he had settled 
these landless men in communities %\-ith a fair share of the soil, he 
next arranged with the several tribes and cities the terms on which 
they were to enjoy their local independence, as friends and allies of 
Rome, in a spirit of such liberality and equity, that the " settlement 
of Gracchus " was long looked back to during subsequent troubles 
\\-ith respect, and its full application or restoration demanded as 
the best charter of their liberties. Forty years after^vards the 
honour in which his father's name was still held gave the more 
famous Tiberius Gracchus such credit with the people of Xumantia 



XXIX THE SETTLEMENT OF GRACCHUS IX SPAIN 463 

that he was able to obtain from them the safety of a Roman army. 
A fixed tribute and a regular obligation as to militar)' ser\-ice 
formed part of all these agreements ; but above all the building 
of castles and fortified towns was forbidden. By long and sad 
experience the Romans had discovered that the winning of battles, 
however bloody, did little towards securing Spain, as long as every Twenty 
petty prince or captain of banditti could ensconce himself and his •^'^^''■^ ^ 
followers behind the walls of a fortress or strong town. It was a 
pohcy which Cato had enforced, but which his successors seem 
to have been unable to maintain. The " thorough " policy of 
Gracchus, joined to the equity of his settlement, was rewarded 
by twenty years of comparative peace at least in northern and 
central Spain, and forms a natural epoch in the dealings of Rome 
with the Spanish people. 

Authorities. — We have little to guide iis in these obscvire struggles but the 
narrative which Li%y has interwoven with the general coiu-se of his histor>% 
xxxii-xxxv. For the Spanish wars something is to be got from Appian, Res 
Hisp. 38-44, from Plutarch's Life of Cato, and from Zonaras, x, 17. For the 
Gallic wars practically the only source is Li\y, with occasional lights from 
•Strabo (v.), and Plutarch's Life of Aemilius Paullus, c. \i. 



CHAPTER XXX 

ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT AND THE AETOLIANS 
193-188 

Greece after the settlement of Flamininus (194-3) — Discontent of the Aetolians — 
They resolve to call in Antiochus^The kingdom and early reign of Antiochus 
— His confederacy with Philip for the partition of Egypt — He occupies the 
Thracian Chersonese — His haughty answer to the Roman envoys — -Hannibal 
at his court — Hannibal's plan rejected — Nabis of Sparta breaks the terms of 
his treaty, and the Roman fleet come to Peloponnesus — Death of Nabis (192)- — 
Preparations in Rome — The Aetolians occupy Demetrias and invite Antiochus 
to liberate Greece — Antiochus arrives in Phthiotis and is proclaimed strategus 
of the Aetolians at the congress at Lamia — He takes Chalcis (192) — He 
attempts to form a Greek confederation — Decay of his forces in the winter of 
192-191 — M'. Acihus Glabrio comes to Thessaly in 190 — Defeat of Antiochus 
at Thermopylae, who returns to Asia — L. Cornelius Scipio with his brother 
Africanus come to Greece in July 189, grant six months' truce to the Aetolians 
and march to the Hellespont — -Meanwhile the Roman fleet had taken Sestos, 
and sailing to Samos shut up the king's fleet at Ephesus — Reduction of towns 
in Caria — Failure at Patara — Great defeat of the king's fleet in the bay of Teos 
— In October 190 the consul Scipio crosses the Hellespont, and in November 
conquers the king at Magnesia, who is forced to evacuate Asia Minor — Settle- 
ment of Asia and victories over Pisidians and Gauls by Cn. Manlius Vulso 
(189-188) — End of the Aetolian war and capture of Ambracia by M. Fulvius 
Nobilior (189-188). 

Elements of THOUGH the settlement of Flamininus had been favourably received 
trouble i?i by a large part of Greece, there were several centres of dissatisfaction 
^^reece— £j.Q^ which trouble might at any time arise. The Aetolians had 
Aetolians never ceased to protest that Greece had only gained a change of 
Boeotians, masters by the Roman victory over Philip ; and they had a special 
and Nabis grievance of their own in the fact that the Senate had declined to 
of bparta. j-ggtore to their League certain towns which had once belonged to it, 
particularly Pharsalus and the island of Leucas. The Boeotians had 
retained their Macedonian sympathies, exasperated by the assassina- 
tion of the Boeotarch Brachylles, the leader of the Macedonian party, 



CHAP. XXX CAREER OF ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT 465 

with the connivance, as they believed, of Flamininus. These feelings 
had shown themselves in the \vinter of 196-195 by frequent murders 
of Roman soldiers or citizens in soHtary places in Boeotia. As many 
as 500 are said to have perished in this way, until Flamininus de- Murder of 
manded satisfaction of the Boeotian community, and when it was Roman 
refused, on the ground that the murders were mere private crimes, soldiers 
entered Boeotia with an army and laid waste the country : only con- ^"- ^"^^^^^' 
senting to hold his hand on the intercession of the Achaeans and 
Athenians, the surrender of the criminals, and the payment of thirty 
talents. Lastly, as long as his enemies the Achaeans could count 
on Roman support, Nabis of Sparta had no hope of recovering his 
seaports, or freeing himself from the humiliating terms which had 
been forced upon him. 

The Aeotolians were the first to stir. Their new idea for the The 
salvation of Greece was, in fact, a very old one. It was to call in AetoUans 
the aid of another foreign power. As of old the king of Persia, ^^^^ ^^'^ 
and in later times the king of Macedonia, had been invoked to aid ■^''^ 
parties in Greece, so now the Aetolians proposed to call for help 
upon Antiochus, king of Syria. 

Antiochus III., called the Great, had been king of Syria for more Antiochus 
than a quarter of a century, with various fortunes. Besides Syria he king of 
claimed to be lord of a great part of Upper Asia and Asia Minor ; Syria from 
but at the beginning of his reign he had had to meet an insurrection ^^-^'^ '' 
of his satraps in Persis and Media ; had engaged in an unsuccessful 
war with Ptolemy IV. for the possession of Palestine ; and, though 
his cousin Achaeus recovered in his name the parts of Asia Minor 
which Attains had taken, he had immediately set up as an independent 
sovereign himself By the fall of Achaeus in 214, however, Antiochus 
recovered Asia Minor ; and a seven years' expedition in Upper 
Asia (212-205) added to his reputation, and extended his alliances 
as far as India. In 205 he began, in conjunction with Philip V. of His attack 
Macedonia, that attack upon the young king of Egypt, of which upon 
we have already heard as involving Philip in hostility with Rome. t'fole7nyV., 
Antiochus began his share of the enterprise by an invasion of Coele- 
Syria, of which he gained possession, after a victory over Ptolemy's 
general (the Aetolian Scopas) at Panium, near the sources of the 
Jordan, in 201. In this enterprise he had shown some of the qualities His 
of a statesman as well as of a soldier, particularly in his treatment of ireatmetit 
the Jews, whom he conciliated by the grant of privileges, and by oftkefews, 
respecting their law and customs. This was followed by an attempt 
upon some of the outlying possessions of the Egyptian king in Caria 
and in the Thracian Chersonese ; and it was this that brought him 
into collision with the Romans, who had undertaken the defence of 
Egypt as well as the cause of Greek freedom. Before actually enter- 

2 H 



466 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Character 

of 

Antiochus 
and his 
dominions. 



Atitiochus 
and Flani- 



ing upon the reduction of Caria and the Chersonese he had made 
terms with Ptolemy, and had given him his daughter Cleopatra in 
marriage, with Palestine and Coele-Syria as her marriage portion. 
He would therefore claim the cities of Asia Minor and of the Cher- 
sonese with some show of right, and could confront Rome without the 
fear of the hostility of Egypt in the background. 

As to his personal quaHfication for the task of resisting Roman 
supremacy, upon which he was now entering, it was not easy for the 
Greeks to judge. He had on several occasions, during his great 
expedition into Upper Asia, shown conspicuous personal courage, not 
unmixed with the cunning and occasional cruelty which appear to 
mark the oriental despot. Nevertheless he had proved, as in the case 
of the Jews, that he was able to treat those over whom he obtained 
power with prudence and magnanimity ; and the name of Great 
seems to have been as much a tribute to the ruler as to the soldier,^ 
The character of his policy, as well as the reputation of his power 
and great resources, had no doubt its influence in suggesting to the 
Aetolians the idea of asking for his aid. On the other hand, he had 
never as yet measured swords with a great military power like that 
of Rome. His triumphs had been over the difficulties of nature 
rather than over disciplined armies ; for even at Panium, though his 
enemies were commanded by an Aetolian, the mass of the army con- 
sisted of unwarlike Egyptians. Moreover, he was now no longer 
young, and was surrounded by flatterers and intriguing courtiers, who 
closed his ears to the sound of wholesome but unwelcome truths, and 
caused him to view with suspicion signs of energy and honesty as 
dangerous to himself. The peoples also over whom he ruled were 
heterogeneous and loosely united. He could command considerable 
levies from his distant satrapies, and could summon a fleet from 
Phoenicia ; but these armies were inspired by no united feeling of 
patriotism and no mutual confidence. The first sign of failure would 
be the signal for immediate dispersion. 

Though in 196 Antiochus answered the Roman envoys at Lysi- 
macheia with haughty indifference, he does not appear to have felt 
entire confidence in his position ; for in the next year legates from 
him visited Flamininus at Corinth with propositions for an alliance. 
They were referred to the Senate. The king accordingly, after 
strengthening himself by a renewed alliance with Egypt and by a 
treaty with Ariarathes of Cappadocia, sent ambassadors to Rome 
(193). They were answered that unless the king abstained from 
entering Europe, the Romans would free the Greek cities in Asia froin 

^ Plutarch [Apophthegm.') says that he wrote to the Greek cities that, if they re- 
ceived any orders from him which were contrary to their laws, they w'ere to neglect 
them, in the assurance that they had been given in ignorance. 



XXX HANNIBAL AT THE COURT OF ANTIOCHUS 467 

him. The ambassadors exclaimed against an answer which must Antiochus 
disturb the peace of the world ; and, as a compromise, three com- ^n<^ ih^ 
missioners — P. Sulpicius, P. Villius, P. Aelius — were sent to nego- ^'^"^^J^ 
tiate with the king in person at Lysimacheia. " 

They found him in no mood for yielding. He had already been Antiochus, 
appealed to by the Aetolians, who promised that Nabis would make influenced 
a movement in Peloponnese, and hoped that they would be able to ^ 
stir up Philip of Macedon to strike another blow against Roman ^^^^ ^^^ 
supremacy. But he had also at his court the most famous general Aetolians, 
of that or perhaps any time, the implacable foe of the Romans, the "'^^ill resist, 
great Hannibal himself. He had been driven into exile by the ^93-^9~- 
malignity of the oligarchical party in Carthage, of which the Roman 
government, contrary to the advice of Africanus, had availed itself to 
consummate the ruin of their great enemy. As early as 200 the 
Senate had protested against Hannibal being employed as a military 
commander. But though the Romanising oligarchs had obediently 
recalled him, the people had been faithful, and had elected him as 
one of the Shophetim or " kings." He strove in that position to break 
up the tyranny of the oligarchical body of Judices ; to restore the 
national finances to a sound position ; and to prevent the malversation 
of public money by which these men lived in luxury. This made 
him enemies at home who were ready to sacrifice him to Roman 
hatred, and who now ( 1 96) denounced him at Rome as having entered 
into correspondence with king Antiochus. The Senate at once rg6-rgs- 
fastened on the excuse, although Scipio protested against the weight Hannibal 
of Roman authority being thrown into the scale of Carthaginian j,^^ ^^^ 
party quarrels, and three commissioners were at once sent to Carthage, thence to 
Their professed purpose was to adjudicate on some of the quarrels Antioch. 
perpetually arising between Masannasa and the Carthaginians ; but, 
on their arrival they put themselves into communication with the 
political enemies of Hannibal, who well understood the object of 
their mission. He had made provision for flight, and during the 
night following the arrival of the Roman commissioners made his 
way from the city to a point on the coast near Thapsus, where a ship 
was in readiness to receive him. Thence he sailed to Tyre, the 
mother city of Carthage, where he was received with all honour as 
the most illustrious of Phoenicians. He stayed there, however, only 
a few days. King Antiochus was said to be at Antioch, and' it was 
to him that he was. now determined to attach himself. When he 
arrived at Antioch the king was gone to Ephesus ; and after being 
entertained with honour at Antioch by his son, he followed the 
king himself to Ephesus. 

Antiochus during the winter of 195 was fluctuating in his mind 
between a desire to answer Roman pride with equal pride, and doubt 



468 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Hannibal' s 
platt for a 
IV ar 
against 
Rome, i(pj. 



Roman 
envoys at 
Apameia, 
igj-192. 



The story 
of the con- 
versation of 
Hannibal 
and 
Africanus . 



as to his ability to meet the forces of the RepubHc. The Aetolians 
were making much of their grievance as to PharsaUis and Leucas, and 
their ambassadors were urging the king to interfere in Greece. The 
arrival of Hannibal seemed likely to turn the scale. But Antiochus 
had not the courage, or perhaps the imprudence, to embark upon the 
plan which Hannibal proposed. He asked for 100 ships, 10,000 
infantry, and 1000 cavalry, that he might sail to Carthage and induce 
the Carthaginians to renew the war by a fresh invasion of Italy. 
Meanwhile the king was to enter Greece with his army, prepared, if 
necessary, to cross even to Italy. The plan was soon known or 
suspected by the Romans ; for Hannibal had sent a Tyrian named 
Aristo, whose acquaintance he made at Ephesus, to Carthage, charged 
with the task of ascertaining the feelings of the Barcine party there ; 
and the purpose of his visit, though he carried no letters, was at once 
divined by Hannibal's enemies, and duly reported at Rome (193). 

It was with the knowledge of this intrigue, therefore, that the 
Roman commissioners were sent to Antiochus, while the Cartha- 
ginians were prevented from making any movement by the threaten- 
ing attitude of Masannasa, whose dispute with them was intentionally 
left undecided by Africanus and his colleagues. 

It was not with any hope, or perhaps desire, of peace that the 
ambassadors visited Antiochus. Their charge was rather to observe 
and report upon the king's position and forces. Various accidental 
circumstances delayed the interview : and when the earliest to arrive, 
P. Villius, did obtain an audience, it was interrupted by the news of 
the death of the king's son. But though the king was at first absent, 
the Romans found Hannibal at the court, and the friendly inter- 
course they maintained with him furnished the jealous courtiers with 
materials for rousing the suspicions of Antiochus as to the good 
faith of his famous guest. It was to allay these suspicions that 
Hannibal told the story of the early vow of undying hostility to Rome 
exacted from him by his father, and assured the king that as long as 
he was at enmity with Rome he might count upon his good service. 

There was a tradition — which Livy seems to disbelieve — that 
Africanus himself was a member of this commission and conversed 
in a friendly manner with Hannibal. Among other things Scipio 
asked him who in his opinion was the greatest general that ever 
lived. "Alexander," said Hannibal. "Who next.?" " Pyrrhus." 
Who third ? " Myself" " What would you have said then," asked 
Scipio, "If you had conquered me?" "I should have said that I 
was greater than either Alexander or Pyrrhus." ^ 



^ The answer is rather too obvious and fulsome, and had it been really given 
would surely have been retailed by Polybius. We have only fragments of 



XXX PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS 469 

But whatever were the circumstances in which the envoys spent The king 

their time during the king's retirement in mourning for his son, they ^^^^ 

got no satisfactory answer at the end. Antiochus had been shut up P^omtse^ 

with his most intimate friends, who knew little of the world beyond *' 

Asia, and believing, or affecting to believe, that the great king 

was the most powerful monarch upon earth, urged him to undertake 

the protection of Greece against Rome. Accordingly when the 

Roman envoys went to Ephesus (early in the spring of 192) they 

found that there was still less disposition on his part to yield. He 

did not personally appear ; but Minio, one of his ministers, was 

instructed to deliver a long and somewhat provocative argument. , 

The application of two Greek towns, Lampsacus and Smyrna, to be 

delivered from Antiochus, had formed the basis of the Roman 

demand. Minio ridiculed their anxiety for the freedom of these 

towns in face of their own treatment of Naples, Rhegium, Tarentum, 

and Syracuse, over which they had the same right as Antiochus 

, over the Asiatic cities, — the right of conquest. The upshot of the 

' speech was a rejection of the Roman demand. The Roman envoys 

I indeed answered the arguments : but the matter had passed beyond 

I discussion. The king was urged on all sides, — by his own council, 

( by Alexander of Acarnania, by messages from Aetolia, and by 

Hannibal, when admitted to an audience. A full belief in his 

', own resources, joined to a confident expectation of welcome and 

I support in Greece, as soon as he moved, combined to make him 

I turn a deaf ear to all counsels of prudence ; and the Roman com- 

missioners were allowed to retire without a word of concession. 

The commissioners had not reached Rome, it seems, when the jg2. The 

consuls and the praetors for the year 192 had already drawn lots for Romans 

\ their provinces. But the unfavourable nature of their report was ^^P^f^ '^f'^< 
\ . . . . . , -11 i\i^ <^na make 

anticipated, and it was determined that measures must be taken to p^^p^y. 

prepare for the now inevitable war. Two of the praetors, M. ations. 

Baebius Tamphilus and A. Atilius Serranus, had drawn the two 

j Spanish provinces. The allotment was annulled, the praetors already 

I in Spain continued in their office, and Baebius was sent with two 

I legions, and their usual contingent of allies, into Bruttium. 

Atilius was put in command of the fleet, for which he was to build thirty 

quinqueremes, to enrol the necessary number of socii navales, and 

to receive 1000 infantry of allies and 1000 Roman soldiers from 

Polybius for this period, bift that the story was not in his books seems clear from 
the fact that Livy — who follows him closely — expressly attributes it to the Greek 
history of C. Acilius (Livy, xxxv. 14), — which he quotes at second hand from Q. 
, Claudius Quadrigarius. It is repeated with some variation by Appian Sy>: and 
Plutarch Titus Flam. xxi. Zonaras (ix. 18) says that Scipio went from Carthage 
to Ephesus, but says nothing of the conversation. 



470 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Nabis 

britigs the 

Romans 

again 

into 

Greece, 

jg2. 



Fall of 
Nabis. 



one of the consuls, who was ordered not to leave Rome till the 
commissioners returned. 

The report of the commissioners however did not announce any 
overt act of hostility on the part of Antiochus, and war was not yet 
therefore openly declared. It was the action of Nabis of Sparta that 
brought the Romans again into Greece. Envoys from the Achaean 
League announced that he had broken the terms imposed upon him 
by the Romans, and was already endeavouring to recover Gythium 
and other maritime towns. An addition of loo quinqueremes was 
ordered for the fleet ; and Atilius was directed to cross to 
Peloponnesus to defend the Roman allies. The rumours in Rome 
becanie more and more alarming : Antiochus was coming to 
Aetolia, and from thence would attack Sicily ; the Aetolians were in 
arms ; all Greece might soon be in revolt. 

To meet these dangers immediate steps were taken. A 
squadron was sent to guard Sicily. A fresh commission was sent to 
Greece headed by T. Quintius Flamininus, whose influence there 
was still believed to be paramount ; and M. Baebius was ordered at 
once to proceed to Brundisium. The alarm was completed when 
Attains, brother of king Eumenes of Pergamus, arrived with the 
intelligence that Antiochus had already crossed the Hellespont and 
was with his army in Europe. It was now late in the year. The 
elections of the new consuls and praetors were hastened, and Baebius 
ordered to cross to Apollonia. 

In Peloponnesus indeed things had not gone unfavourably. 
The attempt of Nabis to recover his seaports, and his incursions on 
Achaean territory, had been answered by immediate proclamation of 
war upon him by the Achaean League. Under the able Philopoe- 
men the Achaeans, after losing an important naval battle, decisively 
defeated him, and shut him up once more in Sparta and its 
immediate territory. He made an urgent appeal to the Aetolians 
for help, as it was at their instigation he had moved. But the 
Aetolians appear to have decided that he was no more to be trusted, 
and to have thought that they could best secure the alliance of 
Sparta by taking the credit of freeing her from her odious tyrant. 
Accordingly a force was sent there ostensibly to support him, but 
with secret orders to kill him. This was accomplished by a ruse 
when he was actually at the head of his own troops : but love 
of plunder overcame all considerations of prudence, and the Aetolians 
began to loot the city. The people rose in self-defence and 
massacred large numbers of them : and Philopoemen, hearing of what 
had happened, hastened by the help of the Roman fleet at Gythium 
to annex Sparta to the League. 

But though the Aetolians had by their own greediness missed 



Demetrias. 



XXX ANTIOCHUS COMES TO GREECE 471 

taking possession of Sparta, they were resolved on getting rid of The 
the Roman supremacy ; and in full assembly, in spite of the advice AetoUans 
of the Athenian envoys, and the presence and authority of Flamin- ''f^^^^'^'^J^ 
mus, voted "to mvite Antiochus to liberate Greece." As a Rome, 102. 
preliminary to this they determined to get possession of Demetrias 
and Chalcis. Demetrias had by the award of Flamininus, at the They 
end of the Macedonian war, been declared free and the chief town occupy 
of the community (to koivov) of the Magnetes. But a rumour had got 
about that the Romans meant to restore it to Philip. The indigna- 
tion of the people found expression by the mouth of the chief 
magistrate Eurylochus, who in the presence of Flamininus declared 
that " Demetrias was only nominally free, in reality was enslaved to 
Rome." The slur upon Roman good faith was prudently repudiated 
by the majority of the meeting, and Eurylochus found it necessary 
to escape to Aetolia. But there were many who sympathised with 
him ; and the Aetolians took advantage of this feeling and of the 
popularity of Eurylochus to gain admittance into Demetrias for their 
troops under pretence of restoring him. 

They failed, however, at Chalcis. There too they had the help But. fail at 
of exiles of the anti-Roman party. But the townsfolk were on the Chalcis. 
alert, and were deaf to the profession of the Aetolian leader Thoas, 
that he had come to free them from servitude to Rome. " We are 
not slaves to any one," they said, "and we have no need of an 
Aetolian or any other garrison." And Thoas, who hoped to 
surprise them, or to find a strong enough party to admit him, but 
was not prepared to besiege a powerful city, retired baffled. 

But the open revolt of the Aetolians from the Roman alliance Antiochus 
decided the wavering determination of Antiochus. Three towns in crosses to 
Asia, which had appealed to Rome, and which he did not wish to Greece. 
leave behind him as enemies, caused him to pause— Smyrna, 
Alexandria Troas, and Lampsacus. Moreover, he had not made 
up his mind to adopt or reject Hannibal's bolder and more hopeful 
plan. But now the Aetolian Thoas insinuated that, if he followed it, 
the glory would all be Hannibal's and not the king's : while, if 
Hannibal failed, his fleet and army would be fatally weakened. 
" Hannibal," he said, " was a soldier of fortune, who might usefully 
be employed as a subordinate : but would be intolerable in a 
position of supremacy." The king listened and was convinced. 
Demetrias in hand was more tempting than a prospective invasion 
of Italy. Leaving therefore the rebellious cities in Asia for future Arrives at 
consideration, he sailed to Pteleus in Achaia Phthiotis on the Devtetrias. 
Pagasaean Gulf, where he was met by Eurylochus and the chief 
Magnesians, and accompanied by them sailed next day into the 
harbour of Demetrias. 



472 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



At the 
congress 
of Lamia 
he is 

proclaimed 
strategus 
of the 
Aetolians, 
ig2. 



The war is 
to be begun 
by an 
attack on 
Chalcis. 



The 

Achaeans 

declare war 

with 

Antiochus 

and the 

Aetolia?is. 



The Aetolians, on hearing of the arrival of Antiochus in 
Demetrias, immediately summoned a meeting and passed a decree 
welcoming him as a deliverer, and appointing a conference to be held 
at Lamia in Malis. At Lamia he v^as received with extraordinary 
enthusiasm. In a crowded meeting he explained that, though he 
had come with small forces at that time (for he had but 10,000 
men) he was prepared, directly spring made the seas navigable, to 
flood Greece with troops, and to spare no exertions till he had shaken 
the Roman yoke from their necks. But when the king retired it 
became manifest that there were two parties in the meeting, headed 
by Phaeneas and Thoas. The former wished to regard Antiochus 
as a mediator in the controversies between themselves and the 
Romans : the latter as a general in a now acknowledged war. The 
opinion of Thoas prevailed ; for it was idle to expect the Romans to 
submit their case to the arbitration of a foreign king. Antiochus 
was declared " strategus " or general of the Aetolian League, to act 
in consultation with the thirty regular counsellors, who in the 
League constitution were known as Apocleti. 

The only subject left for discussion was not whether war should 
be begun, but how best to begin it. The result of the deliberation 
was that the first point of attack should be Chalcis, which the 
Aetolians had lately vainly attempted. Antiochus acted with 
promptness. He marched through the pass of Themiopylae with 
1000 infantry, met the Aetolian levy at Chaeroneia, pitched his 
camp at Salganeus, which commands the northern entrance of the 
Euripus, and at once crossed over by sea into Euboea. The 
Aetolian commanders were met by some of the chief men of Chalcis, 
headed by Mictio, who in answer to their request that, without 
renouncing their friendship with Rome, they would receive Antiochus 
as an ally and friend who had come to liberate Greece, replied that 
they knew of no Greek city which had either a Roman garrison or 
paid tribute to Rome, and therefore were at a loss to understand 
whom the king was come to liberate, or from whom. They declined 
to receive him within their walls and would make no terms with them 
or him unless they left the island. Once more the Aetolians were 
fain to abandon Chalcis : and the king, who had remained by his 
ships, resolved to return to Demetrias, and to pave the way for future 
movements by attempting to secure allies. 

The Achaeans received his envoys at their meeting at Aegium, 
at which Flamininus was present. Hopes had been entertained of 
divided counsels in Achaia from a supposed jealousy between 
Philopoemen and Flamininus. But the vain braggings of the royal 
envoys, backed by the invectives of the Aetolians, who claimed the 
credit of the defeat of Philip, were met by a scornful speech of 



XXX ANTIOCHUS AT CHALCIS 473 

Flamininus, who pointed to the weakness of the king's forces when 
compared to the high talk of covering the sea with his ships and 
flooding the land with his soldiers : and appealed to the meeting to 
decide between these vain boasts and the tried faith and power of 
Rome. The decision was unanimously in favour of the Roman 
alliance and of proclaiming war with the Aetolians and Antiochus. 

Elsewhere the king's legates were more favourably received. The 
The Boeotians, who had not forgiven the punishment their own Boeotians 
treachery had brought upon them two years before at the hands of ^'•^""'^• 
Flamininus, did not, indeed, give a definite answer, but promised to 
give it to Antiochus in person when he came to them ; and it was 
evident that they were ready to join him if they could feel a reason- 
able hope of his success. 

Amynander, king of the Athamanes, was another whom the Amynan- 
machinations of the king's envoys drew into his alliance. He owed der joins 
much to Roman protection at the time of the Macedonian war ; but Antiochus. 
he was under the influence of his wife Apamia and her brother 
Philip, who claimed to be descended from Alexander the Great, and 
were beguiled by a hint that, if they could persuade Amynander to 
join Antiochus, they should be rewarded by Philip being made king 
of Macedonia. 

But while these negotiations were going on, Antiochus was Chalcis 
preparing for a blow which was rendered effective almost by occtipied by 
accident. On his return to Lamia and Demetrias he sent off his A^{\o<^^^^ 
general Menippus with about 3000 men, and his admiral Polyxenidas 
with his ships, to make one more attempt on Chalcis, before the place jg2. 
had been strengthened by the reinforcements which he heard were 
to be thrown into it by king Eumenes and the Achaeans. He 
followed in person some few days afterwards with 6000 men and a 
few Aetolians who meanwhile had mustered at Lamia. They were 
too late to prevent the passage of the reinforcements from Eumenes 
and Achaia ; but while Menippus was encamped at Salganeus, 500 Destruction 
Roman soldiers sent by Flamininus, and accompanied by the of a body of 
Chalcidian Mictio (who had gone to ask for them), came in sight. 
Finding their road to Aulis blocked, these men returned to Delium 
and encamped near the temple of Apollo on the coast ; and not 
expecting to be attacked, as war had not been declared, strayed 
about the country in search of food and firing without any precautions, 
Menippus took advantage of this to attack and cut them ofl", and 
only a small part of them escaped. Thus the first blood had 
been shed by the king. War would doubtless have been proclaimed 
in any case : but it was important in a religious point of view that 
the Romans should have such definite ground for proclaiming it. 
This was rendered still more valid by the fact that many of the 



in the 
autum7t of 



Roman 
soldiers. 



474 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Winter of 
ig2-igi. 
The Greek 
states and 
king 
Antiochus. 



Hannibal 
advises 
that the 
king of 
Macedonia 
should be 
won over. 



The 

utiburied 
bodies at 
Cynos- 
cephalae. 



Romans had been killed within the precincts of the temple of Apollo 
at Delium ; for the profanation of this asylum would entail the 
wrath and vengeance of the gods. 

But its immediate effect was the admission of Antiochus to 
Chalcis. He had arrived at Aulis with his main army, just as 
the success of Menippus silenced the Romanising party at Chalcis, 
the leaders of which effected their escape. The soldiers of Achaia 
and Eumenes occupied for a short time the town of Salganeus, and 
the remains of the Roman force a castle on the Euripus : but both 
had eventually to evacuate these places ; and Antiochus took un- 
disputed possession of Chalcis and with it the whole of Euboea. 

The king had made up his mind to winter at Chalcis ; and he 
was soon actively employed in negotiations with various Greek states. 
Hannibal had warned him that a combination of these states formed 
but a rotten foundation on which to rest. But Hannibal's policy 
had been rejected, and the king was eager to enroll allies. To the 
Eleans, who complained that their opposition to the Achaean pro- 
clamation of war had put them in danger of invasion, he sent i ooo 
men. To the Epirotes, who expressed affection for him, but urged 
that they were too much exposed to invasion from Italy to move, 
he promised to send relief Boeotia he visited in person, and was 
welcomed in Thebes with the utmost enthusiasm. Some flimsy 
pretence indeed was kept up of disclaiming hostility to Rome, but in 
fact the Boeotians voted to join the king against her. In Thessaly 
he held a conference at Demetrias : some of the towns were ready 
to join at once, some were hostile, some temporised. 

Hannibal, who was present, urged that, as his own plan had 
been rejected, it was supremely necessary for the success of the 
present policy that the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of the 
king of Macedonia should be secured. The former might be 
obtained by working on his secret feelings of anger at his subordin- 
ation to Rome ; the latter by directing Seleucus, son of Antiochus, 
to invade Macedonia from Lysimacheia, and so give Philip enough 
to do in his own country. His advice, as before, was rejected, and 
Philip was even needlessly provoked. In the course of his progress 
through Thessaly it occurred to Antiochus to show his goodwill to 
the Macedonians by collecting for burial the bones of those of them 
who had fallen at Cynoscephalae, and had been left unburied. This 
in itself was a reflection on Phiflp, and to make that reflection more 
pointed he employed for the business the new pretender to the 
Macedonian kingdom, PhiHp of Megalopolis. Having taken over a 
considerable number of Thessalian towns, of which Pherae alone 
made serious resistance until he came to Larissa, he found his 
position near the latter town threatened by a combined force of 



XXX ARRIVAL OF A CONSULAR ARMY IN GREECE 475 

Romans under the praetor Baebiiis and Macedonians under king 
Philip ; and therefore, dismissing his AetoHan and Athamanian alHes 
for the winter, he retired to Chalcis. 

Chalcis proved to be the king's Capua. He had fallen in love Antiochus 
with a young Greek lady there, and now celebrated his nuptials with at Chalcis, 
great pomp, followed by a round of festivities and gaieties. While '^'^'^^'' '/ 
thus occupied he neglected business of all kinds ; and his army, ^" 
sharing in the dissipations of its leader, degenerated both in discipline 
and physical condition. To the original error therefore of the plan 
of the war was now added a fatal slackness in the preparations 
for it, which affected his allies no less than his own troops. The 
spring saw his army disorganised and no appearance of the 
promised forces from Greece. On going to Acarnania, to secure the Antiochus 
adherence of the Acarnanians, he found he same division of opinion '^"- Acar- 
and interests as elsewhere. Some of the leading men were in his '""""• 
favour, and some of the towns, such as Stratus and Medion, fell into 
his hands : but Thyreum closed its gates and refused to make any 
alliance without the sanction of Rome ; and the Leucadians, 
encouraged or overawed by the proximity of the Roman fleet, 
declined to commit themselves. The king everywhere professed to 
be wholly disinterested, and that he had come not to annex, but to 
set free. He was soon recalled by graver news. 

The early spring of 1 9 1 had been spent by the praetor Baebius, igi. M. 
in conjunction with king Philip, in securing or recovering numerous Acilius 
cities in Thessaly. He was besieging the pretender Philip of ' ''^''^'^• 
Magalopolis in Pelinnaeum, on the upper Peneius, and king Philip arrives in 
was investing Limnaeum, a few miles to the north, when the Thessaly. 
consul M'. Acilius arrived with a fresh army of above 22,000 men. 
The two towns quickly surrendered ; and the pretender Philip was 
sent in chains to Rome, after having been saluted in mockery as 
king by the Macedonian troops, and as " cousin " by Philip. 

This was followed by the surrender of many other towns with Sudden 
the garrisons placed in them by Antiochus. Almost at a blow the ^f^ll^pse 
whole work of the previous autumn and winter was undone ; and X,^^^, ^f 
Antiochus hurried back to his army at Chalcis, to meet his enemies, Antiochus 
no longer as the acknowledged champion of Greece, but as an in Greece. 
invader driven to his last hold. Town after town between him and 
Larissa opened its gates to the consul, — Pharsalus, Scotussa, 
Pherae, Crannon, — and their garrisons either enlisted under king 
Philip or were allowed to depart disarmed to Demetrias. Hannibal's 
warning was amply justified : at the first touch of danger the 
imaginary Greek alliance had melted into air. 

The king sent urgent messages to the Aetolians for their 
promised contingent. Slowly and reluctantly 4000 of them mustered 



476 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

Aetolians 
at 

Heracleia. 
Antiochus 
at Ther- 
mopylae, 



Battle at 
Ther- 
mopylae. 



at Hypata and Heracleia, while the king found that even his 
reinforcements from Asia were delayed, and that his whole army 
amounted only to 10,000 men. With these he entrenched himself to 
the south of the pass of Thermopylae, which he strengthened by a 
trench, a double stockade, and in parts by a wall. On the Aetolians 
he enjoined the task of guarding the mountain paths by which the 
Persians had in old times got to the rear of Leonidas. By this time 
they had abandoned Hypata and were concentrated in Heracleia, 
and disliked the idea of dividing their forces : for if the king won 
the victory, they were looking forward to join in the pursuit and 
plunder ; if he lost, they desired to keep together for defence. How- 
ever 2000 of them were eventually told off to guard three points 
at which the mountains were passable. The loftiest was called 
Callidromus, and here 600 Aetolians were stationed, but seem to 
have felt so secure that they kept but careless guard. 

Meanwhile the Roman army had arrived at the entrance of the 
pass after laying waste the country round Hypata and Heracleia. 
The defences raised by Antiochus were sufficiently strong to be 
defended by his light-armed troops, while his heavy-armed remained 
in reserve drawn up in phalanx. But Acilius knew of the possi- 
bility of outflanking him by means of the mountain passes. Two 



Retreat of 
Antiochus, 



men apiece, were despatched to make the attempt. Flaccus 
apparently failed to arrive at the point at which he aimed, but Cato 
was more successful. Having obtained a countryman as guide he 
began the ascent of Callidromus, until, as darkness was coming on, 
it was discovered that the guide had lost his way. But Cato, 
accompanied by one L. Maelius, who was a good mountaineer, set 
out in quest of the path. In spite of the darkness of the moonless 
night these two hit the track and placed landmarks to guide them. 
They thus led their men towards the summit, and as they neared it 
found themselves in the presence of an enemy, of whose numbers they 
were ignorant. Some of the cohors Firmana (veterans from the 
colony of Firmum) made a rush to the front, captured one of the 
enemy, and learnt that they were 600 Aetolians. Reassured as to 
the number opposed to them they continued their advance. The 
Aetolians fled almost without a blow, or were surprised and killed, 
and Cato on descending found himself above the rear of Antiochus's 
position. 

Meanwhile the main Roman army, with great exertion and some 
loss, had carried the first stockade, but were unable to make their 
way over the second in face of the sarissae of the phalanx, and under 
fire of the ballistae and other artillery placed at the various points of 
vantage. But Antiochus himself had been wounded in the face by 



ANTIOCHUS RETIRES FROM GREECE 477 



a stone and had retired to the rear and when Cato's force appeared The kings 
above them, his men at first believed it to be an Aetolian reinforce- bosses, igi. 
ment ; but were seized with panic, as soon as they discovered the 
truth, and turned to flight. Though the various hindrances which 
had been placed across the pass prevented a rapid or general 
pursuit, many were killed by the cavalry and Cato's contingent, who 
pursued as far as Scarpheia. The king did not halt until he 
reached Elateia, where he collected the remains of his army, and 
made the best of his way back to Chalcis. Only 500 are said to 
have remained of the 10,000 which he had brought with him: the 
rest had perished in the battle, or had been cut off by the cavalry 
as they wandered helplessly through the country, or had been made 
prisoners. 

There was, of course, an end of any farther resistance in Greece. Boeotia 
The Boeotian cities, conscious of their defection and of their help- submits. 
lessness, sent out deputations from all directions with suppliant 
wreaths and every sign of humiliation. Acilius treated them with 
contemptuous lenity, — only at one spot, the temple of Itonian Pallas 
in the territory of Coroneia, — was he irritated by the sight of a statue 
of Antiochus into giving permission to his men to pillage, but even 
that permission was soon withdrawn, and the Boeotians were made to 
suffer nothing more than a severe rebuke. 

Immediately after the battle of Thermopylae, Atilius, in com- The 

mand of a Roman squadron in the Peiraeus had intercepted a large provision 

fleet of provision ships from Asia off the island of Andros, sinking -^^^^.'2' 

1 • , 1 •, 1 1 • 1- 1- J • J Antiochus 

some and capturmg others ; while ten war vessels which had arrived intercepted. 

at Thronium, on hearing of the disaster, at once departed, some going 

to Asia and some to Demetrias, in case the king should be there. 

But Antiochus had not ventured to remain in Greece. Taking his Antiochus 

young wife with him he embarked at once, and arrived safely at goes to 

Ephesus, having eluded the Roman squadron. Ephestcs. 

The consul was at once admitted into Chalcis, the royal com- Acilius 

mander having escaped before his arrival, and the whole of Euboea occupies 

quietly submitted. Acilius, having thus secured Euboea, returned ^ ^"• 

to his position at Thermopylae. L. Scipio and Cato were sent to 

announce his success at Rome, where a three days' siipplicatio was 

decreed, made the more joyful by the ovatio of Fulvius Nobilior on The 

his return from Spain. Meanwhile Acilius had to deal with the Aetohans. 

Aetolians. Their army was still at Heracleia immediately north of 

the pass of Thermopylae. He sent them a message, pointing out 

that Greece was pacified, and they isolated, and urging them to Fall of 

submit and obtain pardon for their infatuated conduct. Receiving Heracleia. 

no indication of submission in response to this appeal, he laid siege 

to Heracleia. The Aetolians, though in such inadequate numbers. 



47« 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

Aetolians 
seek peace, 
igi. 



Feelings 
of king 
Philip. 



He xuishes 
the 

Aetolians 
to join him. 



made a desperate and even heroic defence ; and it was not till worn 
out with fatigue and constant sleeplessness — 

Ever the labour of fifty that had to be done by five — 

at the end of nearly a month, that they at last surrendered the 
citadel, when the town was already in Roman hands. Among the 
prisoners was Damocritus, who had haughtily answered Flamininus, 
when he demanded the text of the decree passed by the Aetolian 
assembly to invite Antiochus, that "he would give it him in Italy, 
when the Aetolians had encamped there." 

The fall of Heracleia seems to have convinced the Aetolian 
League that they were in grave danger, and envoys were sent to 
Acilius to ask for a truce and to make a treaty of peace. They 
were indeed in a peculiar position. Philip of Macedon had not been 
present at Thennopylae, but had met the consul soon afterwards, 
excused his absence on the score of illness, and, while he was 
engaged at Heracleia, had undertaken for him the siege of Lamia. 
But that he was not whole-hearted in promoting the Roman cause 
might naturally have been expected, and was in fact shown by a 
curious incident. The Aetolians had not wholly despaired of their 
cause after Thermopylae, encouraged by the obstinate defence of 
Heracleia : and had in fact despatched envoys to Antiochus at 
Ephesus, urging him to renew the attempt on Greece, and at any 
rate to send them money to support the war. The king was 
lavish in promises of a second expedition, and gave the money 
asked, but retained Thoas, one of the ambassadors, under some 
honourable pretext, sending Nicander home with his gracious 
message. Nicander found the Romans in possession of Heracleia, 
but Lamia freed from its siege. This had come about by the 
jealousy of the Romans, who had not wished Philip to have the 
prestige of its capture, or the credit of sparing it when taken ; 
and the consul had accordingly bidden him desist from the siege. 
Philip had obeyed and transferred his camp to some distance from 
Lamia, but no doubt with some bitter feelings as to his subjection to 
Rome. At any rate when Nicander, leaving the money at Lamia, 
tried to make his way home between the camps, he fell into the 
hands of the Macedonian pickets, and was taken to the king. He 
expected to be treated as a prisoner ; but to his surprise was honour- 
ably entertained, and had an interview with Philip in which that 
monarch pointed out to him the mischief which the Aetolians had 
done by bringing first the Romans, and then Antiochus, into Greece ; 
and urged that " they should forget the past, adhere loyally to 
himself, and not look out to take advantage of each other's 
difficulties." He bade him take this message to the Aetolian 



XXX THE SUBJECTION OF THE AETOLIANS 479 

government, and sent him off under safe escort. This was no 

obscure hint that Philip had still hopes of a revival of Macedonian 

influence, at the expense of Roman supremacy, and it no doubt 

helped to encourage the obstinacy of the Aetolians, 

For all negotiations failed. When the fall of Heracleia in- The 

duced Phaeneas, the Aetolian strategus, to send envoys to Acilius, Aetolians 

the consul treated them with haughtiness, and refused to listen to '''^^^^ ^"^ 
, . , , 1 , , M , 1 Roman 

their arguments, but granted a ten days' truce while he was engaged /^,;-„,j 

in distributing the spoil of Heracleia, sending L. Valerius Flaccus to igi. 
them at Hypata with his ultimatum, who refused to enter into argu- 
ment, and demanded unconditional submission. This after some 
hesitation they agreed to make to Acilius in person. On accepting 
their submission Acilius told Phaeneas and his colleagues what the 
Romans required of them : they must undertake not to go to Asia 
either as an army or individually ; must surrender the Epirote 
Menestratus, in command of their troops at Naupactus, and 
king Amynander of Athamania. Upon their demurring to this 
abandonment of their allies, Acilius roughly informed them that they 
were dediticii and must do what they were told. They were no 
longer ambassadors, but subjects, and he could even put them in 
chains. He went so far as actually to cause them to be fettered. 
Though he immediately countermanded this, Phaeneas was so com- 
pletely cowed that he assented to all demands, only asking time 
to obtain the ratification of the Aetolian assembly. But the 
Aetolian assembly at Hypata indignantly rejected the peace, furious 
at the treatment of their strategus, and encouraged by Nicanders 
report of the promises of Antiochus, and of the words of king Philip. 

Acilius therefore was obliged to continue the war. The Aetolian The war 
forces were concentrated at Naupactus, and to that place he now i^'ith the 
directed his attack. For two months in the autumn of 191 the siege --^^iohans 
of Naupactus went on. It seemed on the point of falling, and with 7\7aupactus, 
its fall Aetolia as a nation would, it was believed, cease to exist. In jgi 
their despair the League government turned to Flamininus, who had {autumji). 
been engaged all this summer in composing the disturbances in Pelo- 
ponnesus caused by the refusal of Elis and Messenia to be enrolled in 
the Achaean League, and had just arrived at the Roman camp at 
Naupactus. Though they had in former times rejected his counsel 
and insulted his person, they knew that his policy in Greece had 
ever been to preserve nationalities, and that he had already saved 
Chalcis from punishment at the hands of Acilius ; and as a last 
chance they begged his interposition in their behalf. 

Flamininus did not give them any hopes at first : but he actually 
obtained for them what they wanted. His view, which he con- 
trived to impress upon the consul, was founded on the desire to 



48o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



On the 
inter- 
position of 
Flamin- 
inus, 
Acilius 
abandons 
the siege of 
Naupactus. 



Results of 
the 

campaign 
ofigi. 



Antiochus 
not safe 
in Asia. 



preserve north-western Greece as a counterpoise to Philip of 
Macedon, who had been recovering considerable power, nominally 
indeed by the permission of the consul and in the service of Rome, but, 
as was known perhaps to Flamininus, with secret hopes of a more 
independent position in the future. He pointed out to AciHus that 
he would not do well to spend his whole year of office (now drawing 
to a close) in the capture of two cities, while he left Philip the credit 
and material advantage of his conquests of Demetrias, and in 
Dolopia, Aperantia, and Perrhaebia, which would in effect become 
again provinces of the Macedonian kingdom. Acilius, who does not 
seem to have been a strong man, and perhaps was a corrupt one, 
listened to these representations. He had obtained ample wealth 
to adorn a triumph, and he was willing to leave the rest to 
Flamininus, even at the cost of desisting from what was almost 
a successful siege. Flamininus therefore suggested to the besieged 
Aetolians that they should ask for a truce to enable them to 
send ambassadors to Rome. This was granted, and an embassy 
from the Epirotes, who had assisted Antiochus with money though 
not with men, was also referred to Rome. Finally Philip of Mace- 
don — who had been engaged during the siege of Naupactus in 
taking over Demetrias and recovering the districts lately occupied 
by the Aetolians — still took care to openly identify himself with the 
Roman success : he sent ambassadors to congratulate the Senate, 
and begged leave to offer sacrifice to Jupiter on the Capitol and 
present an oblation of gold. Whatever bitterness there was in his 
heart, and whatever suspicions were entertained at Rome, were 
carefully concealed. The Senate gave a gracious answer, remitted 
the remainder of his war indemnity, and sent back his son Demetrius, 
who was residing as a hostage at Rome. 

This was the end of the first year's war with Antiochus, in which 
it was settled definitely that in European Greece at any rate he was 
to have no concern. But he was slow to appreciate his position. 
His promises of a return in the next year with greater forces, his 
immediate calling out of troops from his distant satrapies for the 
next campaign, showed that the voices of flatterers could still close 
his ears to the truth. The Romans might be fought again in 
Greece : but what if they attacked him in Asia ? His courtiers 
told him that that was impossible. Only Hannibal was more clear- 
sighted or more honest than the rest, and ventured to say " he was 
rather surprised at their not being there already than doubtful of 
their coming : the king must prepare to fight for Asia itself." 
Roused by these faithful words to a sense of danger, the king 
proceeded to strengthen his posts in the Chersonese, that they 
might be capable of blocking the Roman march. But that was 



XXX THE SCIFIOS COME TO GREECE 481 

only one narrow gate. The sea was open, and the Roman fleet was The 
on the move. It was now under the command of C, Livius SaHnator. Ro7uan 
He had been acting with vigour from the first ; had punished •^^^^' ^9^- 
Cephallenia and Zakynthus for their participation in the cause of the 
Aetohans ; and then, taking over the old fleet from Atilius at 
the Peiraeus, crossed to Delos, and thence to the coast of Asia 
Minor. The king hurried back to Ephesus, and allowed his admiral 
Polyxenidas to engage the enemy, while he was himself busied in 
collecting land forces. Polyxenidas was anxious to attack the Roman 
fleet at once, before they could be joined by the ships of Eumenes 
and Rhodes ; and in the engagement off Phocaea Eumenes arrived 
almost in the moment of the Roman victory, and the Rhodians only 
joined the next day, as the Romans were pursuing the royal fleet Defeat of 
towards Ephesus. But it was too late in the season for farther th^ king's 
operations. The Roman ships were hauled up at Canae, opposite the ^pf^^^ 
I south coast of Lesbos, and protected by a ditch and stockade. The 
J retaliation was begun : for the first time a Roman force was wintering 
in Asia. 

It is true that the Roman difficulties in Greece, which might The 
^interfere with an attack on Asia, were not yet at an end. The Aetolian 
jAetolian embassy had failed, and the Aetolians were still at war with ^^'^'^^^y ^/ 
J Rome. Before their audience with the Senate the news of the victory 
off Phocaea had reached Rome, and the senators were not disposed 
I to make any concessions. They were required to submit to the will 
of the Roman people, to pay 1000 talents, and to make a treaty of 
offensive and defensive alliance ; and upon the legates desiring to 
|know on what points they were to submit to the will of Rome, they 
were refused an answer, and ordered to quit Rome the same day, 
|and Italy within fifteen. But this afforded Antiochus no foothold in 
Greece. The Aetolians found their southern seaboard ravaged by 
jthe Achaeans, and could do nothing but occupy Corax, the heights 
,|Over Naupactus, in the expectation that this town would be the first 
jpoint of the Roman attack in the spring. Acilius, however, who igo. 
jbegan the campaign of 190 before the arrival of his successor, Acilius 
^preferred to secure the towns on the road to Naupactus before ^^^^\ 
[jattacking Naupactus itself. He besieged and took Lamia, which ig^i^^g^ 
ihad all but fallen to Philip in the previous year ; and then proceeded Amphissa. 
to invest Amphissa, which promised to make a stout resistance. 

His successor, L. Cornelius Scipio, to whom the province of Arrival of 
Greece had been assigned without lot, on the promise of his brother the^cipios, 
Africanus to accompany him as a legatus, arrived towards the end of ^^"^ ^^^" 
July with a consular army at Apollonia, and marched across Epirus 
nd Thessaly to the head of the Malian gulf. The Aetolians were 
o be attacked at every point, and Hypata, their chief town in that 

2 I 



482 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Truce for 
six months 
with 

Aetolians, 
igo. 



Loyalty of 
Philip. 



The pre- 
parations of 
Antiochus 
in the 
7vinter of 
igi-igo. 



district, was summoned to surrender, but refused to do so without orders 
from the League government. The consul would not stay to besiege 
it, but sending on Africanus towards Amphissa with a contingent, 
followed more slowly with his main army. Africanus was met by a 
deputation from Athens pleading for mercy to the Aetolians. He 
gave them hopes of liberal treatment ; but when the consul arrived he 
reiterated the terms of the Senate, — unconditional submission to the 
will of the Roman people, and payment of 1000 talents. The first 
might be admitted, at any rate in words : for the latter they had 
not the means. After consultation a fresh embassy was sent from 
Hypata asking that the sum demanded should be lessened, and that 
the submission should exclude the personal slavery of any Aetolian. 
That was rejected. But the Athenians at length obtained for them 
an armistice for six months to allow of fresh embassies to Rome. 
Thereupon the siege of Amphissa was broken up, Acilius departed} 
for Italy, and the consul proceeded to make arrangements for his- 
march towards the Hellespont, with all anxiety as to movements in 
Greece at an end. In fact the six months' armistice, though granted 
with difficulty, and as an extreme favour to the Aetolians, exactly 
suited his plans. It left him free to act without thought of immediate 
danger in Greece, and it committed him to nothing. The terms to 
be imposed on the Aetolians might be aggravated or alleviated 
hereafter, according to circumstances. 

Before starting on his northward march the consul ascertained, 
by sending Gracchus to Bella, that Bhilip was prepared to give the 
Roman army every facility and liberal supplies on their way 
through his dominions ; and that the roads and bridges were in a 
state to admit the passage of an army. In fact the king met them 
personally, saw that everything was in readiness for them, and 
accompanied them to the Hellespont. Like others he was charmed 
by the character and manners of Africanus, on whom also his own 
facile temper and good breeding made a favourable impression. 

The campaign of 190, however, was destined to be fought 
principally at sea. The wdnter of 191- 190 had been spent by 
Antiochus in active preparations. The defeat of his ships in the 
autumn by the Romans, unsupported by the Rhodians, convinced him 
that he must materially strengthen his fleet. While, therefore, 
he remained himself in Bhrygia to superintend the mustering of his 
land forces, he sent Hannibal to Bhoenicia to secure fresh vessels 
and men from these famous seamen, leaving the defeated Bolyxenidas 
to repair the old ships and build others. He looked out every- 
where for allies, — oifering Eumenes his daughter and large con- 
cessions of territory, and sending even to the Galatians, who retained 
some of the warlike qualities of their original stock. Meanwhile his 



XXX NAVAL WAR IN THP: AEGEAN 483 

son Seleucus was in charge of the cities on the sea-coast of Asia, Division of 
whose loyalty to him was in danger from the machinations of feeling in 
Eumenes and Rome. He found the feelings of the country ifi^f'^ 
favourable to him. The wintering of the Roman fleet at Canae had 
given the towns a taste of what a Roman occupation would 
mean. Complaints were beginning to be heard, as at Phocaea, 
where the citizens had had Roman soldiers billeted upon them, and 
had been required to supply them with clothes. There was there- 
fore a division of feeling in that and other towns, the upper classes 
being generally for the Roman, the lower for the Syrian alliance. 
All that the magistrates of Phocaea could do was to give notice to 
Seleucus that they meant to be neutral. But he was aware of the 
popular feeling, and promptly advanced to occupy the town. 

Meanwhile, the first care of the Roman admiral Livius was to secure Movements 
the passage of the Hellespont. Early in the spring, accompanied of the 
by some Rhodian ships, he sailed to Sestos. The people of that J^omanfleet 
town were greatly alarmed, and sent out the priests of Cybele or ^^ ^^^' 
Galli, in solemn procession and clothed in their religious vestments, sun-enders, 
to beg for mercy. No harm, however, was intended them, and Abydos 
they at once submitted to Roman orders. But Abydos was not ^^^'^f^- 
so peacefully inclined ; and Livius accordingly blockaded it, and was 
on the point of receiving its submission, when he was called south Poly- 
by the news of a severe defeat inflicted on the main Rhodian fleet in xenidas 
the bay of Ephesus by the king's admiral Polyxenidas, himself an defeats the 
exiled Rhodian. The point of danger was changed by this disaster. ^/^^ '^'' 
The king's fleet would command not only the southern coasts of 
Asia Minor, but the Cyclades and the passage into Greece. Livius The 
therefore hastily returned to Canae, got the rest of his ships afloat, Roman 
and proceeded southward. He found Seleucus already in possession fleet goes 
of Phocaea, Cyme, and other towns ; and therefore, waiting only to ^"^^ 
be caught up by the ships of Eumenes, he steered straight for 
Samos. He met with rough weather off the headland of Corycus ; 
but the wind was north and e\entually brought him safe into 
harbour at Samos, while it prevented Polyxenidas from intercepting 
him, as he was trying to do. Here, after demonstrations at the 
mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and some not very successful 
descents upon the Ephesian territory, the command of the Roman L. 
fleet was taken over by L. Aemilius Regillus, who had just arrived Aemilius 
to succeed Livius. A, council of war was held to decide on the ^^'^^^''^ 
course of action. The object was to destroy the king's fleet, or so ^j^^ 
to occupy it as to prevent it from rendering any assistance either in command. 
the Hellespont, or among the Islands, or by keeping the allied fleet 
employed. Livius suggested blocking up the harbour of Ephesus 
by sinking vessels at its entrance. But Eumenes objected that they 



484 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



igo. 



Livius 
takes over 
some 

important 
towns, but 
fails at 
Patara. 



The allied 
Jleet ret urns 
7iorth. 



The 

successes of 
Seleucus 
in Aeolis. 



Antiochus 
wishes to 
treat with 
Aemilius. 



would Still be obliged to keep watch ; for directly they departed, the 
Ephesians would haul up the sunken vessels. It was finally decided, 
on the advice of the Rhodian Epicrates, who had joined with ten 
vessels to supply the place of those lost in the recent disaster, to 
secure the coast of Lycia. This district had once belonged to the 
king of Egypt, at another time to the Seleucidae, and though it was 
now nominally free, Antiochus had garrisons in several of its towns. 
The people disliked being connected with Rhodes, and would be 
inclined to side with Antiochus ; and it was therefore important to 
reduce it to obedience. 

L. Aemilius remained with the main fleet at Samos, but he sent 
Livius with a small squadron of Roman and Rhodian ships to visit 
Rhodes, and to act in regard to Lycia in accordance with the wish 
of the Rhodian government. As he sailed down the coast, some of 
the chief states gave in their adhesion — Miletus, Myndus, HaH- 
carnassus, Cnidus, and Cos ; but he failed to take Patara, and after 
dismissing his Rhodian aUies sailed home. AemiHus, on hearing 
of this failure, started with the main fleet for Patara. But a strong 
feeling was entertained by his officers that they were neglecting 
their proper sphere of duty, and merely serving the interests of 
Rhodes ; and yielding to this he returned to Samos. Nor had he 
been there long before important events called the combined fleet 
farther north still to Elaea, the harbour town of Pergamus. 

For while the allied fleet was thus employed in the southern 
Aegean, Seleucus had been carrying all before him in Aeolis. Partly 
by liberality and partly by severity he had secured the loyalty of the 
cities of that district, and was now actually invading the territories 
of Eumenes, He was already devastating the country round Elaea, 
and was approaching Pergamus. There he was joined by his father 
Antiochus with a large army, which was opposed without much 
success by sallies from the town led by Attains the brother of king 
Eumenes. 

These events naturally caused Eumenes to hurry to Elaea. 
He was presently followed thither by the combined Roman and 
Rhodian fleet ; for Aemilius had also received a despatch from L. 
Scipio announcing the submission of the Aetolians and his approach 
to the Hellespont. The arrival of this formidable fleet at Elaea, 
combined with the news of the Aetolian failure and the approach of 
the Scipios, induced Antiochus to send a herald offering to treat 
with Aemilius, encamping meanwhile in great strength close under 
the walls of Elaea. The Rhodian admirals were inclined to accept 
the proposal, but Eumenes urged upon the praetor that he could not 
with propriety give terms to the king when the consul was so near ; 
or treat on a good footing when the king was in such force and 



and the 

Phoenician 

ships. 



XXX LAST ATTEMPT OF ANTIOCHUS AT SEA 485 

practically beleaguering Pergamus. These arguments were irre- 790. 
sistible, and Aemilius briefly answered the king that no negotiation 
was possible before the arrival of the consul. 

Then followed a kind of pause, as if every one were waiting for Waiting 
what the coming of the consul would bring. Antiochus, before for Scipio. 
returning to Ephesus, remained in Mysia with his army for a time, 
seeking to overawe the country, and sending messages to induce 
Prusias of Bithynia to join him, who, however, had already received 
a despatch from Scipio, and had determined that it was safest to 
stand by the Romans. Seleucus was driven from before Perga- 
mus by some Achaean allies, whose help Eumenes had secured 
earlier in the year, and retired to Phocaea. Eumenes remained 
in Pergamus : the Roman and Rhodian fleets were back at Samos 
to prevent Polyxenidas from moving out of Ephesus. 

The first event to break this temporary calm was the defeat by Defeat of 
the Rhodians of the Phoenician fleet for which Hannibal had been Haimibal 
, sent to Tyre. The Rhodians had been lying in wait at the mouth 
' of the Eurymedon ; and had at last sighted the Phoenicians and 
I forced them to fight. In numbers they were not unequally matched ; 
i but the superior seamanship of the Rhodians had given them the 
I victory. Yet the loss they inflicted on the Phoenician ships does 
not seem to have been great. They only secured one prize, and 
' Hannibal himself escaped into the harbour of Ephesus. 

I In spite of this reverse Antiochus resolved that his fleet should Antiochus 
I make one more attempt to conquer the enemy. He could not resolves 
' prevent the march of the Scipios ; but he hoped that he might ^^"\ 
, embarrass them seriously, if they arrived on the Hellespont to find ^navaT 
their fleet shattered and the strait perhaps in possession of his ships, battle. 
, The Roman ships also were for the time almost alone at Samos. 
Many of the Rhodians were refitting at Patara, and Eumenes 
.had gone to the Hellespont to assist the transport of Scipio's army. 
jThe king reviewed his fleet in the harbour of Ephesus, and 
I conceived a plan for extricating it from the blockade. He marched 
jwith his army to Notium, the harbour town of the ruined Colophon, 
la few miles north of Ephesus, and laid siege to it, ordering his fleet 
to proceed to the same place. What he had anticipated took place. 
jThe Colophonii, as the people of Notium called themselves, sent 
I urgent messages for help to the Roman fleet, which Aemilius, tired of 
ja long inactivity, was glad to give. 

But first it was necessary to sail to Chios for provisions, that Roman 
island having been selected as a magazine of stores from Italy. On ^hips e?iter 
'his way Aemilius learnt that the king had a large quantity of stores ^^'^^^■^ ^ 
collected at Teos on the Lydian coast. He determined to capture 
them ; and after a false alarm caused by the sight of a squadron of 



486 



HISTORY OF ROME 



jgo. 



and are 

nearly 

trapped. 



Battle in 
the Bay of 
Teos. 



pirate vessels in the bay he entered the harbour of Teos. It con- 
sisted of two basins, an outer one in front of the town, and an inner 
one called Garaesticum, This last had an entrance so narrow that 
two ships found it difficult to enter abreast without breaking their 
oars. The Romans rowed into the inner harbour and disembarked 
the soldiers in search of plunder. The Teian magistrates came as 
suppliants to Aemilius, but were told that they had acted as 
enemies in supplying Antiochus, and that the raid would be continued 
until they supplied an equal amount to the Romans. Polyxenidas, 
the king's admiral, got information of the position of the Roman 
ships, perhaps from the pirates ; and thinking that he had them 
in a trap, moved to the small island called Macris, near the 
southern promontory of the bay, and dropped anchor just out 
of sight, intending under cover of the next night to block up the 
passage into the inner harbour, for which twenty ships would be 
sufficient, and line the shores and quays with soldiers. Happily for 
the Romans the Rhodian Eudamus had warned them of their 
dangerous position, and Aemihus had removed the ships to the outer 
harbour. But once there, both soldiers and sailors again disem- 
barked, some to bring wine and provisions from the town, and some 
to scour the country in search of what they could get. This had 
been going on for some days, when a rustic informed Aemilius that 
the enemy's fleet had been lying at anchor for two days at Macris 
and seemed to be on the point of making for Teos. Immediately 
the bugles sounded the recall, and the military tribunes hurried to 
the town to force the men on board, and to send out parties into the 
country to bring back the foragers. Town and fleet were in a 
sudden bustle of preparation ; and the excitement and hurry were so 
great that it was with difficulty that the men could find their proper 
ships. At length, however, Aemilius was able to get his ships out 
of the harbour and into line. Arrived at the open bay they sighted 
the enemy coming towards them in a double line of much greater 
length than their own. The Rhodian ships, however, corrected this 
by their superior speed. They rowed into line on the Roman right 
and so faced the extended left of the enemy. The numbers were not 
very unequal. The king's fleet consisted of eighty-nine, the Roman 
and Rhodian of eighty vessels. But those of the Romans were of 
stronger build, and when the ships ran alongside of each other 
their fighting men proved infinitely superior to those of the enemy. 
The Rhodian vessels not only excelled in flexibility of movement, 
but they were also furnished with scoops or baskets of burning 
materials at the end of long poles fitted to their prows. By means 
of chains these could be dropped on an enemy's ship with fatal 
effect ; and made them so dread a charge, that, in avoiding it, they 



XXX THE ROMANS f ROSS THE HELLESPONT 487 

#i 

frequently presented their broadside to the Rhodian prows, and so igo. 
were more easily staved in. A sea-fight in these circumstances 
becomes a series of single combats impossible to describe. Before 
long the ship of the king's admiral was seen to be hoisting her sails 
for flight, and, the wind setting fair for Ephesus, all the rest which 
could followed the example. Forty-two ships of the king's fleet were 
either sunk or so water-logged, burnt or battered, that they fell into 
the enemy's hands. Of the Roman fleet only two were destroyed, 
though many had received more or less serious damage. One only 
of the Rhodians was captured. 

The Romans and their Rhodian allies were now masters of the Antiochus, 
sea : there was no longer any hope of intercepting the Scipios : the driven 
Hellespont was in the hands of the ships of Eumenes, and Antiochus A^»^ 
could do nothing to prevent the Romans crossing. He was obliged andfyg^^ 
to concentrate all his forces with the hope of defeating them in Europe. 
Asia. Accordingly he withdrew his garrison from Lysimacheia, 
in the Thracian Chersonese, desisted from the attack on Colophon 
(Notium), retired to Sardis, and then collected all his troops, sending 
to Ariarathes of Cappadocia and elsewhere for reinforcements. In 
fact he was thoroughly disheartened, and could form no plan of 
operations. The withdrawal of his garrison from Lysimacheia was 
a mistake, which only despair would have suggested. He could not 
indeed hope to assist so distant a possession ; but it might have 
detained the Romans through the winter, and time was urgently 
needed for the collection of his army. 

Meanwhile Aemilius, after a demonstration in front of the harbour Capture of 
of Ephesus, which set the seal on the abandonment of the sea by the Phocaea. 
royal fleet, put in at Chios to refit ; and sending the Rhodians to assist 
the crossing of the army at the Hellespont, directed his course to 
Phocaea, still in the hands of the king's soldiers. The town held 
out obstinately for some time ; but, finding all hope of relief from 
Antiochus at an end, surrendered. The soldiers were so angry at 
the treachery of the people and the obstinacy of their resistance, 
that Aemilius was unable to prevent the pillaging of the town, and 
was only with difficulty able to save the inhabitants from massacre. 
When order was at length restored, he took measures for the repair 
of the town and the re-establishment of the people, while he selected 
its harbour as the winter quarters of the fleet. 

While the fleet was thus everywhere successful, destroying the The cotisul 
last hopes of Antiochus by sea, the consul L. Scipio and his brother crosses the 
Africanus arrived with the army at the Hellespont, where they found ^l^^^^f^^f' 
everything prepared for their passage by the care of Eumenes. The 
last part of their march had been easy beyond their hopes. They 
had expected to have to capture Lysimacheia, but found it abandoned 



HISTORY OF ROME 



igo. 



Antiochus 
attempts to 
negotiate. 



Scipid s 
advice to 
the king. 



by the royal garrison, and full of supplies, so that they were able to 
await those stragglers who had fallen out during their march, as well 
as their convoys of provisions. They had expected that the passage 
of the Hellespont would have been resisted, but it was as peaceably 
accomplished as though they were crossing the Tiber. But on the 
Asiatic side they had to wait some days for Africanus, who, being a 
member of the College of Salii, was unable to travel at that particular 
time, which happened to be that on which the sacred Ancilia at 
Rome were carried in solemn procession. ^ 

The king took advantage of this delay to attempt negotiation. 
He sent a Byzantine Greek named Heracleides to the Roman camp, 
charged not only with an open message to the consul, but also with 
a secret communication to Africanus. To the consul he declared that 
the king was ready to abandon Lampsacus, Smyrna, Alexandria 
Troas, and the towns of Aeolis and Ionia, which had declared for 
Rome, and to pay half the expenses of the war. The answer of the 
consul to the eloquent commonplaces of Heracleides was short 
and stern : " Antiochus must pay the whole expenses of the war, 
and must abandon the whole of Asia on this side Mount Taurus." 

Nor had the private message to Africanus brought more satis- 
factory results. Earlier in the year a son of Africanus had fallen into 
the king's hands, and had been liberally and kindly treated by him. 2 
He now offered to restore the young man free of ransom, and to pay 
Africanus himself almost any sum he chose if he would secure the 
acceptance of the terms. Scipio accepted the restoration of his 
son, while declining the offer of money; and- sent back in return a 
courteous message, which yet plainly pointed out to him his miscon- 
ception of his position. " The king had no longer anything to offer the 
Romans. By the abandonment of Lysimacheia he had given up the 
chance of hindering their advance : by the loss of Phocaea he had 

1 This appears to date the crossing as taking place on 19th October. Polybius 
(xxi 13) says that Scipio was unable to travel for thirty days after that. The best 
known festival of Mars was in March. Of the October festival little seems to be 
known (see Marquardt, xii. 170). The crossing must have taken place at least 
as late as this, for Scipio did not leave Brundisium until after the ludi Apolhnares 
(July 6-12), Livy xxxvii. 4. •,- u 

2 Appian {Svr. xxix. ) supposed this to have been Scipio Aemilianus, the 
younger Africanus, who, however, was not son to Africanus, but adopted son ot 
his eldest son, and moreover was not born till five years after this. The person 
meant is probably Africanus's younger and less worthy son, Lucius or Gnaeus 
(Livy xli. 27). The particular circumstances of his capture Livy had not been 
able to ascertain. It was probably during the manoeuvres of the fleet on the coast 
of Lycia early in the year : for we find that a legatus of the consul L. Apustius 
was there, and that after his ill success at Patara Livius did not go straight home 
but went to visit the Scipios first in Thessaly, perhaps to communicate the loss of 
his son to Africanus (Livy xxxvii. 16). 



XXX THE ARMIES OF ROME AND THE KING 489 

practically been deprived of the command of Aeolis. He had taken 790. 
the bridle, and must now submit to be mounted. In return for the 
king's kindness to his son, Scipio could only urge him not to fight a 
battle, but to make peace at all costs." 

The result of the embassy determined Antiochus to risk an Antiochus 
engagement ; for defeat could scarcely impose harder terms on him resolves to 
than were already demanded. It was late in the year, and the fS^*- 
ships were all being laid up for the winter, but it was still possible in ^^^^^^,„ 
that climate to continue military operations for a time. The Roman occupy the 
army moved from town to town in the Troad, finding no opposition Troad. 
anywhere, and at Ilium being welcomed as friends and kinsfolk. 
From Ilium six days' march brought them to the mouth of the Caicus, 
where they were met by Eumenes. 

Antiochus, with 70,000 infantry and 1 2,000 cavalry, was encamped Antiochus 

near Thyatira, on the road between Pergamus and Sardis. Africanus shifts his 

was lying ill at Elaea, and, when sending thanks to the king for the quarters 

restoration of his son, had urged him not to fight until he himself was ^!y"^ , . 

11 1 • • 1 T , , , . , . , . , Thyatira 

well enough to rejom the army. It may have been this advice which ^^ ^^^ 

influenced the king to shift his quarters to the vicinity of Magnesia district of 

ad Sipylum ; but it was also no doubt from a desire to reach the Mag?iesia 

plains of the Hermus, where his phalanx and his numerous cavalry 

would both be of greater service. There he entrenched himself 

strongly, and awaited the approach of his enemy. 

j The consul followed him, having found the camp at Thyatira The two 

[ deserted, and encamped about four miles from the king, with a tribu- armies in 

I tary of the Hermus between them. There the two armies remained position. 

I for three days without farther movement beyond a skirmishing attack 

I of the king's Galatian mounted archers upon the Roman outposts, 

' which was repulsed with some loss as the)' were recrossing the 

I river. On the fourth day the Romans themselves crossed the river, 

land repulsed another cavalry attack whilst engaged in making their 

jnew camp. For four days the two armies were drawn out in front 

'of their camps in fighting order, without either advancing to offer 

j battle. On the fifth the Romans advanced into the middle of the 

I plain between the camps. Still Antiochus did not move. The consul 

I determined to force a battle by attacking his camp ; and accordingly 

removed his own quarters nearer those of the king, and again drew 

up in battle order. At last, fearing that delay would discourage and 

perhaps disperse his army, the king resolved to fight. 

The Roman army consisted of two legions of citizens with corre- The forces 

sponding numbers of socii, together about 21,600 men, and were on either 

supported by about 6800 auxiliaries, composed of Achaean, Perga- ^!^f' 

T- 11- 1 ^ -1 T>,r 1 • 1 TheRo?naji 

/mene, Iranian, and Cretan troops, with some Macedonian and Qy^^^,,. 

Thracian volunteers. The Roman soldiers and socii were drawn up 



ad 
Sipylum. 



490 



HISTORY OF ROME 



I()0. 



The kijig's 
order. 



The 

phalanx. 



Battle of 
Magnesia 
{December), 



in the usual triple line of hastati, principes, and triarii, their right 
being- supported by the cavalry and auxiliaries. Their left rested on 
the river, and only required the support of four squadrons of horse. 
On their rear sixteen elephants were kept in reserve, for they Avere 
not able to meet the fifty-four larger Indian elephants of the king, 
while the charge of the camp was committed to the Macedonian and 
Thracian volunteers. 

The Roman army had the advantage of homogeneousness. The 
bulk of it consisted of men armed alike, used to drill together, taught 
the same movements, and accustomed to the same tactics. The 
king's army — numbering 80,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry — was 
a miscellaneous collection of different and often widely separated 
nations : using different arms, different tactics, and different lan- 
guages. The flower and chief strength of it were the 16,000 men 
trained to form the Macedonian phalanx. These were drawn up in 
ten divisions, thirty-two deep, each division containing 1600 men, 
and having a front of fifty — a variation from the usual massing of the 
whole phalanx together, caused probably by want of space. Between 
each of the divisions were two elephants, their foreheads protected 
with armour, and carrying towers with armed men on their backs. 
On the right of the phalanx were 1500 Galatian light horsemen, 
3000 heavy-armed horsemen {cataphi-actae)., and 1000 cavalry of 
the guard or agenia, consisting of picked men from Media. Then 
came a motley throng of various nations. The whole was sup- 
ported by sixteen elephants ; and the line farther extended by more 
mounted archers of the nomad Dahae, with Cretan and Mysian archers 
and slingers. On his left wing 1500 light Galatian horsemen were 
supported by 2000 Cappadocians sent by Ariarathes, 2700 auxiliaries 
of various nations, 3000 cataphractae, and 1000 ordinary cavalry 
from Syria and Phrygia. In front of these horsemen chariots also 
were stationed armed with scythes, and dromedaries carrying archers. 
Farther to the left came Tarentine horsemen, Gallic cavalry, Cretan 
mercenaries, Carian and Cilician infantry, and cetrati from Pisidia, 
Pamphylia, and Lycia, supported, as was the right wing, by archers, 
slingers, and sixteen elephants. 

Scipio Africanus was still at Elymaea ill. His place, as chief 
adviser to his brother, was taken by Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus ; 
and it was he who seems to have decided when to give the king 
battle, and to have taken the actual command on the field. The 
morning of the day was wet and thick with mist, which proved to be 
of greater detriment to the king's army than to the Romans. The 
latter were less numerous and more compact, and the fog did not 
make their movements wholly unintelligible to each other,; while it 
created great confusion in the more widely spread and worse dis- 



XXX SUBMISSION OF ANTIOCHUS 491 

ciplined masses of the king's army. The damp also damaged the igo. 
bow-strings, shngs, and thongs of the spears, but had no effect on Effects of 
the Roman swords and pila. The scythed chariots were especially ^'^^ ^"•^''• 
difficult to work in the mist, for when the horses were frightened or 
wounded they dashed wildly about, and often did as much damage 
to friends as foes. When these had been got out of the way the ground 
was cleared for action ; but the confusion which had been caused in 
these preliminary difficulties not only threw the auxiliaries on the king's 
left wing into disorder, but also affected the steadiness of the phalanx, 
so that it failed to hold its ground before the charge of the Roman 
heavy armed troops. The men were so hampered by the crowding defeat 
in of their beaten auxiliaries that they could not properly use their of the 
huge sarissae, and before long the left and centre were driven in upon phalanx. 
their camp. On the right, however, where Antiochus was command- 
ing in person, it was the Romans who were forced back towards the 
camp. But M. Aemilius Lepidus, who was in charge of the camp, 
met the retreating troops, and induced them by exhortations, threats, 
and even blows to turn and face the enemy. Antiochus, therefore, 
suddenly found his pursuit checked ; and at the same time per- 
ceived that he was being charged on the rear by some cavalry led by 
Attalus, who, having noticed the disaster which was happening to 
the left wing, came to the rescue from the now victorious right. 

This settled the issue of the battle. The rout speedily became Defeat afid 
general, and, as was usually the case with such huge masses oi flight of 
orientals, all idea of resistance or rally seemed at once out of the Antwchtis. 
question. The slaughter both on the field, in the camp, and in the 
pursuit was very great, even if we cannot trust our authorities, who 
place it at 50,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. The Romans had a 
large number wounded, but only 300 infantry killed and 24 cavalry. 
Antiochus escaped to Sardis, and thence to Apameia, whither his son 
Seleucus and his nephew Antipater had preceded him. 

The results of the victory were immediately manifested in the Results of 
deputations from the Asiatic cities which thronged the Roman camp ^he victory. 
and offered their submission. Thyatira and Magnesia ad Sipylum 
were the first ; and they were quickly followed by similar envoys 
from Ephesus (abandoned by Polyxenidas when he heard of the 
battle), Tralles, and Magnesia on the Maeander, Sardis opened 
her gates, and there the consul took up his quarters for the winter. 

Before many days a herald arrived asking that envoys from the Antiochus 
king should be received. Leave being given, Zeuxis, governor of submits to 
Lydia, and Antipater, the king's nephew, came with full powers to J'^^^/'"^" 
■offer an unconditional submission, and to ask on what terms he 
would be admitted to the friendship of Rome. The answer was 
given by Africanus, who had now recovered from his illness and 



492 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



igo. 

The terms. 



The 

Senate s 
decision, 
February 
i8g. 



i8g. Coss. 
M. Fulvius 
Nobilior, 
Cn. 

Man tins 
Vulso. 



had rejoined the camp. The former demand that Antiochus should 
abandon all Asia west of Mount Taurus was of course repeated, and 
to it was now added that he must pay 15,000 Euboic talents 
(^3,600,000), — 500 at once, 2500 on the ratification of the treaty, 
and the rest in twelve yearly instalments of 1000 talents; must 
surrender all elephants, and such ships of war as the Senate might 
demand ; give up prisoners and deserters and certain Greek officers 
serving with him, and above all Hannibal the Carthaginian ; and 
finally must repay Eumenes 400 talents, the balance of the sum 
lent him by Attains, and give twenty hostages at once. The envoys 
could only consent, and legates were despatched to Rome to obtain 
the ratification of the treaty, accompanied by envoys from various 
states interested, and by king Eumenes in person. 

No special difficulty embarrassed the senators in regard to 
Antiochus. They were content with the terms exacted by the 
Scipios, and the treaty was confirmed. The real difficulty was the 
settlement of the country thus evacuated by the king. The 
general principle on which they wished to act was that all Greek 
states should be free ; but they also had to satisfy the claims of their 
allies Eumenes and the Rhodians — claims which covered not only 
districts inhabited by Asiatics, but also those held by Greeks. It 
was impossible that they should have the local knowledge required 
for the settlement of these matters, and for answering the claims 
urged by the several deputations then in Rome. They therefore 
naturally followed the precedent in such cases by nominating ten 
commissioners to proceed to Asia and make the different awards on 
the spot. Still the speeches of Eumenes and of the Rhodian 
ambassadors, — the first submitting that unless the Romans meant 
to keep the parts of Asia which they had taken for themselves, he 
had the best right to expect them ; the Rhodians pleading for the 
liberation of all Greek cities, — suggested to them some general 
principles on which the settlement was to proceed. I. In Asia, west 
of Mount Taurus, what had been subject to king Antiochus 
was now to be subject to king Eumenes, except Lycia and Caria 
south of the Maeander, which were to belong to Rhodes. II. Of 
Greek cities, those which had paid tribute to Attalus were to continue 
to pay it to Eumenes ; those which had been subjected to tribute 
by Antiochus were to be relieved entirely ; those which had been 
free throughout from either king were to continue free. 

To Cn. Manlius Vulso, one of the consuls for 1 89, was en- 
trusted the task of carrying out this settlement in conjunction with 
the ten commissioners. But Manlius found that his first task must 
be to secure the peace of the country from barbaric and warlike 
tribes in the south, inhabiting the highlands of Pisidia, and the 



XXX THE GAULS IN ASIA 493 

marauding Gauls in the centre. Thus Moagetes, tyrant of Cibyra The 
and a district round it, was forced to pay a fine of 100 talents and settlement 
1 00 medimni of corn ; the people of Telmessus, on the complaint 'f, "^/.^ ^ 
of their neighbours the Sindians, were fined 50 talents ; while igg-iSS. 
Aspendus and other towns were taken, plundered, or fined. Having 
partially at any rate pacified this dangerous part of the country, he 
marched towards Galatia ; and at Pessinus was met by a procession 
of the priests of Cybele, in their sacred vestments, who promised 
him success, — which indicated the feelings, if not the foreknowledge, 
of those who had the misfortune to be neighbours to the Gauls. 

The Gauls had been in Asia since the beginning of the third Asiatic 
century. Like the Northmen of later times, they had made them- Gm^^-^- 
selves the terror of all peaceful and unwarlike folk, and forced cities 
and kings to pay them tribute. Even when they at length got a 
Normandy of their own, and settled in permanent homes in the 
district called afterwards Galatia, they still made open profession 
of universal robbery. The three tribes — the Tolistoboii, Trocmi, 
and Tectosages — mapped out the whole of Asia into districts 
in which they should respectively exercise their right of pillage ; the 
Trocmi taking the shores of the Hellespont, the Tolistoboii Aeolis and 
Ionia, the Tectosages the inland parts of Asia Minor. Such people 
were naturally regarded as common enemies, to be beaten back by 
whoever aspired to be supreme in Asia. Thus Attains earned his 
kingdom by his victory over one great horde of them (about 241) ; 
and Prusias of Bithynia (about 220-218) won great glory by cutting 
to pieces another in the vicinity of Abydos ; and Antiochus I. 
(281-261) gained his title of Soter, or Saviour, from the grateful 
Greeks for a victory over them, and lost his life in a second 
great battle with them. Almost alone among the rulers Attalus 
had ventured to refuse them their blackmail ; and all alike employed 
them as mercenaries when " need arose. It was their service in that 
capacity in the army of Antiochus that now gave the consul the 
pretext for invading them. The real reason, however, was a better 
one. If Rome was to deprive Asia of such protection against the The ?7eed 
barbarians as the power of Antiochus, however imperfectly, had f^^' . 
supplied, she was bound to see that the Greeks and other peaceful ^1^^"^*^ 
folk were secured against such a scourge. Manlius had already 
done this in regard to the Pisidians, he was now to do the same 
in regard to the Gauls ; and it was his success, more than the 
victory over Antiochus, that reconciled the feelings of the Asiatic 
Greeks to the new supremacy. The burden of the royal exactions 
was within limits and could be borne, the plunderings of the 
Gauls were incalculable and intolerable. 

The work was done with fair completeness. The Tolistoboii were 



494 HISTORY OF ROME 



Manlius defeated in the neighbourhood of Mount Olympus, whither they had 

subdues the conveyed their famihes and goods for protection ; and the Tecto- 

Astatic sages in the vicinity of Ancyra. The Trocmi had perhaps been 

weakened by some recent defeats, at any rate they do not appear as 

offering any resistance to ManHus. The Gallic envoys who after 

these battles visited the Roman camp, desiring peace, were ordered 

to follow the consul to Ephesus, where he meant to winter. When 

there, however, he refused to make a treaty until king Eumenes 

should be present — ^who had suffered most from them — and it was 

not concluded till the end of the next year (i88), just as the consul 

was about to cross the Hellespont on his way home. Here they 

were granted peace on condition of remaining strictly within their 

own territories, and avoiding all incursions upon the dominions of 

Eumenes, and of paying tribute to Rome.i 

Final Manlius, after wintering at Ephesus, went to Apameia to meet 

treaty with ^q. commissioners and Eumenes. He found that Antiochus had 

nioc us ]-,ggj^ honourably fulfilling his engagements, and had withdrawn his 

settlement garrisons from the towns. The commandant of Perga alone still 

of Asia, retained the post assigned to him, and with a sense of mihtary duty 

j88. and loyalty which deserves record, refused to give it up without the 

king's orders, which however he shortly afterwards received. The 

business remaining to be done, therefore, was to send the treaty as 

confirmed by the Senate to the king, to see to the destruction of the 

ships at Patara, and to publish the award of the commissioners 

as to the future condition of Asia. It carried out in its general 

principles the orders of the Senate. Autonomous cities which had 

stood by Rome were to remain autonomous ; those that had made 

terms with Antiochus or paid him tribute were now to pay the same 

to Eumenes. The Greek cities on the coast — Miletus, Colophon 

and Notium, Cyme, Mylae, Clazomenae with the island of Dry- 

mussa, Ilium with Rhoeteum and Gergithufti annexed, Chios, Smyrna, 

and Erythrae — were all to be free and autonomous. Rhodes was 

to have Lycia and Caria south of the Maeander except Telmessus. 

Ariarathes of Cappadocia was admitted to friendship with Rome 

on the payment of a fine of 200 talents, and Prusias of Bithynia 

was deprived of Mysia. The fiaw in these arrangements was the 

assignment of Lycia to Rhodes in full sovereignty, and not, as the 

Lycians at first understood it, as equal allies. This was contrary to 

the strong feeling of the Lycians themselves ; and the Romans 

twenty years later saw reason to revoke the gift. 

But it was Eumenes of Pergamus who was the greatest gainer. 
Not only had he been guaranteed the payment of the debt of 

^ I Maccabees viii. 2. ijyayov avrovs viro (popov. 



CONCLUSION OF THE AETOLIAN WAR 495 



Enmenes. 



Aetolians, 



Antiochus to him, and secured by treaty from both him and the The 
Gauls, but he now received an enormous extension of territory. In position of 
Europe Lysimacheia and the Thracian Chersonese were assigned to 
him ; and in Asia the whole of Phrygia and Mysia, Lycaonia, 
Milyas, Lydia,' and the cities of Tralles, Ephesus, and Telmessus. 
The case of Pamphylia was reserved for the decision of the Senate, 
as being partly on one side of Taurus and partly on the other. 
He was therefore to be the chief power in Asia, instead of the 
wealthy king of a single city and small territory ; and in this position 
he soon incurred the jealousy of Rome, whither henceforth all 
complaints from Asia found their way. 

Meanwhile the Aetolians had also been forced to submit. In The 
the summer of 190 Scipio had granted a six months' truce to enable 
them to negotiate with Rome. Though they did not violate this ^9'^'^^9- 
truce in the letter, yet circumstances led to actions on their part 
which caused the Roman government to resolve on continuing the 
war. It was brought about by Amynander, king of the Athamanes. 
This prince had been deeply involved in the intrigue which brought 
Antiochus into Greece, and in 191 helped with a body of his 
countrymen to hold Pellinnaeum in Thessaly for Antiochus. At the 
approach of Acilius the Athamanian garrison surrendered them- 
selves into the hands of king Philip, who, being anxious to regain 
Athamania, treated them with special consideration ; but Amyn- 
ander, fearing the anger of the Romans and Phihp alike, fled with 
his wife and children to Ambracia. The district of Athamania, thus 
deprived of its king, was administered by officers of Philip, who 
behaved with such harshness that the Athamanians were eager for 
the return of Amynander. It was during the six months' truce granted The 
by Scipio in 190 that the Aetolians undertook the cause of their guest, Aetolians 

and supplied him with troops with the assistance of which, joined ^^'^^^ Amy- 
1 • ri •n/ri- -lAi- nander to 

to the exertions of the anti- Macedonian party m the Athamanian return to 

towns, he regained possession of his kingdom and expelled the Atka- 

Macedonian garrisons. Philip made some vain attempts to recover mania. 

the country ; and Amynander tried to propitiate the Romans by 

sending envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in Asia, excusing himself 

for having used the help of the Aetolians, and explaining that he 

had taken nothing but his ancestral dominions. 

But being thus in arms the Aetolians took the opportunity of re- They 

covering certain districts which had once been theirs, but of which 

they had been deprived by Philip, — Aperantia, Amphilochia, and 

Dolopia, constant subj^ects of dispute between them and Macedonia, lochia, and 

The government of the League was preferred by the people of these Dolopia, 

districts, and their troops were welcomed. But their action involved <^utu7mi of 

an innovation on the arrangement sanctioned by Rome at the end of ^^'^' 



recover 
Aperatitia , 
A fui 



496 HISTORY OF ROME 



the Macedonian war (196), and the Aetolians could only hope that 
it would be passed over in case of some disaster in Asia inducing the 
Romans to wish to make peace with them. But towards the end of 
190, in the midst of their triumph, the result of the battle of 
Magnesia became known, and the Aetolians learnt that the Romans, 
on the complaint of Philip, intended to prosecute the war against 
themselves at the expiration of the truce. 
i8g. The war had been assigned to the consul M, Fulvius Nobilior, 

M.Fulvius -vvho in the spring of 189 crossed to Apollonia. There some of the 
Nobihor leading men of Epirus met him and advised that the campaign 
Apollonia. should be begun by an attack upon Ambracia, the old capital of 
Pyrrhus, enriched by him with noble buildings and numerous 
works of art, and for some generations an important city of the 
Aetolian League. Fulvius accepted the advice, and the Aetolians in 
Ambracia Ambracia stood a siege memorable for the extraordinary fertility of 
IS besieged device shown on both sides, in mine and countermine, in sally and 
and a assault, and every art of attack and defence. Nevertheless its 

S2irrenders. ultimate fall seemed certain, and its impending fate caused much 
feeling in Greece. In answer to urgent messages sent by the 
Aetolians, when they first knew that they were to be attacked, envoys 
from Rhodes and Athens had arrived at the Roman camp ; and 
now Amynander obtained a safe conduct from the consul, that 
he might appeal to the citizens, among whom he had lived during 
his year's exile, to save themselves by a timely accommodation. 
Other towns in Acarnania joined in the chorus of appeal. Fulvius 
himself seemed unwilling to reduce the Aetolians to extremities, 
influenced in their favour by his half-brother, son of M. Valerius 
Laevinus, who had in 2 1 1 made the first treaty with them. 
Terms At length the Ambraciots submitted, though with the condition 

given to the ^^^^ the Aetolian garrison should be allowed to depart unharmed, 
and the Aetolian League agreed to the terms imposed by Fulvius. 
They were to pay 200 Euboic talents, restore deserters and captives, 
surrender every city annexed by them since the consulship of Lucius 
Flamininus (192), and not to attach any other to their League. 
Cephallenia was expressly excluded from the treaty, and was after- 
wards reduced separately by Fulvius, and made a libera civitas under 
the protection of Rome. Fulvius then took over Ambracia, and 
removed to Rome the collection of statues and pictures made by 
Pyrrhus, but otherwise did no harm to the town, and was rewarded 
by the terrified Ambraciots with a crown of gold, as a liberator and 
benefactor. The terms, which the Aetolians regarded as oppressive 
and had with difficulty been induced to accept, were not confirmed at 
Rome without demur. Philip's envoys complained of the interference 
in Athamania and the annexation of Dolopia, and earnestly pleaded 



XXX TREATMENT OF AMBRACIA 497 

for the rejection of the treaty. The pleading of the Athenian and 
Rhodian deputies, however, prevailed, and the treaty was sworn to, 
with the additional proviso tha,t the Aetolians were strictly bound to 
follow Rome in war and peace. The interests of Philip were guarded 
by the clause requiring the Aetolians to abandon all concjuests since 
192 ; and the Achelous was fixed as the frontier between Acarnania 
and Aetolia. The Acarnanians had always been on bad terms with 
the Aetolians, but had hitherto been accustomed to look for support 
to Macedonia ; henceforth their territory was under the guarantee of 
Rome. 

Though the Ambraciots had treated Fulvius with honour as Ambracia 
their liberator, their envoys at Rome told a different tale in 187. made a free 
Encouraged by the consul M. Aemilius they complained of the ^^'^^^' 7- 
hardships inflicted upon their citizens, the plunder of their town, 
the selling of wives and children into slavery, and the stripping of 
ornaments from their temples. Whether it was the influence of 
party spirit or a tardy awakening of conscience, the Senate were so 
far moved by these appeals as to pass a decree restoring full liberty to 
the Ambraciots, with the one condition that in its harbour Roman 
citizens should be exempt from tolls and dues. The question of the 
restoration of the pictures and statues was referred to the pontifices. 
They do not appear, however, to have been restored ; and thus 
another step was taken in the process of filling Rome with the pro- 
ducts of Greek genius, which had begun for the first time on a large 
scale with the sack of Syracuse a quarter of a century before. 

Authorities. — For the war with Antiochus we still have the most connected 
narrative in Livy, xxxv. -xxxviii. ; but the fragments of Polybius (xviii.-xxi. ), 
whom Livy chiefly follows, are also full and valuable. Appian [Syriacae, 6-21) 
gives us a fresh and instructive account of the campaigns ; and much is to be 
learnt in various ways from V\\x\.3xc\\% Lives of Flaniininus, Cato, Sind. Philopoeine?t. 
Trogus (Justin, xxxi. 3 sq.)\ Josephus [Antig. xii. 3, 3-4, for the conduct of 
Antiochus to the Jews); Zonaras, ix. 18-21; Orosius, iv. 20. Of Diodorus 
Siculus (xxix. ) there are a few fragments relating to the war. 



2 K 



CHAPTER XXXI 



FROM THE END OF THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS TO THE END OF 
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR, I90-166 

Last days of Antiochus, Hannibal, and Scipio — The anti-Roman policy of Philip V. 
in the last years of his life — -Death of his son Demetrius — Death of Philip and 
succession of Perseus (179)— Character of Perseus — His activity and schemes 
for asserting the independence of Macedonia and regaining supremacy in 
Greece — The jealousy of Rome and the complaints against Perseus made by 
Eumenes — The Senate decide to go to war (172) — The first campaign in 
Thessaly and defeat of Licinius — Reduction of Boeotia (171) — The second 
campaign in Thessaly also abortive — Rising in Epirus(i7o) — Third campaign : 
Marcius Philippus enters Macedonia — Perseus intrigues with Genthius, 
Rhodes, and Eumenes, but is only helped materially by Cotys (169) — Fourth 
campaign — Aemilius Paulus defeats Perseus at Pydna, who is captured in 
Samothrace (168) — Division and settlement of Macedonia — Punishment of 
Epirus, Aetolia, and the Macedonian party in Greek states — Deportation of 
Achaean statesmen — Supremacy of Rome — Antiochus and Popilius at 
Pelusium. 

Change of In the period immediately succeeding the defeat of Antiochus the 
Personages. Great the stage was being cleared of its old actors. Antiochus lost 
his life in 187 ; Hannibal and Scipio both died in 183 ; and though 
Philip V. survived nearly four years more (179), they were years of 
domestic unhappiness and public failure and mortification. An evil 
destiny seemed to pursue all the men of chief note in the late wars. 
After the battle of Magnesia (190) Hannibal fled to Crete, knowing 
that his surrender would be demanded by the Romans. Eluding the 
cupidity of the Cretans, by concealing his gold in bronze figures of 
his gods, he presently returned to Asia ; and, after some obscure 
wanderings, found concealment for a time in the court of Prusias, 
king of Bithynia, who was engaged in one of his frequent quarrels 
with Eumenes of Pergamus. His presence was betrayed by the 
new vigour manifested in the counsels of Prusias, whose fleet won an 
important victory over that of Eumenes. But the Romans were on 
the watch, and Flamininus, who happened to be near at hand on one 



Hannibal. 



CHAP. XXXI HANNIBAL AND SCIPIO 499 



of the numerous commissions in Greece or Asia, at once demanded 
his surrender. The king was too weak to resist such an order, and 
Hannibal anticipated the fate a^vaiting him by putting an end to his 
own Hfe by means, it is said, of a poison which he carried on his 
person concealed in a ring. The place of his death was Libyssa, 
between Chalcedon and Nicaea, thus fulfilling an oracle which had 
declared that " Libyan " soil should cover his body.i 

Whatever may be thought of the Roman policy which drove The 
Hannibal from Carthage, it could not be expected that the govern- Romans 
ment should view his presence in Asia Minor with indifference. The Ha7inibal 
Romans were pledged to support Eumenes, and Hannibal had shown 
no intention of living a private life. On the contrary, he had all 
along professed that active enmity to Rome was the undying motive 
of his actions. The Romans were forced in common prudence to 
demand his surrender. It is fortunate for their credit that his 
suicide spared them the shame of doing with him what they almost 
certainly would have done. His character as a leader has been 
sufficiently displayed in the wonderful campaigns in Italy. As a 
statesman he is conspicuous for honesty and good sense. A rough 
humour marks some of the anecdotes preserved of him, and the 
vigorous directness of his language made him but a half- welcome 
guest at the court of Antiochus, who, despite of some brilliant 
qualities, had neither the clear sight nor boldness to perceive or carry 
out the only policy which had a chance of success. The Roman 
verdict, on the other hand, which stamped him as crudelis^ was not 
without some justification ; and though it is possible to feel admira- 
tion for the patriotic soldier and the champion of a ruined cause, it 
is difficult to sympathise strongly with an adventurer ready to give 
his services to any petty Asiatic prince, if only he might annoy the 
old enemies whom he could have no hope of defeating. 

The duties and activities of his conqueror Scipio had fallen on Scipio 
lines more favourable to his reputation. His sword was only drawn 4A'^^'^^-5'- 
in the service of his own land. In his first campaign he had saved 
his father's life ; in the darkest hour of his country's fortunes he had 
been true to her. In Spain, from which others shrank, he had 
avenged his father's death and restored the fortunes of Rome. If 
he had failed to keep Hasdrubal back from Italy, the failure had 
been amply atoned for at Zama ; and the conqueror of Hannibal 
had generally been credited with the defeat of Antiochus rather 
than the brother on whose staff he was serving. Still the last 
five years of his life were full of difficulty and mortification. 

There does not seem to have been any loss of popularity among 

^ Ai^vccra. Kpv\peL /ScDXos ' kvvi^ov defias. 



500 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Activity 
of the 
party in 
opposition 
to Scipio. 



His 

disregard 
for legal 
forms. 



His 

impeach- 
tnent. 



the citizens at large ; but in the Senate he was a member of the 
minority, and the opposite party, which had all along been annoyed 
at his early exercise of those powers which they themselves had only 
attained at mature years and after a regular gradation of official life, 
had of late been particularly active in attacking the magistrates en- 
gaged in foreign commands. Thus a prosecution had been com- 
menced against M'Acilius in 190, on which Cato offered to give 
evidence, and was only withdrawn on Acilius ceasing to be a candi- 
date for the censorship. The "acts" of Fulvius Nobilior in 
Ambracia were rescinded on the proposal of the consul M. Aemilius, 
in 187. In the same year the triumph of Cn. Manlius was opposed 
by a majority of the commissioners sent to Asia, on the ground of 
his unauthorised pursuit of Antiochus over Mount Taurus, and his 
equally unauthorised invasion of Galatia. And now Scipio himself 
was attacked. The accusers, as to whose names there was doubt in 
Livy's time, acted as the mouthpiece of a party in the Senate led by 
Cato, whose opposition to Scipio had not relaxed since his service 
under him as quaestor in 205. Old scandals were raked up : the 
alleged neglect and extravagance in Sicily ; the mismanagement at 
Locri ; his salutation as king by the Spaniards ; the court paid to 
him by Antiochus in restoring his son : all pointing, as they alleged, 
to corruption or unconstitutional ambition. 

Scipio had indeed on his return from Africa shown his modera- 
tion in avoiding the honour of perpetual consul and dictator ; 
yet he sometimes displayed an imprudent contempt for legal forms. 
On one occasion, it was said, when the quaestors had some 
scruple as to opening the money chests in the treasury, he called 
for the keys and opened them on his own authority, remarking 
that no one had a better right to unlock them than the man 
to whom it was owing that there was anything to lock up. And 
when his brother Lucius was called upon for his accounts 
of money received in the campaign of 190-189, Publius took the 
books from his hands and tore them to pieces before the Senate, 
exclaiming that it was unworthy to demand an account of 4000 
sestertia (about ^28,000) from a man who had paid 200,000 
(about ^1,400,000) into the treasury. Lucius and his legates, 
however, were condemned, and, on refusing to make good the 
sum of money demanded, he was arrested by the praetor, the tribunes 
deciding to refuse their auxilium. Publius rescued him by force, 
and was then himself impeached before the centuriate assembly 
by two of the tribunes. He came into the comitium, escorted by a 
large number of friends and clients, and advanced to the foot of the 
Rostra, where it was the custom of accused persons to stand. When 
it came to his turn to speak, he mounted the platform and, without 



XXXI DIFFICULTIES IN GREECE AND ASIA 501 

alluding to the charges against him, reminded his hearers that it was 

the day on which he had conquered Hannibal at Zama, and bade 

them follow him to the temple' of Jupiter on the Capitol to offer 

thanks to the gods and to pray for more citizens like himself. Then 

he left the Rostra and walked towards the Capitol, followed by the 

whole assembly, so that the tribunes and their officers were left 

alone. But his pride was deeply wounded : he retired to his 

estate at Liternum, where he passed the rest of his days, and where 

his ashes were buried at a spot marked by a statue that existed in 

Livy's time. His absence from Rome gave his enemies courage. 

His impeachment was renewed, and when his brother Lucius pleaded 

illness as an excuse for his not obeying the summons to attend, the 

tribunes would have forced him to come, had not one of them. Death of 

Tiberius Gracchus, a political opponent, though afterwards if not Africanus 

then his son-in-law, resisted the desire of his colleagues. He was \.' ^^' " 
. . . . ... , . . lAiernum, 

allowed to die m peace, leavmg it as an injunction to his heirs that the j§j^ 

ungrateful city should not have his ashes. 

Though the Romans had declared the European and Asiatic Greece and 
I Greeks free, and had committed the rule of Asia to native govern- Asiafro7n 
Iments, they were by no means quit of them. Constant appeals ^ '^ 0171. 
■ reached Rome, answered by frequent missions of legates, and it was 
plain that before long an active intervention would be demanded 
I which would not again be withdrawn. In neither country, indeed, 
I had the settlement been one likely to last. In Asia Eumenes of 
I Pergamus was intended to be the chief power : but his quarrels with 
iPrusias on the one hand, and with Philip on the other, were con- 
istant sources of difficulty; while his relations with Greece roused 
'suspicion against him at Rome, where there was a disposition to 
checkmate him by showing special honours to his brother Attains. 
I Another difficulty was Rhodes. The Lycians disliked the Rhodes. 
iRhodian government, to which they had been assigned, and were 
i ready with complaints ; and the naval supremacy which the Rhodians 
'aimed at in the Aegean was not long in attracting the jealous 
I observation of the Romans. 

Aetolia since 189 had been a vassal of Rome ; but its turbulent Aetolia. 
'people, shut off from their old habits of piracy, had turned upon each 
other, and the country was the scene of frequent sanguinary affrays 
land massacres. In Peloponnesus the forcible addition of Sparta to Pelopon- 
' the Achaean League had been a fruitful source of quarrel : and both 
Sparta and Elis, unwillijig members of the League, were encouraged 
to lay their complaints before the Senate. Even in the more con- 
tented part of the League there was a sharp division between those 
who hated and those who wished well to Roman influence. A third 
party, prepared to respect the terms made with Rome and yet to resist 



nesus. 



502 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The designs 
of Philip 
V. 



Philip's 
anger with 
Rome. 
He has to 
withdraw 
from 
Thessaly 
and 
Thrace, 
i8s. 



Prepara- 
iioti in 
Mace- 
donia. 



encroachment upon them, had been led by Philopoemen ; but since 
his death (183) the Romanising party had become more active, and 
assisted the wSenate in dividing and distracting the League. 

With Phihp of Macedonia questions soon arose threatening that 
renewal of war, which actually took place under his successor. 
He had been rewarded for his assistance in the war against Antiochus 
with cities in Thessaly and Athamania, as well as Magnesia, including 
the important town of Demetrias, — one of the three "fetters of 
Greece." Not contented with this he pushed his authority in the 
Thracian Chersonese, claiming to occupy Aenus and Maroneia, on 
the ground that he had taken them during the war, and that they 
had not been mentioned in the settlement of the Roman com- 
missioners. The Romans were jealous of any encroachment in the 
Chersonese, as commanding the shortest passage into Asia, and had 
assigned it to the friendly Eumenes. The Senate, therefore, when 
approached by emissaries from the Thessalian towns and from 
Eumenes, sent three commissioners in 185, headed by Caecilius 
Metellus. Their decisions in favour of the withdrawal of Macedonian 
garrisons from Thessaly, as well as from Aenus and Maroneia, were 
received with great anger by the king, who hinted that the present 
state of things was not destined to last for ever — " the last sun had 
not set." He conformed, however, for the present, but from this 
time forward nursed a settled purpose of one day renewing the war, 
and shaking off the intolerable yoke of Rome. 

He paid great attention to the training and efficiency of his 
army ; collected stores of arms and war material in the towns, and 
on various pretexts or by acts of violence removed from the coast 
towns those whom he believed to be disaffected to himself, filling 
up their places with Thracians and other barbarians, on whom he 
thought he could rely (182). But these transactions had not been 
allowed to pass unobserved. Immediately after the mission of 
Caecilius in 185 complaints had poured in against Philip from every 
side, and he had sent his younger son Demetrius to defend him 
before the Senate. Demetrius was known at Rome, where he had 
been for some years as a hostage ; and the Senate now sought to 
introduce division in Macedonia by treating the young prince with 
special honour, and Flamininus appears to have told him outright 
that it was intended that he should succeed to the Macedonian 
crown : while a fresh commission was sent to insist on the king 
obeying the orders of the Senate and evacuating the towns named by 
them. Philip was forced to obey, but the favour shown to Demetrius 
proved fatal to him. Perseus, the king's elder son, worked on his 
father's jealousy, continually representing Demetrius as engaged in 
treasonable correspondence with Rome, and at length induced him 



XXXI PERSEUS KING OF MACEDONIA 



503 



to consent to his son's death by producing, it is said, a letter of 
Flamininus to Demetrius, referring to a plan for destroying his 
father and brother and securing the crown for himself (181), 

Philip never held up his head again. He found power slipping Death of 
from his hands, and the courtiers crowding round the young heir : Philip, 
while before long he learnt that the letter, on the strength of which '79- 
he had consented to his son's death, was a forgery. Worn out with 
sorrow and the infirmities of premature age, haunted with the furies 
of a conscience stained by cruelty and intemperance, he sank into a 
dishonoured grave at Amphipolis within two years of the death of 
Demetrius. He had wished, it is said, to have named Antigonus, 
nephew of Antigonus Doson, as his heir. But death came on him 
suddenly ; his physician contrived to let Perseus know of it promptly, 
and the succession was secured, Antigonus put to death, and Perseus 
ambassadors sent to Rome to ask for the continuance of the friend- king, 779- 
ship and alliance made with his father. 168. 

For the first two years of the new reign this friendship was at 
least in appearance maintained. The only immediate difficulty was 
one created by the late king, who had instigated the Bastarnae, 
a wandering tribe from the Dniester, to invade the Dardani, hoping 
to divert the attention of the Romans from his own intrigues. But 
for the present the Dardani succeeded in driving back the invaders, 
and the Roman government contented itself with a warning. Other 
sources of uneasiness, however, presently arose. The new king was character 
possessed of many attractive qualities. Noble and royal in figure of Perseus. 
and appearance ; dignified in his manner ; sober, chaste, and 
temperate in the enjoyments of life, he set an example which the 
court was quick to follow. Public business seemed likely to be 
conducted with steadiness and ability, and it only required such a 
change in the Macedonian government to turn the eyes of the Greeks 
once more to it. Perseus from the first was believed to be intent His policy. 
upon recovering the influence once exercised in Greece by Macedonia. 
He began, as his father did, by strengthening his hold in Thrace. He 
expelled a prince named Abrupolis on the plea of some unfair 
dealings as to the mines of Pangaeum ; and when the Dolopians, 
who had a controversy with him, appealed to Rome, he invaded their 
country and forced them to submit to his authority. He made a 
progress in Greece to Delphi, under pretext of consulting the oracle, and 
though he only remained there three days, his presence made a great 
sensation. He was said also to have taken pains to conciliate towns 
on his road, and to have invited the renewal of friendly relations. 
He even offered terms to the Achaean League. An order of the 
League Assembly had closed its territory to Macedonians or to 
kings ; consequently Macedonian territory was also closed to Achaeans, 



504 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



i74-n3- 
The policy 
of Perseus 
alarms the 
Romans. 



Emnencs 
in Rome, 
denounces 
Perseus, 

JT2. 



Attack on 
Eumenes. 



and served as a refuge for their runaway slaves. These Perseus offered 
to restore, if the Achaeans would renew their friendship. Though 
a majority of the League declined the offer, a considerable minority 
wished to accept it, and the jealousy of Rome was roused. It was 
a primary object of Roman policy to keep Macedonia and Greece at 
variance. Only so could the Roman interference in Greek quarrels, 
which was continually being invoked, be exercised with security ; 
and the policy of Perseus was offensive to Rome in proportion as it 
was acceptable in Greece. There was a general feeling that an 
outbreak was at hand ; and many states in Greece were inclined to 
rest their hopes on Perseus. Eumenes of Pergamus was unpopular : 
the benefactions by which he tried to gain favour in Achaia and else- 
where seemed vulgar and ostentatious ; while Macedonia was under- 
stood and had a long established prestige. Who could tell whether 
Perseus might not, in the end, prove a match for the great Republic, 
when it would be well for those states which had been loyal to him ? 
The Romans were aware of the state of things. Frequent com- 
missions were sent into Greece and Macedonia, which Perseus 
studiously ignored. In Thessaly there was a commercial crisis, 
giving rise to intestine quarrels which App. Claudius was sent to 
allay ; while the control of a similar disturbance in Aetolia was entrusted 
to Marcellus, with orders to proceed to Achaia and keep alive the 
hostility to Macedonia. A commission of five, headed by C. 
Valerius, was also sent to Macedonia to investigate what was going 
on there, and afterwards to cross to Egypt to renew the alliance with 
the king (173-172). 

It was while this commission was still at work that the resolution 
was come to at Rome, to go to war with Macedonia. Early in 172 
king Eumenes in person laid before the Senate the proofs of the 
hostile intentions of Perseus. He pointed out the hold already 
obtained by him in Boeotia and AetoHa ; the increase in his military 
power by the inexhaustible recruiting ground obtained in Thrace, 
and the replenishment of his ranks during a long peace. Every 
step taken by him was attributed to deliberate hostility to Rome : 
his expulsion of the Thracian prince Abrupolis ; his intrigues in 
Boeotia, which had caused the death of the leaders of the Romanising 
party ; his invasion of the Dolopes ; his visit to Delphi ; his inter- 
ference in the financial affairs of Thessaly and Perrhaebia. 

The impression made on the Senate was increased by the 
defiant torie of the Macedonian emissary Harpalus, who answered 
Eumenes, and by the advocacy of the Rhodian ambassadors, — them- 
selves under grievous suspicion, — ^who retorted upon Eumenes that 
he was pursuing an exactly similar policy in Asia. It was farther 
deepened, when, after Eumenes had been dismissed with large 



WAR WITH PERSEUS INEVITABLE 505 



presents and every mark of honour, it became known that his Hfe had 

been attempted at Delphi, which he visited on his way home, and 

that the would-be assassins, though they had not been arrested, were 

believed to have been in the pay of Perseus. And when Valerius and 

his fellow-commissioners returned to Rome with a report confirming 

the statements of Eumenes, and bringing with them a Delphian named 

Praxo, at whose house the assassins of Eumenes had lodged ; and 

farther, when a certain L. Rammius of Brundisium was produced, 

asserting that Perseus had instigated him to poison the Roman 

legates who usually lodged at his house on their way to Greece, it 

was decided that war should be begun in the next consular year. 

The praetor Cn. Sicinius was ordered to enrol an army to muster at Prepar- 

Brundisium. A request from Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, to be ationsfor 

allowed to send his son for education at Rome was gladly accepted ; '^'^'^' ^'^^' 

friendship and alliance were made with certain Thracian tribes who 

asked for it; commissioners were sent to Asia, the Aegean Islands, 

and to Crete and Rhodes, to secure their adhesion ; and Eumenes, 

I now recovered from his wound, hastened home to make preparations. 

, War was not yet formally declared, but three legates were sent to 

Macedonia to demand satisfaction on pain of the renunciation of 

I " friendship " with Perseus. The king, being with difficulty induced 

i to give them audience, spoke with the greatest bitterness of the 

I constant visits of Roman commissioners to spy upon him, and of his 

j state of dependence. He ended by handing in a written reply, in Perseus 

I which he denied being bound by his father's treaty, only renewed at ^^fi'-^^^i- 

1 the beginning of his reign as a formality, and demanded that, if the 

\ Romans desired a new treaty, the whole of its conditions should be 

{discussed afresh. The legates answered by renouncing his friend- 

\ ship ; to which the king stopped to reply, as he was leaving the 

room, by ordering them to quit the country within three days. 

I The war was thus made inevitable ; and the Romans were The 

I encouraged in entering upon it by the reports of the various com- 

Uiiissions. The only allies which Perseus seemed to have were 

jGenthius, son of Pleuratus, of Illyria, and Cotys, king of the 

I Thracian Odrysae. Eumenes, Antiochus, and Ptolemy had been 

(approached by Macedonian envoys, but were reported to be still 

,' hostile to him ; and though the Rhodians were said to be wavering, 

J ambassadors from the island, then at Rome, tried to persuade the 

Senate that their loyalty was beyond suspicion. Prusias of Bithynia 

had married a sister of Perseus, yet he resolved to stand aloof and 

I watch the result of the contest ; while Antiochus did not wish to 

interfere, but yet saw with satisfaction the Romans engaged in war 

with Macedonia, as ofifering facilities for his designs upon the 

dominions of Egypt. It was well known that in Greece feelings 



isolation 
of Persetis. 



5o6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



I J I. Coss. 
P. Licinius 
Crass?is, C. 
Cassius 
Longinus. 
The war is 
begun. 



The 

campaign 

in 

Thessaly, 

171. 



Victory of 
Perseus 
near 
Larissa. 



were divided, and that in each state there was a party sympathising 
with Macedonia. At the end of the war the vengeance of Rome con- 
founded with these the moderate party who wished to stand aloof 
from either side and maintain a position of strict adherence to 
treaties. For the present active participation with Perseus, except 
in a small part of Boeotia, was prevented by a Roman commis- 
sion of five, who between them visited every part of the country. 

Perseus affected surprise when an army under Cn. Sicinius 
landed at Apollonia early in 171, and sent legates to Rome to ask 
the reason. They were received in the temple of Bellona without 
being allowed to enter the city, and were only answered that the 
consul would presently be in Macedonia to hear any complaint which 
might be made, but that they were not to return. Meanwhile one 
of the commissioners, O. Marcius Philippus, had met Perseus on the 
Peneus, and had granted a truce to enable the king to once more 
send ambassadors to Rome, though he knew that it was useless, and 
that the war was resolved upon ; but he knew also that the prepara- 
tions were not well advanced, and that delay would be an advantage 
to Rome, — a piece of double dealing afterwards reprobated by a 
minority of the Senate. 

It was not, in fact, till the middle of July that the consul crossed 
to Apollonia and took over the command of the four legions (16,000 
men), with their complement of 800 cavalry, 15,000 infantry and 
1200 cavalry of the allies, auxiliaries from Liguria, Crete, and 
Numidia, and elephants. Perseus, whose council had decided 
against farther efforts at conciliation, had already moved his army 
of 39,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry from its camp at Citium, between 
Pella and Beroea, into Thessaly, and taken up a position at the foot 
of Mount Ossa. About half were Macedonians trained to fight 
in the phalanx ; the rest were of various nationality. The troops 
seem to have been in a state of great efficiency and confidence ; 
while the cities of Macedonia vied with each other in supplying 
provisions and money. Licinius also entered Thessaly, and en- 
camped on the Peneus, near Larissa, where he was joined by 
Eumenes and some Greek allies. Part of the fleet under the praetor 
C. Lucretius sailed up the Gulf of Corinth to the southern coast of 
Boeotia, while the rest, under his brother Marcus, went to Chalcis — 
where squadrons from Rhodes and other places mustered — and 
landed troops to besiege Haliartus. 

The consul was unsuccessful in Thessaly, and sustained a some- 
what severe defeat in a cavalry engagement near Larissa ; and 
though Perseus failed to follow up his advantage, and indeed suffered 
a reverse later on near Crannon, the first yeai-'s campaign had done 
nothing towards crushing him, and had called forth warm enthusiasm 



XXXI DILATORY CONDUCT OF THE WAR 507 

for the king in many parts of Greece. The net result to the Romans 
was the capture of some ThessaHan towns, and the reduction of 
the three towns in Boeotia which had sided with Perseus. Hahartus 
was taken by M. Lucretius after a long siege, its inhabitants sold, 
and its walls levelled with the ground ; Thisbe surrendered to the 
praetor C. Lucretius without a struggle ; and Coronea was taken by 
the consul in the autumn. The other consul, Cassius, who had been 
sent to Gaul, attempted to enter Macedonia through Illyricum, but 
appears to have been stopped by Perseus himself, or a detachment 
of his army. 

After his victory in the first cavalry engagement, Perseus had 170. 
been induced by the wiser members of his council to ofifer peace on Coss. A. 
the same terms as his father. The answer showed the implacable f^ jfr' 
determination of Rome. Perseus, Licinius had answered, must 
submit unconditionally, and the future government of Macedonia 
must be left to the discretion of the Senate. But though the A futile 
Senate's tone was thus haughty, it was not supported by a corre- campaign. 
sponding energy. The consul of the next year (A. Hostilius) failed 
to enter Macedonia from Thessaly, and suffered at least one defeat ; 
Cephalus had been goaded into rousing a somewhat violent insur- 
rection in favour of Perseus in Epirus ; L. Hortensius succeeded Mis- 
Lucretius in command of the fleet, and outdid him in extortion conduct of 
upon the coast towns, without performing any exploit of importance Horten- 
to atone for it ;i and lastly, App. Claudius suffered a mortifying- 
defeat in an attempt upon Uscana in Illyricum. 

The complaint of plundered temples, and of works of art shipped i6g. Coss. 
to Italy from a friendly city like Chalcis, is a forerunner of the Q-Marcius 
corruption that was soon to mark the steps of many Roman magis- , , ^ ipp'us 
trates in their dealing with extra- Italian states, and is a striking Se'rvilius. 
commentary on the ineffectiveness of the conduct of the war up to 
this time. The consul of the next year, Q. Marcius Philippus, did, 
however, advance matters somewhat. Perseus, with ill-timed parsi- 
mony, had failed to obtain active co-operation from Genthius of 
Illyricum or from the other states, which at this crisis might have 
been easily won over by a display of liberality, and was therefore 
unsupported. He was encamped at Dium, which commanded the 
coast road from Perrhaebia into Macedonia, whilst his general Hip- Macedonia 
pias held the passes over the Cambunian mountains. Philippus, "^ length 
however, baffled Hippias, crossed the mountains, and descended ^^ ^^^ ' 
upon Dium.2 Perseus, taken by surprise, retired upon Pydna, order- 
ing his treasure to be thrown into the sea, and recalling his garrison 

1 An inscription exists containing an Athenian decree bestowing citizenship 
upon Hortensius as a "benefactor." Such were the pitiful means taken to avert 
his depredations (Hicks, p. 338, C. I. A., ii. 423). - See Map, p. 440. 



5o8 HISTORY OF ROME 



at Tempe. Philippus entered Dium, but did not stay there. He 
retired along the coast road to Phila, in order to secure the con- 
nexion with his suppHes on his rear. Perseus thereupon reoccupied 
Q.Marcius Dium, which Phihppus answered by taking Heracleum, some miles 
Philippus j^Qj-j.]^ Qf Phila. Nothing more was done that year : and if Perseus 
ericampu ^^^^ angry with Hippias for allowing Philippus to cross the moun- 
Heracleum, tains, the Romans were equally discontented with Philippus for 
^<^9- making no more use of his success. Nor were the movements of 

the fleet of importance ; and Eumenes, after visiting the consul at 
Heracleum, to congratulate him on having effected an entrance into 
Macedonia, returned home for the winter, and was rumoured to have 
been in friendly communication with Perseus. Still the fact of the 
Romans having actually entered Macedonia had a considerable effect 
in Greece. The Achaeans sent Polybius to offer the assistance of a 
League army in Thessaly, and the Romanising party in each state 
was encouraged. The Senate felt strong enough to reject the 
request of an envoy of Prusias to make peace with Perseus, and to 
show its indignation at a similar demand from Rhodes by declaring 
those Carians and Lycians who were under Rhodian government to 
be free. A commission, however, was sent to investigate the state 
of things in the camp at Heracleum, when Philippus asked for 
farther supplies ; and their report was disquieting. The position of 
the Roman camp, they said, was dangerously near the enemy ; 
provisions were running short ; App. Claudius at Lychnis was not 
strong enough to effect a diversion, and had, in fact, been obliged 
to beg help from Achaia, — which the Achaeans were prevented from 
giving by the regulation against answering such demands unless sanc- 
tioned by the Senate ; lastly, Eumenes' loyalty was doubtful. 
i68. L. It was felt that the crisis demanded a man of military experience, 

PauluTlI "^"^^ ^' ^'^^I'^'^i^ius Paulus, who had already seen much fighting in 
C. Liciyi-' Spain, and had celebrated a triumph over the Ligurians, was induced 
ius once more to stand for the consulship. He was sixty years old, a 

Crassus. brother-in-law of Africanus, and had on more than one occasion been 
Aemilius rejected as a candidate for office. Now, however, he was felt to be 
j'^^'^f, the right man, and somewhat against his will was elected consul. 
Iheconu ^^ ^^^^ ^° ^^^^ ^^^^ fresh legions with him, and to be followed by 
mand in 6oo cavalry enlisted in Gaul ; while the praetor L. Anicius was to 
Macedonia, relieve App. Claudius at Lychnis, the chief town of the Dassaretae, in 
order to crush Genthius, who had now definitely declared for 
Perseus, and had even imprisoned some Roman legates. 
Paulus Paulus was to start immediately after the fen'ae Latinae (31st 

command ^^^^h), and not wait, as had of late become the custom, for the 
April 168. games of Apollo in July. The story was often told that, on returning 
from the meeting of the Senate, his daughter met him with the cry, 



XXXI AEMILIUS PAULUS IN COMMAND 509 

" Perse is dead," referring to a favourite dog, and that he took it as 168. 
an omen of success. A bett'er omen was his own energetic and 
honourable character. He found the Roman camp, between Phila 
and Heracleum, somewhat demoraHsed from the apparent impos- 
sibiHty of attacking the position of Perseus, and suffering from want 
of water. He took immediate steps for the restoration of discipUne, 
and reheved the latter distress by showing how to open the springs 
in the neighbouring mountain slopes. Still the position of Perseus Perseus on 
was a very strong one. He had fortified himself on the north bank the Eni- 
of the Enipeus. His left rested on the sea, his right on the range P^^^^- 
of Mount Olympus. Though the Enipeus was nearly dry in the 
summer, he had availed himself of wood from the forests to erect 
such a formidable fortification along its bank, that it was clear to 
Aemilius that the position could not be carried in front. The king's 
army was considerable also in number, although his parsimony had 
deprived him of the help of the 10,000 Gallic horsemen who had 
come at his invitation, but had insisted on having a large sum of 
money paid in advance. Yet he must have felt that he was almost 
alone and was playing his last card. Genthius, whom he had also Perseus 
treated with curious meanness, had already surrendered to the praetor g^t^ no 
L. Anicius. Though the Rhodians had almost openly declared for ^^^^V frovt 
him, they could give him no effective aid while a powerful Roman ^/^^^^j. ly 
fleet was in the Aegean, and their attempted negotiation with Paulus Eume?ies. 
utterly failed. Eumenes had been secretly offering his intervention 
to secure peace with Rome ; but he too had demanded a large sum, 
which Perseus was unwilling to pay ; and, even if he had been will- 
ing, Eumenes was now under such suspicion at Rome that the value of 
his intervention was more than doubtful. The king's one ally was 
the Thracian Cotys. 

After some weeks' delay the consul was relieved from his The 
difficulty by the gallantry of Scipio Nasica and his own son Fabius posUion of 
Maximus, who volunteered to turn the position by a pass leading '^'f^"! l 
over the chain of Olympus past Pythium and Petra, of which they Scipio 
had learnt from native traders. While they were on their way with Nasica and 
8000 infantry and 200 Cretan archers, Paulus distracted the Pabins 
attention of the enemy by an attack upon his outposts on the '^ <i^i>'iu^- 
Enipeus, in which for two days his men suffered severely. On the 
third he made a feint of moving towards the sea, as though 
intending to get on the king's rear by help of the fleet. Perseus 
was thus put off his guard, and was only informed at the last 
moment of Nasica's movement by a Cretan deserter, who had 
managed to outstrip the Roman troops. He at once sent a detach- 
ment under Milo to hold the pass. But it was too late : the 
Romans had already surprised the weak outpost, and now defeated 



Sio 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Battle of 
Pydna, 
22nd June 
168. 



Flight of 
Perseus. 



He takes 
refuge hi 
Samo- 
thrace. 



Milo after a sharp struggle. The king in alarm broke up his camp 
and retired on Pydna. Paulus thereupon crossed the Enipeus, and 
having effected a junction with Nasica, advanced within sight of the 
king's new position, — a plain traversed by a small stream and 
bordered by low hills. 

Nasica wished to attack at once ; but the more experienced 
Aemilius refused to begin a battle immediately after a march with 
an enemy who had had some days to rest, and insisted on first 
securing their camp. An eclipse of the moon terrified the Mace- 
donians, as foreboding the fall of the king ; but the Romans were 
saved from alarm by the presence of the learned Sulpicius Callus, 
who was able to foretell and explain it. The battle next day was 
brought on almost by accident, a contest between the watering- 
parties of the two armies gradually bringing out the full forces on 
either side. Here, for the first time, Paulus saw the famous Mace- 
donian phalanx in action, and afterwards confessed the terror with 
which it inspired him. At first it carried all before it and forced 
the Roman line to give way. But its very success was its ruin. 
As it advanced it gradually became more and more dislocated : 
gaps appeared in the dense mass of spears, of which the Roman 
soldiers were quick to avail themselves. At close quarters the men 
had to drop their sarissae and trust to a light dagger and small 
shield, which proved useless against the sharp strong sword of the 
Roman. The struggle seems to have lasted little more than an 
hour ; the rest of the afternoon was occupied in the pursuit of the 
now disordered mass. 

The king, who had been disabled early in the day by a kick of 
a horse, fled with his bodyguard and some cavalry to Pella. On his 
way most of the cavalry deserted ; and when he reached his palace, 
he found the leading men in Pella unwilling to come in answer to 
his summons. Early the next morning therefore he continued his 
flight towards Amphipolis, accompanied by about fifty Cretans and 
two oflicers, hoping that the river Axius would effectually delay 
pursuit. From Amphipolis, which he reached on the third day, he 
sent legates with a letter to the consul, who was engaged in rapidly 
reducing the cities in north-eastern Macedonia. Aemilius refused 
to answer the letter because Perseus still styled himself king ; and 
the people of Amphipolis, in alarm for their own safety, were eager 
that he should leave. He obtained shipping in the Strymon, and 
still accompanied by the Cretans, who were kept faithful by the 
treasures which he was carrying with him, he arrived at Samothrace, 
the island of the mysterious Kabiri, whose shrine gave it the 
privilege of sanctuary, — a privilege which Cn. Octavius, who 
presently arrived with the Roman fleet, did not venture openly to 



XXXI RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF PYDNA 511 

violate. He endeavoured, however, to work on the scruples of the j68. 
Samothracians, reproaching them with giving harbour to the would- 
be murderer of Eumenes and Demetrius, and to his minister Evander. 
After endeavouring to save himself first by sacrificing Evander, and 
then by escaping to the dominions of Cotys, the king eventually 
surrendered himself and his elder son Philip to Octavius. They 
were taken at once to the camp of the consul Aemilius, who received He 
him with severe reproaches, to which the king made no answer, surrenders 
He was nevertheless profoundly moved by the humiliation of a king ^' " 
lately so powerful, and entertained him not unkindly. Perseus was ji„jpfii. 
kept for the present in easy captivity at Amphipolis, until in the polls. 
following year he was taken with his children, and the children 
of Cotys, to adorn the triumph of Aemilius at Rome. On the 
intervention of his conqueror he was, however, freed from prison. End of 
and with his sons allowed to live in a private station at Alba Perseus. 
Fucentia. But his wealth, which he had so carefully husbanded, 
was all gone, and his second son is said to have been apprenticed 
to the trade of a worker in bronze. 

This was the end of a dynasty which had given PhiHp H. Effects of 
and Alexander the Great to history. It was to be the end ^i the battle 
Macedonian national identity also. But the victory of Pydna had ^^ ^^/^/^f 
still wider consequences affecting not only Greece and the Islands, states. 
but Asia and Egypt also. The various states hastened to send 
envoys to the consul's camp, or to Rome, to offer congratulations and * 

make their court ; and those who were conscious of secret wishes 
for the success of Perseus, or of overt acts in his favour, were 
forwardest of all. Legates from Rhodes were already at Rome to The 
offer their services in effecting a reconciliation with Perseus. They Rhodlans. 
at once substituted a fulsome compliment and congratulation ; but 
were plainly told that the Senate fully understood that their object Eumenes. 
had been to save Perseus, and would know how to requite their 
hostility. King Eumenes, conscious of his secret intrigues, sent his 
brother Attalus to Rome with congratulations, and later on arrived 
himself in Italy. Prusias of Bithynia, with his son Nicomedes, came Pruslas. 
begging to be allowed to sacrifice on the Capitol in honour of the 
victory, having previously mollified the commissioners sent to his 
kingdom by the most abject humiliation, appearing in the dress and 
cap of a manumitted slave, as though a freedman of Rome. His Visit of 
humility gained its object, and afforded the Senate the means of in- ^'"^^^^^J 
flicting a marked slight on Eumenes. For when, next year, the latter ^/ _ 
arrived in Italy, a decree was at once passed, forbidding the visits of 
kings to Rome in person. A quaestor met Eumenes at Brundisium, 
and communicating to him the order of the Senate, asked him 
whether he wanted anything. Quite aware of the meaning of this 



512 



HISTORY OF ROME 



i68. 



No new 
• prov- 
inces' but 
general 
disarm- 
ament and 
liability to 
tribute. 



The 

Illyrians. 



Senatus 
Co7isultu7n 
de Mace- 
don ibzis 
[Livy xlv. 
i8, 29). 



rebuff, Eumenes answered shortly that he wanted nothing, and 
returned to his own dominions. Rome, in fact, was crowded with 
emissaries from every direction ; and whether it wished it or no, the 
Senate found itself compelled to act as arbitrator in a hundred 
disputes, and to have a distinct foreign policy. The idea of 
establishing provinces, in the technical sense, to the east of the 
Adriatic, was not yet definitely recognised. The policy adopted was 
rather that of leaving all states internal freedom, but so isolating 
and weakening them, that all alike would be practically in the power 
of Rome ; while the domain lands of the sovereign princes or 
towns became the property of the Roman people. Tribute or tax 
paid before to native princes or central governments was now to go, 
though generally on a reduced scale, to the Roman exchequer in 
return for the military protection which the Republic undertook. Thus 
the Illyrians were to be "free," their cities and strongholds were 
not to be garrisoned by Roman soldiers, nor were Roman magistrates 
to administer justice ; yet, with the exception of certain towns which 
had been eminently loyal, they were to pay a vectigal to Rome of 
half the amount formerly paid to their kings ; and they lost the 
right of military organisation, or national combination. 

A still more illusory " freedom " was given to the Macedonians. 
The whole country was to be divided into four regions, with the 
capital cities of Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Pella, Pelagonia. Be- 
tween these regions there were to be no rights of intermarriage or 
ownership of land and houses ; and each was to have its own 
council and magistrates. Only in those parts which bordered on 
warlike barbarians were armed garrisons to be permitted, and 
certain regulations were to be observed through all the districts 
alike. 1 No timber was to be cut or sold for shipbuilding ; the 
working of gold and silver mines was prohibited, on the ground that 
they would require a service of Roman publicani.^ though the iron 
and copper mines were still kept open, paying to the Roman exchequer 
half the royalty which they had paid to the king. The salt industry 
was protected by a prohibition of the use of imported salt, but at the 
same time restricted by its exportation being confined to the Dardani, 
who were allowed to buy it at Stobi, as the staple town. A hundred 
talents, half the amount payable to the king, was to be returned yearly 
to the Roman exchequer. The Macedonians quite understood that 
they were reduced to political nullity : but they had feared some- 



^ There was certainly to be no central government, yet Livy (xlv. 32) seems 
to imply that a council of synedri was chosen for business affecting the whole 
country, perhaps chiefly to arrange for the incidence of the tax due to Rome. 
At any rate, they would have nothing to do with the internal administration of 
the regions or any truly national functions. 



XXXI SPOLIATION OF MACEDONIA AND EPIRUS 513 

thing still worse, and the order which compelled the removal to 168. 
Italy of all the late king's courtiers, military and naval commanders, 
and officials of every description, may have been felt as a relief at 
first ; while the reduction of the royal tax by one-half seemed a 
boon, even if, as has been thought, the extra expense of a quadruple 
administration was afterwards found to nullify it. Moreover, the 
laws now drawn up by Paulus, in conjunction with the ten com- 
missioners, who had brought the Se?7ahis CoJisiiUuni containing 
the general principles of this arrangement, proved to have 
some permanent advantages. Yet Macedonia was not only left 
politically impotent, but stripped of the accumulated treasures and 
wealth of centuries. The crowd which came from Greece and spoils of 
Asia to attend the games held by Aemilius at Amphipolis were Macc- 
treated to a sight of the spoil of Macedonian cities, now ready for donia. 
transport to Rome. Pictures, statues, gold and silver plate, 
furniture adorned with ivory, and all the richest product of 
Macedonian looms, were spread out for the inspection of the curious, 
before being shipped in readiness for the proconsul's triumph. To 
crown all, a huge pile of arms of the conquered army was fired by 
the proconsul's own hand. Macedonia was not only to be robbed, 
but to be made a show and a warning to the world. 

Still greater severity was exercised in Epirus, of which Eplrus, 
Aemilius was made the instrument. The rising in favour of Perseus, ^68-167. 
into which Cephalus had been goaded, was to be sternly punished ; 
and the Senate briefly ordered that the spoil of the cities of Epirus 
should be given to the soldiers, who had been greatly discontented 
with their share of Macedonian plunder. Accordingly, when 
Aemilius, on his way home, arrived at Passaron on the coast, he sent 
for ten leading men from each of the seventy cities, chiefly of the Seventy 
Molossi, and ordered them to collect the gold and silver of their ^'^^^^^ dis- 
several towns into some public place, a detachment of soldiers being '"'^^^^j^'^[ 
sent to each to see that the work was done thoroughly and simul- inhabi- 
taneously. The unhappy people believed that, if this were done taitts sold. 
properly, they would be spared. They were bitterly mistaken. The 
towns were given up to pillage, the walls thrown down, and 150,000 
persons sold into slavery. The blame for this abomination rests 
almost wholly with the Senate, though Aemilius' share in it can 
hardly be altogether excused. 

But it was not only in Illyricum, Epirus, and Macedonia that the Rhodes. 
Roman ascendency was now asserted. The hand of the victorious 
Republic fell heavily on all who had assisted Perseus or maintained 
what was regarded as a malevolent neutrality. For nearly two 
centuries friendly intercourse, without formal treaty, had been 
maintained with Rhodes. The islanders now tried to avert the 

2 L 



514 



HISTORY OF ROME 



168-167. 



Delos a 
free port. 



Eumenes. 



Greece. 



Deporta- 
tion of 
suspects to 
Italy. 



consequences of their doubtful policy during the war by applying for 
an alliance. But the Senate had resolved on punishing Rhodes by 
destroying the naval supremacy she had so long exercised in the 
Aegean. She was ordered to withdraw her garrisons from the 
Peraea, — the district of Caria and Lycia which had been already 
declared free ; and a severe blow was struck at her commercial 
prosperity by handing over Delos to Athens and declaring its 
harbour a free port. This at once diverted much of the traffic of 
the Levant from Rhodes to the old Island route, in which Delos was a 
convenient place of call, and in a single year diminished the harbour 
dues at Rhodes by a sixth.^ The Rhodians were finally admitted 
to alliance, but nothing was done to restore her crippled commerce. 

Nor were the Romans content with the slight already put upon 
Eumenes. His brother Attains was ostentatiously patronised, and 
king Prusias encouraged to lay every kind of information against 
his old enemy and rival. The commission sent under C. Sulpicius 
Gallus to Asia even posted up notices inviting complaints against 
him, which brought a host of angry informers to their court at 
Sardis ; while the hostility of the Asiatic Gauls, who had invaded 
his territories, was openly or covertly encouraged. 

Every part of Greece was to be subjected to the same inquisition of 
the Macedonian commissioners. There was no idea as yet, any more 
than in Macedonia, of introducing a provincial administration ; but 
it was to be shown clearly that Rome would not tolerate any state 
or party hostile to herself The three rebellious cities in Boeotia 
had long ago suffered for their mistake, and no farther severity was 
exercised there beyond the execution of Neon of Thebes. But in all 
parts of Greece the same decree was enforced, — conspicuous members 
of the Macedonising party were to go to Italy and stand their trial. 
There was little difficulty in selecting them. In every city traitors 
were eager to curry favour by denouncing their political opponents. 
Aetolia had lately been the scene of civil violence and bloodshed ; 
yet the advisers of the commissioners were Lyciscus and Tisippus, 
themselves the authors of the massacre. In Epirus Charops had 
become infamous for every vice ; yet he was one of the two who 
advised the commissioners as to that country, with what result we 
have seen. The decision was the same in every case. No other 
circumstance was taken into account ; the one question was as to 
fidelity to Rome. The persons denounced by the several informers 
were to go to Italy with their families, — that was the simple and 
uniform order enforced in Aetolia, Acarnania, and Boeotia. 

^ This is the statement of Polybius (xxxi. 7, 25), if we read dcprjpTjKaTe for 
evpTjuaTe. If the latter stands the sentence means, if it means anything, that the 
harbour dues had been reduced to a sixth, which seems incredible. 



XXXI ANTIOCHUS IV. WARNED OUT OF EGYPT 515 

In Achaia, where possible resistance was feared, rather more care The 
was taken. No documents implicating the Achaeans had been Achaean 
found in the Macedonian archives, and Aemilius was inclined there- ^'^'^g^^^< 
fore not to act on the partizan representations of the Romanising ^ 

Callicrates. But he was overruled, and two of the commissioners, 
C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius, were sent to Peloponnese. In an 
assembly of the League they declared that certain leading men had 
helped Perseus, and demanded that the assembly should proceed to 
pass sentence of death against them : when the vote was carried 
they would reveal the names. The assembly refused to commit 
such a flagrant injustice ; whereupon the commissioners named all The 
who had borne office during the war. One of these, named Xeno, Achaeans 
asserted his innocence, and offered to stand his trial either in Greece ^^^* ^^ 
or Italy ; and eventually a list of about a thousand was drawn '^ ^' 
up, on the information of Callicrates, all of whom were ordered to 
proceed to Italy. They were distributed among the cities of 
Etruria ; and when no sign of the promised trial was given, frequent 
embassies were sent to Rome, begging that they might return or 
have a chance of establishing their innocence. But the senators, 
after several ambiguous replies, at length settled the question by 
saying briefly that they considered it undesirable that they should 
return. Among them was the historian Polybius, who used his 
credit among the nobility at Rome in their behalf. But sixteen years 
had passed before the poor remains of these dctejius^ amounting to 
about 300, were contemptuously granted leave to return. 

Throughout Greece there was henceforward no state which could AjiHochus 
venture to resist an order from Rome. How completely the same Epiphanes 
ascendency was established outside Greece also is strikingly ^'^ f-v^ ' 
illustrated by the scene between Antiochus and the Roman envoy in 
Egypt. The connexion between Rome and Egypt had been growing 
ever closer since the early days of the Hannibalian war. The 
Egyptian sovereign had become used to look for Roman protection, 
and for some time, at the beginning of the last war, a Roman 
commissioner had remained at Alexandria. Farther help was now 
needed. Ptolemy V. died in 181 and left two sons, Philometor 
and Physcon, by Cleopatra, sister of Antiochus the Great. Philo- 
metor succeeded his father and engaged in a war with his cousin 
Antiochus Epiphanes 1 for the recovery of Coele-Syria, alleged to 
have been assigned as the dower of Cleopatra. Antiochus in- 
vaded Egypt, defeated Philometor, took him prisoner at Pelusium, 
and advanced to Memphis. Whereupon the other Ptolemy — Physcon 
■ — assumed the diadem at Alexandria, calling himself Euergetes II. 
But Antiochus adopted the cause of his prisoner Philometor, 
1 Antiochus IV., son of Antiochus the Great (175-164). 



5i6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. XXXI 



C. 

Popiliiis 

Laenas 

meets 

Atitiochus 

IV. at 

Pelusium, 

i68. 



The Jews, 
162.. 



established him as king at Memphis, and proceeded to besiege 
Physcon in Alexandria, He refused to listen to remonstrances from 
Rhodes and other Greek states ; but on orders coming from Rome, 
broke up the siege, and consented to take a sum of money (169). 
The two Ptolemies then made terms with each other, and with their 
sister Cleopatra were reigning jointly in Alexandria. But Antiochus, 
seeing that his policy of weakening and dividing Egypt, and thereby 
securing Coele-Syria, was defeated, took advantage of the Romans 
being engaged in the Macedonian war to invade Egypt once more. 
Appeals were promptly sent to Rome by the Ptolemies, and in 168 
C. Popilius Laenas was despatched to Egypt. He found Antiochus 
four miles from Alexandria : and when the king advanced to meet 
him, with outstretched hand, he ignored the greeting, and only held 
out the tablet containing the Senate's decree forbidding him to 
attack Egypt. Antiochus read the tablet and answered that he 
must consult his council. Popilius thereupon drew a circle in the 
dust round the king with a vine staff which he carried in his hand, 
and bade him give his answer before he stepped out of it. The 
haughty assurance of the Roman, supported by the news of Pydna, 
already received, overpowered the king's courage or pride. He 
signified that he was ready to obey the Senate, and was then greeted 
politely by Popilius and allowed to arrange the day for the with- 
drawal of his troops into Syria. Six years later, when the Jews 
had again suffered from the cruelty of Epiphanes, and feared the 
same under Demetrius, the patriotic Judas Maccabaeus looked to an 
alliance with the Roman Republic (162) as the best security for his 
country. Thus free states and sovereigns had alike become the 
clients of the city of the Tiber. 



Authorities. — Livy, 
7-1 1, 14 ; xxiv. I, 3, 4 



xxviii. 42-xlv. Polybius, xxii. 8, 9, 15-18 ; xxiii. 1-4, 
xxvii. 1-18 ; xxviii. -XXX. Plutarch, Philopoefne?t, 
Aemilius Paulus. Appian, MacedoJiicae, Syriacae (45), Illyricae. Diodorus, 
fr. of xxix.-xxxi. Eutropius, iv. 2-4. Justin, xxxii. 2-33. Florus, ii. 12-14. Zonaras, 
ix. 21-23. Orosius, iv. 20. Valerius Maximus, ii. i, 2, 7, 14 ; iii. 3, 2. For 
the Jewish alliance, Joseph. Ant. xii. 10 ; i Maccab. viii. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

MACEDONIA, GREECE, AND CARTHAGE, 1 6 8- 1 46 



PROVINCES 








[Illyricum ^] . 


. 167 


B.C. 


173 


Macedonia , 


. 146 


B.C. 


164 


Africa .... 


. 146 


B.C. 


159 


[Achaia 1] . . 


146 


B.C. 


154 


COLONY 








Auximum in Picenum . 


• 157 







269,015 
327,022 

328,314 

324,000 



Suspension of the tribntinn, growing luxury and consequent cases of peculation 
and embezzlement— Laws, Calpurnia derepetimdis {i^g) — Sumptuary : Orchia 
(182), Fannia (161), Didia (143)— Greek literature and teachers — Writers 
imitating Greek literature — Terence, Pacuvius, Statins Caecilius— Cato's 
opposition— Expulsion of Greek rhetors (161)— Visit of the philosophers (155) 
— Demohtion of stone theatre (151)— The Bacchanalia (186)— Laws against 
bribery, Aemilia Baebia (182), Cornelia Fulvia (159) — Ballot laws, Gabinia 
(139), Cassia (137) — Macedonia between 167-146, the discontents arising 
from the Roman settlement : war with the pseudo-Philippus, and formation 
of the province (148-146)— Destruction of Corinth and settlement of Greece 
(146)— Carthage, the Roman policy in favouring Masannasa — Immediate 
causes of the third Punic war— Consuls land at Utica (149)— Inefficient 
conduct of the war (149-148) — Rising reputation of Scipio the younger 
Africanus (147)— Destruction of Carthage— The province of Africa (146). 

The victories of the last half-century seemed to promise ease and Effects of 
wealth to Rome. She was to live on the spoils and revenue from the wars 
the conquered countries. Not only did they pay a fixed tax to her ^"' ^"^^• 
exchequer, but the rich lands of Capua, the royal domain lands of 
the kings of Syracuse and of Macedonia, became public property, 
and produced a large annual rent. It was found possible in 167 to 
relieve citizens from the property tax or tributuin^ which was not 
collected again until the year after the death of lulius Caesar. But 
the sudden influx of wealth had the usual effect of raising the 
standard of expense ; and new tastes and desires required increased 
means for their gratification. All manner of luxuries were finding 

^ No yearly governor was yet appointed to these, and though practically 
Roman provinces, they were not completely so in form. ' 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



IS6-I46. 



Lex 

Calpurnia 
de 

repetimdis, 
149- 



Leges 

iumptu- 

ariae. 



Greek 

teachers 

and 

literature 



their way into the city from the East. Splendid furniture, costly 
ornaments, wanton dances and music for their banquets, became the 
fashion among the Roman nobles ; and the younger men went to 
lengths of debauchery and extravagance hitherto unknown. 1 The 
result to many was financial embarrassment, from which relief was 
sought in malversation and extortion. The old standard of honour 
in regard to public money was distinctly lowered,^ and cases of 
misconduct and oppression were becoming more common and less 
reprobated. All were in haste to get rich, and the opportunities 
afforded by service amidst conquered or weak peoples was too 
tempting to be resisted. A commander who opposed this passion 
did so at his peril, and the triumph of Aemilius Paulus in 167 was 
opposed at the instigation of some of his own officers, because he had 
insisted on paying the greater part of the Macedonian spoil into the 
treasury. The fashionable taste for Greek works of art, in the adorn- 
ment of private houses, was another incentive to plunder, and in 149 
it was for the first time found necessary to establish a permanent 
court or qicaestio for cases of malversation in the provinces. 

Attempts were indeed made to restrain the extravagance which 
was at the root of the evil. In 184 Cato, as censor, had imposed a 
tax on the sale of slaves under twenty above a certain price, and on 
personal ornaments above a certain value ; and though the lex Oppia^ 
limiting the amount of women's jewelry, had been repealed in spite 
of him in 195, other sumptuary laws were passed. A lex Orchia in 
182 limited the number of guests, a lex Faniiia in 161 the amount 
to be spent on banquets; while a lex Didia in 143 extended the 
operation of the law to all Italy. And though such laws, even if 
enforced, could not really remedy the evil, they perhaps had a certain 
effect in producing a sentiment ; for long afterwards we find over- 
crowded dinners regarded as indecorous and vulgar.^ 

Another cause, believed by some to be unfavourably affecting 
Roman character, was the growing influence of Greek culture and 
Greek teachers. For many years the education of the young, 
once regarded as the special business of the parents, had been 
passing into the hands of Greek slaves or freedmen. The 
children of Livius Salinator (consul in 219) had been instructed 
by the Tarentine Andronicus, who had many other pupils. The 
Athenian Metrodorus was the resident tutor of the sons of Aemilius 
Paulus ; and the schools for boys of a less exalted rank seem 
usually to have been kept by Greeks. The laws of the Twelve 



^ Livy, xxxix. 6 ; Polyb. xxxii. 



Polyb. vi. 56 ; xviii. 35. 



Cicero, in Pis. § 67. Thus the statute imposing a fine for non-attendance 
at church, though long fallen into desuetude, has perhaps helped to attach the 
idea of respectability to a custom. 



XXXII CATO'S OPPOSITION TO GREEK CULTURE 519 

Tables are said to have beea used as an elementary reading book, 186-146. 

yet all who went beyond such elements seem to have learnt Greek, 

which was more commonly spoken by the upper classes than French 

among ourselves. Most of the legates employed abroad seem to 

have been able to speak it ; and though the Tarentines laughed at 

the pronunciation of the Romans (282), yet they were at least 

able to make themselves understood. On the superiority of Greek patron- 

culture there was a division of opinion. The Scipios and their ised by 

party patronised Greek philosophy and literature. Their friend and S<:ip^o ««^ 

protege Terence (193-168) only continued, indeed, the work of his Jl- , 

predecessors in translating Greek comedies ; but his translations were 

more exclusively Greek in spirit than the adaptations of Plautus ; and 

his example was followed by Statins Caecilius, who died about 169, 

at any rate in his later work ; while M. Pacuvius, a nephew of 

Ennius, seems to have dealt almost exclusively with Greek tragedy. 

This tendency, which went far beyond a mere question of literary opposed by 
taste, was opposed by a party of which M. Porcius Cato was the the conser- 
most striking member. Born about sixteen years before the beginning ^"^^"'^ 



of the second Punic war, he lived to see the commencement of the 



party of 



Cato, 

third. His public career had been honourable. As praetor in Sar- 
dinia (199), as consul in Spain (195), he had shown inflexible honesty, 
strict justice, and personal frugality. As censor (184) he had made 
his name a synonym for severity. The influence of his really great Character 
virtues was marred, not only by the caustic bitterness of his speech, and views 
but also by a certain hardness and inhumanity, and a more than ^ ^"'^'^' 
Roman contempt for the provincials, whom he would nevertheless 
protect from injustice. He regarded his slaves as mere chattels, 
treated them with cold severity, and sold them when they were aged 
or infirm, to avoid the expense of their maintenance. His social 
views also were deeply tinged by political prejudice against Scipio 
and his party, to whom he had been in violent opposition ever since 
serving under him as quaestor in Sicily (205) ; and in spite of 
undoubted integrity he made his virtue so offensive that he is said to 
have been a defendant in fifty lawsuits. In Cato's view the reform 
needed was a return to the old ways, before Rome was infected by 
Greece. The best life was that of the old citizen-farmer, who left 
the plough for office or service in the army, and returned to it when 
his duty was done. Slaves were to be kept for working on the farm, 
not for personal luxury. Children should not be entrusted to them, 
but should be taught by their parents, and not Greek but Latin. 
Religion was to be the worship of the Lares, conducted by the head 
of the family according to the old Latin rites. If men would write, 
they should write in Latin, and on the history of their own country. 
He hated to see the young Roman dandies lounging in the Forum, 



520 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Cato fails 
to resist 
Greek in- 



186-146. or loitering in the rhetorician's lecture-room, when they should have 
been looking after their farms, doing civil business, or training them- 
selves on the Campus. He wished the Forum had been paved with 
sharp cobbles for their benefit. He set an example in these points 
himself: took the minimum number of slaves possible with him 
to his provinces ; diligently superintended his farm, and was seen 
riding into town in shabby clothes and bringing his country pro- 
duce for sale. He wrote a history from which to teach his son 
reading ; composed a treatise on farming, and a chronicle of Rome 
from the earliest times ; cultivated eloquence only for practical 
purposes, and long refused to study the literature of Greece at 
all. But he could not stem the current any more than he could 
make himself rich with his old-world notions of economics. The 
influence of his party may be traced perhaps in the senatorial decree 
of 1 6 1 against the Greek rhetors, and in the sumptuary laws, as well as 
that of I 5 I for the demolition of the stone theatre begun by the cen- 
sors ; and four years earlier he had successfully urged that the philo- 
sophers who had come on a mission from Athens, should receive their 
answer promptly and be dismissed, when he saw Roman youths 
crowding to hear them lecture. Still all that he most disliked 
was daily becoming more universal. Greek doctors, Greek school- 
masters and pedagogues — half tutor and half servant — -multiplied. 
There was a great influx of them after the fall of Macedonia ; 1 and 
the decree of the Senate against Greek rhetors seems to have failed 
in its object, for they became well estabhshed ; and in 92 it was the 
Latin rhetors, who set up in opposition to them, that were silenced. ^ 
Not more successful was the conservative party in maintaining 
the ancient religion. New objects of worship were readily admitted 
in Rome. The cult of Cybele or the Magna Mater, introduced in 204, 
when Scipio Nasica had been selected as the " best man " to receive 
the sacred image from Pessinus, had become quickly popular, and 
had been incorporated without difficulty in the state religion. But 
the Hellenisation of that religion was becoming complete. The fact 
of the earliest Roman literature being based on Greek had helped to 
identify Greek and Latin divinities, and to assign the legends belong- 
ing to the one to the other. Now Greek philosophy was introducing 
an easy scepticism as to all alike ; and in the place of an ordered and 
decorous national worship, many were seeking the excitement of 
secret and mystic rites, subversive, it was believed, of morals and 
loyalty alike. In 186 great scandal was caused by the discovery that 
nightly orgies were being held in Rome and Italy. The young of 
Baccha- both sexes were initiated in these Bacchanalia, which were said to be 
nalia. at once obscene and treasonable. Information reached the consul 



Novelties 
in reli^ioti. 



Polyb. xxxii. 10. 



2 Gellius, XV. II. 



XXXII LAWS AGAINST AMBITUS 521 

Postumius through a certain freedwoman named Hispala, whose lover 
Aebutius was about to be initiated. The consul laid the matter Senatus 
before the Senate, and the immorality of the initiations, as well as the Consultum 
seditious nature of the assemblies, was regarded as established. More ^^^^/^an- 
than 7000 men and women were said to be implicated ; and the Senate alibus, 
issued a stringent decree forbidding the Bacchanalia, or the assembly 186. 
of more than five persons for any secret rites. 1 The ringleaders were 
arrested, and for the most part anticipated their fate by suicide. It 
was the same idea, identifying novelty in religion with political inno- 
vation, which in 1 8 1 caused the order for the destruction of the rolls 
found in a stone coffin in the Janiculum, and said to contain com- Expulsion 
mentaries of king Numa and certain Pythagorean writings, — a fraud of 
which, rightly or wrongly, was regarded as an attempt to introduce ^^^J^ ^^^^^ 
novel doctrines dangerous to the State. These measures did not, ^yorship- 
however, repress the tendency. Soothsayers and astrologers found pers of 
their way into Rome, as well as the votaries of the mystic rites of Sabazius. 
Sabazius, both of whom were expelled in 137.^ 

This restless yearning for excitement, and this hunger for wealth 
to satisfy new cravings, were dangerous symptoms in those whose 
task it was to be to govern other nations. The money value of 
office, from the opportunities which it gave abroad, is shown by 
I what candidates were willing to pay for it ; and it is now that the Laws 
\ series of laws against bribery began to be passed, which, with ever- '■^g^^^st 
I increasing severity, vainly attempted to repress this form of corrup- 
tion. The lex Emilia Baebia (182) forbade distribution of money Leges 
, by candidates ; the lex Cornelia Fulvia (159) assigned exile as the tabellanae. 
\ punishment of the offence ; and when neither had the desired effect, Lex 
a remedy was sought in secret voting. The first lex tabcllaria (139) ^'^^^^"'■^^ 
established the ballot in elections; the second (13?) in all trials Lex Cassia. 
before the people except for perduellio. But all alike failed to beat 
back the rising tide of corruption to which they bear witness. 
I Meanwhile events were developing the power of Rome abroad, — Greece and 
in Macedonia, Greece, Asia, and Africa with rapidity ; in Spain with Macedonia. 
I slow and painful struggles. The settlement of Macedonia by 
! Aemilius, in some respects successful, could not have seemed satis- 
factory to patriotic Macedonians. Though the annihilation of 
political existence was accepted with apparent acquiescence, yet the 
fourfold division of the country, with its accompanying restrictions of 

1 A copy of the decree remains on a bronze tablet, found at Tiriolo, in Brut- 
tium, in 1640, and now at Vienna. See C. L L. 196, and almost any collection of 
Early Latin. It is in the form of a circular letter to the Italian towns ordering it 
to be set up in a conspicuous place within ten days of its receipt, and is especially 
interesting as showing how the Romans already interfered in the internal affairs of 
the Italian towns, just as in 143 the sumptuary laws were made applicable to 
them. - Valerius Max. i. 3, i. 



522 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Andriscus 
claims the 
crown , 
152. 



Defeat of 
Andris- 
C71S, 148. 



Two other 
pretenders. 



Macedonia 
becomes a 
provi7ice, 
J47-146. 



mutual intercourse, must have hampered enterprise and depressed 
industry.! Internal disputes and disorders broke out from time to 
time, and involved appeals to Rome and the visits of Roman com- 
missions, and the expense of the divided administration probably 
more than counterbalanced the reduction in the tribute. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the blessings of a constitution without a 
sovereign did not appear self-evident to the Macedonians, and that 
there were among them some who desired to regain a real national 
life. The opportunity came with the appearance of more than one 
pretender. The first was a certain Andriscus, said to be of humble 
birth, who professed however to be a son of Perseus. He seems 
to have first made known his claims about 152: but finding no 
immediate support in Macedonia he went to the court of Demetrius 
of Syria, who, being anxious to conciliate the Romans, arrested and 
sent him to Rome. Being treated with contempt, and carelessly 
guarded, he escaped, and gathered an army, mostly of Thracians, on 
the Strymon (149). The first impulse in Greece was to ridicule him ; 
but before long he had been joined by many Macedonians, had defeated 
the Roman praetor P. luventius, and was invading Thessaly. From 
Thessaly he was driven by Scipio Nasica, with the help of troops from 
Achaia, and in the next year was defeated by Q. Caecilius Metellus, 
who took the title of Macedonicus from his victory. Andriscus fled 
for refuge into the dominions of a Thracian prince, who was, however, 
induced to surrender him, and he adorned the triumph of Metellus.'^ 
Yet another pretender appeared in 147, calling himself Alexander; and 
a third under the name of Philip in 143, both claiming to be sons of 
Perseus, and succeeding for a time in collecting a force of runaway slaves 
and other elements of disorder, until suppressed by Roman troops. 

An end was now put to the empty form of freedom enjoyed by 
Macedonia. With the addition of Thessaly and parts of Epirus it 
was formed into a province, to which a praetor or propraetor was to 
be sent every year. The change seems to have been distinctly 
beneficial. The abolition of the fourfold division, and the construction 
of the great military road {via Egiiatia) from Dyrrhachium and 
Apollonia to Thessalonica, facilitated intercourse and trade ; and 
in spite of suffering periodically from the extortions of Roman 
capitalists or of dishonest magistrates, the province of Macedonia, 

^ In 158 it is said that the working of the mines was again permitted. This 
must refer to the gold and silver mines, for iron mines had not been closed ; and 
it does not seem certain whether the measure was one for relief of distress, or a 
sign of confidence in the peaceful state of the country. 

^ Andriscus is usually called pseudo-Philippus, as though he pretended to be 
Philip, the elder son of Perseus, who had died at Alba two years after his father, 
about 162. But according to others he professed to be the son of a concubine of 
Perseus, brought up clandestinely by a Cretan at Adramyttium in Mysia. 



XXXII DISPUTES IN THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE 523 

protected by the Roman forces against the Thracian barbarians, 
remained among the most prosperous and loyal in the empire. ^ 

The commission of Metellus in Macedonia seems to have in- Greece 
eluded a general superintendence in Greece ; and when he had and the 
disposed of Andriscus his attention was directed there. The death ^'^^^<^^<^n 
of the unprincipled leaders, whom the Roman policy had encouraged ^''^ 
in various parts of Greece, had by this time helped to restore 
tranquillity. But there were elements of discord in Peloponnesus 
still working disastrously. The forcible assignment of Sparta Disputes 
to the Achaean League in 188 had proved as impolitic as it was '^^^^ 
unjust, leading to constant troubles, which generally involved appeals V^''^^- 
to Rome. The Senate was jealous of the League, as the one power- 
ful organisation now existing in Greece, and encouraged appeals 
from its members, in which its decisions were for the most part 
unfavourable to the Government. Among the detained Achaeans, 
who in I 5 1 returned embittered by exile and inexperienced in affairs, 
was Diaeus. Being elected strategus for 150-149, he seized the Policy of 
opportunity of a dispute with Sparta as to certain boundaries to Diaeus, 
involve the League in war— in order to cover, it is said, a personal ^^^' 
charge of corruption against himself. The Spartans having appealed 
to Rome, Diaeus went there in person to represent the Achaean 
case. The answer of the Senate was that Sparta must submit to 
the award of the Achaean government /;/ all things short of life and 
death. By omitting this last qualification he induced the League to 
declare war against her, as having broken a fundamental law which He 
forbade such appeals from separate states. Professing, however, to declares 
be warring, not against Sparta, but against certain traitors in that ^^^^^^-^^^ 
city, he was at last induced to name twenty-four men as guilty. Sparta, 

They escaped to Rome, and being condemned to death in their 1^0-148. 
absence, their case became merged in the larger question of the 
continued adherence of Sparta to the Achaean League. Diaeus 
had either been deceived himself or had deceived his country- 
men as to the intention of the Senate ; while the Spartan envoy 
Menalcidas had also assured his fellow- citizens that the Senate 
had decreed that Sparta should be free to break off from the 
League. Thus both sides believed themselves justified in con- sparta 
tinuing hostilities. The Roman commission, sent to decide the breaks off 
question on the spot, did not arrive till 147. Meanwhile the A'^'" ^'^^ 
Spartans had set up their independence and elected a strategus of '-'■^S^^- 
their own, but had been worsted in the field by the Achaeans. The 
latter continued to push on their advantage in spite of friendly warnings 
sent by Metellus, and were therefore in no mood to listen to L. 

^ Macedonia, Jidelis et arnica populo Romano provincia (Cicero, pro Font. 
§ 34). 



S24 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Roman 
comtnis- 
sioners at 
Corinth, 
147- 



Sextus 
lulius 
Caesar at 
Aegium. 



War with 
Achaeans, 
147. 



Q- 

Caecilius 
Metellus 
in Greece, 
146. 



Aurelius Orestes and his fellow-commissioners, when, summoning a 
meeting of the League magistrates at Corinth, they announced that 
Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenus in Arcadia, and Heracleia in 
Phocis, were to be separated from the League. Diaeus, who was 
again Achaean strategus, summoned the congress to consider this. 
But the Corinthians did not wait for its decision ; they broke out 
into a riot, plundered the houses inhabited by Spartans, and roughly 
handled Orestes and his colleagues when they tried to quell the 
disturbance. Orestes reported this incident in strong if not exag- 
gerated terms at Rome, and the Senate at once sent a fresh 
commission, headed by Sext. lulius Caesar, with full powers. 

At a meeting of the League congress at Aegium, Caesar, 
touching lightly on the offence at Corinth, plainly stated that the 
orders of the Senate as to the towns mentioned must be obeyed. 
The alternative was war : and the more prudent party in the con- 
gress wished to obey, and to avail themselves of the disposition 
of the Senate to wink at the violence offered to Orestes. But 
Diaeus, whose year of office was coming to an end, was to be 
succeeded by Critolaus, who was at the head of the anti- Roman 
party ; and these two men, believing that the moderation of the 
Romans arose from fear, owing to the unfinished wars in Africa and 
Spain, determined to resist. They obtained a vote to defer a settle- 
ment until a meeting with Spartan legates at Tegea ; and when Caesar 
went to Tegea, Critolaus, after keeping him waiting till the last 
moment, again refused to settle anything without a farther reference 
to a League congress. Convinced of his determined hostility 
Caesar and his colleagues thereupon returned to Rome, where war 
with the Achaeans was promptly determined upon. Critolaus spent 
the winter (147-146) in visiting the Peloponnesian cities, and inciting 
them against Roman interference. By proclaiming a temporary relief 
of debtors he induced the popular party in most to follow his policy, 
though the cities in Elis and Messenia were prevented by the presence 
of the Roman fleet from supporting him. In a meeting at Corinth 
during the winter some legates sent by Metellus were again roughly 
treated; and Critolaus, accusing all opponents of treason, and hinting 
that he had the promise of foreign support, induced the Achaeans 
once more to declare war against Sparta for separating herself from 
the League. As the Spartans had acted on Roman authority, this 
was practically war against Rome, and as such it was regarded there. 

Metellus was anxious to use his general powers in Greece to 
settle this war before he was superseded by the consul of the year. 
Early in 146, therefore, he advanced through Thessaly by the coast 
road skirting the Malian gulf Critolaus had meanwhile collected 
the League army at Corinth, and encouraged by the adhesion of 



XXXII FALL OF CORINTH 525 

some Chalcidians and Boeotians — the Thebans particularly being 146. 
discontented with certain awards made by Metellus in their disputes ^^■^■^- <^: 
with the Phocians — had advanced north of the pass of Thermopylae J^^'^^'-'^^^ 
and was now besieging Heracleia, as one of the towns that had j^ 
separated from the League. When he heard from scouts of the Mununius. 
approach of Metellus, he broke up the siege and retired through 
Thermopylae, which he left unguarded, towards Scarpheia. But he 
was overtaken and defeated by Metellus before he could reach that Defeat of 
town, and was either lost in attempting to escape over the salt- Cntolaus 
marshes, or put an end to his life by poison. By the Achaean ^^^-^ . 
constitution his predecessor Diaeus now became strategus, and ^^^ 
showed every intention of carrying on his policy. By proclaiming 
the emancipation of slaves of military age he obtained 10,000 
men in addition to the general Achaean levy, while a forced con- 
tribution from the richer members of the League supplied him 
with money. There was great confusion and alarm throughout 
Peloponnese, increased by the arrival of fugitives from Thebes and 
other parts of Boeotia who had fled before the advancing Roman 
army. Nevertheless Diaeus secured his re-election as strategus, Diaeus. 
and about midsummer came to Corinth to take command of the 
troops. He had made a mistake in dividing his forces between 
Corinth and Megara ; for the troops in the latter, by instantly 
retiring upon Corinth at the approach of Metellus, had produced 
a feeling of defeat and panic. Still, believing that in no case would 
he be personally included in an amnesty, he rejected all proposals 
from Metellus, and imprisoned and put to death several of the 
higher officers who advocated their acceptance. Consequently siege of 
Metellus was obliged to lay regular siege to Corinth, and had to Coritith. 
relinquish the hope of finishing the war ; for before it fell he was 
superseded by the consul L. Mummius. 

Mummius sent Metellus back to Macedonia, and encamped in Mum-mins 
the isthmus with an army raised by adhesion of allies to 26,000 arrives 
men and 500 cavalry. The Romans from over- confidence seem M^^f 
to have been at first somewhat careless, and the Achaeans j^^j ^\ 
gained a slight advantage in a sally, which encouraged them 
to offer battle. But in this they were so disastrously defeated, 
that Diaeus abandoned his army and fled to Megalopolis, where 
he killed his wife and then poisoned himself On the third 
day after the battle Mummius took Corinth. The town was Destruc- 
stripped of everything of value ; and the works of art, pictures, tion of 
statues, and ornaments of every description were collected for Corinth. 
transport to Italy. Much, however, was spoilt by the greedy and 
ignorant soldiers, and Polybius — who, had lately returned from a 
similar spectacle at Carthage — saw some of the finest pictures thrown 



526 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



T46-14S. 



Settlemeiit 
of Pelopon- 



and of 
Greece 
generally. 



Cicero, 
pro Place. 
§ 100. 



Rotnan 
domain 
lands in 
Greece. 



Civitates 
liberce. 



on the ground and used as dice-boards. Mummius was an honest man 
and kept nothing for himself, but ignorant and perhaps contemptuous 
of art. It was told of him, as a satire on this ignorance, — though he 
was probably only using a regular formula, — that in contracts with 
the shipowners who transported these things to Italy a clause was 
inserted by him that they should replace them by others equally good 
if they were lost at sea. Corinth was then dismantled and burnt, 
and remained a mere village until its restoration in 46 by Caesar. 

The rest of Peloponnese was settled by ten commissioners sent 
out immediately after the fall of Corinth. The Achaean League was 
dissolved, and a constitution drawn up for each separate state, with 
the advice it seems of Polybius, who was employed to visit the 
various cities and explain its terms. For a time the members of the 
several states were prohibited from owning property in others, 
and the meeting of the League assembly was forbidden, — though the 
former regulation was afterwards withdrawn, and the latter relaxed 
for certain purposes chiefly religious. The same measure was applied 
to all other federations (Koiva) ; and the policy of weakening Greece 
by a thorough division was strictly followed. No ' province ' of 
Greece in the technical sense was erected, no yearly governor, pro- 
praetor or proconsul, was sent to govern it. But in practice Greece 
was not one but several provinces. Each recognised civiias or state 
paid a fixed tribute to the Roman exchequer and was ultimately under 
the authority of the Senate ; and thus we find Cicero enumerating as 
among the ' provinces ' Achaia, Thessalia, Boeotia, Lacedaemonii, 
Athenienses. The freedom which they were supposed to retain was 
only that of local government : for certain purposes they were under 
the governor of the province of Macedonia, who could levy soldiers 
in them ; and in every external relation which characterises a sovereign 
state they were subject to Rome. In other ways Greece as a whole 
was much reduced ; not only was Thessaly entirely and Epirus partly 
assigned to the province of Macedonia, while Aetolia lay desolate and 
neglected, but large tracts of territory became ager piibliciis — the 
absolute possession, that is, of the Roman people, who received a 
rent or vectigal from it. This was the case with the whole territory 
of Corinth — of which, however, a certain portion was granted to 
Sicyon on condition of paying for the Isthmian games ; this was the 
case with all Euboea, all Boeotia— Thebes and Chalcis having shared 
the fate of Corinth, — and with other cities which had been taken by 
force. Yet there were still certain cities, such as Athens, Sparta, and 
Sicyon, which were in a better position than the rest, enjoying the 
rights secured them by former treaties, and being known as libercE 
civitates.^ who seem to have b^n relieved from tribute, and into which 
a Roman magistrate entered without his lictors ; while several smaller 



XXXII MASANNASA AND CARTHAGE 527 

cities were for special reasons also granted immunity from tax. The fall 
of Greece politically was accompanied by deterioration in other ways. 
Ever since the period of the battle of Pydna the population had been 
declining and the cities falling into ruin. This doubtless facilitated 
the Roman conquest, but cannot safely be attributed to it. Polybius 
alleges more fundamental reasons, — the odious habit of infanticide, 
and the relaxation of morality which marked the epoch. 

The subjection of Greece had been preceded by the still more Carthage 
disastrous ruin of Carthage. During the last half-century Carthage, from the 
though precluded from foreign extension, had largely recovered her end of the 
wealth and prosperity at home, and was being watched with vigilant •^^'^^'^'^ 
jealousy by the Romans. At the end of the last war they had 202-1^6^^' 
established Masannasa in an extended Numidian kingdom, in such 
a way as to make controversies with Carthage inevitable. He 
had been secretly encouraged to encroach on Carthaginian territory, 
and in the references to Roman arbitration the decision was invariably 
in his favour. As early as 193 the Carthaginians by one of these 
decisions had not only lost a considerable district, but had also had 
to pay an indemnity of 500 talents. This was followed by similar 
incidents : Masannasa had lost no opportunity of exciting the Roman 
suspicions ; and when, during the war with Perseus, Cartha- 
ginian ships had joined the Roman fleet, he sent his son Gulusa to 
warn the Senate that the Carthaginians meant to use for their own 
purposes the ships which they pretended to have built for the Roman 
service. Naturally there was a party in Carthage that regarded 
these things as intolerable, and were for resisting the encroachments Quarrel 
of Masannasa and the dictatorship of Rome. This party became of Masan- 
prominent when, in i 54, the quarrel with Masannasa became acute ^'^^'^J^^^ 
owing to the disputed possession of part of the Great Plains, which j„ j..^ 
he claimed in virtue of the Roman settlement. Commissioners were 
sent from Rome to investigate the matter — with secret instructions 
to support the king— and effected a short suspension of hostilities ; 
which, however, began again upon fresh encroachments by Masan- 
nasa. More than one Roman commission visited Carthage in the 
course of the next two years. But the popular party was now getting 
the upper hand ; and indignant at the flagrant injustice of the 
commissioners' decisions, the Carthaginian government refused to 
refer any new question of territory to them, maintaining that the 
one point for their decision was whether the treaty of 202 had been 
infringed. Finally, when Masannasa's son Gulusa appeared with one Cartha- 
of the commissions to negotiate, they refused them admission to the g^^''^ans 
city. The war thus continued resulted in severe disaster to the ^/^^^^, "^ 
Carthaginians, and reduced them to the necessity of accepting nasa. 
almost any terms the Romans should choose to impose. 



528 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The Senate 
resolved to 
destroy 
Carthage, 
ISO. 



Oppositio7i 
of Scipio 
Nasica. 



Coss. L. 

Marcius 

Censor- 

inus, M. 

Manilius, 

149- 



A majority of the Roman Senate had, however, by this 
time gradually come to a determination in regard to Carthage 
which is one of the most iniquitous known to history ; and 
the chief adviser of it was the veteran champion of right and 
justice, Porcius Cato. He had served on one of the commissions, 
and had been struck by the sight of the rich and cultivated lands, by 
the splendour and wealth of the city. With a narrowness of view, 
which generally characterised him in dealing with foreign nations, 
he regarded the prosperity of Carthage as necessarily a menace to 
Roman supremacy and enterprise, and never ceased to urge that she 
must be destroyed. According to the well-known story he was wont 
to end every speech in the Senate, on whatever subject, with this 
sentiment ; and tried on one occasion to impress upon the fathers 
the nearness of their peril by bringing some splendid figs into the 
Senate house, and explaining that they were grown only three days' 
sail from Rome. To men less prejudiced, and to whom justice even 
to an enemy was still of some weight, the difficulty was to discover 
any grounds for war. To Cato and his party it was sufficient that 
Carthage was prosperous ; and they maintained that her military 
and naval preparations, forced upon her by the conduct of their own 
agent Masannasa, constituted a breach of her treaty with Rome. 
Scipio Nasica — once judged the " best man " by the Senate, — on the 
contrary, held that as yet no act of the Carthaginians justified war, 
not even the recent refusal to admit Gulusa and the commissioners. 
But the disasters of the struggle with Masannasa, while they en- 
couraged the war party at Rome, left the Carthaginians so weak that 
they were obliged to pacify the Senate by every possible concession. 
The leaders of the party of resistance to Masannasa were condemned 
to death ; ambassadors were sent to Rome to plead their excuse, and 
to beg the Senate to state what would be considered sufficient com- 
pensation. The Senate refused to name the terms, declaring that the 
Carthaginians well knew what they must be. 

War, in fact, had been determined upon, and the consuls of the 
year ordered to proceed with their armies and fleet to Lilybaeum ; 
though the Senate still allowed the Carthaginian envoys to imagine 
that it might be averted by full submission. Just at this crisis the 
city of Utica surrendered itself unconditionally to Rome. It was the 
largest, town in the country, next to Carthage itself, from which it 
was only eight miles distant, and its excellent harbour and military 
strength gave the Romans exactly the place of landing and position 
for a war with Carthage that they required. This was therefore not 
only a blow to the safety of the Carthaginians, but also took away 
the credit of the step, which after long and painful discussion they 
had resolved upon as necessary — namely, the surrender of their whole 



XXXII CARTHAGE IS TO BE DESTROYED 529 

country /^r deditiotiem} trusting to the mercy of the Repubhc. That The 
mercy was indeed cruel. The envoys who conveyed the surrender Cartha- 
were told that the Senate " granted them freedom and independence, ^^^^^"^ 
the inviolability of their shrines and tombs, and the enjoyment of J^^y'' ^^ 
their territory," but on condition of sending to the consuls at Lily- territory to 
baeum 300 boys of noble birth as hostages. No mention, as J^ome. 
the terrified Carthaginian Senate remarked was made of the city Roman 
itself; and there w^as some hesitation as to sending the hostages.- conditions 
But the alternative was immediate war, and with bitter misgivings j/^ ^^^ 
the boys were sent. Nevertheless the consuls proceeded to Utica, ^*^"^* 
and the Carthaginians were ordered to apply to them for farther in- 
structions. Their envoys were received by the consuls in solemn state, 
sitting on the raised tribunal and surrounded by their co7tciliiiin^ and 
were next informed that all arms, missiles, and war engines must be (2) 
at once brought to Utica. This measure was peculiarly hard at the 'Surrender 
time ; for Hasdrubal, whom the citizens, at the bidding of Rome, "^^ cirms. 
had condemned to death as a leader of the war party, was actually 
encamped with an army against their city. The order, however, was 
obeyed. Two hundred thousand stands of arms and two thousand 
catapults were brought in waggons and given up to the consuls, (j) 
who then at length revealed the purpose of the Senate in its full ^(^^noval to 
severity. Acting on their secret instructions they infomied the ^ _"^^^^ 
envoys that Carthage must be abandoned, and all its citizens miles from 
removed to some spot not less than ten miles from the sea. the sea. 

History hardly presents a determination of greater cruelty Terror and 
executed with more ingenuity of torture long drawn out. The g fief of 
envoys received the announcement with passionate expressions of ^^^ envoys. 
grief and terror, raising their hands to heaven, striking their heads, 
and throwing themselves on the ground. But nothing moved the 
consuls. All the comfort they could give was the promise that the 
sacred buildings and tombs should be preserved and open for 
worship, and the fishermen still allowed to carry on their industry 
in the sea. The envoys were afraid to return home ; and begged 
that at least Roman ships should be sent to Carthage to prove that 
they were acting under conipulsion. Nor was this precaution un- Frantic 
necessary. Those of the envoys who ventured to return betrayed excitetnejit 
by their faces that they brought bad news, and the people, in a ^^ 
state of terrified expectation, waited outside the Senate house ^ ^*^' 
to hear the worst. A cry of horror from the senators, followed 
by an interval of stony despair, caused the crowd to burst in and 

^ See p. 129 note, for the significance of this. 

2 The historian Polybius was hastily summoned by the consul Manilius to 
persuade the Carthaginians to give the hostages. He started at once, but learnt 
at Corcyra that they had comphed (Polyb. xxxvii. 3). 

2 M 



530 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Cartha- 
ginians 
resolve to 
resist. 



Failure of 
the first 
attacks on 
Carthage, 
^49- 



P. Scipio 
Aemili- 



demand to be told the truth. A storm of indignation followed, which 
found vent in cries and execrations, in violence to the envoys, or to 
those who had advised the sending of the hostages, in assaults 
upon Italians in the streets, or in a hasty rush to the city gates as 
though to close them against the enemy ; while the temples were 
crowded by a terrified crowd uttering frantic appeals and reproaches 
to the gods. But these wild scenes were followed by an heroic deter- 
mination and heroic efforts. It was resolved at all hazards to resist 
the orders of Rome, and to defend the city. Hasdrubal consented 
to be reconciled to his country, and to undertake her defence with the 
troops which he had collected to attack her. The whole city was 
turned into a workshop of arms, in which men and women in relays 
laboured day and night ; and a vast number of shields, swords, cata- 
pults, and missiles were produced each day, the women even cutting 
off their hair to be twisted into cords for the engines. 

The delay in the Roman attack gave time for these preparations. 
For the consuls, partly perhaps because they thought that serious resist^ 
ance by an unarmed populace was impossible, partly from caution, 
did not advance upon Carthage at once. They spent some time in 
negotiating with Masannasa, as to whose cordial support they seem to 
have been uneasy, and still more in securing bases of supply in Leptis, 
Hadrumetum, and other towns. They did not, therefore, find a city 
ready for surrender when they at length arrived under its walls. 
Manilius attempted to assault the outer wall of the great suburb or 
Megara, Censorinus landed on the taenia, a narrow strip of land be- 
tween the lake and sea, to attack the walls toward the sea, where 
they were weakest. Both, however, were repulsed more than once, 
to their own dismay and the encouragement of the citizens, and had 
to entrench regular camps for fear of Hasdrubal, who was encamped 
near at hand on the borders of the lake. Censorinus effected a breach 
in the seaward wall, but an attempt to carry the city through it was 
repulsed with some loss, in which the Romans were saved from 
disaster by the prudence and gallantry of Scipio Aemilianus. 

In fact, the consuls were not competent for their task, and 
Scipio, though only a military tribune, seems from this moment 
to have gained the enthusiastic confidence of the army. He 
was the younger son of Aemilius Paulus, the conqueror of Mace- 
donia, and had served with some distinction in the war against 
Perseus, and afterwards in Spain. His aunt was the wife of the 
great Africanus, and having been adopted by his cousin, the son of 
Africanus, he was now known as P. CorneHus Scipio Aemilianus. A 
charming account of his pure and loyal character has been left us 
by his friend and tutor Polybius ; and we cannot but regret that it 
fell to the lot of the best Roman of the day to carry out one of the 



XXXII FAILURES BEFORE CARTHAGE 531 

worst public crimes of which the Repubhc was guilty. In the 
operations which took place during- the rest of the year and the 
succeeding winter he more than once saved the troops from dangers 
into which incompetence or imprudence had led them. Towards Winder of 
the end of the year Censorinus returned to Rome to hold the 14^-148. 
consular elections, and Manilius, after with difficulty resisting a 
night surprise in his camp, spent the winter in scouring the country 
and collecting supplies, dogged by the Carthaginian cavalry com- 
mander, Hamilcar Phameas, who more than once surprised and cut 
off detached parties ; while, on the other side, the Carthaginians 
all but succeeded in setting fire to the Roman fleet. When com- 
missioners came from Rome to inspect the state of affairs, neither 
Manilius nor his staff could refuse Scipio the credit of his eminent 
services during these operations, and the veteran Cato, who died at 
the end of 149, on hearing of them expressed his admiration of him, 
and his contempt of his incompetent superiors, in a line of Homer : " He 
alone has the breath of life in him, the rest are but flitting phantoms." ^ 
Attracted by his character, and perhaps somewhat by his name, the Death of 
aged Masannasa on his deathbed left to Scipio the task of arranging Masaji- 
for the division of his kingdom between his three sons. He crowned '^^•*'^- 
his achievements by receiving the surrender of the cavalry commander, 
Hamilcar Phameas ; and when, in the spring of 148, Manilius, being 
about to be superseded by Calpurnius Piso, resolved to send Scipio 
home with Phameas, the soldiers, accompanying him to his ship, openly 
expressed their hope that he would return as consul to command them. 

Piso, who arrived in the summer of 148 to command the army, j^s^ Coss. 
with his legate Mancinus to command the navy, proved a complete Sp. 
failure. Without venturing to assault the city, he spent his time Postunnus 
in minor operations — against Clupea, Hippo Diarrhytus, and other ,^ ^"^^^ j 
towns, — in most of which he was unsuccessful. Discipline became Calptir- 
relaxed, and deserters from Numidia — amongst others Bithyas, with fiius Piso 
2000 men — were finding their way to Carthage, whilst the sons of Caesonius. 
Masannasa seemed to be in no hurry to fulfil their obligations as to 
reinforcing the Roman troops. The hopes of the Carthaginians 
rose ; they tried to rouse the country against the Romans, and sent 
messages to Andriscus in Macedonia, encouraging him to continue 
the war. Hasdrubal, elated by his successes, was full of confidence. 
There was great anxiety at Rome, and the people were eager to 
place the command in the hands of Scipio, though he was not yet 
of the consular age. He had come to Rome to stand for the 
aedileship, but a large number of the tribes returned his name as 
consul. This was irregular — for the consul was properly elected in 
the centuriate assembly — and it could only be regarded as an 
^ ^ olos ■Kiirvvrai 'toX ds tr/ctai aicraoviXi. 



532 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Scipio 
takes over 
the 

comtnand, 
147- 



Hasdrubal 
puts 
Roman 
prisoners 
to death. 



informal resolution of the people. Accordingly a bill was brought 
before the tribes relieving him from the terms of the lex Afinalzs, and 
he was then elected by the centuries, and a further law passed by the 
tribes giving him the ' province ' of Africa without drawing lots, i 

He arrived at the seat of war with a supplemcntmii of soldiers 
to fill up the legions, as well as with a body of volunteers from the 
allies ; and was immediately joined by Gulusa, the son of Masan- 
nasa, to whom he had assigned the command of the Numidian army 
as his share of his father's inheritance. His arrival was not a day 
too soon. Not only had Piso failed to effect anything against the 
town, or to maintain discipline in the army, but Mancinus was in 
actual danger. The soldiers on the- taenia had succeeded in 
effecting a breach in the walls toward the sea, and had entered the 
town. Mancinus hastened after them with a number of half-armed 
men from the fleet, but had been driven back and beleaguered on a 
solitary cliff, and was only saved by the appearance of Scipio's rein- 
forcements. He was now sent home, and the fleet was put under 
the command of Atilius Serranus. Scipio's next care was the 
restoration of discipline. The straying of the soldiers from the 
camp in search of plunder for their own advantage was put an end to ; 
non-combatants and idle characters were expelled from the camp ; 
superfluous luxuries were forbidden ; and the men brought to a state 
of efficiency. Before long he actually penetrated the outer wall into 
the Megara, but finding that extensive suburb broken up by woods, 
streams, and buildings,^ affording ample opportunity for ambuscades, 
he thought it prudent to retire. After this Hasdrubal left his camp 
outside the walls and withdrew within them ; and his namesake 
Hasdrubal, grandson of Masannasa, being murdered about this time, 
he became governor of the town. His first act was to retaliate 
upon Scipio by bringing his Roman prisoners to the wall, and there^ 
putting them to death in sight of their comrades with horrible 
tortures. His object is said to have been to make his fellow-citizens 
feel that they had no hope of mercy from the Romans, and must resist 
to the last. It is scarcely possible, as some have done, to doubt a 
fact which Polybius must have seen with his own eyes or heard 
of immediately from those who saw it ; yet though he represents 
Hasdrubal as a glutton, a tyrant, and a debauchee, it is true that he 
had for two years baffled the Roman army outside the walls, and 



^ This seems to have been the course of events from a comparison of Livy, 
Epit. xhx. and 1., with Appian, Pun. 112; though Livy leaves it doubtful 
whether the objection of the Senate was founded on the election by the tribes, or 
only on the breach of the lex A?malis. This law, brought in by L. Villius 
(Livy, xl. 44), fixed the age for the aedileship at 36-37, for the praetorship at 
39-40, for the consulship at 42-43. Scipio was born in 185. 



XXXII 



HASDRUBAL'S DEFENCE OF CARTFIAGE 



533 



now maintained an heroic defence within them, refusing until ahnost 
the last the offer of mercy to himself apart from the rest of the citizens. 




lapius 



Cothon 



CARTHAGE 



GREEK STADIA 



ROMAN MILES 



ENGLISH MILEC 



ITaLker &■ Boutall sc. 



Having completed the necessary reforms in his army, Scipio now 
burnt Hasdrubal's deserted camp, and erected a continuous line of 



534 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Complete 
investtiient 

of 

Carthage, 

147. 



Scipid s 
mole. 



The 

Cartha- 
ginian fleet 
issue by a 
new 
channel. 



Capture of 
Nepheris, 
winter of 
I47-I4(>- 



fortifications across the isthmus which formed the approach to Car- 
thage, thus completely cutting off supplies from the land side. The 
only chance for the besieged lay in the provisions which the Numidian 
Bithyas could send round by sea. Though vessels were not numerous, 
and the Roman fleet was on the watch, some supplies were landed ; 
for the Roman ships could not guard all the coast, or venture always 
to follow the lighter craft who ran into the harbour in spite of them. 
Yet these supplies were wholly inadequate ; and, in the course of the 
autumn and winter of 147-146, the people were reduced to horrible 
extremities of famine. To complete the process of starvation, Scipio 
determined on the erection of a mole from the taenia, which would 
at once block up the mouth of the harbour, and give him passage on 
to the end of the quay of the larger or merchants' harbour. It was 
to be formed of great stones, and at the base to be 96 feet broad, 
narrowing gradually to 24 feet at the surface. It seemed an impos- 
sible enterprise to the Carthaginians, and never likely to be formid- 
able. But it was pushed on day and night with such energy, that 
they became alarmed, and began to cut a new entrance to the 
Cothon, and to build vessels of every kind of wood they could find, 
keeping this so secret, that Scipio got no certain information of their 
purpose, until this new channel being thrown open a fleet of fifty 
triremes, with numerous smaller craft, sailed out. The Romans had 
in many cases beached their ships, or were so intent on assisting the 
operations on land, that if they had been at once attacked they might 
probably have been destroyed. But the Carthaginians wasted two 
days in mere naval demonstrations, and when on the third they 
began a real attack, the Romans were prepared ; and, though the 
battle was indecisive, the new entrance became quickly blocked up 
when they attempted to return, and the larger vessels were compelled 
to anchor along the outer quay, where they suffered so severely from 
the Roman ships that only a few eventually made their way back into 
the Cothon. Next day Scipio attacked the wall of the quay from his 
mole, and though the besieged garrison made a desperate resistance, 
and even succeeded by wading through the sea in setting fire to his 
siege works, yet these were erected again, and the siege pressed on. 

The summer was spent in these operations, and Carthage was still 
untaken. But in the winter the source of her supplies, which, however 
scantily, still found their way in, was finally closed by the capture of 
Nepheris, a fortress somewhere on the lake of Tunis, the headquarters 
of Diogenes, who had charge of the business of supplying the capital. 
The capture of this place was entrusted chiefly to Gulusa, supported by 
a detachment of the Roman army under Laelius, and superintended by 
Scipio, who passed backwards and forwards between it and his camp. 

Carthage being thus finally cut off from its only source of supply, 



XXXII THE CAPTURE OF CARTHAGE 535 

the outer harbour being completely blockaded, and the siege works Fall of 
along the quay now reaching the height of the city wall, Scipio Carthage 
resolved upon delivering his final assault. During the winter some "^ ^^^'^ 
negotiations had taken place with Hasdrubal, who offered to sur- ^^^^^^ ^J 
render, if life and freedom were granted to all the inhabitants ; but 
Scipio, in spite of the advice of Gulusa, had declined to pledge him- 
self to anything except to the personal safety of Hasdrubal and his 
family, who refused to accept a favour apart from his countrymen. 
When he saw that the assault was coming, Hasdrubal ordered the 
outer harbour to be fired. In the confusion that followed Laelius 
managed to scale the wall higher up, and, having thus got possession 
' of the Cothon, admitted Scipio with the whole Roman army, who 
easily occupied the market-place. There remained three streets of Fighting 
houses, six stories high, leading up to the Byrsa. From these the ^'^^ ^^'^ 
, Romans were assailed by every kind of missile ; until, forcing their ^^^^^^^• 
way into some of them, and clambering from roof to roof, they fought 
with the famished enemy in detail, hurling them from the roofs, or 
, cutting them down with their swords. For six days and nights this 
, desperate fighting was maintained by relays of men sent forward by 
Scipio, who himself scarcely stopped to eat or sleep. It was not until 
J he reached the foot of the Byrsa that he gave the order to fire the 
houses, in which numbers of helpless inhabitants perished. He had 
I no need to storm the Byrsa. The wretched people who had taken 
I refuge there almost immediately surrendered on the promise of their Surrender 
I lives ; and 50,000 men, women, and children were allowed to descend ^f ^^^ 
1 under guard, and became prisoners of war. This number, probably '^-^^•^^• 
\ not a tenth of the regular inhabitants, speaks strikingly of the havoc 
I which famine and disease had made among them. About 900 Roman 
deserters, who had no mercy to expect, along with Hasdrubal and 
his wife and children, took refuge in the temple of Aesculapius. Before 
long Hasdrubal made his way out secretly and accepted his life 
from Scipio : but the desperate deserters set fire to the temple, and 
perished in the flames ; while Hasdrubal's wife, disdaining to follow 
her husband's humiliation, slew her two boys, and threw herself with 
them into the burning ruins. 

For some days the city was given up to plunder. Silver and 
gold and the works of art in the temples were reserved ; and many 
of the latter, which had come from Sicily, were restored to their 
original sites. When free plunder v/as stopped, the remaining 
booty and slaves were sold, and the army rewarded. A swift ship 
adorned with specimens of the spoils was immediately sent to carry 
the news to Rome, where the exultation of the people was shown by 
(Sacrifices, games, and all the other forms of popular rejoicing. It 
as resolved in the Senate to send commissioners to organise the 



536 HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. XXXII 



new possession ; but, meanwhile, orders were despatched to Scipio 
to entirely destroy the city : the plough was to be drawn over its 
site, and a curse pronounced upon whoever attempted to rebuild it. 
Scipio obeyed, but felt the full horror, and foreboded the evil results, 
of such a step. As he gave the order for firing the town and suburbs, 
he turned to Polybius, his old friend and tutor, " Oh, Polybius," he 
said, " it is a grand thing ; but I shudder to think that some one may 
one day give the same order for Rome." And as he gazed at the 
burning city, where the fire raged for seventeen days, he thought of 
the empires which had perished, and murmured the lines of Homer — 

The day shall come when holy Troy shall fall, 
And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's folk. 

The The settlement of the country was the work of the ten com- 

provifice of missioners sent to assist Scipio. The provincial arrangements, 
Africa. which had now become established in principle, were followed. The 
site of Carthage and its immediate territory became domain land 
of the Roman people, and was leased out to tenants. The whole 
dominion of Carthage was made into the Roman province of Africa, 
to be administered by a yearly magistrate from Utica. It consisted, 
as in other provinces, of a collection of "cities," with municipal 
liberties and a fixed territory, for which the inhabitants paid a rent or 
stipendrnvi to the Roman exchequer. Some towns which had distin- 
guished themselves by fidelity to Carthage were mulcted of territory, 
or altogether destroyed, and their lands assigned to others. The 
kings of Numidia were not granted any addition to their territory, 
nor would they be allowed to make any encroachments on lands 
which were now Roman, as Masannasa had done when they were 
Carthaginian. The only notice taken of them appears to be that the 
public libraries of Carthage were presented to them. The Romans 
had committed a great crime ; they determined at any rate that the 
fruits of it should be their own. Their merchants soon found a pro- 
fitable trade with the interior from Utica ; and the foreboding of 
some of the aristocratic party, that the fall of Carthage would re- 
move a check upon the rising discontents of the lower orders, found 
its fulfilment, perhaps, when Gracchus raised a storm by proposing 
a new colony on its site. 

Authorities. — For the war with Andriscus, Polybius, xxxvii. 2 and 9 ; Livy, 
Ep. xlix. 1. liii. ; Pausanias vii. 12, 9 ; Diodorus, fr. of xxxii. ; Velleius, i. 11 ; 
Eutropius iv. 6, 7 ; Florus ii. 14 ; Aurehus Victor Ixi. ; Zonaras ix. 28. For the 
Achaean war and fall of Corinth, Polybius xxxix. 10-13 I Livy, Ep. li.-lii. ; Pau- 
sanias vii. 12-15 ; Orosius v. 3. For the third Punic war, Polybius xxxii. 2, 
8-16; xxxvi. 1-8; xxxvii. 1-3, 10; xxxviii. i; xxxix. 1-5; Livy, Ep. xlix.-li. ; 
Appian, Pun. Ixvii. -cxxvi. ; Diodorus, fr. of xxxii. ; Eutropius iv. 5; Orosius 
iv. 22 ; Zonaras x. 26-28. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

WARS IN SPAIN 

155-133 

Wars with Ligurians and Dalmatians (168-155) — State of Spain after the settle- 
ment of Gracchus {176). I. The Lusitani invade tribes subject to Rome 
(154) — Campaigns of L. Mummius and M. Atilius (154-152) — Treacherous 
massacre of the Lusitani by Galba (150) — Rise of Viriathus (147) and 
disasters of Vetilius, G. Plautius, and Claudius Unimanus (147-145) — Cam- 
paigns of Q. Fabius Aemilianus (145-144) — Defeat of L. Quinctius (143) — 
Peace made by Q. Fabius Servilianus (142-141), but rejected by Q. Servilius 
Caepio, who causes the murder of Viriathus (141-140) — Campaigns of Decimus 
Junius Brutus in north-west Spain (138-136). II. Celtiberian Wars — the 
Titthi, Belli, and Arevaci — Disasters of Q. Fulvius Nobilior (153-152) — M. 
Claudius Marcellus makes terms and founds the town of Corduba (152-151) — 
War with the Arevaci at Numantia and the Vaccaei continued by L. Licinius 
Lucullus (151-150) — Five years peace (149-144) — ^The Arevaci again revolt 
(144) — Campaigns of Q. Caecilius Metellus, Q. Pompeius Rufus, M. Popilius 
Rufus, C. Hostilius Mancinus, Q. Calpurnius Piso (144-134) — Scipio 
Aemilianus sent to Numantia, which he takes after a long siege (134-133). 

For twelve years after the fall of Perseus (i 68-1 57) such wars as state of 

the Romans undertook were not with distant nations, but were affairs 

fought for the consolidation of Italy. The struggle with the f^^^ '^^• 

Ligurians was always with them, involving once at any rate (163) j^j^^ 

an expedition to Corsica. But in Africa they were content for the Liguriatis. 

present to allow Masannasa to keep the Carthaginians in play ; 

and in the East such questions as the restoration of Ariarathes, Aria- 

the deposed king of Cappadocia, did not call for armed interference, rathes. 

especially as the death of Eumenes in 159 placed on the throne of 

Pergamus a king (Attalus II.) in whom they had greater confidence. 

At length an outbreak among the Dalmatians, who quarrelled xh^ 

with their neighbours the Lissi and Daorsi, tribes under Roman Dalma- 

protection, roused the Roman Government for a time to the sense of i^atis. 

its extended responsibilities; and the consul of 156, C. Marcius 

Figulus, conducted a campaign against them with varied fortunes. 



538 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Wars in 
Spain , 



See p. 



{i) The 
Lusitani. 



L. 

Mummius, 
'54-153' 



M. Atilius, 

153-152- 

S.Sulpicius 

Galba, 

151-150- 



Treacher- 
ous 

massacre 
of the 
Lusitani, 
i5(>- 



It was reserved for Scipio Nasica, consul for 155, to subdue an 
enemy who survived to give trouble as late as the time of Augustus. 
From this time also the Romans were engaged in the West 
with some of the most resolute and dangerous enemies they had 
ever encountered. The value of Spain to the Roman merchants, the 
wealth extracted from her mines, was so great, that in spite of con- 
stant disasters the struggle was continually renewed. The war was 
twofold : that with the Lusitani, living south of the Douro, in what 
is now Portugal, leading to the eight years' struggle with Viriathus ; 
and that with the Celtiberian tribes, especially the Vaccaei and 
Arevaci, culminating in the heroic resistance and final destruction 
of Numantia. The settlement of Gracchus (176) seems to have 
secured quiet for a time in Spain. For the outbreak which now 
occurred, after twenty-three years, the conduct of the Roman 
praetors may very likely be in great part responsible. Still it is 
to be remembered that the mutual depredations of robber tribes 
must have caused constant complications, and that governors sent 
out to thus struggle with Chaos must not be always judged by 
ordinary rules. 

The troubles were begun by raids of the Lusitanians upon tribes 
under Roman protection. The south of Baetica was overrun, and 
the praetors Manilius and Calpurnius Piso (155) suffered more than 
one defeat, though the Lusitanian leader Punicus fell in the course 
of the campaign. His successor Caesareas again defeated the 
praetor L. Mummius (154-153), killing 9000 men and taking many 
standards. Mummius, however, afterwards repaired this disaster 
and recovered the standards ; and moving northward to the Douro 
defeated an army under Caucaenus, relieved the town of Ocelum 
{? Ciiidad Rodrigo)^ and was allowed a triumph. His successor M. 
Atilius (152) made little progress; and in 151 Ser. Sulpicius Galba 
found the Lusitani still harassing the obedient tribes. He attacked 
them at first with some success, but finally lost heavily in a carelessly 
conducted pursuit, and was obliged to go into winter quarters at 
Conistergis, on the extreme south of Lusitania. Next spring, how- 
ever, he was assisted by the consul L. Licinius Lucullus, who 
was engaged on the Celtiberian war, and the two entered the 
Lusitanian territory in different directions. The Lusitani in 
alarm offered a submission, which Galba accepted with a promise 
of redressing their grievances by a grant of new territory, if they 
would meet him in three separate parties. The people not only 
unsuspiciously assembled at the places named, but consented to 
deliver up their arms, as being no longer needed now that they were 
under Roman protection, and were then treacherously massacred by 
Galba's order. Among the few who escaped was a shepherd named 



xxxiii VIRIATHUS TAKES THE LEAD 539 

Viriathus, who was to show for the next nine years what desperate Viriathus. 
patriotism could do. Galba was denounced at home by the tribune 
L. Scribonius Libo and in the last speech ever delivered by the aged 
Cato. But though brought to trial on his return, his subtle oratory 
or his great wealth secured his acquittal ; and in spite of numerous 
scandals connected with private business transactions, as well as the 
complaints of the army as to the embezzlement of the Lusitanian 
spoil, he escaped unscathed, and was consul in 144, when he even had 
the assurance to demand to be sent again to Spain,— one of the 
earliest as well as the most flagrant instances, soon to be too 
common, of wealth dishonestly acquired securing its own immunity. 

The Lusitani, however, were for the present reduced to taking Gaius 
refuge in the mountains, and it was not until 147 that the praetor Vetilim 
Vetilius found them collected in formidable numbers. A party of Z^'^^^^^- 
them were besieged in a stronghold and were on the point of ''^^' 
surrendering, when Viriathus, who happened to be among them, 
urged them to hold out in view of the former treachery of the 
Romans, and being elected leader by acclamation contrived to 
extricate them. Before long he decoyed Vetilius into an ambush, 
where the praetor, who was old, fat, and inactive, lost his own life 
with that of 4000 men. Two other praetors, Gaius Plautius and 
Claudius Unimanus (146-145) were in their turn baffled by the 
skill of the new leader and the re-awakened enthusiasm of his 
people, and expiated their misfortune or incapacity by condemnation 
at Rome. 

But now that Carthage had fallen, and Greece had been subdued, Q. Fabius 
the Senate determined that such a state of affairs in Spain should ^^axtmus 
no longer be tolerated. The consul Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, ^''" ^' 
younger son of the conqueror of Macedonia, was sent agamst ^^^. 
Viriathus with two legions. After devoting the winter to the 
training of his new levies, he proceeded against him in 144 by the 
Fabian method of dogging his steps without offering battle, until at 
length the opportunity came of striking a blow. Viriathus beaten 
in the field was obliged to shut himself up in a fortress, while 
Fabius wintered at Corduba. But Viriathus was not at the end of 
his resources, he instigated a revolt of the Celtiberian tribes, the 
Aravaci, Titthi, and Belli ; and having thus caused the Romans 
trouble in the upper province, he turned again into Lusitania and 
defeated the praetor Quintius, — the proconsul Fabius having now 
apparently returned to Rome, — and forced him to take up his 
winter quarters at Corduba several months before the usual time. 

A consul was again sent in 142. Q. Fabius Maximus Ser- q. Fabius 
vilianus was apparently successful in his first year ; but either from Maximus 
policy or from reverses in his second he listened to proposals of ^_^^'^^^- 

ia?ii/s, 142- 
141. 



54<3 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Servilius 

Caepio, 

140-139- 



Death of 

Viriathiis, 

^39- 



Decimus 

Junius 

Brutus 

Callaiciis, 

138-136. 



(2) Celti- 
beriaii war. 



peace from Viriathus, and made a treaty which was confirmed by 
the people. But his brother and successor Q. Servilius Caepio 
persuaded the Senate that it was unworthy of their dignity to 
negotiate with Viriathus. The Senate at first suggested that 
Caepio, without openly renouncing the treaty, should covertly irritate 
Viriathus ; and presently, on some pretext probably thus obtained 
from Viriathus himself, again proclaimed war. 

Caepio overtook Viriathus in the territory of the Carpetani 
with such superior numbers that the Lusitanian did not venture 
to give battle ; but skilfully eluded him and enabled the greater 
part of his army to escape. Next year (139) Caepio was sup- 
ported by the army of the upper province under M. Popilius, and 
thereupon Viriathus felt it necessary to attempt negotiations. One 
after the other of the Roman demands was accepted, even to the 
surrender of many of his countrymen and of his own relations. But 
when finally the Roman proconsul demanded the surrender of all arms, 
Viriathus determined on resistance. Caepio however had corrupted 
his agents, who contrived to murder him in his sleep, and when 
they asked for their reward he had the assurance to answer that the 
Romans did not approve of the murder of a general by his own 
soldiers. His fellow-countrymen honoured Viriathus with a splendid 
funeral, and for a time attempted to continue the war under a new 
chief named Tantalus. But he proved incapable of the task, and 
presently most of them surrendered their arms, and accepted lands 
assigned them by Caepio. When next year (138) the consul 
Decimus Brutus was sent into Lusitania he turned his arms to the 
North, took the strong town of Talabriga, and penetrated far into the 
territory of the Callaeci {Gallicia). It is to his campaigns that the 
pacification of Lusitania was mainly due, though even after them 
there were renewals of disorder, and in 98 L. Cornelius Dolabella, 
and in 93 P. Licinius Crassus, celebrated triumphs over the Lusitani. 

Side by side with this a still more difficult war had been going 
on with the Celtiberians, so fiercely contested and so dangerous, 
that it was difficult to enrol soldiers or induce officers to give in 
their names for it. This "fiery war," as it was called, began whh 
Segede, a town of the Belli. On being ordered to desist from 
rebuilding their walls and to supply a contingent of troops and a 
contribution of money, the Segedeans replied that the settlement of 
Gracchus only forbade the forming of new fortifications, and ex- 
pressly exempted them from such obligations. The former plea was 
probably an evasion ; the latter may have been well grounded : but 
the Senate replied that all such exemptions were granted " during 
pleasure," and prepared to enforce its orders. The consuls entered 
on their office on the ist of January instead of the 15th of March, 



Nobilior, 
T. Annius 



]\ farce II us. 
152. 



xxxiii DIFFICULTIES OF THE SPANISH WAR 541 

expressly that an army might be promptly sent off;i and Q. Fulvius Coss. Q. 
Nobilior arrived early in the northern province of Spain with an ^'''jl^iif^ 
army of nearly 30,000 men. But the people of Segede, abandoning 
their town, took refuge with the Arevaci, and the combined army 
decisively defeated Nobilior with the loss of 6000 Roman soldiers. is3- 
The battle was on the day of the Vulcanalia (23rd August), which 
was always afterwards regarded as unlucky. Nobilior sustained Defeat of 
fresh losses under the walls of Numantia, in which the Arevaci and Nobilior. 
their allies had secured themselves, in spite of the assistance of 
Numidian cavalry and elephants sent by Masannasa, and after 
several other minor disasters and the loss of his magazines at Ocelum, 
he went into winter quarters, where he again lost largely from sick- 
ness and shortness of food. 

His successor, M. Claudius Marcellus, was somewhat more for- M. 
tunate. The Titthi and Belli at once submitted, and with the Arevaci Claudizis 
sent ambassadors to plead their cause before the Senate. He himself 
was in favour of peace, and had already conciliated the natives by the 
mild treatment of Ocelum and Nercobriga, which he had recovered ; 
and on going into winter quarters at Corduba had taken steps 
for establishing a mixed community of natives and permanent Roman 
residents, hardly to be distinguished from a colony — a title, indeed, 
which Strabo gives it.^ But the Senate would not consent. The 
envoys of the Titthi and Belli, received as friends, warned the Senate The 
against their late allies the Arevaci, and against diminishing their Titthi, 
forces in Spain ; and when the legates of the Arevaci, not admitted ^ ^' 
within the walls, had an audience of the Senate, they showed such ^^,,^^^ ^j^_ 
haughty determination to claim the full settlement of Gracchus that 
they were dismissed without an answer, and orders were despatched 
to Marcellus to continue the war. 

The consul Lucullus, however, was sent as soon as possible to L. Licinius 
supersede him, but found the greatest difficulty in getting military Lncullus, 
tribunes or legati or soldiers. At this crisis Scipio Aemilianus, then ^^^" 
thirty-four years old, imitating his adoptive grandfather, the elder 
Africanus, volunteered for the service. His example had a good 
effect in inducing others to undertake the duty ; and by forcing all 
on whom the lot fell in the tribes to serve, an army was got together. 
When Lucullus arrived in Spain he found that, in spite of the Senate, 
Marcellus had made terms with the Arevaci. But he was deter- 
mined not to be baulked of his chance of reputation and wealth. 

1 The consular year henceforth, though apparently at first with some excep- 
tions, begins on the ist of January, the new arrangement being found more 
convenient. 

2 Yet like Italica, Aquae Sextiae, and other extra Italian settlements, it had 
not the full rank of a colony. 



542 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Lucullus 

proco?isul, 

ISO. 



After an 
interval of 
six years 

{149-143) 
the 

Numafi- 
tine war is 
begun by 

^- 

Caecilius 

Mete II us, 
143-142. 



The Carpetani, a protected tribe, complained of raids committed 
upon their territory by the Vaccaei. Lucullus without orders from 
the Senate attacked them, and massacred the people of Cauca 
with such treachery that the neighbouring inhabitants, rather than 
yield, burnt what they could not move of their property and fled to 
the mountains. He then laid siege to Intercatia, the inhabitants of 
which, warned by the treachery practised on the people of Cauca, 
held out obstinately, and only surrendered at length on the personal 
guarantee of Scipio — who had distinguished himself during the siege 
by a single combat with a champion of the Vaccaei — that the terms 
should be respected. The Roman army had suffered severely before 
Intercatia from sickness and the unaccustomed food ; and it suffered 
still more before Pallantia, which Lucullus next unsuccessfully 
attacked, so that he had to abandon the siege and retire into winter 
quarters at Corduba. He sent Scipio to Masannasa for more ele- 
phants, and next year (150) joined Galba in the invasion of Lusitania. 
Disappointed in the hope of finding stores of silver and gold among 
the Vaccaei, who, in fact, were a tribe farming land in common, and 
neither possessing nor valuing the precious metals, he yet returned 
to Rome rich and infamous to found a temple to Felicitas. 

During the next six years, which witnessed great events in Greece 
and Africa, there was comparative quiet in northern Spain. It was 
not till 143 that Viriathus, who had been all along maintaining the 
struggle in Lusitania, succeeded in instigating the Arevaci to move 
once more, and that a consul was again sent against them with a 
large army. Q. Caecilius Metellus, the conqueror of the Macedonian 
pretender, found the Arevaci engaged in harvest, and without much 
difficulty reduced the open country to submission. But the towns 
still held out, especially Termantia, Numantia, and Contrebia, and 
Metellus, whose character for strict discipHne, prudence, and humanity 
was much enhanced by his two campaigns, left a thoroughly trained 
army for his successor O. Pompeius Rufus, but deliberately weakened, 
it is said, by wholesale grants of furloughs, remissions of service, and 
waste of stores, from dislike of Pompeius. 1 

Though Metellus had beaten the enemy in the field and taken 
many towns, Termantia and Numantia still held out ; and Pompeius 
began his command by an attempt on Numantia. Failing to make 
an impression he transferred his attack to Termantia with equal 



^ This story is told by Valerius Maximus (ix. 3, 7), and is rather inconsistent 
with the words of Appian (vi. 76), who says that he handed over " an army of 
30,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry in a most excellent state of discipline." It may 
have been invented by Pompeius or his friends to account for his own failure. 
Similar complaints were afterwards made against Pompeius himself, probably 
with more foundation. 



XXXIII MORE DISASTERS IN SPAIN 543 

want of success. He then began a regular investment of Numantia, Investment 
throwing up earthworks and diverting the river, in order to starve it ^f Numan- 
out. But his workmen were cut off by salHes of the besieged ; he ^'"' ^^^' 
lost heavily in an ambush ; and finally was glad to go into winter 
quarters to train the new levies, which had come to replace many of 
the veterans of Metellus, and there to receive proposals of peace. 
He demanded openly the usual submission to Rome, return of fugi- 
tives and deserters, and payment of money : but at the same time he 
pledged himself to certain secret articles in favour of the Numan- 
tines, which, on the arrival of his successor M. PopiHus Laenas, he 
had the effrontery to repudiate, in spite of the presence of Roman 
officers who were witnesses of his promise. 

Popilius referred both parties to the Senate, who decided that N.Popilius 
the war was to go on. But Popilius accomplished nothing, and Laenas, 
Numantia was still untouched when he was relieved at the end of ^39-^3^- 
his second year by C. Hostilius Mancinus. 

Mancinus was still more unfortunate. He was decisively de- Cos. C. 
feated and obliged to take refuge in a disused camp of Nobilior's, Hostilius 
which was not secure. He was only saved from utter destruction by ^'^'^"^'"' 
the influence of his young quaestor Tiberius Gracchus, whose name Aanilius 
and character induced the Numantines to accept a treaty acknow- Lepidns, 
ledging their independence, and adopting them as friends of Rome J^37-^3<^- 
on equal terms. Mancinus was superseded by the other consul M. 
Aemilius Lepidus, and summoned home with the Numantine legates 
to state his case. Meanwhile Lepidus, while the question of Numantia 
was thus pending, indulged his desire of reputation and plunder by 
invading the Vaccaei, on the plea that they had suppHed the enemy 
with provisions. The Senate, however, quickly decided that the 
treaty with Numantia should be annulled, and Mancinus was sent 
back stripped and handed over to the enemy, who, however, refused 
to receive him.^ Orders were sent to Lepidus to withdraw from the ^^^g^ of 
expedition against the Vaccaei and the siege of their capital Pallantia, f^^^^^^^'^- 
and to resume the siege of Numantia. He, however, ventured to dis- 
obey, on the grounds that the Senate were not acquainted with the 
facts — that the Vaccaei were supplying Numantia with food ; that 
he was actually in their country ; that Decimus Brutus was assisting 
him ; and that, if he retired now, Roman prestige would be ruined. 
Eventually, however, he and Brutus had to raise the siege of Pal- 
lantia, abandoning their sick and wounded, and pursued by the 

^ Plutarch says that Mancinus was an excellent man, but supremely unlucky. 
All sorts of omens are said to have foretold his misfortune, as, for instance, a 
voice was heard as he embarked, exclaiming, "Mane, mane, Mancine " (Valer. 
i. 6, 7). His return to Rome after his surrender gave rise to a dispute as to 
whether he had lost his citizenship. 



544 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Pi so, ijj. 



triumphant Pallantians. Brutus recouped his reputation by a brilHant 
campaign in the next year, but Lepidus was recalled, brought to trial, 
Q. and fined. His successor Piso, from fear or prudence, did not 

Calpurmus approach Numantia at all, but spent his year of office in aimless 
movements in Carpetania and the territory of Pallantia. It was 
time that some man of military reputation and tried character 
should take the place of these incompetent magistrates, who owed 
their position to ability in the Forum or family interest. 

All eyes were turned to the conqueror of Carthage. Scipio was 
P- now about fifty-two years old. He had been in Spain in i 51-150, 

Cornelius ^^^ ^^^ done good service there. In the third Punic war his 
Africanus character had made him the only possible person to finish what the 
consul a incompetence or corruption of others seemed to render hopeless, 
secondtime, and this appeared an occasion of a similar kind. Without being a 
^34- candidate for the consulship, and in spite of the law,^ he was unani- 

mously elected by all the centuries, and the Iberian war was assigned 
as his province. He made no new levy, but was accompanied by 
5000 volunteers, and a corps of 500 personal friends under the com- 
mand of his nephew Buteo. On his arrival at the camp his first 
task was the restoration of discipline. He expelled all non-com- 
batants — traders, soothsayers, priests, and harlots ; sternly suppressed 
the luxury which the slackness or corruption of previous commanders 
had connived at ; reduced the kit of the soldiers to a saucepan, 
drinking cup, and spit ; and caused the waggons and sumpter cattle 
to be sold. He would not engage in any warlike movements till he 
judged his men fitted by a long series of labour and training for 
service on the field. Towards the end of the year he led them by a 
circuitous march to Numantia, where he was joined by Jugurtha with 
elephants, archers, and slingers. There he formed a winter camp, 
and set his men to work to regularly invest the town and throw up 
every kind of siege work before it. Among those who came from 
Rome with him was young Gaius Marius on his first campaign, 
destined many years later to scourge the corruption and weakness of 
the Optimates ; and here he must have met for the first time with 
Jugurtha, whose intrigues with these venal nobles were to give him 
the opportunity he required. 
Numantia Numantia was an unwalled town, but situated on a steep emi- 

again ^ nence which could only be approached on one side, where it was 
defended by ditches and other works. Scipio constructed a line of 
fortifications and trenches outside these along an arc measuring about 

^ The holding of the consulship a second time appears to have been forbidden 
by a law about B.C. 151, Ijut we do not know the name or exact date of the law. 
But this second consulship of Scipio is the only example between 151 and 104, 
when Marius was consul for the second time. 



invested. 



Numantia, 
^33- 



XXXIII FALL OF NUMANTIA 545 

three miles ; and finding that the besieged could still get provisions 
up the river Douro, he built a fort on each bank and connected them 
with cables and chains, keeping a floating dam of blocks of wood 
armed with spikes across the stream. Thus cut off from supplies, 
the Numantines in vain attempted to break through his lines, on 
which a careful system of signals secured prompt help for the point 
attacked. Through the winter, spring, and summer (134-133) the Horrible 
garrison held out until reduced to eating the corpses of the slain, and siifferings 
even to killing the weak or sick for food. One body of 400 men "/ ^^^ . 
managed to escape and tried to rouse neighbouring cities to bring ^l^^^^f/' 
aid. But Scipio discovered where they were, compelled their sur- 
render, and caused their hands to be chopped off. Reduced to Surrender 
despair, at length they accepted Scipio's demand of unconditional of 
surrender, — though even then many preferred suicide ; and it was not 
] till the third day after the surrender had been agreed upon that the 
' miserable survivors appeared, scarcely human in aspect, wolfish from 
hunger, horrible from filth, with long shaggy hair, and bodies scarcely 
clothed in rags. Scipio selected fifty to adorn his triumph, and sold 
the rest as slaves. The town he completely destroyed — a matter of 
trifling labour compared with his task at Carthage. The Senate had 
given no order for this destruction, but made no objection, and Scipio 
j adopted the additional name of Numantinus after his triumph in 
j 132. The territory was divided among loyal natives, others being 
( punished according to their several degrees of guilt. The Arevaci ^^e future 
\ were not, after all, either destroyed or wholly subdued ; but there 
^ was comparative peace for some time, and it was not till 95-94 that 
I Titus Didius, after taking Temessus and Colida, and killing 20,000 
( men, forced them definitely to abandon walled towns. 

j Authorities. — For the Lusitanian wars and Viriathus, Appian vi. 56, 75 ; 

Livy, Ep. xlix. liii. liv. ; Velleius ii. i ; Diodorus Sic. xxxiii. fr. ; Dio Cassius, 
» fr. 73, 75 ; Orosius v. 4. For the Celtiberian and Numantine war, Polybius 

XXXV. 1-5; Appian vi. 45-55; 76-100; Livy, Ep. xlvii. xlviii. liv. -Ivii. lix. ; Velleius 

ii. 4 ; Floras ii. 17; Orosius v. 5, 7 ; Eutropius iv. 8 ; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus 5 ; 

Diodorus Sic. xxxiii. For anecdotes of Metellus see Frontinus iv. i, 23; iv. 

7, 42; Valerius Max. v. i, 5; vii. 4, 5. 



The 
Arevaci in 



2 N 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

SERVILE WARS IN SICILY 

State of Sicily since 205 — Speculations in land — Miseries of the slaves — Disorders 
in the island from about 139 — Murder of Demophilus, and organisation of 
rebellion under Eunusand Cleon — Defeat of the praetors — M. Perpenna retakes 
Henna — Defeat of Hypsaeus — Campaigns of C. Fulvius Flaccus {134-132) and 
P. Rupilius — Capture of Tauromenium — The lex Rjipilia (132) — Second war 
in 103 — Fraudulent reduction to slavery — Legal decisions of Licinius Nerva 
liberating 800 slaves — Protests by the landowners — Outbreak under Tryphon 
and Athenion — L. Licinius Lucullus (103-102) — C. Servilius (102-101) — 
M'.Aquillius ends the war (101-99). 

The Spanish wars had brought into prominence the unworthiness 
of some of the new nobihty. As they were ending, the troubles at 
Rome in connexion with the legislation of Tiberius Gracchus showed 
the dangers that underlay society in Italy, and gave a foretaste of 
the violence soon to become frequent in the capital. Contemporary 
with this last an insurrection of slaves in Sicily threw a lurid light 
upon another plague spot in Roman civilisation. 
Sicily from For sixty years after the expulsion of the Carthaginians and the 

203. absorption of the kingdom of Syracuse, Sicily had apparently enjoyed 

continuous prosperity. Its fruitful plains were rich with corn, its 
hills covered with sheep, its harbours crowded with merchant vessels, 
and its towns still decorated with some of the masterpieces of Greek 
art. It was, on the whole, peacefully administered by its praetor or 
propraetor, with two quaestors, one at Syracuse and the other at Lily- 
baeum, and had come to be regarded as almost an integral part of 
Roman territory, "a suburban province." Nevertheless a large pro- 
portion of the men and women living in it were in a most miserable 
Position of position. The richness of its soil had caused Roman speculators to 
landteriure l3uy up large estates, which they cultivated exclusively by gangs of 
tn Sicily, slaves, native or foreign, generally without residing on their properties 
or taking proper measures even for the bare support of the men who 
produced their wealth, and whom they encouraged to supply their 



CHAP, xxxiv THE SLAVES IN SICILY 547 

necessities by open brigandage. Some of the wealthier natives, who 
had retained or purchased estates, followed the bad example and even 
bettered the instruction : so that Sicily is described as rapidly becoming Disturbed 
a constant scene of robbery and murder, scarcely safe for living in state of the 
outside the walls of a town, or for peaceful travellers to traverse, ^^^^^ry. 
The praetors from time to time attempted to restrain these disorders ; 
but the masters of the slaves were influential at Rome,i and could pro- 
cure the prosecution and probable condemnation of any praetor who 
offended them ; and the magistrates, therefore, often preferred to 
share the profits of the speculators as the price of a convenient 
blindness. The slaves, besides the habits of robbery almost forced 
on them, had terrible wrongs to avenge. The horrible life of the Wrongs of 
ergastula, the heavy chains in which they had often to work, the ^^^ slaves. 
brandings and the blows, the wrongs to women and children, and in 
many cases the fraudulent proceedings by which they had lost their 
I freedom, all contributed to swell the storm of just resentment now to 
burst upon the rich landowners. Large numbers of slaves had been 
imported into the island from the East ; but there were also numerous 
natives who in the various sieges and battles had been reduced to 
this state : so that some must have been peculiarly exasperated by 
, serving on the lands which they or their fathers had once owned. Of 
, all wars that of slaves against their masters is the most equitable and 
I even praiseworthy ; yet the pent-up rage actuating it, and the absence 
of the conventions tending in some degree to mitigate a contest 
between belligerent nations, make it too often bloody and cruel 
I beyond other wars. Women and children have to suffer for the 
I sins of husbands and fathers ; and the brutality which their own 
( oppression has helped to create is exercised in all its horror on the 
i oppressors. 

* It was not exclusively or mainly against Roman masters that the The 
\ rebellion was directed. Native owners, while aping Roman luxury, inmrrec- 
had often outdone Romans in cruelty, and were even more hated l^^^j.^^^^^ 
1 because more constantly present. It was on the estate of a Sicilian slaves 
{Greek, Demophilus of Henna, that the insurrection began. He and of Demo- 
Ihis wife Megallis had gained an evil eminence in inhumanity to their philus of 
slaves. They at length conspired to murder them, and to strike for /^"^^' 
J freedom under the leadership of a certain Syrian slave named Eunus, 
who had acquired great influence by the profession of magic powers 

^ Diodorus says that the owners were mostly equites, who acted as judices in 
the prosecutions of the praetors. But he here anticipates the law of Gains 
Gracchus by ten years : at this time judices were exclusively senators ; still they 
may in many cases have been interested in Sicilian properties, and if the equites 
were not yet sitting on juries, they were wealthy men and might at any time become 
senators and so judices. 



548 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Eunus 
proclaimed 
king, and 
overcomes 
the island, 
139-135- 



M. 

Perpenna, 

135- 

L. Plant ius 

Hypsaeus, 

r34> C. 

Fidviiis 

Flaccus, 

134-^32- 

P. Rupilius 

-^32. 

Siege of 
Tauro- 
mcnium. 



and the performance of some magic tricks. Collecting a body of 400 
men the slaves seized Henna, killing men, violating women, and 
dashing out the brains of children. Demophilus and Megallis were 
dragged from their country house to the theatre at Henna and there 
torn to pieces. Yet even in the height of their rage these men 
proved that they were not lost to all feelings of humanity. A 
daughter of Demophilus, who had been conspicuous for her kindness 
to her father's slaves, was rescued by some who remembered her 
beneficence with gratitude and conveyed in safety to relatives at a 
distance. 

Eunus was now proclaimed king, and organised a regular govern- 
ment, with assembly and council according to the Greek type. The 
only free inhabitants of Henna who had been spared were the workers 
in iron, who were now forced to manufacture weapons for the multi- 
tude of shepherds, farm labourers, and domestic slaves who flocked 
to Henna, rudely armed with axes, scythes, or even pointed stakes 
hardened in the fire, and iron spits snatched from kitchens. Eunus 
soon had an army of 6000 men, with which he scoured the country, 
plundering and slaying. One praetor after another sustained defeat 
at his hands, and every success added to the numbers that joined 
his standard. Another formidable rising began at Segesta under a 
slave named Cleon, who joined Eunus, and acknowledged his autho- 
rity ; and the numbers of insurgents soon rose to 20,000 and 
eventually to 200,000 men, nearly every city in Sicily, except 
Messana, being infected \vith the contagion of disorder. The first 
success against them was gained, it seems, by the praetor M. Perpenna, 
who retook Henna (135). But his successor L. Plautius Hypsaeus 
(134) was again defeated ; and the consul C. Fulvius Flaccus, though 
at the head of a regular army, appears to have been only partially 
successful. When P. Rupilius took over the command in 132 the 
slaves were still strong enough to defeat his legate and son-in-law 
Q. Fabius and seize Tauromenium, where they made their last stand. 

The town and citadel of Tauromenium {l\iormitui) were all but 
impregnable ; but, as the slaves had no means of getting provisions 
by sea, it might be starved out : and this Rupilius proceeded to do. 
The men were reduced to the most horrible extremities of famine ; 
until a certain Serapion having betrayed the citadel, and Cleon with 
a brother of Eunus having fallen in an attempt to break out, the 
city was surrendered. Eunus, who, with the name and insignia, had 
assumed all the luxury of royalty, escaped, but was afterwards captured, 
and died in a loathsome prison at Morgantia. 

Similar risings at Athens, Delos, and other places had been mean- 
while suppressed with comparative ease ; no slave war equalled that 
of Sicily in its persistence or in the horrors which accompanied it. 



XXXIV THE RUPILIAN SETTLEMENT IN SICILY 549 

Rupilius followed up the capture of Tauromenium by hunting down E7id of 
fugitives, and punishing many hundreds with the cross, which their ^he war. 
outrages no doubt were considered to have richly deserved. It is 
unfortunate that such saviours of society seldom think of redressing 
the wrongs which give rise to the disturbances punished with such 
applause. Some reform in the administration of Sicily, indeed, 
was considered to be necessary, and ten commissioners were sent, 
with whose help a new scheme of government was drawn up, known 
as the lex Rupilia., under which, according to Cicero, Sicily enjoyed The lex 
peace and prosperity for many years. But this charta, though it Rupilia, 
may have improved the legal status of the Sicilians and their ^3^- 
relations with Roman tax-gatherers and citizens residing there, 
appears to have made no change in the system of land tenure 
or the position of the slaves. Perhaps, warned by the sufferings Some slave 
of these terrible years, masters may have been more careful to grievafices 
treat their slaves with some approach to humanity. But one griev- ^"^f^- 
ance, at any rate, was left unredressed, the reduction, that is, of ^''^^^^^' 
freemen by fraud or violence to the condition of slavery : for thirty 
years later a fresh rebellion of slaves broke out in Sicily, which had 
its origin in a matter connected with this point. It was not, indeed, 
in Sicily only that the slave question was causing trouble. There 
were at that time outbreaks in Italy also — one at Nuceria and two 
at Capua — the latter proving so dangerous as to require the presence 
of the praetor L. Lucullus with a legion (103). Almost simul- 
taneous with this last was the second outbreak in Sicily. 

The attention of the Senate had been called to the question by The 
Nicomedes of Bithynia, who on being asked to supply Marius wath question of 
a contingent for the Cimbrian war, complained that large numbers ^^^^S<^^ 
of his subjects had been reduced to slavery by the publicani on J^^^^^ /^-, 
various oppressive pretexts. The Senate ordered investigations to 
be held in the provinces, in order to release such inhabitants 
of the free or allied states as could be shown to have been thus 
illegally enslaved. In vSicily the praetor Licinius Nerva had 
already declared the enfranchisement of more than 800, when he 
was assailed by such vehement protests from the landowners that 
he grew frightened and closed his court. But the slaves were so 
much agitated by the hope and its disappointment, that plots for a 
general rising were at once made. The first, under a certain Varius, 
was quickly suppressed ; but it was followed by another, which began 
with the murder of a Roman knight by his slaves. The rebels 
elected Salvius (Tryphon) king, who soon found himself at the head 
of 20,000 men, with whom he besieged Morgantia, defeated the 
praetor, and scoured the country at his will. A similar rising began 
at Segesta under Athenion, also proclaimed king, who, being joined 



550 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. XXXIV 



not only by slaves but by the poor and the fliers from justice in every 
direction, marched to the Leontine plains, killing all who refused 
to submit. The hope that the rivalry of Tryphon and Athenion 
would ruin the slave cause was disappointed by tlie submission of 
the latter ; and the united forces occupied Triocala, a place of great 
strength twelve miles from Thermae Selinuntiae, where Tryphon 
strongly entrenched himself, and collected large supplies. The 
L.JJiinius praetor L. Licinius Lucullus (103), lately engaged in suppressing 
a rising at Capua, was now sent with two legions, chiefly of 
Roman citizens, with which he defeated Tryphon in the field, 
and compelled him to shut himself up in Triocala ; but from want 
of ability, or, as was believed, from corruption, made no progress 
in the siege. His successor Gains Servilius (102) proved equally 
ineffective, and, like his predecessor, was condemned and banished. 

But Lilybaeum and Morgantia had both held out against the 
slaves, whose final reduction was effected by the consul M'.Aquillius 
(loi), who won a great battle, in which Athenion (now sole leader 
on the death of Tryphon) was killed. Though severely wounded 
himself he continued the campaign against the rebels, and gradually 
secured peace throughout the island. In 99 he was awarded an 
ovation, in which some of his captives were compelled to fight with 
wild beasts. Like his predecessors he was prosecuted for malver- 
sation ; but, unlike them, was acquitted. The slave wars in Sicily 
were for the present at an end ; and the slaves so strictly forbidden 
to bear arms that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, praetor about 96, is 
said to have crucified a slave for killing a boar with a hunting spear. 
But the evils of the system were to be again forcibly illustrated 
when Spartacus, thirty years later, was able for nearly three years 
to play the part almost of another Hannibal. 



Lucullus 

praetor, 

103. 

C. 

Servilius, 

102. 

Af .Aquil- 

lius^ 

loi-gg. 



Authorities. — (i.) Diodorus Sic. xxxiv. fr. ; Livy, Ep. Ivi. ; Strabo vi. 2, 6 ; 
Valerius Max. ii. 7, 3 ; Florus iii. 19 ; Orosius v. 6. For the lex Kupilia, 
chiefly scattered references in Cicero's Verriue Orations, especially 2, 13, § 32. 
(ii, ) For the second war, Diodorus xxxvi. fr. ; Livy, Ep. Ixix. ; Florus iii. 19. 



CHAPTER XXXV 



THE GRACCHI, 133-I2I 



PROVINCES 










CENSUS 


Asia 


B.C. 


127 


B.C. 


142 


. 328,342 


Gallia Narbonensis . 


B.C. 


118 


B.C. 


136 


• 323.000 








B.C. 


131 


. 313.823 


COLONIES 






B.C. 


125 


• 390.736 


Fabrateria (for Fregellae) . 


B.C. 


124 


B.C. 


115 


• 394.336 


Minervia (Scylacium) \ 
Neptunia ( Tarentum) / 


B.C. 


122 








Junonia (Carthage) soon dis- 












established . 


B.C. 


122 








Narbo Martius . 


B.C. 


118 









Depopulation of Italy — The ager publicus — Tiberius Senipronius Gracchus, 
tribjams plebis in 133, attempts to re-enforce the Licinian law — Diffi- 
culties of the attempt — Deposition of his colleague Octavius — His law 
passed and a land commission formed — He promises other reforms, but 
is killed while seeking re-election as tribune for 132 — His younger 
brother Gains returns to Italy in 132 — Supports Carbo's law for allowing 
re-election of tribunes — The Italian holders of ager fubliciis protest against 
the resumption of their allotments — Scipio supports them and transfers the 
judicial power of the commissioners to the consuls — Death of Scipio (129) — 
Foreign affairs from 129 to 125 — Gaius Gracchus in Sardinia (126-125) — 
Elected tribune for 123 — His legislation : (i) de provocatione, (2) lex frumen- 
taria, (3) lex militaris, (4) de provinciis, (5) lex judiciaria, (6) de sociis — 
Collection of the taxes in Asia — His roads, bridges, and colonies at Fabra- 
teria, Tarentum, Capua, and Carthage — Outbidden by the tribune Livius 
Drusus — Not re-elected a third time as tribune for 121 — Proposal to annul his 
colony of Junonia at Carthage — Death of Gracchus during the riot on the 
day of voting — Prosecution of his followers — Results of the movement. 



While the dangers attending the multiplication of slaves were being /j/j. 
illustrated in Sicily, the decrease of the rural population and the appearance 
growth of poverty among the free were becoming serious in Italy, of free 
These evils are said to have struck Tiberius Gracchus, son of the 



pacificator of Spain and grandson of the great Africanus, as he 



inhabitants 
in Italy. 



552 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The ager 
publicus. 




The 

difficulty 
dealing 
with it. 




Tiberius 

returns 

from 

Spain, 

136. 



travelled through Etruria on his way to Spain as quaestor in 
137. The country was cultivated by gangs of slaves, and seemed 
bare of free inhabitants, while the towns and especially Rome 
were full of citizens struggling with poverty. As he afterwards 
expressed it, " The wild beasts in Italy had lairs and sleeping 
places, but those who fought and died for her had no share in 
anything except air and light." Reflecting on these things, it 
seems, his mind recurred to the management of the ager publicus^ 
that land which in various parts of conquered Italy had nominally 
remained in the ownership of the State when not assigned to colojii. 
Laelius had already made an attempt at reform, but had desisted 
for fear of the hostility he foresaw. The law of Licinius (367), 
limiting the amount of this land to be held by any one person, 
had never been repealed, but had from the first been constantly 
evaded and was now almost forgotten. At times the occupation of 
this land had been allowed on such easy conditions that the idea of 
undisturbed ownership naturally grew up, and the small paym.ent to 
the State came soon to be regarded as a tax rather than a rent. 
Sales, mortgages, marriage settlements extending over 200 years 
had confirmed the habit of regarding it in the light of absolute 
property. 

Though such land probably did not form a large proportion of 
^f the estates of the richest men, yet it was sufficiently important to 
a considerable number to make any interference with it a task 
of great difficulty, especially to one who, like Gracchus, belonged 
by birth and every kind of tie to the class most affected. He 
and his brother Gaius were the surviving sons of a large family 
born to their father, one of the best and most liberal of the Optimates, 
by Cornelia, daughter of the great Africanus. She was a woman 
distinguished not more for her illustrious birth than for the dignity 
of her character and the endowments of her intellect. A collection 
of her letters was extant in Cicero's time,i and they were regarded 
as a model of prose style ; and in an age of increasing frivolity she 
was conspicuous for simplicity of life and devotion to the education 
of jier sons. 

' When Tiberius Gracchus returned from Spain he found himself 
an object of popular interest. The disaster in the Numantine 
war was attributed solely to the incompetence of the proconsul 
Mancinus ; that its consequences had not been worse was looked 
upon as owing to the character and energy of his young quaestor 
Gracchus. In 134 therefore he was elected tribune without diffi- 



1 Two extracts are preserved in the fragments of the work of Cornelius 
Nepos, De Historicis Latinis. 



XXXV THE LAND LAW OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 553 

culty, and immediately set himself to carry out the remedial measures 
of which he had been thinking. 

He was now twenty-nine years old ; his brother Gaius, nine years Tiberius 
younger, was serving at Numantia under Scipio Aemilianus, who had Gracchus 
married their sister Sempronia. . He himself was married to a daughter t^^bimus 
of Appius Claudius ; was an accomplished and persuasive orator ; ^^^'^"' '^^' 
simple in his habits ; pure in character ; and far removed by taste 
and temperament from the role of an agitator. It was not part 
of his plan to attack the power and influence of the Senate ; but 
his proposals necessarily involved him in a bitter contest with the 
members of that body and with the wealthy equites, which forced upon 
hrni the proceedings that discredited him. The popular expecta- 
tion of the benefits to arise from his tribuneship was shown in a 
way common in Rome, — by pasquinades and writings on the walls, 
I calling upon him to relieve the poverty of the people by dealing with 
the ager piiblicus. 

His first proposal was designed to conciliate the holders of public pirst 
land. Possessors of more than the legal amount (500 jugera for the -proposal 
father, and 250 jugera for each son) were to be compensated for <:ompara- 
I disturbance on a fair valuation. But the landholders were not ^'^y^ 
: satisfied. Every possible hindrance was put in the way of the '^'''^'''''^'• 
I law being brought forward ; and finally one of his colleagues, M. Second 
( Octavius, though a personal friend, was induced to veto it. proposal 
( Gracchus had been too much elated by popularity to submit 
I tamely. The compensating clauses were withdrawn, and another 
i law substituted, which simply proposed to divide the land held ^PP^^^^- 
in excess of the legal amount. This law had also two clauses Zndtm- 
which distinguished it from previous agrarian legislation : a com- missim. 
mission was to be appointed to superintend the new distribution. Alienation 
and the alienation of the new allotments was to be forbidden. forbidden. 

Octavius interposed his veto to prevent the law being brought Octavius 
before the people : Gracchus retaliated by a veto on the proceedings "^'etoes the 
of other magistrates, and by putting his seal on the treasury to prevent P^'oposal 
all payments and receipts. There was a deadlock. Octavius would fs'TepHved 
not give way, and Gracchus is said to have been forced to arm ^of office^'*^ 
I himself against plots upon his life instigated by the rich. When he 
J tried to bring forward his law his enemies contrived to stir up a riot, 
] and forcibly removed the voting urns. A compromise in the Senate 
I was vainly attempted, and then Gracchus resolved on deposing his 
' colleague Octavius from office by a vote of the people. It was a 
distinctly revolutionary proposal, and struck at the root of the con- 
stitution and the independence of the magistrates. No principle was 
more fundamental in the Roman polity than that a magistrate could 
I not be resisted in the exercise of his legal powers during his year of 



more 
drastic. 



554 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The land 
bill passed. 



First land 
commis- 
sion. 



Dangerous 
position of 
Gracchus. 



Tib. 

Gracchus 

cayididate 

for a second 

year of 



office, though he might be impeached when he laid it down. The 
person and power of a tribune were peculiarly guarded against such 
attacks. Still it was impossible to hmit the competence of a popular 
vote. Gracchus argued that a tribune was elected to protect the 
people : if on the contrary he injured them, he thereby abdicated his 
functions and might be as lawfully deposed as a king who exceeded 
his prerogative. 

Right or wrong the reasoning of Gracchus prevailed. The vote 
was passed, Octavius was dragged from the rostra, and L. Mummius 
substituted for him, without apparently any farther disturbance. 
The land bill was then brought in and promptly passed ; Tiberius 
Gracchus, Appius Claudius, Gaius Gracchus named as commis- 
sioners, and set to work, with judicial powers to decide on dis- 
puted questions as to the status of the land to be dealt with. 

But as the summer wore away and the time approached at which 
Gracchus would have to lay down his office, the spirits of his adver- 
saries revived, and they openly proclaimed their intention of revenge 
when he was once more a private citizen. His supporters had 
crowded into Rome from the country ; but, the law once passed, 
they had returned and were busy with farm-work or the preparations 
for the expected allotments. It would not be easy to recall these, 
and the unconstitutional proceedings against Octavius had no doubt 
alienated others. Gracchus cannot be acquitted of at least ill 
judgment in making the commission such a family coterie, con- 
sisting of himself, his brother, and his father-in-law. It must have 
given his enemies a good excuse for representing his measures as 
intended for personal aggrandisement, and perhaps even for the 
attainment of despotism or regnuvi, the suspicion of which had been 
fatal to so many earlier reformers. 

Whether the re-election of a tribune was lawful was somewhat 
of a moot point. The general feeling was no doubt against it, and 
the struggle between the two parties was now concentrated upon this 
question.! The Senate in rather a petty spirit had shown their 



^ A Senatus Consultum in 460 had declared that the continuation of a 
magistrate's office beyond the year, or the re-election of the same tribunes, \sas 
unconstitutional {contra retnpublicam), Livy iii. 21. This resolution of the Senate 
however had no legal force, though it shows what the constitutional rule or 
doctrine was. In 342 plebiscita prohibited holding the same magistratus within 
ten years or two magistratus in the same year (Livy vii. 42 ; x. 13 ; xxiv. 40 ; 
Cicero, de Legg. iii. 3). But all such rules were liable to suspension in special 
circumstances ; and it was somewhat doubtful whether they applied to the 
tribuneship, as not being a magistratus. At any rate the exceptions to the rule 
had been common at one time in regard to the tribunes, and the question now 
was whether the circumstances were such as to justify one. — See Marquardt and. 
Mommsen, ii. p. 176. 



XXXV MURDER OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS 555 

dislike of Gracchus by refusing the land commission a grant for 
their expenses from the exchequer ; but he was now able to offer an 
additional motive for those who had benefited or were to benefit 
under his land law supporting his candidature. In the course of 7-^^ trea- 
133 died Attains III., last and worst king of Pergamus, leaving the si<res of 
Romans his heirs. What this would precisely mean to the people Attains. 
of his dominions will be discussed hereafter. But his personal 
wealth in money, land, or revenue from certain towns would come 
at once into the Roman exchequer ; and Gracchus promised that, if 
he were re-elected tribune, he would secure that this treasure should 
be devoted to supplying the new holders of allotments with the 
capital necessary for starting. He attempted to win the populace 
also by promising the reduction of the time of military service ; 
and the equites by proposing that they should be admitted to 
serve on juries, confined at present to the members of the Senate. 
Still, in the absence of the country voters his election was in danger, ^is 
and he appealed to the feelings of the people by appearing in re-election 
soiled dress and the signs of mourning. When two tribes had ^fpo^^d as 
already returned his name a protest was entered on the part of the ' ^^^ ' 
Senate against the legality of a re-election. The tribune Rubrius 
who was presiding hesitated, and presently resigned the presidency 
to a colleague. Another controversy was then started as to whether 
the votes already recorded were to be accepted, and eventually the and 
business was postponed to the next day. A body of his partisans postponed. 
kept guard at the house of Gracchus through the night and fresh 
appeals were made to the people. Evil omens were reported to him 
in the morning, but in spite of entreaties he listened to the advice 
of his philosophic friend Blosius of Cumae and went to the Capitol. 
There he found a scene of such disorder that the presiding tribune, 
Mucins, tried in vain to carry on the form of election. In the midst Death of 
of the excitement a senator, Fulvius Flaccus, was seen making his Ttbertus 
way towards Gracchus. Having reached him at length, he told him ^^'^^ "^' 
that the consul had refused to act on a vote carried in the Senate 
giving him power of life and death, but that the extreme party in 
the Senate had resolved to act on their own authority. The friends 
of Gracchus who heard the announcement armed themselves with 
clubs, pieces of broken benches, and other weapons, and pressed 
round him ; but in the hubbub those on the outskirts of the crowd 
could not tell what was happening, and Gracchus raised his hand to 
his head as a sign that his life was in danger.^ This was reported 

^ The Senate it seems passed the vote videant consules ne quid respublica 
detrimenti capiat, which armed the consul with dictatorial powers, — a proceeding 
which by this time had superseded the older custom of appointing a Dictator 
seditionis causa, which Appian expresses surprise at their not doing now. 



556 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

grounds of 
the action 
of the 
senatorial 
party. 



Trial of 
the sup- 
porters of 
Gracchus. 



to the Senate, sitting in the temple of Fides close by, as a demand 
on his part for a crown. Thereupon Scipio Nasica appealed to the 
consul to put the "tyrant" to death. The consul refused to use 
violence or kill a citizen uncondemned, but promised to regard as 
invalid any vote passed under illegal pressure. " Since the consul 
deserts the State," cried Nasica, " let the friends of the constitution 
follow me ! " A large number of the senators, rolling up their togas 
to protect their heads and breasts, rushed down upon the Area 
Capitolina and charged the crowd. The attendants hastily closed 
the door of the temple of Jupiter, and in a few minutes there was a 
general struggle going on, in the course of which Gracchus was 
struck down and slain, — the first blow being from the hand of one 
of his colleagues, P. Satureius, — and his adherents scattered, wounded, 
or killed. 

In deposing his colleague and seeking re-election Gracchus had, 
to say the least, put a strain on the constitution ; but the accusation 
of attempting to establish royal power was stupid, and must have 
been known by the aristocratic rioters to be a mere blind to justify 
themselves. A law or tradition as old as the Republic, that a man 
clearly attempting royalty might be killed without trial,i and the new 
doctrine, that a vote of the Senate conferred the power of life and 
death on the magistrates, gave a certain air of legality to their 
proceedings. But it was essentially a riot, and the blood thus shed 
was amply revenged upon the Optimates in subsequent scenes of 
violence. 

For the present the senatorial party was triumphant and used 
its victory to the full. The body of Gracchus was cast unburied 
into the Tiber, and many of his adherents were brought to trial and 
condemned by the consuls of the next year (132) ; and even Scipio 
when asked his opinion as to the fate of his brother-in-law, answered 
by quoting a line of Homer — 



So perish all who do the like again. 



Commis- 
sion in 
i30-i2() : 
Gaius 
Gracchus, 
C. 

Papirius 
Carbo, 
M. Fulvius 
Flaccns. 



Still the land law was unrepealed ; and the place of Tiberius on the 
commission was filled by Publius Crassus, father-in-law of Gaius 
Gracchus, and on his death in 130 by M. Fulvius Flaccus, a partisan 
of Gracchus, while the place of Appius Claudius, who died in 132, 
was taken by C. Papirius Carbo, also at present a close friend and 
supporter. On the other hand Scipio Nasica, who had led the attack 
on Tiberius, became the object of such popular detestation that the 
Senate relieved him of the provisions of the law which prevented him 



^ Cicero, who had to defend a similar action of his own, is fond of quoting 
the cases of Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius. 



XXXV THE PROTEST OF THE ITALIANS 



557 



as Pontifex Maximus from leaving Italy, and sent him on a mission Return of 
to Asia, from which he did not venture to return, dying the follow- Gaius 
ing year at Pergamus. There was therefore at present no idea of Gracchus, 
hesitating to carry out the provisions of the law. In 132 Gaius ^^^' 
Gracchus returned to Rome in the train of Africanus, and seems at 
once to have attached himself to the party of progress. He too was 
an orator of ability, though in a more violent style than his brother, 
and he supported the proposal made in 131 by Carbo to allow of the 
re-election of a tribune. The law was rejected, but seems in some 
shape to have been subsequently passed. During the next year no 
fresh agitation seems to have taken place. But in 129 the pro- 
ceedings of the land commission gave rise to a new difficulty. 

Up to that time the commission seems to have dealt only with The 
land held by citizens. Difficult and delicate as the decisions must ^t^^H^^ 
often have been, where titles were not registered, and subsequent ^"'(^'V^^ 
I transactions had complicated ownership, a still farther difficulty protest 
appeared when they came to the case of Italians who were not 12c). ' 
citizens. Their holdings of public land must have resulted from a 
variety of special circumstances, as each town fell under the power 
of Rome. Individuals among the natives had to be rewarded, or 
! citizens were not found willing to migrate for the sake of new farms, 
I and any one who was willing to cultivate the land had been admitted! 
To meddle with such holdings gave rise to a new question. There 
was no provision in the Sempronian law for distribution except to 
, citizens, and the Italians exclaimed against being subject to the 
,' disadvantages without sharing in the advantages of citizens, either 
I in this respect or in regard to protection against the imperiiim of 
^ magistrates. They found a patromis to undertake their cause in Scipio 
I Scipio Africanus. After his Spanish triumph he had opposed u?idertakes 
\ Carbo's proposal for allowing the re-election of tribunes, and had in ^^^ ^^'^^'^ 
I the course of the debate expressed his opinion that Tiberius ""{taiians 

Gracchus had deserved his fate ; and when the indignant populace 
I had shouted disapprobation, he had turned haughtily upon them 
I and bade "those to whom Italy was but a stepmother" be silent. 
j This had shaken his popularity, but he still possessed immense 
\ influence which he now used to put an end to the proceedings of 
I the commissioners. He carried a motion in the Senate transferring The 
the judicial powers of the commissioners in cases of dispute as to judicial 
I the public land to the consuls. This practically brought the pro- ^'^^''' < 
: ceedings of the commission to an end without formally abrogating ^sioner'"^'' 
the law, and Scipio seemed to have used his influence in the 'transferred 
interests of peace and compromise. Crowds of enthusiastic to the 
admirers accompanied him to his house whenever he returned ^'-'"^"l^- 
from the Senate or Forum. On one particular day he had thus 



558 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Death of 
Scipio. 



Foreign 
affairs. 
War with 
the 

lapydes, 
I2g. 

War with 
Aristoti- 
iciis ill 
Asia, iji- 
i2g. 



Gains 

Gracchus 

in 

Sardinia, 

126-12J. 

Revolt of 
Fregellae, 

I2<. 



Gains 

Gracchus 
tribnn ns 
plebis, 123. 



been brought home as though he had been celebrating a triumph, 
and had retired early with his writing tablets to prepare a speech 
to the people for the morrow ; but in the morning was found dead 
in his bed. No inquiry was held, and it was assumed that his 
death was natural ; but popular rumour asserted that the body was 
carried to the pyre with its face covered to conceal the marks Oi 
violence, and that Carbo had at least been privy to an assassination. 
Nothing however was ever proved, though scandal did not spare 
the names of his closest relations. 

His death removed a restraining influence, and in the course of 
the next few years the popular party found more and more 
opportunities of attacking the government of the Optimates. A war 
against the Illyrian lapydes {Croatia) under the consul Sempronius, 
though finally successful owing to the ability of the legate D. 
Junius Brutus, was at first marked by disaster to the Roman army. 
The occupation of the kingdom of Pergamus in accordance with the 
will of Attalus had been disputed by the illegitimate son of his 
predecessor Eumenes, named Aristonicus, and in the war with him, 
lasting three years, a consular P. Licinius Crassus had lost his life 
in circumstances which showed both incapacity and greed. In 
129 the consul Perpenna defeated Aristonicus and brought him 
a prisoner to Rome ; but M'.Aquihus, who was deputed to settle the 
province of Asia at the conclusion of the war, was only acquitted of 
malversation by means of bribery. On the other hand the success 
of the consul L. Aurelius Orestes (126) in restoring order in 
Sardinia was so universally attributed to his quaestor Gains 
Gracchus, that the Senate became jealous ; and when the rejection 
of the proposal of the consul M. Fulvius Flaccus (125) to admit the 
Italians to citizenship was followed by a rebellion at Fregellae, 
where the number of non- citizens seem to have been numerous 
enough to direct the policy of the town, the Optimates tried to 
attribute some of the mischief to the intrigues of Gracchus : and 
they endeavoured to keep him in Sardinia by prolonging the imperium 
of the proconsul Orestes, — which carried with it the continuance 
of the quaestorship of Gracchus, — to the third year (124). But 
Gracchus defeated this manoeuvre by returning to Rome, though 
his successor had not been named ; and when called to account by 
the censors argued that he had served twelve years in the army (ten 
being the legal time for an eques) and had been quaestor for two 
years, the law only requiring one. Once more regulations which 
rested on custom were found powerless to restrain an officer resolved 
to defy them and to rest strictly on law. The censors found that 
they could not affix a "note" to the name of Gracchus, and he was 
elected tribune for the next year (123). 



XXXV LEGISLATION OF GAIUS GRACCHUS 559 



immeti- 
taria. 



Tiberius Gracchus had thought first of his reforms and had not 
sought the hostiHty of the Senate ; Gaius at once attacked the party 
to whom his brother owed his death, and showed his intention of 
lowering the power of the Senate. His first proposal, aimed at his 
brother's opponent Octavius — " that a man deposed from office Sempron- 
should be incapable of any other," — was withdrawn it is said on the ««« ^«^^- 
entreaty of his mother. The second, which was passed, had special {^) ^e pro- 
reference to the execution of those who were condemned by the 
consular court after the death of Tiberius. It deprived the consuls 
of the dictatorial power over citizens held to be conferred on them 
by the decree of the Senate {videa7if consulcs 7ic quid respiiblica 
detriuienti capiat) unless it was confirmed by the vote of the people. ^ 
The law was so drawn as to have a retrospective effect, and the 
surviving consul of 132, P. PopiHus Laenas, like Cicero in similar 
circumstances, went into exile rather than stand his trial. 
I This law, which affected only a limited class, was passed with {2) Lex 

some difficulty. The next appealed to the masses, and was immedi- /'' 
ately popular, though it introduced a vicious principle in finance and 
was mischievous in its effects. The lex fruine?ttaria entitled all 
citizens residing in Rome to a certain measure of corn each month 
somewhat below the market price. It was a permanent arrange- 
1 ment, not a temporary expedient to meet a special difficulty, as 
I former corn laws had been. As a poor law it could be and was 
evaded by those who were well off securing by various arrangements 
; large shares in the distribution and reselling at their own price. As 
I a measure of socialism it was inadequate, and only succeeded in 
j drawing more of the idle and thriftless to Rome. As a bribe to the 
j electors its effect was fleeting, while it permanently alienated the 
I upper classes and defeated its own object by exhausting the treasury. 
I Having thus secured the urban populace for the moment on his 

I side, Gracchus turned his attention to the alleviation of the country New roads 
I folk. He fully shared his brother's views of the necessity of '^nd 
replenishing Italy with an industrious and thriving population. His '^'^^^^^^^^ 
first measure, in which he engaged with great energy, provided for 
the construction of roads and bridges, which would facilitate the 
transport of farming produce and the transaction of country business. 
The commission for allotting land being now practically suspended, 
he proposed to provide for the landless by numerous colonies in 
Italy, such as Fabrateria in the place of the ruined Fregellae, 
Neptunia in Tarentum, and Capua, and also obtained a decree for (j) Lex 
a colony of 6000 citizens in the territory of Carthage. Another mthtans. 

^ This was afterwards apparently evaded by the Senate first declaring the 
persons against whom they desired to direct their decree hastes — they were then 
held to be outside the protection of the law. 



56o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



bill relieved the soldiers from the expense of providing clothing and 
arms and threw it on the state. These measures, and the vast 
numbers of workmen employed through him on the roads, public 
granaries, and other undertakings, who were prepared to support 
him at the elections and legislative comitia, gave him such influence 
that he was not only able to secure his own re-election as tribune, 
but the election of a supporter G. Fannius as consul for 122. 
(^) Lex The laws hitherto mentioned (we have no means of ascertaining 

judiciaria. the order of their proposal) were chiefly concerned with practical 
matters of relief. We now come to a law aimed at the Senate, and 
intended to win over the wealthy class immediately below the 
senators, to which it for the first time gave a definite recognition as 
the ordo equester. For the origin of this order we must go to the 
earliest times. The 300 cavalry of the primitive period, serving 
with a horse supplied at the public expense, had been gradually 
raised to 1800, enrolled in eighteen centuries for voting purposes in 
Ordo the Servian constitution. These had always been the wealthiest 

equester. ^-^^^^ -^^ ^^ sX.?i\.^ ; and though they were jtmiores, and should have 
given up their horse when their term of service was over, or when they 
were incapable of farther service, the custom had grown up of those 
who chose retaining their horse, even when they became members 
of the Senate. As the number of wealthy men increased there were 
many who had the equestrian census (400,000 sesterces) but could 
not find admittance into the eighteen centuries, and from about the 
time of the siege of Veii (403) it became the custom for such men 
frequently to serve on their own horse {eqtw privatd). For though 
they had practically ceased to be a military class, yet every individual 
among them had still to serve the legal number of campaigns 
before becoming candidates for office ; and ten campaigns instead 
of twenty, as in the infantry, exempted them from farther service. 
These therefore who were included in the eighteen centuries, or 
who had been so included, or had served on their own horse 
without being included, came to be spoken of generally as the 
ordo equester^ although there was no legal recognition of any except 
the eighteen centuries. As the senators and their sons were 
excluded from commercial enterprise, the public contracts and the 
farming of the revenues had fallen almost entirely to men who 
belonged to this class ; and thus the piiblicaiii formed a division of 
the equestrian order whose interests generally put them in political 
opposition to the Senate. Hitherto in one important point the 
Senators had the advantage of them : in the trial of criminal 
charges, such as malversation and misconduct in public business 
abroad, in which both were interested, the jurors had been all drawn 
from the roll of the Senate. As the number of such quaestioiies 



XXXV ASIA AND THE PUBLICANI 561 

increased, and the cases before the quaestio pcrpetiia (estabhshed by 

the lex Calpurnia in 149) became more numerous, the roll of the 7-^^ 

Senate was perhaps found not large enough ; and according to Livy judicia. 

and Plutarch the first proposition of Gracchus was to add 300 (or 

600) names to the Senate from the equestrian order and to make up 

the list of judices from this enlarged body. But finally the law as 

passed ordered the list to be made up from the whole equestrian 

order of men over thirty years of age. Whether the senators had 

by some recent regulation been already excluded from the eighteen 

centuries, or whether Gracchus now excluded them, seems uncertain. 

At any rate it seems to have been held that the exclusion only 

applied to cases mentioned in his law ; for the lex de repetic72dis of Lex 

M'.Acilius (121) expressly excludes senators as well as ex-tribunes, Acilia. 

plebeian and military, and some others, from a variety of courts named, 

which would have been superfluous if the law of Gracchus had 

\ applied to all courts. The effect of the law was to give a legal 

' recognition to the enlarged ordo eqiiester^ and to put the courts 

in the hands, wholly or in overwhelming majority, of the men 

most interested in business which gave rise to the accusations. 

It did not therefore effect the object of purifying the courts and 

defending the provincials. The eqidtes in fact could now secure 

' their own impunity and crush any senatorial governor more scrupulous 

j than the rest who tried to suppress their iniquities in his province. 1 

I By another proposal Gracchus himself gave men of the The 

\ equestrian order a new field of enterprise, in which their rapacity province of 

\ led to deplorable results abroad, and to much political trouble ^•^^^' '^9- 

i at home. The kingdom of Attalus had nominally belonged to 

I the Romans since 133, but it was not till 129 that the pretender 

( Aristonicus had been captured by M. Perpenna, and the province of 

I "Asia" organised by M'.Aquillius and ten commissioners. Certain 

' districts which had been under the kings of Pergamus were now 

separated. The Thracian Chersonese was annexed to the province 

of Macedonia; Phrygia major was handed over to the king of Pontus ; 

and other districts to the sons of the king of Cappadocia who had 

fallen in the war. The province now organised under the name of 

Asia consisted of Mysia, Aeolia, Caria, and the Dorian cities — 

except the Rhodian Peraea. It was treated at first with great 

indulgence. The Roman Government imposed no direct tribute 

upon it. The taxes originally paid to the king were either remitted 

or, at a greatly reduced rate, were collected by native tax-gatherers, 

and the Roman publicanus was as yet not known, though the country 

was quickly invaded with money-lenders and speculators from Italy. 

1 For the case of P. Rutilms Rufus, see note on p. 603. 
2 O 



562 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

(j) Law of The war of Aristonicus, however, was made an excuse for reim- 
Gracchus posing taxes ; and either to give the equestrian order, whose 
on the support he needed, another chance of gain ; or to find money for 

^4'^^^a"iV?- ^^^ expenses caused by the distribution of land, his colonies, 
122. ' and public works ; or perhaps believing that a better class of men 

would deal with the Asian revenues, Gracchus now carried a law 
ordering the contracts for collecting the tenths {decii)nae\ the 
pasture rents {scriptiirae)^ and the customs ( portorici) of Asia, to be 
sold by the censors at Rome like other public contracts. What- 
ever the intention of this measure may have been, its result was to 
(6) Lex fill Asia with Roman publicani, whose extortions led to the disaster 
Sempronia jj^ ^^ Mithridatic war. But for the present Gracchus seems to have 
Provinciis believed that reforms needed in the provinces were concerned chiefly 
with the appointment of the governors. The assignation of provinces 
had been tacitly left to the Senate. The consuls and praetors had 
usually drawn lots for them, but the Senate retained the right of 
assigning them without lot in special cases. It had always at least 
named those for which consuls or praetors were to cast lots, which 
enabled it to withdraw a province from a magistrate it disliked, and 
assign it with some approach to certainty to one of whom it approved. 
Assignynent The lex de provi7iciis of Gracchus ordered that the provinces to be 
of consular reserved for the consuls should be named before and not after the 
ptovmces. (^Q^^ular elections, in order that this should not be done from personal 
motives. As however, except in times of unusual excitement, the 
Senate were generally able to influence these elections, the effect of 
the law was not of great importance. 
Proposal to Up to this time Gracchus had carried all before him : the people 

enfranchise supported him at the comitia, the equestrian order were won over, 
the Latins ^^^ ^^^^^ -^^ ^^^ Senate he exercised a great influence. His next 
Italians, Step put his popularity to a severe test, and enabled the Senate to 
give vent to the dislike which his policy had planted deep in the 
hearts of the Optimates. Their instinct indeed was not at fault ; the 
planting of large bodies of Roman citizens, retaining their civic rights, 
at wide distances from Rome, as Gracchus was doing by his colony 
of lunonia at Carthage, must lead eventually to the supremacy of a 
narrow clique at Rome being questioned. Even the conception of 
an extended and united nation of Italy, in the place of a privileged 
urban populace dominating dependent communities, was offensive to 
them. And this is what Gracchus now proposed to call into exist- 
ence by extending the Roman franchise to the Italians. Those who 
at present enjoyed the " Latin " rights were to have full civitas, the 
rest the Lati7iitas. No longer alarmed for their possessions in the 
ager publiciis the Italians were eager for this reform. The requisitions 
and oppressions of Roman legati and magistrates had roused strong 



122. 



XXXV THE ITALIANS AND THE CITIZENSHIP 563 

feelings of resentment in many parts, and a determination that, if 122. 
they were to remain subject to Roman government, they ought to 
have the protection which citizens enjoyed through the right of appeal 
to the tribes, or by the auxilium of the tribunes, and a voice in electing 
the magistrates whom they were to obey. Gracchus quoted some 
startling cases of hardship to which the Italian allies had been 
subjected. Not only were requisitions for free quarters and means Grievances 
of transport made upon the towns, but the persons of their inhabitants of the 
were not safe. At Venusia a young Roman, travelling on some ■^^^'^^'^"•^• 
legatio in his closed litter, heard a peasant ask his bearers jestingly 
whether they carried a corpse. He bade his slaves stop, seize the 
peasant, and beat him to death with the leather thongs of his lectica. 
At Teanum Sidicinum a consul, annoyed at the tardy or inadequate 
preparations at the public baths, which he had ordered to be cleared 
for his wife's use, caused the chief magistrate to be tied to a post in 
', the market-place and flogged. At Ferentinum, when a Roman 
praetor made a similar complaint, one of the duovirs committed 
suicide, the other was arrested and flogged. While serving in the 
army also the socii were at a disadvantage as compared with the 
full citizens, who by this time had obtained the right of appeal (7) Rogatio 
, against sentence of death even when pronounced by the imperator ^^ soctts. 
in camp.i These instances were passionately urged by Gracchus in 
I pleading for his law. But they fell on cold ears : and the Senate 
J saw and seized its opportunity of thwarting him, and at the same time 
(of assuming the part of champion of popular rights. It not only 
protested against the admission of Italians to share in the privileges 
'1 of citizens, to claim their part in the distribution of corn and the 
I assignation of land, and to outvote them at the comitia ; but also 
(against the banishment of such large numbers of them to the shores 
'of Africa in the new colony at Carthage. The Senate induced one of Proposals 
his colleagues, M. Livius Drusus, to veto the proposal of the Italian of Livius 
franchise, and to outbid him for popular favour by proposing twelve Driisiis:{i) 
jColonies in Italy of 3000 each with allotments of land ; the remission colonies, (2) 
jof the rent of lands allotted or to be allotted in the ager ftiibliais, remissio7i 
'with the revocation of the law against their sale ; and, lastly, as a of rent and 
jconcession to the Italians, the protection of socii serving in the army P'^^^^f^^on 
|from flogging on the order of Roman officers. Livius also paraded j^^^^^ / \ 
Ihis personal disinterestedness, in contrast with Gracchus, by declining protection 
'to act on the commission for founding the colonies and distributing of Italian 
^the land.- In a moment the popularity of Gracchus seemed to melt ^c^diers. 

^ Mommsen supposes this right to have been secured by Gracchus' own law, 
de provocatione. 

2 It may have been the difficulty of finding places for these twelve colonies, 
of which so much was made, that caused him to shrink from being one of 



564 



HISTORY OF ROME 



121. COSS. 

Q. Fabius 

Maximus, 

L. 

O pi mi us. 

The colony 

lunonia. 



The lex 
Rubria 
{proposed 
by ike 
tribtaie 
R lib r ills') 
for the 
foundation 
of lunonia. 



away. The consul Fannius turned against him, and even ordered 
by an edict all non-citizens to absent themselves from Rome when 
his Italian bill was allowed to be brought before the people. Perhaps 
his absence of seventy days in Africa, superintending the new colony, 
helped the reaction. At any rate his bill was rejected ; and that of 
Livius passed, and when the day for electing the tribunes for 121 
came his name was not returned ; while his bitter opponent, L. 
Opimius, the destroyer of Fregellae, was elected consul. 

On the loth December 122 Gains Gracchus ceased to be a 
tribune, and soon after the new consuls for 121 entered on their 
office the first move was made. He was not attacked in person, but 
the tribune Minucius proposed that the rebuilding of Carthage should 
be forbidden, and the formation of the new colony lunonia be 
stopped. The superstitions of the citizens were worked upon. The 
curse pronounced by Scipio upon all who attempted the restoration 
of Carthage was recalled, and a report spread that the boundary 
stones already placed to mark the allotments had been torn up by 
wild beasts. Everything was done to prevent this still wider removal 
of Roman citizens from the influences which the Optimates could 
bring to bear upon the urban population. It was not the first of 
such settlements in the provinces. The elder Africanus had founded 
Italica in Baetica for his veterans in 207 ; Marcellus had placed 
Roman settlers at Corduba in 151 ; and only in 123 C. Sextius, 
after conquering the Salluvii, had founded Aquae Sextiae at the 
famous springs of hot and cold water in Gallia Narbonensis. But 
these places had not the rank or privileges of Roman colonies 
(although Strabo gives the title to Corduba), they were still only 
foreign towns, in which, for military or other purposes there was a 
castellum and a number of Romans resident. Not only by the lex 
Rubria was lunonia to be a colony of Roman citizens, but Italians were 
to be competent to enrol themselves among the 6000 settlers, and 
were thereupon to become full citizens. This was enough in itself to 
stir the jealousy of the urban population as a step towards the admis- 
sion of Italians to the civitas ; and when the banishment of Roman 
citizens over sea was contrasted with the proposed twelve colonies 
in Italy, the success of the proposal of Minucius seemed assured. At 
first Gains was inclined to submit to the reaction which was thus 
setting in against him ; but he was stirred on by the more violent 
of his supporters, and as the day for voting on the bill for sup- 
pressing lunonia approached, both parties prepared for the worst. 

During the night the partisans of both sides made a lodgment 

the board. There was not much public land left : Scylacium (Minervium) is 
the only colony known to have been founded under this law, and it never 
prospered. 



Gracchus^ 

121. 



XXXV MURDER OF GAIUS GRACCHUS 565 

on the Capitol, lest the bill should be rejected or carried by the exclu- Death of 
sion of the other side. With two mobs thus in position any trifle G(iii<-s 
might bring about a collision ; and presently a certain Q. Antullius, 
carrying the entrails of the victims slain at the sacrifice, at which 
the consul presided, irritated the followers of Gracchus by some 
contemptuous words and was killed, Gracchus, who felt the dis- 
credit and saw the consequences of thus beginning bloodshed, loudly 
remonstrated with his partisans ; but the consul Opimius gladly 
seized on the occurrence to hold up the whole party to odium. The 
meeting was deferred to the next day on the pretext of rain. At 
daybreak the Senate was summoned, the corpse of Antullius displayed, 
and the old accusation of attempted tyranny {7'egniwi) brought up 
against Gracchus. The Senate passed the usual decree authorising 
the consul to protect the state, which Opimius — unlike Mucins 
Scaevola in 133 — accepted as giving him full dictatorial powers. 

The more violent partisans of Gracchus were led by M. m. 
Fulvius Flaccus, who as consul in 125 had proposed the enfran- Fulvius 
chisement of the Italians, and in 122 accepted the tribuneship to P^^^^^^^- 
support Gracchus, whom he had however considerably discredited 
by intemperate conduct. The contrast between him and Gracchus 
■ was eminently marked in this last night of their lives. The house 
; of Fulvius was guarded by a noisy crowd, who passed the hours in 
I revelry, while those who protected Gracchus were serious and orderly, 
' and he himself is said to have been deeply distressed at the now 
inevitable resort to force. Early next morning Fulvius armed his Flaccus 
I immediate followers with the weapons with which his Gallic victories ^"-^ 

'had adorned his house, and proceeded to occupy the half- empty ^^'^'^^^^^■l 
I . . ,,.,, , ' , . . . W . . . \ . occupy the 

, Aventme Hill, where Gracchus presently jomed hmi, leavmg his Aventine 

[house with gloomy forebodings of disaster. The consul Opimius de- 
(clared the gathering on the Aventine an act of war, and proclaimed 
I a reward of their weight in gold for the heads of Gracchus and 
I Fulvius. When the son of Fulvius arrived at the Senate with offers 
of terms he was refused an answer and retained in custody by the 
consul, who marched with a troop of soldiers and some Cretan 
jarchers to take the Aventine. The mob there could offer no appreci- 
able resistance. Fulvius took refuge in a bath, but was dragged out 
;and killed with his elder son. Gracchus, who had struck no blow, was 
(prevented from suicide by the entreaties of his friends. He hurried 
ttowards the Sublician bridge accompanied by one slave, and some of 
his friends attempted to give him time for flight by holding the end Gracchus 
of the bridge. But he failed to find a horse, and was forced to take ^" ^^e 
refuge in the grove of Furina on the Janiculum, where he was over- ^f^^f ^^f 
taken and killed, or, as some reported, was found dead. 

However, L. Septumeleius, of Anagnia, who had been his friend. 



566 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Prosecution 
of his 
followers. 



Temple of 
Coticord. 



Subsequent 
history of 
Opimius 
and Carbo. 



The greater 
part of the 
changes of 
Gracchus 
are main- 
tained. 



The 

faihire of 
the neiv 

C07lStitU- 

tion. 



carried his head to the consul, and claimed and received the reward, 
having even, it was believed, filled the mouth with lead to increase its 
weight. The man who took the head of Fulvius, being a man of a 
lower class, is said to have got nothing. The aristocrats used their 
triumph unmercifully. Besides those killed on the Aventine, as 
many as 3000 are said to have been condemned by a commission 
presided over by Opimius. Many of them, with the mere 
mockery of a trial, or without one at all, were ordered by the consul 
to be strangled in prison. With the proceeds of their forfeited 
property he then rebuilt the Temple of Concord, as though the 
slaughter of political opponents had ended all controversies. The 
tribune Q. Decius indeed, in 1 20, brought him to trial for executing 
citizens uncondemned : but the influence of the Optimates secured his 
acquittal, and it was not until 109 that, having been convicted of 
receiving bribes from Jugurtha, he went into exile and ended his 
days at Dyrrhachium in abject poverty, an object of hatred and 
contempt. But C. Papirius Carbo, once a warm partisan of the 
Gracchi, who on becoming consul in 1 20 had changed over and 
supported Opimius, was frightened by the threat of a similar accusa- 
tion into committing suicide. There was an evident revulsion of 
feeling in favour of the murdered leader ; and, though Gracchus had 
disappeared and his followers had been in large numbers put to 
death, the Optimates did not venture on reversing his legislation. 
His colonial scheme fell to the ground : Carthage did not become a 
colony, though the settlers were not disturbed in their holdings ; the 
land of Capua remained ager publiciis j and Neptunia alone flourished 
for a time in ancient Tarentum. The only other changes made for 
the present were not in the legislation of Gaius, but in the land law 
of Tiberius. The law of Livius was passed abolishing the prohibi- 
tion of alienating the newly allotted lands ; in 119 the tribune Sp. 
Thorius carried a law formally abolishing the land commission and 
fixing a low rent on the lands for the expenses of the corn distribu- 
tion ; and in 1 1 1 this rent was abolished and the allotments became 
freeholds. 1 

The Optimates failed indeed to prevent the formation in 118 of 
the first regular colony outside Italy at Narbo Martius, the capital of 
the new province in Gallia Transalpina, but on the whole they 
recovered their power and influence. Nor did the lex jtidiciaria 
of Gracchus, though unrepealed, have the desired effect of purifying 
the courts and restraining fraud, violence, and corruption. The 
incapacity and venality of a section of the Optimates displayed 

^ This appears to be the law of which fragments are preserved (see C.I.L. 
200, Rruns, p. 72). It also relieved those who fed no more than ten oxen or 
fifty (?) sheep on the public pasture from payment of the scriptura. 



XXXV THE COMING AUTOCRACY 567 

in the Jugurthine war (i 1 1) were punished by the outrages of Marius 
and Cinna ; the oppression of the pubHcani in Asia led to the 
massacre of 88 ; while the refusal of the franchise to the Italians led 
to the Social war of 90-88. Sulla looked for reform of abuses in the 
depression of the Popidares and the stricter control of the Senate ; 
but, on the whole, from the day on which Gracchus fell, the contest 
of parties, each struggling for the monopoly of power and profit, each 
unscrupulous and corrupt, was tending to inevitable civil war and 
the rule of a single master. 

Authorities. — Livy, Ep. Iviii.-lx. Plutarch, Lives of Tiberius and Gains 
Gracchus. Appian, B. Civ. i. 7-27. Velleius ii. 2-7. Dionysius xxxiv. fr. 
Dio Cassius fr. 83. Orosius v. 9, 12. For the legacy of Attalus and the 
provinces of Asia see Strabo xiii. 4, 2 ; Justinus xxxvi. 4 ; Appian , Mithridates, 
62 ; B. Civ. V. 4. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 



THE JUGURTHINE AND CIMBRIAX WARS 



PROVINCES 
Gallia Xarbonensis . B.C. ii8 
Cilicia . . .B.C. 102 



COLONY 

Xarbo Martius 



The formation of the first province in Transalpine Gaul — Wars with Gauls, the 
Balearic islands, and Dalmatia — The Cimbri defeat Cn. Papirius Carbo 
at Xoreia (113), and Manlius and Caepio in Gaul (105) — History of Jugurtha 
— His bribery at Rome — His murder of Massiva — The Jugurthine war 
(112- 106) — Scandalous misconduct of the Roman commanders — Successful 
campaign of Metellus (109-108 1 — Marius consul (107) — Capture of Jugurtha 
(106) — Five consecutive consulships of Marius (104-100) — His conduct of the 
Cimbric war — Great defeat of the Teutones and Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae 
(102), and of the Cimbri at Vercellae (loi). 



The wars 
between 
121 and 
100. 



Oxyhii. 

Salluvii 

and 

Oxvbii. 



The twenty years which separated the death of Gains Gracchus from 
the next outbreak of party violence were filled with active exertions 
in various directions, which showed that the Romans had still the 
greatness to understand and the courage to maintain, and, if necessar>', 
to extend the inheritance of their fathers. We have seen with what 
persistence they had year after year struggled to bring into order the 
north-west of Italy, and secure an uninterrupted road into Spain. 
They were now to find themselves responsible for the peace of Gaul 
beyond the Alps. The town of Massilia had been on terms of 
close friendship with Rome since the time of the second Punic war. 
In 154 the Romans had defended it from its neighbours the Ligurian 
Oxybii ; and recently (in 125) the consul M. Fulvius Flaccus had 
been sent at its request and had won a great victor\- over another 
dangerous tribe, the Salluvii, inhabiting the country between Massilia 
and Antibes, who were joined by the \'ocontii living between the 
Isere and the Durance. Flaccus returned to celebrate his triumph 
in 123, and was succeeded by C. Sextms Calvinus, who was in Gaul 
for two years as proconsul, completed the conquest of the Salluvii, 
and founded the town called Aquae Sextiae. His successor Cn. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus finding a war going on between the Alio- 



CHAP. XXXVI THE CIMBRIAN INVASION 569 

broges and Aedui, espoused the cause of the latter and conquered 
the AUobroges at Vendahum (122). He remained in Gaul during 
121-120 under the consul Q, Fabius Maximus, and two victories 
were gained over the AUobroges and Arverni {Aiiverg?ie). Bituitis 
king of the Arverni was captured and carried off to Italy to adorn 
the consul's triumph, and imprisoned at Alba Fucentia. The large The 
district of southern Gaul between the Alps on the east and the Provitice, 
Cevennes and upper Garonne on the west, as far north as the lake '''^'^• 
of Geneva to the coast of the gulf of Lyons and the Pyrenees, was 
formed into a province, and in 1 1 8 a colony of Roman citizens was 
founded at Narbo, under the title of Narbo Martins, to be its capital. 
The province was called in general terms Gallia Transalpina or Gallia 
Narbonensis — or simply the Province, as opposed to other parts of 
Transalpine Gaul, a name which has survived in the modern Provence. 
Massilia with its dependencies was not under the governor of the 
Province, but remained a libera civitas in alliance with Rome, though 
much of its commercial prosperity was transferred to Narbo, which 
the Romans took great pains to support. 

In other parts of the West also real or pretended disorders were The 
being suppressed. On the plea of their support of piracy Q. Caecilius Balearic 
Metellus in 123 subdued the Balearic islands (^Majorca T^ndi Mi7iorcci). '^^^o.nds. 
In 119 L. Caecilius Metellus conquered the Dalmatians, who were Dalmatae. 
accused of harrying the protected tribes of Illyricum. On a similar 
plea the Thracian Scordisci in Pannonia were attacked by the consul C. Scordisci. 
Porcius Cato, governor of Macedonia (114), who fell into an ambush and 
nearly lost his life in the course of the invasion. The Scordisci, how- 
ever, weie subdued two years later by the consul M. LiviusDrusus (112), 

But now a more terrible danger threatened Italy on the north- 
east. In 118 Q. Marcius Rex had subdued the Stoeni living near Stoeni. 
the Euganean hills between Verona and Padua ; but in 113 news 
was brought to Rome of a vast horde of barbarians who had 
arrived in the valley of the Drave, and were expected either 
\ to cross the Alps into Italy or to penetrate into Illyricum. The The 
nationality of the Cimbri, as these people were called, is still a Ctmbn. 
vexed question. The ancient writers are almost unanimous in calling 
them Celts, and what is known of their armour and customs points 
the same way and against classing them with Germans. It is 
scarcely doubtful, however, that they came from Jutland, and were 
now wandering, for what cause beyond their restless nature we do 
not know, in search of fresh settlements. The consul Cn. Papirius Defeat of 
Carbo (113) went into Noricum to meet them and sustained a severe C^- 
defeat near Noreia, the modern Neuiiiakt in Styria. In the next J^Pp"^ 
eight years, joined by the Teutones on the borders of the Gallic Noreia, 
province and by the Tigurini in Switzerland, they hung like a cloud iij. 



570 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Defeat of 
the consul 
Cn. 

Manlius 
and the 
proconsul 

Q. 

Servilius 
Caepio in 
Gallia 
Trans- 
alpina, 

lOJ. 

Five 

consecutive 

consulships 

of Gaius 

Marius, 

104-100. 



The 

Jugurthine 

7var, 

J 1 2-/06. 



upon the northern frontier of Italy, and defeated one consular com- 
mander after another who were sent to bar their progress. The 
consul M. Junius Silanus was beaten by them in 109. L. Cassius 
Longinus was defeated and slain by the Tigurini in 107. The 
consul Q. Servilius Caepio took Tolosa {Toulouse) in 106, which 
had sided with the invaders, and plundered the stores of gold kept 
in its temples ; but in the next year, as proconsul, with the consul Cn. 
Manlius, he sustained a terrible defeat, losing his camp and 80,000 
men, besides vast numbers of camp followers. The country between 
the Rhone and Pyrenees was now at the invaders' mercy, and hav- 
ing glutted themselves with its spoils, they crossed the mountains 
into Spain, but were repulsed by the Celtiberi and returned into 
Gaul. The Cimbri now left the Province in the hands of the 
Teutones and Ambrones to make their way into Italy from the 
west ; while they themselves, in whole or in part, moved to the east 
and prepared to enter Italy down the valley of the Athesis {Adtge\ 
the two hosts intending to meet in Gallia Cisalpina. Thus Italy 
was being threatened on two sides, and the alarm was so great at 
Rome that Gaius Marius, who after the capture of Jugurtha 
had remained as proconsul in Numidia in 105, was elected consul 
in his absence for 104, and four times in succession after that year, 
in spite of all constitutional rules. He was the champion and 
nominee of the popular party : and the continuous power thus given 
him was a measure, not only of the terror prevailing, but of the 
distrust entertained of the ability or honesty of the aristocratic 
magistrates, who had failed in Numidia and against the Cimbri alike. 
To understand how Marius, a man of humble birth, without wealth 
or political connexions, had risen to this position we must follow the 
course of the war against Jugurtha, begun in the third year after the 
advent of the Cimbri was first reported at Rome. 

Masannasa died in 149, leaving his kingdom of Numidia to his 
three sons Micipsa, Gulussa, Mastanabal, who divided the royal 
functions according to an arrangement made by Scipio Aemilianus. 
Before long the two latter died, and Micipsa reigned alone till i 1 8, 
when he bequeathed his dominions to his two sons Adherbal and 
Hiempsal, and joined with them a natural son of his brother Mas- 
tanabal, whom he had adopted. 1 This was Jugurtha, who had served 

1 Masannasa ob. 149 



Micipsa ob. 118 



Gulussa 

I 



Mastanabal 

I 



Adherbal 
killed at Cirta 



Hiempsal 
killed 118-117 
at Thermida 



Massiva 

murdered in 

Rome no 



Hiempsal 
ob.after 62 

I 
Juba ob. 46 



Jugurtha Cauda 



xxxvi THE CRIMES OF JUGURTHA 571 

in the siege of Numantia, and had returned home with a strong letter 
of recommendation from Scipio. He had the quaHties to win favour, character 
and the cunning to conceal his unscrupulous ambition till the time of 
came to gratify it. First in all manly exercises, in the chase and Jugurtha. 
the field of battle, he indulged in no idleness or luxury, and boasted 
of no success. He was older than his cousins and co-heirs, and had 
secretly resolved to reign without them, acting it is said on hints 
from Roman nobles, whose acquaintance he had made at Numantia, 
that any favour could be got at Rome for money. Disagreements 
as to the division of the royal treasures soon gave him a pretext. 
Hiempsal was murdered by his orders in his house at Thermida ; Murder of 
and Adherbal hurriedly sending off legates to Rome to denounce Hiempsal. 
this crime, after a faint show of resistance, took refuge in the Roman 
, province, and thence went in person to Rome to plead his cause. 
The kingdom of Numidia, enlarged by the addition of most of the 
kingdom of Syphax as far west as the river Mulucha, and consider- 
able portions of the old dominions of Carthage, had been held in 
I nominal independence by Masannasa, but in a close alliance with 
( Rome, which gave the Romans a right of interference in regard to 
' its foreign relations, and practically in the form of its government. 
: Since this reconstruction at the end of the second Punic war, it 
I had become a favourite field of commercial enterprise, and its capital 
! Cirta was full of Roman negociatores engaged in the African trade. 
< The Romans therefore had every motive for keeping Numidia in a 
j state of peace and strictly subordinate to their authority. 
j There could be no doubt of Jugurtha's crime and of the justice Legates 

of Hiempsal's case. But legates from the crafty Numidian appeared f^°^^^ 
I in Rome laden with money: and, instead of calling Jugurtha to account, ^o^^i^t^yact 
i the Senate named ten commissioners to proceed to Numidia and Hiempsal 
\ divide the country between the two. The head of this commission by bribery, 
i was L. Opimius, who as consul in 1 2 1 had made himself conspicuous ^^7- 
\ in the punishment of the adherents of Gains Gracchus. He and 
I others of the commission seem undoubtedly to have received bribes 
,j from Jugurtha. They awarded him the wealthier and more warlike 
\ share, including what was afterwards called Mauretania Caesariensis, 
■I while to Adherbal was given Numidia proper, with its capital Cirta. 
i But no division made by the commissioners was likely to last. Jugurtha's 
\ Adherbal was of a quiet and unwarlike disposition ; Jugurtha policy of 
\ vigorous and ambitious, a splendid soldier, and restrained by no fear ^'I^j^^^^j 
i or scruple. He purposely irritated Adherbal by depredations on JJJ.J12. ' 
\ his frontiers, returned insulting answers to his expostulations, and 
forced him to take up arms. The cousins met near Cirta, into which 
Adherbal was soon forced to retreat. There Jugurtha closely be- 
sieged him, though he was able to despatch messengers to Rome to 



572 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Siege of 
Cirta. 
Two 

embassies 
frotn Rovie 
fail to 
induce 
Jugio-tha to 
raise it, 



Death 
of Adher- 
bal. 

Massacre 
of Italians. 

War 

declared 
against 
Jug7irtha, 

IJ2-TII. 
L. 

Calpttrnius 
Destia in 
Numidia 
is bribed by 
Jngjirtha, 
I J I. 



Sp. 

Postumius 
Albimis, 
iio-iog. 



Jugicrtha 
in Ro7ne. 



lay his wrongs again before the Senate. Legates were sent to Africa ; 
but Jugurtha was ready with specious pleas, asserting that Adherbal 
had conspired against his life, and that he was only acting in self- 
defence. Whether from corruption or conviction, the Roman legates 
quitted Africa without having induced him to raise the siege. A 
despairing letter from Adherbal moved a party in the Senate to vote 
for instant war ; but the senators in the king's interest, or who honestly 
thought, as some may have done, that he had made out a case for 
himself, proved the stronger ; and as a compromise another legation 
of men of higher rank headed by M, Scaurus, \\i^ princeps senahis, 
was sent, who summoned Jugurtha to appear before them at Utica. 
He listened to the threatening message of the Senate, but did not 
break up the siege of Cirta ; and the second embassy left Africa 
without having effected more than the first. Adherbal, in despair, 
followed the advice of the Roman residents in that city, and sur- 
rendered on terms. But Jugurtha cared little for engagements of 
any sort. Adherbal was immediately put to death, and the inhabitants 
massacred without distinction between Numidians and Italians. 

The tribune C. Memmius denounced the intrigues of the nobles 
whereby Jugurtha had enjoyed immunity so long, and the Senate no 
longer ventured to oppose the popular sentiment. It was forced for 
shame to assign the ' province ' of Numidia to one of the consuls 
designate, L. Calpurnius Bestia ; to sanction the enrolment of an 
army ; and to decline receiving Jugurtha's son and other legates 
unless they brought an unconditional surrender. Bestia began the 
campaign with spirit, took several towns, and a large number of 
prisoners. But presently, along with his legatus Scaurus, he succumbed 
to the temptation of Jugurtha's gold, and admitted him to make an 
open and formal surrender, which left him practically in full posses- 
sion of his territories, while the Roman army remained inactive 
in its quarters. Again Memmius denounced this scandalous trans- 
action ; and in iio, on the proposal of the tribune C. Mamilius, a 
tribunal was appointed to determine who had received bribes from 
Jugurtha. Bestia and many others were condemned, though Scaurus 
escaped by getting himself nominated one of the three qiiaesitores. 
The conduct of the war was meanwhile given to the consul Spurius 
Albinus, who made haste to take over his command, but, when 
obliged to return to Rome for the elections, had done nothing. The 
scandal had been so great, that the praetor L. Cassius had been sent 
in IIO to bring Jugurtha under a safe-conduct to Rome, to give 
evidence as to those who had taken his money. He still found that 
he was able to gain support by the same means ; but was obliged to 
fly secretly from the city when it became known that the young prince 
Massiva, a son of Gulussa then residing in Rome, whom Albinus 



METELLUS AND JUGURTHA 573 



proposed to set up as king of Numidia, had been assassinated by his Murder of 

order. In the absence of Albinus from Numidia, his brother Aulus, Massiva. 

whom he had left in command, made an expedition in January 

of 109, and met with such severe . disaster that he was forced to 

make a disgraceful treaty with Jugurtha, and to withdraw his army Treaty of 

into the Province. Albinus hurried back, but found the army too Aulus. 

much demoralised to do anything effectual. The Senate repudiated 

the treaty of Aulus : but no hope of prosecuting the war with any 

good result remained, unless some one should take the command 

who was at once able and incorruptible. 

Such a man was Q. CaeciHus Metellus, who in the summer Q. 
of that year took over the army of Albinus. He found it in a CaeciHus 
disgraceful state of disorder, and would attempt nothing until by ' f . ':^ ^'^ 
expelling from the camp all the ministers of luxury, and forcing \q„ 
the soldiers to regular and severe labours, he had restored it to 
a state of efficiency. The report of his incorruptibility induced 
Jugurtha to offer submission on condition of his own and childrens' 
lives being secured. Metellus, without giving any answer, tried 
to persuade the ambassadors by promises of great rewards to sur- 
render Jugurtha ; and meanwhile marched into Numidia, ably 
supported by his legate Gains Marius, who was in command of the 
cavalry. Jugurtha attempted to cut him off by occupying a strong Battle of 
position above the river Muthul, but was defeated with great loss, the river 
and forced to take refuge in a wild country covered with forest and -^^^^thut. 
rock, and could do nothing but attack detached parties of the Roman 
army, keeping to the hills and avoiding a pitched battle. After 
devastating Numidia and occupying many towns, Metellus finally 
laid siege to Zama, — the " citadel of Numidia." Zama, however, 
proved for the present impregnable, and Metellus put his army into 
winter quarters in the Province, leaving garrisons in the towns which 
he had taken. During the winter Jugurtha was persuaded by 
Bomilcar,— the assassin of Massiva, whom Metellus had worked 
on by promising him impunity for his crime, — to again offer a 
submission. But the negotiation fell through on the question of Fruitless 
a personal surrender ; and when the season for campaigning ^egotta- 
came again, Metellus set out to recapture Vaga, the inhabitants 
of which had during the winter surprised and massacred the 
Roman garrison, leaving none alive but the commander T. Turpilius 
Silanus. This accomplished, he proceeded to attack Jugurtha, who 
having discovered that Bomilcar was tampering with his most 
intimate friends, and that he could trust hardly any one about him, 
was moving from place to place with restless haste. Where 
Jugurtha commanded himself his men stood firm, but the rest were 
easily put to flight ; and he was forced to make his way over the 



574 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Jugurtha 
again de- 
feated ; 
joins 
Bocchus, 
spring of 
io8. 



Gains 

Marius 

consul. 



Previous 
career of 
Marius. 



His con- 
nexion 
■with 
Metellus. 



desert to Thala, where Metellus followed him. With his children 
and treasure he escaped by night, and the town fell into the hands 
of Metellus, though not till after a siege of forty days. Meanwhile 
Jugurtha had made his way across the desert to the country of the 
Gaetuli, where his money enabled him to get soldiers, and where he 
was near enough to the western Mauretania to negotiate with king 
Bocchus. The two agreed to march together upon Cirta, near which 
Metellus was now encamped, having detached a part of his army to 
secure Leptis. Thus the year io8 was wearing away, and while 
encamped at Cirta Metellus learnt that the third year of office decreed 
him by the Senate, in which he hoped to finish the war, was not to 
be his, but was to fall to the new consul Gaius Marius in circum- 
stances peculiarly galling to his pride. 

Gaius Marius, born near Arpinum in 157 of parents in humble 
circumstances, had risen slowly in political life, which he appears to 
have been encouraged to enter upon by L. Caecilius Metellus, consul 
in 119, to whose family his own had been in some way attached as 
chents. He first distinguished himself when serving at Numantia 
under Scipio Africanus the younger, who is said to have pointed him 
out half-playfully as the man likely to succeed himself as a military 
commander in case of great national danger. It was not, however, 
till five years after his return from Spain that he ventured to stand 
for office. In 1 19 he was tribune, and during that year carried a law, 
of which we do not know the terms, intended in some way to secure 
purity in elections. The Senate passed a decree against the law 
being brought before the people ; but Marius threatened to imprison 
both the consuls unless they withdrew the decree, as being an inter- 
ference with the liberty of a tribune, and the law was passed. Though 
he had won popular favour by this boldness, he failed to secure the 
next step in official rank, the aedileship, and was only returned at the 
bottom of the list of the praetors for 115. His year of office as praetor 
added nothing to his reputation ; but being propraetor in farther 
Spain in 1 1 4-1 13, he showed energy in putting down brigandage and 
civilising his province ; and about this time acquired some additional 
social position by marrying lifia, of the aristocratic family of the 
Caesars, and aunt to the future dictator. In naming him as one of 
his legati in the African war, Metellus no doubt imagined that he was 
selecting a useful officer, who had given evidence of energy and 
respectable ability, and who at the same time was attached to his 
own family by traditional ties ; but he had no idea that he was on a 
par with himself, or likely to interfere with his commission in Africa. 
It was a shock to him therefore when during the winter of 109-108 
Marius applied for leave to go home to stand for the consulship. He 
had been promised the highest honours by fortune tellers, and had 



or 



XXXVI MARIUS CONSUL AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 575 

been secretly preparing for it for some time by gaining the good-will 
of the soldiers. Strict in discipline, he had shown that readiness 
to share in their toils, hardships, and rough fare, which, when com- 
bined with undoubted courage and military skill, is sure to secure 
their allegiance. He had let it be known also that he believed more 
energy might have been shown in pursuing Jugurtha, and that he would 
undertake to finish the war in a very short time. Metellus received 
the application with indignant surprise. In the tone of an indulgent 
superior he advised Marius to abandon a measure which could only 
result in mortification ; and finally, when he could not persuade him, 
said sarcastically that it would be time enough for him to think of 
standing for the consulship when his son, the young Metellus, then 
twenty, serving on his father's staff, did the same. However Marius Marius 
continually repeated his request, which had at last to be granted. ^^^^ ^^ 

He arrived in Rome when the inquiry under the lex Mamilia /^^ / 

• 1 • r -i stand jc 

mto the corruption of the officers in the previous part of the war was ffig consul 

still involving the nobility in grave scandal, and giving the popular ship. 
party a strong case against them. He had taken care also that he 
should be preceded by letters from merchants and soldiers complain- 
ing of the dilatory proceedings of Metellus ; and from Cauda, a son 
of Mastanabal, whose pretensions to be treated as a royal personage 
had been slighted by Metellus, and who had received Marius' promise 
of supporting his claim to the throne in the future. The popular 
feeling thus roused overbore all opposition from the nobles. Not lo-j. Coss. 
only was Marius returned for the consulship by all the centuries, ^- Casstus 
but a plebiscitum also gave him the command in Numidia, which Q^fu^^^' 
overrode the Senatorial decree already passed continuing the im- Marius. 
perium of Metellus. We have seen how Metellus was informed of 
this when almost in the presence of the enemy. He was so deeply 
mortified that, when Marius arrived, he deputed one of his legati to 
hand over the army to him, and returned to Rome with the feelings 
of a disgraced man. To his surprise he was received with every 
honour, and no objection was made to his triumph or his cognomen 
of Numidicus. It was not against him personally that the prejudice 
had grown, but against the supremacy of a class which had shown 
itself unworthy. 

Marius had openly spoken of his success as a blow to the nobles, Marius 
and his consulship as a spoil taken in war with them. Nevertheless ■^^J^f'^^^ 
the Senate did not venture to refuse him a supplejnenlum for the Africa. 
legions, or anything else he asked. They even hoped that his activity 
in pressing men into his service would ruin his popularity. But the 
result was the reverse. He induced veterans to re-enlist ; he made a 
point of selecting Latins of tried courage without regard to their 
possessing full citizenship ; and instead of formally convening the 



576 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



His inno- 
vations in 
enrolling 
his armv. 



Marius in 
Africa, 

lOJ. 



Capture of 
Caps a. 



Capture of 
the royal 
fort on the 
Mulucha. 



L. 

Cornelius 

Sulla. 



centuries in the Campus Martius, and selecting from the five classes, 
he received all who volunteered, whether rated up to the standard of 
the fifth class or no. This reform was maintained ; the number of 
needy citizens ready and fit for service had no doubt much increased 
as land became more and more concentrated in few hands, and it was 
imperative to find some employment for them ; but by it almost the last 
shred of the old theory of a citizen soldiery serving as a public duty 
was torn away. Men enlisted as in a profession, expecting to live on 
pay and plunder, and to be maintained afterwards by grants of land ; 
and in the revolutionary times now drawing near, these men, anxious 
to join any army, or as veterans willing to return to the only employ- 
ment for which they were fit, were a ready material for any leader 
who could find them pay or offer hopes of plunder. 

For the present all went well. Marius found plenty of volunteers, 
even more than the number he was authorised to levy ; and soon 
after he had entered on his consulship arrived at Utica and took over 
the army. He at once led them into a rich district, gratified them 
with booty, and set them the comparatively easy task of capturing 
forts and small towns, whose garrisons weitc too weak to resist. But 
while thus apparently indulging his soldiers he kept the most vigilant 
look-out for all chances. Jugurtha and Bocchus had not ventured to 
await his attack, but had retired in different directions, hoping to find 
some opportunity of catching him off his guard. But Marius beat 
Jugurtha at his own tactics, and eventually in a skirmish near Cirta 
forced him to throw away his arms and fly. Bocchus was already 
trying to make peace for himself But Marius would listen to nothing. 
He determined that to finish the war Jugurtha must be deprived of 
every stronghold. By a movement of extraordinary rapidity he seized 
Capsa, a strong position near the Tritonian lake, and one of the 
royal treasure cities, which he burnt, killing or selling all its inhabitants. 
He followed this up by a series of assaults upon other cities and forts, 
until he reached another depot of the royal treasure in the far west, 
on the river Mulucha, which separated the dominions of Jugurtha and 
Bocchus. 

This fortress, perched on a high rock, proved more difficult than 
Capsa. He was on the point of retiring, when a way up the rock 
was discovered accidentally by a Ligurian soldier gathering some 
edible snails on its side. Thus far, therefore, his success had been 
sufficient ; but the great object of capturing Jugurtha was apparently 
as far off as it had been in the time of Metellus. He was now, how- 
ever, joined by his quaestor L. Sulla, who had stayed behind to enrol 
cavalry from the Italian allies, and arrived just after the capture of 
the fort on the Mulucha. Though inexperienced in war, and nineteen 
years younger than Marius, his abilities and vigour quickly made him 



XXXVI CAPTURE OF JUGURTHA 577 

beloved and respected by the soldiers and valued by his chief. They Jvgurtha 
soon had an opportunity of testing their powers. Jugurtha had per- ^^^ 
suaded Bocchus by a promise of a large part of his dominions to join .^"J^.^ J^ 
him again, and the two kings reappeared in force towards the end of Romans 
the year 107, and swept down upon the Roman camp with unexpected near Ciria, 
suddenness. The attack was repulsed and the armies of the kings ^^^^ ^"^ ^^7- 
dispersed, but only to gather again. Following the march of the 
Romans towards their winter quarters, they fell upon their rear when 
close to Cirta. Once more the Romans were all but defeated, and 
Jugurtha brandishing a bloody svvord exclaimed loudly that he had 
killed Marius with his own hand. The lie was presently confuted by 
the appearance of Marius himself, who came from the van to support Victory of 
his wavering rearguard, and a brilliant charge of Sulla's cavalry upon Manus 
the Mauri decided the result of the day, Jugurtha was surrounded 
as he was frantically endeavouring to rally his men to complete what 
he thought was a victory, and escaped almost alone through the darts t 

of the enemy. 

The result of these engagements induced Bocchus once more to Winter of 
try to make his peace with Rome, even at the price of betraying his ^07-106. 
ally. As soon as the king's legates reached him in Cirta, Marius 
despatched L. Sulla and A. Manlius to visit Bocchus, who assured 
them of his devotion. He obtained permission to send plenipotentiaries 
to Rome, who expatiated on the king's repentance, and obtained a 
rather grudging decree admitting him to friendship and alliance. 
Bocchus then begged that Sulla, whose winter quarters were at Utica, Bocchus 
should again visit him. Even then he appears to have been hesi- ''"•'^^^^ 
tating and to have been negotiating with Jugurtha. But the firm tone 
and uncompromising spirit of Sulla at length prevailed, and Bocchus 
consummated his treachery by inducing Jugurtha to meet him and Sulla 
in conference, letting Jugurtha imagine that he meant to put Sulla in 
his hands, as a hostage whose high birth and estimation at Rome 
would give him the greatest advantage in treating. Jugurtha had Jugurtha a 
suggested this treachery, and it was turned upon himself. He came Z^"^^^''- 
to the conference, unarmed and with few attendants, was surrounded 
by troops and handed over to Sblla, who took him and his son to 
Marius. 

The news that this dangerous enemy was in chains, and was to 
be brought to Rome to adorn a triumph, caused great exultation ; and Mai-ius 
when in 105 — during which year Marius still remained in Africa comma.7ider 
with his army — the defeat of Manlius and Caepio by the Cimbri made ^^^^■^. ^ ^ 
it imperative to find a general whom they could trust, the eyes of all 
turned to Marius, and he was elected consul in his absence, in spite 
j of the law, and bidden to return to save his country. 

He entered Rome in triumph on the same day as he took up his 

2 P 



578 



HISTORY OF ROME 



104. 

Mariiis 
triumphs, 
and takes 
thejield 
against 
the Cimbri. 



Marius 
consul 
third 
time, lOj. 



Marius 
fourth time 



cofisul, 
102. 



The battle 
of Aquae 
Sextiae, 
102 
{autumn). 



First day. 



second consulship, the ist of January 104. Jugurtha and his two 
sons were led in the procession, and afterwards thrust into the vault 
of the Mamertine prison and left to starve. The ceremonies usually 
performed at the beginning of a new consulship being over, Marius 
advanced towards Gaul to meet the threatened invasion of the Cimbri 
and Teutones. But the barbarians were engaged in their fruitless 
expedition into Spain, and had not come into contact with him 
when his year of office was drawing to a close ; and he was elected 
a third time in his absence, and spent yet another year in waiting 
for the enemy. He had to return to Rome to hold the elections at 
the end of 103, his colleague Orestes having died. He pretended 
to deprecate re-election ; but easily gave way before the reproaches 
of the tribune L. Saturninus, — who declared that, if he refused, he 
would be a traitor to his country, — and was returned with Q. Lutatius 
Catulus for the fourth time. The great storm was now ready to 
burst. The Teutones and Ambrones were in southern Gaul, and 
were ready to make their way into Italy along the coast ; while a 
vast horde of Cimbri were entering in the east by the Brenner pass. 
Marius commanded in Transalpine Gaul : Catulus in Cisalpine Gaul 
near Verona. 

The first to move were the Teutones and Ambrones : and Marius 
now crossed the Alps and posted himself strongly on the lower Rhone, 
securing his communication with the sea by digging a canal through 
the alluvial deposits at the mouth of the river. Through the 
summer he kept his men employed in such laborious works, and 
refused to be tempted to give the enemy battle till he could do so to 
advantage, in spite of the murmuring among his soldiers, who were 
eager to try their strength against the barbarians under a leader 
whom they trusted. The Teutones encouraged by what seemed his 
timidity grew more insolent, and even attempted to storm his camp. 
Failing in that, they resolved to pass him by and enter Italy. 
For six days, it is said, their vast host filed past in view of the 
Roman army, some of them so near that they could shout jeeringly 
to the men on the vallum, asking if they had any messages for their 
wives at Rome. But as soon as they had passed, Marius broke 
up his camp and followed. He found them encamped near Aquae 
Sextiae, about sixteen miles north of Marseilles, and only a few 
days' march from the pass into Italy, and determined to give them 
battle there. The barbarians were in possession of the stream, and 
when his men complained of want of water Marius pointed to their 
camp, and said that they could get it there but would have to pay 
for it with blood. The first day's battle was in fact brought on by 
struggles for the water, in which the Ambrones were cut to pieces or 
chased to their lager of waggons ; in defending which the women 



XXXVI DESTRUCTION OF TEUTONES AND CIMBRI 579 

fought as desperately as the men, clinging to the shields and spears 
of the Romans, and enduring wounds and blows with the bravest. 
At nightfall the ground was thickly strewn with dead Ambrones : but 
the Teutones were still collected in vast numbers ; and the night was 
made hideous by their yells over the dead, mixed with war cries and 
threatening shouts. Next day, however, C. Marcellus with 3000 Secondday. 
men made his way through rough ground to some hills on their rear. 
The barbarians tried to carry this position, but were driven back 
and found Marius with his main army waiting for them in the plain, 
while Marcellus charged down upon them from the hills. They 
were defeated with a slaughter so immense as to amount to almost 
annihilation. More than 100,000 are said to have fallen ; and the Great 
plains on which they lay produced an extraordinary harvest for some slaughter of 
seasons afterwards, while the Massilians are said to have used the Teuto7ies. 
I bleaching bones to fence their vineyards. Even now remnants of 
the battle are found, and the village of les Pourrieres {putridi) recalls 
the memory of the slaughter. 

The battle had taken place late in 1 02, and while Marius was cele- Marius 
brating his victory by burning a huge pile of spoil which could not J^P^ ti»ie 
I be removed, couriers brought the news that the consular elections ^'^'"^^'^> 
I were over, and that he had been returned a fifth time. The province 
in Transalpine Gaul being thus secured, he returned to Rome with 
j his army to enter on his consulship and to consult as to the danger 
, still threatening in the north-east. Catulus had not been able to pre- Defeat of 
I vent the Cimbri from crossing the Brenner ; and in the spring of loi Catulus 
j they had descended upon his position on the Adige, somewhere ^f^'^ 
\ between the lago di Garda and Verona, with such fury that he had ^^^ 
1 to retreat beyond the Po. Marius at once started to his assistance, 
* met him marching up the Po, like Prince Eugene in 1706, and 
i crossing that river found the Cimbri near Vercellae, whither they 
' had come after ravaging the plains of Lombardy, expecting to 
I meet their allies the Teutones and Ambrones, whose destruction 
! at Aquae Sextiae they do not seem to have known. They tried at 
I first to negotiate, and sent messengers to Marius asking for land 
in which to settle for themselves and their brethren the Teutones. 
J " You need not trouble yourselves about your brothers," replied 
I Marius grimly, " they have got land which they will never have to 
! surrender." He also showed the legates some of the Teutonic chiefs, 
j who had been stopped in their flight by the Sequani, and handed over ^^^/^ ^y- 
] to him. " It was a pity they should go away without greeting their July loi, 
brethren," he said. When the Cimbric king challenged him to single battle 
combat at a fixed time and place, he replied that it was not the habit 
of the Romans to allow their enemies to name the time or place at T/^/^ 
which they were to fight. He would however engage to meet Vercellae. 



on 
the 
Raudian 

s jiear 



58o HISTORY OF ROME chap, xxxvi 

him on the third day on the plains of Vercellae. On these plains — 
called the Raudian plains— the battle took place, in which the 
Cimbri in their turn were annihilated. It is useless to try to name 
exact numbers, and the calculations vary between 200,000 and 
100,000. The horde was utterly destroyed, and the women killed 
themselves with their children, although many thousands of both 
sexes were also taken alive and sold into slavery. Catulus, with 
whom Sulla was now serving, regarded the credit of the battle to be 
chiefly his, and complained that Marius had by his dispositions en- 
deavoured to deprive him of his due share of the glory. Popular 
sentiment, however, was on the side of Marius. He was offered two 
triumphs, but would only accept one, and that in conjunction with 
Catulus. The danger that had been overshadowing Italy for twelve 
years, the forerunner of many similar terrors in generations to come, 
was dispelled. It had had the effect among other things of raising a 
mere soldier to the highest position in the State. The events which 
followed showed how little capable he was as a politician of directing 
the fortunes of the country, which he had known how to protect as a 
general. 

Authorities.— Sallust, Jugurtha, Livy, Ep. 62, 64-67. Velleius ii. 11, 12. 

Diodorus fr. of xxxv. Plutarch, Marius, Sulla. Orosius v. 15, 16. Florus iii. 

3. Strabo vii. 2 (for the Cimbri^. Die Cassius fr. 88, 89. Eutrop. iv. 26, 27. 
Appian fr. of res Numidicae. 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

THE FIRST PERIOD OF CIVIL WARS, IOO-84 

Political parties at Rome— The Senate and the equestrian order— Frequent scenes 
of violence— Marius and the reformed army— The second tribunate of L 
Appuleius Saturninus— Murder of Nonius— Agrarian law of Saturninus and 
banishment of Metellus— Murder of xMemmius— Death of Saturninus and 
Glaucia (100)— Events abroad from 102 to 92— The lex Licinia Marcia and 
alienation of the Italians (95)- Compromises proposed by M. Livius Drusus 
(91) — Death of Drusus— Prosecutions of Varius — The Marsic or Social 
war (90-88)— Sulla consul with command of the Mithridatic war— Revolu- 
tionary proposals of Sulpicius and the substitution of Marius for Sulla— Sulla 
advances on Rome— Death of Sulpicius and flight of Marius (88)— Cinna 
consul in 87— Expelled from Rome, raises army and returns with Marius— Reign 
of terror in Rome— Death of Marius in his seventh consulship (86)— Suc- 
cessive consulships of Cinna, persecution of the party of Sulla, and preparations 
to prevent Sulla's return (85-84)— Death of Cinna (84). 

The division between the parties of the Optimates and Popiilares was Political 
now becoming more clearly defined and more bitter. The reaction Parties at 
after the legislation of Gains Gracchus had brought back some of the ^"'^^' *^^ 
old evils in an acuter form. Land was falling again into the hands anT"''^^' 
of great proprietors, and poverty was on the increase — abundant "poj^ulares 
material for political discontent. The Senate was becoming miserably 
weak and discredited, its numbers sinking,i and its authority flouted 
by magistrates who obtained office by the influence of family cliques 
and wished to be unrestrained in it. Moreover on the question of the Tke Senate 
judicia in public trials it was constantly estranged from the equestrian "^"'^ ^^^ 
order, which accordingly, for the most part, threw its influence on ^^J-^^^^'^'^ 
the side of the Populares. The chief aims of the leaders of the """^ ^''' 
Populares were to break down the monopoly of office maintained by 
the great families ; to reform the administration; and to widen the 
basis of power by removing the barriers which at present separated 
Italian and Roman. But in order to carry their followers with them, 

1 Speaking of the period about 100 and 95, Appian says that the number of 
the Senate could scarcely be kept up to 300 {Bell. Civ. i. 35). 



582 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Constant 
scenes of 
violence. 



Position of 
Marius. 



His 

refortns in 
the army, 
107-102. 



Capite 
censi and 
Italians 
admitted to 
the legions. 



who especially in the last point were jealous and suspicious, they had 
to satisfy the immediate demands for relief suggested by the wants 
and difficulties of the time. This complexity of interests helps to 
account for the bitterness of opposition on the part of the Optimates 
on questions apparently subordinate, and for the sudden desertion of 
their followers sometimes experienced by the popular leaders. Mean- 
while the scandals and failures of the oligarchical government were 
increasing ; and the reform, which Sulla afterwards sought in strengthen- 
ing the Senate and curbing the power of the tribunes, the leaders of 
the Populares tried to accomplish by severer laws, frequent prosecu- 
tions, and by putting the administration more directly in the hands 
of the people. 

But the violence which was becoming more and more common at 
elections and meetings for legislation showed clearly that in the end 
the question of supremacy would be decided by arms ; and it was 
therefore success in war, and the power of commanding the allegiance 
of the soldiers, that now marked out a man as chief of either party. 
Marius in many ways was ill-suited to the position of a political leader. 
The popular party had generally been led by some aristocrat of ability 
and eloquence, who espoused its side from conviction or from per- 
sonal quarrels with his own equals ; Marius belonged by birth to the 
lower class of farmers, and had no gift of elocjuence to make up for his 
lack of social influence or political insight. But he had the confidence 
of soldiers, and by the changes he had introduced in the army had 
made it a readier instrument in the hands of a party chief. Though 
his reforms were primarily intended to increase its effectiveness in 
the field, they resulted in the final disappearance of the notion of it 
as a citizen militia, in which the distinctions of civil life and the 
census determined the rank, arms, and place in the field of the men, 
who, though receiving pay, yet by a theory which had not Cjuite 
ceased to be a reality were also performing a necessary duty of citizen- 
ship. Marius raised the number of a legion to 6000, divided into 
ten cohorts, in which citizens — without regard to any property quali- 
fication — and Italian allies were freely admitted. Once become 
members of a legion all distinction disappeared : the old division of 
hastati, principes, and triarii was dropped, and the men were arranged 
on the field according to the will of the commander. When so 
arranged, generally in the old triple order, these names were still used 
to describe them, but they no longer marked a different rank in the 
legion, or indicated the men who were necessarily to form these 
divisions. The velites, as part of a legion, also disappeared, their 
place being taken by foreign troops, slingers, archers, and the like 
from Crete, the Balearic Isles, and other places. The rule that the 
Roman cavalry should consist of men drawn from the eighteen 



MARIUS AND SATURNINUS 583 



centuries of equites had long been falling into disuse. They The 
were the richest men of the State, with no special aptitude for equites 
their work, were insubordinate, and a difficulty to the commander. ^^^^^ f^ 
Instead of them cavalry was levied from Gaul or other places, and "^^^ 
the equites were only employed as a cohors praetoria — staff and cavalry. 
bodyguard of the imperator — -iiito which he admitted his friends and 
sometimes promoted legionaries. This praetorian cohort had been 
formerly represented by the c.xtraor dinar ii — certain of the socii 
(cavalry or infantry) selected for this service by the commander, 
along with his own friends who volunteered. Thus Scipio in the 
Numantine war had a body of 500, all volunteers or personal 
friends, who did this duty ; and when the distinction between citizens 
and socii in the legion was done away wath, the praetorian cohort The cohors 
became a means whereby the rich equites, who declined to serve praetoria. 
with common soldiers, could perform the ten years' service necessary 
before being candidates for office. The anny thus became a paid body 
of men, who for the most part regarded service not as a temporary 
duty but as a profession ; and not being influenced by strong senti- 
ments of loyalty to the constitution or city, looked to its commander 
first, as securing them continuance of employment and grants of land 
afterwards, for which there was no provision in the law. And as the 
equality in the legion ignored the census, so did it tend to obliterate 
the distinction between citizen and Italian. Service in the army Citizenship 
became one of the means of obtaining citizenship, which Marius, for through the 
instance, on one occasion bestowed upon a thousand men of Camer- ^^^y- 
inum as a reward, excusing himself by saying that in the noise of 
arms he could not hear the laws. A farther step was taken when in 
the Social war he enrolled freedmen in the legions, who had hitherto, 
except at great crises, only served in the fleet. Other reforms attri- Effect of 
buted to him were in matters of detail, for the comfort or efficiency of refining. 
the soldiers. But taken as a whole they produced a different army, — 
recruited from all Italy, with auxiliaries furnished by the provinces 
and client states, and ready to follow its leader even against Rome 
itself. 

It was the knowledge that Marius might depend upon such an L. 
army that seems to have induced Saturninus, the next party leader Appuleitis 
and reformer of importance, to look to him as the most capable "^^^^- 

tltTtZlS 

leader of the popular party. L. Appuleius Saturninus, as quaestor quaestor, 
in 104, had Ostia as his "province" and the superintendence of the 104; 
corn supply. The Senate, thinking him remiss, superseded him and tribune, 
appointed M. Scaurus in his place. This or other reasons induced ^^^' 
him to join the opposition, by whose influence he became tribune in 
102. In his tribuneship he mortally offended the Optimates by his 
law of niajcsfas, under which he prosecuted Manlius and Caepio for 



584 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



A coalition 
of three, 
lor. 



Murder of 
Nonius. 



Agrarian 
law of 
Satur- 
ninus and 
the attack 
upon 
Metellus. 



Vacilla- 
tion of 
Marius, 



mismanagement in the Cimbrian war.i Metellus Numidicus, leader 
of the Optimates, would have retaliated by striking his name from 
the roll of senators, but was prevented by his colleague in the censor- 
ship ; and from this time Saturninus acted with the popular party, 
and, in order to carry out his policy, sought re-election to the tribunate 
for loo. For that year Marius also desired a sixth consulship, 
while another vehement member of the party, C. Servilius Glaucia, 
was a candidate for the praetorship. The three therefore united 
their interests with the idea, like that of the triumvirate of thirty 
years later, that by a simultaneous possession of the chief offices 
they would control the administration. But in loi Saturninus 
denounced and insulted the ambassadors of Mithridates for bribing 
senators. The accusation was very likely true ; but his opponents 
represented his conduct as a dangerous violation of the law of 
nations, and brought him to trial : and though the senatorial judges 
did not venture to condemn him in the face of the loudly expressed 
wishes of the multitude, yet he lost his election, and A. Nonius, 
who had been forward in denouncing him and Glaucia, was returned 
instead. On the evening of the election, however. Nonius was 
murdered, and Saturninus was named in his place. Marius and 
Glaucia also carried their elections, and the first point was thus 
gained. 

The first law proposed by Saturninus in his second tribuneship 
was for the division of the lands in Gallia Cisalpina, lately occupied 
by the Cimbri or their allies. It was sure to be opposed by the 
Optimates on the same grounds as other proposals for extra-Italian 
settlements of citizens. There may, perhaps, have also been in this 
case some scruple at treating as forfeited the lands of a province 
not guilty of any act of hostility. At any rate Saturninus anticipated 
resistance to the execution of his law, and added a special clause 
ordering every senator to take an oath of obedience to it under a 
heavy penalty. Marius as consul assured the Senate that he would 
not take such an oath ; but, when the law passed, immediately took it, 
and advised the Senate to do the same. One senator, however, was 
firm. It was known that Metellus Numidicus would decline the 
oath, and the hope of securing his civil ruin is said to have been the 



^ All crimes harming or diminishing in any way the Roman State were anciently 
included under the range oi perdue I lio. Thus Cn. Fulvius Flaccus was charged with 
perduellio in 211 for losing an army (Livy xxvi. 3). This seems now to have been 
superseded by majestas [crimen iniminutae jnajestatis P. R.), which might strike 
those magistrates who had incurred disasters and yet could not be brought under 
the laws de repetundis. Under the law of majestas the trial was before an 
ordinary court ; whereas cases of perduellio were decided by duoviri especially 
elected, with an appeal to the co?nitia, — an obsolete process revived by Caesar 
in the case of Rabirius in 63. 



xxxvii MURDER OF SATURNINUS 585 

motive for inserting the clause. Rejecting the offer of his friends 
to protect him with arms Metellus retired to Rhodes, and the usual 
interdictio aquae et igjiis was passed upon him. The new legislation 
then proceeded unchecked. Glaucia carried a law de repetimdis^ 
in which senators were more strictly barred than before from the 
judiciaj while Saturninus carried laws for new colonies in Sicily, Law of 
Achaia, and Macedonia, in which Italians were to share ; and for Satur- 
fixing the price of the pulDlic corn at five-sixths of an as for a modius, '^^'^"•^• 
instead of allowing it to vary with the market price. This last was 
carried, in a scene of some violence, in spite of a hostile decree of 
the Senate, of the intervention of his colleagues, and of a statement 
of the quaestor Q. Caepio that the exchequer could not support the 
expense. 

But while Saturninus had gained sufficient popularity to secure 
his re-election for 99, the conduct of Marius had brought him into 
contempt. He was politically extinct and had no chance of being 
elected again. Saturninus was all the more anxious, therefore, that 
the other member of the trio should succeed in his canvass for the 
consulship, although the law ordered an interval of a year between 
the praetorship and consulship. One of the candidates, M, Antonius, 
seems to have been certain of election : the rival of Glaucia was 
C. Memmius. Assassins were accordingly hired and Memmius Murder 
was got rid of by the dagger. Whether this was done quietly ox of C. 
in an election riot, Saturninus and Glaucia were universally beheved ^'^^«""- 

I to have been the instigators of it. A popular reaction set in 
against them : and finding their lives in danger they took refuge, 

I with some others of their party, on the Capitol. The Senate Death of 

I seized its advantage to pass the usual decree declaring them public -5^^^^- 

. 1-1 1-1 • 1 • ^ ^1 ntniLS and 

I enemies, and armmg the consuls with special powers against them. Qi^^^ia 

\ Marius was in a position of great embarrassment. The men were joo. 

I his friends and partisans ; yet he was not prepared to break 

^ entirely with the party of law and order, and to risk the loss of 

I what remained of his reputation as a statesman. He tried to play 

I a double game, admitting the emissaries of the Senate by one door 

j and those of the popular party by another. Finally he took the 

'necessary steps to arrest the conspirators, whom he yet hoped to 

I protect. He cut off the water pipes supplying the Capitol, and 

Saturninus and his friends were soon forced to surrender. To save 

Itheir lives he placed them in the Curia: but a mob of equites 

i broke in the door or untiled the roof and killed them — a murder of 

which the Senate expressed its approval by enfranchising a slave who 

claimed the honour of killing Saturninus ; though forty years later 

an eques named C. Rabirius was tried for it, at the instance of 

Caesar, and all but condemned. 



586 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Estimate of 
the policy 
of Satur- 



Marius 
goes to 
Asia. 



Laws of 

Satur- 

ninus 

suspended, 

99- 



Cilicia, 

I02. 

Spain, gj, 
Cyrene, 96. 



Alienation 
of the 
Italians, 
the lex 
Licinia et 
Miicia, 95. 



Setting aside the murders of Nonius and Memmius, which have 
rightly attached an evil reputation to Saturninus, there is a good deal 
to be said for him as a statesman. The Optimates hated him because 
he attacked and denounced the fraudulent and incompetent members 
of their body. In giving the Italians a share in the Gallic lands he 
risked his popularity to promote the enlightened policy of equalising 
them with the citizens ; and though his corn law was a financial 
mistake, it was a mistake shared in by many ; while his personal 
freedom from corruption is acknowledged by Cicero. The ominous 
feature in the conflict was the fact that such a policy as his could 
neither be promoted nor defeated without violence, disorder, and 
assassination. Unscrupulous partisans went beyond their leaders 
and hurried them on irresistibly, and the Senate was only too ready 
to employ the sharpest weapon which law or terror put into its 
hands. 

For the present the policy of the popular party was checked. 
Marius, with his credit on both sides utterly lost, left Rome for Asia 
on a votiva legatto, pretending that he must perform a vow to the Bona 
Dea, and endeavoured to find a new field for his warlike prowess by 
promoting the quarrels of Nicomedes and Mithridates. The colonies 
and the division of the Gallic lands under the laws of Saturninus 
were suspended, and Metellus was recalled. But the storm of pro- 
secutions went on : the scandals of the Jugurthine and Cimbric cam- 
paigns were not forgotten, and were followed by others as gross ; 
nor did any marked successes abroad help to cover the discredit of 
the governing class. The praetor M. Antonius had suppressed 
some piracies in Cilicia and reduced part of it to the form of a 
province (103-102), and T. Didius had fought some successful 
campaigns in Spain (97) : but the East was much neglected, and 
when Ptolemy Apion in 96 left Cyrene to the Romans, the 
Government would not undertake to form a new province. It con- 
tented itself with levying a tribute, and, declaring the cities free, left 
them to fight out their differences among themselves. 

Unsuccessful abroad, the policy of the Optimates was mischievous 
at home. We have seen that in various ways access to the citizen- 
ship was being opened to the Italians. If the process had been let 
alone, this privilege might perhaps have been quietly extended so as to 
embrace so large a number that the question would have solved itself. 
But in 95 the consuls L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucins Scaevola, both 
men of high character, and the latter a considerable jurist, determined 
on tightening the law, — a process which has often resulted in hastening 
the revolution which it is intended to prevent. The grants of consuls, 
military commanders, or leaders of colonies, — even colonies voted 
though never actually formed, — had it seems produced a number of 



THE PROPOSALS OF M. LIVIUS DRtJSUS 587 



citizens whose claim to that status would hardly bear a strict investi- 
gation. The consuls, perhaps from their devotion to jurisprudence, 
could not endure a process, however wholesome, which did not rest 
on a legal basis ; and they proposed a law establishing a com- 
mission for investigating such claims, and ordering all who had 
illegally assumed or acquired the citizenship to return to their own 
towns. No immediate outbreak took place, but there was a growing 
feeling among the Italians that they should either share the privileges 
of the Romans or separate entirely from them. Such a separation 
would not now, as in old times, mean the loss to Rome of so much 
foreign territory. The Italian cities were becoming part and parcel 
of the State ; the army was filled with Italians ; in every district, side 
by side with the unenfranchised, were living full citizens. A struggle 
between the two classes would in effect be a civil war. 

Such a struggle was now inevitable, and was actually brought Proposals 
about by the failure of an attempt to obviate it. One of the tribunes of th^ 

for 91, M. Livius Drusus, son of that Livius who had been employed l\ 'l'^.^ . 
1 1 o 1 • 1 ^ • ^ 1 ^ ^ M. Livius 

by the Senate to outbid Gams Gracchus, was a young man of great jjnisus gi. 

eloquence and virtue, who had already served with good reputa- 
tion as quaestor in Asia. By birth, tastes, and connexions he was 
allied to the Optimate party, from which in fact he never willingly 
separated, though he incurred the enmity of both parties alike. He 
saw that the cure for the dissatisfaction in Italy was to make it a 
united state without distinction of civil status. This was the main 
object of his policy, and to carry it out it was necessary to con- 
ciliate all orders in the State — Senate, equites, and poorer citizens. 
Like many who try by compromise to satisfy contending factions, 
he eventually dissatisfied all — became hated by the party of 
privilege, and but faintly trusted by those whose claims he wished to 
support. He first tried to put an end to the continued contest be- 
tween the Senate and equites as to the judicia by a compromise 
like that attributed to C. Gracchus by Plutarch. He proposed that 
to the Senate, then weakened both in credit and numbers, 300 
equites should be added, and that the list of jurors should be made 
up from the roll thus formed. Neither order was pleased. The 
existing senators thought that they v/ould be swamped by the new He dis- 
members, who would form a distinct party ; the equites thought satisfes all 
that the 300 would cease to have any sympathy with them, and that ^^^ ^^^' 
the measure only disguised their exclusion from the judicia. At the 
same time Livius attempted to gain to his side the urban populace by 
the usual proposition for increased distributions of corn, new colonies 
in Italy and Sicily, and assignments of land, many of which had been 
long ago voted — both on the proposal of his own father and on that of 
Saturninus, — and not carried out. The people, however, though glad 



588 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The Senate 
declare his 
laws 
invalid. 



Rumours 
of his 
treasonable 
practices. 



Death of 
Drusus, 



of these measures, were easily made suspicious by the knowledge that 
his ultimate purpose was to put the Italians on an equality with them- 
selves ; whilst the richer Italians, who had long occupied parts of the 
ager publicus., were alarmed at his proposed assignations of land, for 
they could not see where it was to come from without disturbing 
some of their own holdings. Thus he had incurred the enmity of 
Senate and equites, who for once combined against a common danger; 
while the Italians, whose interests he had at heart, were divided, the 
richer among them denouncing his laws, and joining with the 
publicani, who feared a loss of profit in the collection of the dues 
on the public lands. The laws for the distribution of corn, the 
colonies, and the judicia were however passed, but in violation of the 
lex Caecilia-Didia (98), which forbade miscellaneous propositions to 
be put in a block to the people, and in spite of some alleged defect 
in the auspices. The Senate accordingly declared them invalid. 
Drusus disregarded this vote, and was proceeding to carry them 
out, in spite of the wildest rumours by which it was sought to alarm 
the people. The old cry of course was raised that he aimed at 
kingly power. The very oath that was to be administered to the 
Italian allies binding them to follow him was handed about ; it was 
stated that 10,000 Marsians under Pompaedius Silo had been 
on their way to Rome to demand their rights in arms, until met 
and persuaded by C. Domitius to adopt more peaceful measures ; a 
plot to murder the consul Philippus at the feriae Lalinae on the 
Alban Mount had also, it was said, been known of by Drusus, 
though he had warned Philippus to be on his guard. Whatever 
foundation there may have been for such stories their circulation 
succeeded in bringing Drusus into suspicion. But that the hopes 
of the bulk of the Italians still rested on him was presently shown 
by the prayers for his recovery offered throughout Italy, when 
he suddenly fainted while speaking in the Forum, and was carried 
home insensible. He was subject, it is said, to the falling sickness 
{inorbiis coinitialis)^ some form of epilepsy, for which he had on one 
occasion gone to Anticyra to try the cure of the hellebore. This per- 
haps may account for his sudden death not long afterwards, though 
the prevailing opinion was that he was assassinated. Believing that 
his life was in danger, it is said, he lived in retirement, receiving his 
partisans in his own house. On one occasion, as he was bidding them 
farewell in the open portico, he suddenly exclaimed that he was 
stabbed, and fell, sprinkling the bust of his own father with his blood. 
A leather-cutter's knife was found in his side and in a short time he 
expired. No investigation was held ; and whether violent or natural, 
his departure seems to have dashed the last hopes for the Italians of 
a peaceful settlement. Preparations for revolt had doubtless been 



XXXVII BEGINNING OF THE SOCIAL WAR 589 

already made, and perhaps some o\ ert proceedings had taken place, Prosecu- 
which gave an excuse to the tribune Q. Varius in 90 to institute a tions of 
number of prosecutions under a new law of inajesfas, extending that of '^'^"^• 
Appuleius, which was carried in spite of the veto of the other tribunes 
by a body of equites who appeared at the Comitia with drawn swords. 
There followed another storm of impeachments, before which Calpurnius 
Bestia, Aurelius Cotta, Memmius, and others went down. But the 
proceedings of the court were violent, and so entirely directed against 
political opponents, that the restoration of the Varian exiles became 
a point in the programme of the popular party hereafter. 

The Social war was actually begun by an outbreak at Asculum in The 
Picenum. Information of the secret communications going on be- Social war, 
tween Italian towns reached the proconsul Q. Servilius, who was in 9^'^°- 
command of that district with a legatus named Fonteius. He at 
once went to Asculum, and harangued the citizens in such threaten- 
ing terms, that the popular indignation broke out with irresistible 
violence. Servilius and Fonteius were murdered, and a general Murder of 
massacre of Roman citizens in the town began. It was the signal Q- 
for a general rising. On a sudden it became apparent that the ^^^^"^^ 
Roman policy in Italy of breaking up nationalities and dividing the ponteius at 
country into separate towns or municipia^ unconnected with others Asculum. 
inhabited by the same nation, had not been successful. The old names 
still meant something : and in a brief space we hear of the Vestini, 
Marsi, Peligni, Marrucini, Samnites, and Lucani all joining the revolt Revolt of 
of the Picentes, each with leaders of their own. Hardly in the midst the 
of the old struggles with Volscian or Samnite had Rome seemed Italians. 
in greater danger. The superiority of her position now chiefly 
consisted in the fact that Italy was studded with thirty-two Roman 
and forty Latin colonies, generally established with a view to military 
purposes, which for the most part remained faithful. In the former 
the Roman citizens were usually in sufficient strength to overawe 
the unprivileged natives ; the latter, though only enjoying the Fidelity 
imperfect citizenship called Latinitas, were still in a superior position of the 
to the viimicipia. It was these immicipia^ towns which endured the <^olonies. 
burden of tribute and military service without the public rights of 
citizenship, in which the rebellion spread. Some chntafes foederatae., 
which, though not enjoying the franchise, had joined the Roman 
system on favourable terms, such as Naples, had no motive for 
sharing in the rebellion, and in fact preferred their own status ; 
while the Samnites and Lucanians, though they eventually accepted 
:he Roman franchise, would have preferred and long contended for 
.entire separation. 

j The movement spread rapidly through Italy, and the greatest 
Exertions were necessary. Before the winter of 91-90 was over, the 



590 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Italian 
consuls. 



The consuls 
P. Rutin us 
Lupus, I.. 
Inlius 
(Jiiesar, 
and their 
le^uti, go. 



The iLhir 
in the 
South, go. 



rebels had organised a new state on the model of the Roman consti- 
tution, the seat of which was to be Corfinium. A large forum and 
senate-house were laid out, a senate of 500 named to superintend the 
war, and two consuls with six legates each to conduct it. The 
Senate, as at first selected, must in some way have represented the 
various nations, but no arrangement seems to have been made for 
what we mean by a representative government in filling up vacancies 
or for electing the consuls. The two first were a Marsian named 
Q. Pompaedius, who was to command with six legates in the north 
of Italy, and Gnaeus Papius Mutilus, a Samnite, with six legates 
in the south. There was no great concentrated campaign. The 
only plan seems to have been that these consuls and their legates 
in their several districts should attack Roman colonies and such of 
the iniuiicipia as had Roman garrisons or many Roman residents. 
It was a war therefore scattered all over Italy, and the Romans had 
to make arrangements corresponding to that of the enemy. The two 
consuls, P. Rutilius Lupus, L. lulius Caesar, undertook the north and 
south respectively, and under them were a number of legates of con- 
sular or praetorian rank. Thus under Rutilius were (X Caepio, Cn. 
Pompeius Strabo, C. Pcrpenna, C. Marius, Valerius Messala ; under 
Caesar, P. Lentulus, T. Didius, Licinius Crassus, L. Cornelius Sulla, 
M. Claudius Marcellus ; and auxiliaries were sent for from Gaul, 
Africa, Numidia, and other places. 

It was in the south, where the Italian " consul" Papius commanded 
in chief, that the war was at first most active and dangerous. The 
consul Caesar lost a battle to Vettius Cato, a legate of Papius, near 
Aesernia, which fell after a long and heroic defence by Marcellus. 
Meanwhile Papius had invaded Campania : Nola, Stabiae, Salernum, 
Nuceria all fell into his hands ; and then going to \'enusia he took 
Oxyntes, son of Jugurtha, who was confined there, and dressing him 
in royal purple appealed so strongly to the loyalty of the Numidian 
auxiliaries that Caesar found it safer to send them home. Another 
Latin commander named Marius Ignatius took Venafrum, and 
massacred two Roman cohorts stationed there ; Licinius Crassus was 
beaten by T. Lafrenius near Grumentum in Lucania; and the Picenian 
C. Judacilius occupied \'enusia, Canusium, and a great part of 
lapygia. Before the end of his year, indeed, Caesar had won a battle 
over Papius near Acerrae, but had not been able to prevent him 
from laying siege to that town, and had himself been beaten by 
Ignatius near Teanum Sidicinum. He retired again towards Acerrae, 
the siege of which by Papius he endeavoured to raise. However 
his victories over Samnites and Lucanians were received with joy at 
Rome, and were made the occasion of the Senate laying aside the 
sagum and appearing once more in the toga. He was continued 



XXXVII END OF THE SOCIAL WAR 591 

in office in the following year as proconsul, and died while engaged 
in the siege of Asculum, 

In the north the vicissitudes had been still greater. C. Perpenna The war 
after losing 4000 men was deposed by the consul Rutilius from his ^« ^he 
command, his troops being transferred to Marius. But Rutilius °^^ ' ^°- 
himself soon after fell. He was stationed with Marius, at some little 
distance from each other, on the Tolenus, a tributary of the Liris, 
and contrary to the advice of Marius crossed the river to attack 
Vettius Cato. The first news Marius had of his disaster was given 
by the arms and corpses brought down the stream. By a rapid 
march Marius seized Cato's camp, while he was engaged in pursuing 
the army of the fallen consul ; and thus forcing him to retreat killed 
8000 of his troops. But he does not appear to have done much 
more ; and when he returned to Rome at the end of the year had 
only some doubtful successes over the Marsians to recount : while 
Q. Caepio, who had taken over the army of Rutilius, and boasted at 
first that he had done as much as Marius, was defeated and killed by 
O. Pompaedius in the territory of the Vestini. In Picenum Pom- 
peius Strabo was defeated by Lafrenius and retired upon Firmum. 
Here, however, Lafrenius was in his turn defeated and killed, and 
Pompey gained a series of victories over the Picentes, which caused 
the magistrates at home to resume the state robes which had been laid 
aside, and began the siege of Asculum. The Roman fortunes, how- Movement 
ever, were sufficiently low to induce the Etruscans and Umbrians, of Etrus- 
who had hitherto held aloof, to declare on the side of the rebels. ''''"^• 
But the Umbrians were defeated by A. Plotius, and the Etruscans 
were conciliated by the lex lulia, now carried by the consul, which The lex 
gave the franchise to all Italians who had not been actually in arms.i J"lia, 90. 

The consuls of the next year were dnaeus Pompeius Strabo and Successes of 
L. Porcius Cato, grandson of the censor. Cato, who took over the ^^^^'J^^^'^ ^"^ 
army of Marius, was after some successes defeated and killed by the 
Marsi, — the second Roman consul to fall in this war. But elsewhere 
the superiority in the struggle was slowly inclining to Rome. Ascu- 
lum still held out, but Corfinium had been taken, and the seat of the 
federal government had to be removed to Bovianum, and then to 
Aesernia. Strabo intercepted and cut up a body of 15,000 Italians 
on their way to Etruria ; and in the south Sulla, who in the previous 

^ The citizenship had to be accepted by tlie communities (as opposed to 
individuals), and those which so accepted it were called populi fundi. It seems 
first to have been proposed that these Italians should be enrolled in ten new 
tribes, and afterwards that they should be confined to eight of the old tribes 
(which had now ceased to be local). This would minimise their influence on 
the voting, and therefore the next (juestion was their distribution through all the 
tribes. 



k 



592 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Fall of 

Corjinium, 

89. 



and 
Bovianum. 



Mithri- 
dates 
refuses 
assistance. 



Lex 

Papiria 
Plautia, 



Coss. L. 
Cornelius 
Sulla, Q. 
Potnpeius 
Rufus, 88. 



Sulpician 
revolution. 



year also had had some successes, and who intended this year to 
stand for the consulship, had been carrying all before him. He beat 
Cluentius near Pompeii, and drove him to take refuge in Nola, where 
he was killed. He took Aquilonia, the chief town of the Hirpini, 
overran Samnium, and stormed Bovianum, defeating Papius again 
and again, and returned to Rome with irresistible claims to the 
consulship. Other successes had been won in Lucania by Aulus 
Gabinius, though he had himself fallen in an attack upon a camp ; 
by Sulpicius against the Marrucini ; by Caecilius Metellus in lapygia, 
where the Latin " consul " Pompaedius fell ; and by C. Cosconius and 
Lucceius in eastern Samnium and Apulia, An appeal by the con- 
federates to Mithridates to assist them by invading Italy had been 
declined on the ground that he must first secure Asia ; and an attempt 
in this or early in the following year to seize Rhegium in order to 
carry the war into Sicily had been defeated by the propraetor C. 
Norbanus. When early in 88 Strabo at length took Asculum, and 
received the submission of the Marsi, Vestini, and Peligni, little 
remained to be done except in the south, where Nola and some 
other towns still held out. But the object of the rebellion, which had 
cost the life of 300,000 men of military age in Italy, was gained. A 
plebiscitu))i of the tribunes C. Papirius Carbo and M. Plautius 
Silvanus extended the citizenship to every member of a civitas 
foederata in Italy, who within two months declared before a praetor 
his desire to take it ; while a lex Pompeza gave the Latinitas to the 
cities between the Po and the Alps. 

During the Social war the Roman government had had other 
anxieties. The Salluvii had again rebelled and had been suppressed 
by C. Caecilius in 90. In 89 there had been a severe commercial 
crisis, and the moneyed class had assassinated the praetor Asellio on 
account of his decisions in favour of the debtors : while in that and 
the following year the movement of Mithridates, to upset the arrange- 
ments in Cappadocia made by Sulla in 92, had been accompanied by 
invasions of the Thracians on the north of Macedonia. War with 
Mithridates had in fact been determined upon when Sulla took up 
the consulship. His colleague Pompeius Rufus was to remain in Italy, 
while the command of the southern army at Nola, and the war with 
Mithridates, for which that army was destined, were assigned to Sulla. 
But the quiet execution of these arrangements was interrupted by the 
intervention of the tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus, He had hitherto 
been a partisan of the Optimates, and in 95 had prosecuted C. Nor- 
banus in their interests, and was a personal friend of the consul 
Rufus. His sudden change to the leadership of the opposition was 
explained by his enemies as the result of embarrassed circumstances 
exposing him to the temptation of a bribe from Marius, The position 



XXXVII REVOLUTIONARY MEASURES OF SULPICIUS 593 

of Marius was certainly mortifying. He had lost all credit as a Position of 
politician since his vacillating conduct in regard to Saturninus in ^/arins in 
TOO ; and when he abdicated his sixth consulship at the end of that ^^' 
year he ceased to be politically important. He was eager, however, 
to recover his prestige, and believed that he could only do so in case 
his services were again needed in war. Since his visit to Asia in 
99-98, and his interview with Mithridates, he seems to have had 
hopes that he might eventually have the command against him. But 
he had had to see Sulla, once his subordinate, charged with the restor- 
ation of Ariobarzanes to Cappadocia, from which Mithridates had 
driven him (92). When the Social war began he was content to act as 
legate to the consul Rutilius ; but at the end of the first year returned 
to Rome without having materially increased his reputation. He was ]\iarius 
sixty- eight years old and began to be thought over- cautious and desires the 
senile, while Sulla in 89 was acquiring fresh laurels and securing his 'command 
consulship ; and when in the course of that year the war with Mithri- MUhri- 
dates was decided on, the command was given by the Senate not to dates. 
him but to Sulla. This could only be altered by a vote of the people 
overriding the decree of the Senate, as had once before been done 
in his favour against Metellus in the Jugurthine war. 

Whether it was Sulpicius who saw in the old hero's unsatisfied 
ambition a means for gaining the support of the popular party for the 
measures he now contemplated, — or whether it was Marius who bribed 
Sulpicius to propose measures giving the popular party the upper hand, La^cs of 
and so securing his nomination to the command, — the result was Sulpicius. 
that Sulpicius now brought in a series of laws which the Optimates 
regarded as revolutionary. The new Italian citizens (perhaps 
amounting to 500,000) were to be enrolled in all the tribes, instead 
of only eight or ten, and so would be able to carry all measures they 
chose ; freedmen were no longer to be confined to the four city 
tribes, but were to be spread over all ; those condemned of viajestas 
by the lavv- of Varius in 90 were to be restored ; bankrupts were 
to cease to be members of the Senate ; and lastly the command 
of the Mithridatic war was to be transferred to Marius. The first of Their 
these laws was necessary for the full enfranchisement of the Italians, object and 
and was a measure in fact which could not be and was not long ^-"^^ ' 
delayed : but its immediate effect would doubtless be to render it 
more easy to swamp the influence of the family coteries which con- 
trolled elections and legislation. The reform of the Senate would 
also crush the influence which the richest heads of families had 
been accustomed to exercise over the poorer senators who practically 
depended upon them ; and the recall of the Varian exiles admitted 
the principle of overriding verdicts of juries by a popular vote. 

The Optimates determined to resist. The consuls attempted 

2 o 



594 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The consuls 
order a 
jusiitium, 
88. 
Riots. 



Sulla 
resolves to 
resist his 
removal 
from the 
command. 



Sulla and 
Rufus 
enter 

Rome with 
the army. 



Death of 
Sulpicius. 

Flight of 

Marius, 

88. 



to Stop the proceedings by declaring a jusiitium^ — a suspension of 
business for religious observances. But the armed followers of Sulpicius 
attacked them with such violence that they were obliged to withdraw 
the notice. In the riot a son of Pompeius Rufus was killed, and he 
himself had to withdraw from Rome ; whilst vSulla only escaped death 
by taking refuge in the house of Marius. He presently withdrew to the 
camp at Nola ; and thereupon the laws of Sulpicius were passed. 

Marius had now attained his wish, and was to command in Asia. 
He despatched two tribunes to Nola to take over the command in 
his name, intending to follow shortly in person. But Sulla was not 
the man tamely to submit to such a defeat. In his eyes he was legal 
commander ; the bill which superseded him had been passed by 
means of such violence as compelled both consuls to leave Rome, and 
was ipso facto invalid. The army which he commanded was devoted 
to him, and had shown that it cared for little else. A few months 
before it had stoned Postumius Albinus, a praetorian legate, and 
Sulla had been content with a reprimand, remarking that they must 
atone for their fault by additional energy in the war. It was thus 
not unprepared for illegal conduct ; and when Sulla laid his case 
before the soldiers, they eagerly promised to follow him to Rome, 
and promptly murdered the tribunes sent by Marius. Sulla was 
joined by his colleague Rufus on the march, and when they 
approached the city Marius and Sulpicius, after vainly trying to raise 
a force by offering freedom to the slaves, were obliged to fly. The 
consuls entered the city, and though the anger of the people at seeing 
soldiers within the walls was manifested by showers of stones and 
other missiles from the housetops, they Avere warmly welcomed by 
the Senate. Sulpicius, Marius, and twelve of their followers were 
at once declared public enemies, whom it was every one's right and 
duty to kill. Sulpicius, having taken refuge in a villa, was betrayed 
and put to death by a slave, who was rewarded by emancipation, 
and then hurled from the rock by Sulla's order. 

Marius was more fortunate. He reached Ostia in safety, where 
he was supplied with a ship, and at once set sail. He was forced, 
however, by a storm to land near Circeii, and wandered about help- 
lessly until, being warned by a peasant that horsemen were scouring 
the country for him, he concealed himself in the woods without food 
or place of rest. Hunger compelled him to descend upon the beach, 
and he was again taken on board a ship, the master of which with 
some hesitation refrained from delivering him up to the horsemen on 
the shore. But after conveying him as far as the mouth of the Liris, he 
landed him on the marshy ground near Minturnae. Making his way 
with difficulty over the bogs and ditches he at last found the hut of 
an old labourer, who concealed him in a hollow and covered him 



XXXVII FLIGHT OF MARIUS & LEGISLATION OF SULLA 595 

with reeds and wood. When the pursuers arrived and threatened Sd\ 
the old man, Marius in terror tried to hide himself more completely 
in the water, but was observed and dragged out covered with mud. 
He was carried off to Minturnae, and delivered up to the magis- Marius 
trates of the town, who, after long consultation, determined to put at Afin- 
him to death. But the executioner sent was a Gallic slave who ^"^^^e. 
had seen him in his glory during the Cimbric campaign. When he 
entered the room the well -remembered form rose, the fierce eyes 
glared in the dim hght, and a voice said sternly, " Man, darest thou 
slay Gaius Marius?" He threw down his sword and rushed from 
the room exclaiming, " I cannot kill Gaius Marius." The citizens of 
Minturnae then repented, and resolved to allow the saviour of Italy 
to go free. They conducted him to the shore and put him on board 
a ship. This time the wind was favourable. He sailed first to the 
island of Aenaria {Ischia), where he found some of his friends, and 
from thence to Africa, where his son had arrived before him in safety. 
He stayed himself in the neighbourhood of Carthage and sent his 
son to beg protection of Hiempsal, king of Numidia. But the pro- 
praetor of Africa, Sextilius, felt it his duty to refuse him harbourage, 
and yet did not wish to injure him. He therefore sent a message to 
^ him bidding him leave the province. As the messenger waited for 
I an answer, Marius, after remaining for a long time silent, at last said, 
( " Go and tell him that you saw Gaius Marius sitting amidst the ruins Marius at 
of Carthage." Meanwhile his son had been politely received by Carthage. 
\ Hiempsal, but had soon discovered that the king was secretly de- 
signing to gratify the Sullan party by doing him some mischief. 
\ By the favour of one of the royal harem he escaped to meet his 
father, who was just about to sail. They made their way to the 
island of Cercina, and there waited till the news from Rome in- 
duced them to return to Italy, with some exiles and Mauritanians, 
whom they persuaded to take service with them. 

To understand this change of plan we must go back to Rome Sulla in 
and Sulla. The first measure of the consuls, when they found them- J^ome, 88. 
selves supreme once more, was to revoke the laws of Sulpicius, 
whether by the Senate declaring them invalid, as having been passed 
by violence, or by a regular vote of the people. Certain measures ///^ ^e- 
were then passed to meet the actual difficulties of the moment : the actionary 
rate of interest was reduced to a maximum of ten per cent (as it measures. 
had been in 357) ; the usual order for new colonies was issued ; and 
the roll of the Senate filled up by the admission of 300 new members. 
In regard to the comitia the old arrangement attributed to Servius 
was recalled as far as was possible in the altered state of things. ^ For 

* It seems, however, doubtful whether this change took place now or after 
Sulla's return from Asia. 



596 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Restraint 
on the 
Tribunes. 



Coss. 

Gnaeus 

Octavius, 

L. 

Cornelius 

Cinna, 8y. 



Sulla 
crosses to 
Greece. 



Pompeius 

Rufus 

killed. 



Revolu- 
tiojiary 
measures of 
Cinna. 



Cinna 
expelled 
from Rotne 
collects an 
army in 
Italian 
cities, 
JS. 



voting purposes those who possessed property to the standard of the 
first class (100,000 sesterces) were distributed into centuries almost 
equal to half the entire number, and could thereby command nearly 
a majority of votes at elections. How far this was applied to the 
tribes, which since 241 had also been divided into centuries accord- 
ing to rating, does not seem certain ; but their importance in legisla- 
tion, usually brought forward by tribunes, was lessened by a regu- 
lation prohibiting the tribunes from proposing bills without the 
previous sanction of the Senate, — a condition once imposed by custom 
then abolished by law, and now for the first time enacted by law. 

But Sulla was in haste to rejoin his army, which after the restora- 
tion of order he had sent to Capua. He tried to propitiate the 
popular party by allowing the election of C. Cornelius Cinna to the 
consulship for 87, though he first exacted an oath from him to abstain 
from reversing the measures just passed. Some of the Lucani and 
Samnites were still in arms, and Nola held out. He therefore had 
enough to detain him in Italy until the spring of 87, in spite of the 
tragic events in Asia which demanded his presence. He crossed to 
Epirus in the early summer, leaving Italy by no means quiet. His 
legati Q. Caecilius Metellus and Appius Claudius retained the com- 
mand in Samnium ; but Cinna had shown his animus at once by pro- 
posing to impeach him, though he had apparently gone to the army 
without condescending to answer the charge. The northern troops 
were still under the optimatist Strabo ; for Pompeius Rufus, who had 
been sent to supersede him, was murdered by the soldiers, and 
Strabo quietly resumed the command. 

Yet no sooner had Sulla left Italy than, trusting to the support 
of the new citizens, Cinna proposed to recall Marius and his friends, 
and to distribute the Italians among all the thirty-five tribes. His 
colleague Octavius determined to oppose him, but waited until some 
act of violence gave him an excuse for interfering. Being informed 
that a crowd of armed Italians were in the Forum to overawe the 
citizens into voting for Cinna's bill, and were actually driving the 
opposing tribunes from the rostra, he led an armed body of men into 
the Forum, killed many of the rioters, and drove the rest through the 
gates. Cinna, after vainly endeavouring to raise the slaves, escaped 
from the city. He set himself at once to raise a party in the Italian 
towns, which he instigated to take up arms. At Nola he was joined 
by most of the army under App. Claudius, and by senators and 
other members of his party, among whom was the able and active 
O. Sertorius. He was thus distinctly levying arms against the city 
and joining with her revolted subjects. The Senate at Rome 
therefore declared him a public enemy and no longer consul, and 
contrived to have L. Merula, the Jlanie?i dialis, elected in his place, 



;! 



^^^^V" MARIUS ENTERS ROME 597 

as though he were dead. Such a proceeding was of course not 
provided for by the constitution. : but it rested on the same ground 
of equity as all depositions of kings or other rulers, namely that he 
was using his office to the harm of the State. Cinna answered by 
coming to Capua, where there were troops, with whom he pleaded 
that the consulship had been given him by them, and could only be 
taken away by those who had given it. A considerable number of 
the men took the oath to him, and many more of his partisans 
joined him there. 

It was the news of these events which reached Marius in Cercina, Return of 
and made him resolve to return to Italy. He landed at Telamon Marius, 
on the Etruscan coast, and immediately communicated with Cinna ^7- 
who named him his legate with proconsular power ; and the two 
agreed to advance on Rome, which for the next few weeks was thus 
threatened by four armies, under Cinna and his three legates, Marius 
Sertorius, and Carbo. The city walls were in a dilapidated state' 
and the Senate was striving to protect them by trenches* and other Weakness 
fortihcations, while sending urgent messages to Strabo in Picenum of the 
and ordering Metellus and Claudius in Campania to make terms ''^•f^^^^^^- 
with the people of Nola and come to their aid. Strabo had been 
annoyed at being refused a second consulship, and it was uncertain 
what he would do. But he obeyed the summons and advanced 
towards the Colline gate, Metellus and Claudius came to Rome 
without however making terms with the Samnites, who presently 
joined Marius and defeated a Roman army under Plancius. Refusing 
to supersede the consul Octavius in the supreme command, as the 
soldiers wished, Metellus retired from the city and crossed to Africa • 
and Claudius, who was stationed on the Janiculum, finally made terms' 
with the Marians, and admitted them into the city. 

Meanwhile Marius had occupied Ostia, and thus got control Marius in 
of the corn supplies. He then proceeded to take the towns on Latircm. 
the Appian Way, Antium, Lanuvium, and Aricia, and crossing the 
river joined Cinna on the Janiculum. The Senate found themselves 
gradually reduced to helplessness. Large desertions were taking 
place from the army of the consuls to Cinna, and numbers of slaves Battle at 
were attracted to his camp by offers of freedom. Strabo's army the Colline 
was suffering from fever, and, soon after an indecisive battle with ^''^'• 
Sertorius near the Colline gate, he was himself killed by light- 
ning. The Senate humbled itself to invite Cinna and Marius into the 
city, only begging that they would spare the lives of the citizens. 
Cinna made fair professions, but Marius, who stood by the consul's 
chair, said nothing, and his grim look gave no sign of mercy. The 
first demand made by Cinna on entering the city was that Marius 
and the other exiles who had joined him at Ostia, should be formally 



598 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The reign 
of terror. 



Coss. L. 
Cornelius 
Cintia II . 
Gains 
Marius 
VII. , 86. 



Death of 

Marius, 

jjth 

January 

86. 



Coss L. 
Cornelius 
Cinna and 
Cn. Papi- 
rius Ca7-bo, 
85-84- 



recalled. But too impatient to wait for the vote, Marius entered the 
Forum surrounded by a band of ruffians, and the work of blood 
began. The consul Octavius had already been killed as he sat on 
the curule chair, and his head brought to Cinna ; and now every 
one whom Marius pointed out by word or gesture in the streets 
was cut down by his attendants, or, as some say, every one whose 
salutation he did not return. His former colleague and rival Catulus 
in vain asked through friends for mercy : inoriejidiim est — was the 
only answer given by the bitter old man. The famous orator M. 
Antonius took refuge with a humble client, but was betrayed by a 
wine-seller, whose suspicions were roused by the man sending for a 
superior kind of wine, and Marius was scarcely restrained from going 
to feast his eyes upon his execution. Some, such as Lucius Merula, 
Cinna's substitute in the consulship, were to be subjected to a form 
of legal trial, but Merula at any rate preferred suicide. Everywhere 
the trackers of blood were on the search, and no man's life who had 
opposed Marius was safe.^ Cinna soon got disgusted with these 
cruelties, and he and Sertorius at length put to death a number of 
Marius's ruffian guards who were revelling in murder, rape, and 
robbery, 

Cinna's next step was to secure the election of himself and Marius 
to the consulship of 86. But the veteran Marius only survived this 
realisation of his dream of a seventh consulship a few days. The 
hero of \'ercellae had lived too long for his fame, and his services 
to \i\-i country were forgotten in the horror of his last days. Worn 
out with excitement or fever he died on the ides of January, and was 
succeeded by L. Valerius Flaccus, who was sent to supersede Sulla 
in the command against Mithridates. 

Meanwhile Cinna was all-powerful. He caused himself to be nomin- 
ated consul with Carbo for 85 and 84 ; and carried laws which were 
meant to secure the adhesion of the populace of the city and the 
Italians. The new citizens were distributed among the thirty-five 
tribes by the censors of 86-85 ; all impediments on the distribution 
of corn were removed ; three-fourths of all private debts were can- 
celled ; and some colotii actually established at Capua.- Sulla was 
declared a public enemy and his town house dem.olished : and the 
provinces were placed or continued in the hands of adherents of the 
consuls. In Macedonia alone Sulla was supreme, and there he was 
1 Some no doubt escaped. For instance we are told of one Cornutus whose 
slaves loved him, and covered his retreat by displaying the dead body of one of 
their fellow-slaves to the pursuers, and pretending that it was their master whom 
they had killed. 

- Capua did not obtain the status of a colonia till 59, though a conventus 
capable of corporate action existed there before, Cicero pro Sest. § 9. Cinna's 
colony therefore was either incomplete or was abolished by Sulla. 



XXXVII PREPARATIONS TO RESIST SULLA 599 

joined by many of the Optimates who fled from Rome. He presently 

had what might ahiiost be looked upon as a senate, and he let it be 

known that, when the war of Mithridates was ended, he was coming Sulla 

home with his army to protect him, and would ignore all the legisla- prepares to 

tion of Cinna except in regard to the Italian voters. The Senate ''^^"''''• 

tried to make peace by proposing that Sulla should come to Rome 

without his army under a safe-conduct, and that the consuls should 

cease their preparations for war. Sulla did not openly decline, but Prepara- 

sent word to say that the exiled nobles must be first recalled, and the ^^ons to 

authors of illegal massacres punished. There was clearly to be war. ''^■^"^ Z^''"' 
r^, 1 o 1 r> • • ,, ■ ,1 • and death 

Ihe consuls spent 85 and 84 principally m collectmg money, troops, of Cinna, 

and war-ships on the Adriatic coast, and several legions were sent 84. 

across to Epirus under Cn. Papirius Carbo. In the latter part of 
' 84, however, Cinna was killed in a mutiny of soldiers, who declined 
\ to cross to Greece to attack their fellow-citizens ; and Carbo, now 

sole consul, returned to Italy, and went into winter quarters at 
1 Ariminum. Such was the state of things in Italy in the winter of 
!■ 84-83. To understand Sulla's position we must follow the course of 
I the Mithridatic war. 

I 

j Authorities. — Livy, Ep. 69-84; Appian, B. Civ. i. 28-78; Velleiu.s 
. Paterc. 11. 12-23; Plutarch. Sulla, Marius, Seriorius, Pompeius : Florus iii. 
J 16-18 ; Diodorus. fr. of xxxvii. ; Dion. fr. 95-106 ; Granius Licinianus, p. 23 
\sq.\ Orosius v. 16-20. For the Lex Papiria Plautia, sec Cicero /;v Archia, 37. 
i For the characters and aims of the men of this period the writings of Cicero. 
jl who served his only campaign under Strabo in the Social war, now become 
1 important. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII 



AIITHRIDATES ^ IN ASIA AND GREECE 



The origin and state of the Roman province of Asia — Causes of discontent — 
Rise of the kingdom of Pontus (315-121) — Early life and character of 
Mithridates Eupator (120-111)— His victories in the Crimea and extension of 
the Pontic kingdom north of the Black Sea (111-102) — His tour in Asia (105) 
He joins Nicomedes of Bithynia in an attack upon Paphlagonia (104) — Obeys 
Roman commissioners and evacuates Paphlagonia, but occupies Galatia — 
Breach between Nicomedes and Mithridates in regard to Cappadocia — 
Meeting of Marius and Mithridates (98) — The Senate order Mithridates to 
evacuate Cappadocia (94) — Tigranes of Armenia allied with Mithridates — ■ 
Sulla restores Ariobarzanes (92) — M'.Aquillius in Asia (90-89) — Mithridates 
determines on war (88) — Defeat of the Roman forces and massacre of 
the Italians (88) — Mithridates attacks Rhodes, and his general Archelaus 
occupies Athens (88-87)— Sulla arrives in Greece with five legions (87). 



Indepen- 
dent 

powers in 
Asia, yet 
owning an 
informal 
protector- 
ate. 



Permmus. 



In virtue of the treaty with Antiochus (189) the Romans had estab- 
hshed an informal protectorate in Asia. No regular province had 
been constituted, no tribute imposed except for war indemnities, and 
no army or fleet stationed in Asia to overawe or protect the peoples. 
The kingdoms of Cappadocia and Bithynia were left untouched ; the 
freedom of the Asiatic Gauls was respected, — though they were to 
cease their depredations on their neighbours ; the Greek cities^ were 
to be free, and to be relieved of the tribute formerly paid to the 
Seleucidae or other princes ; the rest of Asia Minor north of Mount 
Taurus for the most part was given to the king of Pergamus. Besides 
his ancestral kingdom of Mysia he received in Europe Lysimachia 
and the Thracian Chersonese ; in Asia Hellespontine Phrygia, Lydia 
with Sardis and Ephesus, part of Caria, including Magnesia and 
Tralles, part of Cilicia, Greater Phrygia, Lycaonia ; and in Lycia, 
Milyas and the harbour town Telmissus. 

^ The correct form, as found in Greek inscriptions, is Mithradates, i.e. wor- 
shipper of Mithras. I have, however, adopted the more familiar spelling of 
Roman writers. 

2 Especially those who had joined the Romans against Antiochus — Dardanus, 
Ilium, Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Chios, Colophon, Miletus, and the 
Lycian confederate towns. 



6o2 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Legacy of 

Attains 

III. to the 

Roman 
people, ijj. 

The 
province 

of Asia 
formed, 

I2g. 



The 

taxation 
of Asia. 



The lex 
Se?npronia 
and the 
publicani 
in Asia, 

I2J. 



It was this kingdom which passed to the Roman people in 133 
by the will of Attalus III., and was organised as a province in 129 
under the name of Asia with Ephesus as its capital. The European 
possessions, however, were annexed to the province of Macedonia ; 
Telmissus was given up to the Lycian federation, and some other 
outlying districts to various princes, who were to relieve the Romans 
from the burden of defending the eastern frontiers. The Greek 
cities declared free in 189 still nominally retained that freedom in 
129; and the province consisted of the districts known as Mysia, 
Caria, and Lydia, with the adjacent islands, and the Greek cities 
other than those left free. Phrygia for a time was left in dispute, 
but was subsequently joined to the province. This was surrounded 
by independent states, which were friends or clients of Rome, the re- 
publics of Rhodes, Cyzicus, and Heracleia, the Lycian federation, and 
the three kingdoms of Cappadocia, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia. 
Lycaonia and Cilicia Trachea (including and sometimes called Pam- 
phylia) were in 129 assigned to the king of Cappadocia. 

When the inheritance first fell to Rome, the Roman Government 
had promised a remission of the tribute paid by the states to the 
kings of Pergamus, contenting itself with the profits of the royal 
estates. The rebellion of Aristonicus (i 31-129), however, gave a pre- 
text for evading this promise. The cultivators of the soil now paid 
a tenth of their produce {decimiae) ; a rent was levied for feeding cattle 
on the public pastures {scriptura) ; and an ad valorem duty of 2^ per 
cent was imposed on imports (portorhan). Besides these burdens, 
the expenses of Roman governors and the exactions of their retinue, 
more or less supported by law or custom, had to be borne by the 
provincials, already impoverished by war indemnities, and deeply in 
debt to Roman money-lenders or bankers, who flocked over in the 
wake of the conquering aniiies. 

The distress of the country was accentuated by the next change. 
By the lex Semprcmia of Gaius Gracchus (123) the various taxes were 
sold by the censors every quinquennium to companies of publicani, 
who paid a fixed sum to the treasury and recouped themselves by the 
estimated surplus of the revenue. This system, which lasted nearly 
eighty years, was a fruitful source of oppression. The first object 
of the publicani was to obtain a handsome profit ; and as the 
decumae (paid in kind) and portoria varied with the yearly produce 
and the value of the merchandise, every device was employed to 
enhance the amount. The closest and most offensive forms of 
espionage, with every engine of legal chicanery or personal violence, 
were set at work. If the provincials appealed to the proconsul, they 
generally found that his interests or fears were on the side of the 
publicani — his interests, for he might receive a percentage of the 



XXXVIII THE OPPRESSION OF ASIA 603 

profits ; his fears because, if accused on his return, he would have to 
stand a trial before a jury composed of the very eqidtes who had 
enjoyed or hoped to enjoy the chance of similar profits. The oppres- 
sion of course varied somewhat with the character of the proconsul. 
There were instances of righteous and incorrupt governors, with 
firmness equal to their virtue. Under such men for a time the pro- 
vince was happy and prosperous. But they were few and far between ; 
and the ruin which the disappointed publican! generally managed to 
inflict upon them scared those who, perhaps no less well disposed, 
had not the courage of their opinions. ^ For the most part the pro- 
consuls were conveniently blind, and the people suffered. 

It was natural that this government should be detested in most Consequent 
of the States ; that the visits of the publicani should be regarded with ^^P<^P^- 
fear and anger ; and that the Roman merchants, bankers, and money- ^^^ Romayi 
lenders, in whose books many of the natives were deeply involved, government 
should be the most unpopular residents in the towns and harbours, andRoman 
and while receiving the outside deference which weakness pays to '^^^^^ents. 
superior force, should yet be eyed askance with the stealthy hatred 
which has the will without the strength or courage to strike. 

For thirty-five years, however (123-88), all seemed to be going Division 
smoothly. The natives groaned or scowled, but the Roman publican of parties 
and money-lender returned gorged with wealth to plunge into the ^^,^_j. 
luxuries or vices of Roipe. Yet black as is the picture which all our 
authorities give, there must have been some counterbalancmg ad- 
vantages in the Roman sway ; for in nearly every town, when the 
crash came, we find a Romanising party. Probably this was gener- 
ally the merchant or trading class, who found the Romans willing 
and able to protect them against all piracy or pillage other than their 
own ; and the Roman courts, when not judging cases of revenue, 
more trustworthy and impartial than those of the natives. Still there 
was enough well-grounded disaffection to make it certain that at the 
first opportunity the smouldering discontent would burst into flame. 
That opportunity came in 88, when the king of Pontus advanced Mitkri- 
into Roman Asia with an army which had just beaten a combined dates enters 

force of Bithynians and Italians, bringing with him a Roman governor ^^^ . 

- ^.,. . . .,. . f , • 1 province of 

of Cilicia as prisoner in his train, and presently exposing to the scorn ^^^^ in 88. 

and insult of the inhabitants a Roman legate of consular rank in 

chains, and treated with every species of ignominy. 

Mithridates had already achieved no mean work in life ; had 

extended his power almost to encircle the Black Sea, and had come 

^ The most notorious case was that of P. Rutilius Rufus, who having in 95 
distinguished himself (as legatus of Q. Mucius Scaevola) by repressing the extor- 
tions of the publicani, was condemned by a conspiracy of the equites at Rome in 
92 flvivy, Ep. 70; Valer. Ma.x. ii. 10, 5.) 



6o4 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

Character forward as the successful champion of Hellenism beyond the 
ofMithri- Caucasus ; but during the last fifteen years had found the Roman 
power more than once thwarting the influence which he desired to 
exercise in Asia Minor. He was a man of exceptional vigour and 
ability, A youth of hardship and danger had left him with a frame 
of uncommon strength and endurance. A brave and skilful com- 
mander himself, he had the faculty of attaching others to his service 
with unalterable fidelity, and had been generous in rewarding success 
and in making allowance for failure. In spite of his stormy youth 
he had some tincture of Greek taste and culture, had a famous collec- 
tion of engraved gems and other works of art, and was gifted with 
such extraordinary powers of acquisition and memory that he is said 
to have been able to converse in twenty-five languages while transact- 
ing business with deputies from his widely-spread dominions. On 
the other hand this veneer of Greek culture could not conceal the 
vices and passions of the Oriental despot, who measures everything 
by the standard of his personal desires. His well-filled harem was 
stained by the blood of more than one wife, and several of his sons 
fell victims to a father's jealousy. When once his suspicions were 
roused, however causelessly, past services and tried loyalty went for 
nothing. Not conspicuously cruel in war, the massacre of the Italians 
in Asia and the violent removal of the inhabitants of Chios, the cold- 
blooded murder of his nephew Ariarathes, the young king of Cappa- 
docia, were characteristic of the barbarian despot ; and while posing 
as a friend of Hellenism he soon showed that he had no idea of 
Hellenic freedom apart from himself as master. 
The The kingdom ruled by this remarkable man had grown up from 

growth ajid ^^^ dissolution of the Persian Empire. At the time of the invasion 
ment of ^^ Alexander the Great the name of Pontus as a territorial designa- 
Pontus, tion had no existence. The country formed part of the satrapy of 
starting Cappadocia, which then extended from the Black Sea to Mount 
from the Taurus. Alexander, scarcely entering Cappadocia, committed its 

division of i. . U- r . . -t-i r^ ^ ■ r ^ 

Cappadocia conquest to his lieutenants. The Cappadocians refused to accept a 
in the 4th Macedonian satrap, but after the battle of Arbela (331) the Greek 
century. towns along the coast of the Black Sea submitted, and obtained 
various degrees of favour or freedom. Meanwhile Ariarathes, who 
pretended to trace his descent from Otanes, one of the Magi who 
killed the false Smerdis in 522, maintained a kind of royal power in 
Cappadocia while Alexander was engaged in his distant enterprise. 
After Alexander's death the regent Perdiccas conquered and crucified 
Ariarathes, and reduced Cappadocia to the position of a Macedonian 
province, with the addition of Paphlagonia (322). But the quarrels 
between the successors of Alexander gave the Cappadocians a chance 
of ridding themselves of the Macedonian yoke. About 315 Ariarathes, 



XXXVIII RISE OF THE KINGDOM OF PONTUS 605 

a nephew and adopted son of the old Persian satrap crucified by Ariarathes 
Perdiccas, raised a rebellion to regain his paternal inheritance ; while ^i- 
Mithridates, called Ctistes, or the Founder- — a deposed satrap of Mlthri- 
Cappadocia Pontica — roused the northern Cappadocians and Paphla- ^^^/^-^ ^^• 
gonians, and two kingdoms were carved out of the satrapy. That ' '"^ ^^'" 
obtained by Mithridates was at first still called Cappadocia Pontica, 
while that of Ariarathes, comprising the basin of the Halys, was called 
simply Cappadocia. The attempts of Seleucus to reduce them to 
obedience were fruitless, and from the time of his death (280) they 
were firmly established. 

It is Cappadocia Pontica, presently called simply Pontus, which Cappadocia 
developed into the kingdom ruled over by the great Mithridates. For ^ontua 
a long time it was not important. The chief power in Asia till the battle p^^"ll\ 
of Magnesia ( 1 90) was that of the Seleucids ; and even the inferior 
kingdoms of Pergamus and Bithynia were more than a match for 
Pontus. But a succession of kings had slowly aggrandised it by 
marriages, alliances, and other means. Mithridates III. (302-266) Early 
gained parts of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia ; Ariobarzanes (about l^^"S^ (f 
266-240) took Amastris ; Mithridates IV, (about 240-190) received "" ^^■ 
Phrygia as the portion of his wife, a daughter of Seleucus Callinicus. 

The battle of Magnesia ( 1 90), though it put an end to the power Beginning 
of the Seleucids in Asia, brought into the country the still more formid- <f Ionian 
able Romans. The next king, Pharnaces I. (about 190-169), who ^^^.^ J^o 
was restless and encroaching and fought with nearly all his neigh- 
bours, was compelled to abandon his conquests in (ialatia and 
I Paphlagonia at the bidding of Roman legates, though he succeeded 
I in retaining the important Greek town of Sinope, His brother and 
'successor Mithridates V. (about 169-12 1) sought and maintained Mithri- 
' alliance with Rome, supplied ships and men during the third Punic ^^^^-^ 

war, and in 133-129 joined in assisting her to take possession "^^'g^i^s< 
\ of the kingdom of Attalus and to put down Aristonicus. For this j()g.i2i. 

last service he asked for the addition of the greater Phrygia to his 
' dominions, to which he alleged a claim under the marriage contract Phrygia 
] of his mother, daughter of Seleucus Callinicus. But Nicomedes of claimed by 
I Bithynia also claimed it, and the decision in favour of the king of , ^ '^' , 
' Pontus was obtained from Aquillius by means of an enormous bribe. Nicomedes. 
'\ The transaction, however, was too notorious ; the " acts " of Aquillius 
J were annulled, and for some years the question of Phrygia remained 
^open, the agents of both kings lavishing gold in Rome. The lex 
\Aufeia in 123 proposed to assign it to the king of Pontus : but Gams Lex An/eia 
(Gracchus, who wished to annex it to the province in order to increase S'^'"^"S 
jthe revenue, declared that both proposer and opposer of the law were ]\,/iJhri 
bribed by Mithridates and Nicomedes respectively ; and the case was dates, i2j. 
so scandalous that the execution of the law was suspended, and 



6o6 HISTORY OF ROME 



and 
hardships, 

I20-III. 



nothing was done till after the death of the Pontic king. In Ii6, 
Annexa- when Mithridates Eupator was still a child, Phrygia was annexed to 
Hon of the Roman province. Meanwhile Euergetes occupied it without 
Phiygta, waiting for the decision of the Senate ; was extending his influence in 
Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and Crete ; and was maintaining a 
formidable army and fleet. His ambitious projects were suddenly 
cut short in 120. While feasting in his palace at Sinope.he was 
slain by some of his courtiers, not without suspicion of the comphcity 
of his wife and of a secret suggestion from Rome. 
Mithri- The elder of his two sons by his wife Laodice was Mithridates 

dates Eupator. Born in 132 at Sinope, he was only twelve years of age 

Eupator or ^^ ^j-^g ^jj^-^^ ^f |^jg father's death, and had been carefully educated in 
jr^Q.^:, ' all the accomplishments of Greek learning by his mother, a Syrian 
princess, probably a daughter of Antiochus Epiphanes. She now 
became regent, while the guardians of the boy were the assassins of 
his father. The queen was believed to be jealous of her son, whose 
approach to maturity threatened her with a too speedy loss of power. 
Earlj life Acting under a hint from her the guardians were said to have at- 
tempted his life in various ways, now by inducing him to mount an 
unbroken horse, now by mixing poison with his food. The boy's 
prowess or good fortune secured him from these plots. But finding 
himself in danger at Sinope, he made his love of hunting a pretext 
for retiring to the mountains and forests on the south-east of the 
Pontus. There for seven years ( 1 1 8- 1 1 1 ) he lived the hard life of a 
hunter, avoiding inhabited villages, and preferring, after a day of toil 
and danger in the pursuit of wild beasts, to sleep out under the open 
sky. From this stern discipline he emerged with bodily powers 
extraordinarily developed, radiant with youth and beauty, and con- 
fident in himself and his fortunes. Meanwhile the government at 
Sinope had been ill-conducted by his mother and guardians. His 
father's great projects had been abandoned, the fleet allowed to go to 
ruin, the army to melt away ; and, though we do not know the circum- 
stances, it is easy to conceive how the reappearance of the glorious 
young prince was hailed at Sinope as a relief from mismanagement 
Takes the and incompetence. In 1 1 1 he took the government into his hands, 
government imprisoning, some say putting to death, his mother. For a short 
time his younger brother Chrestos was associated with him ; but 
Chrestos soon disappeared, either by natural death or by a court 
intrigue, and Mithridates Eupator became sole sovereign. 
The early He at once showed that he meant to revive the fallen fortunes 

reign of and influence of Pontus. He renewed the connexion with western 
Greece, especially with Delos and Athens ; surrounded himself with 
Greek officers ; and personally superintended the reorganisation of 
the army, of which a body of 6000 mercenary hoplites, armed and 



into his 
own hands, 
III. 



Mithri- 
dates, 
11/-102. 



xxxviii EXTENSION OF THE KINGDOM OF PONTUS 607 

drilled in the Macedonian fashion, formed the nucleus. He was then He is 
ready to carry out the policy of expansion over which he had been invited to 
brooding-. The first opportunity of using his new forces came ^^''^"/"^ ^ . 
about the year iio or 109, on the invitation of the Greek towns ^/;j^ 
in the Tauric Chersonese or Crimea, which, once flourishing and Crimea, 
rich, while they supplied Athens and other cities with corn, no-iog. 
had gradually sunk into poverty, as the demand and the security 
of transport failed with the decline of Greece, especially of the 
Athenian empire, and Greek ships no longer cleared the seas of 
pirates. This commercial ruin had been accelerated by the con- 
quests of Alexander, which helped to spoil their market by encourag- 
ing the supplies of corn from Egypt. For the last two centuries also 
they had suffered from increasing encroachments of the barbarous 
Scythians, while their means of maintaining their defences or hiring 
soldiers were diminishing. Such trade as still remained was 
chiefly with the cities on the southern shore of the Black Sea, 
especially Heracleia and Sinope ; it was therefore natural for them to 
appeal to Mithridates for help. After some hesitation Diophantus Success of 
was sent with an army and fleet to establish a Pontic protectorate in his general 

the Chersonese : and not only were the Scythians forced to confine ^" . '^ 

' ^ •' 11-1 Crimea. 

themselves to the centre of the Cnmea, but a fort was erected which 

became the city of Eupatorium, and served to secure peace for the 

Greek towns, A second expedition established the Pontic supremacy 

on the opposite coast across the Bosporus, and Diophantus returned 

triumphant to Sinope, It required, indeed, four campaigns before 

the conquest was fully accomplished ; but by 107 Mithridates found 

himself sovereign of a rich and populous district, as considerable as 

that which he had inherited, with excellent harbours, and subjects Extensiofi 

who were skilful sailors and good soldiers. It would supply ^f^^e 

Pontus with corn and fish, command the trade of the north, and pay kin<^dom 

a splendid tribute in return for protection. Moreover his name round the 

became known throughout Greece, and he was encouraged to extend Black Sea, 

his conquests, — to the west up to the Carpathian mountains, to the ^^7-^<^5> 

east along the coast of the Maeotis and the district of Colchis, 

Treaties of commerce were made with Iberia, the Greater Armenia, and in 

and Media Atropatena (a vassal state of the Parthians) : and the "^•^'^■ 

Pontic kingdom was itself rounded off and extended to the upper 

Euphrates by the annexation of Lesser Armenia, famous for its 

cavalry and archers. 

Thus with a territory nearly trebled, with the Black Sea almost a He fears 

Pontic lake, with an army trained in victory, and an almost inex- ^^e Roman 

■power. 
haustible recruiting ground, Mithridates had become the most 

powerful king of his day. He soon turned his eyes to western Asia, 

where his character as champion of Hellenism gave him the required 



6o8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Tour of 
Mithri- 
dates i?i 
Asia 
Minor 
about lo^. 

Asiatic 
states and 
kingdoms. 

dalatia. 



Paphla- 



Cappa- 
docia. 



Bithynia. 



pretext. He knew, however, that this policy would bring him into 
collision with Rome, a power which he had perhaps learnt to hate, 
when in i i6 it withdrew Phrygia from his sway, in spite of the bargain 
with his father, and though it had been administered by the Pontic 
king for more than ten years. Still Rome was formidable, and he 
desired, if possible, to secure his objects without incurring her open 
enmity. 

In preparation for his new enterprise Mithridates made a tour of 
inspection throughout Asia. Everywhere he found decaying king- 
doms or oppressed populations sighing for a liberator. The centre of 
the peninsula was occupied by the Galatae, a loose federation of 
three distinct nationalities (Tolistobogii, Sangarii, Trocmes), each sub- 
divided into tribes under tetrarchs. The only central authority was 
an assembly of 300 of these tetrarchs, meeting on fixed dates in a 
sacred wood, and judging cases of homicide. It had no political 
functions, and each tribe managed its own affairs, foreign or domestic. 
A state so divided was necessarily weak, and would have fallen under 
the influence of its powerful neighbour, had not Roman policy 
regarded its independence of other Asiatic powers as imperatively 
necessary. The Galatae were still the best soldiers in Asia, and the 
Romans would not risk the loss of such a recruiting ground. 

Paphlagonia, a smaller district, had also been distracted by 
divisions, and had been left as a legacy by its last king Pylemenes to 
the father of Mithridates, The Romans had forbidden the will to be 
carried out, and the country was again split up among petty princes. 
Here, too, Mithridates saw a chance and could urge a claim. 

The kingdom of Cappadocia was in a state of disorder. Since 
190 it had been a faithful ally of Rome. But in 130 the death of its 
king Ariarathes v., the reformer and Philhellene, had left the regency 
in the hands of his widow Nysa, an abandoned woman said to have 
caused five of her sons to be poisoned that she might retain her 
power. Her cruelties provoked a revolution in 125, which placed her 
sixth and only surviving son Ariarathes Epiphanes on the throne. He 
retained it until he was assassinated in iii, leaving an infant son, 
Ariarathes Philometor, under the guardianship of his widow Laodice. 
But some in Cappadocia remembered that it was once united with 
what was now called Pontus, and looked to a reunion under Mithri- 
dates as a security against the miseries of the past twenty years. 
"The invasion of Mithridates Euergetes during the regency of Nysa, 
the marriage of Epiphanes with a Pontic princess, his murder by one 
who was regarded, rightly or wrongly, as an agent of the king of 
Pontus, were so many episodes which marked the progress of the 
unionist idea and prepared its triumph." 

The other Asiatic kingdom which he would visit was Bithynia. 



XXXVIII FIRST ROMAN LEGATION TO MITHRIDATES 609 

Its present ruler, Nicomedes II., had gained power by the murder of 
his father, who had wished to di^sinherit him. In spite of this he was 
a popular king, who elevated and hellenised his people. He had 
been brought up at Rome, and posed as the enthusiastic friend and 
ally of the Romans. But secretly he bore them ill-will, both on per- 
sonal and public grounds : because his accession had been opposed 
by them, and because the contiguity of the Roman province gave rise 
to frequent disputes as to the jurisdiction of the publicani, who not 
unfrequently crossed the frontier to exact what they alleged to be 
due to them from his subjects. He was rich, and possessed a 
powerful war fleet. Mithridates might count on him for support if 
he ever wished to strike at Rome. 

Mithridates had also reason at the time to think that the attention The 
of the Romans would not easily be diverted to him. The Senate and Ko"^<^f'^ 
the Optimates desired peace. They cared little what went on in the ^/^J^^^'^^ 
East, so long as the Roman territories were not attacked to the los-gs. 
detriment of the revenue. The struggle with Jugurtha had thrown a 
lurid light on the weakness of the army and the corruption of its 
officers. A new war meant fresh power to Marius or some other 
popular favourite dreaded as an opponent of the nobility. They had 

I also enough to do nearer home. The Cimbri were pouring into 
Gaul and threatening Italy, and the danger was not at an end till 
the victory of Vercellae in 10 1 ; Sicily was being threatened with 

I another slave war, and all possible troops were needed at home : 
the East was almost without a Roman soldier, and the field was clear 
for his intrigues, 

Mithridates began his scheme of aggrandisement with the nearest Mithri- 

, and smallest of the Asiatic districts. He formed an alliance with ^'■l^'^^ "^"'^ 
Nicomedes of Bithynia, and the two kings invaded Paphlagonia with ^jl^f"^^ ^^ 
the intention of each taking the part nearest their own dominions. Paphla- 
The dispossessed princes hurried off to denounce Mithridates at gonia, 104. 
Rome, where already legates from Scilur, the Scythian king in the 
Crimea, had arrived with similar complaints. The Romans were 
not protectors of the Scythians ; but their complaints helped to 
warn the Senate of the wide-reaching ambition and strenuous char- 
acter of the king. Moreover the principle laid down in the treaty 
with Antiochus— "that the kings of Asia should not set foot on 
Europe " — was held to apply to the Crimea. Accordingly a commis- A commis- 
sion was at once sent to the two kings demanding a restitution of the -^^^^ ^^"^ 
original state of things, both in Asia and the Crimea. Mithridates 'f''^ ^^^^ 
was not yet prepared for open defiance. He promised satisfaction in 
the Crimea,but asserted his claim by inheritance to at least the southern 
part of Paphlagonia, called Gangra. Nicomedes was less submissive, 
and could not restrain his long pent-up bitterness. Promising to 

2 R 



6io 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Mithri- 

dates and 
Nicomedes 
occupy 
Galaiia. 

Mithri- 
dates bribes 
Roman 
nobles, 
1 02- 1 01. 



Suppres- 
sion of the 
Cilician 
pirates, 
102. 

Breach 

between 

Nicomedes 

and 

Mithri- 

dates, 

io2-gS' 



Meeting 
with 
Marius, 
gg-g8. 



evacuate Paphlagonia in favour of its rightful sovereign, he at once 
proclaimed a natural son of his own, to whom he gave the name of 
Pylemenes, asserting him to be a son of the last king of the whole 
country. In addition to this covert defiance, he answered a farther 
demand brought by the commissioners from the consul Marius, to 
furnish in accordance with his treaty a contingent against the Cimbri, 
that the Roman publicani had left him no subjects to send. To 
crown all, under the very eyes of the commissioners, the two kings 
proceeded to occupy Galatia. 

It would be difficult to understand why the Senate submitted 
quietly to such defiance, did we not know from the denunciations of 
Saturninus that agents of Mithridates were distributing lavish bribes 
among the senators, that they might close their eyes to what the two 
kings were doing. But there were other evils in the East which 
demanded redress ; and, partly perhaps to atone for their neglect in 
one direction, the Roman government resolved to do something in 
another. Cilician pirates infested the seas and even ventured to 
land on the shores of Italy itself The orator M. Antonius had 
Cilicia as his 'province' in 103-102 with proconsular powers, and 
was directed to suppress the pirates. He occupied certain ports on 
the coasts of Cilicia Trachea, to which henceforth a propraetor was 
regularly sent, and the parts occupied by the Romans, gradually 
extended and organised, became the province of Cilicia. 

Eventually Nicomedes and Mithridates brought Roman inter- 
ference upon themselves by quarrelling over their spoil. Nicomedes 
began his encroachments by invading Cappadocia. Laodice the 
queen-regent was a sister of Mithridates, and appealed for protection 
to her brother ; but before his help arrived she had made terms 
with and married Nicomedes. This meant the virtual annexation 
of Cappadocia to Bithynia, which Mithridates resolved to prevent by 
invading the country. Laodice and her new husband retreated into 
Bithynia, and her young son Ariarathes VI. was established on the 
throne. He soon found, however, that he was to be wholly sub- 
servient to his uncle Mithridates, who, on his venturing to resist, 
demanded a conference and killed his nephew with his own hand. 
Though not daring openly to annex Cappadocia, he installed one 
of his own sons in it, pretending that he was a grandson of Aria- 
rathes v., whom he had brought up in his court. He took the 
name of Ariarathes Eusebes Philopator, and the unscrupulous 
Gordios was made his guardian and chief minister. 

It was while in Cappadocia that Mithridates met the veteran 
Marius, who had come on his votiva legatio to the Mother of the 
Gods, with the double object of cloaking his loss of influence and of 
seeking occasion in Asia for the war in which alone his eminence 



XXXVIII INTRIGUES OF MITHRIDATES 6ii 

was unquestioned. Mithrldates employed all his powers of pleasing MithH- 
to win over the famous soldier. But Marius was not to be moved, dates 
"Make yourself stronger than' Rome, or submit to the orders of ZJ^^^^^,/"^ 
Rome," was his final advice to the king. But no such spirit animated cappa- 
the Senate. For five more years the practical supremacy of Mithri- ducia, 
dates in Cappadocia was allowed to continue, although the harsh and ^oo-gj. 
cruel administration of Gordios provoked more than one popular out- 
break. But Nicomedes of Bithynia feared for his own territory Jealousy of 
from the growing ambition of Mithridates, and determined in self- Nicomedes. 
defence to reconcile himself with Rome. Queen Laodice went 
thither with a handsome youth whom she affirmed to be her third 
son by Ariarathes Epiphanes, and consequently the true heir to the 
throne of Cappadocia ; while Mithridates sent Gordios to assert 
that the reigning sovereign was really the grandson of Ariarathes 
Philopator. 
\ Public feeling at Rome, however, was now beginning to be Roma?i 
alarmed by the encroachments of Mithridates. Marius no doubt Senate 
had enlightened his party as to the reality of what was going on in .^" t ^ 
Asia. The Senate therefore passed a decree ordering Mithridates 9^.9^. 
' to evacuate Cappadocia and the share of Paphlagonia which he 
J had annexed, and Nicomedes to withdraw his son from the rest of 
Paphlagonia. The same decree declared Cappadocia and Paphla- 
I gonia free. The Paphlagonians quietly resumed their old govern- 
I ment of chiefs. But the Cappadocians refused this offer of illusory 
( " freedom," which they believed would mean internal discord and 
ultimate annexation to the Roman province, and obtained per- 
* mission to elect a king. Their choice fell upon a noble named 
' Ariobarzanes, who adopted the title of Philoromaeus. 

' Thus Mithridates was forced to surrender the prize in his Tigranes 

I first encounter with Rome. But though yielding for the moment ^^"^ of 
' he had not given up his schemes of aggrandisement. Next time, attacks'^ 
I however, he contrived to induce another to confront the danger in Cappadocia 
' what was really his own undertaking. Of the two kingdoms of at the 
I Lesser and Greater Armenia, which had been set free after the ^»^tigatio?i 
\ defeat of Antiochus at Magnesia (190), the former had been for ^J^^^ 
\ some time incorporated with Pontus, the latter had remained in- 
; dependent, and was now under the rule of an energetic and able 
I sovereign named Tigranes, who had already absorbed the district 
of Sophene, on the frontier of Cappadocia, and was turning his 
eyes towards Cappadocia itself. With him Mithridates negotiated 
an alliance through his minister Gordios, giving him one of his own 
daughters in marriage, and persuading him to attack Cappadocia, 
then ruled by the recently-elected Ariobarzanes. ^^'ithout attempt- 
ing resistance, the feeble Ariobarzanes collected his treasures and 



6l2 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Sulla 
propraetor 
of Cilicia 
charged 
with the 
restoration 
of Ariobar- 
zanes, ()2. 



Arsaces 
king of 
Part hi a 
sends a 
legate to 
Sulla. 



Effect in 
Asia of the 
Social 7var 
in Italy, 
gr-88. 



fled to Rome, leaving the country in the power of Tigranes, who 
committed it to the regency of Gordios, the tool of Mithridates. 

Once more Mithridates had to yield the prey which his intrigues 
had won. The Roman government listened to the appeal of Ario- 
barzanes, who had not come empty-handed to Rome, and Lucius 
Sulla was commissioned to restore him. Sulla was praetor in 93, 
and was to go as propraetor to Cilicia in 92 with the special charge 
of restoring Ariobarzanes, and with the understanding that his chief 
object should be to check the growing power of Mithridates. He 
took only a small force of Roman soldiers, but having quickly secured 
large contingents from the province and the allied kingdoms, ad- 
vanced into Cappadocia, defeated the troops raised to resist him, 
expelled Gordios, and proclaimed the restoration of Ariobarzanes. 
Having penetrated to the extreme east of Cappadocia Sulla encamped 
on the banks of the Euphrates, and was there visited by Orobazos, 
legate of the Parthian king — the first occasion on which the Arsacids 
came into communication with a Roman officer. Sulla felt the im- 
portance of the occasion, and the necessity of impressing this great 
but unknown power with the might of Rome. He received the 
ambassador seated on a lofty tribunal, with two lower seats arranged 
for the Parthian legate and the king of Cappadocia on either 
hand. And though Arsaces afterwards put his legate to death for 
compromising the dignity of the Great King, the fact remained to 
the credit of Sulla that to him first the Parthian monarch had sent 
desiring the friendship and alliance of Rome. It seemed the crown- 
ing point of his success, and the presage (as some necromancer was 
careful to tell him) of his future greatness. Asia was apparently 
more completely in the hands of Rome than ever. With Parthia 
friendly, with Mithridates and Nicomedes forced to submit, and with 
the king of Cappadocia wholly dependent on the support of the 
Republic for his throne and safety, there seemed to be no quarter 
from which danger might be expected. The province itself was 
more content than usual, for it had lately been governed (94-93) by 
the honest Q. Mucius Scaevola and his still more noble legate P. 
Rutilius, and had experienced a temporary alleviation of the exactions 
and cruelties of the publicani. The Egyptian and Syrian dynasties, 
so formidable in the past, were in the last stage of decline, and could 
never more raise a hand to contest Roman supremacy. All seemed 
safe and quiet. 

But this tranquillity was shaken by the news which reached Asia 
at the end of 91, or the beginning of 90, of the outbreak of the 
Marsic war. The Roman troops were hurriedly ordered home, and 
the provinces left unprotected. At once we hear of Thracian incur- 
sions upon Macedonia, of renewed activity of Mithridates in Asia. 



XXXVIII ROMAN INTERFERENCE IN BITHYNIA 613 

He had been preparing fleets and forces for farther expeditions to 
the north of the Black Sea ; but his preparations were not complete ; 
and again he induced Tigraries to be his cat's-paw — to invade 
Cappadocia, and, expelling Ariobarzanes, once more to set upon the 
throne Mithridates' own son. About the same time he instigated a 
revolution in Bithynia. Nicomedes II. had died in 91 and had Revolution 
been succeeded by his eldest son Nicomedes Philopator, a cruel "^ 
and cowardly tyrant, whose bastard brother Socrates, after insti- ^^^^y^^^- 
gating abominable executions in the royal family in the apparent 
interest of the king, and after securing the support of Mithridates, 
retired to Rome, accused his brother of atrocious crimes, and asked 
to be declared king in his place. Rejected by the Senate he retired 
first to Cyzicus, where he assassinated his sister in order to obtain her 
property^ then to Euboea, and lastly to the court of Mithridates, just 
when the news of the Marsic war had made him feel that he might 
do as he liked in Asia without fear of Roman interference. Mithri- 
dates did not actively assist this disreputable adventurer ; but he 
allowed him to enlist troops in Pontus, with which he easily defeated 
Nicomedes III. and seized on the throne of Bithynia. 

But again Mithridates found that he had reckoned too confidently iVr. 
on the blindness or indifference of the Senate. Nicomedes and AguilHus 
Ariarathes had both hurried to Rome, and found there the crisis of ^^ ^•^^<3!, 
the Social war already past. The Senate warmly espoused their 
cause, and a commission was sent to Asia to restore the exiled kings. 
At the head of it was Manius Aquillius (son of the organiser of the 
province in 129), who had already distinguished himself in 102-101 by 
his vigorous suppression of the revolted slaves in Sicily. But though 
a brave and successful soldier, his character for venality was bad. 
He had barely escaped being convicted of peculation after his 
Sicilian campaign, and was not likely to resist the still greater tempta- 
tion offered by the state of Asia. 

The instructions given to Aquillius and his colleagues were to Nicomedes 
restore, by force if necessary, the two kings Nicomedes and Ariarathes and 
to the thrones of Bithynia and Cappadocia. They brought no ^^^(^^'<^ihes 
troops, but were to have the services of the small Roman force in the restored 
province, augmented by the contingents of the allied states, among 8g. 
which Pontus itself was reckoned. To the surprise of all Mithri- 
dates submitted. He does not appear to have sent the required 
contingent, but he did not resist the restoration of the two kings, 
which was peaceably accomplished in the spring of 89. 

Whether this proceeded from a politic desire to gain time for 
preparations, or from a real wish to be at peace with Rome in order 
to push on his conquests in the north, it would have been prudent 
on the part of Aquillius to have affected belief in his sincerity. But 



6i4 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Aquilliiis 
forces oil a 
rupture 
with 
Mithri- 
dates, 8g. 



Aquillius 
suggests to 
Nicoinedes 
and Ario- 
barzanes to 
pillage the 
lands of 
Potitus. 



Mithri- 

dates 

demands 

competi- 

sation. 



Mithri- 
dates 
avenges 
himself 



His strong 
position 
in 8g. 



a peaceful solution of the difficulty was in fact a disappointment to 
him. He had come to Asia in the hopes of enhancing his reputation 
as a soldier and of enriching himself. It did not suit him that Mithri- 
dates should make no resistance. There was, however, one method 
of producing fresh complications. Though there had been no fight- 
ing, an army had been raised and kept on foot for some months and 
had to be paid. The restored kings had not yet had time to fill their 
coffers, and could not find the money. Who should more justly pay 
than Mithridates, who had made Roman interference necessary ? In 
answer to the demand the king produced an account of the sums 
already disbursed by him in maintaining good relations with the 
Senate ; the Romans were his debtors rather than his creditors. 
Aquillius, thus repulsed by Mithridates, demanded payment from 
Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes, and when they pleaded their inability, 
advised them to fill their exchequers by raids upon the territory of 
Mithridates. The advice was acted upon by Nicomedes, though 
Ariobarzanes was more cowardly or more scrupulous. The former 
led an expedition over the Pontic frontier to the walls of Amastris, 
and returned with sufficient booty to repay the money which Aquillius 
and his colleagues had raised from Roman publicani and bankers 
in Asia. 

Mithridates acted diplomatically. He ordered his troops to 
retire before the Bithynians ; and, when the raid was over, one of his 
officers, Pelopidas, appeared at the Roman headquarters demanding 
the punishment of the aggressors, and ignoring the fact that the raid 
had been advised or connived at by the Romans. Aquillius and his 
colleagues parried the demand with equal caution. " We will not," 
they said, "permit Mithridates to be injured by Nicomedes any more 
than Nicomedes by Mithridates." Thus refused satisfaction Mithri- 
dates replied by sending his son Ariarathes at the head of an army 
into Cappadocia, and once more driving Ariobarzanes from the 
country. Then Pelopidas appeared again and informed the Roman 
commissioners of the just reprisals taken by his master, who at the 
same time was sending an ambassador to Rome to complain of their 
conduct. Still he offered that, if they would even now give him just 
satisfaction for the injuries of the king of Bithynia, he would not only 
withdraw from Cappadocia, but would also supply ships and men to 
put down the Italian revolt. 

Mithridates was now so formidable that the Roman legates might 
prudently have listened to this offer. During the year then drawing 
to a close his generals had conducted a successful campaign north of 
the Euxine against the Bastarnes and Sarmatians ; his army had 
been swollen by enormous contingents from Scythia ; his fleet already 
consisted of 300 vessels of war : many others were being built, and 



XXXVIII WAR WITH MITHRIDATES BEGUN 615 

his wealth enabled him to hire skilful pilots and sea-captains from 
Egypt and Phoenicia ; while throughout Asia his agents were work- 
ing successfully in securing him alHances not only in the East — in 
Iberia, Media, *and Parthia, — but also among the Greek towns in the 
West, both in Asia and Europe, in Crete, Egypt, and Syria. 

But Aquillius was blind to the terrors of such a coalition at Final 
a time when the energies of Rome were still demanded for the re- demand of 
mains of the Marsic war. He answered Pelopidas by declaring that ^^"""•^• 
his master must respect the freedom of Bithynia, must evacuate 
Cappadocia and restore Ariobarzanes, or take the consequences. 
At the same time Pelopidas was ordered to quit the Roman quarters 
anci not to return except with a full submission from the king. 

Mithridates accepted the challenge thus haughtily thrown down, War. 
and in the spring of 88 open war began. The Roman and allied forces ^P^^^g of 
were in four divisions. The Bithynian army of 60,000 infantry and 
6000 cavalry under Nicomedes was to invade Paphlagonia. Of the 
rest, one corps commanded by Q. Oppius, governor of Cilicia, accom- 
panied by one of Aquillius' colleagues, Manlius Mantinus, was to 
enter Cappadocia ; another under Aquillius himself was stationed on 
the river Billeos, near the western frontier of Paphlagonia, to support 
Nicomedes ; a fourth under L. Cassius Longinus, governor of Asia, 
was posted in reserve at Gordiocome, on the river Sangarios, near the 
southern frontier of Bithynia, to protect Galatia and Phrygia. To this 
attack by land was added one by sea ; a fleet of vessels belonging 
partly to Bithynia, partly to the province of Asia, was stationed 
(under the command of Minucius Rufus and Gains Popilius) at 
Byzantium, to close the Propontis to the Pontic ships of war. 

These preparations occupied the winter of 89-88, and when The huo 
hostilities commenced the Roman forces collected from the province armies. 
and allies consisted of about 190,000 men. The army of Mithridates 
gathered from all parts of his extensive dominions was superior by 
nearly 100,000 men, including a large body of Greek mercenaries, 
50,000 cavalry, and 130 scythed chariots under the command of 
Crateros. The chief officers were Dorylaus in command of the picked 
corps or phalanx, and Archelaus and Neoptolemus (apparently Mace- 
donian mercenaries) for the rest of the army. The king himself was 
commander-in-chief, and showed extraordinary activity and vigilance 
in every department. The bulk of the Pontic army was to muster Defeat of 
in the plain of Amasia, on the south-west frontier of Pontus. But ^_;J^ 
before this could take place the Bithynians had already entered 
Pontus by the valley of the river Amnias, where they were met by a spring of 
force under Archelaus and Neoptolemus, and after a slight success 88, 
were disastrously defeated and almost annihilated. This was in 
the early spring of 88, and Mithridates was prompt to follow up 



Bithynians 
in the 



6i6 



IISTORV OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Defeat of 
Aquillius, 
and 
general 
retreat if 
the Roman 
forces. 



Cassias 
re/ires to 
Apameia. 



Success of 

Miihri- 

dates. 

Flight of 
the Roman 
command- 
ers. 



Capture of 
Oppius, 



the advantage. One division of his forces was pushed forward I 
towards Cappadocia to stop Oppius, while the main army crossed 
Paphlagonia by forced marches to attack AquiUius on the Billeos. ■ 
Everywhere the prestige of this victory over Nicomedes stood him 
in stead : the Bithynian outposts, guarding defiles on his line of 
march, abandoned their ground directly he appeared ; Nicomedes 
himself retreated southward to join L, Cassius at Gordiocome ; 
and Aquillius found his Asiatic auxiliaries gradually deserting and 
scattering to their homes. He presently felt obliged to abandon his 
position on the Billeos, and to attempt to join his colleague Cassius 
also. But before he could traverse the distance between the two 
positions the advanced guard of the army of Mithridates caught him, 
and at a place unknown to us, called Protopacheion, he was obliged to 
fight. The Roman army was completely defeated, and lost its camp 
with 10,000 men killed and 300 made prisoners. Aquillius himself 
escaped by favour of the darkness, which prevented immediate pursuit, 
and crossing the Sangarios arrived at Pergamus. 

Cassius was more prudent. He distrusted his newly enrolled 
troops, consisting almost entirely of Asiatics and the fragments of the 
recently beaten Bithynian army, and retiring southward into Phrygia 
posted himself in a strong position at a fortified village called the 
Lion's Head. Here his distrust of his .\siatic troops was justified by 
their constant desertion : and at length abandoning all idea of giving 
Mithridates battle, he dismissed them to their homes, and retired 
with his Roman legionaries to Apameia on the Meander. 

The failure of the Roman interference was complete, and through- 
out Asia there was a rush to seek the alliance and protection of 
Mithridates. Aquillius not thinking himself safe even at Pergamus 
retired to Mitylene ; his colleague Mantinus escaped to Rhodes ; Nico- 
medes and Ariobarzanes embarked for Italy and Rome ; Cassius 
abandoned Apameia at the approach of the Pontic troops, and retired 
also to Rhodes. Oppius, who had retreated to Laodicea in Caria, 
attempted to hold the town. But when a herald from Mithridates 
proclaimed to the townsfolk that, if they delivered up the Roman 
general, they should be unharmed, they allowed the mercenary troops 
to escape, and led out Oppius, preceded in mockery by his lictors, 
and handed him over to the king, whom, like other Greeks in Asia 
Minor, they were ready to receive as a deliverer from the heavy yoke 
of Rome. Mithridates, however, was not yet prepared for acts of 
unpardonable hostility. Oppius was not ill-treated or thrown into 
chains, but was merely taken in the king's suite as a prisoner on 
parole. But this was enough to impress the people with the great- 
ness of the king's power. He entered the Roman province by the 
valley of the Maeander, and was everywhere enthusiastically received. 



XXXVIII MASSACRE OF ITALIANS IN ASIA 617 

At Ephesus he embarked on board his fleet and proceeded to secure 
the submission of the islands. Chios submitted with reluctance ; but 
the people of Mitylene handed over Aquillius with ready officiousness. and of 
Mithridates treated him very differently from Oppius. He had now Aquilluis. 
resolved to break openly with Rome, and the punishment of one who 
had been notorious for oppressive exactions would impress the im- 
aginations of the people whom he now affected to liberate. He 
exposed him therefore to every kind of indignity, and at length put 
him to a cruel death. ^ 

All the Greek cities were now stirred with the hope of shaking off The Greek 

the burden of Roman tax-gatherers and money-lenders, of Roman c^i^^^^ pm 
, . . ^ - , • 1 -1 Mithrt- 

, proconsuls and their tram. In some few the richer commercial ^^^^^^ 

' classes still clung to the Roman connexion, as well as some specially 

favoured cities, such as Stratonice in Caria, which Mithridates had 

to take by force ; while at Adramyttium in Mysia, though its Senate 

, declared for Rome, the popular party massacred the Senate and 

delivered the town to the king. In the greater number of Greek 

' cities there was no appreciable division or hesitation in following the 

; example of Ephesus, where the statues in honour of Rome were 

I thrown down and the royal troops welcomed with every demonstration 

I of joy. 

( But a still more terrible blow was to be struck. The capture of The 

\ Stratonice completed the conquest of Asia Minor, but it had not ^jH^fJ'^^ ^-^ 
I relieved the cities of the Italian residents, who to the number of j^g^^jgntsin 
above 100,000 were settled in them as members of the companies of Asia, SS. 
publicani, or as bankers and merchants. Many of them were person- 
ally obnoxious either as oppressive collectors of taxes or extortionate 
money-lenders, but many more were honest and peaceable traders. 
\ Public feeling, however, was too much excited to make distinctions. 
) All were alike regarded with hatred as the representatives of the 
I conquering race whom tyranny had made odious to all. As a question 
I of policy they presented a difficulty to the king. War had been 
I determined upon early in 88 at Rome, and the consul Lucius Sulla 
I was already with his army preparing to cross to Asia. The Italian 

I residents were sure to be a nucleus of resistance to the supremacy 
of the king, and the support of the Romanising party in each state. 
!| How was he to deal with them ? 

He was not long in deciding ; and having decided he carried 

1 According to some, however, Aquillius killed himself ; according to others 
he was taken through Asia riding on an ass, and forced by blows continually to 
proclaim his name, and was finally killed by having molten gold poured down his 
throat. In Licinianus, p. 34, it is said that his restoration to liberty was stipu- 
lated for in the treaty of Dardanus (84). If that is so, it is evident that his real 
fate was unknown. See p. 635. 



6i8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



All Latin- 
speakitig 
residents to 
be put to 
death on a 
Jixed day 
and cast out 
utiburied, 
88. 



The order 
almost 
universally 
obeyed. 



Sotne 
escape to 
Rhodes. 



The con- 
fiscations 
used to re- 
lieve the 
towns. 



out his plan with great adroitness, so as to avail himself to the full 
of the popular exasperation against the Romans. Secret instructions 
were sent round to the governors of the towns whom he had himself 
appointed, and to the magistrates of those which were still nominally 
free, that on the thirtieth day from the receipt of the order every Latin- 
speaking resident, without distinction between Roman and Italian,^ 
without regard to sex or age, was to be put to death, and their bodies 
cast out unburied. Rewards were to be offered to slaves or debtors 
who killed Italian masters or creditors. Slaves were to have their 
freedom, debtors the remission of half their debts, while severe 
punishment was threatened to all who gave harbour to the living or 
iDurial to the dead. 

When the fatal day came the horrible order was almost universally 
obeyed. Neither shrine nor altar was allowed to shelter the fugi- 
tives. From the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, of Asclepius at 
Pergamus, of Hestia at Caunes, and of Concord at Tralles, the terrified 
suppliants were torn away and slain within the sacred precincts. 
Different degrees and forms of cruelty were used in different places. 
Sometimes the victims had their hands cut off before being slain ; at 
Caunes all the children were killed in the presence of their mothers, 
the wives before the eyes of their husbands, who were put to death 
last. At Adramyttium they were driven into the sea and drowned. 
At Tralles the citizens, not willing to stain their own hands with 
blood, hired a Paphlagonian captain of mercenaries to carry out the 
order. Here and there a Roman escaped by adopting a Greek 
dress ; in a few places, such as Cos, Calymne, and Magnesia on the 
Maeander, the rights of sanctuary were for a time respected, and the 
Italians managed to escape to Rhodes, the sole Greek territory within 
possible distance still holding aloof from Mithridates. The number 
of the victims is variously stated from 80,000 to 150,000, while 
15,000 slaves were rewarded with liberty. Whatever were the exact 
figures of the black list, it is certain that the slaughter was very large, 
and that the property collected in Pergamus was so vast that IVIithri- 
dates was able to crown his popularity in Asia by relieving the cities 
from tribute for five years. This wealth was increased by other 
acts of spoliation. At Cos he laid hands upon 800 talents deposited 
by Jewish bankers in the temples, and upon the treasures of a young 
Egyptian prince (Ptolemy Alexander), whom he took with him to 
Pontus. It may be true that in some cases the Greek citizens were 
reluctant to carry out the order. It would be impossible to conceive 
that in no case had the Italian residents gained the friendship and 



^ The recent enfranchisement of the ItaUans perhaps made any distinction 
between citizen and non-citizen ditificult, even if it were desired. 



attacks 
Rhodes atid 
occupies 



Peiraeus 
and Athens, 
88. 



XXXVIII MITHRIDATES REPULSED AT RHODES 619 

esteem of their neighbours ; but it seems certain that in the majority 
the massacre was in the strictest sense popular, and the gratification 
of a long repressed but burning hatred. 

Having thus secured Asia Mithridates proceeded to extend his Mithri- 
power in the rest of Greece. The one place which still remained ^'^^^f^ 
faithful to Rome was Rhodes ; and therefore, while sending his 
lieutenant Archelaus to Athens, on the invitation of the Athenians, 
he himself embarked at Ephesus and sailed with a fleet of war the 
vessels, carrying siege artiller}^ and all the implements for attacking 
walls, to that island. The Rhodians were before all things merchants, 
and had suffered some disadvantages under the Roman supremacy, 
which had deprived them of their continental possessions in Caria 
and Lycia, and damaged their trade by opening the harbour of 
Delos as a rival to their own in 146. Still they were cautious, and 
had no confidence in the ultimate success of Mithridates. They saw 
that the immediate effect of joining him would be the failure of their The 
Italian trade, and the removal of Italian merchants, for which, even Rhodians 
if Mithridates ultimately succeeded, there was no obvious way in ^f^uVJ^jf 
which he could compensate them ; whereas if the Romans should j^oiiie. 
succeed, their vengeance would be certain and heavy. Therefore, 
though they had received many favours at the hands of Mithridates, 

( and indeed had erected his statue in their town as a benefactor, they 
determined to resist. Their fleet met the king's off Myndos in Caria : 

' but though superior in skill it was inferior in numbers, and after a 
severe engagement the Rhodian admiral Damagoras drew off his 
ships and returned home. Mithridates followed and blockaded the 
town of Rhodes, situated on a lofty rock at the north-east corner of 
the island. But all his efforts to capture it proved futile. For some Mithri- 
time his siege artillery was delayed by contrary winds ; and mean- "^^^-y"^'-^ 
while the daily skirmishes which took place went rather against the Rhodes. 
Pontic fleet and army, the king himself on one occasion all but 
falling into the enemy's hands. When the artillery arrived attempt 
after attempt to scale the rock or batter the walls failed, and after 
one desperate endeavour to effect an escalade by night Mithridates, 
finding winter approaching, withdrew his fleet to Asia ; where having 
made an equally unsuccessful attack upon Patara in Lycia, he removed 
for the winter to Pergamus, which was now to be the capital and 
headquarters of his great empire. 

Meanwhile his lieutenant Archelaus had had a much easier and Archelajis 
more successful task in European Greece. The burden of Roman '^^^ihens, 
sway had weighed much less heavily on the Greeks of Europe than 
on those of Asia. Though for certain purposes Greece had been 
placed under the supremacy of the governor of Macedonia, yet its 
local liberties had been respected, and the phantom of independence 



620 



HISTORY OF ROME 



88. 



Divided 
feelings at 
Athens. 



The party 
in favour 
of Mithri- 
dates 
prevail, 
and send 
A r is t ion to 
Ephesus. 



Aristion 
reports in 
favour 
of an 
alliance 
with 
Mithri- 
dates. 



preserved. Of all the republics of Greece, amounting to some hun- 
dred, none had been more favourably treated than Athens. Even 
some shadow of its old imperial position had been restored to it, by 
allowing it to possess Oropus and Haliartus, and the islands of Paros, 
Scyros, Imbros, and Lemnos, and above all Delos, as the centre of 
a flourishing commerce. Yet even at Athens, though not without 
a Romanising party, there was a feeling that the Roman supremacy 
stood in the way of a still more splendid future, and a disposition to 
hail Mithridates as the messiah of a restored Hellenism. In their 
dreams the Athenians saw once more the empty basins of the 
Peiraeus crowded with vessels of war or commerce ; the arsenals 
once more replenished ; the long walls restored ; the Pnyx filled with 
the ecclesia of a powerful republic, making treaties with kings or 
dictating measures to subject states. The alliance of Mithridates 
seemed to offer the opportunity required. He was lord of those 
regions with which the commerce of a restored Athens would be 
specially concerned ; and he and his father before him had for 
many years kept up a friendly intercourse with the republic, attested 
by a gymnasium built by Euergetes, a college of Etipatoristae of 
which Mithridates was patron, and by numerous offerings in the 
temples of Delos. It was determined to send an ambassador to him 
at Ephesus to offer the friendship of the city^ and to investigate on 
the spot the state of affairs, and whether it would be prudent for the 
state to commit itself farther. The agent chosen was Aristion, 
son of the peripatetic philosopher Athenion, and himself a philoso- 
pher and rhetorician of some repute. He was received with the 
highest honours by Mithridates ; was enrolled as one of the king's 
"friends" ; and wrote such glowing accounts to Athens of the Pontic 
sovereign's abilities, popularity, and success, that on his return 
accompanied by a crowd of slaves laden with gold, and bearing on 
his finger a ring engraved with the portrait of the king, he was 
received in the Peiraeus with all the honours of a triumph, attended 
by a bodyguard, lodged in the principal building — the official resi- 
dence of the chief commissioner of the Delian revenue — and invited 
to give an account of his embassy from the lofty tribune usually 
reserved for the governors of Macedonia. 

The oration which he then delivered dwelt on the wrongs, real 
and imaginary, which the city suffered under Roman supremacy ; and 
painted in such bright colours the court of Mithridates, whose ante- 
chamber was guarded by kings and crowded with ambassadors from 
every imaginable country, that in a state of wild excitement the citizens 
rushed to the theatre, elected Aristion chief minister for war (o-T/aarr;- 
■yo? kiiX TO. oTrAa), allowing him to choose his own colleagues, and 
immediately afterwards declared the full republic restored, re- 



XXXVIII MITHRIDATES SUPREME IN GREECE 621 

nounced the friendship of Rome, and accepted the alliance of 88. 
Mithridates. 

The example of Athens was followed by nearly all the states in The rest of 
Greece, from the Achaeans and Spartans in the south to the borders Gi^eece joins 
of Thessaly in the north, and by the islands of the Aegean with ^^l^^' 
the one exception of Delos. Besides containing a large number of except 
Italian residents, Delos owed its commercial position and importance Delos. 
to the favour of Rome, which it might easily lose, but was not hkely 
to enhance, by a change of allegiance. An expedition sent out by Failure of 
Aristion, under the command of another philosopher named ApeUicon Athenian 
of Teos, was cut to pieces by Orbius, a legate of the governor of ^^'P^^^^'^'^ 
Macedonia or a resident magistrate at Delos. Apellicon had no 
knowledge of warfare : leaving his camp without proper defences he 
was surprised and had to fly back to Athens, with the loss of the 
greater part of his ships and men. But shortly after this repulse of Arrival of 
Apellicon Archelaus arrived at Delos : he took the island, put to death Archelaus 
all the Italians and many of the Delians, sold the women and children, i^n^y ^^rt 
plundered the temples, and levelled the city to the ground. Half of of 88. 
the spoil, indeed, was given up to the Athenians ; and their chief Athens 
magistrate Aristion, who now joined the fleet, was treated with high ^^^^^^^^f 
honour, and had a guard of 2000 soldiers assigned to him. But it ^^^/^^^ ^^ 
soon became evident that in shaking off the yoke of Rome Athens the kifig of 
had fallen under a worse slavery. Aristion was practically a military Pontus. 
dictator or tyrant, himself the tool of a foreign king. A Pontic 
garrison occupied the Peiraeus, and Mithridates himself early the 
following year was elected chief strategus, with Aristion as his second 
colleague. Seeing that this was coming, a large number of those 
who still favoured the Roman alliance left the city, until, alarmed at 
the number of emigrants, Aristion stationed guards at the gates to 
kill all who endeavoured to escape. 

Meanwhile Archelaus, established quietly in the Peiraeus, received EstabHsh- 
the submission of all Greece. One of the Pontic lieutenants, Metro- ^^'^'^f ^f *^^ 
phanes, seized Chalcis and secured all Euboea. Thebes led the ofMithri- 
defection of Boeotia, in which Thespiae alone refused to join. The dates in 
Spartans and Achaeans brought over all Peloponnese, and the neigh- Greece, 
bouring islands followed suit. The governor of Macedonia, who ^^-^7- 
should have interfered, was at the time engaged in repulsing an 
invasion of Thracians, who, instigated perhaps by Mithridates, and 
certainly allied with him, had penetrated as far south as Epirus, and 
had pillaged the temple of Dodona. Before the spring of 87 all 
Greece south of Thessaly, with the islands of the archipelago, had 
fallen almost without a blow under the supremacy of Mithridates. 
It was the highest point of his prosperity. From being the king of 
a comparatively insignificant district of Asia, he had in six months 



622 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. XXXVIII 



Sulla 
starts for 
Greece in 
the summer 
0/87. 



become master of Asia Minor, and of all Greece south of Thermo- 
pylae, with the islands of the Aegean, The power of Rome, which 
at the beginning of the year extended almost without dispute over 
all these lands, had been entirely wiped out. It may well have 
appeared strange that the Roman government seemed to be tamely 
submitting to this disgrace, to this loss of territory and prestige. 
There were not wanting some more cautious than the rest, who fore- 
saw that the vengeance was only delayed and would assuredly fall. 
Already the omens were said to be bad for Mithridates, and a 
crowned figure of victory which was being lowered to his seat in the 
theatre of Pergamus, just as it was about to touch his head, had 
slipped from its cords and been broken in pieces. But more 
alarming than any omen was the news that Sulla had overcome 
his difficulties at home and was on his way with five legions to 
Greece. 



AuTHORrriES. — Seep. 639. 



CHAPTER XXXIX 

SULLA AND THE FIRST MITHRIDATIC WAR 

Success of the quaestor Q. Bruttius Sura in the spring of 87 — Sulla lands in 
Epirus in the early summer, and marches to Athens — Revolution of feeling 
in Greece — Siege of Athens and the Peiraeus (87-86) — Lucullus sent to Egypt 
and the islands to collect a fleet (86-85) — Capture of Athens (86) — Destruction 
of the Peiraeus — Battle of Chaeroneia (86)^ — Unpopularity of the government 
of Mithridates in Asia and revolt of Ephesus (86) — Dorylaus defeated by 
Sulla at Orchomenus (85) — The Romans again supreme in Greece — L. 
Valerius Flaccus, sent out to supersede Sulla, is murdered by Fimbria (85) — 
Fimbria overruns Bithynia (85) — Mithridates takes refuge in Pitane (85-84) — 
i Arrival of Lucullus with his fleet, and negotiations with Mithridates at 
Pergamus — Death of Fimbria (84) — Return of Sulla to Italy (83). 

I 

I When Sulla landed in Epirus in the summer of 87, the fortunes of Q. Bruttius 
I Mithridates had already received a check. Metrophanes, after con- ^^^<^^ 
iquering Euboea, had sailed northward, and was threatening Deme- t^g Z-aetor 
Urias, an important magazine and place of arms of the province of of Mace- 
I Macedonia. Here he was surprised by the proquaestor Bruttius donia. 

Sura, lost two ships with their crews and was obliged to sail away, '^^f^^^^ 
I Bruttius then made a successful descent upon the island of Sciathos, p}ianes 
(where the stores and booty of the Pontic army had been collected, spring of 
[killed the slaves in charge, and cut off the hands of free men. S'^, 
' Returning to the mainland and receiving reinforcements from 
J Macedonia he marched south, and met Archelaus and Aristion in 

Boeotia near Chaeroneia. For three days he maintained the contest, 
\ driving his opponents towards the coast, until, the Pontic army being 

reinforced by some Spartans and Achaeans, he was obliged to retire. 

But his success had already caused a revolution of feeling in Greece, 

and by the time he had met Lucullus with Sulla's advanced guard, 

and had been ordered to return to Macedonia, the cities were for the 

most part ready to submit. 

Sulla had landed with five legions, or about 31,500 men, and 
< collecting reinforcements of men and money from Thessaly and 

Aetolia, was on his march to Athens, now the stronghold of the Pontic 



624 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

Sulla forces. When he arrived in Boeotia, Thebes set the example of sub- 

marches to mission, and his camp was visited by legates from many other parts of 

Athens, Greece, asking pardon for their defection and promising obedience 

of 87. ^^^ ^^ future. Before long Archelaus could count on nothing south 

of Thermopylae except Euboea and Attica. There indeed Athens, 

influenced by Aristion and the Pontic garrison of the Peiraeus, closed 

her gates and defied the proconsul. Sulla, in spite of a tincture of 

letters and art, was not the man to feel any sentimental wish to 

spare Athens for the sake of her glorious past or the genius of her 

He poets and philosophers. " I am come to Athens," he said, " not to 

confiscates study but to subdue rebels." Nor had he any scruples as to other 

^ ^ . sacred places in Greece, The war required money, which could be 

treasures of . \ . ^ ^..^ 

the temples, obtamed from the treasuries of the temples. His agents were sent 

to the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and of Asclepius at Epidaurus, 

with orders to bring all the offerings that were of value. To the 

Amphictyonic council, to whom belonged especially the care of the 

temple at Delphi, he wrote in mocking terms that the treasures 01 

that temple had better be transferred to his custody, as he would 

be able to keep them more securely, or, if he were obliged to use 

them, would be able to repay their value. And when his agent, 

Kaphis the Phocian, reported that he was awed by the sound of the 

god's lyre within the shrine as he approached it, he wrote back word 

to him not to be afraid, for singing was a sign of joy, and the god 

was doubtless rejoiced to hand over his treasures. 

Siege of He found, however, that the difficulty before him was a formid- 

Athens ^ble one. The long walls connecting Athens and the Peiraeus had 

and the ^^^ many years been in ruins. But their materials had been used to 
r'eiracus, ..v..- . _, _^. 1/-, --iri-i 

S7-86. repair the fortifications of the Peiraeus and of the city itself, which 

was still surrounded by walls more than five miles in circuit, some- 
times double, with huge square towers at the principal gates, able in 
most parts to resist the ordinary siege artillery of the time. The 
fortifications of the Peiraeus were still more formidable, as they had 
been ever since the time oT Pericles. A wall about fifty-five feet 
in height and fifteen in breadth, built entirely of hewn stone secured 
by iron clamps, enclosed the whole peninsula within a circuit of about 
eight miles, and contained an almost impregnable citadel on the height 
of Munychia. Sulla had not sufficient forces to undertake the siege 
and assault of both these strong places. He therefore contented him- 
self with leaving enough men outside the city to prevent the egress 
of the citizens or the introduction of supplies, and bent his whole 
energy upon the taking of the Peiraeus, where Archelaus was posted 
in force, commanding the entrance to the harbour with his ships. 

To supply materials for this, not only were the treasures of 
the temples seized and converted into money by Lucullus in Pelo- 



XXXIX LUCULLUS COLLECTS A FLEET 625 

ponnese ; but requisitions were made on all the cities. Long The 
strings of mule-carts, ten thousand in number, brought timber, iron, Petraeus, 
and workmen from Boeotia d,nd elsewhere. When that proved '^' ' 
insufficient he did not hesitate to cut down the sacred groves, and 
especially the trees of the Academy — spared through so many genera- 
tions and so many hostile occupations. Still the mighty walls of the 
Peiraeus defied him, and the construction of his embankment against 
them was interrupted by frequent sallies of the garrison, in one of 
which the Roman troops were only saved from a panic by the 
strenuous efforts of the legate Murena and the opportune arrival of 
a fresh legion, which had been engaged in collecting timber. Yet 
I when the winter came neither the Peiraeus nor the city had fallen : 
\ and Sulla withdrew his troops to a camp between Eleusis and Sf^/la 
Megara, which he defended by a trench reaching to the sea, and ^vmfers 
devoted himself to active preparations for the spring. The difficulty ''^^^ 
of taking the Peiraeus was much enhanced, if not made insuperable, g^.^f,^ ' 
by the fact that the king's fleet held the sea, and commanding the 
entrance to the harbour could always throw in provisions. It was 
therefore necessary to have ships, and Lucullus was despatched 
1 during the winter to Egypt and the Roman province of Africa to 
' obtain them. 

I He started with a small fleet of three Greek vessels and the same Lucullus 
( number of Rhodian galleys, and made his way to Crete. Having "« E.gypt^ 
i secured the loyalty of that island he crossed to Cyrene, where he was ^l^^^' , 
I received with high favour, and asked to give advice as to the ^^^ Aegean 
I political constitution of the country. From Cyrene, though losing Sea,86-8s. 
\ some of his ships by pirates, he made his way safely to Alexandria. 
The lately-restored king Ptolemy Lathyrus (89-81) received him 
with royal honours, and lodged him in the palace, but refused to 
supply him with ships, not wishing to take either side in the contest. 
He, however, sent Lucullus with a convoy to Cyprus, who found 
means as he was coasting along Syria and Cilicia to get ships from 
the cities. At Cyprus he learnt that the king's fleet was lying in 
wait for him on the coast of Asia, He contrived, however, by a ruse 
to get safely to Rhodes, where he obtained an addition to the number 
of his ships. Thus strengthened he persuaded the people of Cnidus 
and Cos to abandon Mithridates, and join him in an attack upon 
Samos. He then proceeded to Colophon, which he set free, arresting 
its tyrant Epigonus, and expelling the king's garrison and partisans. 
These operations, which lasted through 86 and 85, were eventually of 
great service ; and the fleet thus collected struck the last blow in the 
war and gave Sulla decisive help at the supreme moment : but for 
i two years Sulla learnt nothing of them, and had to carry on the war 
with the disadvantage of an almost total want of ships. 

2 s 



626 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Fall of 
Athens, ist 
March 86. 



Slaughter 
of the in- 
habitants. 



A ristion 
in the 
Acropolis. 



With the return of spring the siege of Peiraeus and Athens was 
pushed on with new vigour. Sulla was specially eager to take 
Athens from irritation caused by insults aimed at him by Attic wits, 
who jeered at his blotched face, which they likened to a mulberry 
sprinkled with meal, and satirised his wife Metella. But though 
the chief efforts had been hitherto directed against Peiraeus, 
Athens fell first, because it could not be relieved with provisions by 
sea as the Peiraeus could. Traitors within gave Sulla warning of in- 
tended sorties or expected convoys of provisions ; so that the latter 
were nearly always intercepted. Starvation was imminent, and 
people were seen gathering herbs on the Acropolis and soaking 
leather shoes and oilskins to make food. The gay and careless 
Athenians bore privation with admirable good temper and unex- 
pected patience. But it was impossible that they could hold out 
much longer. It added bitterness to their sufferings to be told that 
Aristion — who appears to have quarrelled with Archelaus — was still 
living luxuriously, and had wealth stored in the Acropolis, whilst they 
were feeding on grass and leather. When members of the boul^ and 
priests entreated him to have pity on the people and make terms with 
Sulla he caused his archers to shoot them down. Nor were his dis- 
positions complete. A weak place in the walls, between the Sacred 
Gate into the outer Ceramicus and the Gate of the Peiraeus, was in- 
sufficiently guarded, of which Sulla was made aware by some of his 
agents overhearing a conversation. The few sentries fled on the 
approach of the Roman soldiers, and before daybreak of the first of 
March a sufficient breach was made for Sulla to march in at the 
head of his troops. For a while the town was given up to all the 
horrors of military licence ; the streets flowed with blood, the air re- 
sounded with the screams of the dying, butchered in the agora, or 
in the streets and houses where the furious soldiers were allowed to 
work their will ; while many who did not fall by Roman swords put 
an end to their own lives in despair. Sulla had indeed forbidden the 
town to be fired, but it seems as though he intended to denude 
it of all inhabitants, except those of the Romanising party who had 
already found their way to his camp. But some of this party now 
threw themselves at his feet, entreating him to spare the town, 
and their entreaties were supported by Roman senators in his 
own army, moved by the unique fame of a city in which perhaps 
they had themselves studied in their youth. Sulla yielded, saying 
with sullen scorn that he granted the lives of a few to the merits of 
many, the living to the dead. The contemptible Aristion caused 
the Odeum to be burnt, and took refuge in the Acropolis. Here 
for a short time he held out, blockaded by Sulla's legate Gaius 
Scribonius Curio. Want of water, however, compelled him to 



XXXIX FALL OF THE PEIRAEUS 627 

surrender, but not, it appears, until after Sulla had left Attica for 
Phocis.i 

The fall of the city was followed shortly by that of the Peiraeus, Capture 
against which every method of attack had as yet proved vain. A ^'^^ 
huge earthwork had been thrown up to bring the battering-rams and ^^■^Jj'^^^^^'* 
other engines on a level with the wall, but Archelaus undermined the Peiraeus, 
mound, so that it suddenly collapsed. With difficulty saving their siege 86. 
apparatus, the Romans dug a countermine to meet that of the garrison, 
and the soldiers met underground and fought in the darkness. At 
another time, having set fire to one of the towers of defence and knocked 
down some of the upper part of the wall, Sulla sent some of his most 
courageous men to scale the gap ; but the wall was undermined and 
shored up with wooden props, which were set on fire by tow and 
sulphur and other combustible materials, so that it suddenly gave 
way, bringing down besiegers and besieged in indescribable confusion. 
Sulla brought up fresh men to the breach ; but Archelaus had suffi- 
cient reserves to defend the still formidable ruins and in the night 
to repair the disaster by hastily erecting new loop-walls covering the 
weakened places in the old. When Sulla assaulted these, thinking 
that not being thoroughly set they might easily be battered down, he 
found himself assailed in front and both flanks at once, and was 
obliged to withdraw his men from the narrow ground between the 
I debris of the old wall and the curve of the new. The fall of the city, 
j however, set free a large number of the besieging army, and the 
I attacks on Peiraeus were resumed with redoubled fury. The walls 
I were so continuously battered and assaulted that Archelaus was 
' forced to abandon them. He retreated to Munychia, which could The 
\ only be attacked from the sea. The Romans, who had no ships, Pontic 
' could not touch him. They occupied and dismantled the rest of the S^^''-^'^"' 

fCtCllJt 

Peiraeus, while Archelaus remained on Munychia, avoiding all direct Mu7iychia. 
engagements with them, but on the watch from it and from his ships 
to cut off their supplies and so prolong the war. Sulla ordered the 
' Peiraeus to be destroyed, and the docks and magazines burnt — a 
ruin from which it never recovered. 

Both he and Archelaus, however, had soon imperative reasons for SiUla and 



quitting Attica. Sulla was called to the North both by the necessities Archelaus 
of his own position and by the fact that his legate Hortensius had 
entered Phocis with a corps of 8000 men, and was cut off from 



^ According to Pausanias (i, 20, 4) the fall of Athens — by which he seems to 
mean that of the Acropolis — took place almost simultaneously with the battle of 
Chaeroneia, so that the messengers from Curio and Sulla mutually announcing 
the two events met each other on the road. Appian seems to place it soon after 
j the fall of the city, — ou ywera TroXu ; but Plutarch says that Aristion held out a 
considerable [(jv^vov) time. 



CHAP. XXXIX THE WAR IN PllOCIS AND BOEOTIA 629 

retreat and unable to venture forw^ard owing to a Pontic force occupy- 
ing the pass of Thermopylae behind him and besieging Elateia. 

For while Sulla had been intent upon Athens and the Peiraeus a The army 
Pontic army under Askathias, a son of Mithridates, in the year Z'] of Mithn- 
had entered Macedonia. Finding it almost bare of Roman troops, ^^^^^^ 
he had with little difficulty reduced the province by the spring of 86 atid Mace- 
and established governors or satraps in the cities. He had then donia, 87- 
marched southward with the express purpose of attacking Sulla and ^^• 
relieving Athens. Apparently in order to avoid Hortensius, he had 
marched through Magnesia to the promontory of Tisaeum, intending 
perhaps to cross to Euboea. But at Tisaeum he was taken ill and 
died,i and the command of the army passed to Taxiles, who brought 
the troops to Thermopylae, and sent a message begging Archelaus to 
join him, proceeding meanwhile to invest Elateia, the next strong- 
hold in the way of his march to Boeotia. When the message 
reached Archelaus the Peiraeus had been lost and he was occupying 
Munychia, which could be safely left in charge of a garrison. He Archelaus 
therefore seems to have determined to obey the summons. About (^"-d Sulla 
the same time Sulla resolved to march into Boeotia and Phocis. J^^ 
Attica was a poor country and could not supply his army with Boeotia, 86, 
food ; and having no ships he could not be certain of getting sup- 
plies elsewhere. His own position also was now most precarious. 
Since he left Italy the Cinnan revolution had taken place. Marius 
indeed had died in January of this year (86), but his successor in the 
consulship, L. Valerius Flaccus, had been named to the command of 
the Mithridatic war. Sulla was not yet absolutely recalled, but was 
to remain if he would act under Flaccus. But it was well understood 
that it was intended virtually to supersede him and deprive him of 
the credit of conquering Mithridates. It was all-important for him- 
self and his party to anticipate this by striking a decisive blow. To 
[do this he was anxious to effect a junction with Hortensius before the 
j combined armies of Archelaus and Taxiles could attack him. His 
I own forces were thinned by the various casualties of a long march 
land a wearisome siege. Taxiles, whom Archelaus had joined at 

1 This is Appian's statement [Miih. xxxv. ) There is, however, some difficuhy 
as to the prince and the circumstances of his death. Plutarch {Sull. xi.) says that 
'the son of Mithridates serving in Thrace and Macedonia was Ariarathes, and 
\{Pomp. xxxvii.) that in some secret memoranda of the king's, which afterwards fell 
Hnto Pompey's hands, it was discovered that he had ordered his son to be poisoned. 
Reinach accepts the statement, and supposes that the king had ordered his son to 
be put to death because he had become convinced of his incapacity. Appian, 
however, thrice repeats the name (cc. 7, 35, 41), which is found in an Attic 
inscription (C. I. G. 964). Memnon (ap. Phot. 379 H.) attributes the operations 
,in Thrace and Macedonia to Taxiles alone, and dwells on the service done by them 
to Archelaus in the Peiraeus by securing the market for supplies at Amphipolis. 



630 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Junctio7i of 
Sulla and 
Hortensius 
in the 
valley of the 
Cephisus, 
early 

sutnmer of 
86. 



The battle 
of Chaer- 
oneia. 



Thermopylae by sea, had an army much superior in numbers and 
furnished with numerous cavalry, war chariots, and all the best arms 
known to the East. 

Meanwhile Hortensius had been guided by Kaphis of Chaeroneia 
round the foot of Parnassus to a stronghold on a precipitous cliff 
called Tithorea. When he heard that Sulla had entered Phocis he 
descended from this place of safety and joined him in the valley of 
the Cephisus, and the united forces encamped on an elevation in the 
plain of Elateia, called Philoboeotus, which commands the only defile 
between Phocis and Boeotia. They could not descend to the level 
ground, because the enemy — still engaged on the siege of Elateia — 
were greatly superior in cavalry and scythed chariots. Sulla there- 
fore was compelled for a time to look on passively while the enemy 
harried the country. But he kept his men so rigorously to work at 
digging trenches to keep off the cavalry that they clamoured for a 
battle in preference to such labours. In answer Sulla bade them 
seize a hill — once the citadel of a ruined town called Parapotamii — 
which was an important point of vantage on the road to Chaeroneia. 
Archelaus saw its importance when too late, but failing to anticipate 
or dislodge the Romans he attempted to march past it and reach 
Chaeroneia. Sulla had men of Chaeroneia in his camp who entreated 
him to save the town. He therefore sent off his advanced guard, 
who outstripped Archelaus and were welcomed as deliverers at 
Chaeroneia, and he himself presently followed with his main army. 
He now occupied two excellent positions — Parapotamii commanded 
the road back to Elateia, Chaeroneia commanded that to Thebes as 
well as a branch road to Opus. Taxiles and Archelaus were caught, 
and must either fight or retreat round the lake Copais by a road 
difficult and full of defiles, leading to the coast opposite Chalcis. 

It was in a narrow valley near the entrance to this difficult route, 
between two hills called Hedylion and Acontion, that Taxiles and 
Archelaus were encamped. The battle was fought betw^een Mounts 
Hedylion and Thurion, in a somewhat contracted part of the plain of the 
Cephisus, unfavourable to the use of the war chariots, which required 
a considerable space for charging ; and at the very beginning of the 
day the Pontic army had been thrown into confusion by a sudden 
attack upon the rear of their left flank. Some natives of Chaeroneia 
had guided a Roman detachment by a shepherd's track over Mount 
Thurion, which brought them down on the rear of one wing of the 
enemy. Not only did these men themselves inflict considerable loss on 
the troops thus attacked, driving them in upon the Roman right, where 
they were cut to pieces, but the survivors of the disaster demoralised 
their own army when they rushed into its ranks for safety. Archelaus 
had forces nearly four times as numerous as those of Sulla, — amounting 



XXXIX THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEIA 631 

to 60,000, while Sulla had i 5,000 infantry and i 500 cavalry, — but they 
were a motley throng of various nationality, and though capable of 
obstinate resistance if brought to bay, were no match for Roman 
legions, if their cavalry failed from want of space, or if the phalanx— 
the nucleus of the whole army— was broken. Both of these circum- 
stances occurred at Chaeroneia : and after some severe fighting the 
whole army became a disorganised mass, rushing for safety to the 
camp from which they had issued in the morning, followed and 
butchered almost without resistance by the victorious Romans, who 
are asserted by Sulla to have lost but twelve men. The slaughter 
was continued in the captured camp, and the survivors were obHged 
to light false watch-fires and entice into the same death-trap some of 
their own men who had been foraging. Out of an army of 60,000, 
about 10,000 managed to escape with Archelaus round the lake Archelans 
Copais to the Euripus, and to cross to Chalcis. From this place escapes to 
he carried on a kind of piratic war, ravaging the coasts of Pelo- ^ ""^^ 
ponnesus and the island of Zacynthus, from which he destroyed some 
of the ships employed to transport the army of Flaccus into Epirus. 

But the victory of Chaeroneia had secured Sulla's position in Sulla in 
Greece, though fruitless in regard to the immediate prosecution of Greece after 
the war, since he had not sufficient force to enable him to venture ^^' ^^^^^^ °f 
into Asia to attack Mithridates himself The next month or two ^^^^^-^ 
were devoted to refreshing and recruiting his army, to the celebration latter part 
of his victory by trophies and splendid games outside Thebes, and to of 86. 
punishing those who had joined the rebellion. Thus at Athens, to 
which he returned for a time, Sulla condemned to death Aristion 
and all who had served as his bodyguard or had held any office 
I during the rebellion, and confiscated their property. The freedom 
; of Athens was restored, but all citizens who had remained in the city 
I were to be disfranchised for life. Delos was given back to her, but 
the territory of Oropus was assigned to the temple of Amphiaraos, 
I probably in compensation for treasures appropriated by Sulla, and in 
I gratitude for favourable oracles before the battle of Chaeroneia. 
I Thebes also was punished for its defection without regard to its early Ruin of 
I return to its duty. Half its territory was confiscated, and the revenues Thebes. 
] from it assigned to compensate the treasuries of the temples of 
I Delphi, Olympia, and Epidaurus, which Sulla had emptied. 

j Meanwhile a change of feeling had been taking place in Asia. The rule of 

I The government of the king, conducted as that of the Attalids Mithri- 

Ifrom Pergamus, was at first liberal and popular. A general relief J^^J^ ^^ 
from imposts, a respect for ancient institutions and for the rights of s8-86. 
sanctuary, large subventions from the royal exchequer in relief of 
: distress caused by earthquakes or other disasters, seemed to secure 
the cheerful allegiance of all and to promise an era of peace and 



632 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Grievances 
in Asia. 



EpJiesus 
abandons 
the king, 
86. 



The hint's 
measures. 



happiness. But though only one city, Magnesia ad Sipylum, still 
openly held out against the royal authority, yet in many other of the 
Greek towns there was secretly a strong Romanising party, generally 
consisting of those who had been most influential in politics or most 
successful in commerce. Their hostility or distrust had been natur- 
ally roused by the measures of the king, meant to conciliate the lower 
orders, such as the abolition of debts, and the general enfranchise- 
ment of slaves who had betrayed their masters. Nor did the king's 
yoke prove lighter than that of the Romans ; for although taxes were 
lessened military service was as rigorous and more constant. Large 
conscriptions were needed for the wars in Thrace, Macedonia, and 
Greece. The success of Sulla and the fall of Athens gave a vent to 
this discontent, and by the time of the battle of Chaeroneia matters 
were ripe for change. By an elaborate system of espionage the king 
was kept aware of what was going on : and the ferocious measures 
which he took to secure himself, the frequent execution of real or 
suspected conspirators, the massacre of Galatian tetrarchs with their 
families, whom he had forced to come as hostages to Pergamus, and 
the deportation of the inhabitants of Chios on a frivolous pretext, 
irritated and alarmed the Greek communities. 

The first movement was at Ephesus. After the cruel treatment 
of Chios, Zenobius, the agent for the execution of the decree, landed 
at Ephesus and summoned an assembly of citizens for the next 
day. A rumour spread among the people that the fate of Chios was 
in store for them. Instigated by the chiefs of the Romanising 
party, they dragged Zenobius from his bed and put him to death ; 
and a decree was passed with enthusiasm renouncing allegiance to 
Mithridates, whom it declared to have possessed himself of Ephesus 
by treachery, and proclaiming their unchanging loyalty to Rome, 
which it asserted the citizens to have always retained, while yielding 
to superior force. ^ The example of Ephesus was followed by other 
towns, and a general defection was only arrested by measures of great 
severity in the case of those cities which the king was able to take ; 
and finally by a decree declaring all Greek cities which had remained 
faithful free, debts abolished, slaves liberated, and metics full citizens. 
This for a time engaged the lower classes in the several cities on his 



JVew army 
from Asia 
under 
Dorylaus. 



course follow the return of Roman rule. 

To secure his influence, however, the king knew that he must be 
successful in Greece. An army of 70,000 was again raised, includ- 
ing 10,000 cavalry and 70 scythed chariots. It was carefully selected 
and placed under the command of Dorylaus, a trusted friend and 

^ The decree itself is still extant (Waddington, Inscriptions d' Asie Mineure, 
No. 136a ; Dittenberger, Sylloge, No. 253 ; Reinach, Appendix, p. 463). 



XXXIX BATTLE OF ORCHOMENUS 633 

councillor. Sailing to Euboea Dorylaus joined Archelaus and the 
survivors of Chaeroneia, and the two made descents upon the coast 
of Boeotia and recovered the allegiance of several towns. 

This brought Sulla back into Boeotia. Soon after the battle 

of Chaeroneia he had learnt that the consul L. Valerius Flaccus, Sulla and 

appointed in his place to the chief command in the Mithridatic war, Flaccus. 

was marching with two legions through Thessaly. He resolved not 

to accept the secondary place thus left to him, and marched towards 

Thessaly to meet him. He came upon his advanced guard at 

Melitaea, at the foot of Mount Orthrys, on the road from Pharsalus. 

Flaccus had already made himself so offensive to his men by severity 

'1 and greed that they to a large extent deserted to Sulla, — an example 

which would have been followed by larger numbers still but for the 

exertions of the consul's legate Fimbria, who, though a man of violent 

and unreasonable character, possessed ability and influence. Flaccus, 

however, gave up the idea of marching into Greece to take over 

1 Sulla's army or attack him, and turned northwards to the Hellespont. 

I Sulla wished to follow him, but urgent messages came from Boeotia 

j announcing the arrival of Dorylaus, the defection of the Boeotian 

I towns, and depredations of the Pontic army. In all haste he repassed 

j the defile of Thermopylae and marched back into Boeotia. 

The struggle there was short and decisive. Archelaus, with his Battle of 
'1 experience of Roman troops, advised that they should avoid a regular Orcho- 
\ engagement. But Dorylaus was intoxicated with the easy successes ''"^"^^^' 
\ already obtained and anxious to measure swords with Sulla. His first s6. 
encounter, however, which took place at Tilphasium, a hill and town 
on the south of the lake Copais, between Coroneia and Haliartus, con- 
vinced him of his mistake. He too was now anxious to avoid an en- 
gagement, and hoped rather to wear out Sulla by protracting the war 
with all its attendant expenses. He therefore selected a position which 
he thought favourable. This was the plain of Orchomenus on the 
west of the lake, not far from the battle-field of Chaeroneia, but much 
wider and more open, where his cavalry and chariots would have full 
play, and would deter the Roman legions from attacking his camp. 
It proved a fatal selection. To prevent the excursions of the 
cavalry, Sulla at once began digging a network of trenches ten feet 
wide, which he pushed gradually up to the enemy's camp. The 
cavalry sent to interrupt the work gained some success at first against 
the companies of Roman infantry posted to defend the diggers. But 
an incipient panic was prevented by Sulla, who flung himself from 
his horse, and seizing a standard rushed into the thick of the fight, 
shouting out, " Soldiers, if asked where you abandoned your 
general, say at Orchomenus." He was followed by his principal 
officers, and their example sufficed to shame or encourage the rest. 



634 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Destruc- 
tion of the 
Pofitic 
army. 



Effects of 
the battle of 
Orcho- 



Sulla 
wifiters iti 
Thessaly, 
86-Ss. 

Flaccus 
marches 
through 
Macedonia 
and Thrace 
to Byzan- 
tiutn, 86. 



The main army having now come on to the ground, the ranks were 
soon reformed, and presented a solid wall of defence. The enemy's 
cavalry dashed themselves to pieces on the serried ranks of the 
legions, and fell in immense numbers. The Pontic archers charged 
by the legions fought desperately, using their arrows as daggers when 
they could no longer shoot ; so that by the evening the field was 
covered with nearly i 5,000 dead, among whom was a son or son-in- 
law of Archelaus. The survivors took refuge in their camp, but were 
entirely surrounded, and had no way out except across the lake. 
Next morning Sulla began another trench, to complete the cir- 
cumvallation, which they vainly tried to interrupt. When it was 
finished he gave the signal for an assault. The Romans scaled 
the vallum and another butchery began. Some who endeavoured 
to escape by swimming in the lake were slain by arrows and ja\elins ; 
so that in the time of Plutarch, 200 years afterwards, bows, swords, 
helmets and coats of mail were still found in the mud at the bottom. 
As many as 50,000 are said to have perished, and 25,000 prisoners 
were sold by military auction after the battle. 

Dorylaus and Archelaus escaped to Chalcis : but the question 
of supremacy in Greece was settled. Archelaus recalled such 
Pontic garrisons as still held Greek towns to Chalcis, and the country 
was once more in the power of the Romans. The effect was at 
once felt in Asia. The Galatians expelled the Pontic satrap : their 
example was followed by a great number of Asiatic Greeks ; and 
Mithridates was only saved from an immediate attack by Sulla's 
lack of ships. He had not enough even to cross to Chalcis, and had 
to content himself wreaking vengeance on the revolted Boeotians. 
But if he was not to be anticipated by Flaccus in defeating Mithri- 
dates he must have a fleet. No news had yet come of Lucullus ; and 
when he went into winter quarters he began shipbuilding for himself. 

Meanwhile, Flaccus had made his way to the Bosporus through 
Macedonia and Thrace, pillaging the towns and enslaving the people 
without mercy. Philippi was taken ; the royal army besieging 
Abdera fled, and he reached the loyal town of Byzantium in time to 
take up his winter quarters outside the walls. But the unpopularity 
of Flaccus had been increased on the march. Grasping and 
unscrupulous himself, he had been severe in punishing similar 
conduct among the men : and while he was in Byzantium, negotiating 
with shipowners for a passage across the Bosporus, they broke out 
almost into open mutiny. He tried to remedy this by dividing 
them, sending the advanced guard under Fimbria across to Chalcedon. 
But a quarrel between Fimbria and the quaestor about billeting 
the soldiers, having been referred to Flaccus, was decided in favour 
of the quaestor. Fimbria, after threatening to return to Rome, and 



xxxix PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE AT DELIUM 635 

being thereupon deposed from the command of the cavalry, pro- 
moted another mutiny. Flaccus fled for his life to Nicomedia, where 
Fimbria discovered and put him to death. It cannot be supposed Murder of 
that the murder of a proconsul by his legatus was approved by the Flaccus, 
Senate, but the dislike of the dominant party to Sulla was stronger ^S- 
than any other feeling. Fimbria was not recalled and, though he was 
repudiated by Sulla and Lucullus (who presently arrived with his fleet 
on the coast of Asia Minor), it was less perhaps as a murderer than 
as the agent of the party of Cinna. But the change in the command 
of the army thus made added to its effectiveness. Fimbria was 
abler and more active than Flaccus, and a series of successes Success of 
against the younger Mithridates and other officers of the king in Fimbria 
Bithynia seemed to promise a speedy termination of the war. ^'^ 
Nicomedia was carried by assault, and other towns in Bithynia were ^ y^ia. 
terrified into submission. Mithridates was in instant expectation of Mithri- 
being besieged in Pergamus, and retired to the harbour town at dates in 
Pitane. Whether Fimbria could force him to surrender depended Pii<^^^- 
on the action of the fleet of Lucullus. But Lucullus refused to co- Lucullus 
operate with Fimbria, and it was Sulla, therefore, who with his own will not 
ships and those of Lucullus could come at any time to Asia, that '^^-^P^''^^^ 
Mithridates had to fear. Early in 84 a message came from Archelaus pi^f^j^^ia. 
requesting a conference. Sulla's political position at the time made 
it of primary importance to him to end the war. His refusal to act 
under Flaccus had been answered by a decree of the Senate, proposed 
by Cinna, declaring him a public enemy and depriving him of his ^^lla 
command : his town house had been pulled down, his wife and declared a 
children forced to fly ; and with them came to his camp in Thessaly hostis, 8j. 
a large number of the Optimates, who believed themselves no longer 
safe at Rome. And now this same Senate preferred to keep a 
murderer like Fimbria in command rather than acknowledge him. 
It was time to make an end of the war and to return in force to Italy. 
He therefore agreed to receive Archelaus at Delium. 

After the usual attempts to beat each other down by arrogant Prelim- 
language preliminaries were agreed upon. The king was to abandon tnanes of 
all conquests made since the beginning of the war ; to surrender f^^^. "^ 
the province of Asia ; to evacuate Bithynia and Cappadocia, ^^ 
and in return was to be guaranteed in the rest of his dominions 
as "a friend" of Rome. He was to furnish Sulla with seventy 
decked vessels, with crews and provisions, and 500 archers ; prisoners, 
hostages, and deserters to be mutually restored. ^ The population 

^ Licinianus mentions among those to be restored M'.Aquillius and Q. 
Oppius. But according to all other authorities Aquillius had been put to death 
long ago. If it is true that his name was mentioned in the preliminaries, we must 
either suppose that Sulla did not know of his death and that Archelaus dared not 



636 



HISTORY OF ROME 



MithrU 
dates 

hesitates to 
accept the 
terms. 



Interview 

between 

Sulla 

and 

Mithri- 

dates at 

Pergamus, 

84. 



of Chios, removed to the Black Sea, were to be allowed to return 
home, as well as the families driven from Macedonia, while Sulla was 
to grant an amnesty to the cities in Asia which had sided with the 
king.i 

Though the terms were less than might be expected at Rome, 
the king thought them severe, and never quite forgave Archelaus, whom 
he suspected of having been bought over, especially when it after- 
wards appeared that Sulla had granted him an estate in Boeotia. 
He particularly objected to the cession of Paphlagonia and the supply 
of the seventy ships ; and he secretly made overtures to Fimbria, while 
transferring himself to Mitylene, where he would be safe from any 
enemy who had no ships. But though this made him independent 
of Fimbria, who was obliged to confine himself to the devastation 
of the Troad,— among other things utterly destroying Ilium for 
the offence of asking aid from Sulla, — it put him still more in 
danger of attack from Sulla, who after the conference at Delium 
had advanced northwards and was to be joined by Lucullus and his 
fleet at the Thracian Chersonese. While subduing some tribes on 
the frontier of Macedonia and Thrace Sulla was met by a courier 
conveying the king's objections to the terms. Affecting the utmost 
anger he swore that he would not bate a single point. Archelaus, 
still in the Roman camp, and treated with extraordinary marks of 
regard by Sulla, — who had gratified him with the execution of 
Aristion, — begged with tears to be allowed to go to the king, 
promising that he would bring the ratification or perish by his own 
hands. On his return he found Sulla at Philippi, and brought word 
that the king assented generally to the terms, but desired a personal 
interview. 

Of the nature of their interview we have the account of Sulla 
himself preserved by Plutarch, which, however, is open to some 
suspicion as composed to defend his conduct from what some thought 
an act of treason. The king, he says, offered his hand, which he 
refused to accept until he signified in express terms his acceptance of 
the treaty. After an interval of silence Mithridates began a long 
defence of his conduct. Sulla interrupted it by saying that he 
admired the king's eloquence, but that words could not alter deeds, 
and that he demanded a direct answer of yes or no, adding a state- 
ment of the injuries sustained by the Romans at his hands. At 



mention it, or that the story of the molten gold, etc. was a fiction of the king's 
enemies (see p. 617 note). 

^ This last provision is only mentioned by Memnon of Heracleia, who was 
likely to be well informed on such a point, though in the rest of his account there 
are several inaccuracies. The treaty was not written, and therefore there may 
have been disputes on many points. 



XXXIX PEACE OF PERGAMUS AND FALL OF FIMBRIA 637 

length the king signified his acceptation of the treaty : whereupon Treaty of 
Sulla caused the deposed kings of Bithynia to come forward and Pergamus, 
bear witness to the treaty which was to restore them to their domin- ^"f' 
ions. Mithridates acknowledged Nicomedes with courtesy, but he 
refused to receive Ariobarzanes, the elect of the nobles of Cappadocia, 
as not of royal blood, a mere subject or slave, to whose royalty he 
would give no social acknowledgment. 

Thus the first Mithridatic war was at an end. It had cost nearly Unsatis- 
half a million of lives ; it had brought with it the ruin or de- factory 
struction of a large number of flourishing towns ; and after all it ''^•^^''^^•^ ^f 
had not been decisive. It had indeed settled that Mithridates' plan ^^^ '^^''''" 
of uniting Asia Minor and Greece under his sceptre was not to be 
realised ; but it left the Roman province with a feeling of insecurity, 
while the king — with such memories in his heart — was still close 
to the frontier, and still powerful in money, ships, and men. In 
every city there were still two opposed parties, with the recollec- 
tion of mutual wrongs and sufferings. The richer class were 
" Romanisers," the lower were still " Cappadocists," whose perpetual 
antagonism promised danger and trouble for the future. And it 
I might well be remembered at Rome that this lame result was 
(after all the effect of political differences : that if the two armies 
I of the republic had been acting in unison, and if Lucullus with 
^his ships had not declined to support Fimbria, the war might have 
I been ended for ever by the .captivity or death of Mithridates. 
! For Sulla the retirement of Mithridates was not the end of his Sulla's 
'difficulties. He was still an outcast by the vote of the Senate ; and difficulties. 
'if he was to recover his own position and rescue his party from the 
faction of the consuls Cinna and Carbo, he must return to Italy at 
the head of an army which left no foe behind it, and was capable 
jOf meeting every enemy at home. His own soldiers, indignant at 
jthe sight of the king allowed to depart unharmed, after all their 
jlabours and victories, or disappointed at the loss of the easy spoil 
Iwhich they had expected from an Asiatic war, must be satisfied. Fim- 
ibria, too, was encamped near Thyatira in the north of Lydia, between 
jthe rivers Carius and Hermus, and refused to surrender or to fight. 
] Sulla began at once to beleaguer his camp by digging trenches Attack 
round it. Fimbria's soldiers deserted in great numbers, and helped ^^pon 
to complete the trenches. Those who remained refused to fight 
their fellow-citizens, or to take an oath of fidelity to him. He failed 
also to procure Sulla's assassination, and having come to the end 
of his resources asked for a personal interview. Sulla contemptu- 
ously refused it, but he sent word by Rutilius — the exiled quaestor 
of Scaevola — that he would give him a safe-conduct to the sea on 
condition that he immediately left Asia. But Fimbria knew that his 



Fimbria. 



638 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Death of 
Fimbria, 
84. 

Settlement 
of Asia. 



Punish- 
m,ent of 
disloyal 
towns. 



Arrears of 
tribute of 
88-84 io be 
paid. 



The 

pirates. 



life would not be safe when Sulla returned to Italy, and determined 
to escape dishonour by death. He fled to Pergamus, and stabbed 
himself in the temple of Asclepius. The wound was not mortal, but 
he persuaded a slave to kill him, and the whole of his legions, with 
the exception of a few officers who took refuge with Mithridates, 
then joined Sulla's standard. 

Sulla spent the rest of the year and the following spring (85-84) 
in regulating affairs in Asia. Whether or no there was an article in 
the treaty granting amnesty to the Asiatic cities which had joined 
the king's party, he certainly did not observe its spirit. The Greek 
cities which submitted were not destroyed, but the party in them 
opposed to Rome suffered ruthless punishment. After despatching 
Curio with a sufficient force to superintend the restoration of 
Nicomedes in Bithynia and of Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, he 
proceeded to take certain towns which still held out, and therefore 
might be considered in any case to be excluded from the benefit 
of the clause. The abolition of the king's proclamation relieving 
debtors and freeing slaves caused the resistance to be more obstinate, 
and the punishment the more severe ; the towns were dismantled 
and pillaged, and their inhabitants sold into slavery. Even in cities 
not so treated individual citizens convicted of disloyalty were 
executed. At Ephesus, for instance, all were so treated who could 
be proved to have been leaders in the rebellion, or to have taken 
part in the massacre of Italians in 88, or in denouncing the 
Romanisers in 86. Here too, in the course of his visit, Sulla 
announced to an assembly of notables from the cities that the five 
years' tribute — remitted by Mithridates — was now to be paid in 
full, besides a fine of 20,000 talents, or about ^5,000,000, the whole 
country being divided into fourty-four districts, to be rated according 
to the property of the inhabitants, in order to raise the sum. To add 
to the distress the soldiers were billeted for the winter in various 
towns upon private individuals, who were obliged, besides lodging 
them, to pay each soldier four drachmae a day, as well as one meal 
for himself and any guest he might choose to invite ; and each 
centurion fifty drachmae and two suits of clothing. This burden on 
the middle and richer classes made it all the more difficult for the 
cities to procure the money to pay Sulla's demand. It was only 
done by borrowing money on heavy and usurious terms, and by 
mortgaging public buildings of all sorts ; and it left Asia in a 
state of financial ruin from which it was long in recovering. Nor 
in return did Sulla secure the country from other evils. In the 
course of the troubles of the last four years piracy had again become 
rife. Sailing it is said at first under letters of marque from Mithri- 
dates, these pests of the sea had increased to the dimensions of a 



XXXIX SULLA'S RETURN TO ROME 639 

fleet, and captured whole islands and towns. lassus and Samos, 
Clazomenae and Samothrace were seized by them while Sulla was 
at Ephesus ; and it does not appear that he took any measures to 
repress them. 

He was now intent upon his return to Italy. In the late Sulla 
summer of 84, leaving Murena as governor and Lucullus as leaves 
quaestor in charge of Asia, he embarked his army — increased by ""^' 
fresh levies and with ships, which the vast spoils and fines had given 0/84. 
him the means to acquire, to the number of 1200, — and in three 
days arrived at the Peiraeus. He stayed for some months at 
Athens, where he collected fresh troops from Macedonia and the At Athens. 
Peloponnese, and enriched himself with various treasures, such for 
instance as the famous library of Apellicon, which contained a great 
collection of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus. He found 
there the well-known Pomponius Atticus, afterwards the friend and 
correspondent of Cicero, then a young man, who had already 
made himself thoroughly conversant with Attic ways and speech, and 
seems to have exercised that charm over Sulla which rendered him 
the close friend of so many leaders of opposite parties at Rome. 
Perhaps it was under his guidance that Sulla threw himself into the 
Attic life for a time, and was among other things initiated in the 
Eleusinian mysteries and established a new festival called the Sulleia. 
But the hardships of the last four ye^rs had told on his health. He was 
attacked with a severe fit of gout, and had to remove to the Libantine 
plain near Chalcis for the sake of the baths, or to Aedipsus on the Stilla 
north-west coast, famed for its hot springs. It was not therefore returns to 
till the next spring (83) that he set out again, marching through It'^ly early 
Thessaly and Macedonia to Dyrrachium, whence he crossed to ^^ ^' 
Brundisium with 40,000 men and 1200 ships. 

Authorities. — Livy, Ep. 78-82. Appian, Mithridatica. Justin, 37, 38. 
Granius Licinianus, fr. of book xxxv. Diodorus, fr. of xxxvii. Memnon of 
Heracleia in Photius, Mithridatica. Velleius Paterculus, ii. 23, 24. Plutarch, 
Sulla, Lucullus. Pausanias, i, 20, 4 ; 9, 7, S ; 30, i ; 33, 6. Orosius, v. 19. 
The most continuous narrative is in Appian and Plutarch. The date of Licinianus 
is uncertain, he may perhaps be the earliest of all. The inscriptions illustrating 
the affairs of Asia during the period will be found in the Appendix to M. Reinach's 
Mithridate Eupator. 



CHAPTER XL 

VICTORIES OF SULLA IN ITALY, AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 

83-78 



Sj. Coss. 
L. Cornel- 
ius Scipio 
Asiatictis, 
C. Junius 
N orb anus. 



Sulla's 
position in 
Italy. 



Sulla lands in Italy — He is joined by Metellus, Pompey, Crassus, and many 
others — His march to Rome — Defeat of Norbanus and the younger Marius at 
Tifata — -Surrender of Scipio and Sertorius at Teanum — Fire at the Capitol 
(83) — Campaigns of 82 — Defeat of Marius at Sacriportus, and siege of Prae- 
neste — Victory of Metellus on the Aesis — The war in Etruria and Gallia Cis- 
alpina — Battles of Saturnia, Clusium, Faventia, Fidentia — Flight of Norbanus 
and Carbo — Defeat of the Samnites at the CoUine Gate — Fall of Praeneste 
and Norba (November 82) — Sulla at Rome — The proscriptions — Sulla dictator 
— His political reforms — His code of laws — Fall of Nola and Volaterrae — 
Devastation of Samnium (82-80) — Pompey in Sicily and Africa (81) — Abdi- 
cation of Sulla (79) — His death (78) — Rome expanded into Italy — Change in 
the colonial system — Extent of Empire — Number of provinces — Their con- 
tributions to the Roman exchequer— Indifference at Rome to foreign affairs 
— The new generation — Development of oratory and literature. 

When Sulla landed at Brundisium early in 83 no farther disguise 
was possible, — there was to be open civil war. The negotiations 
with the Senate had not cancelled the decree declaring him, and 
those who had joined him, public enemies : his town house had been 
pulled down, his property confiscated, and the constitutional authori- 
ties were almost unanimously opposed to him. Both consuls were his 
enemies : Sertorius, the ablest man of the party, was a praetor ; 
Marius, nephew and adopted son of the great Gains Marius, was a 
consul-designate for the next year ; Carbo, who had already been 
twice consul, was to be his colleague, and was now commanding an 
army in Cisalpine Gaul as proconsul. The very fact that so many 
senators and other Optimates had taken refuge with Sulla in Greece, 
or now joined him on his march, left the comitia in the city — so far 
as they v/ere consulted at all — even more entirely in the hands of his 
enemies, who had thus the technical advantage of a constitutional 
position. On the other hand, Sulla had never laid down his procon- 
sular /w/r?r/«?«, and until he did so, or until he entered the city, there 



CHAP. XL SULLA DEFEATS THE CONSULS 641 

was no certain means of depriving him of it. The decree of the 
Senate declaring him a hostis was affirmed by him and his friends 
to be invahd, as having been extorted by violence, and in the forcible 
absence of many members. Both sides thus claimed to be legally 
within their right : no solution was possible except by battle, 

Sulla had a devoted army, which regarded its military oath to His army. 
him as of superior obligation to obedience to Senate or consuls. 
Nor can such a view seem surprising when at this very time the son 
of Strabo, Gnaeus Pompeius, an eques of three-and-twenty, who had 
held no office, and was a mere privatus^ had been able to raise 
three legions in Picenum, without authority and without any one 
knowing what he was going to do with them. Thus Sulla profited 
by the changes made in the army by his great rival Marius. His 
only partisan who could claim a constitutional position was Metellus 
Pius. When Marius and Cinna entered Rome, Metellus had gone 
to Africa. Having been beaten there by the Marian governor C, 
Fabius, he had returned to Liguria and was watching events. He 
had never laid down the im-perium which he held during the 
Marsic war, and was therefore still proconsul ; and when he hastened 
to join Sulla was greeted by him as " Imperator." 

Carbo and the dead Cinna had been working for some years Sulla's 
past to secure themselves, and there were now enormous forces on ^««^<^^ 
foot to resist Sulla. Several Italian towns, and the Samnites gene- ^fl'3^^^ 
rally, who had not laid down their arms at the end of the Social Way, 83. 
war, warmly espoused the side of Carbo, and as many as 225,000 
men were said to be under arms in various parts of Italy under 
fifteen different commanders. Formidable as these forces must 
have seemed, their composition was of some advantage to Sulla, 
who could pose as the champion of the citizens against rebels. They Defeat of 
were also widely separated. Carbo was in Cisalpine Gaul ; three of ^orbanus. 
his legati — M. Brutus, C. Caelius Caldus, and C. Caninas — were 
kept in play in Picenum by Pompey, who had declared for Sulla as 
soon as he landed. It was with the two consuls Norbanus and 
Scipio, who had hastily enrolled an army of 100,000 men from the 
city and the neighbourhood, that Sulla had first to reckon. They 
were marching to meet him in two divisions, Norbanus and Marius in 
front, Scipio at no great distance in the rear. Sulla, who had been 
warmly welcomed at Brundisium, and was receiving continual ad- 
hesions, found Norbanus encamped near Mount Tifata, overlooking 
Capua. The conflict was short and decisive. The consul's raw 
levies proved unable to face Sulla's veterans, and he had to retreat 
into Capua with the loss of 6000 men. 

Sulla, who asserts that he only lost seventy men in this battle, 
continued his advance along the via Appia, and in the neighbourhood 

2 T 



642 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Scipio, 
whose army 
joins Sulla, 
obliged to 
make 
terms. 



Prepara- 
tiofts in the 
winter of 
83-82. 



Fire on the 
Capitol, 
6th July 8 J. 



82. Coss. C. 
Marius, 
Cn. Pap- 
irius Carbo 
III. 

The war 
renewed, 
battle on 
the Aesis. 



Defeat of 
Marius 
at Sacri- 
portus and 
siege of 
Praeneste. 



of Teanum came in sight of Scipio and the second division of the 
consular army. But the effect of the victory of Tifata was soon 
manifest. Sulla made some proposals for pacification to the consul, 
and when Scipio hesitated to accept them, he suddenly found him- 
self deserted by his army, which went over to Sulla almost to a man. 
He was left nearly alone in his tent with his son, and was obliged to 
accept Sulla's terms. But Sertorius, who was with him, seems to 
have been able to lead off a certain number of men, and on his 
way seized Suessa, which had sided with Sulla ; and though Scipio, 
whom Sulla had allowed to go free, repudiated this action of 
Sertorius, Sulla affected to consider that thereby the terms had been 
broken, and he continued his advance, wasting the lands of all who 
were opposed to him. 

He did not, however, as yet approach Rome. The opposite party 
was still strong there, and Carbo now came himself to the city from 
Gaul, and prevailed upon the remnant of the Senate to denounce as 
hosfes all who had joined Sulla. He and young Marius, as consuls- 
designate, with their numerous legati, had been raising forces in 
Latium, Etruria, and Cisalpine Gaul, and Sulla was obliged to pause 
till he could reckon on armies somewhat equivalent to theirs. The 
winter, also, which was devoted to these preparations, chanced to 
be an unusually severe one, which made active operations impossible. 
But Rome was in a state of great anxiety throughout the autumn 
and winter of 83 ; and it seemed no slight omen of impending disaster 
that on the 6th of July a fire had destroyed the venerable temple 
of Jupiter on the Capitol, which had stood for more than 400 years, 
the visible emblem of the greatness of Rome, and that in it had 
perished those Sibylline verses so often consulted in the hour of 
danger. 

In the spring Sertorius had gone as propraetor to Spain, and the war 
began with a severe battle between Metellus and Carbo's legate 
Caninas on the river Aesis, separating Picenum and Umbria. Metellus 
was prevented from following up his victory at once by the presence 
of Carbo, who came to the rescue of Caninas. Before long, however, 
Carbo, hearing that his colleague Marius had been defeated, retired 
to Ariminum, the headquarters of his party in the north, harassed 
by Pompey on the rear. Caninas made his way to Spoletium in 
Umbria, where presently Pompey and Crassus followed and again 
defeated him, shutting him up in the town. Meanwhile Marius had 
been trying to intercept Sulla, who was taking various towns in 
Latium. But he had sustained so severe a defeat at Sacriportus, 
between Setia and Praeneste, that part of his army went over to 
Sulla, and he was himself compelled to fly with the rest to Praeneste. 
So hot was the pursuit that the Praenestines dared not open their 



XL DISASTERS OF THE PARTY OF CARBO 643 

gates, and had to haul him up the wall by a rope. Sulla invested 
Praeneste, and, presently entrusting to Lucretius Ofella the task of 
starving it out, led his army in several columns by different roads to 
Rome, and pitched a camp in the Campus Martins. 

But he did not stay long at Rome. He had not, indeed, arrived Sulla's 
in time to prevent a last act of vengeance on the part of Marius, fi'^'^^ 
who had found means to send a message to the praetor urbanus, ^^''^^^^ ^^ 
Damasippus, ordering the execution of four leading senators, one 
of them the pontifex maximus Scaevola. The order had been 
carried out with cold-blooded craft. Damasippus had summoned 
the Senate on pretence of business, had then had three of them 
assassinated in or just outside the Curia, while Scaevola was killed 
in the temple of Vesta itself. Still Sulla could not stay to punish 
this at once. He had just time to order the confiscation of the 
property of the most violent of his opponents, and to address an 
encouraging speech to a meeting of citizens, and then started in all 
haste to attack Carbo, who had come to Clusium on his way to the 
relief of Marius. His cavalry defeated some Celtiberian auxiliaries Cavalry 
of Carbo on the Clanis, the survivors partly coming over to him, skirmish 
partly being cut to pieces by Carbo, who suspected their fidelity. °":^^^. 
He next defeated another division of the enemy at Saturnia, and then 
advanced on Clusium. As usual, he dashed upon his enemy without Battle at 
any well-considered plan, and a severe fight lasting all day long was Clusiutn. 
after all indecisive. Yet when Carbo attempted to send an army of 
relief from Ariminum to Caninas at Spoletium, Sulla intercepted and Carbo fails 
defeated it with a loss of 2000 men, and Caninas in despair took lo relieve 
advantage of a dark rainy night to escape, only to perish a few months ^P^^^^^^^ 
later. Carbo still attempted to send troops under Marcius to relieve ^n^ste"^^' 
Marius in Praeneste ; but he was followed by Pompey, now set free 
from besieging Spoletium. Overtaken in the difficult ground near 
Praeneste, he was utterly defeated, and forced to take refuge in the 
hills. The men laid the blame on Marcius, and either made their 
way back to Ariminum or dispersed to their homes. 

Meanwhile fresh disasters befell the Carbonian party in the Battle of 
north. After his victory on the Aesis, Metellus collected ships and Faventia. 
sailed up the east coast of Italy, making descents on his way ; and as ^^^\ '^ 
Carbo and Norbanus held Ariminum, he occupied the next harbour and^GalHa 
north of it at Ravenna. From that town he led his army to Faventia, Cisalpina. 
on the Via AemiHa, barring the road between Ariminum and the 
towns in the valley of the Po. Here Carbo and Norbanus attacked 
him, but were defeated with a loss of 10,000 men. Six thousand 
of the survivors then went over to Metellus, while the rest took 
refuge in Arretium. This was followed by the betrayal of Ariminum 
by P. Tullius Albinovanus, who even poisoned a number of the officers 



644 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Flight and 
death of 
N orb anus. 



Victory of 
Lucullus at 
Fidentia. 



Carbo's last 
chance. 



The 

Samnite 
army under 
Pontius of 
Teles ia. 



Flight of 
Car bo. 



His troops 
advance on 
Rome. 



Battle at 
the Colline 
Gate, 1st 
November 
82. 



at a banquet. Norbanus had refused the invitation, and so escaped; 
but finding Ariminum in the hands of the enemy, and the rest of 
Gallia Cisalpina submitting to Sulla, he took ship and fled to Rhodes, 
where, some time afterwards, when he saw the Rhodian magistrates 
deliberating what to do in answer to a demand from Sulla for his 
surrender, he stabbed himself in the agora. The defection of Gallia 
Cisalpina, indeed, was inevitable when Ariminum was lost ; and soon 
after that event M. Lucullus, who had been besieged in Fidentia, cut 
his way out by a sudden sally and defeated the besieging army. 
The valley of the Po was therefore in the hands of the legates of 
Sulla. 

Carbo, whose activity and spirit had been remarkable throughout 
this campaign, did not fly at once after his defeat at Faventia. He 
had still 30,000 men at Clusium, and his legates Damasippus, 
Caninas, and Marcius still were at the head of some troops. One 
last attempt was resolved upon. An army of Samnites, Lucanians, 
and Campanians, under Pontius of Telesia, M. Lampronius the Lu- 
canian, and Gutta of Capua, was on the way from the south to the 
relief of Praeneste. If he and his legates could effect a junction 
with them, his colleague Marius might still be rescued. L. Dama- 
sippus was at once sent off with two legions, but was prevented by 
Sulla from approaching Praeneste ; and Carbo, seeing all going 
against him, lost heart, and escaping secretly from headquarters at 
Clusium with a few friends made his way to Africa, where his 
own adherent Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus had taken over the govern- 
ment. The troops remaining at Clusium were attacked by Pompey ; 
many were killed, and the rest dispersed to their homes. Caninas, 
Marcius, and Damasippus, indeed, succeeded in joining the Samnites, 
who were advancing on Praeneste ; but Pompey had followed close 
behind them, and finding themselves likely to be caught between 
his army and that of Sulla, they abandoned the attempt to reach 
Praeneste, in which they had already suffered severely, and made a 
dash upon Rome. 

There were no troops in Rome, and its walls were not in a 
state to stand a siege ; but with Samnites at the gates, party spirit 
for the moment was hushed, and the men of military age armed 
themselves and sallied out against the enemy. They were defeated, 
however ; and when Sulla — following close behind the 700 cavalry 
which he had sent forward under Balbus — arrived in the after- 
noon of the I St of November, he found the enemy encamped 
within a mile of the city. Rejecting the entreaties of his officers, 
that he would rest his men before fighting, he attacked at once. It 
was the bloodiest battle of the whole war. Fifty thousand men are 
said to have fallen in the two armies, and Sulla himself was only 



SULLA'S VICTORY AND CRUELTIES 645 



saved from death by his groom, who seeing a spear coming at him, 
whipped on his horse and just secured him. Nor did his disposi- 
tions do him any credit as a general. His right wing under Crassus Victory of 
was completely successful, and drove the enemy to Antemnae, three ^^^ ^^S^ 
miles off; but the left, in which he was himself commanding, was "^^'^S^nder 
driven back upon its camp ; and he was so entirely ignorant of ^'^^^^^' 
what had happened on his right, that he only learnt that Crassus 
was at Antemnae by a message from him in the evening asking for 
provisions. Still, the loss inflicted on the enemy had been very 
great. Pontius himself had fallen, and a large number of prisoners The left 
had been taken ; and though at one time in the afternoon Sulla's "^^^S 
defeat had seemed so certain that a messenger had been despatched '^'''''^" ^'^• 
to Praeneste begging Ofella to come, and announcing his death, 
he was able next morning to join Crassus at Antemnae. The 
enemy were still in considerable force, but 3000 of them offered Sicrrender 
to submit, and Sulla promised them their lives if they would attack of the 
their own comrades. A large number having fallen in this unnatural -^^^^^^'^^-^ 
, combat, the remaining 6000 were taken to Rome, drawn up in the ""Antemnae 
I Circus, and cut to pieces by his orders. 
' Sulla now met the Senate in the temple of Bellona, outside Sulla at 

the pomoerium, within which he could not legally enter without Ro7ne, 
, losing his imperium. While he was actually addressing them the ^'^'-^^''' 
j shrieks of the six or eight thousand Samnite prisoners, who were ^* 
I being cut down hard by, startled the fathers. Sulla bade them not 
be disturbed ; they were only some criminals being punished by his 
( orders. If the senators were content to condone such cruelty 
I on the ground that the victims were Samnites, the common enemy, 
, they soon found that the same measure was to be meted out to 
I others. The victory at the Colline Gate brought with it the 
I surrender of Praeneste. Marius committed suicide, but all men of 
I military age were put to death by Lucretius, doubtless hy Sulla's Severities 
I order ; and in Norba, the last town in Latium to hold out, when it ^^ P^^^- 
\ was taken by Aemilius Lepidus, those of the inhabitants who did not ^^^^^ ^"^ 
I die by their own hand were all executed, and the town was burnt. ^^''^^• 
I Marcius and Caninas, who had escaped after the battle of the 
; Colline Gate, were arrested and at once put to death ; while Marius 
I Gratidianus — in revenge, it seems, for the death of Catulus in the 
I Marian massacres — was taken to the tomb of the Catuli and put to 
I death with horrible tortures. 

j Though Sulla was probably not the author of this crime, he had 
I resolved upon a wholesale slaughter, which has rightly blackened his 
name for ever. It was not primarily personal revenge, or cruelty for 
cruelty's sake that moved him, though both passions perhaps had their The pro- 
influence. Rome was to be renewed, and the constitution restored to ^criptions. 



646 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



82. 

Object of 
the pro- 
scriptions. 



The death 
lists. 



Sulla 

dictator^ 

82-79. 



the state existing before the time of the Gracchi ; and to this end those 
who had in any way contributed to the disastrous change were to be 
remorselessly removed. He now told the people in public meeting 
what his intentions were. All who had borne office as praetors, 
quaestors, or military tribunes, or who had co-operated with the enemy 
since the agreement made with the consul Scipio in the previous year, 
were to be first put to death. Forty senators and about sixteen hundred 
equites were at once named, Sulla remarking that there were others 
whom he could not at present remember. Everywhere the execu- 
tioners — chiefly his Celtic guards — were sent in the track of the 
condemned, not only in Rome but in all the cities of Italy. Death 
was denounced on all who sheltered, and a large reward promised 
to all who could prove that they had killed any of them. The 
vagueness which attended the announcement of the first batch of 
victims added to the horror of the time ; and it was perhaps with a 
view of confining the executions to the persons he desired to get rid 
of that he adopted the plan, recommended in the Senate by C. 
Metellus, of putting up a list of the condemned in the Forum. Even 
then, the terrible uncertainty was not removed, for the first pro- 
scription list was followed by at least two others, and they seem to 
have been so carelessly supervised by Sulla himself that alterations 
and additions were always possible. Full rein was thus given to 
private hatred or covetousness, and many a man perished because 
he had incurred a neighbour's enmity, or possessed what another 
desired. Nothing was easier than to get a man's name on the list, 
and sometimes, as Catiline is said to have done in the case of his 
own brother, the murder was first committed and the name after- 
wards inserted. Proscription involved confiscation of property, 
and Sulla enriched himself with what he called his " spoils," and 
allowed his friends and freedmen to enrich themselves by pur- 
chasing for small sums as sectorcs the estates of the dead men, and 
selling them later on at enormous profit. Even with such deduc- 
tions the treasury is said to have received about ^4,000,000 from 
the sales. 

Many of these executions, perhaps most of those actually carried 
out in Rome, seem to have taken place while Sulla held no official 
rank except the military one of proconsul. For what remained to be 
done, some position recognised within the city seemed necessary. He 
therefore sent a letter to the Senate expressing an opinion that, in 
the disordered state of the republic, supreme power ought to be 
entrusted to some one in order to restore the state, and that he was 
willing to undertake the task. The Senate of course complied, and 
as one of the consuls was dead, and the other out of Italy, the old 
expedient of an interrex was adopted. L. Valerius Flaccus, princeps 



SULLA DICTATOR 647 



or 
constitut- 



senatus, was elected, and proposed a bill to the people appointing Bill ft 
Sulla dictator, with full power of legislation and government every- constit 
where, and without any limit of time. This would not prevent the "'* ^^^ 
election of the usual magistrates, but would subject them in their '^!^*''*'^' 
admmistrative acts entirely to the viajus imperium of the dictator. 82"^" ^'' 
The office had been in abeyance for 120 years; nor was the new 
dictatorship like the office of former times except in name. The 
irregularity of his mode of appointment— by bill, instead of on the 
nomination of a consul— might perhaps be regarded as unimportant, 
and had something like a precedent in the case of Fabius Cunctator ; 
his assumption of twenty-four lictors merely raised a disputed ques- 
tion in archaeology : 1 where Sulla's dictatorship differed from 
former dictatorships was first in absence of any limit of time— the 
old dictators having been confined to six months, and constantly U7iconstl- 
abdicating sooner— and secondly in the words expressing his com- tutional 
petence. Of old dictators had been named for the routine pur- ^^^ti^re of 
poses of holding elections {comitioriwi habe7idoruin c,\ for suppress- ^^^ ""ffi"^^- 
ing seditions {sedandae seditionis c.\ or for taking the command of 
the army {rei gere?idae c). But Sulla was appointed to settle the 
constitution {rez piiblicae coiistitiiendae c.\ which gave him authority 
to propose every kind of legislation, however much opposed to the 
spirit of existing laws and customs, without any of the usual checks 
from Senate or Tribune. To be binding after his dictatorship 
his laws had to be passed by the centuries, but his unlimited 
coercive powers would make that a mere form. He was now 
practically master and monarch, and might well have forborne the 
mean revenge of ordering the ashes of his great rival Marius to be 
torn from their grave and scattered on the Aesis. 

The bill constituting Sulla dictator contained clauses giving him Limitation 
indemnity for the past and confirming his acts; but also it appears of time of 
limiting the time during which proscriptions should continue, and ^f'''-^^''^^ 
sales of confiscated property hold good, to the ist of June 81. 
This period was probably not longer than was necessary to carry 

out his plans in Italy, where certain towns still held out, Nola 

in Campania, Aesernia in Samnium, Volaterra in Etruria,— and had 
to be reduced. This was made an occasion for disfranchising them 
and other towns. Sulla did not break his promise of not repealing 
the Julian law or reversing Cinna's arrangement, which allowed 
Italians to be enrolled in all the tribes. Special laws or edicts 

1 Livy says that no dictator ever had twenty-four hctors before ; but as Poly- 
bius (iii. 87). Dionysius (x. 24), Plutarch [Fab. i), and Appian [B. Civ. i. 100) 
all say that a dictator had twenty-four lictors, there may at least have been a 
diversity of opinion on a subject now a matter of almost ancient history. The last 
dictatorship was in 202, and then only for holding the comitia. 



ttons and 
confisca- 
tions. 



648 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAr. 



Pun I sh- 
in cut of 
Samnuim 
and 

rebellious 
Italian 
towns. 



Si-79- 



The new 
constitu- 
tion. 



The Senate. 



prohibited the inhabitants of particular towns, or certain individuals 
and their sons, from being so enrolled ; the general law was left 
untouched. But, in fact, he made it unimportant : for he confiscated 
vast tracts of land in all parts of Italy; and so nearly depopulated 
the great scat of disaffection, Samnium, that the towns became 
mere villages, and whole districts were almost left empty to receive 
the new colonies of veterans, of whom forty-seven legions, according 
to Livy, or twenty-three, according to the more moderate statement 
of Appian, were planted in the empty farms. This was his notion 
of Romanising Italy -} and it was in fact the most permanent of all 
his measures. 

His triumph over Mithridates was celebrated on the istof Feb- 
ruary (81) with all splendour. He assumed the titles of Felix and 
Epaphroditus, as though he were the special favourite of fortune and 
love ; and then went on with the constitutional changes for which he 
had sought the dictatorship. His object was to restore the oli- 
garchy, with the control of the Senate rendered effective over every 
magistrate and every department — resting, indeed, ultimately for 
authority on the people, but a people purged of many elements of 
sedition, and looking to the Senate and the consuls for guidance in 
legislation rather than to tribunes. The Senate, now much thinned 
by war and massacre, was strengthened by the addition of 300 of the 
most respectable equites. Their names seem to have been selected by 
Sulla, but each was submitted to a vote of the centuries. This was 
only a measure for the nonce. It would not be needed for the future ; 
for henceforth the quaestorship was to entitle a man to a seat ; and 
as the numlicr of quaestors was now, owing to the multiplied spheres 
of duty, raised to twenty, and that of the praetors to eight, there 
were enough magistrates elected each year to fill up vacancies. It 
was not a new thing to thus replenish the Senate from the magistracy, 
but it was now to work automatically, without the necessity of a quin- 
quennial revision of the censors.- The importance of the censors 
was already decreased by the fact that, since the tributum was no 



^ Sulla is accused of allowing his treatment of particular towns to be influenced 
by the payment of money (("ic. de off. iii. 22, 87). This may mean, not that he 
took bribes, but that he allowed towns to commute their offence for a fine to the 
exchequer. 

2 The magistrates and ex-magistrates sat and spoke in the Senate up to this 
time, but were not senators till the censor made up the list with their names in 
it. This interval seems to have been abolished by Sulla ; they now became 
senators at once. The censor's powers were farther curtailed by Clodius in 58 ; 
and though that law was repealed by Metellus in 52, the office, as far as the 
exercise of the right of affixing the nota and revising the Senate was concerned, 
became impossible ; and the last censors appointed (in 50) were unwilling to 
accept the duties, and did nothing. 



XL SULLA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 649 

longer paid by the citizens, a census of property was unnecessary. 81 yg. 
Another reason for their existence now disappeared, and, in fact, the 
office fell into abeyance : none were appointed till 70, and then it 
seems without the power of making up the roll of the Senate. 

The regulations as to the government of the provinces were also The 
calculated to increase the power of the Senate. Henceforth consuls magistrates 
and praetors were to stay in Rome during their year of office, and ^^^^^-j^^^ 
only to have military imperium in their second year in one of the 
provinces. The particular province which each was to have was 
still usually decided by lot ; but the Senate arranged beforehand 
which were to be consular and which praetorian provinces, or could 
withdraw any particular province from allotment, and so prolong the 
tenure of any one whom they wished to remain. On the other hand, 
he was bound not to pass the limits of his province in arms without 
order from the Senate,^ and to leave it within thirty days of the 
arrival of his successor, retaining however his imperium until he 
arrived in Italy, or, if he claimed a triumph, which depended on a 
vote of the Senate as before, till he entered Rome. The Senate, 
therefore, at least in theory, controlled the men with military imperium, 
and could recall them or lengthen their tenure of it. The recent 
innovations on the tenure of the consulship, marked by the seven 
consulships of the elder Marius and the election of the younger 
Marius at twenty-seven, were now forbidden. Not only were the 
regulations as to age to be reinforced, but no one was to be praetor 
who had not been quaestor, or consul who had not been praetor. The 
highest magistracy would, therefore, only be held by men of official 
experience and sober age. " One should be rower before taking 
the helm," was Sulla's comment when he saw the gory head of the 
younger Marius. 

The Comitia tributa was still to elect the lower magistrates ; but The 
it practically ceased under Sulla's arrangement, as probably in that comitia. 
made in his consulship in 88, to pass laws, to be consulted and 
addressed on public affairs, or to judge in cases affecting the caput 
of a citizen. These functions were transferred to the centuriate 
assembly, in which property and age still had the preponderating 
influence, and to the quaestiones perpetiiae^ in which all public charges 
were now tried. But while the Italian towns were to be peopled by Gives 
new citizens drawn from Sulla's veterans, the urban electorate was Comelii. 
modified by the addition of more than 10,000 slaves of masters who 
had fallen in arms against him or had been proscribed. They were 
made full citizens, and enrolled in the urban tribes under the general 
name of Cornelii, a measure which might be called a noble act of 

^ The le.y Cornelia de majestafc (Cicero /// Pis. § 50). 



650 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Si-79- 



The 
tribunes. 



The sacred 
colleges. 



Sulla s 

criminal 

code. 



Senators 
jurymen 
instead of 
equites. 



justice, if we could think it done from regard to the natural rights of 
men, and not rather with a view to strengthen his own hold upon 
the populace of the city. 

The tribuneship, again, lost much of its power and prestige. It 
had indeed wandered far from its original purpose. The auxilium of 
the tribunes was less and less frequently needed as the administration 
of the law became more settled ; and they had used their veto chiefly 
for political ends, generally as tools of a party in the Senate, and to 
check liberal legislation proposed by any one of their number more 
mindful than the rest of his proper functions. They had, therefore, 
ceased to interest the people at large, while Sulla feared the confusion 
which their powers, if freely exercised, might introduce in the control 
which it was his object to give to the Senate. They now practically 
lost their legislative function, for they were forbidden to propose 
measures without previous sanction of the Senate, or to summon and 
address the people ; and the office was rendered unattractive to men 
of ability by the rule which made tribunes ineligible to all other 
offices. Their right of veto was not wholly taken away, but was 
restricted in some way not accurately known. 

Finally the colleges of sacerdotes and augures, which since 104 
had by the lex Domitia been filled by election in the Coinitia t?-iln(hi, 
recovered their right of co-optation ; and the much-coveted member- 
ship was thereby kept more strictly in the hands of a few families. 

Besides these organic political changes, Sulla showed extra- 
ordinary diligence in extending or codifying the criminal law and 
arranging for its administration. In doing this he followed the 
precedent of the /ex Calpnr?na in 149. The general principle, that 
it was the part of the comitia to order the investigation of a public 
charge by a committee representing it, was maintained ; but, as the 
lex Caipur7iia had established a standing commission to investigate 
charges of malversation {lie 7-epetiimiis).^ so Sulla now established 
nine new standing commissions to try cases of various defined crimes.^ 
Each would have certain peculiarities in its composition or pro- 
cedure, but they were all alike in the fact of the juries being drawn 
from the roll of the Senate, instead of the equestrian order, and in 
being presided over usually by one of the six praetors,^ — the civil 
business being left to the praetor urbanus and the praetor peregrinus. 
It would no longer be necessary for a magistrate to bring in a bill 



^ They were de majestate, de sicariis et venejiciis, de parricidio, de pectilatu, 
de atnbitu, de nummis adulterinis , defalsis, de vi publica. 

2 When there was more business than the six praetors could do, it was usual 
to appoint special presidents — judices quaestio7ium — apparently by lot among 
ex-aediles. who would usually be praetors the next year. Both classes of 
presidents are spoken of in general terms as quaesitores. 



XL POMPEY IN SICILY AND AFRICA 651 

before the people to secure the prosecution of any one of these 8i-jg. 
crimes. Any citizen might now bring the offender to trial : and in 
fact it became the regular way for a young man courting popular 
favour, as a preparation for curule office, to prosecute some of the 
governors of provinces or party leaders at home. The general aim 
was no doubt to protect the provinces, check the magistrates, 
strengthen the control of the Senate, and depress the equestrian 
order, — an aim but imperfectly attained even for a time. The 
equestrian order, indeed, was a special object of his attack. Large The 
numbers were put on the proscription lists ; they lost their right ^liiit^^^- 
to sit on juries ; and Sulla's arrangement for the five years' taxes 
in Asia deprived them for a time of a profitable field of enter- 
prise, though before long the publicani were again at work 
there. 

Sulla retained power long enough to see that the new constitu- 
tion should at any rate be tried. He was consul himself in 80 ; 
but declined re-election for 79, apparently because his new law was 
then in operation : and when Lucretius Ofella, — the victor at 
Praeneste, — ventured to appear as a candidate for the consulship Assassin- 
without having previously been praetor, and refused to withdraw on ^^^^'^ "f 
Sulla's order, he sent a soldier to cut him down in the Forum, and told ^'/If^"^ 
those who appealed to hmi on the tribunal to punish the assassin 
that it had been done by his direction. 

He was not, however, able or willing to crush the rising influence Pompey in 
of Pompey, who insisted on a triumph for his actions in Africa, and -^^'^^d' o-nd 
dared to tell him, when he objected, that "more worshipped the '^^'^l^"' 
rising- than the setting sun." Pompey had been sent to Sicily 
at the end of 82 to put down the remains of the party of Carbo, 
entertained there by the praetor M. Perpenna, who had returned 
a resolute defiance to Sulla's message demanding his submission. 
At Pompey's approach he fled, and Sicily remained under Pompey's Death of 
government. Carbo himself was on his way to Sicily from Africa, ^^''l''^- 
and sent forward M. Brutus to see whether Pompey had arrived. 
Brutus being caught off Lilybaeum killed himself; and Carbo took 
refuge in the island of Cossyra, half way between Sicily and 
Africa, but was there arrested, brought to Pompey, and at once 
executed and his head sent to Rome. While engaged in organising 
affairs in Sicily, in doing which he gained a high reputation for 
justice and incorruptibility, Pompey received an order from Sulla to 
cross to Africa, where Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cinna's son-in-law, 
who had been proscribed and fled to Africa, had taken over the Defeat of 
troops of the praetor Fabius Hadrianus (burnt in his own praetorium -^heriobar- 
at Utica), and by the assistance of Hiarbas, a pretender to the 
throne of Numidia, collected a considerable force. Domitius fell in 



652 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Triumph 
of Pompey 
on the 12th 
of March 
81.^ 



His rela- 
tions with 
Sulla. 



Sulla 

abdicates 
the dic- 
tatorship, 
79- 



battle with, it is said, 17,000 out of the 20,000 of his army. Hiarbas ! 
was captured and put to death, and Hiempsal restored to the throne 
of Numidia — all within forty days. Returning to Rome, Pompey 
was met by the dictator at the head of a great procession, and 
addressed by him with the cognomen of Magnus, which he thence- 
forth adopted. His claim to a triumph, however, was in strictness 
barred by the fact that he was a privatus, his rank in Sicily and Africa 
having been that of propraetor only. Sulla tried to persuade him 
to forbear asking it, and when it was referred to the Senate openly 
opposed it. Pompey, however, was firm, and Sulla gave way with the 
half-contemptuous expression, " Let him triumph then ! " Nor was 
this the only point in which Pompey dared to oppose Sulla. It seems 
from coins that he assumed the title of proconsul instead of the 
lower one of propraetor, under which he had been sent to Sicily 
and Africa ; and in 79 he supported M. Aemilius Lepidus in his 
canvass for the consulship against Sulla's express wish and warn- 
ing. Lepidus was elected even before Sulla's candidate O. Lutatius 
Catulus. 

It seems the more surprising, in view of such proof of diminished 
influence, that Sulla should have ventured to divest himself of supreme 
power. It is true that all the provinces were now in the hands of 
his partisans ; that Italy was everywhere dotted with settlements of 
his veterans, whose interests would induce them to maintain the 
validity of his laws ; and that the urban voters in the centuries were 
for various causes influenced by the same consideration. Still the 
party of his enemies was not destroyed, and there must have been 
many whose resentment he would have to fear. His resignation, 
therefore, seems another instance of that bold trust in chance which 
characterised so many of his actions in war as well as peace. " He 
never succeeded so well," he used to say, " as when he made least 
preparation." He looked upon himself as pre-eminently the favourite 
of fortune. He not only called himself Felix, but his son and 
daughter Faustus and Fausta. He may haxe been tired of power 
and resolved to risk it. Happily for himself, perhaps, he did not live 
long enough to test the gratitude of friends or to give free scope 
to the ill-will of enemies. He abdicated the dictatorship towards 
the end of 79, and retired to his villa at Cumae, where in the society 
of artists, actors, musicians, and men of letters, he gave free vent to 



1 This date is deduced from Licinianus, fr. of bk. 36. Clinton has fixed 
it in September 81, which certainly seems more reasonable. If the 12th March 
given by Licinianus is to be accepted it would seem more likely to be in 80. But 
Livy (Ep. 89) says he was twenty-four years old, and on the 30th of September 81 
he would be twenty-five. Therefore according to Livy the triumph must have 
been before the end of September 81. 



XL SULLA'S DEATH AND CHARACTER 653 

his taste for literature and art as well as luxury, though he still 
interfered in the local politics of the neighbouring town of Puteoli. 
Before many months had passed he was attacked by a loathsome and 
painful disease, and seems to have had presages of death, — Sulla's 
Chaldaeans had assured him that he was to die at the height of death, j8. 
his good fortune : his son by Metella (whom he had divorced on 
her death -bed because engaged in a solemn festival for which 
he would be unfitted by contact with the dead) had appeared 
in his dreams and invited him to come with him to his 
mother. He prepared for his end with calmness, busying himself 
with the composition of his memoirs until two days before it 
came. 

Thus the man whose hands were so deeply dyed in the blood of His 
his fellow-citizens, the scourge of Greece and Asia, the destroyer of funeral. 
Samnium, died, like his great rival Marius, quietly in his bed ; and 
in spite of some opposition on the part of the consul Lepidus, was 
honoured by a magnificent funeral procession to the Campus 
, Martins, where his body was burned, and a monument erected 
with an inscription, said to be composed by himself, affirming 
I that no friend had outdone him in benefits or foe in injuries. Per- 
I haps he struck the true keynote of his career when he called himself Estimate of 
I " lucky." He certainly had been supremely fortunate at more than ^'ull<^- 
I one crisis in his career. Coming to the Jugurthine war almost at 
j the eleventh hour, by a curious series of chances he all but robbed 
I Marius of the credit of finishing it. His enemy Fimbria had all but 
1 reduced Mithridates to despair, when the opportune appearance of 
\ Lucullus and his fleet gave Sulla all the advantage of what the 
i other had done. In the Civil war, while he was all but beaten 
i himself, both at Clusium and the Colline Gate, he was excellently 
I served by others. Pompey, Crassus, Metellus, Ofella struck the 
I decisive blows in the war from which he reaped all the profit. A 
j great soldier rather than a great general, he showed a courage on 
I the field — partly born of fatalism — which inspired others, and saved 
] him from situations into which a greater strategist would not perhaps 
jhave fallen. By a mixture of severity towards breaches of military 
I duty which affected success, and indulgence towards crimes which 
I were only the offspring of cruelty or avarice, he won and retained 
the devotion of his army. Dissolute, cynical, and cruel, he could 
5 have possessed the love of few in civil life ; yet by two characteristics 
— definite clearness as to what he desired and utter disregard of 
human life in attaining it^he not only gained supreme power, but, 
what was more surprising, left it with safety. To the admirer of the 
Roman libertas, — that tyranny of the few under republican forms, — this 
homage to the constitution seemed to compensate for many crimes. 



654 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Yet in neither of the two great works of his Hfe was he really success- 
ful. Mithridates was not crushed, but was soon at war with Rome 
again. The constitution, which he had created or restored at the 
cost of so much blood, stood unshaken for scarcely ten years, and 
finally collapsed in the great Civil war, in which men who shared his 
achievements or suffered under his tyranny as youths, took principal 
parts when scarcely past middle age. 



Italy 

becomes an 

extended 

Ro?ne. 



Cisalpine 
Caul. 



The new 
Italy. 



The most permanent part of Sulla's work was the Romanising of 
Italy. Though certain cities and individuals were disfranchised for 
the time, Italy became an extended Rome, — the pomoerium, as it 
were, being pushed up to the Rubicon, south of which no provincial 
governor might come with an army, and especially no governor of 
Gaul, without laying down his imperium. Cisalpine Gaul itself was 
on the way to become part of Italy. The three Roman colonies, 
Mutina, Parma, and Eporedia, had always enjoyed the citizenship, 
and at the close of the Social war the four " Latin " colonies — 
Placentia, Bononia, Cremona, Aquileia — obtained the same rights. 
Again in 89 the lex Pompeia organised the native communities south 
of the Po on the model of the Italian municipia, and gave the 
inhabitants the position oi pe?'egri?ti, which like the Laliiiitas secured 
them conubium and commercium, though not the suffrage, except in 
the case of provincial magistrates. Thus, though Gallia Cisalpina 
remained a province and was governed by a propraetor or proconsul 
until after the death of Caesar, it was on a peculiarly favourable 
footing, and was so filled with Roman citizens that it became known 
as Gallia Togata^ as distinguished from Gaul beyond the Alps. 

But Italy south of the Rubicon was now united and organised 
as head of the Empire. The old system of planting colonies in it for 
military purposes, as though amidst a hostile population, came to an 
end. Coloni indeed were still established in various parts, and with 
the old formalities of the military colony, 1 but their purpose was now 
the provision for poor citizens or veteran soldiers, not military 
defence.2 Since the lex lulia (89) they enjoyed no higher political 
status than other cities. All alike came under certain general laws 
such as the lex lulia municipalis of Caesar, all shared in the 



1 Cicero, 2 Phil. § 102. 

2 The Italian colonies before the Punic wars have been given on p. 156. 
Those settled afterwards were : — I. " Latin" : Brundisium (244), Spoletium (241), 
Copia or Thurii (193), Valenlia or Vibo (192), Pisae (180). II. Roman : Pyrgi 
(191), Puteoli, Volternum, Liternum, Salernum, Buxentum, Sipontum, Tempsa, 
Croton (194), Potentia, Pisaurum (184), Saturnia (183), Graviscae (181), Luna 
(180), Auximum (157), Fabrateria (124), Minervia at Scylacium, and Neptunia at 
Tarentum (122). 



THE ORGANISATION OF THE EMPIRE 655 



immunity from tributum,! ^nd only had the same obhgation as to 
military service as other cities. The right of voting was of little 
value perhaps to men who seldom went to Rome, but such as it was 
they possessed it : and, what was more valuable, they had the 
citizen's protection or remedy against the arbitrary acts of Roman 
magistrates. The old differences of internal government still kept up 
the distinction between coloniae, municipia, praefecturae, conciliabula 
and fora, — but from the standpoint of political status all alike might 
be classed as municipia, in which all who enjoyed the municipal 
franchise were thereby Roman citizens. ^ Therefore the military 
" colonies " formed by Sulla and others are not to be classed with 
those of former times, — the list of which may now be considered 
closed, — -but were rather systematic grants of land. "Latin" 
colonies could no longer be planted in Italy ; but though the pre- 
cedent of the Carthaginian lunonia of C. Gracchus in 122 was 
followed in 118 in the case of Narbo Martins, where the coloni 
retained their citizenship, colonies in the provinces hereafter had 
only a restricted citizenship analogous to the old Latinitas. 

Italy, thus organised, was at the head of an empire already The extent 
stretching across Europe ; and the territories afterwards added were ^f^'^^^ 
in some cases, as in Gaul, Greece, and Egypt, already preparing to 
accept her power, in others were in a sense merely consequential 
accretions, necessary for the development or defence of that already 
possessed. There were now ten provinces^ governed by a propraetor Ten 
or proconsul, with a quaestor and staff, with difoj-imila or charta, under provinces. 
a law passed in the case of each according to its special circumstances. 
Their administration gave employment and chances of wealth to many 
Romans, both among the aristocrats and the middle class. But they 
also contributed to the greatness of Rome by the auxiliaries which Their 
they supplied to her army and fleet, and the tribute paid to her 
exchequer. This tribute was raised in various ways. In Sicily and ij^'perial 
Asia a tenth {deciimd) of the produce of the year — in wine, oil, wheat, exchequer 

1 The twelve colonies which in 209 refused their contingents were in 204 
subjected to the census and tributum like Roman citizens (Livy xxix. 15, ■^']), but 
from the latter they would be freed like the other citizens in 168. 

^ To put it differently, a man who was a citizen of one of these towns was 
ipso facto a Roman citizen, but what constituted him a citizen of one of these 
towns was still different in different municipia, coloniae, etc. 

^ Sicily, Sardinia with Corsica, Hispania Citerior, Hispania Ulterior, Gallia 
Cisalpina, Gallia Narbonensis, Macedonia, Africa, Asia, Cilicia. Besides these 
Illyricum or Dalmatia was partly organised, paid tribute, and was under pro- 
tection, but it seems that no annual governor was sent there regularly till the time 
of Caesar. Cyrenaica had been left to Rome (95), but had not yet been made a 
province in form. Egypt it was said, had also been bequeathed, and at any rate 
its kings depended on Roman support. Greece was partly incorporated with 
Macedonia, partly enjoyed a nominal freedom. 



con- 
tributions 
to the 



656 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Decuma, 
fortoria, 
scripttira. 



Stipend- 
iu?n. 



Indiffer- 
ence at 
Rome to 
the East. 



The new 
generatio?i. 



oats, and other grains — was transmitted to Rome.i Customs {por- 
toria), and a charge for the use of the pasture land {scripttira)^ 
which had been reserved in the several states, were paid in money. 
There was this distinction between the two provinces : in Sicily the 
contracts for farming the revenue were sold at Syracuse ; for Asia, 
by the censors in Rome, In the other provinces a fixed sum was paid 
{stipendiwn or iribiitum\ but the manner of assessing it differed in 
the several provinces, or even in the several communities in the pro- 
vinces, generally in accordance with the fiscal arrangements existing 
before the Roman occupation. In every province there were certain 
cities which, either as a reward for services, or in consequence of 
terms made at their surrender, were free from the stipendium {im- 
imtnes). But even these shared in the special land tax {tributimi 
soli)^ which was raised to pay the expenses of the praetor and his 
staff, or to defray the cost of war. Besides these sources of revenue 
the Roman exchequer received a royalty on mines, saltworks, and 
fisheries, which, like the customs and pasture rents in the several 
communities within the province,- were paid in money. 

Like our own Indian Empire this great empire had been built up 
by men able and active, though sometimes cruel and corrupt, often 
with little direction or control from home, where the chief interest 
felt was in the wealth poured into the treasury and the games and 
shows which accompanied the triumphs. In regard to no part of the 
empire was this indifference more conspicuous or more harmful in 
its consequences than in the East, The pirates of Cilicia and Crete 
swept the Aegean, crippling commerce and ruining cities, and the 
Romans seemed not to be moved till the audacity of these sea-rovers 
brought them actually into Italy. Dynasties rose and fell in Asia 
without seriously disturbing the minds of statesmen or people ; and 
the good or ill government of the provincials was regarded, not so 
much a matter for energetic interference and reform, as affording 
opportunities for party triumphs and personal revenge. 

Meanwhile the last years of Sulla's life introduce us to a group 
of men who were to play prominent parts in the closing scenes of 
the republic, and who, either from the greater abundance of the 
records remaining of them, or the more permanent import of their 
work, occupy a larger share than almost any other in the imagina- 



1 The publican! calculated the average produce and undertook to transmit a 
tenth to Rome, making their profit by the excess of the produce over the estimate. 
A bad harvest, therefore, or a careless collection might cause them to lose 
heavily ; and in their eagerness for business they sometimes made so high an 
estimate as to overreach themselves. 

^ A province consisted of a collection of urban communities with a recognised 
territory. But in each there was usually a reserve of public land. 



XL THE NEW GENERATION AND LITERATURE 657 

tion of posterity. Pompey had triumphed in 81 ; Caesar had served 
his first campaign ; Crassus had laid the foundation of his colossal 
fortune at the auctions of the Sullan confiscation ; Catiline had 
committed his first crime ; Cicero had delivered his first speech in 
a public cause ; M. Terentius Varro, " the most learned of the 
Romans," was already forty years old, and yet survived them all. 

With the new men a new literary development was taking place, j-jj^ „^^ 
The most characteristic and flourishing department was that of literature. 
oratory. It was natural that it should be so. Most of the upper 
class desired public office, and one of the surest claims to it was the 
reputation, not only for skill in addressing Senate or people, but even 
more for the power of convincing juries, v/ho, being senators or 
I equites, were above the average in education and intelligence. Ac- 
cordingly every man of note in this and the previous age was more 
or less of an orator ; many of them left speeches written out for Orators. 
; publication, as Africanus, the Gracchi, Metellus Macedonicus, 
and many others. The most noted of all before the time of 
Cicero was M. Antonius (143-87), the grandfather of the triumvir, 
( and L. Licinius Crassus (140-91), long looked up to as models 
j on which young Roman orators should form their style. But in 
\ other ways also the mass of Roman literature (though only frag- 
\ ments survive) had been steadily swelling and developing in new 
' directions. L. Attius (170-104) had kept to the custom of adapting 
' Greek tragedies ; but T. Ouintius Atta (ob. 78) and L. Afranius 
] (b. 154) had been prolific in fabulae togatae — comedies on Roman Comediae 
1 subjects with titles drawn from Roman festivals or stories. Above tog^-tae. 
all C. Lucilius (148-103) had almost created a new department of 
, literature in his satirae., which handled subjects of the day and Satire. 
I3 started a form of composition claimed as wholly Roman by Quin- 
j(j tilian, afterwards so brilliantly used by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal. 
j] It was also an age of memoir-writing. Q. Catulus, the victor at Memoirs. 
jVercellae, Sulla himself, and P. Rutilius Rufus all left memoirs 
J behind them ; while more formal history was represented by L. Lu- History. 
jjcullus on the Social war, Piso on the Civil wars of Marius and Sulla, 
and by a number of Annalists. In jurisprudence there were already Jurispru- 
many eminent names, especially those of the two Scaevolae. And deuce. 
Greek philosophy, which, however imperfectly understood, was to Philosophy. 
influence so profoundly the best men at Rome, had already been 
H expounded by the stoic C. Blosius of Cumae, by Q. Tubero, Q. 
Scaevola the augur, L. Aelius Stilo, and others. Thus both the in- 
tellectual life at Rome and her foreign dominion were assuming the 
form which they presented at their highest development. 

In social life we may notice, first, that family life in Rome was 
being much undermined by the facility of divorce. Divorce was 

2 u 



6s8 HISTORY OF ROME 



known in early times and provided for by the XII Tables, but was so 
rare that that of Carvilius (231) was spoken of as the first. It is 
probable that the most solemn matrimony — that by coiifarreatio — 
was indissoluble except in the gravest circumstances. But marriage 
in manus or usiis^ which became the prevalent form, was easily dis- 
soluble by the mere will of either of the pair ; and though Cicero's 
remark on Pompey's divorce, that it was " generally approved," 
shows that public opinion was not always favourable, yet it had 
evidently become exceedingly common, and tended to be more and 
more so. Secondly, enormous private fortunes were becoming 
common, and establishments were maintained on an almost in- 
credible scale. The slaves in a rich man's house were counted by 
hundreds, every department of household work, dress, and comfort 
had their special attendants. Crassus thought no man rich whose 
income could not support an army. Lucullus could spend 50,000 
denarii on a single feast. Cicero, who had little paternal wealth, 
and was forbidden by the lex Cincia (204) to take fees, yet ac- 
knowledges the receipt of a sum equal to ^160,000 in legacies, and 
mentions at least seven villas belonging to him besides his town 
house. In many cases this wealth came from the plunder of 
provinces. The most conspicuous example of this was C. Verres. 
As pro-quaestor of Cilicia (80-79) he had not only enriched himself 
with money, but with works of art from numberless towns in Asia 
and Achaia. This he carried on to an incredible extent in his three 
years as propraetor in Sicily (73-71). No chicane, no art, no violence 
was omitted to wring from towns, nobles, and rich men their money or 
the most cherished objects of religious or ancestral veneration. His 
trial took place in 70, and was of special importance as testing the 
impartiality of the senatorial courts. But though Cicero by his exer- 
tions made his condemnation inevitable, he was able, on retiring to 
Marseilles to escape it, to retain the vast majority of his ill-gotten 
gains, and to live in profusion and luxury till, in 43, he fell an 
unpitied victim to the proscriptions of the Triumvirs. 



Authorities. — Plutarch, Lives of Sulla, Pompey, IaicuUus, Sertorii/s^ Crassus. 
Livy, Ep. 84-90. Appian, B. Civ. i. 79-108 (the only continuous narrative). 
Florus iii. 21. Dion Cassius, fr. 106-110. Diodorus, fr. of xxxvii. Orosius v. 
20-22. Zonaras x. i. Cicero's speech in defence of Roscius of Ameria (81 or 80) 
refers directly to a circumstance rising out of the proscriptions. His Verrine 
Oratiofis and Letters to his brother Quintus are the best authorities for the treat- 
ment of the provinces. 



CHAPTER XLI 

WARS IN ITALY, SPAIN, AND THE EAST 

Lepidus attempts to rescind Sulla's acts — He is sent to Etruria (78) — Attacks 
Rome — Is defeated and goes to Sardinia {77) — Sertorius in Spain — Defeats 
many Roman armies — The campaigns of Metellus (79-76) — Sertorius joined 
by Perpenna and partisans of Lepidus (77) — Negotiates with Mithridates 
(75-74) — Pompey in Spain (76-74) — Death of Sertorius (72) — Rebellion of 
gladiators and slaves under Spartacus (73-71) — Victories of Crassus (72-71) — 
Second war with Mithridates under Murena (83-81) — Wars with Thracians 
and with the pirates (78-74) — Third war with Mithridates and campaigns of 
Lucullus( 74-67) — BiTHYNiA left to the Roman people(74) — Battle atChalcedon 
and siege of Cyzicus (73) — Naval victories (72) — Battle of Cabira (71) — Mith- 
ridates in Armenia (71-69) — Lucullus invades Armenia, battle at Tigranocerta 
(69) — Battle of Arsanias (68) — Mutiny in the Roman army (67) — Recall of 
Lucullus (67). 

Sulla was no sooner dead than the opposition to his system revived. Coss. M. 
The consul Lepidus, whose appointment Pompey had regarded as a Aemihus 
triumph over Sulla, was not long in showing his hand. He was just qK'^^\ 
the sort of man of whom Sulla had desired to cleanse the state, and ^^^^ Catu- 
had returned from his praetorship in Sicily (80) infamous for extor- lus, 78. 
tion and tyranny ; while his colleague, a strong supporter of the 
Optimates, is represented by Cicero as one of the best and most 

j honest of men. The two were at any rate always at variance, and 
Lepidus seems to have relied for support on the discontent existing 

I in the Italian communities, on which Sulla's hand had been heavy. 
He began by opposing the ex-dictator's public funeral, but withdrew 
in deference to Pompey, who, in spite of his inclination to the side 
of the Populares, his strained relations with Sulla during the last 
years of his life, and the slight of being passed over without mention 
in his will, still wished to pay him this last honour. Soon afterwards JReacHon- 
he brought in a series of laws intended to rescind Sulla's acta. He «0' policy 
was not indeed prepared to restore the tribunitian power,i but he ^ Lepidus. 

1 Verum ubi convenerant Tr. PI. consules uti tribuniciam potestatem restituerent, 
negavit prior Lepidus, et in contione magna pars adsensast dicenti, non esse utile 
restitui tribuniciam potestatem, Licimatius (who alone records this). 



66o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



War of 
Lepidus, yj. 



Death of 
Lepidus. 



War with 
Sertorius 
in Spain, 
77-72. 



carried a law without opposition to renew the distribution of cheap 
corn, and proposed to recall those who had been banished by Sulla, 
and restore the lands which had been divided among the veterans to 
their owners. The contention between the two consuls became so 
vehement, that the Senate was glad to send both into Etruria, 
to put down a rising of certain of those dispossessed owners who 
were forcibly recovering their estates. The Senate had required 
them to swear not to turn their arms against each other ; but 
Lepidus regarded the oath as only binding during his consul- 
ship : next year as proconsul of Narbonensis he would have a 
free hand. The Senate in alarm ordered him back to Rome, to 
hold the elections, but he declined to come ; and as Catulus could 
not safely leave his army, the new year opened without consuls, and 
Appius Claudius was appointed interrex. With the spring of 77 
Lepidus prepared for action. Leaving his legate M. Brutus in com- 
mand of the valley of the Po with an army at Mutina, he marched 
against Rome. He found Catulus waiting for him at the Milvian 
Bridge, and was decisively defeated there, or, as some say, in the 
Campus Martins, to which Catulus had retired. He retreated to 
Cosa in Etruria, followed by Catulus, and had to fight again in order 
to take ship for Sardinia, where he shortly afterwards died from 
disease, — aggravated by chagrin at his failure ; at the loss of his son 
Scipio, who had shut himself up in Alba but had been starved out 
and executed; and, as some say, at the discovery of the unfaithfulness 
of his wife. Pompey, who had determined to support the Senate, and 
had received a military command, then marched against Brutus in 
Mutina. Brutus did not await his attack, but retired to Regium 
(seventeen miles off) with an escort of cavalry, and there next day 
was killed by Geminius on the order of Pompey.^ 

The Optimates had thus for the time successfully defended the 
Sullan constitution. But a formidable danger was also threatening 
in Spain. Quintus Sertorius left Italy after the battle of Tifata, at 
the end of 83, to take up the government of farther Spain as pro- 
praetor. Some say that he did so under pressure of Cinna and the 
younger Marius, who found his counsels inconvenient. However 
that may be, he made himself popular with the Roman residents by 
his mildness and equity, and with the natives by wise measures, 
as well as by liberal gifts. He knew that Sulla would supersede him, 
and had left his legatus lulius Salinator with 6000 men to block 
the road over the Pyrenees. But when Sulla's nominee, Gaius 
Annius, appeared, Salinator was murdered ; his soldiers abandoned 
their entrenchments ; and Annius marched down the country with 



1 Scandal said that he surrendered on promise of his life. 



XLi SERTORIUS IN SPAIN 66i 

a large army. Sertorius, who had only 3000 men, retired into SertoHus 
New Carthage, and thence crossed to Mauritania with ships and crosses to 
men. Repulsed there, and (Jogged by the ships of Annius from -^A^'^^- 
island to island, he passed through the Straits and landed near the 
mouth of the Baetis, accompanied by some Cilician pirate vessels. 
Here he was told by sailors of delightful islands in the Atlantic 
where the climate was charming, the means of life abundant, and 
peace unbroken. He longed, it is said, for this rest from war and 
trouble ; but his Cilician auxiliaries preferred arms and plunder, and 
he had to cross to Africa again, where, in support of the Mauritani, 
who were rebelling against their king, he took Tangier, having first 
defeated Sulla's legate Paccianus. 

His fame now induced the Lusitani to invite him to become their Sertorius 
leader. He therefore crossed once more to Spain, and quickly l^'^d^i' 
established a great reputation among the simple country folk, which "{ •. • 
he enhanced by a pretence of Divine aid. A favourite fawn, given 
him by a hunter, accompanied his camp, which he allowed it to be 
understood had been bestowed on him by Diana, and was a pledge 
of her support. He soon had a large army, constantly supplemented 
by refugees from Rome who disliked or feared the present regime. 
He still claimed to have constitutional imperium, but was in fact in 
open war with Rome. He made frequent raids on Baetica, the 
southern province ; took many towns ; and defeated the propraetor Q. 
Fufidius on the Baetis with a loss of 2000 men, and Cotta in a sea- Caecilius 
\ fight near Gibraltar. Quintus Caecilius, who came as proconsul to ■ '^ i "-^ 
I farther Spain in 79, found himself in a country devoid of roads, 'vg-yS. 
\ always liable to be attacked by an enemy whom he yet could not 
! bring to battle ; while L. Domitius, governor of the upper province, Fall of L. 
\ was, with the legate Thorius, defeated and slain by the quaestor of Domitius 
\ Sertorius. As in the old wars, the Romans were being pushed to -f"^"'^^'^^- 
the north of the Ebro : and even there Sertorius defeated two 
I armies, one under L. Valerius Praeconinus on the Sicoris, and DefeatofL. 
j another under L. Manlius, who had come to the aid of Metellus Valerius 
yfrom Gallia Narbonensis. In 'j^ he was reinforced by M. Perpenna, ''^^ ' 
tia legate of the rebellious proconsul Lepidus, who, after the death of yg^ 
ijhis chief, came from Sardinia with an army and many nobles who 
ihad been involved in the abortive movement. He was now at the Sertorius 
.[jhead of a considerable party of citizens; his constitutional preten- ^^^''^^^ ^^ 
tions were still more insisted upon ; and it was believed that he meant p'. 
to march against Rome itself It was resolved, therefore, to reinforce y^. 

i Metellus with a fresh army under Pompeius, already distinguished 
for services in the Marsic war and in Africa. He was still at the 
head of a force outside Rome, kept on foot since the rebellion of 
'jLepidus ; and he was now elected to the command in Spain as 



662 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Pompey 
goes to 
Spain, yd. 



Loss of 
Lauren, 
76. 



Pompey 
defeated 
7iear 
Sucro, 7J. 



Battle of 
Saguntum. 



Ser tori Its 
acknow- 
ledged by 
Mithri- 
dates, 74. 



73-72. 
Position of 



proconsul, or rather, as his proposer answered some caviller, pro 
co7isulibiis. 

The arrival of Pompey inspired new energy in the Roman forces, 
which had been slackly handled by Metellus, now past fifty and 
always inclined to a luxurious life. Yet his first essay was unfor- 
tunate. He advanced to the relief of Lauron, a town south of the 
Sucro, which had declared for Rome, and was accordingly being 
besieged by a division of the forces of Sertorius. But he allowed 
himself to be caught in an unfavourable position, and was forced 
to look on while the enemy captured and burnt the town. 

Next spring he again marched south to attack Dianium, the naval 
headquarters of Sertorius, and port of Sucro, named from a temple 
of Diana on the foreland. But Sertorius hastened to defend it, and 
Pompey, beaten and wounded, retired upon Saguntum. There he 
was joined by Metellus, who had defeated L. Heracleius at Italica. 
Another desperate battle was fought, in which the cavalry commanded 
by Sertorius, though losing heavily, routed the Roman cavalry with 
great loss, though the di\ision commanded by Perpenna was defeated 
and cut to pieces by Metellus. On the whole, Sertorius had held his 
own in a remarkable manner. He advanced to the Ebro, occupied 
Calagurris, and forced Pompey almost out of Spain. A large party 
in Rome wished him success, and wrote encouraging him to perse- 
vere ; and about the same time he was visited by Metrophanes, an 
envoy of Mithridates, The king offered to recognise him as head of 
the Roman State, and supply him with money and ships, if he would 
in return acknowledge the king's right to the province of Asia. 
Sertorius declined this concession, but offered Bithynia, Cappadocia, 
Galatia, and Paphlagonia, which were not Roman provinces though 
under Roman guarantee. But when, at the end of 74, the cjuestion 
of the Bithynian succession came up, Mithridates sent him 3000 
talents and forty ships ; and in return Sertorius sent M. Marius (the 
One-Eyed) as "proconsul" of Asia, to co-operate with the king. 
Thus Sertorius was acting as a constitutional magistrate of Rome, 
dealing with the empire as already under his control, and with a 
sufficient number of Roman men of rank in his district and camp 
to keep up the pretence of a Senate, as Pompey was to do in 49-48, 
and as Sulla had done before. 

In 73 Pompey was still confined almost to the north-east corner 
of Spain. He had exhausted his own resources, and had had to ask 
for money and men from Rome ; which he got the more readily 
as the consul Lucullus wished for the command against Mithridates, 
and feared, if Pompey were discouraged in Spain, that he would 
return home and be sent to Asia instead. As the war Avent on and 
became more and more wearisome, it was prosecuted with increasing 



^I'l REVOLT OF THE GLADIATORS 663 

severities on both sides. Sertorius' temper was embittered by Exasper- 
desertions, and his savage acts of retahation, especially the killing ation of 
or enslaving of a number of boys at Osca (Huesca), where he had ^^^toHus. 
■ himself established a school, alienated the affections of many. He 
could not trust his Roman bodyguard, but surrounded himself with 
Celtiberians, who irritated and shamed his Roman adherents by 
bringing into painful prominence the fact that they were fighting Successes of 
against their country. The result was that the armies of Metellus Metellus 
and Pompey made steady progress in forcing the submission of towns ^"^ 
that had taken part with him ; and though he still performed some ^"""^^^y- 
brilliant feats, such as forcing Pompey to raise the siege of Pallantia, 
he must have felt his cause declining. 

The more that was the case the sharper his temper and the ys. 
heavier his hand became ; and Perpenna, who had always chafed Murder of 
under his subordination, beginning to fear for his own safety, re- ^^^^orius. 
solved to strike the first blow. To celebrate a real or pretended 
victory he induced Sertorius to attend a banquet, at which, contrary 
to his known wishes, certain buffooneries were indulged in, which 
made him turn on his couch away from the table. At this moment 
I Perpenna gave the signal by dropping a cup, and the guest next 
\ Sertorius suddenly stabbed him. Attempting to rise, he was dragged 
' back by the conspirators and killed, and many of his guards who 
I were about the house shared his fate. Perpenna, however, did not Perpenna 
j gain what he hoped. The natives on every side offered their sub- gains 
mission to Pompey and Metellus, and he soon found his cause ^^^''"'^^ 
I hopeless ; he had, however, seized Sertorius' papers, among which ^-^ ^^' 
(were letters from leading men at Rome, and he hoped by ofifer- 
\mg them to Pompey to purchase his own safety. But Pompey 
I refused to see him, ordered him to be killed, and the letters to be 
burnt unread. 

Resistance was not wholly overcome in Spain ; certain towns Spartacus, 
still held out, and the horrors of the siege of Calagurris {Calaherrd) 73-7^- 
have scarcely ever been surpassed. But attention at Rome was 
1) turned to dangers nearer home. The custom of exhibiting gladiators. Gladiators. 
begun in 264, had become thoroughly established. They were the 
jmost popular of shows, for which the theatres and almost every 
other amusement were quickly deserted. The unhappy men thus 
jforced to mutual slaughter to "make a Roman holiday," were 
ijperhaps at first criminals, whose lives were forfeited in any 
jcase, like the slaves brought from Sicily, or at any rate were 
jprisoners of war. But as the fashion extended the wealthy began 
}to pride themselves on training the best fighters, and Hkely men 
|were bought up in every direction. The people of the north 
ere specially valued for the purpose on account of their size and 



664 



HISTORY OF ROME 



72. 

Continued 
victories of 
Spartacus. 



Coss. L. 

Gellius 

Poplicola, 

Cn. 

Cornelius 

Lentulus, 

72- 



Spartacus 
at Thurii, 



72-71. 



valour. They were confined in training establishments or ludi until 
wanted, where their food and exercise were specially directed by a 
trainer or lanista. A large school of this kind at Capua, in which 
certain Gauls and Thracians were being trained, was owned at this 
time by one Lentulus. Two hundred of them made a plot to escape. 
It was discovered, but about eighty contrived to break out ; armed 
themselves with knives and spits from a neighbouring cook-shop ; 
and seized some waggons full of arms going to another gladiatorial 
school. They elected Spartacus, a Thracian of great power and 
ability, as their captain, and, entrenching themselves on a spur of 
Mount Vesuvius, resisted all attempts of the forces in Capua to arrest 
them. One of the praetors, C. Claudius Pulcher, was sent against 
them, but was defeated and lost his camp. They were now joined 
by the slaves from the various ergastula in the country round, and 
soon had a formidable force. Another praetor, P. Varenus, did no 
better than Claudius, and the slave army daily increased. Varenus' 
legate Furius was routed ; another member of his staff, Corsinius, 
lost his life and many men, with all his baggage and camp ; and 
Varenus himself was again and again beaten in skirmishes. Spar- 
tacus traversed Italy almost at his will, intending, it is said, to make 
his way over the Alps to his native land. But his followers were 
more intent on plunder, and years afterwards Horace could express 
a half playful doubt whether any of the wine cellars in the country 
houses had escaped the " wandering Spartacus." 1 The consuls of 
75 were despatched with a regular army against them ; and Crixus, 
one of their commanders, was defeated and killed near Mount 
Garganus, on the coast of Apulia. But they were in their turn de- 
feated by Spartacus when they attempted to stop his march to 
the north. Cassius, proconsul of Gallia, was beaten near Mutina ; 
and finally Spartacus inflicted a great slaughter on both consuls in 
Picenum. It was after this victory that he committed almost the 
only cruelty to be fairly charged against him, when he forced 300 
Romans to fight as gladiators at the funeral of Crixus. 

His followers now forced him to abandon his plan of crossing the 
Alps ; nor did he venture to advance on Rome. Turning south once 
more he occupied Thurii for the winter, where merchants crowded in 
with every kind of goods. Forbidding the importation of gold and 
silver, he spent the winter in collecting materials of war and forging 
weapons, and was ready in the spring for still greater enterprises. 
Such was the terror inspired by him, that, the war having been 
assigned as the praetorian ' province,' there were no candidates 
for the praetorship at the end of 72. At length L. Licinius ' 

^ Hor. Od. III. 14, 19, Spartacuni si qua potuit vaga7iteni fallere testa. 



XLi THE FALL OF SPARTACUS 665 

Crassus volunteered, and took the field as praetor against Spar- 7/. The 

tacus, whose movements, however^ were so rapid and incalculable command 

that it was impossible to settle on a plan of campaign. Crassus S^^'^^'t ^o 

entered Picenum and sent his legate Mummius to find and 

follow the enemy, without attacking him. But Mummius could not 

refrain from battle ; and in it his soldiers behaved so badly, that Defeat of 

having sternly reprimanded him Crassus punished the men by Mninmius. 

decimation. Having thus restored discipline he defeated a body of 

10,000 slaves, encamped separately, with a loss of two-thirds of their 

number. He then advanced against Spartacus himself, whom he Spartacus 

forced to retire into the extreme south, and shut himself up in defeated 

Rhegium, where he tried to negotiate with some Cilician pirates to ^'^"^f^^^^ 

transport his army to Sicily. He hoped to rouse the slaves there RheUtnn 

and cut off a great source of corn supply from Rome. But the 

Cilicians, though they received his money, put out to sea and left 

him ; and Crassus, who had followed him, now endeavoured to shut 

him up in the Bruttian peninsula by a deep trench and bank from 

I sea to sea somewhere above Scylacium, about thirty miles in length. 

! Spartacus, however, with a third of his army contrived to cross it by Spartacus 

I means of fascines, and made his way towards Thurii. Alarmed lest breaks out. 

( he should again march towards Rome, Crassus asked the Senate to 

I summon Pompey from Spain and M. Lucullus from Macedonia. 

But he repented of the application when he found that there were 

I dissensions in the enemy's ranks, and that a large division of them 

' had left Spartacus and was encamped by itself, not far from Volci, 

under Gains Gannicus and Castus. He routed these men, but was 

I prevented from a pursuit by the appearance of Spartacus, who had 

I followed him. Yet he presently compelled the combined forces to Defeat of 

j give him battle, and after a desperate fight killed 12,000 of them, of Spartacus 

i whom only two are said to have had wounds in the back, Spartacus 'ff*^^,. 
1 • 1 1 • T^ 1- 1 1 • T Petelia. 

j retired to the mountams near Petelia, where he again turned on 

( the Roman forces under the legate Quintus and the quaestor Scrofa, 

I and defeated them, Scrofa himself being severely wounded. But this 

^ was the end of his successes. His followers, always difficult to keep 

in hand, were elated by the victory, and, forcing him to abandon his 

system of avoiding open battle, insisted on again attacking the 

I Roman army. M. Lucullus, who had just returned from his 

province, shut him off from Brundisium, and Crassus was entrenched 

in his front and had dug a deep trench to prevent his progress. 

Spartacus, unable to control his men, prepared for a last desperate 

struggle. He killed his charger as a sign that he would not fly, but 

looked for victory or death, and hewed his way through the Roman Death of 

ranks till, deserted by his followers, and fighting fiercely to the last, Spartacus. 

even when beaten to his knees, he fell at last among such heaps of 



666 



HISTORY OF ROxME 



Pompey 
cuts off the 
survivi7ig 
slaves. 



The slaves 
crucified. 



Jij^atrs in 
the East. 

Macedonia 

and 

Thrace, 

Appiiis 

Claudius, 

76. C. 

Scribonius 

Curio, 

75-73- '^^• 
Luc7illus, 

72-JI. 
p. 

Servilius 
Vatia 
Isauricus, 
7S-74. 



Reorganis- 
ation of the 
province of 
Cilicia. 



Mure n a 
and Mith- 
ridates, 
84-81. 



slain that his body was never recovered. His army was cut to 
pieces, while the Romans lost about 1000 men. The survivors of 
the revolted slaves, still numbering many thousands, were scattered 
over the mountains in four bands, where they were for the most part 
pursued and killed by Pompey, returning to claim his triumph over 
Sertorius, who boasted that, though Crassus had won battles, he 
had cut up the rebellion by the roots. Some still survived near 
Thurii in 60 ; but 6000 were crucified along the Appian road,^ — a 
cruelty shamed by the merciful conduct of Spartacus himself, in whose 
camp some thousands of Roman prisoners were found uninjured. It 
is difficult to estimate the effect of the horrible spectacle of these 
corpses bleaching along the great highway in hardening the hearts of 
a people whose craving for blood and insensibility to human suffering 
were already fearfully fostered by the shows of the arena. 

Meanwhile the officers sent yearly to Macedonia and Asia had 
not been wholly idle. In 76 Appius Claudius, proconsul of 
Macedonia, had repulsed the Thracian border tribes in several 
engagements ; and his successor, C. Curio, for the first time 
carried the Roman arms to the Danube and celebrated a triumph 
over the Dardani, though they were not finally subdued until 
the next year by M. Lucullus. From 7Z to 74 P. Servilius Vatia, 
as proconsul of Cilicia, had been engaged in a successful war 
with the pirates. Defeated by him at sea they took refuge in the 
strongholds of Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia. Servilius landed in 
Lycia ; took Olympus, which was defended by a robber chief named 
Zenicetes ; and then marched through the country into Cilicia, taking 
various strongholds on the way, ending with Corycus on the Cilician 
coast. Crossing Mount Taurus into Isauria, he took the capital) 
of this strange race of mountain robbers, and defeated them in 
many dangerous engagements. He was greeted by his soldiers 
with the title of imperator, and on returning home to celebrate his 
triumph assumed the name of Isauricus. The province of Cilicia 
was organised and enlarged by the addition of Pamphylia, Pisidia, 
Isauria, and Cappadocia, and became the most important bulwark of 
the Roman Empire in the East. 

But now the Romans found themselves once more involved in a 
Avar with Mithridates of Pontus. When Sulla left Asia in 84, after 
making the treaty of Pergamus, he left L. Licinius Murena as 
propraetor of Asia, with his quaestor L. Lucullus, to see that the 
terms of the unwritten agreement were observed. Of all the states 
that had rebelled against Rome only Mitylene still held out. The 
reduction of that town and island was presently delegated to M. 
Minucius Thermus, in whose camp C. lulius Caesar, who having 
defied Sulla, had found it prudent to leave Rome, was making 



XLI MURENA AND MITHRIDATES 667 

his first campaign. Murena was engaged meanwhile in fighting 
with pirates and deposing Moagetes the tyrant of Cibyra, which 
he annexed to Phrygia. But he was ambitious to gain credit by a Second 
victory over Mithridates himself, and therefore picked a quarrel Mithn- 
with him on the subject of certain parts of Cappadocia which he ^^^^ ^^''' 
still retained. Archelaus, who had been rewarded by Sulla after 
negotiating the preliminaries and had been suspected of treason by 
Mithridates, now openly joined Murena and denounced the ambitious 
projects of the king. Murena seized on the pretext for crossing the Mureiia 
Pontic frontier and pillaging the great temple of I sis in Comana ; and i^^^f^d^^ 
then wintered in Cappadocia, where he seems to have fortified a ^ ' 3- 

I town, called after his own name Licinia, to defend the country. In 
I vain Mithridates appealed to the treaty. Murena professed not to be 
cognisant of it, and while the king was sending ambassadors to 
Sulla in Greece and to Rome, he again in the next spring entered 
i Pontus and pillaged a great number of villages. The Senate sent 
I Calidius to order him to refrain from hostilities. But the Senate was 
I the now discredited remnant, which Sulla was on his way to put 
1 down, and Murena refused to obey ; or, as some say, Calidius had 
I secret instructions contradicting his official message. 

! At any rate early in 82 Murena advanced to attack the Pontic Murena 

\ capital Sinope, but was disastrously defeated by Mithridates on the advances 
j Halys, and his army had to find its way by various mountain roads ^^y^^"!^ ^^ 
i into Phrygia. The Roman garrisons were driven from the towns in 
Cappadocia ; and the news made so great a sensation in Asia, that 
the anti-Roman party, which had been reduced to silence, began to . 
I stir again, and a fresh invasion by Mithridates was looked for. But 
j early in 81 Sulla sent Gabinius with positive orders to Murena to Pacifica- 
\ cease hostilities, and charged with the task of reconcihng Mithridates ^^*^ 
I and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia. The king of Pontus once more ^^^^^ ^^ 
j showed his desire to avoid direct hostilities with Rome. He 
consented to promise his infant daughter in marriage to a son of 
i Ariobarzanes, and a festival of marriage and reconciliation was 

! celebrated with great niagnificence. Murena was appeased with the 
promise of a triumph, and Mithridates quietly retained portions of 
Cappadocia. 
\ From that date until the question of the succession to Bithynia Peace from 

arose in 74 he lived on tolerable terms with the Roman governors of ^^-Tf- 
Asia, who were forbidden by a lex Cornelia to pass the official limits 
of their province without orders from the Senate. But he still had 
reason to fear that the Romans eventually meditated a renewal of the 
war. His ambassadors at Rome were unable to obtain the formal 
ratification of the treaty of Pergamus, and were told that their master 
must first evacuate the portion of Cappadocia which envoys from 



668 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Mithri- 
dates 
prepares 
for possible 
war, 78-7S' 

Roma7t 
precau- 
tions. 



Coss. L. 

Liciriius 

Lucullus, 

M. 

Aurelius 

Cotta, 74. 



The 

question 
of the 
successio7i 
to 
Bithynia. 



Ariobarzanes complained of his retaining. Not getting any answer 
to a second embassy in 7Z he busied himself in collecting and 
improving his naval and military forces. The Roman government, 
aware of this, strengthened their garrisons in Asia from time to 
time, but did little to stop what was more dangerous, — the ill-feeling 
which their fiscal system was again rousing in the province. L. 
Lucullus, who stayed after Sulla's departure till 80 as quaestor, had 
carried on the financial administration with equity and consideration ; 
but on his departure the farming of the taxes by the publicani 
suspended by Sulla was re-established, with the usual results of 
oppression and discontent. Such men as Dolabella and the notorious 
C. Verres, proconsul and quaestor in Cilicia (80-78), did more for 
the cause of Mithridates than an army could do against him. 

Mithridates was fully alive to these things, and was also availing 
himself of dynastic changes in central Asia, to which the Romans 
remained indifferent, in order to secure for himself extension of 
territory and support. He is even said to have had an understanding 
with the pirates who invested the Aegean, to whom he would be able 
to look for strengthening his fleet, or for giving rapid intelligence ; 
and his dealing with Sertorius had proved how keenly he was watch- 
ing for every opportunity of striking at Rome. War seems to have 
been already determined upon at Rome, when, towards the end of 
74, Nicomedes of Bithynia died, leaving his kingdom to the Roman 
people. Nicomedes had also left a young son, whom some at any 
rate regarded as the heir in spite of this will, and in spite of rumours 
as to the unfaithfulness of his mother to her husband. The Romans, 
however, decided to accept the inheritance, and the propraetor of 
Asia was ordered to take it over, while his quaestor carried off 
the royal treasury to Rome. The Romans thus obtained a consider- 
able district on the Black Sea, could command the entrance to it 
with their fleet, and by blockading the Bosporus could ruin 
the Pontic trade. It was natural, therefore, to expect that their 
possession of this new district would hardly be maintained without a 
struggle ; and either from that idea, or from earlier reports of 
Mithridates' proceedings, it had been resolved to send an army 
and special commander to supplement the two legions in Asia 
(those formerly commanded by Fimbria) and the two in Cilicia. In 
fact, everything seemed as it was in the former war. Asia dis- 
turbed : the Thracians invading Macedonia : and Mithridates negoti- 
ating with the rebels in Spain, as formerly with the Socii in 
Italy. Pompey was known to be anxious for the command ; 
and therefore Lucullus — who wished for it also — took care 
that sufficient money and supplies were sent to him in Spain to 
induce him to continue the war against Sertorius ; and though the 



XLi THIRD WAR WITH MITHRIDATES 669 

proconsular province assigned to himself had been Cisalpine Gaul, he 

induced the Senate — under the influence of P. Cethegus to transfer 

him to Cilicia, which happened to fall vacant by the death of the 
proconsul L. Octavius ; and, that having been done, he was named 
by an unanimous vote of the centuries commander-in-chief against 
Mithri dates. His colleague Cotta was, at his own urgent entreaty, 
allowed to take part in the war. He was to guard the Propontis 
with ships obtained on the spot and to hold Bithynia ; while M. 
Antonius, praetor in 75, was to be in command of the fleet and all 
the coasts of the Mediterranean, to clear the sea of pirates. 

Mithridates having spent the winter in every kind of preparation, Mithri- 
building ships, making arms, and collecting corn, began hostilities in dates begins 
the spring of 73 by an invasion of Paphlagonia, having first solemnly ^hewar, 
thrown a chariot and four white horses into the sea as a sacrifice to ^^^"^S of 
Poseidon. He was accompanied by some Roman officers^ among 
whom was Marius, the One-Eyed, sent as proconsul by Sertorius 
and his " senate." In nine days the army marched through 
Paphlagonia and part of Galatia and entered Bithynia, while the 
Pontic fleet appeared in the harbour of Heracleia, a city which had 
lately shown its anti- Roman feeling by killing some Roman agents 
sent to claim it for Rome. The Bithynians received him with 
no show of hostility, and the Roman residents fled to Chalcedon, 
opposite Byzantium, where Cotta had on his arrival in the previous 
winter fixed his headquarters and collected a fleet. Lucullus, who 
had also come late in 74, was engaged in restoring something like 
order in the province of Asia — joined to that of Cilicia for the time, 
and groaning under the renewed exactions of publicani and money- 
lenders, who had taken the occasion of the heavy burden imposed 
on it by Sulla to exact such exorbitant interest, that the provincials 
had incurred a debt of double the amount of the indemnity, and had 
only paid it by mortgaging their sacred buildings, and even selling 
their children. Cotta wished to use the interval to secure the credit 
of defeating Mithridates ; and accordingly when the king, sending his 
fleet forward to meet him, marched against Chalcedon, Cotta gave 
him battle under its walls and was decisively beaten with a loss of Defeat of 
3000 men, his legate P. Rutilius Rufus, commanding the fleet, Cotta at 
being only saved by being drawn up the wall by a rope. The Chalcedon, 
Pontic fleet also broke the chain across the mouth of the harbour, '^^'^"^ "f 
destroyed or towed ofi" the Roman ships, and thus opened the passage 
of the Bosporus. 

Leaving a detachment to blockade Chalcedon, Mithridates entered Mithri- 
the province of Asia proclaiming the freedom of the cities from ^^^^'-^ ^^ the 
imposts in the name of the " proconsul " M. Marius, who was mean- ^'''''^'' 
while holding the lines of the Sangarius against Lucullus. But ^''''"^'^"'^- 



670 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Siege of 
Cyzicus by 
Mithri- 
dates and 
M. Marius, 
autumn of 
73- 



Lucidlus 

relieves 

Cyzicus. 



Mithri- 
dates 
escapes by 
sea. 



Result of 
the first 
year of the 



Lucullus, avoiding a battle, cut off his provisions so successfully that 
he had to retire to the coast. There he was joined by Mithridates, 
and the two laid siege to Cyzicus, chief port of Asia on the Propontis, 
which had clung to the Roman cause and was almost impregnable. i 
Situated on the neck of an isthmus, which stretched towards a rocky 
island with artificial causeways and bridges, it had the sea on one side 
and Mount Dindymon on the other. Its fortifications dated from the 
time of Timotheos of Athens in the fourth century, and its people, who 
had abundance of provisions stored in two immense magazines, and a 
powerful navy in their harbours, were resolute to defend it. The 
undertaking proved disastrous to Mithridates. Failing to take it by 
assault he blockaded the city by sea and land. But though he 
employed every device and every engine known to the science of war, 
they proved unavailing, and a dreadful storm swept away in an hour 
the preparations of laborious weeks. Moreover, when Lucullus came 
to the relief of Cyzicus, Mithridates was persuaded to quit his lines, 
which were at once occupied by the Romans, and was himself con- 
fined to the peninsula and the high ground of Mount Dindymon. The 
approach of winter made it difficult to obtain supplies by sea ; the 
Roman cavalry cut off his convoys by land ; and famine with its 
accompaniment of pestilence began to make dreadful ravages in his 
army. It was necessary for him to break out. But when the long 
train of beasts of burden, sutlers, and their convoy had reached the 
river Rhyndacus, a few miles to the east of Cyzicus, the Romans 
overtook it, killed great numbers, took i 5,000 prisoners, with all the 
animals and an immense booty. The king after this escaped on 
board ship by night, but those of his troops who could not find ships 
were pursued by Lucullus, lost 1 1,000 men while crossing rivers, and 
finally were shut up in Lampsacus, from which the survivors were 
taken off by the Royal fleet in the following spring (72). 

The grand army was at an end. Of i 50,000 men whom Mithri- 
dates commanded at the beginning of the campaign, 20,000 only 
could now be mustered ; while the fleet had suffered more than one 
disaster from storms, and 100 vessels were missing. Moreover, the 
news of the death of Sertorius took away all semblance of right of 
his Roman ally, M. Marius, and some of his Roman officers at 
once made overtures to Lucullus. Yet the king still kept up the 



1 These operations have generally been assigned to the year 74, principally 
because Livy attributes the actions to Cotta and Lucullus as consuls. It has, 
however, been satisfactorily shown from coins that Nicomedes did not die till late 
in 74 ; and though the Romans had resolved on war before they became possessed 
of Bithynia, it was not begun until after that event. The confusion perhaps arose 
from the fact that Cotta and Lucullus left Rome before the end of their year of 
office, though no hostilities occurred till the beginning of the next year. 



XLi THE DISASTERS OF MITHRIDATES 671 

fight. With half his fleet he attacked the towns on the Propontis ; 

while M. Marius led another squadron into the Aegean, where there 

was nothing to resist him, for Cotta had lost his ships at Chalcedon, 

and Antonius had been beaten- at Crete. Lucullus, however, collected 

ships and in two battles off Tenedos and Lemnos, destroyed the fleet Naval 

of M. Marius, taking him and his two colleagues prisoners, while his I'lctones of 

army was recovering Bithynia and driving out the Pontic garrisons. ^^J'" "^' 

Mithridates himself, after being shut up for a time in Nicomedia by 

Cotta and Triarius, had broken the blockade and forced his way out, 

but lost sixty vessels and 10,000 men in a storm, and only escaped 

by getting on board a pirate vessel which landed him at the mouth 

of the Hypios {Karasa\ whence he was admitted into Heracleia. 

In another part of Asia his arms had been equally unsuccessful. 
After the victory of Chalcedon he had sent a large force under 
Eumachus through Phrygia and Cilicia. At first Eumachus had 
carried all before him ; had massacred the Roman residents ; and 
received the adhesion of the Isaurians and Pisidians. But C. lulius 
Caesar, who was studying rhetoric at Rhodes, crossed to Caria, raised 
a force of volunteers, and prevented the Pontic troops from 
approaching the coast, while the propraetor C. Salvius Naso barred 
their way into Phrygia Epictete, and Mysia. Mamercus, a legate of 
Lucullus, defeated another army under Fannius and Metrophanes ; 
a treasure of 10,000 staters, which was being conveyed by Aris- 
tonicus into the Aegean, to corrupt the islanders, was captured ; 
and the Gallic tetrarch Deiotarus finally drove the Pontic garrisons 
from the towns of Phrygia. 

Mithridates was obliged to look for help to other Asiatic powers, 7/. 
and especially to Tigranes, king of Armenia. Naturally he found in ^I^thn- 
his present circumstances that the response was cold and doubtful, ^^^^^^i^ fg 
Of the kingdoms in the East the one, besides that of Mithridates, Tigranes of 
which had during the last twenty years increased in power and extent Ar?nenia. 
was Armenia. Tigranes had united to his original kingdom by 
successive conquests the districts of Sophene, Atropatene, and 
Gordiene, and had built a new capital, Tigranocerta, in the upper 
valley of the Tigris. In 83 the whole of the Syrian monarchy, from 
the Euphrates to the sea, had submitted to him. In extent of terri- 
tory, therefore, and external show of power, Tigranes had no rival in 
Asia ; and Mithridates had endeavoured to secure his friendship and 
support by giving him his daughter Cleopatra in marriage, and now 
sent Diodes to demand his aid. But Tigranes was engaged in 
securing his own hold on Syria, and gave nothing but vain promises, 
being in fact privately dissuaded from doing more by the envoy of 
Mithridates himself. Nor was this the only indication of declining 
power given by the defections or coldness of friends. His own son, 



672 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Spring 

battles of 
Cabira. 



Flight of 

Mithri- 

dates. 



He is de- 
tained in 
Armenia, 
7i-6g. 



Machares, king of Bosporus, who a year afterwards made terms 
with Lucullus, even now showed no haste to help him. His minister 
Dorylaus was put to death for treason ; and other princes and 
magistrates, among them the grandfather of the geographer Strabo, 
dehvered up fortresses to the Romans. Still the king by great 
exertions raised an army and defended the triangle formed by the 
rivers Isis and Lycos round Cabira. There Lucullus, after a difficult 
and fatiguing march across Bithynia in the spring of 7 1 (leaving L. 
Murena with two legions before Amisus) came upon him. He had 
three legions ; Mithridates 40,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. At 
the first encounter the Roman cavalry was totally defeated by the 
Pontic horse, and Lucullus fell back towards Mount Paryadres, but 
contrived to gain a position commanding the plain, and defended by 
a deep ravine. Here they remained opposite each other for some 
weeks. But though the Pontic army in the skirmishes that took place 
not only held its own, but once at least inflicted a serious disaster on 
the Romans, yet, while both camps were in great straits for provisions, 
Mithridates was the more distressed of the two ; and when, in 
attempting to cut off a convoy of wheat coming to the Roman 
camp, he lost between 5000 and 6000 men, he decided to retire 
into Lesser Armenia. The design was kept secret from the 
soldiers, who were roused before dawn by the noise of the servants 
and baggage waggons of the officers quitting the camp. Believing 
themselves betrayed, they broke out into a furious panic, killed 
the drivers, and pillaged the waggons. Mithridates himself barely 
escaped with his life by the fidelity of the eunuch Ptolemy, who gave 
him his horse, and, accompanied by about 2000 cavalry, fled to the 
south towards Comana. When Lucullus appeared next morning before 
the Pontic camp he found it deserted ; and it was plundered in spite 
of his order to let the booty alone till the enemy was destroyed. 
The cavalry, under M. Pompeius, was sent in pursuit. But they too 
lost time by stopping to plunder some of the king's baggage : and 
finding that he was four days' march ahead of them they returned. 
Mithridates arrived safely at Comana, from which he sent one of 
his eunuchs back to a fortress in which his harem was guarded, 
with orders that all his wives and concubines were to die, lest 
they should fall into Roman hands. Then he hurried on to 
Armenia to demand hospitality and succour from his son-in-law. 
Tigranes did not refuse the fugitive king a certain protection ; but 
he declined to see him, and assigned him as a residence a strong 
castle in an unhealthy district, where, surrounded by a so-called guard 
of honour, he was practically a prisoner for nearly two years (71-69). 
Meanwhile Lucullus and his legates were carrying all before them. 
Cities, fortresses, and deposits of treasure everywhere fell into his 



XLi» LUCULLUS AT EPHESUS 673 

hands ; Pharnacia, Trapezus, and other towns on the Pontus yielded yi. 

without a struggle. Amisos, which had been holding out against Capture of 

Murena, was taken by assault and burnt, though part of the ^^^f^'^^"^^ 

inhabitants escaped by sea, apd Lucullus restored the rest to their 4^iso2 ' 

homes and caused the town to be rebuilt.^ Heracleia, which Cotta 

had been besieging since the summer of 72, was still untaken. Heracleia 

But a fleet under Triarius, set free by the victories in the Aegean, now hoMs out 

co-operated with Cotta. The Heracleote fleet was beaten ; famine ^^^ ^ 
, ., ... , , 1 . sianmer of 

and pestilence were ragmg m the town ; and at last the garrison -^ 

escaped by sea, and the strategus Demopheles admitted the soldiers 

of Triarius. The town was burnt and pillaged, and Cotta carried off 

his prisoners and spoil to Italy (70). 

Lucullus resided during the winter of 71-70 at Ephesus, dis- Lucullus 
tributing his army into winter quarters in Pontus. He spent the "i^i^iters at 
time partly in celebrating by games and gladiatorial contests his ^f^^r 
recent victories, partly in farther regulating the financial troubles of fj^^ 
the provincials of Asia, still overburdened by debt. He cut down the prcviucial 
interest legally recoverable to i 2 per cent, and forbade the recovery debtors, 
of arrears amounting to more than the original debt. Defaulting 7^'7^- 
debtors finally were not to be dispossessed of their whole property. 
The creditor could only take one-fourth of the debtor's income, and 
so gradually wipe out the debt. These debts had been mostly owed 
to Roman publicani and money-lenders, and their hostility made 
it easier for his opponents at home in 67 to secure the recall of 
Lucullus. 

In the autumn of 7 i Appius Claudius - had been sent to Tigranes Mission to 
to demand the surrender of Mithridates. Misled by his guides he Tigranes, 
went a great circuit before reaching the Euphrates ; and when he 7^-70' 
finally arrived at Antioch he had to wait until the king returned from 
Phoenicia. He made his demand in peremptory language, and as the 
despatch of Lucullus addressed Tigranes as king, instead of " king of 
kings," Appius was dismissed with scarcely the semblance of an answer, 
though with a decent show of liberality. Extravagantly elated with 
his recent victories and accession of territory, and with an intelli- 
gence corrupted by twenty-five years of flattery, the king could not 
conceive that Lucullus would attack him or could escape destruction 
if he did. He therefore devoted himself to the development of his 
new capital, Tigranocerta, and made no special preparations. 

The attack upon him was still delayed for a year. During the 

^ It was here that the grammarian Tyrannion was captured. Lucullus seems 
to have meant to have taken him to Rome as a friend. But Murena begged him 
and emancipated him as a friend of Cicero. 

" Appius Claudius Pulcher and his more notorious brother Publius were 
brothers-in-law to Lucullus, and were serving on his staff as legati. 

2 X 



674 



HISTORY OF ROME 



ciIap. 



Lwcullus 
takes 
Sino^e, 70. 



Lucullus 
winters in 
Pontus, 
yo-bg. 



Lucullus 

invades 

Armenia, 



69. 



Passage 
of the 
Euphrates 
and Tigris 



Defeat of 

Mithro- 

barzanes. 



winter the blockade of Sinope had been begun by a Roman fleet under 
Censorinus. It was defended by Leonippus and Cleochares, with a 
garrison of about 12,000 Cilicians, and a fleet of ships which 
enabled them in spite of the Roman vessels to receive the pro- 
visions which were sent from time to time by Machares of Bosporus, 
the son of Mithridates,— nearly the only service he ever rendered to 
his father's cause. But when Lucullus rejoined the army in the 
spring of 70 Machares made terms with him ; and, ceasing to send 
provisions to the town, consented to send them to the Roman camp 
instead, as well as all property deposited in his kingdom by the 
Sinopian generals. The garrison, therefore, threatened with famme, 
collected all they could gather on board their ships, set fire to the 
rest and to the town, and escaped to the coast of the Caucasus. 
Lucullus could now turn his attention to Tigranes, who was offensive 
to Rome not only from his entertainment of Mithridates, but by his 
conquests in Cilicia and Phoenicia. The Romans could not view 
with indifference his becoming a Mediterranean power; and the 
Jews, allies of Rome since 161, were already alarmed at his progress 
towards Palestine. Lucullus, therefore, made plans to cross the 
Euphrates in the spring of 69. 

Tigranes now seemed to be more alive to his danger. He sum- 
moned his vassals, admitted Mithridates to an interview, caused the 
ministers who had kept them apart to be executed, and placed the 
Pontic king at the head of 10,000 cavalry. But still he thought of 
invading the Roman domains, not of being invaded himself. Mith- 
ridates was to march with his cavalry to recover his kingdom ; his 
own generals were to enter Roman Cilicia and Lycaonia. To his 
intense surprise these two movements were hardly begun when it 
was announced that Lucullus had crossed the Euphrates and the 
Tigris, and was in full march upon Tigranocerta. He had started 
early in the spring, leaving 6000 men to hold Pontus ; had 
■ crossed Melitene by forced marches along the route of the 
caravans, carrying with him the materials for a pontoon over the 
Euphrates ; had seized Tomasa, the first fortress in Armenia ; 
passed through Sophene ; and crossed the Tigris almost at its source. 
The first messengers who announced this were disbelieved and 
hanged. But it was impossible to deny facts. The king, however, 
still imagining himself all powerful, sent 3000 cavalry under Mithro- 
barzanes, with orders to bring Lucullus dead or alive. They were 
cut to pieces by a Roman division under Sextilius : and Tigranes 
hastily recalling Mithridates from his march to Pontus, and Maga- 
dates from Syria, with all the men in garrisons there, strengthened 
the fortresses between the Tigris and Tigranocerta, and then re- 
treated with his main army towards the mountains. Tigranocerta 



XLi VICTORY OF LUCULLUS AT TIGRANOCERTA 675 

was thus left deserted, and its siege was presently commenced by 
Sextilius, who had cut to pieces a force of Arabians on their way to 
join Tigranes, and continued by Lucullus when he arrived with the 
main army. A body of 6000 men, however, was sent by the king 
to remove his harem and chief treasures, and their success in eluding 
or breaking through the Roman lines encouraged the king to lead 
his immense forces— joined by allies and subject kings from many 
parts — to raise the siege. His contempt was moved by the small- 
ness of the Roman army, — "too many for ambassadors and too few 
for an army," and he determined, in spite of remonstrances, to give 
battle. The two armies were on opposite sides of the Tigris, Battle of 
and a movement of Lucullus at first made the king think that Tigrano- 
he was retiring to Cappadocia. When it was found that he had ^^^^' ^^ 
only marched higher up the river to cross more easily, the king 
hastily got his huge army into some order, commanding in the centre 
himself, with two client kings on either wing. It was an unlucky 
day in the Roman calendar, — that on which Caepio had been 
beaten by the Cimbrians ; but Lucullus proudly declared that he 
would make it a lucky one. When he got on the left bank 
of the river he sent his Thracian and Galatian cavalry to skir- 
mish up to the enemy and tempt them down on to the plain ; 
and it was soon evident that the ill-assorted and ill -disciplined 
Asiatic army was no match for his, with its nucleus of Roman 
veterans. It was cut to pieces in detachments, and before the 
day was over the ground was strewn with 30,000 dead, while 
Lucullus boasted in his despatch that he had only lost five killed 
and 100 wounded. 

Tigranes fled with 150 horsemen, flinging away his royal tiara to Flight of 
escape detection, and was met by Mithridates, who, without re- Tigranes. 
proaching him with his own long -delayed reception, encouraged and 
consoled the old man, and was entrusted with the absolute manage- 
ment of affairs. All the provinces south of the Tigris were now lost 
to Armenia ; Tigranocerta surrendered ; and an immense booty fell 
to Lucullus. Eight thousand talents (nearly two million pounds) Dismcm- 
were found in the royal treasury ; the sale of the plunder brought in berment of 
a third as much again ; and a large bounty w^as given to each '^" king- 
soldier. The chiefs in the districts round hastened to tender their 
submission, and Antiochus Asiaticus ^ was allowed once more to 
call himself king of Syria. This w^as the climax of the good 
fortune of Lucullus. Tigranocerta, stripped of the Greek and 
Asiatic inhabitants placed there forcibly by Tigranes, who were 

1 This last of the Seleucidae had fled to Rome when Tigranes took Syria. He 
i was finally deprived of his kingdom by Pompey in 65. 



676 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Battle of 
Arsanias, 
September 
68. 



Winter of 
68-67. 
Alutiiiy in 
the army of 
Lucullus. 

Mitkri- 
dates 
recovers 
Pontus. 

Defeat of 
Hadri- 



novv allowed to return to their native cities, soon ceased to be of 
importance ; and the Roman army went into winter quarters in 
Gordyene (69-68). Both parties tried during the winter to enlist 
Phraates, king of the Parthians, on their side, but without inducing 
him to commit himself 

In the spring of 68 Lucullus advanced northwards to continue his 
conquest of Armenia and found Tigranes still at the head of vast 
forces, which under the vigorous direction of Mithridates baffled his 
attempts to bring them to battle. Tired of useless manoeuvres, he at 
length determined to make for Artaxata on the Araxes, the ancient 
capital of Armenia. In the valley of the eastern Euphrates formed 
by the mountains Arsanias he was overtaken by the kings, and 
though he gained another victory, it was at the cost of heavy losses. 
And now his own army began to show signs of mutiny. Already the 
troops left in Pontus had refused to obey his summons to join him in 
Gordyene. He was in a mountainous country in which the summer 
was very brief, and by the time of this battle (September) the snow 
began to fall and the cold to be great. The men insisted on turning 
southward to Mesopotamia ; and after vainly attempting to secure 
their compliance by humiliating entreaties and promises, he was 
fain to give in and console himself by taking Nisibis, the one great 
city south of the Tigris still holding for Tigranes. But during the 
winter following (68-67) he found himself reduced to complete 
inaction by this mutinous temper of his troops, who, instigated by 
his own brother-in-law P. Clodius, refused to endure any more 
labours and fatigues or to undertake any farther expeditions. The 
time of service of the two legions was about to expire,^ and they were 
not prepared to risk their safe return. Meanwhile Mithridates with 
8000 men was said to be approaching Pontus. The people of 
Lesser Armenia and eastern Pontus rose ; began killing Roman 
residents, and declaring for their king. The legate M. Fabius 
Hadrianus was defeated near Cabira, when he tried to stop his 
advance, and was only saved from the gravest disaster by the 
fact of the king being wounded. He was superseded by Triarius, 
who came with his fleet to the coast of Pontus and disembarked to 
relieve him. But Triarius did not venture to attack Mithridates, who 
was now behind the river Iris, and the two armies wintered in face 
of each other without stirring. Triarius sent to Lucullus for aid, but 
his soldiers would not leave the pleasant land of Mesopotamia to enter 



^ They had been enrolled in 86 by L. Valerius Flaccus for service against 
Mithridates in the first war. They were taken over by Fimbria after the murder of 
Flaccus, and after his death submitted to Sulla, but were kept permanently in 
Asia. The full term of service was twenty years. Therefore at the end of 67 
they could claim their discharge. 



XLi RECALL OF LUCULLUS 677 

on the toilsome winter march back to Pontus. And Triarius thus left Spring of 
alone was tempted in the spring of 67 to cross the Iris and offer battle ^7- Defeat 
between his winter station at Gaziura and Zela. He lost almost all v 
his infantry, while his cavalry was again saved from a hot pursuit by 
the severe wound received by the king from a Roman centurion who 
had got access to him under the guise of a deserter. But 7000 
Roman soldiers were lying dead upon the field, 24 tribunes, and 150 
centurions. Lucullus, now at length on his way back to Pontus, 
heard the news of the defeat of Triarius, and hastened on to 
prevent the fruits of his previous conquests being entirely lost. 
But Mithridates hung about the mountains and refused battle, 
while a son-in-law of Tigranes, Atropotenes of Media, scoured 
Cappadocia ; and Tigranes himself was recovering full possession 
of Armenia. 

The news of these disasters enabled the enemies of Lucullus at Lucullus 
Rome, backed by the equites whose enmity he had incurred in Asia, superseded. 
to secure his recall. His brother-in-law O. Marcius Rex (consul in 
68) had already come to Cihcia as proconsul ; and a plebiscitum 
was obtained conferring the command against Mithridates, with the 
province of Bithynia and Pontus, on M'.Acilius Glabrio, at the end of 
his consulship (67). Still it was imagined at Rome that Mithridates 
was as good as conquered, and that a new province of Bithynia and End of 67. 
Pontus was awaiting organisation.^ Such indeed had been the impres- '^^^ 
sion conveyed by the despatches of Lucullus ; and ten commissioners . ^ 
as usual had been despatched to assist in that business. But when for the new 
they arrived they found Lucullus almost without an army; while Pontus, province of 
so far from being ready for organisation, was again in the hands of Pontus. 
Mithridates. Lucullus had hoped before their arrival to strike some 
blow to recover his losses ; but Marcius Rex had refused his appeal 
for help from Cilicia, and his own troops had, in spite of almost 
abject entreaties, declined to march again into Armenia to prevent 
the junction of Tigranes and Mithridates, when they learnt that 
the command was about to pass from Lucullus to Glabrio. Those 
whose period of service had elapsed marched in a body out of his 
camp, followed by some who had not the same excuse. This was Glabrids 
no doubt in great measure directly the effect of the action of Glabrio. ^? Y^' 
As soon as he arrived in his province of Bithynia at the end of 67 
he issued edicts releasing the soldiers from their military oath to ^°^^ ^f 
Lucullus, who was obliged to see Pontus and Cappadocia completely raMa- 
recovered by Mithridates without being able to stir : while Glabrio — docia^ 
utterly incompetent for mihtary affairs — remained inactive in Bithynia, 

^ Bithynia had been a province since 74. It was now proposed to add to it 
the western part of the kingdom of Mithridates. After Pompey's arrangements 
in 65, it was known as Bithynia Pontus, or Bithynia et Pontus, 



678 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xli 

even allowing the enemy to make raids over its borders. But 
Lucullus seems to have remained at the head of some troops, and at 
any rate spent the winter of 77-76 in Galatia, where he still was, when 
the necessity of the case and the course of politics at Rome brought 
about the appointment of Pompey. 

Authorities. — For the war of Lepidus : Appian, B. Civ. i. 105, 107 ; IJvy, 
Ep. 90 ; Plutarch, Pompeius 15-16 ; Sallust fr. Hist. i. ; Oros. v. 22 ; Licinianus 
fr. 43. For Sertorius : Livy, Ep. 90-93; Appian, 5. Civ. i. , 108-115; Plutarch, 
Sertorius, Pompeius 17-19; Oros. v. 23. For Spartacus : Livy Ep. 95-97; 
Plutarch, Crassus 8-11; Appian B. Civ. i. 116-120; Sallust fr. Hist, 3, 67-71 ; 
Frontinus, Strateg. i, 5, 20-22. For Mithridates : Livy, Ep. 93-103; Appian, 
Mithrid. 64-121; Cicero, pro lege Manilia; Sallust fr. Hist. 4; Memnon ap. 
Photium, 74 R. sq.\ Dio Cassias 36, 3-46; Oros. vi. 19, sq.; Plutarch, Lucullus, 
Pompeius. 



CHAPTER XLII 

POMPEY IN THE EAST 

Pompey's first consulship — Censors — Restoration of Tribunician power — The 
judices (70) — Pompey and the war with pirates (67-66) — The lex Manilia 
appointing him to Bithynia and the Mithridatic war — He goes to Pontus 
— Two defeats of Mithridates who retires across the Caucasus — Capture of 
Artaxata and submission of Tigranes — Victory over the Albani (66) — Victory 
over the Iberes — Reduction of Pontus and settlement of Asia (65) — Syria 
taken from Tigranes — Dispute in Judaea between Hyrcanus and Aristobulus 
— Pompey's arrival in Damascus (64) — Death of Mithridates — Pompey takes 
Jerusalem (63) — Returns to Amisos — Makes final arrangements in Pontus and 
Asia — Returns to Rome (62) — New Provinces : Bithynia and Pontus (74- 
63), Cyrene (74) joined with Crete (67), Syria (64). 

When Pompey returned to Italy in 71 and crowned his success Coss. Cn. 
in Spain by crushing the last sparks of the slave war, there seems to Pompeius 
have been no question as to his consulship for the next year. He ^^^S^^^^ 
celebrated his second triumph on the last day of December, and j^icinius 
entered on his consulship on the first of January of 70. His election Crassus, 
was in defiance of the law, for he was under the consular age and 7^- 
had held none of the inferior offices. He had commanded armies Pompey's 
from his earliest youth, but had never been even a quaestor, and did election in 
not become a member of the Senate until he presided over the first J^^^ ^ 
meeting of the new year. He had shown in the matter of Lepidus 
that his sympathy with the Populares stopped short of armed 
rebellion. Still it was to that side that he was inclined ; and for all 
these reasons the Optimates regarded his election with anxiety. And, 
in fact, though he was moderate in his legislation, the reaction 
against the Sullan constitution made considerable progress during his 
year of office. Censors were appointed, after an interval of sixteen The 
years, who struck sixty -four names off the roll of the Senate; he censors of 
removed the restriction on the exercise of the Tribunician powers ; ^o- 
and a law of the praetor Aurelius Cotta ordained that only one-third THbune- 
of a jury should consist of senators, the other two-thirds were to ^\^^ recoTi- 

^,. /. , • , • 1 M • •• , structed. 

be filled in equal proportions by equites and tribuni aerarii, whose 



68o HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

The lex ratable property was next below that of the equites.i In other 
Aurelia de respects his consulship passed with nothing more serious than 
judictts. constant bickerings with his Optimatist colleague Crassus, whose 
influence resulted from enormous wealth. He himself was careful to 
parade his obedience to the law, appearing before the censors at the 
review of the knights leading his horse and answering the usual 
question, whether he had served the required number of campaigns 
and under what commander, by saying that he had served them all 
as imperator himself The two years following he spent in retire- 
ment, seldom appearing in the Forum, though his house was crowded 
with visitors and admirers. From petty intrigues and unimportant 
combinations he held aloof with prudent dignity. But an occasion 
soon arose which seemed worthy of his intervention. 
The The greatest blot in the administration of the Empire had 

pirates. \iQQXi the toleration of the pirates in the Mediterranean. Their 
numbers and audacity had risen to such a height that commerce was 
threatened with extinction, and the sea had become almost impass- 
able to any but large vessels with armed men on board. Scarcely a 
temple or sacred asylum in Asia, Greece, or Epirus had escaped 
their ravages. The shores of Italy itself were not safe from them. 
They had captured two Roman praetors with their attendants, and 
carried off ladies of high rank. They had even run into the har- 
bours of Caieta and Ostia and set fire to the ships. Now and again 
some of their victims proved strong enough to be avenged upon 
them. In 76, for instance, they captured lulius Caesar on his way 
to Rhodes, and exacted a ransom of fifty talents. He raised the money 
in certain Greek towns, and then having obtained ships captured 
and caused them to be put to death at Pergamus. But though some 
fitful and partial attacks had been made upon them from time to time 
since the Illyrian war of 220, no great or determined effort had been 
made to put them down. The Balearic islands were taken in 123, 
on the pretext of harbouring them ; Murena had dealt with some of 
them in Asia without much success in 83-82 ; P. Servilius Isauricus 
had only made a partial and temporary impression in Cilicia and 
Isauria (74) ; C. Antonius had failed shamefully in Crete (74) ; and 
though Q. Caecilius Metellus, — who had already dealt ably with 
them when praetor in Sicily in 70, — was at this very time sub- 
duing Crete successfully, it had become plain that something 

^ Who the tribuni aerarii were is a vexed question. The best opinion seems 
to be that they were originally tribal officers employed to collect the tributmn and 
pay the soldiers. They were taken from those whose property was reckoned next 
below the 400,000 asses, which was the equestrian fortune ; and when the 
tributum ceased to be collected (168) men so rated still continued to be called 
tribuni aerarii and were reckoned as a distinct ordo^ though the law of Cotta is 
the first known recognition of them as such. 



Coss. C. 



Acilius 
Glabrio. 



XLii POMPEY CLEARS THE SEAS OF PIRATES 68i 

more was wanted to vindicate the position of Rome as protector of 
her alHes and subjects. The people of Rome were themselves now 
experiencing the inconvenience of farther toleration by a serious rise 
in the price of provisions ; and when the tribune A. Gabinius pro- Lex- 
posed that a commander should be named, with absolute powers for Gabinia, 
three years all over the Mediterranean and fifty miles inland from y' 
all coasts, with 200 ships, and unlimited power of drawing" upon the Cal'pv 
treasury, all eyes were turned to Pompey, though he was not named. Piso, M. 
Caesar supported the measure in the Senate, but the majority 
vehemently opposed it, as granting dictatorial powers dangerous to the 
state, and Gabinius almost lost his life at the hands of a senatorial 
mob headed by the consul Piso. But the people in their turn saved 
Gabinius, and would have killed Piso, had not Gabinius given him 
refuge in his house. Another tribune, Trebellius, was next set up 
to veto the bill, and refused to withdraw his veto till seventeen out of 
eighteen tribes required for a majority had voted on the proposal 
of Gabinius to depose him. The law was then passed and Pompey Pompey 
named for the post. After some hollow pretence of reluctance he (Appointed 
accepted it. In their enthusiasm the people voted him an even more ZyJiic 
liberal equipment than that originally proposed. He was to have uiars. 
500 vessels, 2 quaestors, 24 legates, and 120,000 sailors and foot- 
soldiers, with 500 horse. The orator Q. Hortensius and Q. Catulus 
opposed the bill on the grounds that it was dangerous to give a 
man such great powers, especially outside Italy. Like Marius or 
Sulla he might return to make himself a despot. But the people 
were convinced of the wisdom of the measure when, on the day after 
his appointment, the prices of provisions suddenly fell. 

Pompey lost no time. Before spring had well begun he had Pompey 
divided the sea and coasts into nine regions, to be explored and clears the 
cleared by his several legates; had visited in person the shores of ^l^'^.f^ ^ ^^ 
Africa and Sicily ; and stationed squadrons along them to protect the 
corn ships. Then returning to Italy, after a brief visit to Rome, 
he started again from Brundisium. Within forty days the pirates 
were scattered, killed, or forced to submit, and their strongholds 
in Cilicia and Pamphylia taken or destroyed. He wintered in 
Cilicia, and employed himself in bringing the province to order, 
founding cities, and settling the best of the pirates in districts where 
they could live honestly. His only serious difficulty was with 0. Q.Caccilius 
Metellus, who had been engaged since 68 in his successful war in Crete, ^l^-^^^^"^ 
which was one of the chief sources of piracy, and greatly resented (^^.(^(^ ' 
the authority which Pompey's commission enabled him to exercise 
in that island, as in all others. But the states in Crete, expecting 
better terms from Pompey, begged him to interfere. He wrote 
to Metellus, ordering him to suspend operations, and to the cities not 



Mithri 
dates, 66 



682 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

to obey him, and sent his legate L. Octavius to openly oppose him. 
Crete nevertheless was joined to Cyrenaica, which had been made a 
province in 75, and Pompey's attention was soon turned elsewhere. 
The popular party used his success to again mortify the Senate. 
The lex Qne of the tribunes, C. Manilius, now proposed a piebiscifum, con- 
Manilia ferring the province of Bithynia upon Pompey, in addition to his 
^Pompey the existing powers, with the command against Mithridates, and full 
command authority to settle all matters in Phrygia, Lycaonia, Galatia, Cappa- 
against docia, Cilicia, Colchis, and Armenia. This immense addition to his 
commission was of course alarming to the Senate, and was opposed 
again by Hortensius and Q. Catulus ; but lulius Caesar, who was 
aedile elect, supported it, and Cicero, who was praetor urbanus, 
spoke in its favour. The law was passed by all the tribes, and as 
soon as Pompey was informed of it, while pretending indignation at 
Pompey the constant demands upon his services, he ceased to think of Crete ; 
^p^ ^^ A/^ turned his whole attention to his new duties ; and, leaving three 
legions to cover Cilicia, started for the war. He found Lucullus 
in Galatia still at the head of an army, and at first treated him with 
respect ; but made it clear that he had no intention of allowing him 
any share in finishing the war. He deprived him of all but 1500 
of the worst of his soldiers, upset his arrangements, and spoke 
contemptuously of his pretensions to settle with the commissioners a 
province over which he had lost all military control. Lucullus was 
glad to go home for his triumph. 
Position of But in fact Pompey found Pontus ready to fall into his hands. 
Mithridates, indeed, was still at the head of 30,000 infantry and 
2000 cavalry ; but his fortunes, which seemed so fair in the previous 
year, were, nevertheless, at a low ebb. The country which he had 
reoccupied was wasted and desolate ; he had lost the help of 
the piratical fleets ; and his son-in-law Tigranes, king of Armenia, 
was again alienated. Of the three sons of Tigranes the eldest 
in the course of the previous year fell in arms against his father ; 
the second was executed for hastily assuming the royal tiara when 
his father was rendered insensible by a fall from his horse ; and, 
finally, the third, who had seemed the only one loyal, seized the 
opportunity of his father's absence in Cappadocia to rebel, and when 
his father advanced against him fled to his father-in-law Phraates, 
king of Parthia. These young princes were all sons of Cleopatra, 
the daughter of Mithridates ; and Tigranes, suspecting that they 
acted at the instigation of their grandfather, was little inclined to 
help him. Mithridates therefore stood alone, and was no longer con- 
fronted by 2i faineant like Glabrio, or by a discredited general like 
Lucullus, with a disorganised army ; but by a man confident and 
energetic, invested with fullest powers, and enjoying the confidence of 



Mithri 
dates in 66 



XLii POMPEY DEFEATS MITHRIDATES 683 

his army. Still he would not listen to the terms offered by Pompey ; The 
and tried again as a last resource to attract the Parthians to his Parthian 
alliance. But in this, too, Pompey baffled him. Envoys appeared ^^^^'^^^^^■ 
at the court of Phraates, promising alliance with Rome and the 
Euphrates as a frontier ; and the Parthian king, resolving to accept 
the offer, prepared to invade Armenia, thus forcing Tigranes event- 
ually to seek Roman protection. 

Early in 66 Pompey appeared in Bithynia with an army of 60,000 Pompey in 
men, which included the two Fimbrian legions that had refused to Pontus, 
serve any longer under Lucullus. His great fleet was guarding all 
points along the shore from Phoenicia to the Bosporus, and he now 
advanced to the frontier of Pontus. In answer to offers made by 
Mithridates he demanded unconditional submission and surrender 
of all deserters. The army of the king was full of such men, 
and their alarm forced him to declare his determination to surrender 
none, explaining that his envoys had been really meant as spies. 
Nevertheless he dared not meet Pompey's superior force. He 
retreated eastward, trying to harass the advancing army by inter- 
cepting convoys and cutting off detached parties. But Pompey Pompey 
out -manoeuvred and out-marched him; drew him into country out- 
ill-suited to cavalry ; got between him and the road into Greater 'f^.^'f'^^^ 

A J 1-- 1 XT- 1- u r Mithri- 

Armenia ; and cut up his cavalry near Nicopolis by means of an ^^^^^ 
ambuscade. Mithridates then entrenched himself on a hill near 
the river Lycus, where he had an abundant supply of water, and was 
able to hold out for forty-five days. Pompey sent for reinforce- 
ments from Cilicia, and cut off his supplies by throwing a corps 
across the Euphrates and occupying the district on his rear, while he 
drew round him a vast line of fortresses extending for fifteen miles. 
At length Mithridates, finding his provisions running short, determined 
to escape. The wounded and sick were killed, the watch-fires were 
lit as usual, and in the darkness of the night he and his main army 
made their way through the Roman lines in the direction of the 
Euphrates. But they dared not march except by night, concealing 
themselves during the day in glens and forests. This gave the pursuers 
an opportunity of out-marching them. On the third day Pompey 
stationed his men so as to command a defile through which the 
Pontic forces would necessarily pass in the next night's march. 
As they entered the defile the Roman trumpets and battle-cry 
suddenly broke the stillness of the night, and the advanced guard Night 
found themselves overwhelmed on all sides by a shower of darts, ^^t^^*^ 
stones, and arrows ; Mithridates was roused by his officers and ^o^t„tai7is 
endeavoured to draw up his men in battle order ; but they proved 
unable to withstand the Roman attack, and were cut to pieces, 
driven over precipices, or trampled under foot by the horses. The 



684 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Defeat and 
flight of 
Mithri- 
dates. 



The 

younger 
Tigranes 
comes to 
Pompey's 



Mithri- 
dates 
escapes to 
the Cau- 
casus. 



Pompey ht 
Armenia, 
autum?i of 
66. 

Tigranes 
surrenders 
all his 
conquests. 



moon rose during the struggle behind the Romans, but the deceptive 
light made it impossible for the Pontic archers to take good aim or 
to judge of distances. The army was annihilated ; 10,000 were 
killed ; and the rest were taken prisoners, or wandered away among 
the mountains. Pompey returned his loss as only forty killed and 
1000 wounded. Mithridates escaped with some horsemen, who 
presently deserted him, and arrived with two attendants and his 
wife Hypsicrate at Sinoria, on the frontier of the Greater Armenia, 
from which he sent once more to demand the hospitality of Tigranes. 
But Tigranes was in no case to help him, and with no inclination to 
do so if he were. The Parthian king had penetrated to his capital, 
Artaxata, accompanied by the younger Tigranes. As the winter 
was approaching, Phraates left the siege of the city to this young 
prince and returned to Parthia. Thereupon the elder Tigranes re- 
appeared, appealed to the loyalty of his subjects, and proceeded to 
attack his son. The young Tigranes fled, intending to join Mithri- 
dates, but, hearing of his defeat, changed his plan, and proceeding 
to the Roman camp surrendered to Pompey. The elder Tigranes, 
still believing Mithridates to be the instigator of his son, seized his 
envoys and sent them also to Pompey, whom he tried to propitiate 
by offering 100 talents for the head of Mithridates. 

The Pontic king, thus deserted on all hands, resolved to make his 
way to the Bosporus and recover the kingdom held by his son 
Machares, who had betrayed him and made peace with Lucullus. 
The large treasures at Sinoria furnished a yeai-'s pay in advance for 
the troops which still remained to him ; and before long he started 
with a small army along the right bank of the Euphrates on his way 
to Colchis and the Caucasus. The line of the Caucasus, between 
the Black Sea and the Caspian, was held by two warlike tribes, the 
Albani and the Iberes, with the latter of whom he had long had 
diplomatic relations. He easily persuaded them that a Roman army 
would endanger their independence ; and having thus, as he hoped, 
secured an interruption to Pompey's pursuit, continued his march 
round the Black Sea and wintered at Dioscurias in Colchis. 

Pompey did not immediately follow him. The Roman fleet under 
Servilius sailed up the coast of the Euxine as far as the mouth of 
the Phasis ; while Pompey himself, guided by young Tigranes, 
marched through Armenia upon Artaxata. There was no resistance ; 
and at fifteen miles from the city the old king Tigranes appeared, 
offering full submission. He was kindly received by Pompey ; treated 
as a king ; and admitted to friendship and alliance with Rome, on 
condition of surrendering all his conquests in Syria, Phoenicia, 
Cihcia, and Galatia, and paying a war indemnity of 6000 talents. 
This did not satisfy the young Tigranes, who was to have as his 



XLir POMPEY CONQUERS THE ALBANI AND IBERES 685 

sole reward the kingdom of Sophene, the south-western district, 
annexed by his father to Armenia. He had annoyed Pompey by j^j^^ 
his rudeness to his father when both were entertained by him ; younger 
and now his language was so haughty and defiant that Pompey put Tigranes 
him in chains, and resolved to send him, with his wife and family, ^^Z^-^^'^- 
to Rome to adorn his triumph. Ariobarzanes was restored to the 
kingdom of Cappadocia, with the addition of Sophene, now taken 
from the young Tigranes, and charged to protect the line of the 
Euphrates. 

Pompey moved into winter quarters on the banks of the Cyrus 
{K/mr) on the extreme north-western frontier of Armenia, and ob- 
tained from the kings of the Albani and Iberes a promise of free 
passage through their territories in pursuit of Mithridates in the 
spring. But while the Roman troops were keeping the festival Battles 
of the Saturnalia (17th December) king Oroizes led 40,000 Albani -^ith the 
across the Cyrus and fell upon the three camps— of Pompey, L. ^^""""^ 
Valerius Flaccus, and Q. Metellus Celer. The treacherous attack (,1''''' ^'^ 
was repulsed with severe loss, and Oroizes was obliged to beg 
humbly for a truce. Next spring, however, though Artokes, king and with 
of the Iberes, affected to keep up friendly negotiations, Pompey ^hc Iberes 
resolved to anticipate the attack which he ascertained that he was '^''^^ '" 
meditating. He surprised him by marching up the Cyrus and seiz- '^' 
ing the defiles before the Iberian army was ready. Artokes retired 
behind the Cyrus, burnt the bridge behind him, and tried to renew 
negotiations. But Pompey continued to advance, and at last came 
up with him close to the Caucasus. There Artokes was forced to 
fight, and after losing 9000 killed and 10,000 prisoners, was fain to 
submit to terms and give his own children as hostages. 

Having thus subdued a nation whose freedom had never been 
infringed, either by the Persian kings or by Alexander, Pompey 
continued his advance in pursuit of Mithridates as far as the 
Phasis, at the mouth of which a Roman fleet was at anchor. Pomp< 
But there finding that Mithridates had left Dioscurias, and was ^^'^ ^^ 
well on his way to the Bosporus, he resolved to follow him no 
farther. He believed that the Roman fleet in the Black Sea would 
suffice to cut him off from provisions and other help, and that 
he might be safely left to go to ruin. He turned his steps once Pompev 
more to the south ; defeated the Albani again, who were inclined \q returns 
hinder his passage, killing their leader Kosis with his own hand ; and ^''''^"'' 
arrived in Lesser Armenia in the early summer of 65, where fortress '^"""''' "J 
after fortress was captured or surrendered. Sinoria was taken by 
his legate Manlius Porcius ; Symphorion was surrendered by the 
deserted Queen Stratonice ; and the archives of the kingdom fell 
into Pompey's hands at a place called the New Town. Taking up 



ey Of! 
asi's. 



to 



686 



HISTORY OF ROME 



At Ami SOS 
he settles 
the affairs 
of Asia, 
6S-64- 
Pontus 
made a 
province. 



Affairs in 
Syria. 



March of 
Afranius 
into Syria, 
winter of 
6J-64. 



Rival 
kings of 
the Jews. 



Pompey 
goes to 
Damascus 
64. 



his residence at Amisos he proceeded to regulate the affairs of Asia 
with absolute authority, and was visited by twelve kings desirous to 
obtain recognition or pardon. He also reduced the kingdom of 
Pontus to the form of a province, to be united with Bithynia. Stripped 
of the outlying districts, granted to various princes and tetrarchs, it 
consisted of eleven urban communities {civitates), some already exist- 
ing, others founded or restored by Pompey himself, as Pompeiopolis 
on the Amnias, and Nicopolis in the valley of the Lycus, where he 
first conquered Mithridates. 

The one important monarch who still ventured on acts of hostility 
was Phraates, king of the Parthians — that mysterious people, whose 
mission seemed to be to create a reaction against the hellenisation 
of Asia, and to put a limit to the Empire of Rome in the East. 
Phraates occupied the part of the territory of Tigranes called 
Gordyene, and threatened the rest. As the remaining dominion of 
Tigranes had been guaranteed to him by Pompey, L. Afranius was 
despatched to expel Phraates. Having done so he continued his 
march with great difficulty through Mesopotamia towards Syria. This 
great district between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean, bounded 
on the north by the ranges of Amanus and Taurus, and on the 
south by the desert of Arabia Petraea, had been taken by Tigranes, 
but was now to become a Roman province. L. Aemilius Scaurus 
had been sent by Pompey to take possession of it, and arrived 
in Damascus at the end of 65, which he found already held by 
two of Pompey's legates. There his interposition was invited in 
the affairs of Palestine. Hyrcanus II., who was high priest, 
succeeded his mother Alexandra in the kingdom of ludaea in 
69 ; but his younger brother Aristobulus, who was of a far more 
energetic character, raised an army and defeated him near Jericho, 
and compelled him to resign the crown. Instigated, however, by 
Antipater or Antipas (father of Herod), he asked help from Aretas, 
king of the Nabataei in Arabia Petraea (65). Aretas defeated Aris- 
tobulus and blockaded him in the Temple, which had been strongly 
fortified since the time of the Maccabees, he and Hyrcanus holding 
the rest of Jerusalem. When Scaurus arrived at Damascus both 
sides appealed to him, and both offered him large bribes. He 
decided in favour of Aristobulus (who seems to have bidden highest), 
and ordered Hyrcanus and Aretas to withdraw. Aristobulus pursued 
them as they retired and inflicted a defeat upon them. Such was 
the state of affairs when Pompey himself arrived at Damascus from 
Pontus, leaving the fleet to blockade the shores of the Euxine, and 
starve out Mithridates. 

At Damascus he was visited by embassies from all parts of 
Syria and from Egypt. Among others Aristobulus sent him a 



POMPEY IN lUDAEA 687 



present of a golden vine, worth 500 talents ; and at the same time He makes 
envoys appeared on the part of Hyrcanus and Antipas, denouncing Syria a 
the bribery which had secured the intervention in favour of P^^^^^^^* 
Aristobulus. Pompey wintered in Syria, where his legate Afranius ^/■<5^. 
subdued the people in the north at the foot of the Amanus range, while 
he himself was employed in reducing the kingdom of the deposed 
Antiochus to the form of a province. In the spring of 63 
he summoned representatives of the two rivals to meet him at 
Damascus. Having heard them he refused to give a decision at 
once, but expressed his intention of coming shortly into ludaea and 
judging by his own eyes. Owing, however, in a great degree to 
the skilful advocacy of Antipas his inclination was clearly shown to be Pompey 
in favour of Hyrcanus: and accordingly Aristobulus, instead of obey- favours 
ing his injunction to take no warlike steps till he came, proceeded y^'canus. 
to occupy the roads and passes into ludaea. Pompey therefore 
determined to attack him and subdue the whole country. Marching He 
to Pella he crossed the Jordan to Scythopolis, and thence entered invades 

ludaea. There he summoned Aristobulus, who was securely posted ' f^!^ , 

early I fi o?. 
on the hill fortress of Alexandreion. He feigned obedience, mean- 
while secretly occupying all the strong places he could on the way 
to Jerusalem. Ordered to deliver up these fortresses he reluctantly 
obeyed, and retiring to Jerusalem, there fortified himself 

As Pompey approached Jericho couriers arrived in the Roman Pompey 
camp informing him that the great object of his mission was ^^^^'-^ rf 
accomplished. Mithridates was dead. While Pompey in 65 had ^A/^^^,,^-. 
been parcelling out the kingdom of Pontus, the fugitive lord of these dates. 
wide domains had been pressing on towards the Bosporus. Arrived 
after a harassing march on the shores of the Maeotis he summoned 
his ancient vassals, distributed gold, promised his daughters in 
marriage to the chiefs, and was soon at the head of a formidable 
force. His treacherous son Machares in alarm sent envoys to demand 
pardon and make terms. Mithridates answered by offering a reward 
for his head, and the unfortunate prince, deserted by all, fled from 
Phanagoria to Panticapaeum {Kertch\ and there fell on his sword. 
Mithridates was again a king, and secured himself in the impregnable Mithri- 



citadel of Panticapaeum. Still he was at bay. The Roman fleet, 
though it could not starve him, since he was in a land of rich 
corn fields, could interrupt and hamper the trade of his recovered 
kingdom. He knew that he must in some way remove the blockade 
if he was to remain king ; and early in 64 he sent offers of submission 
to Pompey, agreeing to hold his realms as the vassal of Rome, and 
to despatch his sons as hostages. Pompey would have nothing but a 
personal surrender and unconditional submission. Then the old king- 
conceived the bold project of making his way by land through 



dates in 
t he Crimea, 
6S. 



688 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Mithri- 
dates medi- 
tates an 
invasion of 
Italy. 



Death of 
Mithri- 
dates, 
spring of 
63. 



Pompey 

takes 

Jerusalem. 



Scythia, descending into the valley of the Danube, and thence by 
the Brenner Pass into Italy, where he believed that the Romans were 
so beset by difficulties, and the Italians so ripe for revolt, that he 
might yet sweep all before him, and succeed where the less disciplined 
Cimbrians had failed. This last heroic dream, however, was baffled. 
His people were suffering from the distress caused by the Roman 
blockade, aggravated by a destructive earthquake ; he was himself 
confined to his palace by illness ; and a slight cause might at any 
time produce a revolution. An attempt to garrison Phanagoria on 
the Asiatic side of the Bosporus caused a violent outburst, in which 
his sons and daughters residing there were captured and handed over 
to the Roman fleet. This example was followed in the Crimea, and 
soon the king had nothing left but Panticapaeum and the army. 
Even in the army mutiny was breaking out, and the cruel punishment 
with which he tried to suppress it only served to inflame it. The troops 
conducting his two daughters to their Scythian husbands mutinied, 
killed the eunuchs in charge, and handed over the girls to the 
Romans. And presently the one son left him, Pharnaces, fearing the 
fate of his brothers, four of whom had died by their father's orders, 
conspired against the aged king. The plot was discovered, the 
secret agents tortured, but the prince pardoned. Mithridates hoped 
that once on the Italian expedition he would forget his schemes. 
But a few days before the date fixed for the start Pharnaces appeared 
among the Roman deserters serving the king ; urged them to join 
him in delivering themselves from his tyranny ; and sent emissaries 
through the town to rouse all who were similarly aggrieved. The 
peopk, hardly knowing what was happening, joined in the movement, 
and Mithridates from the hill, on which were the citadel and palace, 
could see the rebels and hear Pharnaces proclaimed king. He knew 
that his time was come. He had a deadly poison concealed in the 
hilt of his sword. He drew it forth and began mixing it. His 
two daughters demanded to share the draught and soon lay dead 
at his feet. It failed, however, to have a like rapid effect upon 
himself. Either what remained of the potion was too little, or, 
as he believed, his body was fortified by antidotes. At any rate 
he was still alive when the noise of the approaching rebels was 
heard. He exerted all his remaining authority to induce one of his 
Gallic guards to give him the death-stroke ; and the emissaries of 
Pharnaces burst into the chamber to find the great king a corpse. 

With him fell all resistance to Rome in the East for the present ; 
and when the news reached Pompey he knew that he could safely 
delay his return to Pontus till he had finally subdued Aristobulus 
and the Jews, As he approached Jerusalem he seemed likely 
to accomplish this without striking a blow. That prince had lost 



XLii SURRENDER OF JERUSALEM 689 

heart, and now appeared in the camp offering complete submission. 
His offer was accepted, and Gabinius was sent to take possession of 
the city and obtain suppHes. But the obstinacy of the Jews had not 
been taken into account. They closed their gates, repudiated the 
bargain of Aristobulus, and refused all supplies. Pompey, thinking 
himself deceived, put Aristobulus in chains and advanced to assault 
Jerusalem. The inhabitants were divided, one part wishing to submit, 
the other determined to resist. The former delivered the city, the 
latter entrenched themselves in the precincts of the temple, breaking 
down the means of communication between it and the city. The men Siege of the 
in the temple were summoned but refused to submit ; and Pompey temple. 
pitching his camp to the north of the hill proceeded to invest it. He 
cut down wood in every direction to fill up the deep moat round 
the temple hill, and siege artillery was sent for from Tyre. The reso- 
lute adherence by the Jews, even in this hour of danger, to the 
observance of the Sabbath gave the besiegers an advantage they 
were quick to seize.i Still the besieged held out till the third month. 
At length one of the great towers yielded to the blows of the 
battering rams, and through the breach the Roman soldiers, headed 
by Cornelius Faustus, son of Sulla, poured in. Twelve thousand Jews 
are said to have perished by the enemy's, or by each other's hands, 
or by flinging themselves from the precipitous rock. Pompey insisted 
; on entering the Holy of Holies, and gazed at a shrine without a god, 
at the golden table and candlesticks, at the censers and incense. 
I He respected the sublime simplicity of a religion which he did not 
I understand ; left the sacred objects in their place ; and ordered the 
I temple to be cleansed and restored. The high priesthood was given 
to Hyrcanus, with the authority though not the title of king, and 
I Jerusalem was subjected to a tribute, and, with a curtailed territory, 

, was treated as a separate community. The towns on the sea coast Restored on 

I Gaza, Joppa, Dora, Stratonis Turris {Caesared) — were severed from the request 
j Jewish control, and retaining internal freedom were reckoned in the ^^" 
I new province of Syria,2 along with the towns of Decapolis. The A^^^»«^«. 
I final settlement of the country was left to Gabinius when pro- aTadarme 
\ consul of Syria in 57. Aretas of Arabia Petraea was punished 
1 for his interference by an invasion under Scaurus, and was glad 
to secure by a payment of 300 talents the freedom of his territory 
I from plunder. Aristobulus and his family were carried off to 
I Rome. 

^ An attack might be repelled on the Sabbath, but not made. Therefore the 
work of trenches and the like were uninterrupted on it (Jos. Ant. xiv. 4 ; Bell. 
Jud. I, 7, 3 ; Dio xlvii. 16). 

2 Trdo-as 6 YloixirriCo% dipiJKev iXevd^pas Kal irpoaiveifjie rrj iirapxiq. (Joseph. 
Antiq. xiv. 5, 4). 

2 Y 



690 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Pompey 
returns to 
Pontus, 62. 



Restoration 
of the 
kings. 



Towns 
founded or 
rebuilt. 



Pompey s 
journey 
home, 62. 



Greatness 
of Pompey': 
achieve- 
?nents. 



Jerusalem seems to have been taken in October ^ 63, and 
Pompey must have been detained for some time making these 
arrangements for the cities of Palestine ; but early in 62 he started 
once more for Pontus. At Amisos an envoy from Pharnaces 
appeared, bringing presents and hostages, and above all, the 
embalmed body of Mithridates, which Pompey would not look at and 
ordered to be buried in the royal mausoleum at Sinope. Pharnaces 
was rewarded with the kingdom of the Bosporus, and the usual 
title of "friend and ally" of Rome. Phanagoria was declared 
free ; and a number of the partisans of Mithridates were sent to 
Rome in readiness for Pompey's triumph. The greater Asiatic 
kingdoms were restored generally to those who had been driven out 
— Armenia to Tigranes, Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, Commagene 
with Seleucia to Antiochus ; while Deiotarus was made tetrarch of a 
part of Galatia ; Attalus prince of Paphlagonia ; Aristarchus of 
Colchis ; and Archelaus high priest of Comana, which carried with it 
royal power. Pompey wished also to perpetuate his name by the 
restoration or foundation of cities. In Pontus, Eupatoria was 
changed to Magnopolis ; in Cappadocia, Mazaca was restored, and 
Nicopolis Pompeii built on the site of his victory over the king ; in 
Cihcia, Soli became Pompeiopolis, — and so with many cities in 
Pontus, in Palestine, Coele- Syria, and Cilicia, though in many cases 
the name was not permanently presei-ved; finally, as a favour to his 
friend the Greek historian Theophanes, he touched at Mitylene 
and restored to it the freedom forfeited in 81. These arrange- 
ments made, Pompey proceeded to Ephesus, Rhodes, and Athens, 
which he presented with a subscription of fifty talents towards the 
restoration of the city, and thence to Italy, landing at Brundisium 
towards the close of the year. 

He returned with a record of achievement never surpassed. 
The seas were cleared of the pirates. Two large provinces 
had been added to the Empire ; from the Caspian and Araxes 
to the Mediterranean all sovereigns reigned by the will and under 
the protection of Rome. His ships were crowded with kings, 
princes, and chiefs, who had ruled or claimed to rule over great 
territories, and with their families numbered 300. For four years 
he had exercised an unlimited authority over a vast expanse of 
country, had set up and deposed, had destroyed and built, had re- 
warded with imperial magnificence and (more seldom) had punished 
with unquestioned authority. And in this exalted position he had 
won esteem and even affection by his unblemished integrity and 
wise lenity. His return to Italy, at the head of such large forces, 

^ Josephus says iv ttj ttjs vrfo-retas rifJ^-^pq., the day of Atonement, i.e. loth 
October, about loth November of unreformed Roman calendar. 



XLii RETURN OF POMPEY TO ITALY 691 

and with the halo of such glory, was looked forward to with anxiety 
by the senatorial party, which had always been jealous of him, and 
with mixed feelings of hope and doubt by the Populares, who had 
never been able to feel sure of his allegiance. To both it seemed 
that his advent might be the beginning of incalculable change. But 
Pompey disappointed hopes and fears alike. He was too confident 
in the glory which he had won to think of playing the part of a Sulla 
or a Marius. As soon as he landed at Brundisium, after munificently 
rewarding the men, and pledging himself to obtain grants of land for 
the veterans, he quietly dismissed his army. 

AuTHORniES. — Livy, Epit. 99-102 ; Plutarch, Pompey, 23-43 ; Appian, 
Bellum Miihridat. 93-121 ; Josephus, Antiq. xiv. 2-4 ; Dio Cassius xxxvi. 19- 
xxxvii. 20 ; Orosius vi. 4-6 ; Zonaras x, 3-5. The 2nd of the Apocryphal 
" Psalms of Solomon " appears to refer to the entrance of Pompey into the Holy 
of Holies, and his death in Egypt as a retribution. 



CHAPTER XLIII 



THE CONSPIRACY OF CATILINE, AND THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE 

State of parties at Pompcy's return — The leaders of the Optiniates — The Popu- 
lares without a leader — C. lulius Caesar — His early career — His support of 
popular measures (73-68) — Quaestor in Spain (68) — Supports the Gabinian (67) 
and Manilian laws (66) — Aedile (65) — Fails to get appointed to Egypt — 
Index quacstiotiis (64) — As diiovir capitalis condemns C. Rabirius — The 
Catiline conspiracy crushed by Cicero as consul — Caesar advises against 
executing the conspirators — His election as pontifex maximus (63) — Caesar's 
praetorship — His contests with the Senate — Fall of Catiline (62) — Caesar 
propraetor in Spam (61) — Caesar returns from Spain to stand for consulship — 
Is not allowed to be a candidate without entering Rome — Elected consul, and 
forms a league with Pompey and Crassus (60) — His consulship and laws (59) 
— P. Clodius — His violation of the mysteries (62) — His adoption into a 
plebeian gens and election as tribune (59) — Cicero is banished and Caesar 
goes as proconsul to Gaul (58) — Clodius' laws — Quarrels with Pompey who 
supports the recall of Cicero (57) — Pompey praefecfus annonae for five years — 
Goes to the congress at Lucca on Caesar's invitation (56). 



h'c/urn of 
Pompey, 
at<tum)i 
0/62. 



Parties at 
Rome. 



Pompey did not reach Rome till late in 62. The Senate had refused 
his request to postpone the Comitia in order that he might pay M. 
Pupius Piso, one of his legates, the compliment of being present at 
his election. He had imagined that hardly any request of his would 
be rejected, and he perhaps learnt from it that a general without an 
army was not likely to be as influential as he hoped to be. Changes 
at Rome were rapid, and an absence of four years was enough to 
put a man out of touch with thein. 

Both of the two great parties at Rome, the Optimates and the 
Populares, had a specious programme. The Optimates wished to pre- 
serve the ancient constitution, the national religion and system of 
auspices, the powers of the magistrates, the influence of the Senate, 
the Senatorial hold on the law courts, the credit of the exchequer, 
the subordination of the army, the government of the provinces. 
The Populares maintained that the religious system, especially that 
of the auspices, was employed to enable certain aristocratic families 
to retain hold of office and prevent necessary reforms ; that the 



CHAP. XLiii THE OPTIMATES AND THE POPULARES 693 

authority of the Senate should always bow before the popular will ; 
that, under pretence of maintaining national credit, lands were with- 
held from the people and served only to enrich the already wealthy ; 
that the law courts, when in the hands of the Senate, were corrupt ; 
that the provinces were oppressed and plundered by the aristocratic 
governors. But in fact neither party had clean hands in these matters. 
Though there were honest and good men on both sides, there was 
a large number on both also whose sole object was to get the advan- 
tages now arising from office. 

Sulla had attempted to refonii the existing evils by increasing Pompeys 
the power of the Senate, and diminishing that of the tribunes, who innova- 
had long ceased to be the protectors of the oppressed, and had 'J'^''^ °^^ ^^^ 
learnt to use their great powers for purely political purposes. But constitu- 
Pompey's own measures in his consulsh-ip (70) had to a great Hon, jo. 
extent undone Sulla's work. The old constitution was restored with 
all its anomalies, — a close oligarchy under democratic forms tem- 
pered by prosecutions. These prosecutions were made the means 
of party triumphs, and young men on the look-out for office found 
their account in popular favour or aristocratic fears by bringing an 
extortionate or unsuccessful governor to trial. But such a man had 
often made such good use of his time that he possessed a fortune A provin- 
large enough to pay for the shows by which he got office, and to "'^^ 
bribe the jury as well ; or, if his case was too flagrant or his oppon- S^^''^'^^"^^ ^ 
ents too influential, to enable him to live in splendour at Marseilles fortunes 
or other residence open to exiles. So little did these prosecutions 
do for the provinces that some said that it would be better for 
them if there were no law de rcpetu?idis ; the governors would have 
one less fortune to make out of them. 

The party of the Optimates was the smaller but the more conv The 
pact. Its strength lay in long prescription, family connexions, and Op/itnates 
' the influence which the actual possession of wealth and power gives. ' ' ^f 
\ Its weakness was that it disliked and mistrusted great men. A true single 
oligarchy, it regarded all who seemed likely to be specially promi- leader^ 
nent with suspicion. Pompey had shown independence : had joined 
, Sulla and yet opposed him on more than one occasion. The measures 
' of his consulate had indeed served to class him with the Populares ; 
' but his services against Lepidus and Sertorius, and his dismissal of 
I his army on his return from the East had proved that he meant to 
confine himself within the limits of the constitution. Yet the Opti- They dis- 
mates slighted and thwarted him, and drove him into the arms of ^i^ed 
Caesar and Crassus, of the former of whom he was jealous, while he ^^"^P^y- 
personally disliked the latter. M. Tullius Cicero, great orator and Cicero's 
brilliant man of letters, joined the party but never seemed at home party 
in it. He had ventured to beard Sulla at the height of his power in Z'^"^"''^- 



694 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Cicero joins 
the Opti- 
mates. 



The 

weakness 
of the 
Optimatist 

leaders. 

Catulus. 



Cato. 



defending Roscius of Ameria (80) ; as quaestor at Lilybaeum he 
had estabHshed a character for integrity and activity ; and his influence 
in the law courts was so great that though a " new man " there seemed 
to be no serious opposition to his rise through the regular gradations 
of office to the consulship. His impeachment of Verres, whose 
scandalous peculation in Cilicia (80-79), ^^^^ still more abominable 
cruelties in Sicily (73-71), had been passed over by the Senate, 
which had left him three years in office, seemed to point him out as 
a member of the popular party. But he was before all things a 
lawyer in politics. The best of all possible constitutions — that 
under which he had risen — must be maintained : and when to his 
horrified amazement he found that there were men who, while 
ostensibly fighting for reforms, cared nothing for this wonderful con- 
stitution, with all its elaborate contrivances to enable a small knot of 
men to monopolise the right of doing wrong, he joined the party of 
privilege, and lent all his eloquence to the maintenance of the whole 
obsolete machinery of tradition, senatorial influence, and religious and 
ceremonial checks. Into this he fancied new life might be breathed 
if the languid and corrupt nobility could be induced to leave their 
country palaces and fish-ponds and take a real part in public affairs ; 
and if the best men of the senatorial and equestrian orders would 
but combine to uphold the constitution, to purify the law courts, and 
honestly administer the provinces. But he spoke to deaf ears : nor 
was he himself sufficiently true to his principles to have weight with 
others. His voice was often raised, either from private friendship 
or party needs, in defence of notorious wrongdoers ; and for every 
friend which his eloquence made, it made a dozen angry or jealous 
enemies. His policy of winning over Pompey and setting him up as 
a counterpoise to Caesar for a long time found no support. 

The sort of leaders pleasing to the Optimates were men of 
mediocre abilities and narrow views, who had no hold on the popular 
imagination. Q. Lutatius Catulus, one of the best men of the day, 
had held all the highest offices and had saved the city from the 
attack of Lepidus. But the narrowness of his views was shown by 
his refusal as censor to enrol any of the Transpadani as citizens ; and 
the weakness of his influence by the failure of his opposition to the 
Gabinian and Manilian laws. M. Porcius Cato, great-grandson of 
the censor, was a figure of some interest and was influential in the 
Senate. But his Stoicism was as unpopular as Puritanism after the 
Restoration, and his success at elections was but moderate. He never 
rose above the praetorship or held a first-class government. He 
would compromise nothing : he offended Pompey by resisting the 
allotments to his veterans, and Caesar by talking out the proposal to 
allow him to triumph from Spain and yet stand for the consulship. 



XLiii EARLY CAREER OF lULIUS CAESAR 695 

M. Licinius Crassus was chiefly devoted to amassing wealth, and Crassus. 
though he showed energy in the war with Spartacus, he was a 
poHtician by accident, and owed his influence to the fact of being 
the creditor to a large section of the nobility. L. Lucullus, on his Lucullus. 
return from the East, preferred to enjoy his vast wealth in private 
luxury, and only interfered in politics when moved by personal 
resentment, and, so far as he did act, prevented any conciliation of 
Pompey. 

But while the Optimates had no need or wish for a leader, the The 
larger and more divided party of the Populares was helpless without Populares 
one. And as yet there had been no successor to Marius and i^^^^^ 
Cinna. The movement of Lepidus proved abortive. Sertorius 
in Spain had seemed almost like a foreign enemy, and though 
some of the extreme Populares joined him, there was no movement 
in Rome. There was, indeed, one man whose character was only 
beginning to be understood. In the light of after events the Roman 
writers dwelt much on the early career of Caesar ; but it seems Early 
certain that in 63 he was not generally regarded as the head of his c<^^'^^>' of 
party, or likely to be so. Caius Julius Caesar was born in 100 (or ^ 
loi), of one of the most illustrious patrician gentes. He had 
already shown daring and independence. In 83 he married Cornelia, 
daughter of Cinna, and defied Sulla when ordered to divorce her. 
Serving his first campaign under Thermus at Mytilene he had been 
selected to demand from the king of Bithynia the use of his fleet 
(81-80). Returning to Rome after Sulla's death he gained a great 
reputation for eloquence in the prosecution of Cn. Dolabella for 
extortion in Macedonia ij^)^ and of C. Antonius for a like crime in 
Greece (76). On his voyage to Rhodes to study rhetoric he was 
captured and put to ransom by pirates, and revenged himself by 
pursuing and putting them to death ; and while at Rhodes, at the 
beginning of the Mithridatic war (74), he collected troops, crossed 
over to Asia, and repulsed the general of the king. He returned to 
Rome in 'Ji^ and from that time was forward in promoting the Supports 
measures of the popular party. Thus he supported the law of his ^^^ 
uncle Aurelius Cotta for transferring the judicia from the Senate to f^^^Hy'^^ 
the three orders, and the lex Plotia for restoring the exiles of the 
party of Lepidus and Sertorius. In 68 at the funeral of his aunt 
lulia, widow of Marius, he rejoiced the Populares by causing the 
images of Marius to be carried in the procession. But he had not 
yet held office, and his achievement in Asia was probably little known 
or cared for at Rome.^ His friends (as well as some of his enemies) 

^ As an illustration of the indifference at Rome to any but the most striking 
events in the provinces may be quoted the story that Cicero tells of his own 
mortified vanity when landing at Baiae from his quaestorship at Lilybaeum, where 



696 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Quaestor 
in. Spain, 
68. 

Why he 
supported 
the 

Gabiniati 
afid 

Manilian 
laws. 



Caesar s 

risiiifi 

popularity. 



His aedile- 
ship in 6j. 



Wishes to 
go to Egypt. 



might remember Sulla's saying that there were the materials of many 
Mariuses in the young man ; but it was at best as a possible leader 
in the future that he was regarded when, returning from his quaestor- 
ship in farther Spain in 67, he gave his support to Pompey, and 
warmly advocated the Gabinian and Manilian laws.^ All sorts of 
motives were afterwards attributed to him ; he foresaw that he would 
want similar powers himself in the future : he hoped that Pompey 
would crush the powers of the Optimates : he imagined that in 
Pompey's absence he could secure popular favour for himself. Yet 
his motives may have been more simple. He was not ready yet to 
take the lead. He had done nothing to justify a hope of being 
selected out of the ordinary course for high command. He must 
rely at present on the ordinary means of securing favour, and rise 
in the regular course. Meanwhile an important piece of work had 
to be done, and no one was better fitted to do it than Pompey, whose 
political leanings at least were on the popular side, and whose appoint- 
ment would be a hint to the Optimates that family arrangements were 
not always to shelter incompetence. At any rate, if Pompey did 
return at the head of his army as an enemy of any party, it would 
be of that to which Caesar himself was opposed. 

It is from the time of Pompey's departure to the East perhaps 
that we may date Caesar's deliberate designs of securing the first 
place for himself, though it was not till the end of the decade that he 
can be said to have attained his object and gained the undisputed 
leadership. He adopted the usual measures for the purpose. 
Becoming a commissioner for the repair of the Appian Way in 67 
he expended large sums out of his own purse ; as aedile in 65 he 
outshone all his predecessors in the magnificence with which he 
celebrated the games and adorned the public buildings ; and one 
morning the survivors of the Marian veterans were delighted to find 
that during the night the statues of Marius and the representations 
of his Jugurthine and Cimbrian triumphs, removed by Sulla, had 
been restored on the Capitol by his order. But he had now not 
only spent all his private fortune, but was so deeply in debt that 
but for "his hopes" he must have seen nothing but bankruptcy 
before him. Some lucrative office alone could save him. At that 
time there was a burning question in Egypt. The reigning king, 
Ptolemy Auletes, was a miserable debauchee and feeble tyrant, 
whose subjects despised and wished to get rid of him. Crassus 
as censor proposed in the Senate that Egypt should be made tribu- 

he flattered himself that he had made a profound impression, and had done much 
towards securing his future elections, to find that no one knew where he had 
been {Pro Plane. § 65). 
1 See pp. 681, 682. 



XLiii CAESAR TAKES THE LEAD OF THE POPULARES 697 

tary to Rome, having been already, it was believed, left to the Roman 
people by will, and the question of Ptolemy be reserved for considera- 
tion. The Senate rejected the proposal, for the importance of 
Egypt to the corn supply made them jealous of allowing any one to 
go there with imperium ; and when Caesar, as aedile, proposed to 
secure the mission by a plebiscitwn^ the Senate induced a tribune to 
veto the measure, which would have relieved him from debt, and 
have at once made him a formidable rival of Pompey. Baffled in 
this he next year attempted to frighten the Optimates. He was As Index 
appointed in 64 by the praetor to act as index qiiaestio7iis in quaesHonis 
cases of murder, and in that capacity condemned some who had condemns 
killed citizens during Sulla's proscriptions ; and in the following '^^^^^1 
year, getting himself and his cousin nominated in accordance with 
an obsolete law duoviri capitales^ condemned C. Rabirius of per- 6j. 
duellio^ when impeached by the tribune Labienus for murdering Duoviri 
Saturninus. Rabirius appealed to the people, and would have ^«/^^«^"- 
been condemned by them, in spite of Cicero's defence, had not 
the augur and praetor Metellus, opposing one obsolete practice by 
another, pulled down the red flag which by an old custom floated on c. Rab- 
the laniculum during public business. Its lowering was supposed to "''"'•y saved 
indicate the approach of an enemy, and all business was at once stopped. ^^ ^^'^ . 
The attack on Rabirius was not renewed ; but Caesar had effected his tlTflal^ 
object in warning the Optimates that such things were not to be 
done with impunity. Again in the last days of 64 he supported an 
agrarian law of the tribune P. Servilius Rullus, not probably because Caesar 
he thought that such a wide -reaching scheme had a chance of supports the 
passing, but because it sketched a policy.^ To fill Italy with 'y',l"Y" 
prosperous freeholders was the primary object ; but another was to j^ulLs 
stop a source of discontent by buying out those who held under 
Sulla's confiscations and regranting the land to the original owners. 
Cicero successfully opposed the law as he did another, to restore the 
children of those disfranchised by Sulla, on the ground that the safety 
of the State was at present bound up with the Sullan settlement. 

Caesar now had an opportunity of testing the popularity he had Caesar 
acquired. At the end of 64 or beginning of 63 the office of Pontifex against the 
Maximus became vacant. Caesar was a pontifex, but if the election Optunatist 
was to be according to Sulla's law by co-optation, he would have no candidate 
chance. Labienus was therefore again employed to carry a law for pon- 
1 restoring the election to the tribes. Caesar's opponents were ^iA 
I Q. Lutatius Catulus, princeps senatus, and. P. Servilius Isauricus, 
under whom he had served. He staked his all on success, refused 

^ Ten commissioners were to decide what was ager publicus in Italy and 
the provinces ; to sell it ; and with the money make allotments and colonies 
I in Italy. 



ex 
maxiynus, 
6j. 



698 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



L. Set-gius 
Catiline. 



6s. Coss. 
L. Aur- 
clius Cotta, 
L. Man litis 
Torquatus. 



First 

Catiline 

conspiracy 



large offers from Catulus of relief from debt if he would retire, and 
told his mother as he left home on the day of election that he 
would return Pontifex Maximus or an exile. But he was already 
praetor elect, and after his year of office was to go to Spain. There 
at last he would have the chance of commanding troops and showmg 
his capacity for power. 

But there were other members of the party of Populares who were 
not prepared to wait : and the leadership of this section at least 
seemed open to any one who could grasp it. Such a man was found 
in L. Sergius Catiline. An aristocrat by birth, though without mhent- 
ance, he could only hope to satisfy his ambition and desires by the 
profits of office, and could only hope for office from service to one of 
the great parties. Earlier in life he is found in the SuUan party, and 
some of its worst excesses were attributed to him, such as the murder 
of his own brother and that of Gratidianus with torture. Since then 
he was said to have poisoned wife and son to make room for a new 
wife, the rich Aurelia Orestilla, and to have debauched a Vestal 
Virgin. The extreme licence of abuse indulged in by political 
adversaries at Rome must make us cautious of such stories. He 
certainly obtained the praetorship in 68 without difficulty, went 
next year as propraetor to Africa without remark, and returned in 
66 hoping for the consulship. It is now that his definite break with 
the Optimates begins. The consuls elected at the comitia of 66 
were disqualified for bribery, and the Senate (with questionable 
legality) ordered the defeated candidates to enter on the office. 
Soon after the beginning of their year (65), in order to prevent 
Catiline from standing at the next comitia, they instigated 
P. Clodius Pulcher— at that time an Optimatist — to accuse him of 
extortion in Africa. The accusation was so timed as to prevent his 
being a candidate for the consulship : and meanwhile a rumour of a 
plot, in which he was concerned, was spread abroad. It depended 
on the merest gossip, which did not spare even the names of Caesar 
and Crassus. In conjunction with P. Antonius Paetus— one of the 
candidates disqualified for bribery— he is said to have conspired to 
kill the consuls on the ist of January, seize the fasces, and put the 
province of Spain in the hands of a confederate, Cn. Calpurnius Piso. 
The consuls were warned and took precautions, and the murder, 
postponed till the 5 th of Februar>', was at last prevented by Catiline 
giving the signal too soon. This is known as the first Catiline con- 
spiracy. It is enough to observe that no investigation was ever held, 
and that the Senate sent Piso to Spain after all with extraordinary 
powers. 

Catiline's acquittal on the charge of extortion in Africa — in spite 
of Cicero's assertion that it was impossible — cannot be held as a 



XLiii CONSPIRACY OF CATALINE 699 

proof of innocence. But so far from regarding him as outside the 64. 

pale, Cicero wished to conciHate him, and even to be elected with him Cahline 

at the comitia of 64. He undertook also to defend him on another f^^^^ .f!^ 
... - , . - J thecomitia. 

charge brought against him tpis year, the nature of which we do not 

know. But whether the charge was again so timed as to prevent his 6j. Coss. 

profession or whether his evil reputation united all parties against him, ^f- TullUis 

Cicero and C. Antonius were elected for 63, and Catiline was more Y^f*^'. ' 

^ . . Antonius. 

than ever thrown upon the support of the extremists. 

Cicero would have us believe that he was aware from the first The 
day of his consulship, or before it, that a nefarious plot was hatch- schemes of 
ing : that Catiline had collected round him the needy desperadoes ^ ^ ^"^' 
whose bankruptcy could only be warded off by revolution, and had 
promised them offices, plunder, abolition of debts, confiscations, and 
the usual harvest of political disruption. The time was favourable: 
Piso would support them in Spain ; P. Sittius in Africa. There were 
no forces in Italy, and the flower of the army was with Pompey in 
Asia. The first step was for Catiline to get elected consul for 63. 
When that failed, there was still the chance of the next election, 
C. Antonius, one of the consuls, being on their side ; and lastly, 
disturbances were reported in Gaul which might turn to their 
advantage, as well as in Etruria, where the land -holders put 
in by Sulla (who had not prospered), as well as the dispossessed 
heirs, were ready for revolt. 

From the first, whether fully aware of these things or no, Cicero Cicero's 
had seen that it was necessary to buy off the opposition of his fneasures. 
colleague by resigning to him the rich province of Macedonia. 
He then introduced certain reforms, intended to benefit the provinces 
and to prevent violence at home. The abuse of the libera legatio 
was mitigated by a restriction as to lime : banishment was added to 
the existing penalties for bribery at elections ; and the exhibition of 
gladiators forbidden to any candidate within two years of his election, 
except when carrying out the provisions of a will. These measures 
went very little way in stopping the evils from which the needy 
at home and the oppressed abroad were suffering. And as the 
summer wore away rumours of dangerous associations throughout 
Italy became frequent. Catiline was again a candidate for the 
consulship ; and Cicero believed, or affected to believe, that he meant 
with the connivance of Antonius to assassinate him while presiding 6j>. Meet- 
at the election. He therefore got the comitia postponed, and on the iftg of 
2 I St September (the day last fixed for the comitia) asked Catiline in *^^^"^^^^. 
the Senate for an explanation. He had already been threatened with " ^ ' 

an impeachment by Cato, and had retaliated by declaring that, if the 
Optimates lit the flames of civil war, he would quench them by a 
general overthrow. He now disdained to clear himself in answer 



700 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Catiline to Cicero, but avowed amidst the groans of the Senators that he 
loses his proposed to give the larger party in the State what alone it needed 
election. _^ \^2.^^x. 

Cicero declared his own life in danger and came to the comitia 

wearing a cuirass under his toga and surrounded by an armed guard 

Fresh of his supporters. ^ Catiline was again defeated, and then, according to 

rumours of t^g received story, entered upon a deliberate plot for a revolution. 

a plot, 'pj^g consul Antonius was believed to be in favour of the conspirators, 

^J as well as Caesar, praetor-elect, and the actual praetor urbanus, 

P. Cornelius Lentulus. Every movement of persons suspected of 

sympathy had been watched with jealousy. P. Sulla was at Naples : 

he was believed to be concocting plots in the South. P. Sittius, 

who had business connexions with the king of Mauretania and in 

southern Spain, went to Spain leaving orders to sell his property in 

Italy : it was rumoured that he was going as an emissary of the 

conspirators. Other reports spoke of a rising in Picenum, and of 

C.Manlius slaves in Capua and Apulia ; but what alone was certainly known in 

in Etruria Rome was that C. Manlius, an old officer of Sulla, had collected a 

at Fae- number of malcontents and was encamped near Faesulae, where the 

Sullan colonists were in a state of bankruptcy, and had set up his 

standard on the 27th of October, with the intention of marching 

towards Rome. 

The plot Cicero had meanwhile kept a close watch on the doings of Cati- 

betrayedto line and his confederates at Rome, whose plans were betrayed to 

Cicero. him by Fulvia, the mistress of Q. Curius, one of the band. But 

though the Senate had conferred upon the consuls extraordinary 

powers by the usual decree, Cicero does not appear to have got 

Measuresof sufficient information to justify an arrest. When the information 

precaution, ^s to the movement of Manlius was announced in the Senate by 

L. Saenius, who read a letter he had received from Faesulae, 

military preparations were begun ; measures taken to secure Etruria, 

Apulia, Capua, and Picenum ; and rewards offered for information. 

Meeting in Catiline now determined to join the army at Faesulae, and in a meeting 

the house of of his Confederates at the house of M. Porcius Laeca, arranged the 

Laeca^'^^^^ parts to be played by those who remained behind. L. Vargunteius 

jM Nov. ^^<i ^"^ eques named C. Cornelius were to assassinate Cicero at 

his own house ; while the praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus, the senator 

C. Cornelius Cethegus, with Statilius and Gabinius, were to co-operate 

with the invading army by firing the city in several places at once 

and attacking the houses of the leading Optimates. 

Cicero Cicero, informed of everything, secured a guard for his own 

informed 

of it. ^ The day usually named for the comitia is the 28th October. It seems too 

late for what happened afterwards. Some hold that they were as usual in July. 
I assume them to be soon after the meeting of 21st September. 



XLiii THE BARGAIN WITH THE ALLOBROGES 701 

house and strengthened the city watches ; and on the 7th of First 
November denounced Catihne in a fiery speech before the Senate in oration 
the temple of Jupiter Stator, which was surrounded by a number of ^^!^"f^ 
the equestrian order armed. Cowed by the vehemence of the orator -^^ j\^^J 
and by the obvious disfavour of the Senators, who avoided sitting 6j. 
near him, he quitted the house after appeaHng against a hasty and 
unsupported judgment. That same night he left Rome for Marseilles, Catiline 
addressing a letter on the road to the p7'i7iceps sena/us, Q. Catulus, gnits 
*asserting his innocence of everything except an intention to support ^^me.^ 
the poor and oppressed, and asking his protection for his wife. "^ 
Next morning in a speech to the people Cicero explained why he had Second 
allowed Catiline to escape ; promised the citizens protection ; and -^P^'^^^/'- 
warned the remaining conspirators. In a few days it was known ^J'^J-V 
that Catiline had not gone on to Marseilles, but had entered the (Cont/o), 
camp at Faesulae and assumed the ensigns of unperiu7n. ^ 8th Nov. 

The Senate at once declared Catiline and Manlius public enemies ; Catiline 
ordered the consuls to levy troops, — Cicero remaining in Rome, ''''''^ 
Antonius advancing against Catiline,- — ^and offered an amnesty to ^^^"^^'^'^ 
all who would quit the camp. The offer had no effect. Adherents i^^^^f^^ 
were flocking to Faesulae, while tho confederates in Rome were pre- 
paring to carry out their part of the plot, under the praetor Lentulus. 
The conflagrations were to be the care of Statilius and Gabinius ; 
Lentulus was to attack Cicero, Cethegus other leading senators ; 
while the tribune L. Bestia was to persuade the people that Cicero 
had invented the story of a plot in order to drive away their leader. 

Whether these plans were in reality so far matured or no, it 

seems that Cicero, in spite of his spies, had not yet sufficient 

evidence to enable him to act. Perhaps the plot, whatever it was, 

had not been so definitely formulated as Cicero would have us 

believe, or was not so distinctly treasonable and murderous. But 

the confederates now took a step which delivered them into the 

I hands of the vigilant consul, and made it easy for him to ascribe any- 

j thing to them, however nefarious. There were at Rome some envoys 

I from the Allobroges, a tribe between the Rhone and the I sere in the 

j province of Transalpine Gaul. They had come to plead for protection 

1 against the tyranny of the Roman governors and the extortion of 

I Roman money-lenders, to whom their state was deeply indebted. 

1 The Allobroges ever since their conquest in 120 had been a dan- 

I gerous element in the province, and had as yet got no answer from 

\ the Senate. Lentulus commissioned P. Umbrenus to open com- The Catil- 

Imunication with them, offering to secure satisfaction of their claims ^^^''^^^^ 
if their tribe would promise to support the contemplated movement, -,niinicate 
Umbrenus had done business in their country and was known there, -with the 
, The envoys caught at the chance and begged him to exercise his Allobroges. 



702 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 

Allobroges 
promise 
their aid. 



The 

A llobroges 
betray the 
conspiracy. 



Arrest of 
the Allo- 
broges on 
the 

Milvian 
bridge, 
2nd Dec. 

Volturcius 

turns 

informer. 



Cicero 
sutnmons 
the con- 
spirators. 



influence in their behalf. But before entering into a positive engage- 
ment they naturally wished to know whether he was backed by a 
party strong enough to secure the fulfilment of their promises. They 
were accordingly introduced to P. Gabinius — one of the most active 
of the conspirators, — and a list was given them of men actually in 
the plot or known to be in favour of it. But the cunning Gauls 
reflected that they had no proof that the men whose names they 
had heard were really prepared to move, or, if they succeeded, 
would deal any better with their tribe than the party in power. 
It would be a great thing to have their debt wiped out ; but would 
it not be safer to take what they could get by betraying the 
scheme to the consuls ? They soon decided. Their hereditary 
patronus — the descendant probably of their conqueror — was O. 
Fabius Sanga. To him they imparted the whole business, and by 
him Cicero was made aware of what was going on. It was exactly 
what he wanted to complete his case. Once convict the men of 
tampering with these dangerous provincials, and any crime could be 
safely attributed to them. Public sympathy would be diverted from 
them and would support him, at least for a time, in almost any 
measure he might take. He instructed the envoys to feign com- 
pHance, to arrange a speedy departure, and to ask for written 
credentials for their own Senate. Volturcius was to accompany 
them with a letter to Catiline, on whom they were to call on their 
way. They were to start in the night of 2nd December, and Cicero 
arranged with the praetors L, Flaccus and C. Pomptinus to arrest 
them. This was effected on the Milvian bridge, on the via 
Flainima, the great road to the North. The envoys of course 
allowed themselves to be taken quietly. Volturcius at first drew 
his sword and would have defended himself, but the praetors had 
made their dispositions so well, that he soon recognised the futility 
of resistance and surrendered quietly. The whole party being taken 
to Cicero's house, Volturcius — on promise of his life — acknowledged 
that he was the bearer of a letter and a message from Lentulus to 
Catiline, bidding him come as soon as possible to Rome with his 
army, since all was ready for the promised conflagration. The envoys 
deposed that Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius had sworn to fulfil 
their part of the contract, and had given them letters to their Senate ; 
that L. Cassius had commissioned them to send cavalry to Catiline ; 
and that Lentulus had assured them that according to a Sibylline 
oracle three Cornelii were destined to be supreme in Rome — two had 
already been so, Sulla and Cinna ; he was to be the third. 

Exercising his right of summons {vocatio\ Cicero ordered the 
attendance of all the men named. They came without knowing 
of the arrest of the Allobroges, and prepared to maintain their 



XLiii EXAMINATION OF THE CONSPIRATORS 703 

innocence. Cicero now had a case which would not wholly rest 
on the word of foreigners against that of Roman magistrates or 
citizens. He produced the letters to the Allobrogian Senate, asking The letters 
Cethegus, Statilius, and Lentulus to acknowledge their signets. The Produced. 
seals were then broken in their presence and the letters read. But, 
carefully worded, they bore on their face nothing treasonable. They 
merely contained an assurance that the writers would fulfil their 
engagements, and begged the Senate and people of the Allobroges 
to do what the envoys had undertaken in their name. The inno- 
cence or guilt of this depended after all upon the evidence of the 
envoys as to what the bargain referred to was. It might be only 
an undertaking to promote their cause before the Senate ; it might 
be much more. There was still one other letter, — that written by 
Lentulus to Catiline and entrusted to Volturcius. It had no name 
of writer or person addressed, but Lentulus again acknowledged his 
signet. It was vague enough, ^ but Cicero represents Lentulus as Letter of 
greatly agitated, and confessing the truth when confronted with the ^-^ntulus. 
Allobroges. Yet it does not appear that he confessed anything 
beyond the remark about the Sibylline oracle. And when P. 
Gabinius was confronted with them, all Cicero can say is that he 
denied nothing, though until then he had spoken with great assurance. 
The same seems to have been the case with O. Caeparius, who had 
escaped from the city on hearing of the arrest, but had been captured 
and brought back. 

Cicero next summoned a meeting of the Senate in the temple of Meeting of 
Concord. Volturcius was introduced and told his tale, but affirmed i^^^ Senate, 
that he had lately joined and only knew the names of some of the ^ 
conspirators, told him by Gabinius. The Allobroges had nothing f!J^^J^"^\-„ 
to add except the foolish talk of Lentulus about the three Cornelii custody— 
in the Sibylline oracles. The letters were then read, and the Senate P. Lentulus 
committed the five men to the custody of five senators, Lentulus ^ura, L. 
having been first forced to abdicate his praetorship. To persuade ^J^^q^^^^' 
the Senate was perhaps easy. It was necessary to produce the right ini^s, c. 
effect upon the people ; and when the Senate rose on the evening of Cethegus, 
the 3rd, Cicero proceeded to address the people from the rostra, and Q- Cae- 
dwelt at length on the treasonable league with the Allobroges to P^^^"^- 
excite a war beyond the Alps, and on the large store of arms V'^.^'f. 
found at the house of Cethegus. The revulsion of popular feeling ^^^-^J 
encouraged the Consul to proceed on his course. speech 

The 4th December was spent in taking precautions against any {Contio). 
attempt to release the prisoners by violence. The Forum and the 

1 ' ' Who I am you will learn from the bearer. See that you play the man 
and understand fully your present position. Omit no necessary measure ; avail 
yourself of all auxiliaries, even the most humble." 



704 



HISTORY OF ROME 



4th Dec. 
Prepar- 
ations for 
the final 
blow. 

Meeting of 
the Senate, 
^th Dec. 
(>3- 



Caesar s 
speech. 



The only 
safe course 
is to observe 
the laws. 



Fourth 
Catilin- 
arian 
speech [in 
the Senate). 



road up to the Capitol were occupied by armed men, mostly of the 
equestrian order, who volunteered to take the military oath, which 
next morning was required of all citizens. At the next meeting of 
the Senate, on the 5th, Cicero brought the question of the prisoners 
before it. The Senate had no right to sit in judgment on the lives 
of citizens. It was the consul who, in virtue of the special powers 
conferred on him, had for the time the power of life and death. 
But it was a power which rested on no law, and its exercise was at 
least invidious ; Cicero therefore desired to be supported by a resolu- 
tion of the Senate. D. Junius Silanus, as consul -designate, was 
called on first and delivered an opinion in favour of death. ^ In the 
same sense fourteen consulars also gave their voices. The next to 
speak was C. lulius Caesar, as praetor-designate. He warned the 
senators against embarking on a course of illegality, and proposed 
that the prisoners' property should be confiscated and they them- 
selves confined for life in certain municipia : " Their crimes deserved 
the severest punishment ; but when the excitement was over, severity 
beyond the laws would be remembered, the crimes forgotten. He 
suggested no mitigation : in their case death might be regarded 
rather as a release from suffering. If one law were disregarded, 
why not neglect another and have them flogged before execution ? ^ 
The bad character of the men did not make unconstitutional 
measures safer. The thirty tyrants at Athens at first destroyed 
only criminals ; they soon went on to attack the good ; and even 
Sulla had begun by what seemed the righteous condemnation of 
Damasippus. There was no fear of such tyranny with Cicero 
consul, but no one could speak for the future." 

The speech made a strong impression and seemed likely to carry 
the day. After a time Cicero summed up the arguments for the two 
proposals, professing that he was able and willing to carry out either, 
but plainly inclining to the side of severity. Still he failed to do 
away with the effect of Caesar's speech : and when Tib. Nero (grand- 
father of the Emperor Tiberius) suggested as a compromise that a 
final decision should be postponed till Catiline had been cmshed, and 
that then the accused should be tried in the law courts, being kept 
meanwhile in custody, Silanus and many others professed to be con- 
vinced. But M. Porcius Cato (tribune-elect) here interposed, and in 



^ This was to include also L. Cassius, P. Furius, P. Umbrenus, Q. Annius, 
who at present had avoided arrest. A senator named Aulus Fulvius is said to have 
been put to death by his father. 

2 The Valerian and subsequent laws de provocatione would be broken by the 
consul putting the men to death without trial before the people or a popular jury 
representing them. The law which prevented the flogging of a criminal citizen 
before execution was the lex Porcia (see p. 93). 



XLiii DEFEAT AND DEATH OF CATILINE 705 

a fiery speech denounced the conspirators and demanded their 

death. 1 This seems to have settled the matter. When the 

consul put the question, the majority were for death, and he lost The Senate 

no time in acting on the decree. The prisoners were taken to '^''^tc ^^^ 

the Mamertine prison, let down into the dungeon, and strangled. p^^^^Hy^ 

When it was over Cicero made his way through the crowd in the 

Forum exclaiming, "They are dead!" He was encouraged by "Vixe- 

what seemed to him the universal expression of relief, and was ^^"^■' 

greeted by Cato and Catulus as " Father of his country." - It 

was a triumph for the Optimates, but a measure of fatal import The 

for the constitution. The inviolability of a magistrate was set at ''^-f^^^^- 

naught in the person of Lentulus, by means of a forced abdication ; 

the Senate had lent its authority to the consul in breaking the law 

and usurping the functions of the courts.^ The time was soon to 

come when hundreds of these Optimates, and Cicero himself, were to 

reap as they had sown and perish by the sword which they had drawn. 

Catiline recognised it as reducing him to desperation. He had Death of 
a force of about 20,000 men at Faesulae, though imperfectly armed, Catiline, 
and early in 62 attempted to make his way into Gaul. But Metellus 
Celer with three legions barred the direct road at Bononia, and C. 
Antonius was advancing against him with another army from the 
south. At Pistoria he turned to bay. Unable to get food for Desperate 
his men, he resolved to give Antonius battle, and, if he won, to ^^^/^^ «^'^^ 
push on to join the Allobroges. He took post in the centre of ^/^^^^^^ 
his line close by the eagle, once belonging to Marius and regarded ^2. 
by him with superstitious reverence, and prepared his men in a bold 
speech for victory or death. Antony was, or feigned to be, ill with 
gout, and the Roman army was commanded by his legate M. 
Petreius. The rebels fought desperately. Their centre was driven 
in by the praetorian cohort ; but the rest fell where they were posted, 
and the dead bodies were found with all their wounds in front. 
Catiline himself, when he saw all was lost, rushed into the thickest 
of the enemy and fell fighting fiercely to the last. 

Cicero had soon reason to know, though obstinately blind to Cicero's 

the fact, that he had estranged friends and increased his enemies. ^^^ °f 

tnjluence. 

1 Cicero was indignant with Brutus, who wrote a history of the affair, for 
representing the vote as being given between Caesar and Cato. Technically, it 
seems, the two motions before the house were those of Silanus and Caesar. Still, as 
Cato's speech decided the vote, it was loosely said that the Senate in Catonis 
sententiam disccssit {'^^Wwsi, Cat. 55; Cic. ad Att. xii. 21). 

^ The title /a/6V- ox parens patriae, given by the Senate to the emperors, is not 
to be confounded with this compliment. It is applied by Livy to Romulus (i. 16) 
and to Camillus (v. 49) ; and had been given to Julius (Cic. 13 Phil. § 23). 

^ The execution was the consul's own absolute act ; though he chose to support 
himself by the auctoritas of the Senate. 

2 Z 



7o6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



62. Coss. 
D. Lunius 
Silanus, 
L. Licinius 
Muraena. 



Continuous 
rise of 
Caesar. 

Caesar 
praetor 
urbanus, 
62. 



Cato and 
Meiellus. 



Caesar 
defeats the 
Senate. 



Futile 
attempt to 
co)inect 
Caesar 
with 

Catiline s 
conspiracy, 
62. 



The tribune Q. Caecilius Metellus, a legate of Pompey, and supposed 
to represent his views, prevented him from making the usual speech 
on laying down his consulship on the 31st of December ; and he had 
to console himself with the cheer which greeted his loud declaration, 
when the oath was tendered to him, that he had " saved the republic." 
Yet his feverish anxiety for expressions of approval showed an un- 
easy sense of his equivocal position. 

The real gainer was Caesar, whose election as pontifex maximus 
was promoted by the popularity of his action in regard to the con- 
spirators. ^ From this time he steadily comes to the front in spite 
of rumours (on which Cicero never ventured to act) that he and 
Crassus were privy to the plot of Catiline. The year of his praetor- 
ship (62) was not marked by striking events, yet he showed 
sufficiently in it that he meant to defy the Optimates. On the first 
day of it he attempted, though without success, to oust Q. Catulus 
from the commission for repairing the Capitol, and fixed a slight upon 
him by not calling on him to speak first when presiding in the 
Senate ; and he afterwards supported the tribune Caecilius Metellus 
when he proposed to recall Pompey to protect citizens from illegal 
punishment. To this vote of censure on the proceedings of the 
previous year the Optimates offered strenuous resistance. Cato 
vetoed the law, was driven from the Forum, and returned with 
numbers of armed Optimates. It was then the turn of Metellus to 
fly. He made his way to Pompey' s camp, who had lately come to 
Italy. The Senate declared him deposed from his tribuneship (per- 
haps on the ground of his absence from Rome), and suspended 
Caesar also from his praetorial functions. He, however, continued to 
preside in his court, till the Senate sent armed officers to drag him 
from his seat. He then dismissed his lictors, threw off his toga 
praetexta, and retired to his house. But to have thus drawn the 
Senate into an illegal position was a real triumph. His house 
was visited by such crowds, and the popular feeling was shown so 
threateningly, that two days afterwards the Senate rescinded its 
decree and offered him an apology. But this was not the last attack 
by the Optimates. L. Vettius was set on to accuse him before the 
quaestor Novius of having been an accomplice of Catiline, and O. 
Curius to denounce him in the Senate on the same ground, promising 
to produce an autograph letter of his to Catiline. In his defence 
Caesar appealed to Cicero to testify that he had volunteered infor- 
mation ; and he succeeded in preventing the reward for informa- 
tion being paid to Curius : while Vettius was nearly torn to pieces in 

^ Both Plutarch (Caes. 7) and Dio (xxxvii. 37) imply this. It has been 
generally stated that Caesar was elected on the previous 6th of March, on the 
authority of Ovid [Fast. iii. 415-428). But Ovid is referring to Augustus. 



XLiii CAESAR PROPRAETOR IN SPAIN 707 

the Forum, and was thrown into prison, as was Novius also, for hearing 
a charge against a magistrate of higher rank than himself ^ 

At the end of his praetorship Caesar went to his province of Caesar in 
farther Spain. He was so, deeply in debt^ — wanting (he said) Spaifi, 61. 
250,000,000 sesterces to be worth nothing — that his creditors would 
have retained him, had not Crassus interposed as security for a large 
sum. Even so he was later than usual in starting, and to the satis- 
faction of the Senate had to stay some months longer than usual in 
the next year. In Spain he was principally occupied with military 
operations in Lusitania and Gallaecia, which were in a state of semi- 
rebellion, though he had also an opportunity of showing his skill as 
a statesman in legislation at Cades. For the first time he was able 
to send home reports of battles won and towns taken, as well as to 
pay large sums into the treasury. He was probably not much more 
scrupulous than others in regard to enriching himself; and at any 
rate after the Spanish government we hear little more of financial 
embarrassment. His achievements in Spain had been honoured by 
a supplicatio^ and it was understood that on his return he should be 
allowed a triumph. He however arrived at the gates of the city Returns to 
somewhat late in the summer (60), not long before it was necessary ^^'«^ ^^^^ 
for him to make his professio as a candidate for the consulship. J^^^^^^z- 
Custom, if not law, made it necessary for that to be done in person ; (^q 
yet he could not enter the city without forfeiting his triumph, the 
preparations for which could not be completed in time. He applied 
to the Senate for a relaxation of the rule requiring a personal jZ^rt*- 
fcssio. A lex Cornelia in 70 {ne legibiis solverentiir) required such a 
suspension of a law to be passed in a Senate of not less than 200 
members and afterwards to be ratified by the people. The Optimates 
saw a way of mortifying Caesar, and Cato talked the proposition out. 
Caesar had therefore to decide between his triumph and his election. Caesar 
He at once entered the city, made the declaration as required, seven- abaiidons 
teen days before the election, and was returned with M. Bibulus, who /^^ ^^^"' 
had undertaken to find the money, which now almost as a matter trhattph. 
of course was distributed among the tribes. 

But the animus shown by the Optimates in the Senate proved the S9- 
necessity of strengthening his position. If he was to be upon a level ^^^^^^'s 
with Pompey, he must, like him, have a lengthened term of imperium, 
and in a province where he might have a chance of distinction. In 

1 Caesar's complicity in the plot has always been a moot point. Rumour 
connected both his name and that of Crassus with it, and Mommsen regards it as 
certain that they were both implicated. The ancient authorities do not counte- 
nance it, with the doubtful exception of Suetonius (17). According to Sallust (49) 
Catulus and Piso vainly urged Cicero to include Caesar's name. Cicero nowhere 
implicates him, as surely he would have done in after times if he had had grounds. 



objects. 



7o8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Situation 
of Pompey 
on his 
return, 
6i-sg. 



The Senate 
hesitate to 
conjirtn his 
acta. 



The case of 
P. Clodius 
Pule her, 
62-61. 



Spain it was said that, coming across some likeness of Alexander the 
Great, he had sighed to think that he had achieved so little, 
though past the age at which Alexander had conquered the world. 
Gaul seemed the province now most likely to give him the oppor- 
tunity. But to secure it for a sufficient time and with a free enough 
hand he must get the support of Pompey : and he now found Pompey 
willing to help him to his objects in order to secure his own. 

Pompey's return had been looked forward to with anxiety in 
many quarters. Cicero hoped for his approval, while Crassus 
affected fear and removed his family from Rome. The Populares 
expected his support both against the illegal measures of the Optimates 
and in the better government of the provinces. C. Antonius, for 
instance, in Macedonia (62) had been both oppressive and flagrantly 
unsuccessful against the surrounding barbarians, and Pompey was 
said to have declared that he must be recalled. But the Optimates 
generally were suspicious and unfriendly. We have seen how they 
slighted his request for a postponement of the comitia. That might 
be defended on good grounds. But to his main object — that of 
having his acta in the East confirmed— ^he found also unexpected and 
annoying opposition. It touched his honour and pride nearly that 
the awards made by him after his victories in the new provinces and 
surrounding states should be formally ratified. The opposition 
in the Senate was led by L. Lucullus and his brother. Lucullus 
naturally resented the fact that Pompey was reaping the fruits of his 
own labour, and he plausibly opposed the demand of Pompey that 
the acta should be approved en bloc : it was pledging the senators to 
they knew not what ; each item should be debated and passed by 
itself At the best, however, this would take much time, and Pompey 
failed to hasten it. He found himself disliked by the Optimates and 
yet not well received by the Populares. " His first speech," says 
Cicero, " did not gratify the poor, was unsatisfactory to the revolu- 
tionary party, unacceptable to the rich, and regarded as unsound by 
the conservatives; and so fell very flat.''^ He could not therefore 
overcome the opposition in the Senate by any manifestation of popu- 
larity, in spite of his splendid triumph (28th September 61), and 
the acclamations of the people hailing him as " Magnus." Nor did 
his conduct in the two chief party contests in the interval gain him 
the allegiance of any party in the state. 

The first of these was caused by the silly freak of the dissolute 
P. Clodius. He was discovered in woman's dress in the house of 
Caesar, whose wife Pompeia (a grand-daughter of Sulla) was entertain- 
ing the ladies engaged in celebrating the mysteries of the Bona Dea, 



1 Cicero ad Att, i, 14, 



xLiii THE TRIAL OF CLODIUS 709 

from which males were strictly excluded. It was assumed that he 
was intriguing with Pompeia, although Caesar declared that he had 
no reason to think s6, but divorced her on the ground that his wife 
must be above suspicion. Shocking as this senseless escapade was 
to religious feeling, its consequences were altogether out of proportion 
to Its importance. It was made the occasion of a violent party con- 
flict. The bill for his impeachment contained a special clause as 
to the selection of the jury by the praetor urbanus. It was proposed 
under the direction of the Senate by the consul Piso, who however 
was opposed to it and spoke against it. The Populares looked upon 
this as a device for tampering with the jury system : Clodius became 
a popular hero, and the question of his trial a test of strength be- 
tween the two great parties. Pompey was called upon to express 6t. Coss. 
his opinion in a co?itio at the instance of the tribune Fusius, and ^^^- ^^/" 
also in the Senate in answer to the consul Messala. In both 'cases ^"''* ^• 
he spoke vaguely of his deference to the Senate, but was outbidden Me'^^l'a 
in that point by Crassus, while he yet said enough to annoy Piso 
and the Populares, who eventually triumphed. The comitia was 
broken up by bands of ruffians or mechanics {operae) ; a new bill 
had to be passed without the obnoxious clause ; and Clodius, by 
means of exercising his right of challenge, secured a jury in which 
a majority was easily purchased ;i and a subsequent proposal in the 
Senate for an investigation was resented by the equestrian order and 
vetoed by a tribune. The only importance of the whole foolish 
business was the light thrown on the defects of the jury system, 
and the lengths to which party feeling would go. Secondary con- 
sequences were that Cicero made a vindictive enemy of Clodius by 
testifying to having seen him in Rome on the day of the alleged im- 
piety, on which he affirmed that he was at Interamna ; and secondly, 
that Pompey had again failed to please any party. 

The next burning question was the controversy between the The case 
Senate and the equestrian order. Cicero made it one of the chief <"/ ^^^ 
points of his policy to promote harmony between the two. Their ^"'^^^'^f"^' 
interests were, he contended, closely allied. The equites would be ^';^''''' 
the chief suffbrers by the triumph of the extremists. A wiping out 
of debts— «^7w tabi(/ae--^2is a bugbear always before the eyes of 
rich men, and in some form or other supposed to be always in 

^ The Jury pretended to be alarmed and asked for a guard. After the 
verdict Catulus said sarcastically that he supposed they wanted it to protect 
their money. Clodius, however, was believed to have succeeded in a double 
rascality, by intercepting the promised bribe; thus, as Cicero sardonically 
remarked, after all keeping the law which punished those y^ho paid bribes The 
lively and graphic letters of Cicero {ad Att. i. 14, 16), describing the scenes in 
the Senate, contio, and court should be read. Curio divided the Senate on the 
question of having a special rogatio at all, but lost by 15 to 400. 



7IO 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



60. Coss. L 

Afranius, 

Q. Cae- 

cilius 

Metellus 

Celer. 



Fir si {in- 
formal) 
triumvir- 
ate. 



the popular programme; while allotments of land ^"^ the supply 
of free corn at the public cost must eventually be made at the ex- 
pense of the rich. Therefore they should hold together ; they were 
alike bonij they were equally interested in the mamtenance of the 
constitution. This harmony was now endangered by what the equites 
chose to consider a hardship. In the eager competition for state 
contracts the publicani had bought the taxes of Asia at a price 
which, owing to a too sanguine estimate, or a bad season, threatened 
them with bankruptcy. They applied to the Senate in whose hands 
such matters lay, for some abatement. It was an indefensible claim, 
and Cicero spoke of it as disgraceful.i Yet he was for going even 
this length to propitiate the rich middle class. Cato however was 
uncompromising,-" living," Cicero said, " ni a republic of Plato 
-and carried the majority of the Senate with him - The breach 
between the orders grew worse and worse; and Pompey did not 
avail himself of the opportunity to get credit by healing^ it, or by 
lending his support to either side. He held aloof altogether, think- 
ing only of the confirmation of his acta and the satisfaction of his 
veterans He hoped to secure these by getting his adherent Afranius 
elected consul for 60. But Afranius proved a failure and had no 
influence Therefore when Caesar returned from Spain he found 
Pompey as far from his object as ever ; and, though enjoying im- 
mense prestige, without a party strong enough to carry his measures. 
Both had now reasons for discontent with the Senate, and a 
motive for combination. Caesar could give Pompey what he lacked, 
the cordial support of the Populares ; and together they might check- 
mate the Optimates and Cicero by adopting the latter s pohcy of 
conciliating the equites. Shortly before Caesai-'s election therefore 
the proposal of co-operation seems to have been made. Caesar, 
however, could not afford to forfeit the support of the wealthy 
Crassus, and his first step was to reconcile him with Pompey 
Thus was formed what has been called the First Triumvirate. It 
was not, like the triumvirate of 43, a legally established commis- 
sion ; it was rather on the precedent of the informal agreement of 
Marius, Saturninus, and C. Servilius Glaucia in 90, to secure the 
administration in the hands of friends. Caesar went to the comitia 

1 Invidiosa res, turpis postidatio, et confessio temeritatis {adAtt. i. ^7)- 

2 We do not know Chat they had to say for themselves. The great capitalist 
Crassus supported them, but he may have been an interested P^;; X- ^^^5° ^ 
policy was the most barefaced expediency. -the equites must be ^^^^^^^^^ed^ Just 
as after the trial of Clodius he opposed an mvestigation because the equites 
regarded it as a slight upon themselves. The only thmg that seems Posj.ble to 
be urged in favour%f the abatement is that it would perhaps have saved the 
provincials themselves some extra suffering and pressure ; but that nobody 
thought of. 



XLiii CAESAR'S CONSULSHIP 711 

walking between Pompey and Crassus ; and all the Optimates could 
do was to secure the return of M. Bibulus as his colleague, who was 
devoted to their interests. 

It was now the turn of . the Populares. Pompey was gratified by S9- Coss.C. 
the confirmation of his acta, and his veterans obtained allotments of ^"^^"^ 
lands under an agrarian law dealing with all the ager publicus in ^"f T' ^^' 
Italy. The Stellatian plain and other lands in Campania were divided 

among 20,000 citizens who had three or more children; a colonv ^^^^^^ ^ 
,, -. , . , . ^^i^^iiy measures. 

was settled at Capua ; the equestrian order was conciliated by an 
abatement of a third from contracts for the revenues of Asia ; and 
the urban populace by fresh bills for distribution of corn. These 
measures were not carried without some violence. Pompey, who 
had now married Caesar's daughter Julia, appeared at the head of an 
armed force in the Campus, nominally to keep order, really to over- 
awe the voters ; and when Cato persisted in a vehement opposition 
in the Senate Caesar ordered his lictors to drag him to prison. This 
was, however, going too far. Cato was respected, if not followed ; 
and one of the tribunes, on a hint from Caesar, released him. His 
colleague Bibulus tried in vain to vitiate Caesar's agrarian law by 
sending him notice that he was watching the sky {se servare de caeld). 
Finding his interposition neglected he retired to his house and con- 
tented himself with issuing edicts, much admired as specimens of 
style, but wholly disregarded. The wits declared that the acts of 
the year were done in the year of lulius and Caesar, — Bibulus did 
not count. ^ While thus carrying reforms at home, however, Caesar lexIuUadc 
was not unmindful of the still more crying claims of the provinces, repetundis. 
Among his measures was a new law de repetundis, under which the 
whole of the retinue of a governor was made responsible for ex- 
tortion. Restitution was to be made to four times the value, and a 
conviction was to disable a man from bequeathing his property 
iititestabilis), and in certain cases was to involve perpetual exile. 
The Senate was studiously ignored : and not consulted as to the 
legislation which the consul brought before the people. 

The next step was to secure a lengthened imperium and a The 
province with chances of distinction. The Senate had allotted P^'ovince 
" Italy" as the province for the consuls of 59. But Caesar did not -^^^ Caesar. 
mean to be content with that. The tribune P. Vatinius, who had 
been his most forward partisan throughout the year, brought in a 
rogatio conferring on Caesar the government of Illyricum and Cis- 
alpine Gaul for five years. This was in itself (though perfectly legal) lex 
an invasion of a department which had always been left to the Senate. Vatinia. 
But ^he Senate, accepting the inevitable with apparent good grace, 

^ Non Bibulo quicquam nuper sed Caesare factum est ; 
Nam Bibulo Jieri consule ?iil viemini (Suet. lulius, 20). 



712 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Measures 
of security 
during 
Caesar s 
absence. 

^8. Coss. L. 
Calpurnius 
Piso, A. 

Gabinius. 



Cicero to be 
removed. 



P. Clodius 
becomes 
tribune 
fors8. 



even added to this already large province that of Transalpine Gaul. 
Their motive however was not, it seems, a desire to promote Caesar's 
honour. The Cisalpine province presented no special difficulty or 
cause for alarm, although Caesar was known to be in favour of giving 
the citizenship to the Transpadani : but rumours of dangerous move- 
ments in Transalpine Gaul had for some time been rife ; and only 
in 6 1 a rebellion of the Allobroges had been crushed by the praetor 
Gnaeus Pontinus at Solonium. No doubt some man of energy was 
needed there ; but the Senate caught at the chance of removing 
Caesar to a distance, where there was also a possibility of his meet- 
ing with disaster. His sphere would be in strictness the Roman 
'province' or Narbonensis; but any expedition or extension demanded 
by the safety of the province would be in his hands. 

Caesar, moreover, would not be cut off from Roman politics as 
completely as Pompey had been during his Eastern command. 
Spending the winters at Lucca or Ravenna or some other place in 
Cisalpine Gaul, he could easily be visited by his partisans, and be kept 
in touch with home affairs. But still it was necessary to keep the 
administration in the hands of friends. For 58 therefore the consul- 
ship was secured for his father-in-law L. Calpurnius Piso Caesonius and 
for Pompey's legate and partisan A. Gabinius. C. Cato, the tribune 
of 56, tried to prevent Gabinius from entering upon his office by laying 
a charge of bribery against him ; but the praetors avoided hearing the 
case ; and Cato himself was nearly murdered by the mob. He had 
to content himself with speaking of Pompey as a " private dictator." 
Farther, they judged it necessary to remove Cicero from Rome at 
least for a time. His opposition to the policy of the triumvirs was 
well known. It had even been possible to connect his name with a 
plot, in conjunction with C. Curio, L. Lucullus and others, to murder 
Caesar and Pompey ; and though the informer Vettius — who had 
previously denounced Caesar in the affair of Catiline — contradicted 
himself so outrageously that he was no more worthy of credit than 
Titus Gates, and was eventually found strangled in prison, there 
perhaps remained some uneasiness in their minds. 

There was one obvious way of getting rid of him. P. Clodius, 
after his acquittal on the charge of impiety, had gone as quaestor 
to Sicily (60), and had returned in the following year intending to 
stand for the aedileship. But though it was impossible to regard 
him as a serious politician, he seems now to have taken up the 
side of the extremists among the Populares, and to have had a definite 
scheme of legislation ; and, above all, to have determined to revenge 
himself upon Cicero for giving evidence against him. This ven- 
geance could be conveniently joined with the rest of his extremist 
politics ; and in order to effectually carry out both purposes, the 



XLiii CLODIUS BECOMES A TRIBUNE 713 

tribuneship would be better than any other office. To become a 
tribune, however, he would have to become a member of a plebeian 
gens. As he was not i7i 7?ia?tti patris he could only be adopted by 
a process called adrogatio in the old coviitia ciiriata^ and with the 
sanction of the college of pontifices. To hold the couiitia ciiriata 
also certain religious rites had to be observed requiring the presence 
of an augur. But with Caesar pontifex maximus, and Pompey a 
member of the college of augurs, this would not be difficult, supposing 
them to be willing. They thus had to their hand an instrument 
for getting rid of Cicero. 

Clodius made no secret of the fact that his motive in seeking Clodius 
such an adoption was to qualify for the tribuneship and then to ^"'^ ^^^ 
attack Cicero. For some time Caesar and Pompey apparently ^l-T^^' 
hesitated to gratify him. But when Cicero disgraced himself by 
defending C. Antonius on a charge of majostas for his failures and 
extortions iil Macedonia, in the course of his speech he made some 
allusion to the political situation, which was reported in exaggerated 
terms (he says) to Caesar and Pompey. Within three hours the 
adoption of Clodius into a plebeian gens was accomplished, Pompey 
himself presiding. Still Caesar (who had a sincere liking and 
admiration for him) endeavoured to induce Cicero to leave Rome in 
some honourable way, — as his own legatus in (laul, — as a member 
of the land commission under his new agrarian law, — or at least on a 
tour with a libera legatio. But Cicero declined all such friendly 
offers. For some time he seems to have hardly credited the inten- 
tion of Clodius to attack him, and believed that he aimed at a 
mission to Tigranes of Armenia, or a seat on the land commission ; 
and when he could no longer shut his eyes to the truth, he buoyed 
himself up with the belief that his own services had been so extra- 
ordinary that his safety would be the care of every respectable citizen. 
Pompey also seems to have assured him that he would be protected. 
He determined to stay and fight Clodius at home. 

On the loth of December 59 Clodius entered upon his tribune- 
ship ; and at the end of the year Ceasar left Rome to enrol his 
legions and make his preparations for Gaul, but for some weeks 
was outside the city. Clodius showed his animus at once by pre- P. Clodius 
venting Bibulus from speaking when fonnally abdicating his consul- P^kher 
ship on the 31st DecemlDer, and soon afterwards produced his project ^' '' 
of legislation. The first item was as usual a more liberal distribution cn-iotli 
of corn. This was only what others had done. The three next items Dec jS. 
had more important consequences. The first related to the auspices, //is 
By the lex Aclia (160) a magistrate was prohibited from continuing popular 
any public business if another magistrate gave notice that the omens '''^"^''''^■'^• 
were bad or that he was "watching the sky." This was called 



714 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The obmin- 
tiatio. 



Collegia 
opificum. 



The 

censors. 



Pi so and 
Gabinins 
sent to 
Cilicia and 
Syria. 

Cyprus 
annexed to 
Cilicia. 



Banish- 
ment of 
Cicero, 
March jS. 



obniiutiatio., and was used as a means of hindering legislation or 
elections obnoxious to either party. Bibulus had employed the right 
in the case of Clodius' own adoption, though his interference had 
been disregarded. Clodius now abolished the clause in the lex Aelia 
by forbidding such obniintiatio?tes, at least in legislative comitia. The 
next law also requires a few words of explanation. From very early 
times (traditionally in the reign of Numa) guilds {sodalitatcs or collegia) 
of various craftsmen had existed at Rome, each with its own objects 
of worship and trade rules. But in course of time there had grown 
up certain other collegia sodalicia., — whether developed from them 
or entirely independent it is difficult to say, — whose object was to 
influence elections and legislation. This object was often effected by 
violent means, the collegia forming the nucleus of riots, and furnish- 
ing those gangs of workmen {operac) of which we hear so much in 
the next few years. These collegia had been declared illegal by a 
senatus-consult in 64 : they were now legalised afresh. ^ The third 
important Clodian law regarded the censors. Since the severe 
measures of the censors of 70, by which several of the Populares as 
well as the Optimates had suffered, the office had been almost in 
abeyance. Clodius now deprived them of the power of striking off 
names from the Senate except after a formal trial before both. 

These laws were of course odious to the Optimates. His foreign 
policy was equally objectionable to them. He carried a bill assign- 
ing Cilicia and Syria to the consuls Piso and Gabinius respectively, 
thus putting the East for the time in the hands of his party ; and 
another to depose Ptolemy, king of Cyprus, — once called friend of 
the Roman people, — on the pretext of abetting the pirates, and to 
send Cato to confiscate the king's treasures. Ptolemy killed him- 
self; but Clodius effected the double object of getting rid of Cato for 
a time on an invidious and disgraceful service and of filling the 
treasury, exhausted by his corn distribution and his remission of a 
fifth of the vectigalia. But his greatest stroke was to secure Cicero's 
fall. Early in 58 he brought in a bill rendering liable to prosecution 
all magistrates who had put citizens to death without trial. As soon 
as it was passed he appears to have given notice of his action {dicni 
dixit). The confidence which Cicero had expressed in the support 
he would find throughout all Italy, in the pledges of Pompey and 
Caesar, in the good disposition of the praetors and of the majority 
of the tribunes, proved at once illusory,^ Caesar, who was outside 



^ They disappeared under the Empire, only those guilds being licensed which 
could prove their antiquity (Suet. Aug. 32). The illegitimate collegia came to be 
regarded as dangerous everywhere, almost like the " secret societies" of our time. 

^ This confidence is expressed in a remarkable way in a passage beginning, 
" Si diem nobis Clodius dixit : tola Italia concurret " ... written to his brother 



XLiii EXILE OF CICERO 715 

the walls, would do nothing. Pompey retired to his Alban villa and 
refused to see Cicero when he came there. One consul, Gabinius, 
repulsed him rudely ; the other, Piso, was more courteous but ad- 
vised him to yield to the storm and retire for a time. By a merciful 
custom voluntary exile saved a man from condemnation. Cicero's 
thoughts seem at first to have turned to suicide ; but from this he 
was diverted by his friend Atticus, and early in April he left Rome 
for South Italy, intending it seems to go to Sicily. At Vibo (Hip- 
ponium) in Lucania he heard that Clodius had taken the step always 
possible in regard to a voluntary exile. He had carried a rogatio 
declaring him a public enemy, confiscating his property, and pro- 
hibiting him from " fire and water " within 400 miles of Rome. The 
Senate indeed had protested, and a majority had put on signs of 
mourning, but it could not prevent or counteract a law. Clodius 
proceeded to pull down Cicero's town house on the Palatine, to 
declare its site dedicated to Liberty, and to dismantle his Tusculan 
and Formian villas. 

Meanwhile, having received notice from the praetor in Sicily, Cicero at 
P. Verginius, that he would not be allowed to come there, Cicero Thessal- 
arrived at Brundisium on the i6th of April, and on the ist of May ^"^« '^""' 
crossed to Epirus and travelled along the Egnatian road to Thessal- chiujn, sS. 
onica, where he remained till November ; and then returned to 
Dyrrachium in expectation of the recall which he felt sure would 
come with the new magistrates of 57, and from the differences which 
had arisen between Clodius and Pompey. 

For Clodius, growing insolent from success, had irritated and Clodii/s 
insulted Pompey, with the secret support it seems of Crassus, with q^*ayrels 
whom Pompey was never on cordial terms. He secured the reversal „' 
of some of his measures ; prosecuted some of his friends ; connived at 
the escape of Tigranes, son of the Armenian monarch, whom Pompey 
had kept as a hostage ; and openly ridiculed and denounced him. 
His riotous partisans almost murdered Q. Cicero, the orator's brother ; 
and treated Pompey himself with such violence in the Forum, that he 
retired to his house, refused to appear any more in the Forum while 
Clodius was tribune, and resolved to secure the recall of Cicero. 

Clodius ceased to be tribune on the loth of December, and of 57- Coss. 
the consuls who came into office on the ist of January following (57), ^^''^'^t'/^/^j 
Lentulus was a close friend of Caesar's ; and Metellus, who had been ^pinther 
a legate of Pompey's, was the tribune of 62 who prevented Cicero q, Cae- 
making the usual speech on laying down his consulship. But Len- cilius 
tulus, who from this time sided with the Optimates, on the ist of -^/ff<^^^"^ 
January declared in the Senate that he would not oppose the recall ^ ^^^^' 

after the elections for 58. It is too long to quote, but it is worth reading as show- 
ing how far Cicero was blinded [Ad (J. Fr. i. 2, 9). 



7i6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Milo fights 
Clodius 
with his 
own 
■weapons. 



Poinpey 
appoiyitcd 
praefectus 
annofiae 
forjivc 
years, sj- 

J 6. Coss. 

Cn. 

Cornelius 

Ixntulus, 

L. Mar- 

cius 

Philippus. 



of Cicero ; and his colleague Metellus seems to have joined in the 
same assurance, purely, it seems, out of deference to Pompey. But 
it was many months before the measure was carried. Two of the 
new tribunes were found to hinder the resolution of the Senate 
being passed, directing the consul to bring in a law, till the 25th of 
January. But even then, Clodius contrived to prevent the consul 
carrying out the Senate's order. His law as to the collegia had 
secured him the services of bands of workmen {operae\ and he con- 
tinually interrupted by violence the comitia summoned to pass the 
law. The Optimates opposed him with equal violence. One of the 
tribunes, P. Annius Milo, collected similar bands, or hired gladiators, 
with whom he attacked the bands of Clodius, and retaliated by pre- 
venting the comitia at which he was a candidate for the aedileship. 
The city was constantly a scene of fierce violence. It was not till 
the 5th of September that Lentulus was able to bring his law before 
the comitia centuriata and get it passed. Cicero at once returned. 
But though Clodius could not prevent that, he could make life 
dangerous to him by attacks of his mob, and by burning his brother 
Quintus' house ; while he vehemently opposed the rebuilding of 
Cicero's own house on the Palatine, and the vote of money for the 
restoration of his villas. 

Cicero returned professing gratitude to Pompey, and bent on his 
old policy of detaching hini from Caesar and attaching him to the 
Senate. Of Caesar he spoke as bitterly as he dare. " He would not 
call him an enemy," he said, "but he was aware that he had allowed 
others to call him so without a word of contradiction." ^ In 
pursuance of this policy, he proposed immediately after his return 
that, in view of an alarming scarcity and dearness of corn, Pompey 
should be appointed pracfcctiis aiwonae for five years, with ships and 
legates, and authority over all ports, agricultural operations, and corn 
markets throughout the Empire. Though this removed Pompey for 
a short time from Rome, it gave him a standing and prestige which 
might keep him on equal terms with Caesar. }Ie went to Sicily, and 
succeeded in promoting the supply of corn and bringing down the 
price. But on his return at the beginning of 56, instead of the 
popularity he expected, he found himself constantly attacked by 
Clodius,— now aedile, and therefore safe from impeachment,^ — and 
an object of jealousy to the Optimates in the Senate. He attributed 
much of this to the persistent enmity of Crassus, and for a brief 
time a rupture in the triumvirate seemed imminent. His thoughts 
turned again to the East. If he could get the commission to restore 
Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, he might occupy again a 



^ Post reditu7n in Sen. § 



32. 



XLiii POMPEY GOES TO LUCCA 717 

position in the East counterbalancing that of Caesar in the West. 
But the jealousy of the Senate prevented this, or in fact any appoint- 
ment. ^ A Sibylline oracle was produced forbidding Ptolemy's restora- 
tion by force : and, finding himself the object of aversion to the 
Clodian and Optimate extremists alike, Pompey was compelled to 
accept the invitation of Caesar to a conference at Lucca, whither 
Crassus had already gone, in order to settle anew the questions that 
had arisen since Caesar had left Rome. 

Thus Cicero's hope of detaching Pompey from Caesar was Renewal 
frustrated, and the complete agreement between the three was out- ^f ^J^^ . 
wardly renewed. Events indeed presently showed its hollowness ; a^eement 
freed Pompey from his double bondage ; and placed him in a position at Lucca, 
in which complete control of the state seemed to be in his hands. April s 6. 
Had he grasped it with vigour, — had he seen, as his rival did, that 
the hour of the old constitutional regime and its hypocrisies had 
come, the fate of the Republic might have been changed. 

1 Cicero, adQ. Fr. ii. 16 ; Plutarch, Pomp. 49 ; Dio Cass. 39, 21-16. Ptolemy 
had assisted Pompey in the Jewish war in 63 ; had been declared a ' ' friend and 
ally" in 59 (Caes. B. Civ. iii. 107), and had on his expulsion from Alexandria 
come to Rome to ask assistance (57). See p. 696. A tribune named Caninius 
promulgated a rogatio for commissioning Pompey without an army to go to 
Alexandria and attempt a reconciliation between Ptolemy and his subjects, but it 
fell through. He was finally restored by Gabinius in 55 (Cic. 2 Phil. § 48). He 
was the father of Cleopatra, and died in 51. 

Authorities. — The best are the letters and speeches of Cicero himself. If 
the letters are read in chronological order, they will be found of extraordinary in- 
terest. There are, however, only eleven before 63, none unfortunately in that 
year (the consulship), but a great number from 62 to 56. The speeches most 
useful for this period are the two Contra Rulliim ; those after his return — in Senatu, 
ad Qui rites, de Dome sua, de Ilaruspicum rcsponso ; pro Sestio, in P. Vatinium, de 
Provinciis Consularibus. For the Catiline conspiracy Cicero's four speeches and 
the monograph of Sallust. With works so entirely contemporary others become less 
important. Still nmch may be got from Plutarch's lives of Pompey, Cicero, Caesar, 
Crassus; and from Suetonius' Life of Caesar. We have now Dio's continuous 
history from 67 onwards, books 36-39. Of Livy there are only epitomes of books 
102-104. Appian {Dell. Civ. ii. 1-16) is interesting, but curiously inaccurate. 



CHAPTER XLIV 

CONQUEST OF GAUL AND OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR, 58-49 

Caesar vainly attacked for actions during his consulship (58) — First campaign 
in Gaul against the Helvetii and Germans under Ariovistus (58). Sf.COND, 
against Xhe Belgae and Nendi (57) — Attacks upon Caesar in Rome by Aheno- 
barbus, and the conference at Lucca (57-56). Third campaign in Gaul, the 
Veneti — Consulship of Ponipey and Crassus (55). Fourth campaign, de- 
feat of Germans on the Meuse — Crossing the Rhine — First invasion of Britain 
(55). Fifth campaign, second invasion of Britain — Outbreixk in North 
Gaul and loss of a legion (54). Sixth campaign, the Nkrvti and Tre- 
VERi — Second crossing of the Rhine (53)— Seventh campaign. Rebellion in 
southern Gaul — Capture of Avaricum — Failure at Gergovia — Capture of 
Alesia (52). Eighth and Ninth campaigns, reduction and pacification 
of Gaul (51-50) — Events leading to the Civil war (55-50) — The Senate decide 
to give Caesar a successor — Refuse to consider his desixitch — Expel the tribunes 
— Caesar crosses the Rubicon [January 49]. 

s8. Coss. There had been sufficient show of force at the comitia when Caesar's 
L. Cat- \2i\\s were passed to give a handle to his enemies. Two of the praetors 
PisT^A ^'^^ 5^' ^^^^'^ Memmius and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. consulted the 
Gabinius. Senate on a prosecution ; and one of the tribunes was only prevented 
by the veto of his colleagues from bringing him to trial, while he was 
still outside the walls preparing to start for his province. But all 
such hindrances were brushed aside by alarming news from Trans- 
alpine Gaul. The part of his province which was south of the Alps 
was rapidly becoming Romanised, and though the Transpadani were 
not yet full citizens, the question of admitting them to that privilege 
was one for a statesman rather than a soldier. Illyricum was always 
open to attacks from the Dalmatians, and since 167 (when it became 
a province) there had been at least three wars there. It seems that 
even now it was looked upon as the most likely part of Caesar's 
government to require force ; for three out of his four legions w^ere 
sent to Aquileia, from which they might easily cross. But in fact, 
during Caesar's rule, with the exception of one brief outbreak towards 
the end, it remained peaceful, and was only visited by him for the 
holding yearly assizes or convetitus. 



CHAP. XLiv CAESAR PROCONSUL IN GAUL 719 

Transalpine Gaul, added at Pompey's instance to Caesar's govern- Trans- 
ment, turned out to be the real sphere of his activity. The province, (^^P^^e 
regularly constituted since 1 1 8, included the district marked off by ^" ' 
the Rhone from the lake of Geneva to the Gulf of Lyons, with a west- 
ward extension to take in Tolosa {Toulouse) and the country between 
it and the Pyrenees. On the south-west no natural boundary 
separated it from the Aquitani ; but on the north-west the Cevennes 
severed it from the Arverni, and on the north the Rhone divided it 
from the Sequani. The rest of Gaul is divided by Caesar into 
three compartments — Central or Celtic Gaul, from the Sequana 
{Seme) to the Garumna {Ga7-on)ie\ extending westward to the ocean ; 
Aquitania, between the Garonne and the Pyrenees ; and Belgic 
Gaul, from the Seine to the Rhine. In Celtic Gaul the Aedui, separ- 
ated on one side from the Arverni by the Loire, and on the other by 
the Saone from the Sequani, had some years before sought protection 
from Rome against their dangerous neighbours, and had been received 
as " friends and allies." ^ But in the midst of domestic troubles 
Gaul had been neglected. In 78 L. Manilius was defeated by the 
Aquitani ; in 76 and 75 Pompey found rebellious movements in the 
province itself In 61 the Allobroges in the northern part of the 
province had risen and were put down with difficulty. These 
indications of weakness or neglect had encouraged the Arverni and 
Sequani to combine against the Romanising Aedui, for whose de- 
struction they had invited the Germans across the Rhine. The Aedui 
sent Divitiacus to Rome for help, but none had been given ; and 
Ariovistus, the head of the motley German horde now in Gaul, 
had even found means during Caesar's consulship (59) to be recog- 
nised by the Senate as a "friend and ally." There did not seem, 
therefore, any immediate need of the legions in the province. 

It was quite a different danger that hastened Caesar's departure. The 
The Helvetii — between Basle and Geneva — occupied a country then ^^i'^^iii- 
much covered with forest and marsh, and had for some years been 
contemplating a migration to a better district, either westward to 
Aquitania and the ocean, or, as some said, eastward into Italy. 
Their easiest way would be to cross the Rhone by the bridge at Geneva 
— the first town of the Allobroges, — march through the province, 
and then either recross the Rhone and make their way to Aqui- 
tania, or turn eastward towards Italy. The news of the contem- 
plated migration, under Orgetorix, reached Rome in 61, and caused 
much alarm. But the treason and death of Orgetorix (accused of 
aiming at tyranny) seems to have delayed matters. It was only 
in 58 that the report came that they had burnt their villages, 

^ Fratres ?iostri , Cicero ad Att. i. 19 (written in 60). 



720 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Caesar 
hastens to 
Geneva, 



Defeat a7id 
destruction 
of the Hel- 
vetii. 



TKe Aediii 
ask aid 
against the 
Germans. 



Victory 
over Ario- 
vistus, 
autumn of 
5S. 



prepared their train of waggons, and meant to start on the 28th of 
March. 

In 107 they had joined the Cimbri ; and the Tigurini had 
defeated L. Cassius Longinus. The same might happen again. 
Caesar reached Geneva in a week, ordered a general levy in the 
province, and broke down the bridge over the Rhone. He thus left 
the Helvetii only the narrow road between the lake and the Jura, and 
this he at once closed by an earthen rampart and ditch, strengthened 
by towers, from the point where the Rhone leaves the lake to where 
it passes through the Jura and becomes too rapid to be crossed. 
While this work — extending for more than ten miles — was being com- 
pleted, the Helvetii were kept back by evasive answers to their request 
for a passage ; and after a vain attempt to break through the ram- 
part they went into the territory of the Sequani, who let them pass, 
and thence across the Saone into the lands of the Aedui. But a crowd 
of 300,000, including women and children, moved slowly. Caesar 
had time, leaving Labienus in charge of the earthwork, to hurry into 
North Italy ; summon the three legions from Aquileia ; raise two fresh 
ones ; and yet catch the Helvetii while still only partly across the 
Saone. The Tigurini were cut to pieces ; the rest were overtaken 
near Bibracte {Autun), and defeated with immense slaughter. The 
survivors, about 130,000, were sent back to their country. 

This victory brought submissions on all sides. But the friendly 
Aedui now asked for help. There were 120,000 Germans of various 
tribes in Gaul under Ariovistus, who had already defeated the Aedui 
more than once, and had occupied much of the territoiy of the Sequani 
who had joined originally in asking their aid. Caesar at once under- 
took to be the champion of the Gauls. Though not yet a province, 
Gaul was to be closed to foreign invaders. The step from protection 
to mastership was apt to be a short one. 

But Ariovistus was not easily cowed. He claimed the rights of 
conquest over the Aedui ; declared himself ready to fight Caesar ; and 
showed that he was aware of the political divisions at Rome, and 
that he would be pleasing a powerful party there by defeating and 
even slaying him. By great exertions Caesar anticipated him in 
occupying Vesontio {Besa?ti-o?i) on the Doube ; and after some diffi- 
culty with his soldiers, who feared the unknown country and the 
warlike character of the Germans, came within sight of Ariovistus 
between Basle and Mulhausen. After fruitless negotiations, Ariovistus 
attempted to get between the Romans and their supplies from the 
Sequani, and Caesar was obliged to fight for his own safety. For 
some days, however, he failed to induce Ariovistus to give him battle. 
The wise women, it was said, refused leave till the next new moon. 
When at length the Germans were forced to fight, the Romans 



DEFEAT OF ARIOVISTUS 



721 



charged with such fury that they did not wait to hurl their pila, but 
rushed upon the enemy, and dashed to pieces the close circle with its 




locked shields, in which they were formed ; while in another part of 
the field young P. Crassus led a brilliant charge of cavalry which 

3 A 



722 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Gaul 
cleared of 
Germans. 



Second 
Campaign. 
Conquest of 
north- 
west Gaul, 
57- 



Great 

victory 
over the 
Nervii. 



carried all before it. The slaughter was immense, and was rendered 
still more complete by the hostile natives, who cut off stragglers as 
they were traversing the thirty-five miles to the Rhine. 

By this victory north-eastern Gaul was cleared of the foreigner, 
and the powerful tribe of the Suevi, who had reached the river, 
returned to their homes. The territory thus " protected," moreover, 
was not to be abandoned. The legions wintered outside the pro- 
vince in the country of the Sequani, under the command of Labienus, 
while Caesar went to Cisalpine Gaul to hold the convejttus and to 
meet his friends^ 

During the winter a new danger was growing to a head. The 
Belgae, in the north-west, between the Seine and the Rhine, were 
collecting their forces. They feared, it was said, an attack upon 
themselves ; but an even stronger motive was the fact that by the 
occupation of " Celtic Gaul " the Romans cut off from the various 
usurpers in the Belgic tribes a fruitful recruiting ground, and to secure 
themselves it was necessary to stop the Roman advance. Caesar, 
on hearing the news, enrolled two new legions i in Cisalpine Gaul, 
and sent them to Besangon. Early in 57 he arrived there himself, 
and by a rapid march of fifteen days entered the territory of the 
Belgae, received the submission of the Remi, and advanced across 
the Aisne, where he left six cohorts to guard the bridge. He came 
up with the enemy near Bibrax, which he occupied, and after some 
days of desultory fighting advanced to Noviodunum {Soissons sur 
Aistie), a city of the Suessiones, which presently surrendered, as did 
also the chief town of the Bellovaci, Bratuspantium {Beauvais)., 
and now found himself in the presence of the most warlike of the 
Belgic tribes, the Nervii, who were encamped on the left bank of the 
Sabis (ySambre). 

Then followed the most formidable struggle in which he had yet 
been engaged ; and the victory was due above everything to himself 
His advanced guard selected for a camp a hill sloping down to the 

1 In his first year Caesar had in Gaul : (i) one legion which he found there 
[loth] ; (2) two which he enrolled in the province [nth and 12th] ; (3) three which 
he brought from Aquileia [7th, 8th, and 9th]. These six legions, with auxili- 
aries of horse and foot, did the work of 58. 

In 57 he enrolled two more in Cisalpine Gaul [13th and 14th]. These eight 
were his whole force till 54. 

In 54 another was enlisted in the province [isth], but the 14th was only kept 
at half strength — half being drafted into the other legions. 

In 53 the 14th was replenished, and Pompey lent two more [ist and 3rd]. 

In 51-50 he had to send two of these eleven for the Parthian war [ist and 15th], 
but fresh levies might easily make up for them (Dio. xl. 65, koX /aAXwi' e-wl r% 
Trpo(pda-€L Tavrrj ttoXXw irXelovs crrparicuras avTiKa KaraXe^eLv), so that in 49 Cicero 
reckons him to have eleven legions, besides Gallic cavalry {ad Att. vii. 7). The 
legions now contained from 30Q0 to 3600 men, including cavalry. 



XLiv DEFEAT OF THE NERVII 723 



right bank of the Sambre. Opposite was a similar hill covered with 57. Coss. 
woods in which some of the Nervii were concealed. They had been ■^• 
told that the Roman legions marched singly with a baggage train ome tns 
between each two. When Caesar therefore led six legions into camp, spinther, 
and the men were engaged in fortifying it, and the long baggage Q. 
train was seen following, the Nervii rushed from* their hiding, drove Caecilius 
off the Roman cavalry which had already crossed the river, and in a ^^^^^^^^^ 
moment seemed everywhere — in the river, on the bank, and swarm- 
ing up the hill. Caesar, calm in the midst of the storm, recalled Heroism of 
by bugle the fatigue parties gone in search of wood ; got his men Caesar. 
into some sort of order, and gave the signal for battle. Even so, if 
the men had not been veterans, capable of independent action in 
an emergency, there must have been a disaster. Yet, though the 
Roman left and centre repulsed the Atrebates and Veromandui ; the 
right, which was attacked by the main body of the Nervii, was out- 
flanked, and so crowded as to be altogether blocked and unable to 
use their weapons. Caesar hurrying to the spot found that many of 
the cohorts had lost all their centurions, and were on the point of 
giving way to complete panic. He snatched a shield from a soldier, 
called on surviving centurions by name, forced the men to take more 
open order, and, getting the two legions together, led a charge. Its 
success restored confidence, and w4ien the two legions which had 
been on the rear of the baggage came up, and when Labienus, who 
had crossed the river in pursuit of the enemy, sent back the loth legion DestmcHon 
to his relief, the whole face of the battle was changed. The cavalry, of the ^ 
which had been driven from the camp, returned ; and though the ^^^^^^^ 
Nervii still fought desperately, before the day closed they had been 
all but exterminated. When those who had been concealed with 
women and children in the forest sent in their submission, they 
declared that of 60,000 only 500 fighting men remained. Belgic 
Gaul was now almost subdued, only the Aduatuci held out in their 
chief town on the Meuse. Caesar laid siege to it, and the garrison and of the 
soon offered to surrender, throwing their arms from the walls as a Aduatuci. 
pledge of good faith. They had, however, concealed others, and in 
the night sallied out against the camp. They were driven back, the 
gates forced, and the inhabitants sold into slavery. 

As P. Crassus had meanwhile secured the submission of the tribes Norih- 
of Normandy and Britanny,^ the whole of north-western France and "^^^tem 
Belgium was now subject to Rome. The peoples were dediticu, and ^JJ^ 
as such must accept Roman orders. They were not yet formed into 
a province. They were in that transitional state in which, though 
not formally under any laws other than their own, they were in fact 

1 The Veneti, Unelli, Osistni, Curiosolitae, EsuHi, Aulerci, Kedones (Caes. 
D.G. ii. 34). 



724 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Wittier of 

Affairs at 
Rotne. 



Opposition 
to Caesar. 



j<5. Coss. 

Cn. 

Cortieliiis 

Lentulus 

Marcel- 

Htius, L. 

Marcius 

Philippus. 



subjects of Rome, unable to refuse obedience or to make war on 
their own account.^ In return they would be protected from attack, 
and would presently take their place in the imperial system, with 
legal rights varying in the several communities. It was a splendid 
achievement to have brought this noble country with its vigorous 
inhabitants to share in the civilisation and world-interests of Rome, 
and to stand between Italy and the northern hordes which were in 
the future to be its scourge. 

The minor tribes of Carnutes, Andes, and Turones were reduced ; 
the troops put into winter quarters ; and he himself went to hold 
the cojiveiitus in North Italy and Illyricum. Caesar could now see 
his way to fame and power beyond his highest aspirations. But 
to put the finishing stroke to his successes required time. His 
five years of ofiice would be out in December 54 — five years before the 
legal term for a second consulship. His work in Gaul would pro- 
bably be left imperfect, his acta reversed, his veterans left unpro- 
vided for, and at least the laws, passed in his consulship, neglected or 
repealed. Already, since his return, Cicero had attacked the policy 
of the triumvirs,- and had even carried a motion in the Senate fixing 
a day (i 5th May) for the revision of the land laws,^ a subject already 
started in the previous December by a Tribune ; ^ while L. Domitius 
Ahenobarbus, a candidate for the consulship of 55, who, as praetor in 
58 had moved an enquiry into the validity of Caesar's laws on the 
ground of the ohiuntiatio of Bibulus, was openly declaring that as 
consul he would do what he failed to do as praetor, and would 
secure Caesar's recall. Nor must we assume that such a policy 
depended wholly for support on blind party animosity. There must 
have been many who sincerely deprecated an extension of responsi- 
bility, and some who even sympathised with the struggles of the 
Gauls for independence. It cannot seem incredible to Englishmen 
of our time that honest men should be found to oppose a policy of 
aggrandisement. 

Still these movements, whatever their motives, were dangers in 



1 Bellum in Gallia maximum gestum est : domitae sunt a Caesare maximae 
nationes, sed nottdum legibus, nondutn jure certo, nondum satis firma pace 
devinctae (Cicero de Prov. § 19 (spoken in 56)). 

2 The speech pro Sestio (12th March 56), though all direct blame of Caesar 
or Pompey is carefully avoided, contains a sketch of the different objects of the 
Optimates and Populares meant to bring discredit on Caesar's party. 

^ Ad Q. Frat. ii. 5 ; cp. ib. i. 9, 3. Cicero gave notice of the motion on the 
5th of April, and there was at once a scene of great excitement {clamore senatus 
prope coTtcionali). The point was that funds were wanting to compensate dis- 
possessed holders of the Campanian lands according to Caesar's law. It took 
place just as Pompey was starting to visit Caesar at Lucca. 
^ P. Rupilius Lupus, ad Quittt. Fr. ii. i. 



TERMS AGREED UPON AT LUCCA 725 



Caesar's path. Nor did Pompey seem to be able or willing to offer Dissert- 
an effective opposition to them. He had apparently no hold on the ^ions be. 
extreme party, and could not cope with the violence excited by the ^^^^^^ 
contests of Milo and Clodiusi When Clodiiis accused Milo de vi ^IT'^ 
(6th February 56) Pompey, who desired to speak for Milo, was hooted 'crassus. 
by the Clodian mob, and had to fly for his life amidst a scene of 
indescribable confusion. He was inclined to put down much of the 
opposition and insult which he encountered to the influence of 
Crassus, against whom he began to feel some of the old bitterness. 
He made no opposition to Cicero's motion as to the Campanian land, 
and there seemed a danger of his becoming detached from the 
interests of the triumvirate and joining the senatorial party. 

On his return from his official duties in Illyricum Caesar had The confer- 
been visited by Crassus, some time in March, at Ravenna,^ and ^nf^e at 
there a meeting of the party was agreed upon. Early in April ^^^<^^' 5^- 
Caesar came to Lucca, just within the borders of his province, and 
was visited in the course of the month by 200 senators, and 
so many magistrates that there were said to be 1 20 lictors in the 
town. Pompey, who as pracfcctus an?io?iae had to go to Sardinia and 
Africa, stopped at Lucca on his way. Caesar effected a reconcilia- The terms 
tion between him and Crassus ; and it was agreed that Ahenobarbus "^S^^^^ 
should not be allowed to be consul for 55, but that Pompey and ^^^"' 
Crassus should be elected, with the reversion of the provinces of 
Spain and Syria. For his part Caesar was to have a farther term 
of five years in his province (53-48), and to be allowed to stand 
for the consulship of 48 without making his professio at Rome. He 
would thus have imperium till 31st December 49, and before the time 
of laying it down would have renewed it as consul, and at the end of 
his consulship could still farther extend it by taking another province. 

The effect of this new understanding between the three leaders Effects of 
was at once manifest. at Rome. Pompey and Crassus were elected ^hereneived 
at the next comitia, though not without violent opposition, which ''S''^^"^^''^- 
they were obliged to suppress by a show of military force. But jj-. coss. 
even before that the demands of Caesar were carried out. Not Cn. Pom- 
only was a supplicatio — lasting the unprecedented number of fifteen ^^"'-^ 
days—decreed in honour of his victories ; but the Senate also voted f ^-^f '^^^•^ ^^- 

4.1, . • ^ , . . . , Al.Lictnius 

the extension of his impenum, and named Spain and Syria as Crassus II. 
consular provinces for Pompey and Crassus.- To Caesar also was 

^ Cic, ad Fam. i. 9. 

2 The senatus-consultuvi merely excluded the Gauls from the list of provinces 
to be assigned to consuls for that and following years. The extraordinary ex- 
tension of Caesar's command, as well as that of Pompey and Crassus, was held 
to require a lex ; and that was accordingly proposed in 55 by the tribune C. 
Trebonius. This law, however, is sometimes spoken of a lex Pompeia, as 



726 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Third 
Campaign. 
The 
Veneti, j6. 



Fourth 

Campaign 

Germans 

and 

Britanni, 

SS- 

Defeat of 
Germans 
on the 
Meuse. 



allowed the unusual number of ten legates, and a large grant of 
money for his troops. Cicero himself, who looked upon the pro- 
ceedings at Lucca as an abdication on the part of the Optimatist 
party, voted and spoke on behalf of these decrees ; and henceforth 
professed— with however little sincerity— to be devoted to the m- 
terests of Pompey and Caesar. ^ 

^. Caesar had to hurry from Lucca to his Transalpine provmce. 
The Veneti, living in the modern department of Morbihan in 
Britanny, had seized two of his officers who had during the winter 
entered their territory to buy corn, and it was necessary, lest 
their example should infect others, that they should be suppressed. 
Their country was intersected by firths, and their towns were mostly 
on projecting headlands such as that of Quiberon. They were, there- 
fore, a seafaring folk, possessing numerous ships specially constructed 
for their shallow waters. In order to subdue them a fleet was 
necessary, and this Caesar had ordered to be built during the 
winter and spring in the Loire. It was now ready under Dec. 
Brutus. Sabinus was sent to the north to prevent the Belgic tribes 
from giving help, Crassus south to check the Aquitani. Though 
the flat-bottomed ships of the Veneti could elude the Roman vessels 
in the firths, they could not escape them in the open. They only 
used sails ; the Roman oars outstripped them ; and, when caught, 
the soldiers on board easily secured them. Hooks on long poles 
{fakes) were invented to tear down their rigging, and only a few 
out of 220 eventually escaped. The Veneti were practically de- 
stroyed : their senators were executed, and such of the people as 
were caught sold into slavery. The Unelli in the north and the 
Aquitani in the south were conquered by his legates. Caesar finished 
the campaign by subduing the Morini {BoiilogJie) ; and his troops 
wintered in the territory of the Lexovii {Bayeux). 

To his next campaign he was summoned earlier than usual by 

the news that certain German tribes were crossing the Rhine. This 
meant rebellion amongst the Belgic tribes near the river, and 
Caesar at once marched thither. He found the German invaders 
or immigrants, the Usipetes and Tencteri, — who had been driven 
out by the Suevi,— in the plain of Goch, between the rivers Niess 
and Meuse ; stormed their laager of waggons ; and drove the motley 
crowd of men and women and children, reckoned at 430,000 souls, in 
utter confusion towards the Rhine. The greater part of them perished 
by the sword or in the river. A certain number of the chiefs who 

having been passed in his consulship (Cic. de Prov. §§ 21-30 ; Dio. xxxix. 33 ; 
2 Phil. § 24). Cato opposed it and was arrested by Trebonius. 

1 "Since those who have no power decline to love me, let me see that I am 
in favour with those who have power" (ad Att. 4, 5, written in April 56). 



XLiv FIRST EXPEDITION TO BRITAIN 727 

had come to Caesar's camp were allowed to go free, and Caesar 
justifies his action by alleging a treacherous attack upon his cavalry. Disap- 
But this, as well as the severity to the Veneti, were viewed with proval at 
mixed feelings at home ; and Cato actually proposed his surrender ^'^'"^• 
to the Germans. His party in the Senate, however, was now too 
strong, and the German name too great a terror at Rome for such a 
measure. 

But Caesar was determined to still farther impress the Germans. Caesar 
He marched to a spot on the Rhine opposite Bonn ; in ten days ^^^^-^ ^^^ 
caused a wooden bridge to be constructed, by which he crossed 
into the territory of the friendly Ubii ; and thence marched against 
the Sicambri, who had entertained the cavalry of the Tencteri and 
Usipetes. The Sicambri abandoned their villages and took refuge in and 
the forests : and having burned their houses and cut down their corn, returns 
Caesar, after eighteen days, recrossed the Rhine, not venturing to "^^^ ^'/ 
penetrate an unknown country to attack the Suevi, who were said ^^j^ Suevi. 
to have concealed their property in the woods and to be preparing 
to fight for their lives. 

Having made, as he thought, the necessary impression in Ger- First 

many, he resolved to finish the season by visiting the islands of the (crossing to 

Britanni, of whose close intercourse with Gaul he had become ^^j^^^^' 

' . , . . , , - . ^ , autumn of 

aware durmg the campaign agamst the Veneti. It was, perhaps, ^^ 

jealousy of possible interference with their British trade which had 
caused the rising of the Veneti. Caesar could learn little about 
the island except from reports of traders ; and they only knew the 
east and south coasts. Of the interior they knew little or nothing, 
and even what they knew had always been unwilling to tell. But the 
island was said to be rich in the precious metals, as well as in tin 
and lead : and partly from the hope of booty, partly to strike terror 
into all who aided the Gauls, and partly from curiosity, Caesar 
resolved to cross. After sending a ship to reconnoitre, he set sail with 
eighty vessels carrying two legions. The Britons had tried to avert 
the invasion by sending ambassadors, and Caesar in return had sent 
Commius, king of the Atrebates, to persuade them to submit. But 
his landing — probably near Deal — was bravely resisted by the natives. The 
who rushed into the water to attack his men ; when it was nevertheless ^(^"ding. 
effected the chiefs submitted and gave hostages. But four days after- 
wards a violent storm damaged or destroyed all Caesar's ships and 
prevented the cavalry, who followed him, from landing. This en- 
couraged the British chiefs to attack him again. They were twice 
decisively defeated ; but Caesar had been nearly a month in the 
island without making any advance. It was now about the end of 
September ; all his ships, except twelve, were refitted, and when the 
equinoctial storms abated he returned to Gaul. There after punish- 



728 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

ing an attack of the Morini upon a party of his troops, he put his 

men into winter quarters in Belgium, where the Menapii on the 

lower Rhine had during his absence been subdued by his legates Q. 

Titanus and L. Cotta. 

Piflh The expedition to Britain seems to have strongly touched the 

Campaign, imagination of the Romans. Since they had taken the place of the 

Second Carthaginians in Spain the knowledge of British trade must have 

^Britain, reached their merchants. The island was said to supply " corn, 

j^. ' cattle, silver, iron, hides, slaves, and sporting dogs ; " and still more 

valuable things, such as gold and pearls, were believed to be 

Coss. L. abundant there.i The hope, therefore, of opening a rich field of 

Domitius traffic to Roman enterprise, as well as of obtaining large immediate 

^4heno- profit, induced Caesar to make a second attempt, although he was 

Appiiis leaving Gaul by no means secure, and in fact almost certain to rebel 

Claudius again if he met with disaster. At the very place of embarkation, 

Ptilcher. ti-je portiis Itijis (probably JVzssanf), Dumnorix with some Aeduan 

cavalry attempted to leave him, and had to be pursued and killed. 

When he landed (probably near Romney Marsh) the natives, 

alarmed at the number of his fleet, were hiding in the forests, 

and his disembarkation was not opposed. He advanced to the 

river Stour ; drove them from a strong camp to which they had 

retreated ; and, after halting about ten days, — while sending men to 

repair his ships, which had been beached too near the sea, and had 

been much damaged by a high tide and severe gale, — he crossed the 

Thames near Brentford ; defeated Cassivelaunus ; and advanced to 

Submission his capital, standing probably on the site of St. Albans. He occupied 

of some the town unopposed, for Cassivelaunus had made his way by another 

route into Kent, and was attempting the naval camp. Failing in that 

he sent in his submission ; and Caesar, resolving to return to Gaul 

/aunus. before the end of the autumn, was content to receive hostages from 

such tribes as had submitted, and to impose a tribute, which was 

1 It has been suggested with some plausibiUty that the British tin had been 
driven from the markets by that of Spain, and that the trade did not revive 
till the regular Roman occupation. When Caesar landed no gold or silver was 
being dug there, and he found nothing worth taking but slaves. Cicero's 
brother Quintus served in Britain in 54, and though the orator promised to use 
his skill to magnify the exploit {ad Q. Fr. ii. 13), he soon found it a barren 
theme. "As to British affairs, I gather from your letters that there is no 
occasion either for exultation or fear" {lb. 3, ij. In May (54) he says in a 
letter to Trebatius : " I hear there is no gold or silver in Britain " {ad Fam. vii. 
7, i); and to Atticus (October 54), "It has been now thoroughly ascertained 
that there is not a drachm of silver in the island, and no hope of booty except 
from slaves" {ad Att. iv. 16; cp. iv. 17). These expressions, however, show 
what had been expected. This is farther illustrated by the fact that Caesar's 
fleet was accompanied by a large number of corn and merchant vessels belonging 
to private speculators, so that the whole flotilla amounted to about 800 vessels. 



British 
tribes and 
Cassive- 



XLiv FALL OF SABINUS AND COTTA 729 

not likely to be paid with great regularity. Late in September he 
began his preparations for return. ^ 

The expedition, in one sense successful, had been neither Growing 
glorious nor profitable ; and though the war vessels and transports dangers m 
were mostly preserved, a large number of the corn ships accompany- " * ^'^' 
ing the fleet had been lost. Caesar's absence through the summer 
had also been a cause of danger in Gaul, where a rebellion was 
maturing, which he would probably have crushed in the bud had he 
been in the country. As it was, he helped the latent treason by 
placing his legions in winter camps at some distance from each other, 
though all, it appears, within the radius of about 100 miles from 
Amiens, where he was spending the early part of the winter himself.^ 
The last raised of his eight legions, under the command of Sabinus 
and Cotta, was stationed at Aduatuca {To7igres\ between the Meuse 
and Rhine, where Ambiorix and Catavolcus ruled the Eburones. 
Suddenly the camp was assaulted and the legion driven in. They Fall of 
believed that help from Caesar was impossible, and, though Cotta Sabinus 
was for holding out, Sabinus persuaded him to try to join Q. Cicero at ^"^^^^^y? 
Charleroi. They were surrounded, and, after a vain attempt to j_^, 
treat, the legion was cut to pieces, only a few escaping to carry the 
news to Labienus. Ambiorix was then able to rouse the Aduatuci, 
Nervii, and other tribes and attack O. Cicero. He defended himself 
gallantly, and was relieved by Caesar when almost at the end of his 
resources. But though this success produced immediate effect on 
the Treveri and other rebellious tribes, the danger was by no means 
over. The Treveri were secretly trying to persuade the Germans once 
more to cross the Rhine, and Caesar for the first time found it 
necessary to spend the whole winter in Transalpine Gaul, and to 
obtain three more legions in the Cisalpine province, two of which 
Pompey had raised in 55, but had apparently dispersed on furlough. 

Thus reinforced Caesar reduced the Nervii before spring had well Sixth 

begun and overawed the Menapii ; while Labienus conquered the <-ampaign. 

Treveri and re-established the faithful Cingetorix as their ruler. The ^^' -^ » 

^ Aei'vii and 

two then joined forces and again crossed the Rhine by a new bridge Treveri 

1 "On the 27th of October I received letters from my brother Quintus and "^ "^ ' 
Caesar, dated from the British coast on the 26th of September. Britain was 
conquered, hostages received — there was no booty, but a tribute had been im- 
posed. They were on the point of bringing the army across " {ad Alt. iv. 17). 

- The legions were thus placed : (i) One under Q. Cicero among the Nervii 
at Charleroi ; (2) one under Labienus among the Remi near Luxemburg ; (3) 
one under Trebonius at Samarobriva [Amiens) ; (4) one under L. Fabius among 
the Morini at St. Pol ; (5) one under L. Roscius among the Essuvii at S^ez in 
Normandy ; (6) one under M. Crassus among the Bellovaci at Mendidier ; (7) 
one under L. Munatius Plancus at Champlieu ; (8) one under Titurius Sabinus 
and Aurunculeius Cotta at Aduatuca ( Tongres). Caesar set the fashion of putting 
Dne of his legati at the head of each legion. 



730 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Second 
crossing of 
the Rhine. 

Q. Cicero 
surprised 
by the 
Sicambri. 



Seventh 

Campaign. 

52. 

Rebellion 

in 

southern 

Gaul. 



Unsuc- 
cessful siege 
of Ger- 

goxna. 

Capture of 
Alesia, 
and sur- 
render of 
Vercinge- 
torix. 



Eighth and 
ninth Cam- 
paigns, 
51-50. 



near Bonn, which on his return Caesar left partly standing and 
guarded. The later summer and autumn were spent in Belgic Gaul, 
where the Eburones were driven to take refuge in the Ardennes or 
marshes. Aduatuca {Toiigres) was made the headquarters of the 
army under the care of Q. Cicero, and Caesar with three legions 
advanced to the Scheldt. In his absence Cicero, who had not obeyed 
his orders to keep strictly within his lines, almost suffered a disaster 
at the hands of the Sicambri, who crossed the Rhine in hopes of 
plunder. They were eventually repulsed and the camp and town 
saved, but Q. Cicero did not remain in Gaul next year. After putting 
his men into winter quarters Caesar held an assembly of the Gauls 
at Rheims, at which the leaders of the rebellious tribes were con- 
demned, and then at length felt that he might go to Italy. 

But next year the danger was in southern Gaul, close to the 
Province.^ The young chief of the Arverni {Ain>eri^}ie\ Vercinge- 
torix, took advantage of a movement of the Canutes (about Orleans) 
to rouse his own and the neighbouring tribes. Caesar hurried across 
the Alps, drove Vercingetorix into the valley of the Loire among 
the Bituriges, and followed him rapidly with such troops as he had, 
leaving orders for the rest to concentrate at Agendicum {Sens). He 
seized Genabum {Orteans\ and having thus secured a bridge over 
the Loire, advanced upon Avaricum {Botir'^es), the chief town of the 
Bituriges. It was taken after a long siege, which Vercingetorix 
vainly attempted to interrupt. Caesar then marched down the Allier 
into Auvergne. He was delayed by X'ercingetorix having broken 
the bridges over this river, and when he arrived at Gergovia {Ger- 
govie) he found it strongly guarded. It proved almost his only 
failure. After some weeks' fruitless siege he was obliged to march 
against the Aedui, who had revolted and seized Noviodunum {Nevers). 
Yet for the present he let the Aedui be, and directed his whole 
strength upon Alesia, into which Vercingetorix had thrown himself 

Round this hill (between Tonnerre and Dijon) the final struggle 
took place. Vercingetorix had had time to send messengers to rouse 
the neighbouring tribes ; and before long an army of 24,000 men 
arrived to attack Caesar's line of circumvallation from the outside. 
But though they made a furious assault on the weakest point of the 
Roman lines, they were beaten back with great loss. Vercingetorix 
surrendered himself in hopes of saving his men, and was reserved to 
adorn a triumph and to die in a Roman prison. 

Gaul was now subdued, and though Caesar wintered at Bibracte 
{Autun), and in the spring of 5 i had to move into the valley of the 
Loire, and thence north to Beauvais beyond the Oise, to fight a 

^ News of the disorders at Rome following the death of Clodius encouraged 
the rebellion. 



XLiv DISORDERS AT ROME 73i 

somewhat severe battle on the plain of Choisy-au-Bec, and again to 
inflict some severity on the district between the Meuse and the 
Rhine,^ the greater part of these two years (51-50) was spent in 
measures of conciliation and in settling counter-claims. Caesar's 
chief glory is that after so many years of fighting he left this great 
province on the whole thoroughly loyal, and convinced of the advan- 
tage of taking its place in the Roman system. 

Meanwhile the course of affairs at Rome had been gradually Political 
making it inevitable that supreme power should be in one man's »ff<^trs 
hands, and that in some way it would have to be settled whether ^^ ^cfvil 
that man should be Caesar or Pompey. During 54 and 53 there ^ar. 
had been frequent and bloody struggles between the ruffians hired (^oss. 

by Milo and Clodius. They prevented the election of consuls for Cn. 
53 until six months of the year were passed ; and as this year was Domitius 
drawing to an end it became certain that the elections for 52 would ^.^J^'^"^^' 
also be prevented. The first of January arrived without a consul, ^^^^^ 
and after nearly three more weeks of violence, Milo, who was one of Messalla. 
the candidates, on his way to Lanuvium met Clodius on the Appian Murder of 
way near liovillae, and taking advantage of a squabble which arose Clodius, 
between their slaves, in which Clodius received a wound, caused him ^'^f^'- 
to be dragged from the house in which he had taken refuge and ■''^^'"'^'y 
despatched. This was followed by fresh disorders. Clodius' fate 
roused his followers to fury and awakened sympathy with him among 
the people. His body was carried by the mob into the Curia and 
burnt on a pile of broken benches, during which the Curia caught 
fire and was destroyed. At length, on the 25th of February- the 
Senate named Servius Sulpicius interrex, and directed him to declare pompey 
Pompey sole consul, with authority to raise troops and restore order, sole 
Pompey published an edict forbidding the wearing of arms in the city ; consul, 
caused the ashes of Clodius to be removed ; and proceeded to carry ^ ruary 
a series of laws aimed at the root of these disorders. One was a lex 
judiciarid., which arranged for the selection of jurors by the magis- 
trates, with a definite right of challenge on the part of the defendant. -^^^-^-^^-^ 
It also limited the time allowed for the speeches on either side, and 
abolished or curtailed the system oi laudationcs^ — speeches by power- 
ful friends of either side, — which, like the "maintenance" in the 
English courts of the fourteenth century, were employed to overawe 
juries. Another law, dc jure magistratum)i^ ordained that consuls De jure 
were not in future to proceed to a province until five years after the magis- 

tratuum. 

^ The last place to hold out in southern Gaul was Uxellodununi [le Puy 
d' Issolu). Caesar also went with two legions into Aquitania in the course of 51. 

- This was nearly two months since Clodius' murder (20th January) because, 
in order to correct the calendar, it had become the custom in alternate years to 
intercalate twenty days after the 23rd of February. 



732 



HISTORY OF ROME 



de Ambitu. 



Pompeys 
position. 



end of their year of office, and renewed the rule of a personal J)ro- 
fessio on the part of a candidate. After the law was engraved he 
was reminded that he was pledged to make a special exemption of 
Caesar in this last point, and he thereupon caused the alteration to 
be made ; but, perhaps because the legality of such a proceeding was 
doubtful, the privilege was confirmed to Caesar by a law brought in 
by the tribune Caelius at Pompey's request. ^ Finally he brought in 
a severe law against ambitus^ which was to be retrospective up to his 
own first consulship (70), and under it numerous 'prosecutions at once 
took place. Under the lex judiciaria the condemnation of Milo 
{de vi) was secured, order being secured by Pompey stationing an 
armed guard round the court. 

For the moment Pompey was regarded by the Optimates as the 
saviour of Society, and seemed all-powerful. He could not, indeed, 
get all he desired. He had wished to be named Dictator, and his 
six months' sole consulship was a compromise. Moreover, in order 
to prevent the nomination of Caesar as his colleague, he was obliged 
to take his father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, in that capacity. Nor had 
his influence been able to prevent the condemnation of Gabinius for 
majcsfas, though he induced Cicero (much against his wishes) to 
undertake his defence. Still he was evidently drawing closer to the 
Optimates and drifting away from his friendship with Caesar. One 
tie which had bound them had been severed at the latter end of 54 
by the death of Pompey's wife lulia in childbed. There was no 
Crassus now to oppose him ; and there were plenty of people to tell 
Caesar that he meant to use his renewed influence against him. He 
had obtained from the Senate a farther extension of five years to 
his governorship of the Spains, which he had been conducting since 
54 by three legates. In 51 he was still outside the walls with 
imperium, constantly talking of going to Spain, but always allowing' 
himself to be over-persuaded to stay. The consuls for that year also, 
whose election he had at any rate not prevented, were both oppo- 
nents of Caesar ; and when one of them, Marcellus, moved the 
question of naming a successor in Gaul, although Pompey did not 
support it, insisting that Caesar would at any time obey the Senate, 
his opposition was not warm ; nor did he oppose the measures of 
Marcellus calculated to cast a slight on Caesar, such, for instance, 
on^the ^^^^ ^^ refusing the citizenship to a magistrate at Comum, in which Caesar 
colony of ^^^ settled a colony with Latin rights. The magistrates in such a 
Co7num. colony had the full civitas, yet Marcellus on some pretext ordered 
one of them to be flogged, as though he had no such privilege. 
This was meant to be an insult to Caesar, and was followed by more 



^T. Coss. 
Ser. 

Stilpicius 
Rufus, M. 
Claudius 
Marcellus. 

The 

question of 
Caesar s 
successor. 



1 Cic. ad Att. 



viii. 3, 



xLiv THE FALL OF CRASSUS 733 

attempts to supersede him in Gaul.^ Marcellus had originally 
brought the subject forward in the Senate on the ist of January, 
directly he entered office. On that occasion Pompey had spoken in 
favour of postponing it till the ist of January next, but yet had not 
hesitated to express his dislike of the idea of Caesar becoming consul 
while in possession of his province and army.^ The subject was Motion for 
renewed at the end of September, and a resolution passed that a Caesar's 
motion should be made concerning it on the ist of March (50) along ^^^f^^^^^^^^ 
with a resolution as to the pay of Caesar's troops. These resolutions ^j, 
were vetoed by a tribune, and did not become se7iatus co7isiiltaj but 
Pompey, who was present, declared that after the ist of March next 
the arrangement might be made without injury to Caesar, and that 
veto or no veto Caesar would yield to the aiictoritas of the Senate. 
" What," said some one, " if Caesar should choose to keep his army 
and be consul too?" "What," he answered, "if my son should 
strike me with his stick ? " 

Caesar saw what was coming, and took care during 51 and 50 The Hvo 
to ascertain the feelings of the Cisalpine towns in his favour, especially legions 
in the spring of 50, when he visited them ostensibly to recommend ''" //f" 
M. Antonius to their suffrages for the augursbip agamst his old ^,^^^ 
enemy Ahenobarbus. But late in 5 i or at the beginning of 50 a s^so. 
still more open blow was struck at him. 

During the year 5 i there had been frequent rumours of a Parthian The 
war. The Parthians (first appearing as a powerful people about 256) Parthians. 
had been brought into contact with the Romans in the Mithridatic 
war. Pompey had made a treaty of peace with Phraates (63) ; and 
Gabinius, while governor of Syria (57-55), crossed the Euphrates to 
take part in a dispute as to the succession between the two sons of 
Phraates, Mithridates and Orodes. He had, however, retired with- Crassns in 
out doing anything. When Crassus came to Syria at the end of 55 Syria, 
his head was full of a great Parthian war,-^ which should make him ^•^"•^^• 
equal to Pompey and Caesar ; and early in 54 he started for the 
Euphrates, took Zenodotium, in Mesopotamia, and returned to Syria He attacks 
for the winter. He had no pretext for the invasion, and had taken ''^'^ 
no precautions to secure the alliance of the Armenians or others ^^.^ ^^^^^ 
hostile to the Parthians. He was unfitted by age and manner ^^ just pre- 
life for a campaign, and everything forboded disaster. In 53 he text,j4-^j. 

^ Cicero exclaims against it as illegal in the case of a Transpadanus, even 
without the privilege given him by office, and professes to be as indignant as 
Caesar himself [ad Att. v. 11). 

- Cicero, Fam. viii. 4 ; viii. 9. 

^ By the lex Trebonia (the plebiscitum giving him and the other triumvirs 
their prolonged commands, see p. 725) he had the right to wage war, though 
one of the tribunes had forbidden it, and even laid him under a solemn curse if 
he attacked the Parthians. 



734 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Battle of 
Carrhae 
atid fall of 
Crassus, 
S3- 



Crassus 
defends 
Syria and 
defeats the 
Parthian s, 

The two 
legions. 



50. Coss. 

L. 

A em Hi us 

Paullus, 

C. 

Claudius 

Marcellus. 



rejoined his army in Mesopotamia, rejecting the request of Artavasdes 
that he should come to Armenia, which Orodes was invading-, and 
which as a rugged country would be less suitable for the Parthian 
cavalry. Orodes made peace with Artavasdes, and sent an army 
under Surenas to oppose Crassus. He was misled by an Arab 
guide ; was surprised in an unfavourable position ; and after a long 
day's battle, in which his son fell, retired upon Carrhae. The 
Parthians followed, and when he again attempted a retreat, he was 
tempted into a conference and killed. His quaestor C. Cassius 
Longinus escaped with 500 horsemen across the Euphrates, col- 
lected the remains of the army, and defended the province of Syria, 
which he held as proquaestor for the next year and a half. After 
some feeble attacks in 52 the Parthians invaded the province in 
earnest in 5 i under Osaces and a son of the king named Pacorus. 
Cassius, who was at Antioch, decisively defeated them, thereby 
saving Syria and relieving Cicero, who was governor of Cilicia in 
51-50, from a much-dreaded struggle with them.^ 

That the danger was over could only have been known at Rome 
late in 51. During the year suggestions had been made of sending 
Pompey or Caesar against the Parthians ; and finally the Senate 
ordered two legions to follow Bibulus, who had started for Syria in the 
summer of 51, and of these legions Pompey was to supply one and 
Caesar the other. But as Pompey now claimed the return of one ot 
the legions he had lent to Caesar, the result was that Caesar was 
deprived of two, as the Senate no doubt wished. He had, how- 
ever, satisfied himself that he could raise men enough in Gaul, and 
he sept the ist and 15th legions without remonstrance. He soon 
found that the alarm had been a pretence, or at any rate was over : 
for the legions, instead of being sent to the east, were handed over 
to Pompey, and stationed temporarily at Capua. 

It was time to act if he meant to hold his own against Pompey. 
He had more than made up for the two legions by new levies in 
Gaul, but it was necessary to secure himself in Rome also if civil 
war was to be avoided. The two consuls were hostile, as well as 
one of the tribunes, C. Curio, and might be expected to push forward 
the question of his recall by including Gaul among the provinces to 
be allotted. Caesar by promises or bribes won over one of the 
consuls, Paullus, and simply bought Curio, who was overwhelmed 
with debt. To every one's surprise Curio began bickering with the 



1 Cicero, Fam. xv. 14 ; iii. 8 ; viii. 10 ; ad Att. v. 21. Cicero was in Cilicia 
(much to his own disgust), owing to the provision in Pompey's law ordering a five 
years' interval between the consulship and a province. In order to supply gover- 
nors for the interval, the Senate had to pass a resolution ordering all ex-praetors 
who had not had a province to take one in order of seniority. 



XLiv THE QUESTION OF CAESAR'S RECALL 735 

Optimates. He wished the pontifices to intercalate a month in C. Curio 

February, though it was the wrong year ; and when refused began >/«j the 

dropping obscure hints as to Caesar's claims, and putting forward P^^ y ^J 

proposals of a compromise between him and Pompey, which he 

knew the latter would not accept ; and finally showed himself as an 

open champion of Caesar. The first part of 50, however, was quiet. 

There seemed a kind of lethargy after so much excitement, and both 

sides paused. This was partly caused by Pompey's dangerous Pompey s 

illness at Naples, which called forth an immense outburst of ^^^"^^^' 

enthusiasm in the Italian cities, where prayers were offered up 

with great fervency for his recovery. The gods ofiered — it was 

afterwards said — to remove him from the evil to come ; but the 

prayers and sacrifices of the Italians reserved him for his doom. 

In one sense this was true, for the feeling thus displayed blinded him 

to his true position. He believed Caesar's troops to be disaffected, and He declines 

that he himself had only to stamp on the ground to raise soldiers any- ^^ ^^'^^^ 

where in Italy, and till December took no precautions against him.i '^^-^■^* 

For a time it seemed possible to avoid extreme measures. The 
consul, C. Marcellus, indeed, was anxious to push on the decree 
for naming Caesar's successor, who was to be Ahenobarbus ; but The 
though it had been arranged that the motion should be made in the' ^"otton to 
Senate in March for his leaving his province on the i ith of November, c^esar 
it had not been passed in June. Curio gave out that he would do vetoed. 
anything rather than allow it. Pompey professed a wish to do 
Caesar full justice, but plainly showed that he was for fixing this 
day. At last, after the consular elections, on the motion being made. 
Curio vetoed it ; and a proposal to remonstrate with him {agere cum 
tribimo) was lost by a large majority. Clearly, therefore, nothing 
would be done that year. But the consuls for 49 were vehement 
opponents of Caesar, and Curio would be no longer in office. C. 
Marcellus, as consul designate, had voted for the recall, and the 
attempt would no doubt be renewed when he became consul. " There 
is no hope of peace beyond the year's end," wrote Caelius to Cicero 
in September, " Pompey is determined that Caesar shall not be consul 
designate till he has given up province and army. Caesar is con- 
vinced that he cannot leave his army safely." 

The words were quickly justified. " I have a partiality for 49- Coss. 
Curio ; I wish Caesar to act like an honest man ; I could die for ^- 
Pompey," wrote Cicero in June (50) as he was quitting his province. Marcellus. 
But when he reached Rome (4th January 49) he found the time for /.. cor- 
compromise and compliment all but past. Curio, going out of ofiice nelius 
on the loth of December, at once went to Caesar at Ravenna, and Lentulus. 

1 In December, at the urgent instance of Marcellus, Pompey left Rome to 
look after troops, but seems to have done nothing (Cic. ad Alt. vii. 4, 5). 



736 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Caesar s 
letter and 
ulti- 
matum, 

JSt 

January 
49- 



urged him to march straight upon Rome and wrest his rights from a 
tyrannical cHque. But Caesar wished to try once more for peace, or 
to put his enemies more completely in the wrong. Curio was sent 
back with a letter addressed to the Senate, which he handed to the 
consuls on the ist of January (49), requesting them to read it. 
They refused until compelled iDy the tribunes M. Antonius and Q. 
Cassius. It contained a recital of Caesar's services to the State, and 
finally expressed his readiness to hand over his province and army 
if Pompey would do the same. In his view this was the least he 
could ask. He could not come to Rome and stand the inevitable 
trial surrounded by Pompey's soldiers. He speaks of the demand as 
" of the mildest possible kind " ; but the consuls regarded the letter 
as " threatening and violent," and refused to submit its proposals 
to the Senate.^ Instead, they made a formal statement as to the 
danger of the State, or, as the phrase went, retiileriint de repicblica. 
A stormy debate followed. The consul Lentulus proposed to fix a 
day at once for Caesar's resignation of his province, and was sup- 
ported by Pompey's father-in-law, Metellus Scipio, who, as Pompey 
could not attend a meeting on the Capitol, was supposed to express 
his sentiments. Marcellus, the other consul, wished to wait till 
troops had been levied. But Lentulus overbore all opposition. 
Only one senator voted against a resolution for fixing a day for 
Caesar to resign on pain of high treason, 2 and declaring that Pompey 
need not do the same. This was vetoed by the two tribunes 
Antonius and Cassius. The debate as to whether they should be 
appealed to to withdraw the veto lasted till nightfall, and was 
renewed on the four days following on which the Senate could meet.'^ 
It was not till the evening of the 7th that the two obstructing tribunes 
were expelled,^ and the sejiatus consultuin ultimmn was passed, 
ordering consuls, praetors, tribunes, and proconsuls (the last to 
include Pompey and Cicero), "to see that the republic took no 
harm." Antonius and Cassius fled from the city, where their sacro- 
sanct office was of doubtful protection against this dictatorship in 
commission, and started to join Caesar. 



^ Caesar, B. Civ. i. 5, lenissima postulata. Cicero [Fam. xvi. 11), menaces 
et acerbas literas. So much depends on the point of view ! 

2 Eu7n adversus ?-etnpublicatn facturum videri. Caelius was the single voter. 

3 The five meetings were on the ist, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th. A meeting of the 
Senate on the 3rd and 4th of January, which were dies cofnitiales, seems to have 
been specially prohibited by the lex Piipia (Cic. ad Q. Fr. ii. 33). At any rate the 
same rule does not seem to have applied to all comitial days — i.e. days on which 
business was done in the comitia — for the 7th is also a dies comitialis. See 
Willems' Le Sdnat, vol. ii. p. 152 sqq. 

^ Cicero says " without violence" {mdla vi expulsi), but it does not appear 
how it could have been done otherwise. 



XLiv CAESAR CROSSES THE RUBICON 737 

He was at Ravenna when news reached him of these proceed- 
ings. Without betraying his intention to the townsfolk he started Caesar 
after nightfall with the 1 3th legion, from Ariminum, sending orders ^^^^^-^ 
to the others to leave their winter quarters and follow him. Ariminum "^^'^^^^^^^ 
was the first town out of his province, which was here divided from January ' 
Italy proper by the little stream of the Rubicon. To cross it was to ^9, 
put himself definitely in a position of hostility to the government, 
and the final step may well have caused him hesitation. He is 
said to have turned to his officers with the words, " Even now we 
may draw back " ; and to have finally followed the spontaneous and crosses 
action of some soldiers who dashed across the stream to listen ^^ 
to a shepherd playing a flute on the other side. Regarding this as 
providential he exclaimed, " Let us go where the omen of the 
gods and the iniquity of our enemies calls us ; the die is cast ! " 
But of all this he tells us nothing himself. He only says that he 
addressed his men ; found them ready to avenge the wrongs of the 
tribunes, and at once led them to Ariminum. There he found the 
expelled tribunes ; and there Lucius Caesar (a distant relative) 
came with offers of mediation, along with the praetor Roscius, Vain 
who brought a message from Pompey. He listened courteously, "^go^i^- 
and answered that if Pompey would go to Spain and disband ^'^/JJJ. 
soldiers in Italy, and so leave the comitia free, he would also give „^^,;^. 
up his legions. But he had no expectation of such a settlement, and 
did not delay a single day in securing the towns along the coast. 
The civil war had begun. It was too late to speak of peace, — Civil war. 
utendum est iudice bello. 

Authorities. — For Caesar's wars in Gaul we have his own admirable narra- 
tive. For events in Rome the best guides are Cicero's Correspondence, supple- 
mented by the Speeches Pro Sestio, In Vatinium, De Provinciis consularibus, 
Pro Milone. Livy, Ep. 105-109; Appian, B. Civ. ii. 15-33; Plutarch, Lzw:r 0/ 
Caesar, Crassiis, Cicero; Dio Cassius, xxxviii. 31-xli. i ; l.nc:m s Pharsalia. For 
Cicero's change of policy in 56 the letter to Lentulus [Fam. i. 9) should especially 
be read. 



3B 



CHAPTER XLV 



THE CIVIL WAR TO THE DEATH OF lULIUS CAESAR 

Civil war — Preparations for the defence of Italy — Caesar's rapid advance — Fruit- 
less negotiations — Ponipey leaves Italy — Caesar at Rome — Siege of Massilia — 
Campaign in Spain — Surrender of Massilia — Caesar as dictator holds consular 
elections (49). Caesar as consul crosses to Macedonia to attack Pompey — 
His difficulties — Beleaguers Pompey's camp — Pompey pierces his lines — Re- 
treat to Thessaly — Battle of Pharsalus — Death of Ponipey in Egypt (48). 
Alexandrine war (48-47) — Expedition into Pontus — Battle of Zela — Second 
dictatorship (47) — Pompeians in Africa (48-46) — Caesar's campaign in Africa 
— Battle of Thapsus — Province of New Africa — Rectification of calendar and 
legislation, year of 445 days (46). Campaign in Spain against Pompey's 
sons — Battle of Munda — Third dictatorship (45) — Plans for enlargement of 
Rome — Scheme of colonies — Preparations for Parthian expedition — The con- 
spiracy — Murder of Caesar (44). 



4g. Coss. 

Claudius 

Alarcelhis, 

L. 

Cornelius 

Lepidus. 



The consuls 

quit 

Rome. 

Caesar s 
advance. 



The vote of the Senate meant war. Italy and Sicily were divided 
into districts for defence, and new governors were allotted to the 
provinces, Gallia Narbonensis falling to Ahenobarbus, and privati 
being invested with imperiuin when there were not sufficient ex- 
magistrates. Pompey seems to have left Rome immediately, to 
raise new levies in Campania and to mobilise the two legions in 
winter quarters in Apulia. Before another ten days the consuls and 
a large number of the senators had also left Rome. For the news 
which reached the city by the 1 8th caused such a panic that in the 
very act of opening the treasury of the reserved funds, to take out 
the money voted to Pompey, the consuls hurriedly withdrew. Caesar, 
it was said, was on his way to Rome. He had seized Pisanum, 
Fanum, and Ancona ; had sent Antonius across the Apennines to 
secure Arretium, and intercept any attempt of Pompey to march 
through Etruria to the north ; and Curio to occupy Iguvium on the 
pass of the Apennines. No one had resisted him except Attius Varus 
at Auximum, and even he had been compelled to withdraw by the 
people of the town. 

On the 24th of January Lucius Caesar delivered Caesar's answer 



CHAP. XLV POMPEY LEAVES ITALY 739 

to Pompey at Teanum Sidicinum. The consuls and Pompey would Failure of 
only treat on condition of Caesar's withdrawal from the towns he had negoti- 
occupied, and Caesar would not do that unless Pompey would fix a '^^^^"■^■ 
day for going to his provinqe of Spain and cease levying troops. 
Both therefore went on. Pompey was joined on the 23rd by 
T. Labienus, who had been left in charge of Cisalpine Gaul by Caesar. 
But Caesar's successes were not interrupted. The strong town of Aheno- 
Cingulum (of which Labienus was the patronus) submitted volun- barb^^s 
tarily. Firmum was easily taken; and, intercepting several Pompeian •"''''^''/'''•^ 
officers on the march, he arrived on the river Aternus, three miles 
from Corfinium, where Ahenobarbus had twenty newly-levied cohorts. 
Pompey, who had found the raising of troops in Campania more 
difficult than he expected, had on the 25th started for Apulia ; ^ but 
refused to relieve Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, ordering him rather to 
join him at Brundisium. Ahenobarbus tried to conceal this from his 
soldiers, meaning to escape by himself. They discovered it how- 
ever ; arrested him ; and sent legates to Caesar. The next morning 
Ahenobarbus and the chief men with him were in Caesar's hands, 
who, after making a statement justifying his measures, dismissed 
them all unharmed, even returning to Ahenobarbus a large sum of 
public money. 

Pompey was now resolved to leave Italy and summon men and Pompey 
ships from the East. He had remained some days at Luceria to be <^rosses to 

joined by the consuls and senators. But when he heard of the fall y^^^^- 

chiunt 
of Corfinium he removed to Canusium ( i 8th February), and thence Marck 

to Brundisium (20th February). When Caesar arrived there on the [/a«.] ^9. 

9th of March, he found that the consuls and a considerable part of 

the army had already crossed to Dyrrachium. Pompey with two 

legions was waiting the return of the transports. After some fruitless 

negotiations, and an attempt on Caesar's part to block up the 

harbour — which, if successful, would have forced Pompey to make 

terms apart from the main body of his supporters, — Pompey and 

^ The first notions of Pompey's forces were much exaggerated (see Cicero, 
ad Alt. ix. 6 and 9). As a fact he had at first only the two legions in Apulia. 
These were reinforced by recruits ordered to concentrate at Brundisium, and by 
others who were serving under other magistrates, until he crossed with five legions 
(or between 25,000 and 30,000 men, counting cavalry and auxiliaries) (Plut. Pomp. 
Ixii. ; Caesar, B. Civ. i. 25). Caesar was supposed to have at his command 
eleven legions with unlimited Gallic cavalry (Cicero, ad Att. vii. 7). Tn reality the 
"Army of Gaul" consisted of nine legions; of these only one (the 13th) was 
ready at the beginning of January, the rest being in winter quarters. It was this 
with which he passed the Rubicon (knowing that Pompey had only two, and they 
in winter quarters). The 12th legion joined him on the 5th February [8th Janu- 
ary], and the 8th on the 17th February [20th January], and by taking over 
captured cohorts and fresh enrolments he had six legions and 1000 cavalry when 
he arrived at Brundisium, 



740 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Caesar s 
visit to 
Rome, 
March- 
April 4g. 



Siege of 

Massilia, 

April 

[March'] 

49- 



Fabius sent 
from Narbo 
to Spain, 
Sth May 
[Sth April] 
49- 



his two legions succeeded in crossing on the night of the i8th of 
March.i 

Caesar had not sufficient ships to follow him. He must leave 
him to gather the forces in the East, while he secured the West, and 
especially the corn-growing countries ; for, as Pompey had sent for 
ships from Alexandria, Phoenicia, Cyprus, Asia, Rhodes, Byzantium, 
and other places, he would be able to starve out Italy. Caesar, 
therefore, after securing the harbours of Brundisium, Tarentum, and 
Sipontum, sent a legion under Q. Valerius to Sardinia, and arranged 
for Curio to go to Sicily with another. At the end of March he 
went with six legions to Rome, where he found some senators and 
magistrates, though he could not persuade Cicero, whom he met at 
Sinuessa on the 28th, to come. He did not stay long in the city. 
His object was to put himself in a constitutional position. Both consuls 
being absent, and the praetor L. Aemilius Lepidus not being capable, 
as Cicero told him, of naming a dictator or holding consular elections,'^ 
he proposed that the Senate should appoint an interrex for the purpose. 
But he found so much opposition and indecision that, after a few 
days of fruitless wrangling, he started for Massilia to secure the 
road for Spain. He seems to have obtained some authority for 
his legates in Sardinia and Sicily ; and he left Lepidus in charge 
of Rome, and the tribune M. Antonius in charge of Italy with 
pro-praetorial authority, and with directions to prevent farther 
emigrations to Pompey, and to recall those banished under Pompey's 
laws. 

The people of Massilia refused him admission within their walls ; 
but they not only received Ahenobarbus — who, after being dismissed 
by Caesar at Corfinium, had collected a fleet at Cosa in Etruria, and 
manned it with his own tenants and other country folk — but made 
him commandant of the garrison. Caesar therefore decided that he 
must take the town, and to do so must build ships. In thirty days 
from the felling of the timber twelve ships of war were built at Aries, 
and put under the command of Decimus Brutus ; towers and vincae 
were constructed, and the siege committed to C. Trebonius. But 
this had seriously delayed him. Two of Pompey's legati in Spain, L. 
Afranius and M. Petreius, had united their forces, and were stationed 
at Ilerda with five legions to resist him. He had sent on C. Fabius 
from Narbo through Perpignan and Barcelona early in May : and when 
he followed him in June he found Fabius shut up in a narrow strip 
of country between the rivers Sicoris {Segre) and Cincius. It had 
been stripped of provisions ; the rivers were impassable from floods ; 

^ The dates are those of the unreformed calendar. Those of the reformed 
lulian Calendar are given in square brackets. 

2 Ad Att. ix. 9, quod mains itnperium a minore rogari tion sit ius. 



XLV CAESAR SECURES SPAIN 741 

and his bridges were broken down. Caesar repaired the bridges and Caesar 

relieved Fabius ; but after some indecisive skirmishes the bridges follows, 

were again swept away by a storm. Afranius and Petreius holding ^^^^ J^^^ 

the only sound one, near Ilerda, could obtain provisions, while he ^/aV] 

was again shut up in the fork of the streams. He was in great peril, ^ 

and exaggerated reports of his defeat reached Rome, where the difficulties 

town-house of Afranius was thronged with visits of congratulation, in Spain, 

and many who had before hesitated crossed to Dyrrachium to join June-July. 

Pompey. Among them was Cicero, who embarked at Caieta on the 

I ith of June. 

But the position was suddenly reversed. A long train of pro- Caesar 

visions from Gaul had been stopped by the flooded Sicoris. Caesar, ^^^^^'^^^ h 

however, got a legion across in coracles, constructed after those he ''\ ^^^"'!^^-^ "J 
^ r . . . . provisions, 

had seen in Britam ; and havmg thus men on both sides of the river jji^ j^iy 

the bridge was quickly repaired and the provisions secured. Before [/j/A 

long Afranius and Petreius, alarmed at the advance of Caesar's June\ 

lines, and at the defection of native tribes, attempted to retire 

beyond the Ebro. But they were outmarched by Caesar, who seized 

a gorge through which they meant to pass, and they had to choose 

between fighting and surrender. Their men, however, were against Surrender 

fighting, and fraternised with Caesar's soldiers; and after some toil- of Petreius 

some marches, harassed by Caesar's cavalry, they surrendered, and ^^^ 

were permitted to quit Spain unharmed. Those of their soldiers who 2nd Aug. 

were domiciled in Spain v/ere allowed to go to their homes, the rest \^2nd July\ 

were sent to Italy. 

The third of Pompey's legates, M, Terentius Varro, governor of M. 
Baetica, felt himself still bound to resist in the interests of his im- 'terentius 
perator, and was actually engaged in levying fresh troops and collect- . ^'JJ' . 
ing stores. But the citizens of Corduba closed their gates against Baetica, 
him ; the people of Gades did the same ; one of his legions deserted ; surrenders 
and, finding it impossible to proceed, he handed over his remaining lo Caesar, 
legion to Caesar, as well as his provincial accounts and the balance ^ //^ ^ 
of public money in his hands. After taking some measures for \Aucr\4Q 
pacifying the country, Caesar placed Q. Cassius Longinus in com- 
mand of Baetica ; and reaching the camp at Massilia on the 3rd of Caesar 
October, found the Massilians ready to surrender. Ahenobarbus returns to 
managed to escape; but the city, with all arms, engines of war, and ^J^!^^^' 
money, was given up to him, and was allowed to retain its position [jo/zi^J/cr.] 
as a libera civitas. 

Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, and Gaul were thus secured to Caesar ; but Sardinia 
Africa was in the meanwhile lost, and remained a refuge for the occupied by 
defeated Pompeians in the next year. For though Q. Valerius had *^^i^^^^^^ >' 
successfully occupied Sardinia, the senatorial governor M. Cotta 
escaping to Africa ; and though C. Curio had been equally successful 



742 



HISTORY OF ROME 



and Sicily 
by Curio, 
2jrd April 

l2Sth 

Marc hi 
49- 

Fall of 
Curio in 
Africa, 
20th Aug. 
[20lh /uly] 
49- 

Caesar at 
Rome, 2nd 
Dec. [2Sth 
Oct. ] to 
ijth Dec. 
{8th Nov.] 
49- 



48. Coss. 

C. lulius 

Caesar, 

P. 

Servilius 

Vatia. 



Caesar 
embarks at 
Brundis- 
ium, 4th 
Jan. 48 
{28th Nov. 
49\ 



Caesar at 
Apollonia, 
yth Jan. 
48 {ist 
Dec. 4g]. 



in Sicily, which Cato abandoned without a blow (23rd April), 
there had been a disaster in Africa. The Pompeian governor 
P. Attius Varus was supported by luba, king of Numidia, who was 
attached to Pompey and had reason for hostility to Caesar and 
Curio. In 81 Pompey had restored his father Hiempsal, dethroned 
by the Marians ; but in 62, when acting as his father's ambassador in 
Rome, he had a violent personal altercation with Caesar, then praetor ; 
and in 50 C. Curio as tribune had proposed to reduce Numidia to 
the form of a province. luba therefore supported Varus, and though 
he did not arrive in time to save him from a somewhat severe 
defeat, yet in a subsequent engagement with the king C. Curio was 
defeated and killed. 

Caesar had not time to attempt to retrieve this disaster. While on 
his return to Massilia he learnt that the constitutional difficulty had 
been got over, and that he had been named dictator coniitiis /ladendis. 
He hastened to Rome, stopping at Placentia to put down a mutiny 
on the 15th November [October], and held the consular elections, at 
which he was himself returned with P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus, who 
had joined his party. He carried two laws, of which there was pressing 
need. The Civil war had caused a commercial crisis : credit was 
shaken, and debts could not be collected. His first law established 
arbitrators who were to prevent forced sales at panic prices. The 
creditors were to accept the property o( debtors at a price estimated 
at their value before the war. His second law gave the civiias to 
the Transpadani. It had been long promised, and their votes were 
necessary to him. He also directed the tribunes and praetors to 
carry on the work of Antony by bringing in laws to restore those who 
had been condemned \n judicui overawed by Pompey's arms. He 
spent only eleven days in Rome altogether ; and having abdicated the 
dictatorship, hastened to Brundisium, where he had appointed twelve 
legions to meet him. Though he found his legions reduced in strength 
by the long march from Spain and the unhealthiness of Brundisium, 
and though the number of transports was insufficient, he yet got 
seven legions across on the 4th of January. He landed at Oricum, 
which the commandant surrendered to him as consul, and marched 
to Apollonia. Pompey's magazines were at Dyrrachium, but he 
was himself encamped more inland. It became a kind of race 
between the two, which should reach Dyrrachium first. Pompey 
outmarched Caesar ; saved Dyrrachium ; and sent ships which 
recovered Oricum. 

Caesar was now in considerable danger. He had landed with 
seven legions : but Pompey had nine, besides large numbers of 
auxiliaries from all parts of Greece, Thrace, and Asia ; and was also 
supported by a numerous and powerful fleet, whicli, stationed at 



POMPEY AND CAESAR NEAR DYRRACHIUM 



743 



C. Caesar's Camp 

A. A. Unfinished lines of Caesar. 



Corcyra under Bibulus,i had attacked and burnt thirty of Caesar's 
transports while on their way back to Brundisium to bring the 
remainder of his army over. Through the winter months he awaited 
them with great anxiety ; even, it is said, attempting to cross himself 
in an open boat to urge their coming. He nearly lost his life in the 
attempt, and did not succeed. He then sent Postumius with positive 
orders that they were to cross at any risk and to run their ships 
aground anywhere. It was not, however, till the spring of 48 that Arrival of 
Antony with three veteran legions, one of tirones^ and 800 cavalry, ^^- Antony, 
arrived at Lissus, about 30 miles north of Dyrrachium. Pompey en- ^^^^^^ 
deavoured to prevent Caesar effecting a junction with him. In this, [-^^^/i Feb.^ 
however, he failed, and returned to his old quarters between Petra 48. 
and Asparagium, south of Dyrrachium. Caesar endeavoured in every 
way to provoke him to give him 
battle, seizing strong places, 
raising forts, and constructing 
lines of circumvallation, which 
presently extended for fifteen, 
miles round Pompey's camp, 
and included twenty-four castles 
and forts. Pompey, on his part, 
erected defensive lines within 
Caesar's from Petra round to 
the sea again ; and though he 
was cut off from the country 
he could get provisions from 
Dyrrachium and the sea. His 
agents were everywhere, col- 
lecting corn, and raising money 
by loans in advance of taxes. 

He was suffering, however, from shortness of fodder for his horses, 
which died in great numbers ; and as the cavalry was his strong 
arm he was anxious to put an end to this state of things, and was 
less able than ever to resist the pressure of his followers, who, un- 
disciplined, luxurious, and insubordinate, were urging him to attack. 
Caesar was really in a still worse plight ; his corn was running short, 
and his men were feeding on bread made of a root called " chava " ; 
yet their spirits were unbroken, and they threw loaves of this stuff 
over the ramparts to persuade the Pompeians that they were 
well off. 

Pompey however was waiting for a reinforcement from the east, 
which his father-in-law Metellus Scipio was bringing up the Egnatian 




Walker GtBoutallsc 



* Bibulus died early in March [February] 48. 



744 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Caesar s 

line 

pierced, 

jrd-^th 

July [2jrd- 

2j//t A/ay] 

48. 

Retreat of 
Caesar, yth 
July {27th 
May]. 



Pompey 
pursues for 
one day, 
8th July 
[28thyiay\ 
Caesar 
joined by 
Calvinus. 

Pompey in 
Thessaly. 



The two 
armies 
near each 
other, Aug. 
[June] 48. 



road (and which Caesar had sent Domitius Calvinus to intercept), and 
still avoided making any movement ; until, as the summer was wearing 
away, two Allobrogians, in whom Caesar had placed great confidence, 
but who had abused his trust, deserted to Pompey and pointed 
out a weak point in Caesar's lines, — their south extremity near the sea, 
where they were as yet unfinished, and might be turned by landing 
troops at this point. This was done ; and a temporary embankment, 
thrown up to block the gap, was found to be only guarded by two 
cohorts ; and though the quaestor P. Marcellinus, Antony, and finally 
Caesar himself came to the rescue, it was too late. The lines were 
pierced and Pompey was entrenched outside them close to the sea. 
Caesar fortified a new camp hard by ; but after meeting with a 
fresh disaster in attacking a Pompeian legion, which was march- 
ing into a deserted camp a little to the north of his position, he 
resolved to retire to Apollonia and thence to Thessaly, in hopes 
of being joined by Domitius Calvinus and drawing Pompey from the 
sea. 

The Pompeians were highly elated at this retreat, and urged a 
pursuit. Pompey yielded for one day, but was unwilling to venture 
farther. He returned to Dyrrachium : but presently, in hopes of being 
joined by Metellus, marched down the Egnatian road. Domitius 
Calvinus, warned of the danger of being thus caught between two 
armies, made his way across the mountains into Thessaly and joined 
Caesar at Aeginium on the upper Peneius.^ Meanwhile Pompey had 
also effected his junction with Metellus Scipio, and leaving the 
Egnatian road marched to the vale of Tempe and thence to Larissa, 
1st August [21st June]; and on the 5th [25th June] advanced by 
Scotussa across the Enipeus and pitched a camp about four miles 
from Caesar. 

The two rivals were now within moderate distance of each other, 
with a country of plain and hill between them suitable for fighting. 
Pompey had declined to follow the advice of Afranius after Caesar's 
retreat, — to leave him to be hemmed in by the fleet, while he went 
himself to Italy, — partly out of regard to the safety of his father- 
in-law, and partly from a dislike to appear to his Eastern allies to 
be afraid to fight. Still his better judgment was for avoid- 
ing a battle and gradually exhausting Caesar, who had no fleet to 
bring him provisions, and had to depend on exactions from the 
country, while his own ships were at every point of the coast and 
could supply him with anything. But the pressure and flattery of 
his followers, elated with the events at Dyrrachium and the junction 
with Metellus, and eager to get back to Italy and enjoy the offices 

^ Caesar had marched towards Gomphi, south of the Peneius, along the 
same route as Flamininus in 163. See map on p. 440. , 



XLV DEFEAT OF POMPEY AT PHARSALUS 745 

for which they had bargained and the confiscated properties of the Contrast 
Caesarians, impelled him to give battle at once. His army was between 
distracted by intrigues and cabals, and with quarrels as to the ^^^ (^^^i^^- 
division of the spoil. The dignity of pontifex maximus was 
especially coveted, and the claims of various men of rank were 
gravely debated as though Caesar were already dead or a prisoner. 
The camp was a scene of luxury and folly ; and was crowded with 
men from the provinces of Asia and the Islands, with Jews, 
Armenians, and Arabians ; and with sovereigns such as Deiotarus 
of Galatia and Ariarathes of Cappadocia. On the other side 
was a smaller army, but largely composed of veterans, enthusi- 
astically devoted to and believing in their chief In it there was 
no division of counsels, no rivalry of claims, and no hope but in 
victory. 

The battle was to decide whether the evils which had so long 
sapped the strength of Rome, — the selfish grasp on power of a 
narrow clique, and its misuse in the government of the provinces, 
and in the accumulation of enormous fortunes spent in personal 
luxury, were to give place to the wisdom of a statesman and the 
hand of a master of men. It is a pity therefore that its details are 
even less clearly ascertainable than usual. Pompey trusted to the 
superiority of his numbers, especially in cavalry, to outflank Caesar. 
His army actually on the field amounted to more than 44,000 Battle of 
with 7000 cavalry, Caesar's to little more than 22,000, with 1000 Pharsalus, 
cavalry. The left of Pompey's line, which was longer than Caesar's, f!^ "f"^' 
was commanded by Ahenobarbus, the centre by Scipio, and the right 
by Lentulus. Caesar took post on the extreme right of his line, 
with the 1 2th legion; P. Sulla commanded the left; Domitius 
Calvinus the centre ; and M. Antonius the right. 

Pompey's plan was that his numerous cavalry on his left (under 
Labienus) should outflank Caesar's line on the right and throw itself 
upon the rear of his legions ; but that his infantry should wait to be 
charged. Caesar criticises this as failing to take into account the 
ardour generated by a rapid advance ; and it certainly was unsuccess- 
ful. Pompey's cavalry drove back Caesar's horse, but was in its turn 
repulsed by Caesar's reserve, or fourth line, of infantry and archers, 
and fled in confusion to the high ground, leaving the light armed 
archers and slingers unprotected. Meanwhile Caesar's infantry, find- 
ing that the enemy did not move, slackened their charge, that they 
might not arrive out of breath ; hurled \\\^\x pilaj and then, drawing 
their swords, closed in deadly embrace. The struggle, which was victory of 
severe, was decided by Caesar's third line coming fresh on to the Caesar. 
ground ; and the Pompeians were soon in full flight. 

Pompey had given up the battle as lost when he saw the defeat 



746 



HISTORY OF ROME 



48, 



Pompey s 
camp taken. 

Flight of 
Pompey. 



Pompey 
resolves to 
go to 
Egypt. 

Civil war 
in Egypt. 

Pompey at 
Pelusium, 
28th Sept. 
{i6th 
A ug. ]. 



of his cavalry ; and returning to his camp, and giving orders for the 
guarding of the vallum, retired to his tent. Caesar pushed on his 
advantage. Though it was midday, and the heat was terrible he 
led his men against Pompey's camp. Before long its defenders 
were rushing through the opposite gate ; and Pompey had mounted 
his horse and was galloping to Larissa. There he was joined by a 
few followers, and without resting hurried on to the coast. Finding 
a corn ship ready to start he reached Amphipolis ; and after one 
night there sailed to Lesbos, where his wife and younger son were 
with his friend Theophanes. Taking them on board he proceeded 
on his voyage down the Asiatic coast. At Attaleia in Pamphylia he 
obtained some triremes and certain Cilician recruits, and heard that 
his fleet under Cato at Corcyra had taken up many survivors of the 
battle as well as those left at Dyrrachium, and had gone to the 
province of Africa. During his stay at Apameia he collected more 
ships and men, and was joined by about sixty senators He 
was looking out for some place of safety. He thought of Syria, 
which he had in part granted to the Parthian king Orodes ; but by 
the advice of Theophanes at last decided upon Egypt. Landing 
at Paphos in Cyprus, he collected more ships, money, and men; 
and about the middle of October [August] set sail for Alexandria. 

The sovereign of Egypt was the youthful Ptolemy XII., son ot 
that Ptolemy Auletes whose cause Pompey had supported at Rome. 
The boy had been Pompey's ward ; and was at present at Pelusium 
with an army to oppose the return of his sister Cleopatra from Syria. 
His ministers or guardians were the eunuch Pothmus and the 
rhetorician Theodotus of Chios. His army was commanded by 
Achillas There were also some Roman troops at Alexandria, left 
there by Gabinius when he restored Auletes in 57. ^^/hen 
Pompey's message reached the king, announcing his arrival at the 
promontory of Casius, and asking shelter, the royal council was 
divided in opinion, but eventually decided that it was not safe 
to receive him or to let him go. To murder him would be best : 
"dead men do not bite." The task was entrusted to two Romans, 
— Septimius, once a military tribune in Pompey's army, and Salvius, 
a centurion. A boat was sent out with Achillas on board, who 
greeted Pompey respectfully and invited him to come on shore. 
On the beach were seen armed men, and ships of war getting 
ready. It was necessary to risk all. Amidst the agonised anxiety 
of wife and friends Pompey stepped into the boat, took his place 
in the stern, and recognised and addressed Septimius as an old 
comrade. The surly reply received must have warned him of his 
danger ; and when, as he was stepping out of the boat, he felt the 
sword of Septimius at his back, he hastily drew the folds of his toga 



XLV MURDER OF POMPEY IN EGYPT 747 

over his face and fell without a struggle. His head was cut off, and Potnpey 
his body left upon the sand, until his faithful freedman Philip found murdered, 
some fragments of a stranded boat, with which he made a rude ^ ' 
funeral pyre, assisted by an old Roman soldier, who found him at his 
sorrowful task. 

This was the end of a great career. No contemporary had done 
greater services to the Empire. From his earliest youth to his death 
he had been employed at every crisis. The hand of the assassin 
had indeed aided him against Sertorius : and he only intervened in 
the war with Spartacu§ when the chief work was done. But the Pompey's 
delivery of the sea from the pirates had been all his own : and career and 
though Mithridates had nearly come to the end of his resources ^'^^''^^^^''• 
when Pompey arrived, it was his energy that finally drove the king 
from Pontus, and his honesty and ability which settled the new 
provinces and made the Euphrates the boundary of the Roman 
Empire. He had been less successful in politics. Beginning with 
a leaning to the Populares, he had been outbidden and outmanoeuvred 
by Caesar ; had lost control of the extreme left wing ; had declined 
to join the Optimates when to do so would have made him all- 
powerful ; and had joined them when his credit was failing and 
their cause had become hopeless, and never really trusted, or was 
trusted, by them. He wished for two inconsistent things, — personal 
supremacy and the strict maintenance of the constitution ; and did 
not see that reforms had become impossible except by arms. He 
had no policy to propose, and trusted blindly to the position which 
his great services had secured ; and in his last war had allowed him- 
self to be overruled by incompetent followers. Caesar was six years Contrast of 
younger, and with boundless confidence in himself, with which he Caesar's 
inspired others, never felt his career closed while there was work to ^^^^'^<^^^^' 
do. He had a distinct policy, small respect for laws or customs 
which barred its success, and little scruple as to the character of the 
men employed to carry it out. He felt the faculty of government in 
him and desired to leave his mark in everything, from the Calendar 
to the highest matters of state. Pompey's victory would have 
meant the perpetuation of a system which had proved unworkable ; 
Caesar's meant at any rate a change. Though it was impossible 
even for him to make a clean sweep of ancient forms, yet under 
those ancient forms a new constitution was in fact to be created, 
which would make the government of the Empire a possibility. 

Caesar had lost only 200 men and about thirty centurions at Caesar 
Pharsalus, while nearly i 5,000 of the enemy lay on the field or were follows 
killed by the cavalry in the pursuit ; and nine eagles and 1 80 ^^^"/^^' ^ 
standards were laid at his feet. The victory was signal, but must r^^^ July] 
be followed up by the destruction of the party, which still had a 



748 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Caesar 
arrives h 
Egypt. 



Outbreaks 
in Alex- 
andria. 



Mithri- 
dates of 
Pergaytius 
arrives at 
Pelusium, 
2nd March 
[i2th Jan. J 
47- 



great fleet and the command of Africa. Caesar therefore hurried 
forward in pursuit of Pompey with one legion and some cavalry, 
leaving orders for another legion to follow. At the Hellespont he 
was overtaken by this second legion, and marched through Asia, 
where he stayed for about a week, from the 19th to the 25 th Sep- 
tember [7th- 1 3th August]. He seems to have been kept informed 
of the stages of Pompey's flight ; and was everywhere received with 
great honour, and the announcement of prodigies from complaisant 
temples. He arrived at Alexandria on the 5th of October [24th 
August], and was at once informed of Pompey's death, the head being 
shown him with ready ofliciousness. He turned from it with horror, 
and shed tears at the sight of his signet ring. 

His difficulties however were not over. His landing with lictors 
and the ensigns of imperium was resented by the Alexandrine mob ; 
and for some days there were riots in which Roman soldiers were 
murdered. He sent for reinforcements from Asia, and summoned 
both Ptolemy and Cleopatra to Alexandria, bidding them dismiss 
their armies, and submit their differences to him, as head of the 
Roman people, who by their father's will were their guardians. The 
army at Pelusium under Achillas, 20,000 strong, was incited by 
Pothinus to resist his decision of a joint reign for Ptolemy and his 
sister, and advanced on Alexandria. Caesar was not strong enough 
to fight, and induced Ptolemy to send envoys to Achillas, who 
however refused them a hearing and put one of them to death. 
Caesar thereupon secured Ptolemy's person, and shortly afterwards 
put Pothinus to death. About the loth of November [27th 
September] Achillas occupied Alexandria and assaulted the palace. 
Caesar burnt the docks and Egyptian fleet, and transferred his men 
to Pharos, commanding the entrance to the harbour and connected 
with the city by the Heptistadium and drawbridges. Achillas was 
master of Alexandria, and set up Cleopatra's sister Arsinoe as queen, 
who however soon quarrelled with him, put him to death, and made 
Ganymedes commander. Caesar obtained ships from Rhodes, and 
was promised help by Mithridates of Pergamus, who collected an 
army in Syria and Cilicia. Towards the end of the year Ptolemy 
persuaded Caesar to allow him to go to Alexandria and negotiate a 
peace ; but immediately joined the enemy and renewed the war, cut- 
ting off Caesar's convoys of provisions at sea. At the beginning of 
March 47 [12th January] Mithridates arrived at Pelusium ; Ptolemy 
was defeated, and drowned in attempting to escape. Alexandria 
surrendered on the 27th March [6th February] and Cleopatra was 
made queen with a boy brother called Ptolemy XI H. 

In the autumn of 48, while at Alexandria, Caesar was informed 
that he had been named dictator for a year, consul for five, with the 



XLV CAESAR'S EXPEDITION INTO ASIA 749 

tribimicia potestas for life, and the right of holding all elections Caesar 

except those of the tribunes. ^^-T"? - 

But there was still work to do in the East. Pharnaces (the son of jlth^Nov. 

Mithridates whom Pompey had made king of Bosporus) had invaded i2()thSept.'\ 

his paternal kingdom of Pontus and defeated Domitius Calvinus and 48. 

Deiotarus, who tried to make up for his presence at Pharsalus by 

offering assistance to Calvinus. Caesar started for Asia and Caesar 

arrived at Antioch on 13th July [23rd May]. There he heard bad leaves Alex- 

news from home, from the reports of his Master of the Horse, M. '!'!ff^f' 

1 , T • 11 • e 2istn June 

Antonius.i The returned soldiers were mutmous and clamourmg tor [-^^^ ^,j^y-^ 

bounties. M. Caelius, who had been rewarded for his adhesion by ^7. 
the praetorship (48), was discontented at C. Trebonius being Troubles 
preferred as praetor urbanus, and at not getting what he expected in Italy, 
from confiscations. He refused to carry out Caesar's law as to the 4^-47 ■ 
securities to be surrendered by debtors, and even instigated the as- 
sassination of Trebonius. Failing in that, he promulgated a law for Rebellion 
wiping out debts and rent. The consul Servilius Vatia obtained a ^f Caehus 
guard, tore down the tablets, and suspended Caelius. Driven from ^^ ^ ' ^" 
Senate-house and Rostra, Caelius fled to Campania to join Milo, who 
had been at the head of a band of ruffians at Capua, in wrath at not 
being included in the number of exiles recalled. Finding Milo 
already put to death by the praetor Q. Pedius near Thurii, he continued 
his flight to Bruttium, where he was overtaken and killed. Next year P- Cor- 
(47) it was Dolabella who caused trouble. He was young, profligate, "^'^^"^ 
and overburdened with debt ; and not getting the relief he expected for j.^ p^ ' 
his services at Pharsalus, he got himself transferred to a plebeian gens ; 
was elected tribune for 47 ; and as he was opposed by his colleague 
Trebellius, party fights were constantly going on, which Antony 
could not control ; and when Caesar's difficulties in Egypt, and still 
more his departure for Asia were known, Dolabella, who had the 
ear of the mob, was promising ?tovae tabulae and the rest of a revolu- 
tionary programme, while Antony was called away from Rome by 
disorders of the troops at Brundisium. 

Still Caesar determined that he must settle affairs in Asia before Caesar in 

returning. His movements were extremely rapid. Three days at ^^^' 

, ^ ^ , ^ ,-- , ^ rr ■ • Summer of 

Antioch, four at Tarsus, three at Comana, sufficed to settle affairs in ^^ 

Syria, Cilicia, and Cappadocia. On the 28th July [7th June] he 

met Deiotarus, whom he deprived of his tetrarchy in Galatia, and 

took over a legion which he had with him, allowing him to retain 

1 Cicero (2 Phil. § 62) asserts Antony to have been named Magister Equitum 
without Caesar's knowledge, but both Plutarch {Ant. viii. ) and Dio (xlii. 21) speak 
of Caesar's selection of him. His conduct is bitterly attacked by Cicero, whom 
Plutarch copies. There was at any rate great disorder, which he could not, or 
at any rate did not check (Dio xlii. 27). 



750 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Zela. 

Ve7ii, vidi, 
vici, 27id 

Alli^. [/2//i 

June'\ 4-j. 



Caesar in 
Rome, .fill 
Oct. -4tk 
Dec. [rilh 
Au^.-ioth 
OcL]47. 

Coss. Q. 
Fufius 
Calenus, J' 
Vatinius. 

Discedite 
Quirites. 



The 

Pompeians 
in AJrica, 
48-47- 



his royal title, and some small part of Lesser Armenia. ^ Next day 
he entered Pontus, and answered the envoys of Pharnaces by ordering 
the king to quit that country and restore to freedom the Roman 
publicani whom he had seized, and all property he had taken from 
allies of Rome. Pharnaces pretended obedience ; but when he 
shuffled and delayed, Caesar moved swiftly upon his position, on 
a hill three miles from Zela ; defeated him ; and stormed his camp. 
Pharnaces fled to Sinope, and thence to Panticapaeum, where he 
was defeated and killed by his own rebellious general Asander. 
Caesar left Pontus in charge of Caelius Vinicianus with two 
legions ; gave Bosporus and Deiotarus' Galatian tetrarchy to 
Mithridates of Pergamus, with leave to drive out Asander ; and 
hurried back through Bithynia and Asia — settling many disputes on 
the way and leaving the rest to Domitius Calvinus. From Athens, 
which he reached in the middle of September, he went to Rome, 
where he arrived on the 4th of October [i ith August], 

He only stayed two months in the city, during which he held 
elections of consuls for the remainder of the year ; arranged for 
his own consulship with M. Aemilius Lepidus for 46; and suppressed 
the disorders going on, though without punishing Dolabella or 
others. He disappointed many of his followers, who had bought 
confiscated estates, sometimes beyond their marketable value, in the 
confidence that they would not have to pay, by insisting on the discharge 
of the debt. It was on this point that a coolness arose between 
Caesar and Antony (who had purchased Pompey's estate), on which 
Cicero dwells at length in the second Philippic. He partly, however, 
satisfied his partisans with offices, priesthoods, and seats in the 
Senate ; and suppressed a sedition among the soldiers by addressing 
them as " Quirites," and granting them the dismissal they asked for, 
but did not wish to have, — only admitting them back to the service 
as a favour, and taking care to weed out the most unruly. 

Earlier in the year his legate Vatinius had successfully driven the 
Pompeian M. Octavius from Illyricum ; but the party was still in 
great strength in Africa. When the news of the defeat at Pharsalus 
arrived, Cato, who had been left in charge of the camp at Dyrrachium, 
joined the fleet at Corcyra. There he found Pompey's elder son 
Gnaeus, who had been deserted by the Egyptian ships which he 
commanded, but insisted that with the large fleet still left them they 
might maintain the war, and was nearly killing Cicero for opposing 
it. It was resolved to go to Africa, where they expected to be 
rejoined by Pompey himself, and by Metellus Scipio, who had fled to 
the protection of King luba and Attius Varus. When they arrived 

* He was accused of trying to poison Caesar, and was defended by M. Brutus 
at Nicaea \ad Alt. xiv, i] and by Cicero at Rome. 



XLV 



THE POMPEIANS IN AFRICA 



751 




at Cyrene they heard 
of Pompey's death 
from his younger son 
Sextus : and the ships 
being dispersed by a 
storm, Cato made his 
way by land to the 
province of Africa, and 
arrived at Utica early 
in April 47. He had 
refused the chief com- 
mand on the ground 
that Metellus Scipio 
as a consular was his 
superior in rank. 
Scipio therefore was 
made commander-in- 
chief; and Attius 
Varus, who had been 
anxious to retain this 
post in his own pro- 
vince, took the com- 
mand of the fleet ; 
while Cato remained 
at Utica to support 
them both. 

They had now had Caesar 
a year in which to con- leaves 
solidate their forces. 
Caesar hastened to 
meet them before it 
was too late. On the 
17th of December 
[23rd October] he 
was in Lilybaeum. 
There he collected 
six legions and 2000 
cavalry ; set sail on 
the 25 th December 
[31st October]; and 
in four days landed 
at Adrumetum, but 
with only 3000 in- 
fantry and 1 50 cavalry. 



Rome for 
Africa, ^tli 
Dec. [loth 

Oct.^.n. 



752 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



46. Coss. 
C. lulius 
Caesar 
III. , M. 
Aemilius 
Lepidus. 



The rest were delayed by bad weather. Considius, commandant of 
Pompeian troops in Adrumetum, refused to yield ; and attacked him 
as he moved down the coast to Ruspina, where he arrived on the ist 
of January 46 [5th November 47]. There he received the sub- 
mission of Leptis, and stationed guards in it. He was, however, in a 
dangerous position, having landed in Africa with forces inadequate 
to withstand the combined forces of Scipio and luba, which were 
advancing upon him, even when about the 4th January [8th 
November 47] a part of his scattered fleet suddenly appeared. 
Up to that time he had been obliged to let his small force — -farther 
diminished by the despatch of Sallustius Crispus to Cercina for 
provisions — pass the nights on board ship. He now fortified 
himself at Ruspina, and waited for the auxiliaries and provisions 
which he had sent for from Sardinia and Sicily. But he would 
probably even so have been crushed but for the timely intervention of 
P. Sittius, who with king Bocchus of Mauritania, invaded the 
dominions of luba, took Cirta, and by this diversion forced luba to 
return to the defence of his own kingdom, though on the point of 
joining Scipio. Meanwhile Caesar was joined by many Romans of 
position in the province ; and his ships came to land at different 
points, though attacked by C. Vergilius at Thapsus, and sometimes 
taken. Scipio, however, advancing close up to Ruspina, tried to 
bring Caesar to battle ; and after a time induced luba to join him 
with three legions and 800 horse, though he left his main army 
under Saburra to defend his own kingdom. 

Scipio being thus reinforced by luba, and by fresh troops enrolled 
and sent by Cato from Utica, was eager to fight. Caesar too had 
been reinforced by two legions from Sicily, though in a feeble and 
disorganised state [iith March=iith January]; and offered or 
pretended to offer Scipio battle. But though there was some cavalry 
skirmishing, the armies stood all day without engaging. It was now 
towards the end of March [January], and nothing decisive had 
occurred. Caesar took various strongholds, and Varus with his fleet 
hovered off the coast from time to time, capturing Caesar's transports. 
But neither side gained any conspicuous advantage, till at last on 
the 4th April [4th February] Caesar advanced to attack Thapsus. 
Scipio followed, keeping on high ground, and attempted to throw 
a reinforcement into Thapsus along a narrow neck of land between 
a salt lagoon and the sea, defended by a castle and three legions. 

Scipio began pitching a camp about a mile from this castle, 
between it and the sea. Caesar recalled his men from the siege of 
Thapsus, ordered ships up to the shore near Scipio's camp, and thus 
forced Scipio to fight while his army was partly occupied in 
fortifying the camp. Yet Caesar seemed unwilling to begin, in spite 



XLV VICTORY AT THAPSUS AND DEATH OF CATO 753 

of the entreaties of his officers. But the soldiers could not be 

restrained. The men on the left wing forced the trumpeter to sound 

the charge, and Caesar, finding it inevitable, mounted a horse and, 

giving the word Felicitas^ led it himself. luba's elephants took 

fright and rushed through their own lines into the camp. Deprived 

of their expected support, the Mauritanian cavalry fled ; and the 

Caesarians with little resistance forced their way into the camp of the 

enemy. A sally from Thapsus was repulsed ; the fugitives from the Defeat of 

camp made for that of luba, and, finding that also occupied, retired Sc^P<^ '^"'^ 

to a hill and gave the signal of surrender by dropping their arms. 

But Caesar's veterans were so infuriated by long restraint, that he 

could not prevent them from cutting the unarmed crowd to pieces, or 

from killing some of their own officers who tried to prevent them. 

He is said to have lost only fifty men ; the enemy 50,000 in killed, 

wounded, prisoners, and missing. Three camps fell into his hands, 

with many elephants and immense spoil. Vergilius still held out in 

Thapsus, but Caesar did not stay to attack him. Leaving that to 

Rebilus with three legions, and the attack on Considius at Thisdra 

to Cn. Domitius Calvinus with two, he started for Utica, occupying 

Uzita and Adrumetum without resistance. 

The unarmed people of Utica had been mistrusted by Cato and Death of 
forced to live outside the walls. Scipio's defeated cavalry would have ^!^^^^',r^[^, 
vented their fury and disappointment on them, but were beaten oflf by y,^.^ -i ^~ 
clubs and stones ; even in the town Cato and Faustus Sulla had to 
bribe them to desist from pillage. But Cato had now made up his 
mind that his cause was hopeless. After talking cheerfully on philo- 
sophy to a large number of guests, and commending his family to L. 
Caesar, he retired to his bedroom and fell on his sword. The wound 
was not mortal, and was dressed ; but, when left alone, he tore away 
the bandages and expired. The other leaders either made their 
peace with Caesar or fell in various ways. luba was refused 
admittance to his capital Zama, and, retiring to a villa with Petreius, 
the two agreed to end their lives by a duel. luba killed Petreius, Death of 
and then induced a slave to stab him. Saburra was conquered and ^"^^' 
killed by P. Sittius. Faustus Sulla and Afranius soon after fell into y,-^^""/' 
Sittius' hands, and, though spared by him, were killed in a military Su//a, ami 
riot. Scipio tried to escape to Spain, to join Gnacus and Scxtus Metcllus 
Pompeius, but was intercepted by Sittius' fleet and threw himself into ^<^ipio- 
the sea. 

Caesar confiscated and sold luba's property, and reduced his Proi'ince of 
kingdom to the form of a province (Numidia), over which he Numidia 
set Sallustius Crispus as proconsul. Vergilius then surrendered orNeiv 
Thapsus ; and having punished or degraded other towns Caesar em- ' J^^'^^'4 
barked at Utica on the i 3th June [April], and touching at Sardinia 

3 ^ 



754 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP 



46. 

Caesar's 
four 
triutuphs 



A year of 
445 days. 
Last year 
of disorder. 



Caesar s 
leisislafion. 



and fining some towns there, arrived at Rome on the 25th July 
[25th May]. 

He celebrated four triumphs — over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and 
Numidia, avoiding thus all reference to the Civil war, and leading no 
Roman citizen among his captives. It was now that most of such 
legislation as he lived to carry out was accomplished. Though he 
left for Spain in December, the reform in the Calendar, on which he 
had employed the (jreek mathematician Sosigenes, gave him two 
months more than appears. The Roman year since the time of Numa 
had consisted of 12 lunar months or 355 days (really 354 d. 8 h. 48', 
36"). The solar year consists of 365 days, 5 hrs., 48', 51^". The 
error had been accumulating, in spite of intercalations, and a correction 
by the decemvirs, till it amounted to 90 days. This was now to end. 
A month of 23 days had already been intercalated after February ; 
and now 67 days were added between the last day of November 
and the first of December. The "last year of disorder," A.u.c. 

708 (B.C. 46), thus consisted of 445 days, and the first of January 

709 (h.C. 45) was brought to its true place in the solar year. Caesar 
was therefore at Rome between six and seven months. He had 
before his arrival been declared dictator for ten years ; and had been 
granted censorial powers under the title of pracfcctiis moruni^ — with 
other honours, some of them usually appropriated to the gods. Well 
understanding that these measures were the effect of fear rather than 
affection, he took an early opportunity of disclaiming any intention of 
vengeance. He aimed at healing the wounds of the last twenty years 
of party conflict and civil war. Among others, Cicero was allowed 
to return unharmed to Rome ; exiles were recalled ; senatorial rank 
restored to others ; and the Senate allowed to recall even some of 
his most violent opponents, such as M. Marcellus. 

His measures, apparently passed now, included a reform of the 
judicia by excluding the tribu7ii aerarii ; ^ a sumptuary law regulating 
cost of banquets and dress, and levying a duty on foreign luxuries ; 
a law encouraging marriage by granting certain privileges to fathers ; 
a law prohibiting senators or their sons from residing out of Italy for 
more than three years except on military service ; while farther to 
encourage the residence of free men, it was ordered that on sheep 
farms not more than two-thirds of the shepherds were to be slaves. 
He wished also to extend the civitas so as to embrace all worthy 
men. The Transpadani had been enfranchised by him in 49, as well 
as the whole of his favourite legion the Alauda. Now the citizen- 
ship was granted to physicians and all professors of the liberal arts 
resident in Rome ; and two new colonies, at Carthage and Corinth, 



^ See p. 680 (note). 



XLV CAESAR GOES TO SPAIN 755 

were projected to supply his veterans and others with land. Finally, 
as a restraint upon ambition in the future, the tenure of a praetorial 
province was confined to one year, that of a consular to two. 

But as a set off to these wise and liberal measures, it must be Inferiority 
owned that there was something in what Cicero alleged, that Caesar of Caesar s 
cared little for the character of those whom he admitted to his ^^^^'^^^ 
confidence, nay, that he seemed to prefer men of damaged reputa- 
tion and fortunes. He was now to experience the results of such a Movements 
choice. In 49 he had left Baetica in charge of Q. Cassius Longinus, in Spain, 
who had already in 54 gained an evil reputation there, and now 49-4^- 
made himself so odious that he was assassinated (47). Caesar 
appointed C Trebonius in his place. But the soldiers in Baetica 
were exasperated with Caesar's governors. They expelled Trebonius, 
and when Gnaeus Pompeius (elder son of Magnus) crossed to Spain 
from Africa, and, after Thapsus, was joined by his brother Sextus, 
Attius Varus, and Labienus, he was able to collect thirteen legions 
and defeat C. Didius, whom Caesar sent against him. 

It was necessary that Caesar should go himself. As soon there- Caesar goes 
fore as necessary arrangements had been made he started. He left ^^ Spain, 
Rome on the 3rd of December (46), and was back again at the ^^ ^^' 
beginning of the following September. The struggle in which he 
was engaged till the i 7th of March was a very severe one, and there 
were at times disquieting rumours as to his defeat. The two armies 
were almost wholly Italian, though Bocchus, one king of Mauritania, 
sent his sons to Pompey, and the other king, Bagouas, served with 
Caesar. The Pompeians were mostly veterans, who, having served 
against Caesar before, and having been granted their lives, had no 
hope of pardon. Caesar's army also consisted mostly of veterans, 
incensed at being called on to fight a civil war again. There was 
likely to be little quarter given ; and, in fact, in no part of the civil 
war was there so much ruthless slaughter. 

On Caesar's approach Sext. Pompeius threw himself into Corduba, 
and sent for aid to his brother Gnaeus, who was besieging Ulia. 
Caesar, not being able to assault Corduba at once, recrossed the Baetis Campaign 
and attacked Pompey's magazine, Ategua ( Teba\ commanded by "' Baetica, 
L. Munatius Flaccus, who l^id been the head of the opposition j/^'^^^ 
to Cassius Longinus. The surrender of Ategua (19th February) 
brought many submissions to Caesar ; and after various minor en- 
gagements Gnaeus Pompeius finally encamped on a plain near 
Munda. Caesar followed, and on the 17th of March forced him to liatth- of 
fight. The struggle on both sides was desperate. For a long time '^f""<ia, 
the two armies remained locked in a deadly embrace, hand to hand ^^^^.y^ 
and foot to foot : at one point Caesar barely saved a panic by rushing 
to the front himself; and it was only, as it appears, from a mistaken 



Settlement 



756 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

notion that Labienus — who rode out of the 7nclcc to beat back a 

charge of Bagouas — was quitting the field, that the Pompcians gave 

way and fled. No quarter was given, and 30,000 are said to have 

been killed, Caesar losing 1000 killed and many wounded. Gnaeus 

Pompeius fled to Carteia, there embarked, and set sail with twenty 

ships. But he had forgotten to take water, and when he went on 

shore for it was surprised by Didius and slain (nth April). Labienus, 

Attius, and Varus had fallen in the battle ; Corduba was taken (Sextus 

Pompeius escaping) ; and the whole of southern Spain fell into Caesar's 

hands. Soon after the battle he was joined by his grand-nephew 

Octavius, then in his eighteenth year, who had been prevented by 

illness from accompanying him. There was still a good deal to do 

l)efore Caesar could leave the country. He was at Hispalis at the 

of Baetica end of April, and on the 30th found time to write to Cicero condoling 

and visit to ^^.jjj^ j^jj^^ Qj^ ^l^g j^,^jl^ ^,f j^ig daughter. But as he did not arrive at 

ApriT-^^' I^oiiie till September, there is a considerable time to be accounted 

Sept. 4s. for, and it is possible that Nicolas of Damascus may be right in 

saying, as he alone does, that he went to Carthage to settle certain 

matters in regard to the colony of 70,000 veterans and others, 

which he had in the previous year determined upon in opposition to 

the Pompeian Utica.^ 

Honours to Every kind of honour had been voted to him as soon as the news 

Caesar. of Munda reached Rome (20th .April) : a sui)plicalio for fifty days ; 

the dictatorship for life ; the right of being consul for the next ten 

years ; the entire control of the treasury ; and complete military 

Shall authority by the title of perpetual impcrator. He was, in fact, in all 

Caesar be but name absolute king. The idea of giving him this title was 

a ''rex" f \^^^^^x openly mooted. There were two points in the Empire which 

still appeared to demand active measures of defence. The Getae 

or Daci were forcing their way over the Danube and eastward into 

Pontus ; the Parthians were again crossing the Euphrates into the 

Roman province of Syria. It was known that Caesar wished to 

undertake the campaigns against them, and his flatterers were not 

slow to urge him to do so, Cicero himself writing to advise it. 

Moreover L. Aurelius Cotta, one of the XW'iri sacris faciundis, 

affirmed from the Sibylline books 2 jhat the Parthians could only 

1 Nicolas (fr. 11-12) makes Octavius accompany him there. Against his 
statement is the silence of all other authorities, and the remark of Sueton. [Aug. 
47), Nee est, opinor, provincia, excepta dumtaxat Africa et Sardinia, quam non 
adierit. But we must observe that Nicolas is the only contemporary writer on 
Augustus, — the most damaging thing is the want of any hint of it in Cicero's 
Letters. 

- The original Sibylline books had been burnt in 82, but others had been 
collected from different places (Tac. Ann. vi. 18 ; Dionys. iv. 62). 



XLv CAESAR'S PROJECTED REFORMS 757 

be conquered by a Roman king, and that he meant in the next The Sibyl 
meeting of the Senate to propose that Caesar should have that title, o-nd the 
— not perhaps at Rome, but in the provinces.^ This proposition f<^^^f^^^"^' 
was put before Caesar in various tentative ways during the six 
months that remained to him of life. On one occasion, as he was 
entering the city, some officious partisans addressed him as n'.r, and 
were answered by him that they were mistaken in his name, — he 
was not Rex but Caesar. Again, some of his statues were found 
decorated with crowns, and when the tribunes took them off and 
arrested some leaders of the mob, Caesar showed his displeasure by 
causing the tribunes to be suspended from their office. On the i 5th The 
February, as he sat on his high seat watching the Lupercalia, Antony, Lupercalia, 
in the semi-nude state of a Lupercus, taking advantage of the licence ^■^^^ 
of the festival, put a royal crown on his head, which Caesar — 
observing the feeling of the people — three times rejected amidst 
applause, finally ordering it to be dedicated on the Capitol to the only 
king Jupiter.'^ 

But though the name, which perhaps Caesar desired as impressing Caesar's 
the eastern peoples, was thus rendered impossible, he was in effect S*"^"/ 
king; and spent the last months of his life in royal schemes for -^'^^■'^^ ^' 
organising the Empire and beautifying the city. It was at this time, 
apparently, that the lex Iitlia miinicipalis was passed, regulating the 
internal government of Rome and municipal towns, which had been 
draughted under his directions while he was in Spain.-' Measures 
were taken to enforce the sumptuary law which, in his absence, had 
been much neglected ;^ and that his law for the yearly tenure of pro- 
vincial office might be obsei'ved the number of praetors was raised to 
sixteen, of quaestors to forty. He made also large plans for extending Extension 
the city. The po?no€rium was to take in the Vatican district, the Tiber oftheFomo- 
bcing diverted into a great canal draining the Pomptine marshes "'^^"^■ 
and rejoining the true course at the Milvian bridge. The Campus 
Martins was to be built over, an open space near the Vatican taking 
its place. The architect had actually been selected ; '• and the 
houses purchased and pulled down for a site of a new theatre, after- 
wards completed by Augustus as the Thcatruni MarccIliS' An ^f^v 
immense temple to Mars was to commemorate his victories. A new '>"*^^^"g^- 
Senate-house was to be built, the old Curia, burnt in the Clodian 
riots, was to be replaced by a temple of Felicitas. Varro was to 

^ Appian, /?. Civ. ii. no. 

- Tlie entry in the Fasti asserted that Antony's action was by the ' ' order 
of the people" (Cic. 2 Phil. § 87). 

' Cicero, ad Farn. vi. 18. It has been in part preserved on a bronze tablet 
found near Heraclea in 1732. See C. I. L. 11 19. Bruns, p. loi. 

■* ad Att. xiii. 7. ^ ad Att. xiii. 33, 35. ^ Dio. xliii. 49. 



758 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Foreign 
colonies. 



Prepara- 
tions for 
the 

Parthian 
expedition. 



The 

conspiracy 

44. 



Some 
causes of it. 

The 

Spa?iish 

triumph. 



collect a library ; the best jurists to codify the laws. The lacus 
Fucinus was to be drained ; an immense harbour constructed at 
Ostia ; a new road made across the Apennines to the coast of the 
Adriatic. A great scheme of colonisation was also formed. Besides 
Corinth (which was to involve a canal through the isthmus) and 
Carthage, numerous veterans, liberti, and others were to be settled 
in Narbo, Aries, Forum Julii, Buthrotum, Pharos (Alexandria), 
Berytos (Syria), and Heracleia and Sinope on the Black Sea : and 
Plancus was directed to found a colony at Lugdunum, and perhaps 
another in the territory of the Rauraci near Bale. 

Vast preparations were made for the expedition against the Getae 
and Parthians. Six legions and 10,000 cavalry were sent over to en- 
camp near Apollonia, ready to start in the next spring, where Octavius, 
Caesar's now acknowledged heir, was to study during the winter and 
learn cavalry exercises. These were to be supplemented by archers 
from Crete, light troops from Spain and Africa, and slingers from the 
Balearic Isles, while immense stores of arms were ordered at Demetrias 
and Magnesia. The expedition was calculated to last three years, 
and for that period Caesar availed himself of his dictatorial and other 
powers to name the consuls, praetors, and provincial governors. He 
was consul with Antony for 44, but he meant to abdicate that office 
in favour of Dolabella before he departed, — a measure resisted by 
Antony, who wished to be in sole charge, and had had experience of 
Dolabella's misconduct, — while he himself as dictator would have 
two magistri equitum instead of legati, his nephew Octavius and 
his old officer Cn. Domitius Calvinus. 

But the conspiracy was now in active formation which was to 
put an end to all this. No doubt it was largely composed of men 
whose selfish views had been baulked by Caesar. The prime mover 
in it, for instance, C. Cassius, was annoyed at not being urban 
praetor instead of M. Brutus, who, though thus favoured, joined in the 
conspiracy from an overstrained notion of the duty of slaying a 
tyrant. But there were other causes of dissatisfaction. On his 
return from Spain he had again triumphed, and allowed a similar 
honour, against all precedent, to Fabius Maximus and Pedius. 
This time there could be no concealment of the fact that the triumph 
was over Roman citizens, and one of the tribunes, Pontius Aquila, 
had had the courage to" protest by refusing to rise v,^hen Caesar's car 
passed him. The reduction of the number of the recipients of the 
public corn, though a righteous measure and a permanent relief to 
the exchequer, must have made enemies. His nomination of con- 
suls, sometimes for a few days, and practical nomination of other 
magistrates by letters of recommendation to the comitia, showed 
clearly that the consulship was to be an honorary office, and the 



XLV THE CONSPIRACY AND ITS CAUSES 759 

other magistrates his agents. His large admissions to the Senate of His rela- 
provincials, freedmen, and supporters of every kind was really a ^^^'" ^'^^'^ 
blow to its dignity and power, which he farther slighted on one ^ ^'^^ ^' 
occasion by receiving the fathers, when they came to offer some new 
complimentary votes, without rising. He lived in Rome, indeed, 
without a guard ; but when he travelled in Italy he was escorted by 
about 2000 men ; and though clement and easily moved to pardon, 
he seems at the same time to have had the misfortune of exciting 
deep personal resentment. Nearly all his legati in Gaul turned 
against him ; and there is point in Julian's satire, that the one thing Personal 
Caesar could not do was to make people love him.^ He had some qiidHties. 
habits also calculated to give offence. At the theatre or circus, and 
even at the table of his friends, he showed his want of interest in 
what was going on by reading and answering his letters ; and to 
some it must have seemed offensive that the author of a marriage law 
and a repressor of adultery should himself be the subject of numerous 
scandals, and that Cleopatra should be Hving in his house. 2 Perhaps 
it was impossible for a reformer of such a mass of corruption to escape 
immense odium ; and however he may have unnecessarily excited it, 
there can be but one opinion of the. treachery of the assassins, many 
of whom owed their lives to Caesar's clemency, and high office to his 
favour. 

Libels began to be scattered about, and sentences to be mysteriously The 
inscribed on walls calling on Brutus to justify his name. The murder ^nurder 
was finally arranged at a supper in the house of Cassius, where the ^^^'^"^^ • 
principal members of the conspiracy met ( 1 4th March), It was agreed 
that it must be done at once, lest the plot, to which more than sixty 
were privy, should be betrayed. There was a meeting of the Senate 
next day ; and Caesar, in spite of warnings, was accustomed to attend 
without guards. Antony was to be detained by C. Trebonius on 
some pretext outside the Curia Pompei ^ while the deed was done. 

Caesar himself seems to have been uneasy. As he lay at supper rjlk 
on the evening of the 1 4th at the house of Lepidus the conversation ^larch. 
turned on the question as to which kind of death was to be wished. He . ^^^^^ 
looked up from his correspondence, which as usual he was engaged ^^ fg the 
upon, and said briefly, *'A sudden one." Still no one deliberately ^Senate- 
courts what was now awaiting him. He had received hints couched house. 
in the guise of predictions ; his wife had evil dreams and entreated 
him to put off going to the Senate ; meteors had been observed ; the 

^ Julian, Co7iviv. 332A. 

2 Cicero, ad Att. xiv. 8; 1-20. Some have supposed that Cicero alludes to 
Cleopatra's sister Arsinoe, who had been brought to Rome to grace Caesar's 
triumph. But the second of the two letters settles it in favour of Cleopatra. 

^ In the Campus Martins, near the Theatrum Pompei. The old Curia was 
being removed for the temple of Felicitas. 



76o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 

murder of 
Caesar, 
iSth 
March 44. 



KO.I (XV 
T€KVOV 

{Suet. 82). 



The 

assassins 
go to the 

Capitol. 



omens were bad ; the armour of Mars in the palace of the Pontifex 
Maximus fell. He was perhaps unwell or unnerved, and decided not 
to go. But the Senate having met in large numbers, as important 
business was expected, was waiting for him ; and those in the 
secret were armed with daggers concealed by the cases of their 
styli. Caesar's delay alarmed them. Hasty conferences were held, 
and Decimus Brutus undertook the part of Judas. He went to 
Caesar's house, and appealed to his pride not to let it be said that 
he failed to meet the Senate from mere fanciful causes and super- 
stitious fears. Caesar was convinced, and rose to go about 1 1 A.M. 
As he crossed the hall his bust or statue fell and broke to pieces, 
perhaps overthrown by a friendly serv^ant to warn him. As he walked 
along the street the usual crowd pressed round him with petitions, 
and one man especially thrust a paper into his hand, begging him to 
read it at once, as it concerned him ; but he either did not hear or 
did not understand, and gave it with others to his attendant. 

When he entered and took his place (the senators as usual rising), 
those in the secret crowded round him on the pretext of supporting 
Cimber, who presented a petition for the recall of a brother. He 
did not mean to grant it, and with some anger at their persistence 
turned from Cimber, who thereupon clutched his toga with such 
eagerness as to drag it from his neck. Then P. Casca struck him 
with his dagger. But from nervousness or haste the blade did not 
reach his throat, but struck his shoulder. Caesar sprang up and 
snatched at the weapon, crying, "You villain, Casca! what do you 
mean ? " But he found himself surrounded by angry faces and gleam- 
ing daggers ; and when among them he saw M. Brutus — pardoned, 
promoted, and loved — he gave up hope, and drawing his robe over 
his face fell pierced by more than twenty blades, aimed at him with 
such violence and in such confusion that several of the conspirators 
were themselves wounded. He fell near the base of Pompey's 
statue, which was sprinkled with his blood. The other senators 
remained rooted to the spot with terror whilst this was going on ; 
but when M. Brutus raising the bloody dagger, and calling on Cicero 
to witness that he had freed Rome, would have addressed the house, 
the senators rushed out, spreading the dreadful news among the 
people, though Cicero apparently tried to induce them to meet at 
once again in the Capitol. 1 

Antony and Lepidus, fearing that they might share the same fate, 
hastily concealed themselves in the houses of friends. But the con- 
spirators marched through the streets loudly proclaiming their deed, 
and calling on all lovers of freedom to join them. They expected to 



' Ad Att. xiv. 10. 



XLV AFTER THE MURDER 761 

be greeted as saviours of the commonwealth ; but though one or two 44. 
did join their train, wishing to share in the credit of a deed in which 
they had had no part, the general aspect of the people, who hastily 
closed their shops or withdrew into their houses, was so far from 
encouraging that they retired to the Capitol, on the pretence of 
offering thanks to the gods, accompanied by gladiators whom Dec. 
Brutus had had ready near the Curia Pompeii on pretence of some 
exhibition. 

The corpse of the murdered dictator was carried in a covered 
litter by his servants through the streets to his house in the Forum. 
The curtains waved backwards and forwards, showing the ghastly 
body with its thirty-six wounds, and the hands swung loose as the 
litter moved. The sight caused a tempest of lamentation from the 
excited crowd in the street, and from those who watched from door- 
steps and housetops. It was plain that the temper of the people 
could not be trusted. But it was resolved to make one more attempt 
to gain them. Escorted by their gladiators, the chief conspirators Speeches of 
descended into the Forum, and M. Brutus made a speech from the ^^- Brutus 
Rostra, which was listened to quietly, as it dwelt rather on the high '^"'^^^""'^^ 
patriotic motives of the assassins than on the demerits of Caesar ; 
but when Cinna followed with a vehement attack on Caesar's 
character, there was such a threatening exhibition of feeling that the 
assassins retired again to the Capitol, and fortified themselves there 
during the night. 

Meanwhile Antony recovered his courage, and appeared again in Negoti- 
consular state. Lepidus brought troops into the Forum to keep '""^"'^ '^^^^ 
order, and Dolabella assumed the consular robes and lictors, in spite of " "^' 
the doubt as to his election. ^ Negotiations went on during the next 
day, and on the 17th {Libcralid), at a meeting of the Senate in the Meeting of 
temple of Tellus, close to Antony's house, Antony, who had got ^^^ Senate 
possession of Caesar's memoranda and other state papers, as well as ^J^ * ^ ^"J^^ 
the treasury, made a conciliatory speech, agreeing that no decree of 
Caesar's not published before the ides of March should be held to be 
in force, and that the dictatorship should be declared unconstitu- 
tional.2 In return, Cicero, who came forward with great vigour, 
proposed an amnesty, and some alteration in the provinces assigned 

^ Because whilst it was going on Antony attempted to invalidate it by an 
obmintiatio (Cicero, 2 Phil. § 82). 

- Cicero, i Phil. 3 ; 2 Phil. 91. The measure at first was only a resolution 
of the Senate, but was afterwards embodied in a law (Cic. 5 Phil. § 10 ; Dio 
Cass. xliv. 51). Some difficulty has been made on the subject, because the 
dictatorship was offered to Augustus. But w hat had been abolished by a lex 
might be restored by a lex, which no doubt would then have been easily carried. 
Moreover, Augustus declined it on the ground that it was illegal {Monuin. 
Ancyr. 5, 6 ; Suet. Aug. 52). 



762 HISTORY OF ROME chap, xlv 

to Brutus and Cassius was made, which they, however, afterwards 
decHned to accept. A vote of thanks was passed to Antony for 
having prevented a civil war ; Caesar's acta were confirmed, and a 
pubHc funeral was ordered for his body. Thereupon Antony gave his 
son as a hostage to the conspirators, they left the Capitol, and were 
entertained that evening by him and Lepidus at supper. 

It seemed for the moment as if the revolution were at an end, 
and the old forms of the republic restored to real life : that, as Cicero 
expressed it, the regnuin was abolished with the death of the rex. 
In reality it was the beginning of twelve years of confusion, blood- 
shed, and dissolution, only to be ended by the establishment on a 
sounder and more permanent footing of the autocracy which seemed 
to have received its death-blow. 

Authorities. — Caesar, Bell. Civ. i. -iii. Bellum Alexandrinnm ; Africanum ; 
Hispaniense (of uncertain authorship, but probably contemporary). Cicero's 
Correspondence. Appian, Bell. Civ. ii. c. 3, 30-154. Plutarch, Lives of Pompey, 
Caesar, Cicero, Briitus, Antony. Livy, Ep. 109-116. Dio Cassius, xli.-xliv. 
Velleius, ii. 48-58. Lucan's Pharsalia. Suetonius, Caesar. 



CHAPTER XLVI 

THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE AND END OF THE CIVIL WARS 

Antony and the acta of Caesar — Popular feeling against the assassins — Change in 
the provincial arrangements of Caesar — M. Brutus and C. Cassius resist — 
Arrival of C. Octavius (May) — His disputes with Antony — He enrols a legion 
of veterans — Antony made governor of Cisalpine Gaul for 43, besieges Dec. 
Brutus in Mutina (44) — Decrees of Senate against Antony — Battle near 
Mutina — Antony in Gaul, joined by Lepidus, Pollio, and Plancus — Death of 
Decimus Brutus — Octavius (now C. Caesar Octavianus) comes to Rome and 
is elected consul (19th August) — Makes terms with Antony — The Triumvirate 
— The proscriptions and death of Cicero (43) — M. Brutus and C. Cassius in 
Macedonia and Syria — Sext. Pompeius in Sicily — Battles of Philippi — Death 
of Brutus and Cassius — Division of the Provinces (42) — L. Antonius and the 
siege of Perusia — M. Antonius and Cleopatra — Disputes between Caesar and 
Antony — Peace of Brundisium (40) — Peace of Misenum with Sext. Pompeius 
(39) — Defeat and death of Pompeius (36-35) — Lepidus deprived of power (35) 
Antonius in the East — Wars in Parthia and Armenia (38-36) — Cleopatra's 
renewed influence (36-33) — Battle of Actium (31) — Death of Antony and 
Cleopatra (30) — Egypt a Pkovinck — The new constitution — Literature at 
the end of the Republic — New buildings begun at Rome. 

The confirmation of Caesar's acta gave Antony an opportunity of Antony's 
securing enormous powers, and soon made it plain that rejoicing on ^''^^'^^-J 
the part of the Optimates was premature. It was left to the consuls /'l^ ^ /■ 
to decide what these acfa were, — with the help indeed of a committee, Caesar. 
which however seems not to have met, — and Antony, who had got 
Caesar's papers from his widow, was able to carry on the adminis- 
tration for a time unchecked. He conciliated Lepidus by consenting 
to his election as pontifex maximus, and Dolabella by allowing him 
to take up the consulship with the reversion of the province of 
Syria ; he obtained the disposal of a vast sum of money deposited 
by Caesar in the temple of Ops ; and was encouraged to neglect 
the opposition by the evidence of popular feeling. His laiidatio at 
the public funeral voted by the Senate had roused such a tempest of 
indignation that the people burnt the body in the Forum, and seizing 
brands from the pile were with difficulty prevented from firing the 



764 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Caesar's 
nomin- 
ations to 
the consul- 
ship. 

The 

Provincial 
a r range - 
tnents of 
Caesar. 



houses of the murderers. C. Helvius Cinna, poet and tribune, was 
torn to pieces in mistake for CorneHus Cinna the assassin ; and 
when this popular feehng was increased by the pubHcation of 
Caesar's will, under which all citizens benefited, it was no longer 
possible for the assassins to remain in Rome, and Brutus was relieved, 
on Antony's motion in the Senate, from the law preventing a praetor 
urbanus from being more than ten days absent. He and Cassius 
retired to Antium waiting for the tide to turn : and meanwhile Antony 
sought, by rearrangement of the provinces, by conciliation of indi- 
viduals or states, and by securing the command of the troops in 
camp in Macedonia, to strengthen his position. He spoke respectfully 
of Brutus and Cassius and the rest, and absolute disorder on the part 
of the angry people he and Dolabella did check. A man who 
claimed to be the grandson of Marius, and so a connexion of 
Caesar's, had signalised this claim by setting up a column on the spot 
on which his body was burnt ; and it became the rendezvous of 
Caesarians and the scene of frequent riots, until Antony (early in 
April) executed some of the rioters, the pseudo-IVIarius among them ; 
and later on Dolabella pulled down the column and executed more 
rioters.! Still the arrangements made by Caesar for the consulship 
and the provinces had included many of the very men now odious for 
his murder ; and they were not ashamed to claim their rights in virtue 
of the acfa of the very man whom they had killed for " tyranny." 

For 43 the consuls were to be Aulus Hirtius, one of Caesar's 
officers in Gaul, and C. Vibius Pansa, who had already governed 
Bithynia and Gallia Cisalpina : for 42 Decimus Brutus, meanwhile 
governor of Cisalpine (iaul ; and L. Munatius Plancus, meanwhile 
governor of Transalpine Gaul, exclusive of the " Province." 

Syria, where there was a mutiny on foot under Caecilius Bassus, 
a Pompeian," was to be held by C. Cassius Longinus ; Africa by Q. 
Cornificius ; Gallia Narbonensis and Hispania Superior by M. 
Aemilius Lepidus ; Hispania Ulterior by C. Asinius Pollio ; Mace- 
donia by M. Junius Brutus ; Sicily by A. Pompeius Bithynicus ; 
Asia by C. Trebonius ; Bithynia by L. Tullius Cimber. Five of 
these twelve men were among Caesar's assassins. ^ Of the five, Tre- 



^ This pretender seems to have been really a veterinary surgeon named 
Amatias or Herophilus. He had tried to get recognition from Octavius and 
others of the family (see Nicolas Dam. 14, Cic. ad Att. xii. 49 ; xiv. 6, 8 ; i 
Phil. § 5 ; 2 Phil. § 107. Valer. Max. 91, 15, 2 ; Appian, B.Civ. iii. 2, 3). 

- Q. Caecilius Bassus escaped from Pharsalus to Syria, and being there joined 
by others induced the soldiers of the governor Sex. Julius Caesar to murder him. 
He took the title of praetor (46), and for three years maintained himself in 
Apameia. 

^ L. Cimber (Bithynia), C. Trebonius (Asia), C. Cassius (Syria), M. Brutus 
(Macedonia), Dec. Brutus (Gallia Cisalpina). 



ns 
clait?i their 
provinces. 



XLVi ANTONY'S AMBITIOUS POLICY 765 

bonius, Cimber, and Decimus Brutus, who were not detained by office, The 
seem at once to have gone to their provinces. But M. Brutus and (Js^^^^f^i 
C. Cassius, being praetors, would not naturally go till the end of the 
year ; and Antony soon showed that he did not mean to allow them 
to take quiet possession. Early in April he had let Decimus Brutus 
know that he could not propose in the Senate the confirmation of 
the provinces of M. Brutus and C. Cassius, owing to the anger of 
people and veterans. ^ And in June, after several different proposals, 
he carried a law granting Gallia Cisalpina to himself in 43, Syria 
to Dolabella, Macedonia to his brother Gaius Antonius, the praetor. 
As a compromise, and as a means of getting them out of the way, M. 
Brutus and C. Cassius were to have legationes^ the one in Asia and 
the other in Sicily, to superintend the corn supply.- This they 
scornfully rejected, and set to work collecting ships and men to 
secure the provinces they regarded as theirs by right. Civil war in 
many places seemed imminent. Gaius Antonius went to Macedonia, 
which he was to govern in the following year, to send over the legions 
with which Marcus meant in 43 to expel Decimus Brutus from Gallia 
Cisalpina. Dolabella hurried off before the end of his consulship to 
wrest Syria from Cassius, who had arrived there before him. M. Brutus 
leaving Italy with Cassius, and parting from him at Athens, spent the 
autumn there in preparing to oust Ciaius Antonius from Macedonia. 

The constitutionalists, now led by Cicero, who since the Ides of Aji/ony's 
March had thrown himself into politics with immense vigour, — ^'f*^" */ , 
viewed the proceedings of Antony with increasing alarm and dislike, ^"f"*"' ^ 
By means of Caesar's papers, in which his enemies declared that he 
found whatever he wished, he lavished immunities on towns and 
peoples, restitutions of exiles, grants of lands, and privileges of all 
description ; and is accused of using the treasure which fell into his 
hands to relieve himself of an enormous burden of debt. He had a 
large body-guard of soldiers. Through his brother Lucius, who was 
a tribune, he gratified the veterans, whom he frequently visited in 
their settlements, by an agrarian law, and by adding a third decuria 
to the juries to consist of those who had served as centurions. To 
secure a longer hold on power he abrogated Caesar's law limiting the 
tenure of the provinces. He had also outbid the Ciceronians in His deal- 
regard to Sextus Pompeius, who since the battle of Munda had ^"g^ "ivith 
collected a considerable force in Spain. Cicero had looked to his ^p^,^^^.-,^^ 
certain enmity to Antony as a security for their interests in the west ; 
but Antony now secured his alliance by agreeing to his restitution to 
his father's property.^ It was clear that Antony meant to be as 

' Letter of Dec. Brutus in Cic. Fam. xi. i. - Cicero, ad Alt. xv. 9-1 1. 

•"* Sext. Pompiius conquered Asinius Pollio in farther Spain, but yielded to 
the persuasions of Lepidus, who went to visit him (I)io. xlv. lo). 



766 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Gains 
Octavius, 
b. 2jrd 
Sept. 63. 



Takes the 
inherit- 
ance and 
name of 
Caesar. 



powerful as Caesar, and that the crime of the Ides of March had 
not restored the constitution. 

The situation was farther compHcated by the intervention of the 
dictator's great-nephew, the young Gains Octavius, He was the 
son of Gaius Octavius Rufus, once propraetor of Macedonia, and 
Atia, daughter of M. Atius Balbus and luHa, sister of luHus Caesar. 
He had been treated for some years as his great-uncle's heir pre- 
sumptive. On taking the toga virilis in 48 he had at once been 
elected a pontifex in succession to Ahenobarbus, killed at Pharsalus. 
His health, or his mother's timidity, prevented his accompanying- 
Caesar to Africa in 47-46, but he took part in the triumphs of 46, and 
had afterwards been put in charge of some minor official duties. 
Though he was again prevented by illness from accompanying 
Caesar to Spain at the end of 46, he joined him there in 45, shortly 
after the battle of Munda ; accompanied him to Carthage ; and on 
his return to Rome was named one of Caesar's two viagistri equitum 
for the Parthian expedition. Meanwhile he had been sent to 
ApoUonia, with Maecenas, Agrippa, and other friends, to pursue his 
studies, and to learn military duties with some of the cavalry from 
the camp. Here he was informed by a letter from his mother of 
the murder of Caesar. He did not know to what extent he was his 
uncle's heir ; but he determined at once to return to Italy, and reached 
the villa of his step-father, L. Marcius Philippus, near Naples, on the 
1 6th of April. He had declined offers of help from the army in Mace- 
donia, but came with a steady resolve to avenge his uncle ; and, 
when he knew that he was his heir and adopted son, he determined 
to accept the inheritance with all its consequences. Proceeding to 
Rome he cautiously felt his way, for the present concealing all 
intentions of revenge, and only letting it be known that he would 
carry out his " father's " will. The legacies to the citizens were paid, 
the temple of Venus Genetrix, dedicated by the dictator, finished, and 
the games vowed by lulius with it given. From the first he found 
himself slighted and thwarted by Antony. He had great difficulty 
in getting possession of his uncle's money, Antony claiming much of 
it as public property ; the passing of a lex curiata for his formal 
adoption into the lulian gens was vetoed by a Tribune (probably L. 
Antonius) ; and when as an alternative he sought to be himself elected 
tribune in place of Helvius Cinna, the patriciate conferred on him by 
his uncle, or perhaps his age, was held to bar his wish. Thus checked 
he appealed to the veterans planted in various parts of Campania ; 
and Antony in alarm came to some terms with him, whereby he 
obtained a large part of his uncle's property, and the opposition to 
his acting as his heir was withdrawn, though the formal adoption 
was not completed until after the war of Mutina. Henceforth, 



XLVi OCTAVIUS AND ANTONY 767 

however, he is known by his uncle's name/ and by such we may 
speak of him. 

He was in a position of great delicacy. As the friend of his Difficult 
uncle and the vindicator of his reputation, he must have felt bound ^Q^^^^^^f 
to support Antony and oppose the Ciceronians. On the other hand, 
he had no intention of allowing Antony to use Caesar's name to obtain 
absolute power and render his own position insecure. Yet while, to 
protect himself, he held communication with Cicero and the con- 
stitutionalists, he was well aware that they regarded him only as a 
means of opposing Antony, and would turn on him as soon as they 
had got rid of that dangerous enemy. While keeping up, therefore, a 
semblance of respect for Antony as consul, he was consulting with 
Cicero and providing for his own safety. He was even accused of 
hiring assassins to kill the consul as he was about to start for Brun- 
disium in October, to meet the legions brought from Macedonia. - 
With these legions some believed that Antony meant to come to 
Rome and carry all his measures by force. Caesar, on this pretext, 
enrolled soldiers on his own account among the veterans in Cam- He enrols 
pania and Samnium ; and by offering a liberal bounty had 3000 '^ Ifgioji. 
men under arms before the end of November. He professed to be 
acting for the protection, and under the authority, of the Senate, 
though in reality he had no authority and no official position. He 
also sent agents to win over the four legions at Brundisium, where 
Antony had been met with signs of mutiny, which he repressed with 
great severity. In this Caesar was so successful that two of the four 
legions, the 4th and the Martia, instead of proceeding by the Antony 
coast to await Antony at Ariminum, turned off the road and came rctums to 
to Alba Fucentia ; and the legates of Antony, who meanwhile had /'.'"j^,\^j^j^ 
returned to Rome along the Appian Way with a strong guard, were ^yw. 
repelled from the walls with stones. 

The two antagonists were now at the head of forces in Italy : 
Antony at Rome, Caesar at Capua. Antony met the Senate on the 
28th of November ; but did not, as was expected, demand a decree 
declaring Caesar a hostis. He brought forward some formal busi- 
ness, among other things a sortitio for the provinces, by which Gaius 
Macedonia fell to his brother Gaius. The edict summoning the ^ntomns 
meeting had contained severe reflections on Caesar ; but the evident ^/^^"i^,^^^ 
animus of the senators, or the growing power of Caesar, or the 

^ Octavius, as soon as he knew of his uncle's will, took the name of Gaius 
iulius Caesar Octavianus, and is henceforth known as Caesar. But there was at 
first some hesitation in his family as to so addressing him (Cicero, ad Att. xiv. 12). 

2 Suetonius, Aug. lo. Cicero believed it, though most people thought it a 
trick of Antony's to discredit him {ad Fain. xii. 23). Neither Plutarch nor Appian 
seems to believe it [Anton, xvi. ; B. Civ. iii. 39). 



768 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



44- 



M. 

Antonius 
goes to 
Arimi- 



2nd Sept. 
The I St 
Philippic. 



Decree of 
the igth 
Dec. 44- 

3rd 
Philippic. 



4J. Coss. 

Gaius 

Vibius 

Pafisa, 

Aulas 

Hirtius. 



defection of the two legions, caused him to alter his plans. Instead 
of stopping in Rome till May (43) he withdrew first to Tibur, and, being 
there supported by fresh levies and partisans, joined his forces at 
Ariminum at the beginning of December. His purpose was to eject 
Decimus Brutus from Gallia Cisalpina ; and he reckoned on the 
support of Lepidus from Narbonensis, Asinius Pollio from farther 
Spain, Plancus from farther Gaul. 

Antony once gone, his enemies took courage. Cicero in August 
had despaired of the republic, and had set out with a libera legatio 
from Dolabella for Greece. He had returned from Rhegium, 
because he had heard that Antony was using more conciliatory 
language, but on the 2nd of September had been goaded by Antony's 
attacks to declare the grievances of his party in a speech known as the 
first Philippic. This drew a bitter answer from Antony on the i8th, 
to which he had replied in the venomous pamphlet known as the 
second Philippic. No compromise was possible after that. And 
now an edict sent by Decimus Brutus to Rome from Gallia Cisal- 
pina, forbidding any one with imperium to enter his province, drew 
from the Senate what was practically a declaration of war in the 
shape of a resolution, to be moved on the ist of January by the new 
consuls C. Pansa and Aul. Hirtius, adopting the claims of Decimus 
Brutus and others in possession of provinces, and approving the 
action of Caesar and of the two legions which had joined him. 

When the Senate met on the ist of January, Caesar was 
already on his way to Gaul with the two legions from Alba 
Fucentia, and the third which he had enrolled himself; and Antony 
was already besieging Decimus Brutus at Mutina. After several 
days' debate it was resolved to give Caesar a distinct position as 
pro-praetor ; to send Hirtius to the seat of war with two legions 
(the 3rd and 35th, which had volunteered) ; but at the same time to 
send three legates to Antony to announce to him the decision and 
endeavour to obtain a peaceful solution. Antony's demands in 
answer were held to be impossible. He was willing to accept 
Gallia Comata instead of Gallia Cisalpina, with six legions, for five 
years, or for so long as M. Brutus and Cassius were consuls or pro- 
consuls, on condition that all his acta were confirmed, including his 
dealing with the treasure in the temple of Ops, the assignments made 
under his agrarian law, and his judicial law. The Senate in reply 
voted that there was a iinmiltns; that Lepidus and Plancus should 
be summoned to the aid of the state ; and that the suppression of 
the tiimultus should be entrusted to the consuls and Caesar. Lastly, 
an indemnity was offered to all soldiers serving with Antony who 
quitted him iDefore the Ides of March. Cicero was for more extreme 
measures : for acknowledging a " war," and for proclaiming Antony a 



XLVi BATTLES NEAR MUTINA 769 

hostis. But the consulares in the Senate were more timid or cautious, 
and Antony's name was omitted. 

From the latter part of February till the 15th of April the armies 
of the Republic were watching' Antony, who held places on both sides 
of Mutina along the via Aemilia — Rhegium Lepidi and Parma on 
the west, Bononia on the east — while Hirtius was at Claterna, eleven 
miles east of Bononia, and Caesar at Forum Cornelii, nine miles 
farther east. The Ciceronians were vainly expecting Decimus Brutus 
to break out from Mutina, and deliberating on the necessity of sum- 
moning M. Brutus and his army from Macedonia. But though 
some skirmishing took place, nothing decisive occurred till the i 5th 
of April. On the evening of the 14th Pansa had arrived at Bononia 
with another consular army. An attempt on the part of Antony to 
intercept the advance of the combined armies half-way between 
Bononia and Mutina, though at first successful, was finally defeated Battle at 
with great loss ; and on the next day his camp was all but stormed I'^orum 
by Caesar and Hirtius. The latter, however, was killed in the [^j^^^7'" 
struggle, and his death was soon followed by that of Pansa, who had franco), 
been wounded in the engagement of the i 5th. But Antony had /jM April 
suffered so severely that he broke up the siege of Mutina, retreated 43- 
along the via Acviilia ; reached Vada Sabbata by the pass between Death of 
the Apennines and the Maritime Alps ; and being there joined 
by a reinforcement under the praetor Ventidius,^ entered Gaul, 
hoping to be joined by Lepidus and Plancus. These men in Pansu 
their despatches had been loud in expressions of fidelity to the Senate, Antony s 
but did in fact presently join him — Lepidus on the 29th of May, retreat into 
Plancus later in the summer. Decimus Brutus had followed Antony Cnillia 
two days after he left Mutina ; but Caesar refused to join in the 
pursuit, or to allow him any of his legions ; and Brutus did not 
venture to Vada Sabbata. His despatches up to the 3rd of June ^^^^^^ 
show him to be intending to enter (iaul by the pass of the Little St. piancus. 
Bernard, in hopes of a junction with Plancus. This towards the end 
of June he effected ; but when Plancus joined Antony and Lepidus, 
he was obliged to recross the Alps, and endeavour to reach Ravenna Death of 
in order to join AL Brutus in Macedonia. From this he was cut off Decimus 
by the advance of Caesar. His army dispersed, and he endeavoured 
to reach the Rhine ; but was eventually captured and put to death by 
a chief of the Sequani, acting under orders from Antony. 

^ P. Vontidius Bassus of Picenum was said to have been brought a captive to 
Rome in the Social war. He had served Caesar in Gaul and been nominated 
by him praetor for 43. In virtue of his oflfice and of the special decree of the 
Senate he enrolled a legion and marched to Potentia, but instead of proceeding 
to Mutina turned off, and by a forced march across the Apennines joined 
Antony at Vada Sabbata. 

3 D 



the consuls 
Hirtius 
(/6th) and 



Trans- 
alpina. 



Brutus, 
autumn of 
43- 



770 



HISTORY OF ROME 



C. Cassius 
in Syria. 

M. Brutus 
in Mace- 
donia. 



The Senate 

slight 

Octavian. 



He 

demands 
the consul- 
ship. 



Meanwhile Caesar had secured himself at Rome. The defeat 
and flight of Antony left him in a peculiar position. The Ciceronian 
party in the Senate might feel that they no longer needed him. 
They were encouraged by the success of Brutus and Cassius. Dola- 
bella, after treacherously murdering C. Trebonius in Asia, had been 
defeated by Cassius at Laodicea and driven to commit suicide, and 
Cassius was in undisputed possession of Syria. In December 44 
M. Brutus, having collected a considerable force in Greece, took over 
Macedonia from Q. Hortensius at Demctrias, advanced to Dyr- 
rachium, and in the spring of 43 captured C. Antonius near 
Buthrotum. One decree of the Senate in the month of April added 
Illyricum to the province of Brutus, and another committed the 
defence of the Empire east of the Adriatic to Brutus and Cassius 
jointly. Encouraged by these circumstances, the Senate soon showed 
that they meant to dispense with Caesar. On the news of the battle 
of the 15th, the complimentary decrees passed conveyed no special 
honour to him, and the messengers who carried them to the army 
communicated directly with the soldiers without taking notice of 
Caesar. His demand of the consulship and of a triumph was 
rejected, though he was granted consular rank {o7-namcuta consii- 
1(1} ia) and an ovation. At the same time votes were passed con- 
firming Brutus and Cassius in their provinces, and nominating 
Sextus Pompeius commander of the fleet. Pansa on his death-bed 
had warned Caesar that the Ciceronians were only using him to 
thwart Antony, and he was informed of a saying of Cicero's that 
"the young man w^as to be praised, complimented, and got rid of" ^ 

Finally, on the death of the consuls, decennnri, among whom 
Cicero was one, had been nominated {co7istitucndac 7-cipiibIicae) 
to undo the acta of Antony ; and they were already meddling with 
the assignation of lands to the veterans. Caesar therefore had a 
double reason for trusting his legions, of whom the 4th and the 
Martia absolutely refused obedience to the decree ordering them to 
join Decimus Brutus. After some fruitless messages, he sent a depu- 
tation of 400 men, under a centurion named Cornelius, to ask the 
Senate for the consulship, and Cornelius in the Senate-house, touching 
the hilt of his sword, said bluntly, " If you do not give it, this will." 
Cicero seems during the summer to have wished for some compromise, 
when M. Brutus failed to come over from Macedonia. But he was 
believed to have a scheme for a second consulship with Caesar, and 
was laughed down. The extreme party had got beyond him, and 
still trusted in the forces gathered round M. Brutus and Cassius in the 
East, and in the legions which Cornificius was sending from Africa. 



^ Laudandum adolescentem ornandum tollendum (Cicero ad Fani. xi. 20, 21), 



THE TRIUMVIRATE 771 



Caesar sent a conciliatory message to Antony, and set out for Caesar 
Rome with his three legions. The Senate ordered the army not to Octavianus 
approach within a hundred miles of the city. It was its last inde- ^'^■^'^ ' 
pendent decree. By the middle of August Caesar was in Rome, 
interreges duly appointed, and on the 1 9th he and his cousin, Q. 
Pedius, were elected consuls. The rest followed. The soldiers were 
satisfied with pay and bounties ; Caesar was named commander both of 
his own legions and those of Decimus Brutus, with imperium superior to 
all others in all camps ; the care of the city w^as committed to him ; 
and a lex curiata for his admission \.o gens Iiilia passed. Pedius also Trial 
carried a law constituting a qiiaestio for the trial of the assassins, of the 
in which sentence of outlawry was passed on all. One of them, ^•^■^^"^'^•^• 
Casca, was a tribune, but had fled from Rome at the approach 
of Caesar, and was now solemnly deprived and condemned with the 
rest. 

After less than a month in Rome Caesar advanced northward to Negotia- 
attack Decimus Brutus. This advance, as we have seen, had been *'^"' '^ 
sufficient to cut off his escape to Ravenna, and had indirectly caused 
his death in Gaul. But Caesar was now anxious for a reconciliation 
with Antony and Lepidus ; for only so could he hope to be able to 
crush M. Brutus and Cassius. Pedius, no doubt by his suggestion, 
carried a decree in the Senate, reversing those which had declared 
Antonius, Lepidus, and their followers hostcs ; and Caesar, on hear- 
ing of the death of Decimus Brutus, again opened communications 
with Antony, now joined by Plancus from farther Gaul, and Pollio 
from Spain, neither of whom stood in the way of peace, A meeting Meeting of 
was arranged on an island in the Po ; at which decisions were come ^^^^^^^ ^"^ 
to on the second day, which practically suspended the republican ^^^ ^' 
constitution. Caesar, Antony, and Lepidus were to be trcsviri 7'ei- 
publicac constituouiac for five years, with absolute powers, were to 
form in fact a dictatorship in commission— Caesar abdicating the 
consulship. The ordinary magistrates were to be appointed, but the Trium- 
triumvirs were to nominate them at once for the quinquennium. The ^''^''"■^ /'^* 
western provinces were to be divided between the three, who were ^^dae 
to nominate legaii in them, — Antony taking all the Gauls except 
Narbonensis ; Lepidus, Narbonensis and Spain ; Caesar, Africa, 
Sardinia, and Sicily with other islands. Lepidus was to have charge 
of Rome with three legions ; Caesar to have three, and Antony four, 
with which to crush Brutus and Cassius. As a confirmation of the 
peace thus made Caesar was betrothed to Clodia, a daughter of 
Antony's wife Fulvia by her former husband Publius Clodius. Finally, The pro- 
a clause in the agreement, concealed for the present from the army, ^<:^ipiion. 
arranged for the execution of certain members of the opposite party. 
Caesar seems to have wished to confine the list to the assassins of 



772 



HISTORY OF ROME 



The 

triumviri 

reipublicae 

constitu- 

endae 

appointed 

by law, 

27th Nov. 

43- 



Death of 
Cicero, 
December 
43- 



lulius, and is indeed said by several of our authorities to have been 
opposed to it altogether.^ It seems certain that he endeavoured to 
save Cicero, but gave way to Antony, who in his turn allowed Lepidus 
to place his uncle Lucius Caesar on the list in return for the privilege 
of inserting the name of Lepidus' own brother L. Paullus. Seven- 
teen names were in the first list sent forward to the consul Pedius, 
who tried to calm the excitement and terror at Rome by assuring all 
(apparently believing what he said) that no more were to be punished. 
But when the three triumvirs arrived at Rome, each with a praetorian 
guard and a legion, at the end of November, and were duly con- 
stituted in their new office by a law proposed by the tribune Publius 
Titius (November 27), this assurance was quickly falsified. Next 
morning a long edict was fixed up in the Forum justifying the 
measures, and containing a list of 1 30 names, followed shortly 
afterwards by another list of 150.- Death was denounced on all 
who sheltered or concealed, a large reward oftercd to every freeman, 
and liberty to every slave, who betrayed or killed them. The blood- 
shed in Rome itself must soon have been over, as it would not be 
difficult to find the condemned ; but in December and January the 
dreadful work went on in Italy, soldiers scouring towns and villages 
in search of the proscribed. 

The most illustrious victim was M. Tullius Cicero. He had com- 
mitted himself with such rancour agamst Antony, and had taken 
such a foremost place in the policy of the Senate since the death of 
the dictator, that he could hardly have hoped to escape. The 
limits of vituperation in political life at Rome were wide ; but the 
second Philippic was hard to forgive, and supported as it was by 
speech after speech scarcely less offensive, it explains if it does not 
justify Antony's implacability. Nor had Caesar any reason to trust 
him. When he came to Rome in August for the consulship, Cicero, 
who had corresponded with and professed friendship to him, had 
caught at a rumoured intention of the legions to abandon him, and 
joined in a last attempt to bring fresh republican forces to over- 
whelm him, and had fled by night from Rome when the rumour 



1 Vclleius ii. 66 ; Suet. Ajig. xxvii. ; Dio. xlvii. 7. VcUeius writing in the time of 
Tiberius could hardly have spoken out even if he had wished. Dio remarks that 
Caesar's youth prevented him from having many enemies on whom he would 
wish to wreak vengeance. Suetonius says that he opposed the proscription, but 
carried it out when settled more severely than either. 

- Appian says 300 senators and 2000 equites were proscribed [Bell. Civ. iv. 5); 
Livy (Ep. 120), 130 senators and plurimi equites. Livy perhaps refers to the 
number actually killed, Appian to those on the lists. Two havens of refuge were 
open — i.e. the camp of M. Brutus in Macedonia, and that of Sext. Pompeius in 
Sicily. Of sixty-nine names mentioned by Appian he narrates the escape in one 
way or another of thirty-one. 



XLVi M. BRUTUS AND C. CASSIUS 773 

proved false. He and his brother Quintus were at his Tusculan 
villa when they heard of the proscription. They started for Astura, 
intending to take ship to join M. Brutus in Macedonia. In their 
haste they had forgotten to bring money, and Quintus returned to 
Rome, where he and his son were discovered and put to death with 
great cruelty. Cicero succeeded in getting on board a ship ; but 
from irresolution or stress of weather landed again at Circeii, whence 
he started for Rome, but returned and re-embarked, and again landed 
at Caieta, going to his villa at Formiae, As he lay resting there, 
news came that the soldiers were approaching. His slaves hurried 
him into a litter, and took the most unfrequented way to the coast. 
Some traitor informed Laenas, who commanded the company, and 
who had once been defended by Cicero, of the route. They quickly 
overtook him ; and when Cicero heard the tramp of their feet he 
ordered his slaves to set down the litter, and thrusting his head out of 
the curtains, received the fatal stroke from Herennius. The head 
and hands were taken to Antony at Rome, and nailed ytp on the 
Rostra, and Fulvia is said to have thrust her bodkin through the 
tongue that had spoken such bitter words of her. 

But the triumvirs found themselves in straits for money, in spite jygsh con- 
of the reimposition of the tributum in 44, It was impossible to realise Jiscations, 
I full value for confiscated property at such a time, or to punish '^^' 
I dishonest agents, who were mostly soldiers. A kind of bloodless pro- 
scription therefore followed, by which a fine of 10 per cent was im- 
( posed on certain persons. Among them were some ladies, who by Coss. L. 
I the mouth of Hortensia (daughter of the orator) loudly protested, and ^lumUtus 
, with partial success. It was a relief to all when the triumvirs separated, j^^^"'^"^' 
after making provision for the magistrates to be appointed, and the At-milius 
\ execution of the rttAe of I ulius. Lepidus remained at Rome; Antony Lepidusll. 
' went to Brundisium to arrange for the transport of the army to 
• Macedonia ; Caesar to Rhegium to put down Sextus Pompeius, now 
I master of a large fleet and of Sicily. 

I M. Brutus had been acting as in all respects lawful governor of m. Brutus 

I Macedonia, and had engaged in war with the barbarians, always «='« 
I attacking its frontier. But he had precluded all reconciliation with ^f^^^^^]"^J^ 
\ Antony — if any had ever been possible, by ordering or allowing the ^^.^2. 
I execution of his brother Gains, some say in retaliation for the pro- 
( scriptions, though it seems probable that it took place before then. 
Towards the end of 43 he had gone to the Asiatic side of the Propontis, 
— still maintaining the authority granted him with Cassius over all cast 
of the Adriatic, — and had collected a considerable fleet at Cyzicus. 
Thence in 42 he sent to Cassius to meet him at Smyrna. Cassius c. Cassius 
had been equally successful in Syria. He had taken over the troops of in Syria, 
the propraetors Statins Murcus and Marcus Crispus, as well as those of "f^'^f^- 



774 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Union of 
Brutus and 
Cassius at 
Sardis, 42. 

The 

situation 

atPhilippi. 



Caesar at 
Rhegiutn, 
Antony at 
Brundi- 
sium. 



DijfficTilties 
atPhilippi. 



First 
battle of 
Philippi, 
and death 
of Cassius. 



Second 
battle of 
Philippi, 
and death 
ofM. 
Brutus, 
Nov. 42. 



Caecilius Bassus ; ^ he had driven Dolabella to suicide, and had been 
joined by most of his troops ; and lastly, had also collected a large fleet, 
with which he prevented Cleopatra from sending aid to Antony and 
Caesar. After their meeting at Smyrna they farther extended their 
operations in Asia and Rhodes, collecting money and troops. Later 
in the summer, hearing that Antony and Caesar were at length com- 
ing to Macedonia, they united their forces at Sardis - and proceeded 
to the Hellespont. Thence they marched along the coast road 
and found Antony's advanced guard stationed between Philippi 
and Amphipolis. They occupied two heights south of Philippi, 
between it and the sea ; drove the Caesarians from a point command- 
ing the road between their camps and the shore, called Symbolum ; 
and were thus in easy communication with their fleet, which under 
Cimber held the island of Thasos and secured them their provisions. 
Caesar and Antony were not yet arrived at Amphipolis. Caesar had 
been engaged all the spring and early summer in a doubtful struggle 
with Sextus Pompeius in the straits of Messina ; Antony had been 
prevented from transporting his main army from Brundisium by the 
opposition of Murcus and Ahenobarbus, who were cruising off the 
coast. Caesar had at length to come with his fleet to the assistance 
of his colleague, and about August the whole army was across. 
Even then Caesar was detained by illness : and when he arrived at 
the seat of war he found the army somewhat discouraged. Brutus 
and Cassius were too strongly posted to be attacked ; could not 
be drawn into giving battle in the plain ; and were much better off 
than their opponents for provisions, owing to the presence of their 
fleet. It was not until late in October that Antony, by laboriously 
constructing a causeway across a marsh, which intervened between 
the camp of Cassius and the sea, induced his soldiers to descend ; 
drove them back with great slaughter ; and seized the camp. Mean- 
while Brutus had defeated the division of Caesar, who was not present 
in person from illness, and had sent some cavalry to announce his victory 
to Cassius. But from short sight or haste Cassius mistook them for 
the enemy, and retiring to his tent with his legate Pindarus stabbed 
himself, with the very dagger, it is said, with which he had struck 
Caesar. 

Brutus was still strongly posted and equal in forces to his 
antagonists, and for about fourteen days refused to give them battle. 
He was farther encouraged by hearing that some reinforcements sent 
from Brundisium to Antony had been cut off by Ahenobarbus ; and 
by knowing that Antony and Caesar were in great straits for provi- 
sions. But his troops were so confident that they insisted on 

1 See p. 764 (note). 
- This is the time of the famous quarrel and reconciliation. 



XLVi THE WAR OF PERUSIA 775 

fighting. After a desperate struggle the army of Brutus broke and 
fled : his camp was stormed ; and he himself retreated with four 
legions to the hills. Next morning he would have renewed the 
fight, but his officers bade him consult for himself; they meant to 
submit and try to save their lives. Upon this, Brutus exclaiming, 
"Then I am of no more use to my country," persuaded his friend Strato 
of Epirus to give him the death-stroke. 

With the death of Brutus and Cassius fell the resistance of those Effects of 
nobles who had for so many centuries guided the destiny of Rome ; ^^^^ 
and who, with many glaring vices, had on the whole played a splendid ^^"^^->'- 
part in the world's history. Henceforth it was only a question who 
should be master of the Empire. A new distribution was made. Fresh 
Antony was to take Gaul and Africa: Caesar Spain and Numidia. division of 
Italy was to be common to both, as the head of the Empire and the t^'^^ E.mpire. 
recruiting ground for the armies. If Lepidus was proved not to have 
held treasonable correspondence with Sextus Pompeius, as he had 
been accused of doing, he was to have Africa. Meanwhile Antony 
was to go to Asia to put down opposition in the East and collect 
money ; Caesar to Rome, to carry on the war with Sextus Pompeius 
and arrange for assignments of lands to the veterans. 
' From this moment began the rivalry which was only ended ten 41. Coss. 

I years later at Actium. Caesar returned to Rome, after another ^• 

illness, early in 41, and found an opposition prepared for him by '_" ^"^^"^ 
\ Antony's wife Fulvia and his brother Lucius, who had triumphed p. 
I for some insignificant successes in Gaul, and was now consul. Lucius Scrvilius 
( and Fulvia soon got material for a quarrel in the distribution of land ^'<^i^(i 
': to the veterans : Caesar retaliated by divorcing Fulvia's daughter, still y^^^'^"^ 
* a mere child. Prices were high at Rome, because Sextus Pompeius 
' and Ahenobarbus infested the seas and stopped the supply of corn. ^^-^^^ "' 
^ Dispossessed landowners naturally resented their loss ; while, if the between 
I confiscations were not carried out, the soldiers mutinied. Fulvia and Caesar 
I Lucius contrived to turn the odium for all these difficulties upon "^^ ^•. 

Caesar, as though he had the means, if he chose, of satisfying the J^^ 

' veterans without farther confiscations : and refused to fulfil the part fulvia. 

I of the agreement between Caesar and M. Antony (though it was 

I written and sealed), whereby Caesar was to have two of his legions. 

1 Both sides armed. Caesar's men came to Rome in great numbers, 

I and in public meeting ordered both to appear at Gabii on a fixed day 

j to state their case. Lucius refused to appear, and was condemned 

in his absence, while Caesar's acta were confirmed. Lucius, having 

wrung from the Senate a decree authorising him to conduct a war 

(no enemy apparently being mentioned), endeavoured to lead his men 

to Ariminum. But Caesar had occupied Nursia and Sentinum on 

the Flaminian road, and Lucius and Fulvia turned aside to Perusia. 



n^ 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Siege and 
fall of 
Perusia, 
March 40. 



Ahenohar- 
bus ceases 
to infest 
the Italian 
coast. 

Antony 
and 

Cleopatra, 
41-40. 



Invasion of 
Syria and 
Asia by Q. 
Labienus 
and the 
Parthians, 
40. 



40. Coss. 

Cn. 

Dotnitius 

Calvinus 

II., C. 

Asinius 

Pollio. 



Peace of 
Brundi- 
sium, 

autumn of 
40. 



There, after a long siege, they were reduced by hunger to submit 
(March 40). Fulvia and her children went to Greece ; Lucius was 
allowed to go free, and was presently sent on service to Spain ; but 
considerable severity was exercised on the senators and equites found 
in the town, as many as 300, it is said, being put to death, and the 
old party of the Optimates seems here to have found its final doom. 
No other outbreak occurred in Italy, except a short and easily 
suppressed rising of dispossessed landowners in Campania, headed 
by Tib. Claudius Nero, the husband of Caesar's future wife Livia. 
The pressure on the market was also relieved by the departure of 
Ahenobarbus, who sailed away to join Antony : and Caesar entered 
Rome in triumphal robes and was regarded as a saviour of society. 

But though Caesar seemed now securely master of Italy there 
appeared to be danger of a civil war between him and M. Antonius. 
When the two parted at Philippi Antonius had gone to Asia to 
raise money, which he or his agents did with great severity. But at 
Tarsus he had been visited by Cleopatra, summoned to answer for 
help given by her generals to Cassius. She appeared in a state barge 
on the Cydnus, lying on a couch in the guise of Venus, surrounded by 
Cupids and Graces. Sweet scents were wafted to the banks, and the 
strains of flute and pipe kept time for the silver oars. From that 
moment Antony became her slave. He accompanied the queen to 
Alexandria, and forgot the cares of state in banquets, shows, and the 
chase. From this dream of pleasure he was wakened in April (40) 
by the news that the Parthians were invading Syria under Q. Labienus, 
a son of Caesar's old officer, who having been sent to king Orodes 
by Cassius had remained in Parthia, when he heard of the disaster 
of Phiiippi. Antony roused himself to go with his fleet to Tyre ; but 
finding that Labienus had overrun the country and had entered Asia 
Minor, and that nothing could be done at present, he went to 
Greece, on the plea that his presence was required in the war against 
Sext. Pompeius. There he met Fulvia, fresh from Perusia, and his 
mother Julia, who had since l^een with Pompeius, On their instiga- 
tion, though he roughly rebuked Fulvia, he resolved to make terms 
with Sextus Pompeius and attack Caesar ; and, in fact, with 
Ahenobarbus and Pompeius did make some raids on southern Italy. 
But on the death of Fulvia, which occurred while this was going on, 
he consented to treat ^ith Caesar. Ahenobarbus was sent to 
Bithynia, Sextus Pompeius to Sicily ; and by Maecenas for Caesar, 
and Pollio for Antony, an arrangement known as the peace of Bnm- 
disium was made. Antony was to govern all east of the Adriatic 
and undertake the Parthian war ; Lepidus was to have Africa; 
and Caesar all the rest, undertaking to put down Pompeius. Antony 
was to confirm the peace by marrying Caesar's sister Octavia, recently 



XLVi DEATH OF SEXTUS POMPEIUS 777 

left a widow by Marcellus. Asinius Pollio, who seems to have 
abdicated his consulship, had next year the conduct of an expedition 
against the Parthini, in which he earned a triumph. 

This was followed a few months later by a pacification with Peace with 
Sextus at Misenum, in accordance with which he was to cease Sextus 
obstructing the corn supply, but was to retain the government of Pompeius, 
Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, and Achaia, with a fleet, during" the ^^'. "^ 
triumvirate, and to have the consulship in due course. Those who 
had joined him (except the murderers of Caesar) were to recover their 
full rights ; and he was to receive a large sum of money in compensa- 
tion for his father's property. Antony then returned to the East to 
make his preparations against the Parthians. 

The peace with Pompeius did not last long. He complained that Reneived 
the terms were not loyally kept, especially on the part of Antony in tuts of 
regard to Peloponnese ; and the raids on corn ships began again, hostility by 
and with them the distress in the markets at Rome. Antony and *^^^'^-^. 

r^ 1 /■ J ,- ... ^ r'ompeius, 

Caesar also tound many causes of mutual dissatisfaction, though j8-j6. 
from time to time they were allayed by the influence of Octavia, with 
whom Antony lived for nearly two years in Greece. Finally, how- 
ever, Caesar was left to cope with Pompeius alone : and it was not 
till 36, after many dangers and some reverses, that his able minister 
M. Vipsanius Agrippa defeated Pompey's fleet off Naulochus (3rd Flight and 
September), and drove him to fly to Asia, where, though in pur- death of 
suance of the agreement of Misenum he was consul in 35, he was ^'^'''A^'^-f. 
put to death by Marcus Titius on Antony's order, of which he ^ ''^"^" 
repented too late. In the course of the last campaign against Sextus 
Lepidus had been summoned from Africa to the help of Caesar. 
Having taken Lilybaeum and Messana, and being joined by the 
Pompeian legions, he claimed Sicily for himself, and was even 
believed to have made a plot against Caesar's life. But his army 
abandoned him, and he had no resource but to fall at Caesar's feet 
and beg for pardon. His life was spared, and he retained his ofiice Lepidus 
of pontifex maximus till his death (15); but henceforth he had to deprived of 
live as a privatus at Circcii, and Africa was added to the provinces '^^ ^^^^^ 
under Caesar's control. Moreover, the defeat of Pompey was so /^^-^^^t 
great a relief to Rome that Caesar at once became the hero of the vimtc, 36. 
day, and every kind of honour was voted to him. 

The triumvirate had been renewed for a second five years in The seco?id 
a conference at Tarentum in 2)7 -> apparently without a fresh law. ^fium- 
One member of it had been since deposed or forced to abdicate. It ^'■''«^«-^. ^-^^ 
would be a question which of the other two was to be supreme when ^"/^ fjj^ 
the period ended. -,0 

Antony had had a chequered career since 38. His legate V. 
Ventidius had conquered the Parthians in that year, killed Pacorus, 



778 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 

Parthian 

war. 



C. Sosius 
takes 

Jerusalem, 
37- 

Antony s 
disasters in 
Armenia, 
36. 

Antony 
returns to 
Cleopatra , 
3(>-33- 



Antony 
captures 
Artavasdes 

Armenia, 
34- 

Establishes 
his 

children by 
Cleopatra 
in 

kingdoyns, 
and asks 
for a con- 
firmation 
frojH the 
Senate, 
33-32. 



son of king Orodes, and driven Labienus (who now called him- 
self "Parthian Imperator") into Cilicia, where he was discovered 
and killed. But Antony was jealous ; deposed Ventidius, who, how- 
ever, was allowed a triumph ; and took over the command himself 
with very poor results. He failed in the siege of Samosata, and had 
to make inglorious terms with Antiochus, king of Commagene. The 
war in the next year {2,7) was continued by C. Sosius, governor of 
Syria and Cilicia, who took Jerusalem and restored Herod as king 
of ludaea. In 36 Antonius carried on a disastrous campaign against 
Phraates, king of Parthia. His legate Oppius was cut off with a 
whole division ; and Antony in hurrying to his assistance, though 
winning some minor battles, lost large numbers of men ; had to raise 
the siege of Ecbatana ; was deserted by his ally Artavasdes of 
Armenia ; was continually attacked at various passes in Armenia ; 
and eventually retired inglorious to Egypt. From that time he again 
fell under the fascination of Cleopatra. He had left Octavia in Italy 
in 37, and never returned to her, and even declined to see her in 35 
when she came to Greece with money and soldiers from Caesar, 
though he accepted the presents. Henceforward he assumed more 
and more the position of an emperor of the East, carving out king- 
doms and setting up or deposing rulers. Alexander, his son by 
Cleopatra, was made nominal king of Abilene (Palestine), Crete, 
Cyrene, and Cyprus ; and after a comparatively successful expedition 
in Armenia (34), to exact vengeance from Artavasdes, in which that 
king was treacherously captured and brought in silver chains to 
Alexandria, the policy of treating the East as entirely subject to 
himself and Cleopatra was still farther extended. Cleopatra was now 
styled queen of queens ; her son Ptolemy, openly acknowledged as a 
son of Julius and named Caesarion, was made king of Syria to the 
Euphrates, and called "king of kings" ; Alexander was made king 
of Armenia and all beyond the Euphrates ; and a daughter born to 
him by Cleopatra declared queen of Libya and Cyrene ; while in t,^, 
though going on an expedition nominally directed against theParthians, 
he contented himself with making a treaty with the king of Media. 
These arrangements he desired to be confirmed by the Senate at 
Rome. But the accounts of his proceedings were so shocking to the 
pride of the Romans, who believed that his object was to transfer the 
centre of government to Alexandria, ^ that the consuls for 32, who 
were his friends, endeavoured to suppress the despatch, though Caesar 
took care that it should be known. 

It was indeed impossible that the contrast between him and 
Caesar should not be striking. While Antony was suffering reverses 
in Asia or revelling in Alexandria, Caesar had been performing sub- 

^ A similar design was once attributed to lulius Caesar (Suet. ////. 79). 



in 



XLVi FINAL QUARREL OF CAESAR AND ANTONY 779 

stantial services to the state. His friend and minister, M. Vipsanius Contrast of 
Agrippa, had in 38 suppressed a dangerous rising in Gaul ; had crossed Caesar's 
the Rhine to the territory of the Catti ; and had afterwards subdued ^^ ^^-^' 
the revolted Aquitani. In 35, after relieving the city from the ^^^^^ 
distress caused by Sextus Pompeius, Caesar had in person or by ^" • j" • 
legati carried on difficult expeditions in Illyricum and Pannonia, 
sailing down the Danube and the Save as far as Siscia (Stssek), juyrian 
and forcing the barbarians to respect the security of the Roman and 
provinces. In 34 Messalla had suppressed the Salassi for him. He Pannonian 
had also at his own expense, or that of his friends, begun those J^^^ ^" _ 
buildings or restorations which made his reign an era in the archi- ' ''' 

tectural history of Rome. Accordingly, though Antony still had 
partisans, the people generally had come to look upon Caesar and 
his ministers as offering a guarantee for peace and honour, while 
Antony's name was connected with scandalous stories or unsuccessful 
expeditions. 

The second tenure of the triumvirate was to expire at the end of The 
^i^i-) and Antony wrote to the Senate that he did not wish to be grounds of 
reappointed. He hoped that he might be regarded by them as their ^"^^*^^'- 
champion against the ambition of Caesar, who he presumed would 
not be willing to abandon his position in a similar manner. The 
causes of mutual dissatisfaction between the two had been con- 
tinually accumulating. Antony complained that Caesar had exceeded 
his powers in deposing Lepidus, in taking over the countries held by 
Sextus Pompeius, in enlisting soldiers for himself without sending 
half to him. Caesar complained that Antony had no authority for 
being in Egypt ; that his execution of Sextus Pompeius was illegal ; 
that his treachery to the king of Armenia disgraced the Roman 
name ; that he had not sent half the proceeds of the spoils to Rome 
according to his agreement : that his connexion with Cleopatra and 
the acknowledgment of Caesarion as a legrtimate son of lulius were 
a degradation of his office and a menace to himself. 

The quarrel came to a head in 32. The consuls of that year j2. Cass. 
had, as we have seen, determined to conceal the extent of Antony's Cn. 
demands. Ahenobarbus seems to have wished to keep quiet ; but '^''"^^"^ 
C. Sosius on the i st of January made an elaborate speech in favour i^ardus C. 
of Antony, and would have proposed the confirmation of his acfa had Sosius. 
it not been vetoed by a tribune. Caesar was not present, but at the 
next meeting made a reply of such a nature that the consuls both 
left Rome to join Antony ; and Antony, when he heard of it, after 
publicly divorcing Octavia, came at once to Ephesus with Cleopatra, Antony 
where a vast fleet was gathered from all parts of the East, of which '^f^i his 
Cleopatra furnished a large proportion. Thence, after some months '^^^"^y '-" 
of splendid festivities with the crowd of princes and generals collected 



78o 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Caesar s 
prepara- 
tions. 



Antony 
winters at 
Patrae. 



ji. Coss. 

Imp. 

Caesar 

III., M. 

Valerius 

Messalla 

Corvinus. 



Early half 

Agrippa 
takes to7vns 
in Greece. 



Cleopatra 
7vis/ies to 
return to 
Egypt. 



Battle of 
Actiuni, 
2nd Sept. 
31- 



at Samos, he removed to Athens. His land forces which had been 
in Armenia were brought down to the coast of Asia, and embarked 
under L. Canidius Crassus. 

Caesar was not behindhand in preparations. By the pubHcation 
of Antony's will, which had been put into his hands by the traitor 
Plancus, and by carefully letting it be known at Rome what prepara- 
tions were going on at Samos, and how entirely Antony was acting 
as the agent of Cleopatra, he had produced such a violent outburst 
of feeling that he easily obtained his deposition from the consulship 
of 31, for which he was designated, and a vote for a proclamation 
of war against Cleopatra, well understood to mean against Antonius, 
though he was not named. 

He meant to anticipate an attack by a descent upon Italy towards 
the end of 32, and came as far as Corey ra. But finding the sea 
guarded by a squadron of Caesar's ships he retired to winter at 
Patrae, while his fleet for the most part lay in the Ambracian Gulf, 
and his land forces encamped near the promontory of Actium, while 
the opposite side of the narrow strait into the Ambracian Gulf was 
also protected by a tower and a body of troops. 

Caesar's proposals for a conference with Antony having been 
scornfully rejected, both sides prepared for the final struggle next year. 
The early months passed without notable event, beyond some 
successes of Agrippa on the coasts of Greece meant to divert Antony's 
attention. It was not until the latter part of August that troops 
were brought by land into the neighbourhood of Antony's camp on 
the north side of the strait. Still Antony could not be tempted 
out. It was not for some months that his full strength could be 
collected from the various places in which his allies or his ships had 
wintered. But during these months not only was Agrippa continuing 
his descents upon Greek towns and coasts, but in various cavalry 
skirmishes Caesar had so far worsted the enemy that Antony 
abandoned the north side of the strait and confined his soldiers to 
the southern camp. Cleopatra now earnestly advised that garrisons 
should be put into strong towns, and that the main fleet should 
return to Alexandria. The large contingent furnished by Egypt gave 
her advice as much weight as her personal influence over Antony ; 
and it appears that this movement was really resolved upon. 

Caesar learnt this and determined to prevent it. On the first 
day of September he issued an address to his fleet, preparing them 
for battle. The next day was wet, and the sea was rough ; and when 
the trumpet signal for the start rang out, Antony's fleet began issuing 
from the straits, and the ships moving into line remained quiet. 
Caesar, after a short hesitation, ordered his vessels to steer to the 
right and pass the enemy's ships. Then for fear of being surrounded 



XLVi BATTLE OF ACTIUM 781 

Antony was forced to give the word to attack. His fleet numbered ji. 
500, many of them large galleys of eight or ten banks of oars, 
furnished with towers full of armed men. Caesar had about 250 
ships, generally of smaller size, but more manageable in the heavy 
surf, capable of reversing their course at a short notice, and returning to 
the charge, or, after pouring in a volley of darts on some huge adversary, 
able to retreat out of shot with speed. Antony's ships were often 
furnished with grappling irons, which were effective if the cast 
succeeded ; but, if it failed, were apt to damage the ship, or to cause 
so much delay as to expose the men on board to the darts from the 
smaller vessel. The battle raged all the afternoon without decisive 
result. But Cleopatra, on the rear of the fleet, could not bear the Cleopatra 
suspense, and in an agony of anxiety gave the signal for retreat, ^^t^ ^he 
A iDreeze sprang up in the right direction, and the Egyptian ships J^^f'^ ^ ^ 
were soon hurrying out of sight. Antony had not observed the signal, "^ 
and believing that it was a mere panic, and that all was lost, 
followed the flying squadron. The contagion spread fast ; every- 
where sails were seen unfurling, and towers and other heavy fight- 
ing gear going by the board. Yet some still fought on ; and it was 
not till long after nightfall, when many a ship was blazing from 
the firebrands thrown upon them, that the work was done. For General 
when resistance was over, Caesar exerted himself to save the crews "^'^ftory of 
of the burning vessels, and had to spend the whole night on board. 
Next day such of the land army as had not escaped to their own 
lands submitted, or were followed in their retreat to Macedonia and 
forced to surrender, and Antony's camp was occupied. It was all 
over, and the Empire had a single master. 
\ Antony, though he had not laid down his imperium, was a fugitive 

j and a rebel, without that shadow of a legal position which the pres- 
ence of the consuls and senators had given him in the previous 
year. Some of the victorious fleet were in pursuit of him ; but Caesar 
himself spent the rest of the year in Greece and Asia, wintering at 
Samos ; though he was obliged to go for a short time to Brundisium 
to settle a mutiny and arrange for assignations of land. 

At Samos he received a message from Cleopatra with the present Cleopatra 
j of a gold crown and throne, offering to abdicate in favour of her sons, iries to 

' The queen was allowed to believe that she would be well treated, ^ , ^^^'"/ 
(/•^ . !/-,••,* , /<''' her self, 

' for Caesar was anxious to secure her for his triumph. Antony, who o/.jo. 

\ had found himself generally deserted, after vainly attempting to 

secure the army stationed near Paraetonium under Pinarius, and 

sending his eldest son Antyllus with money to Caesar and an offer to 

live at Athens as a private citizen, found himself in the spring 

attacked on two sides. C. Cornelius Callus was advancing from 

Paraetonium ; and Caesar himself landed at Pclusium, with the 



782 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



Death of 

Antony 

and 

Cleopatra, 

30. 



A 71 tony 
and Oct. 
Caesar 
contrasted. 



Changes in 
the Empire 
since the 
death of 
lulius. 



Mauri- 
tania. 



Egypt. 



connivance it was believed of Cleopatra, Antony was defeated by 
Callus, and returning to Egypt advanced on Pelusium. There a 
slight success over Caesar's tired soldiers encouraged him to make a 
general attack, in which he was decisively beaten. Failing to escape 
on board ship he stabbed himself; and, as he did not die at once, 
insisted on being taken to the mausoleum in which Cleopatra was 
shut up, and there died in her arms. The queen was shortly after- 
wards brought from this place to the palace ; and after vainly 
attempting to move Caesar's passions or pity, eluded the vigilance of 
his guards, and put an end to her life, as it was believed, by the 
bite of an asp conveyed to her in a basket of fruit : 

saevis LUmrnis scilicet invideus 
privata deduct super ho 

7ion humilis mtilier iriiirnpho. 

Antony had some attractive qualities, but no virtues. His dis- 
position was open and not ungenerous ; yet his easy temper permitted 
flagrant oppression on the part of subordinates, and made him the slave 
of now one passion and now another. It was a good thing for the 
world that the victory rested with his colder and more passionless 
rival. Caesar began public life with one strong feeling — a desire to 
revenge the murdered lulius. In exacting that vengeance he was 
more than once guilty of cold-blooded cruelty. Hut that accomplished, 
and his own supremacy established, he devoted a long life to a re- 
construction of his vast Empire, which on the whole infinitely extended 
and secured the happiness of the world. 

The fourteen years which had elapsed since the death of lulius 
had added little to that Empire. For a time indeed, Cilicia and 
Syria seemed almost lost to it, the dissensions of revolted Roman 
officers giving an opportunity to the ever watchful Parthian enemy. 
This state of things had been checked by the successes of Antony's 
officers, and Caesar had nothing to fear west of the Euphrates. In 
Africa the kingdom of Mauritania had been taken over on the death 
of Bocchus in 33. It was not, however, kept permanently as a Roman 
province. In 25 luba, son of the king of Numidia conquered by 
lulius, who had been brought up at Rome, was established as its 
king, and it was not again reduced to the form of a province till A.D. 
40. A permanent addition however was made at once in Egypt. 
Cleopatra was the last of the Lagidae to reign, Caesarion was put 
to death, and the two sons and a daughter whom she bore to Antony 
were taken to Rome and generously received and educated by 
Octavia. But though Egypt was made a province, it was on some- 
what different terms to the other provinces. It was so important as a 
granary of Rome, that it was thought necessary to jealously guard it 



XLvi THE NEW GOVERNMENT 783 

from the ambition of party leaders. Its governor was an eques^ not 
called propraetor or proconsul, but praefectus Acgypti^ who did not 
take the fasces or other signs of imperium, and who was immediately 
answerable to the Emperor. No man of senatorial rank might enter 
the country without special permission ; and it did not share with the 
other provinces in the privilege granted by the lex Saeiiia (30) of 
furnishing members to the Senate. Two legions were permanently 
kept in the country, which was divided into three large districts 
(upper, lower, and middle) and subdivided into ?wnies and comae, the 
governors of which were nominated by the praefectus. 

With these exceptions, and with certain rearrangements of client 30-2^. 
kings in the East caused by the deposition of those who had served 
with Antony at Actium, the Empire, now practically under the rule of 
Caesar, was the same as it had been at the death of lulius. Nor were 
the constitutional forms at once changed. The magistrates were still ConstUu- 
elected, though in the case of the consuls this had become a mere form. ^^^«^^ 
We have seen that at the time of his death lulius had "designated" ' " * " 
consuls for three years in advance. At the treaty of Misenum (39) 
the same had been done for eight years ; and practically henceforth 
it was in the hands of Caesar, the old forms being however maintained. 
The Senate in the course of the twenty years of civil disorder had The 
steadily declined in prestige, while it had increased in number by the ^^'"<^^^- 
repeated admissions of various party chiefs, and by the cessation of 
anything like censorial action ; ^ but it still conducted much of the 
Inisiness of administration, especially in regard to the provinces ; and 
one of the first of Caesar's reforms was directed to purifying it 
and defining its powers. Immediately after the victory of Actium 
the process commenced of centring in his person the functions 
of the different magistrates. Without being either tribune or The 
censor, he was invested with tribunician and censorial powers, the lf»P'^>'^fo^- 
former especially making his person sacred, and giving him a veto 
on all proceedings, nominally for a limited time, which however was 
always extended. But he had also imperium, which gave him the 
command of the army, the right of levying troops, and coercing 
citizens. He had had imperium ever since 43,'^^ and seems to have 
adopted the title or pnisnomen Imperator very early, and is entered 

^ At ('acsar's first review of the Senate in 29 there were said to be 1000 names 
on the roll (Dio. lii. 42). 

- Cicero, 5 Phil. §§ 45-47 ; Monument. Ancyr. i. But Cicero seems to have 
regarded this as irregular, and only arising from the necessities of the times, 11 
Phil. § 20, Imperium C. Caesari belli necessitas, fasces senatus dedit. As triumvir 
he would still have imperium, and though the triumvirate legally ran out at the end 
of 33, he had not abdicated the imperium. In 44-43 there were two decrees, one 
giving him imperium as proi)raetor, the other (after 15th April) giving him con- 
sular rank. 



CHAP. XLVi LITERATURE AT THE END OF THE REPUBLIC 785 

as Imperator Caesar in the Fasti for 2il>' But for this somewhat Procon- 
irregular imperium a more regular proconsulare imperium was now s^iiare im- 
substituted, which was held to give him the command in every province, P^^^^^"- 
even in those which he afterwards left to the care of the Senate. The 
title princeps seems not to have been official, though it was used as 
expressing a fact, — that he was chief citizen {prificeps civium). The 
title Augustus (27) expressed the almost divine character that the 
Senate was prepared to attribute to him, but added nothing to his 
powers. 

These arrangements were, for the most part, made within three The fiew 
years of the battle of Actium (28-27), and their effect was to produce monarchy. 
a really new constitution under old forms. The magistrates became 
executive officers answerable not to the people but to the Imperator ; 
the Senate, the one remaining trace of the old Republican govern- 
ment, became outwardly more important than ever, both as an 
administrative and judicial body, but practically it had to yield to the 
master of the Legions and the controller of the Exchequer. 

We have thus traced the marvellous rise of a single city, till its The rise 
magistrates controlled (as will be seen in the annexed map) the whole of Rome 
of Europe south of Germany and the Danube, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, -^^^^ *^\^ 
and a large part of the northern district of Africa. The constitution to^Trend 
under which it rose to this extraordinary power broke down under the of the 
stress of its extended responsibilities. After nearly a hundred years Republic, 
of more or less acute civil war, a statesman had been found capable 7SJ-3o- 
of remodelling that constitution and organising that vast Empire. 
It was to remain for many centuries much as he left it, until dis- 
integrating forces from within and violent incursions from without 
slowly resolved it into the separate countries of our modern world. 



Of the literature produced during the last century of the Republic Literature 
we have, in comparison with the amount once existing, what may be (^f ^^^ ^^^^ 
considered but a fragment. The first in quantity, as well as in im- "^^^^ ur^ 
portance, are the works of M. TULLIUS Cicero [106-43]. Setting ^ ". 

aside their importance to the historian, he is to be specially noted as cicero 
the founder of a literary style, at once brilliant, correct, and clear, to 
which nearly all subsequent writers looked as a standard. Though 
he followed the Greek schools of rhetoric in the construction of his 
speeches, and translated or epitomised Greek writers in his philo- 
sophical writings, his language is always the purest Latin, exquisite 
but not laboured, learned but not pedantic. His works fall into four 
divisions: (i) Speeches; (2) Rhetorical Treatises; (3) Essays on 
Moral, Metaphysical, or Political Philosophy ; (4) Correspondence. 

I. Of about one hundred and ten speeches known to have been 

3 !•: 



786 HISTORY OF ROME chap. 

delivered by him we possess fifty-seven, with fragments of about twenty 
more. They date from 8 1 to the last year of his life. He seems to have 
carefully prepared, and perhaps written them before delivery, and at 
any rate to have edited them afterwards. To the historical student 
the most important are those delivered on public affairs. The three 
speeches against the agrarian bill of Rullus, and the four against 
Catiline, were delivered in the year of his consulship (63). The four- 
teen Philippics (the second of which is a pamphlet cast in the form 
of a speech) belong to 44-43, in which nearly every step in the con- 
troversy with Antony from September 44 to April 43 can be traced. 
To this group might be added the speeches against Verres, for 
though in form they are the speeches of an advocate, and in great 
part were never delivered, they form the most valuable state papers 
we possess on the government of the provinces. So, too, the four 
speeches delivered on his return from exile (57), those for P. Sestius 
and M. Caelius, and the <-/<? Provinciis Considaribus (56), as well as the 
earlier speech de hnpcrio Cn. Pompeii (66), give striking pictures of 
the politics of the time. The more purely forensic speeches depend 
for their interest partly on the subject, but more still on the skill and 
often the sophistry with which the argument is handled, and above 
all on the beauty and musical cadence of the language. 

II. The rhetorical treatises, except the dc Im'cntione, which is a frag- 
ment of an early work called Rhctorica^ were produced between $ 5 and 
46, when the state of public affairs kept him (with the exception of 
one year) from engaging much in politics. They are in the form of 
dialogues, and deal with style {de Oratore), history of Roman oratory 
{de Oraforibus)^ the ideal of an orator {Orator ad M. Brutum\ besides 
the minor essays Partitiones oratoriae and Topica. 

III. The philosophical essays were also the fruits of an enforced 
abstention from politics in 45, and were continued, in spite of re- 
newed political activity, to the year of his death. During these years 
he threw himself with such energy into this new field of literature that 
he is said to have regarded it as the true work of his life, and all 
his speeches and rhetorical treatises as comparatively unimportant. 
Though they are compilations from the later Greek philosophers, yet 
the amount done in these three years, in the last part of which (from 
March 44) he returned with intense eagerness to politics, is astonish- 
ing. They are, ( i ) five books de Finibus^ on the Summum Bonum ; 
(2) the Academica, the first book of the second edition containing 
a sketch of the history of philosophy from Socrates to Arcesilaus, and 
the second book of the first edition the doctrines of Antiochus and 
Philo ; (3) five books of Tuscuian Disputations on the elements of 
happiness, from Plato, the Stoics, and Peripatetics ; (4) de Natura 
Deorinn, in three books; (5) de Senectutej (6) de Divinatione^ in 



. XLVi THE PROSE WRITERS 787 

two books, in which the Greek oracles as well as the Roman auguries 
are discussed ; (6) de Amicitia ; (7) de Officiis^ in three books, a 
treatise on practical ethics addressed to his son. There are frag- 
ments of many other works, especially of two treatises on the 
philosophy of politics and law, called de Republica and de Legibus^ 
written in 54 and 53, just before his government in Cilicia. 

IV. The correspondence, not counting twenty-five possibly spurious 
letters to and from M. Brutus, contains 861 letters (some of them 
including copies of others), of which ninety are addressed to Cicero. 
Little else which has come down to us from antiquity can be com- 
pared in interest with this unconscious contemporary record, in which 
— as far at any rate as the letters to Atticus are concerned — the writer 
is speaking with entire candour of the events of the day and his views 
and feelings in regard to them. They were mostly preserved and 
edited after Cicero's death by his freedman Tiro. They extend from 
the year 68 to within a few months of Cicero's death. There are how- 
ever only eleven before 63, and none during that year of his consulship. 
With that exception there is very little break in them. Some are 
mere formal letters of introduction, some evidently elaborate docu- 
ments meant to give a more or less false impression ; but a large 
proportion of them are genuine letters, expressing the writer's true 
self, — a man vain, restless, eager ; a violent partisan and a violent 
enemy ; but still a man of high aims, real patriotism, and at bottom 
of true candour and humanity. He loved Rome as Dr. Johnson 
loved London, and was never quite happy out of it, and never so 
brilliant as when describing scenes in the city. He hungered for 
praise, but was also generous in giving it ; and his constant friendship 
with Atticus was hardly ever dimmed by even a passing shadow. 

M. Terentius Varro [116-28] was ten years older than M. 

Cicero, and, though his name was in the proscription list of 43-42, Terentius 

I survived him fifteen years. Of the 490 books which he is said to 

I have written, in prose and verse, embracing almost every subject of 

I learning, philosophy, jurisprudence, and history, only one has come 

' down to us entire, the Res Rusticae^ in three books, and a portion of 

i another, the de Lingua Latiita. The Res Riisticae is addressed to 

I his wife Fundania, and contains a long list of Greek writers on agri- 

I culture, as well as extracts from Cato and others, and enters into full 

I details of the management of land. It was written in his eightieth 

1 year (36), and, like Cicero's treatises, is cast in the form of a 

' dialogue, but lacks the literary grace of his great contemporary. Of 

the twenty-five books of the de Lingua Latijia only V. to X. survive, 

in a somewhat mutilated form. They contain useful information, 

though the etymology is unscientific and often merely conjectural, 

< and the style ungraceful. 



Varro. 



788 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



C. lulius 
Caesar. 



C. 

Sallustius 
Crispus. 



Poets. 
T. 

Lucretli 
Car us. 



Among the most valuable remains of the literature of the period 
are the Commentaries of lULius Caesar [100-44], containing the 
history of the first seven years of the Gallic war, in seven books, and 
of the Civil war down to the occupation of Pharos (47). An eighth 
book added to the history of the Gallic war, and three on the 
Alexandrine, African, and Spanish wars are by some of Caesar's 
officers, A. Hirtius and others, and are of very unequal merit. 
Caesar's own books are admirable for the conciseness with which 
military movements are fully described, or the results of investiga- 
tions in unknown countries are stated. There is nothing rhetorical 
in them, and no attention to style in the Ciceronian sense ; yet the 
language is pure, and its directness and business-like brevity present 
an admirable model for such records. In the Civil war Caesar had 
to justify himself, and is more open to the charge of at least modifying 
facts for that purpose. His work on grammar {de A7iaJogia\ on 
astronomy {dc Astris)^ and his pamphlet against Cato, as well as his 
speeches and poems, have not survived. 

Of C. Sallustius Crispus [86-33] we have two monographs 
on the conspiracy of Catiline and the Jugurthine war. He was 
tribune in 52, expelled from the Senate for scandalous life in 50, 
served with Caesar and was restored to the Senate in 47, and made 
governor of Africa in 46, where he obtained great wealth. After 
Caesar's death he lived in retirement, and devoted himself to litera- 
ture. He took as his models the writings of Thucydides, in regard 
to the introduction of sketches of character and the use of imaginary 
speeches, — a regular feature of Cireek historical writing, as opposed 
to the dry annalistic form which Roman history had up to his time 
taken. He may therefore in this respect seem to have set a 
fashion to be followed and extended by Livy. He also imitated 
his Greek models in choosing subjects on which, as in the Catiline 
conspiracy, he may have had personal knowledge or information 
from eye-witnesses ; and, as in the Jugurthine war, relations or imme- 
diate descendants of those engaged. His style is rhetorical and 
didactic, he affects Graecisms and archaic words, or, as some say, 
introduces words in common, though not generally in literary, use. 
The accuracy of his account of the Catiline conspiracy has been 
seriously impugned ; and at any rate the invectives against the cor- 
ruptions of the age in both monographs lose much of their force 
when his own character is taken into consideration. Of the five 
books of Histories from the death of Sulla only fragments remain. 

Of the poets whose work survives only two properly belong to 
this period. Of T. Lucretius Carus (? 95-52) we hardly know 
anything for certain, even the dates of his birth and death. A brief 
criticism of Cicero's in a letter to his brother in 54 — Lucretii poemata.^ 



xLvi THE POETS 789 



ut scribis, ita sunt : 7nultis lumi7iihics i7ig€?tii, mulkie etiam artis 

is the only indication we have of the date of the de Rericm 7iaHira, or 
of contemporary opinion. The poem (in six books) is the result of 
the study of the Greek philosophers, which had been steadily spread- 
ing among the cultivated classes at Rome. Its object is to free men 
from the terrors of superstition, resting on the supposed active inter- 
vention of the gods in the affairs of men, and the horrors awaiting 
them after death. To this end he expounds the doctrine of Epicurus 
as to the impassiveness of the gods ; and the atomic theory of 
Leucippus, to explain the origin and order of the material universe 
apart from divine creation or directing energy. The difficulty of 



ntroducing Greek philosophic terms into Latin verse is overcome 



th masterly power, and the dryness of a didactic poem is relieved 
by splendid outbursts of poetry. His use of the Greek hexameter is 
an immense advance on all known predecessors, and marks a stage 
between the roughness of Ennius with the earlier writers generally, 
and the elaborate work of Vergil. 

A still more careful attention to the artistic use of metre marks c. 
Gaius Valerius Catullus {Z-j to about 47), who was a native of Valerius 
, Verona and possessed an estate on Sirmio and a villa at Tibur. Catullus. 
I He came to Rome early, and was a friend of Cicero and other men 
1 of letters ; and, though his father was intimate with Caesar, he attacked 
I him with great bitterness. His surviving work is small in bulk, but 
contains experiments in several metres. What he made especially his 
I own was the Hendecasyllabic verse, which has never been used by 
I any poet with equal effect. The wild Galliambics of the Attis have 
I no parallel in Roman literature, and prove him to have possessed 
j supreme lyrical skill and imagination. His love-poetry centres round 
I a passion for one heroine, to whom the fancy name of Lesbia is given, 
' by some identified with Clodia, the sister of Cicero's enemy. Some of 
» his less successful work is founded on the Alexandrine writers. 

P. VeRGILIUS MaRO (70-19) and Q. HoRATIUS FlACCUS (65-8) Ver^il and 
I belong, partly at least, to the next generation ; and their most im- Horace. 
j portant work was produced after Augustus had become virtual monarch. 
'But Vergilius suffered from the confiscations of 41-40, and was 
; restored to his property by the friendship of Asinius Pollio, and two 
I out of his three works belong to the last period of the civil wars. 
<The Eclogues, founded on the pastoral poems of Theocritus, were The 
:composed between 42 and 39, and the four books of the Geon^ics, Eclogae or 
I founded partly on the Works a?id Days of Hesiod, and tinged with ^«^'^^''^«- 
the same physical philosophy as the poem of Lucretius, occupied him '^he 
from 37 to 31, or perhaps later. Like Catullus, he was a native of ^^'^''Si^'- 
Gallia Transpadana (being born at Andes near Mantua), and there- 
fore not a Roman citizen until 49, though part of his education was 



790 



HISTORY OF ROME 



CHAP. 



The 
^neid. 

Q- 

Horatlus 

Flaccus. 



A Iblus 
Tibulliis. 



The 

buildings 
at Rome 
in the last 
age of the 
Republic. 



at Rome. The glory and fertility of Italy from the great theme of the 
Georgics, although a desire on the part of his patron Maecenas to 
render country pursuits fashionable may have contributed to the choice 
of his subject. It was not till the policy of Augustus had giv-en new 
life to the Empire of Rome that he undertook the great national epic 
which was to glorify her origin and destiny (27-20). 

Horace had been studying at Athens when Brutus arrived there 
in 44, and had taken service with him and shared the disaster of 
Philippi. He had shared also in the amnesty granted to the army of 
Brutus and Cassius, but returned to Rome to find himself penniless. 
He was, however, introduced to Maecenas by Vergil (about 38), and 
before the return of Augustus from the East after Actium had pub- 
lished the two books of his Satires and the Epodes (35-3o)- Though 
the Satires do not pretend to be " poems " but sermones, his use of 
the Hexameter is much more conformable to the stricter rule followed 
by Vergilius than that of his model Lucilius ; and the Iambics of the 
Epodes were a first essay in the adoption of other Greek metres, 
which in a few years was to be extended with such success in the 
Odes, chiefly founded on Sappho and Alcaeus. Being a native of 
Venusia he was a citizen by birth, but as the son of a freedman was 
in an inferior social position, and for some years acted as a public 
clerk or scriba, until relieved from all care by the gift of a small 
Sabine estate from Maecenas. 

Albius Tibullus (circ. 59-18) has left some beautiful elegiac 
poems, chiefly on love subjects, though there are also certain personal 
details of interest. Like Horace and Vergil he suffered from the 
confiscations, and like them was restored or remunerated by a patron, 

M. Valerius Messalla. The bulk of his writings, however, appear to 

belong to the period after 27, when he accompanied his patron to 
Aquitain, though detesting war. He is the poet of quiet life, and 
makes no pretence to Roman sentiment as to martial glory. 

Before the battle of Actium the adornment of Rome with splendid 
buildings had begun. The temple on the Capitol burnt down in 83 
was restored and dedicated in 69. L. Aemilius Paullus had spent 
large sums in 54 on restoring and erecting basilicae. Pompeius 
Magnus had finished his great theatre, capable of holding 40,000 
people, in 52; a porticus, called also the "Hall of the Hundred 
Columns " {Hecatostyloii), outside the theatre ; and a curia adjoining 
the porticus, in which lulius was murdered. This last was burnt 
down at the time of Caesar's funeral, but the statue was saved. lulius 
Caesar had made vast plans both for extending and beautifying Rome, 
but most of them were prevented by his death. He erected stone 
seats in the Circus ; dedicated in 46 a new Forum (the Forum lultuni), 
though it was still unfinished at his death ; actually began a new 



XLVi THE IMPROVEMENTS IN ROME 791 

theatre, afterwards completed by Augustus as the Theatrum MarcelH ; 
dedicated a temple to Venus Genetrix in 46 ; built new rostra at the 
east of the Forum ; began marble septa in the Campus Martins for 
voting at the Comitia ; began a basilica, afterwards completed by 
Augustus. The regia, attached to the temple of Vesta, had been 
rebuilt with great magnificence by Domitius Calvinus in 36. Before 
the battle of Actium, besides carrying on some of these works 
Augustus had begun the ' opera Octaviae,' a curia, a porticus, and 
library; Agrippa had begun the aqueduct called the Aqua Julia 
{2>2>), as well as a large number of fountains in the city ; and probably 
the vast building which still stands and is known as the Pantheon. 
Thus Rome was already beginning to assume a splendour worthy of 
the capital of the world. 

Authorities.— The 14 Philippics of Cicero and the Letters. Appian Bell 
Civ. 111. and iv. Dio Cassius. xhv.-li. Livy. Ep. 1 16-133. Suetonius, Augustus 
46. Plutarch, Lives of Cicero, M. Antonius, M. Brutus. Nicolas of Damascus 
Yx^gTaQxv\.so{\.h^LifeofAjtgustus. Velleius Paterculus, ii. 58-89. Augustus himself 
left a precis of his administration which was to be inscribed on a column at Rome 
and in the provinces. Nearly all of it survives on a temple at Ancyra in Galatia 
The first part gives his version of his conduct in the Civil war, and is here ap 
pended as one of the few contemporary records of Roman History before the Empire 
Annos ufideviginti natus exercitutn privato consilio et privata impeiisa comparavi 
per quern rempublicam dominatione factions oppressafn in libertatem vindicavi. 
Ob quae senatus decretis honorijicis in ordittem suum 7ne adlegit C. Pansa A. 
Hirtio consulibus, consularem locutn simul dans sententiae fere?tdae, et imperium 
miht dedit. Res publica ne quid detrimenti caperet me pro praetore simul cum 
cotisuhbus providere iussit. Populus autem eodem anno 7ne consulem, cum cos. 
uterque bello cecidisset, et trium virum rei publicae cofistituendae creavit. Qui 
parentem meum interfecerunt, eos in exilium expuli iudiciis legitimis ultus 
f acinus, et postea bellum inferefites rei publicae vici bis acie. 



eorum 



INDEX 



Abydos, siege of, 427 
Acarnania, 413 

Achaean League, 276, 414, 415; decide 
on war with Philip, 434-436 ; states- 
men deported, 515; end of, 523- 
527 
Achillas, 746-748 
Acilius Glabrio, M'., 475-480 
Actium, battle of, 780, 781 
Adherbal, 260 

Aduatuca, 729, 730; Aduatuci, 723, 729 
Aebutius Elva, T. , 70 
Aediles, 97, 211, 212; curule, 170 
Aedui, the, 719, 720 
Aegean Sea, war in the, 483 
AemiUus, L. (Cos. 478), 79. Barbula. 
L., 181. Papus, Q. (Cos. 282), 
campaign in S. Italy, 180-182, 191. 
L. (Cos. 225), wars with the Roii, 
278-280. Paulus, L. (Cos. 216), 
falls at Cannae. 323-327. Paulus, L.' 
(Cos. 182, 168), conquers Perseus, 
508-510. Regulus, L., commands in 
the Aegean. 483, 484. Lepidus M. 
(Cos. 78), 659, 660. L., envoy to 
Philip. 427. M. , praetor in 49, 
740. 750- 759. 760, 761, 764. 769; 
triumvir, 771, 772, 777 
Aeneas, legends of 21, 22 
Aequi, II, 29, 72, 73. 75, 104, 151, 

152 
Aesculapius, worship of, 52 
Aesis, R. , 6 

Aetolian League, 276, 413, 414; makes 
peace with Philip, 416 ; treaty with 
Rome, 418 ; joins Romans in second 
Macedonian war, 430 ; discontent 
of. 443. 464 ; invites Antiochus, 465- 
468 ; war with, 471-482, 495-497 



657- 



Afranius, L. (dramatist), 

(Cos. 60), 710, 740 
Africa, province of, 536 ; new, 753 
Agathocles of Syracuse, 193, 223 
Ager publicus, 93, 167, 168, 552 ; 
complaints of Italians as to, 557, 
568, 697 (note). Romanus, 29, 30 
Agger of Servius, 43 
Agis of Tarentum, 181 
Agrigentum, 194 ; occupied by Car- 
thaginians, 239; siege and fall of. 
240. 241 ; sale of inhabitants, 284 ; 
holds out against Marcellus, 342 ; 
taken by Laevinus, 361, 362 
Agrippa. See I'ipsatiius 
Aius Locutus, altar to, 121 
Alba, king, 22 
Alba Longa, kings of, 22; destruction 

of, 57. Fucentia, 349, 767 
Alban lake, iviissarimn of. 85, 86 
Albani, Pcmpey's battles with, 685 
Albinus, L. , 97 
Albula, old name of Tiber, 22 
Album of Pontifices, 57 
Alesia. 730 
Alexander the Great, the division of his 

empire, 409-411 ; 
Alexander, king of the Molossi, in S. 

Italy, 19. 136-138 
Alexandria, Caesar at. 748, 749 
Algidus, Mt., battles near, 73. 75; 

camp at, 104 
Allia, battle of the, 117 
Allifae, battle at, 149 
AUobroges. Hannibal among the, 301 ; 
conquered, 569; envoys of, in Rome,' 
701 ; rebellion of, 712 
Alps, the, 5, 9 ; passage of by Hannibal. 
301-303 



794 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Ambiorix, 729 | 

Ambitus, laws against, 403, 521 I 

Ambracia, taken by Nobilior. 496, 497 
Ambrones, the, 270, 578, 579 
Amphipolis, 774 
Aniulius, uncle of Romulus, 22 
Anaxilas of Rhegium, 78 
Ancus Marcius, 39, 40 
Andriscus, 522, 531 
Andronicus, Livius. 287 
Annales maximi, 57 
Annius Milo. P., 716. 731. 732, 749 
Antiochus III., the Great, of Syria. 
424, 465, 466 ; visited by Hannibal. 
467; conies into Greece. 471-473; war 
with, 475-492. IV.. Kpiphanes. 
ordered out of Egypt, 516. .Vsiaticus. 
675 (note) 
Antium, 29, 67 ; struggles with Vol- 

scians for, 73 ; surrender of, 125 
Antonius M. (orator), 657. C. (Cos. 
63). 699, 705. 706. 708. M. 733. 
736, 740, 745. 749. 750. 757. 759: 
his policy after C'aesar's death, 763- 
741 ; triumvir, 771 ; at Philippi. 
773-775 ; his government of the 
East, 775-778 ; breach with Augustus \ 
and death, 779-782. Gaius, 765 
773. Lucius, 766, 775 
Apennines, the, 6 
Apollo, worship of. 52. 405 (note) 
Apollonia. 742. 744 
Appius Herdonius, 73 
Appuleius Saturninus, L. , his legisla- 
tion and death, 583-585 
Apuani (Ligurians) removed to Sam- 

nium, 457, 458 
Apulia, 6 ; conquest of, 198, 199 
Apuli, the, 19 ; join Samnites, 141 
Aquae Sextiae founded, 564, 568 ; battle 

of, 578 
Aquilius M'. (Cos. 129), m Asia, 605. 
(Son) in Sicily, 550; in Asia, 613; 
defeated by Mithri dates, 616, 617 ; 
doubt as to fate, 617 (note), 635 (note) 
Aquilonia, 160 
Aratus, 415 
Archidamus, of Sparta, in Italy, 19, 

136 (note) 
Archimedes at Syracuse, 338, 339 ; his 

death, 341 
Ardea, 29 ; siege of, 53 
Argei, 36 

Ariarathes V. . of Cappadocia, 608. 
VI., of Cappadocia, 610 



Aricia, besieged by Etruscans, 67, 68 ; 
obtains civitas, 133 

Ariminum, 6 ; demanded by the Boii, 
273 ; Caesar at, 737 

Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, 611 

Ariovistus, 720 

Aristobulus, 686. 689 

Aristodemus of Cumae, 68 

Aristonicus of Pergamus, 558, 561 

Army, Roman, first receives pay, 84 ; 
mutiny of, at Capua, and reforms, 
130. 131 ; organisation before the 
time of Marius, 214-218 ; number 
in third century, 278 ; mutiny of, 
in Spain, 373 ; rorarii reorganised 
as velites, 347 (note), 399 ; socii in, 
214. 399; changes by Martius in, 
582. 583 

Arnus, R., 7, 314 

Arpi, Hannibal at, 317; taken by Fabius. 

343 

.\rretium (Etruria), 153, 396 

Arruns, son of Tarquin, 49 : of Por- 
.sena, 67, 68 

Arsian Wood, 63 

Arsinoe, 748, 759 (note) 

Arvales, 40 ; their prayer. 406 (note) 

.\r\'erni, 719 

Ascanius, 21, 22 

Asculum, victory of Pyrrhus at, 190 ; 
beginning of Social war at, 589 

Asia, kingdoms in, 600, 680-609 

Asia or Syria, kingdom of, 411 ; settle- 
ment of, 494 ; province of Asia, 561, 
602 ; the publicatii and negotiatores 
in, 602, 603 ; Mithridates in, 603, 
j 616; massacre of Italians in, 617; 
I fined by Sulla, 638 
I Asinius Pollio. C, 764, 768, 771 

Athens. 412, 427 ; joins Mithridates, 
620, 621 ; siege of, by Sulla, 624-626 

Athesis, R. , 14 

Atilius Regulus, C. (Cos. 257), 246. 
M. (Cos. 256, 426) ; his victory at 
Ecnomus, 247 ; lands in Africa, 
246-249 ; defeated and captured, 
251 ; mission to Rome and death, 
256-257. Calatinus, Aul. (Diet. 249), 
261. C. Atilius Regulus (Cos. 225), 
falls in battle with Gauls, 278-280 

Attalus I. of Pergamus joins the Romans, 
417, 418 ; purchases Aegina, 419 ; 
joins in attack on Euboea, 420 ; pro- 
claims war with Philip, 425 ; his 
death, 439 (note). II., 511, 537- 



INDEX 



795 



Attalus III., leaves his kingdom to 

Rome, 558, 561 
Atta Naevius, 41, 42, 59 
Attius, L. (dramatist), 657. Varus, P., 

738-742, 750, 751, 755, 756 
Atys, king of Alba, 22 
Aufidus, R. , 7 
Augustus, 6 
Aurelius Cotta, C. (Cos. 200), 397. 

M. (Cos. 74), in the Mithridatic war, 

669. L., 756 
Ausones, 132, 134 ; destruction of, 145 
Aventinus, Mons, fortified, 35, 39 
Aventinus, king of Alba, 22 

Bacchanalia, the, 520, 521 

Baecula, battle of, 370 

Baebius Tamphilus, M., 469, 475 

Baetica, 362, 363, 370, 371 

Bagradas, R. , 270 

Balearic Isles subdued, 569 

Bassus, Caecilius, 764, 773, 774. P. 

Ventidius, 769 (note), 777 
Belgae, 722 

Bellovisus, king of the Bituriges, 14 
Beneventum, battle of, 155 
Bibracte, 720, 730 
Bithynia, kingdom of, 411 ; left to the 

Romans, 668 
Bithynia and Pontus, 677, 686 
Bituriges, the, 14 
Blosius, C, of Cumae. 555, 657 
Bocchus of Numidia betrays lugurtha, 

577. Bocchus and Bagouas, 752, 

755. 782 
Boii, the, 14, 177, 273, 278, 280; 

attack Placentia and Cremona, 298 ; 

wars with, 451-455 
Bomilcar in Sicily, 340 
Bona Dea, mysteries of, 708 
Bononia, 334 
Bovianum, 146, 150, 155, 160 ; in the 

Social war, 591 
Bratuspantium, 722 
Brennus, 115 

Britain, invasions of, 727-729 
Brundisium, 17, 199, 200, 739 
Bruttii, the, 19 ; subdued, 198, 199 ; 

punished for assisting Hannibal, 395 
Bruttium, 6 ; invaded, 196 ; joins 

Hannibal, 331 
Bruttius Sura at Demetrias, 623 
Brutus. See luniiis 
Brutus Albinus, Dec. , 726, 740, 760, 

764, 768, 770 



Buxentum, 17 

Byrsa, meaning of, 224 

Cabira, battles of, 672, 676 

Caecilius Metellus, L. (Cos. 251), his 
victory at Panormus, 256. Statins, 
519. Metellus Macedonicus, Q. , 
defeats Andriscus, 522 ; in Greece, 
524, 525. Metellus, Q. , campaign 
against lugurtha, 573-576 ; banish- 
ment and return of, 584, 586. 
Metellus Creticus, Q. , 680, 681. 
Metellus, Q. (Cos. 51), 706, 715. 
Pius Scipio, Q. (Cos. 52), 743, 744, 

750-753 
Caelius, Mons, included in the city, 35, 

37 

Caelius, M., 736, 749 

Caere, Caerite franchise, 127, 133 

Caesar. See Itilh(S 

Calabria, 6 

Calagurris, siege of, 663 

Calatia, 149, 151 (note) 

Calendar, reform of, 754 

Callipolis, 17 

Calpurnius Beslia, L. , bribed by 
Jugurtha, 572. Piso, L. (Cos. 148), 
in third Punic war, 531 

Camarina, shipwreck off, 254 

Camillus. See Furius 

Campania, 68 ; Samnites in, 83, 128, 
129 ; Hannibal in, 320, 332, 343 ; 
treatment of after second Punic war, 
395 ; settlement of, 133 ; senatus con- 
sultum dc Campanis, 351 

Campus Martius, 47, 62 

Canae, Roman fleet at, 481-483 

Cannae, seized by Hannibal, 323 ; 
battle of, 325-327 

Capitolinus, Mons, 25, 31 ; fortified, 
35 ; temple on, 51 

Capitolium vetus, 25, 31 

Capena, 83, 84 

Capetus, king of Alba, 22 

Capua (formerly Volternum), 83 ; 
Hannibal at, 332, 333 ; siege of, 346, 
347 ; fall of, 350 ; colonists at, 598 

Capys, king of Alba, 22 

Carrhae, battle of, 734 

Carthage, first treaty with, 41, 57 ; 
foundation and dominions of, 224- 
226 ; constitution of, 228-230 ; mer- 
cenary armies of, 230 ; city and har- 
bours, 231, 232 ; treaties with Greeks 
in Sicily, 227 ; supremacy of, at sea, 



796 



HISTORY OF ROME 



242 ; severe terms to, 267, 392, 529 ; 
siege and destruction of, 532-536 ; 
Marius at, 595. Carthaginians send 
gold crown to Rome, 130 ; in Sicily, 
191-193 ; make treaty with Romans 
against Pyrrhus, 193 ; at Tarentum, 
198 ; terms to, after second Punic 
war, 392 ; their quarrels with Masan- 
nasa, 527 

Carthage, New, 277, 293 ; description 
of, 367 ; taking of, 368, 369 

Carthalo, 261, 262 

Carvilius, Sp. (Cos. 292), 160, 161 

Casa Romuli, 59 

Casilinum taken, 343 

Casinum, 320 (note) 

Cassius Viscellinus, Sp., defeats the 
Sabines, 69 ; negotiates with Latins, 
70, 72 ; his agrarian law, 98 ; his 
death, 99. Longinus, L. , 615. C, 
734. 758, 764. 773. 774- Q-. 736. 
741. 755 

Casilinum, 320 (note) 

Cassivelaunus, 728 

Castitas Patricia, Chapel of, 175 

Castor and Pollux, 71 

Castulonensis saltus, 361, 362 

Catana, 194 

Catilina, L. Sergius, early life of, 698 ; 
his conspiracy and death, 698-706 

Cato. See Porcius 

Catulus. See Lutatius 

Caudinae Furculae, 141 -144 

Caudiuni, 144 

Caulonia, 16 

Celtiberian war, the, 540 

Celts, 13. 114 

Cenomani, 14 

Censors appointed, 109 ; functions, 
209 

Centuriae, 45, 46, 91 

Ceres, mysteries of, 329 (note) 

Chaeroneia, battle of, 630 

Chalcedon, battle of, 668 

Chalcis, Antiochus at, 474, 475 ; occu- 
pied by Glabrio, 477 

Cilicia, province of, enlarged, 666 

Cilnii of Etruria, the, 153. Cilnius 
Maecenas, C. , 766 

Cimbri, the, 569, 570, 578-580 

Ciminius saltus, 88, 147 

Cincinnatus. See Quintius 

Cincius Alimentus, L. , 288 

Cineas, minister of Pyrrhus, 188 

Cingetorix, 729 



Cinna, battle of, 146 

Cinna. See Cornelius 

Circeii, 51, 72 

Circus Maximus, 41 ; Flaminius, 285 

Cirta, siege of, 572 ; fighting near, 577 

Civitas, 2, 90, 91, 202, 591, 592 ; 
gained by military service, 583 

Civitas foederata, 268, 589 

Clanis, R. , 115 

Classes, 45, 46, 596 

Claudius, Appius, the decemvir, 95, 
99, 102-105. Caecus, Appius in 
Umbria, 156 ; his writings, 163, 
164 ; his censorship, 171, 172, 209 ; 
his speech against terms with Pyrrhus, 
188. Caudex, App. , 237-239. 
Cento, App., defeated at Uscana, 
507. L. , at Rhegium, 237. Pulcher, 
P. (Cos. 249), defeated at Drepana, 
260. M.\RCELLUS, M. (Cos. 222), 
wins spolia opima, 281 ; at Ostia, 
330; campaigns against Hannibal, 
332, 335 ; in Sicily, 338-342 ; three 
days' fight near Canusium with 
Hannibal, 352 ; his death, 353, 354. 
Marcellus, M. , in Spain, 541. Nero, 
C. (Cos. 207), 355, 356, 365. 
Pulcher, App., 673. Nero. Tib., 
776 

Clausus, Atta, migrates to Rome, 69 

C'leomenes of Sparta, 415 

Cleonymus of Sparta, 19, 178 

Cleopatra, 748, 759, 774. 776, 778, 
779, 781, 782 

Cloaca maxima, 41 (note), 51 

Clodia, 771 

Clodius Pulcher, P. , 673 ; prosecutes 
Catiline, 698 ; violates the mysteries, 
708, 709 ; joins the populares, 712- 
717 ; murdered, 731 

Cloelia, 66 

Cluilius, king of Alba, 36 

Clupea, 249, 253 

Clusium, besieged by Gauls, 115 ; 
fighting at, 159, 279 

Collatia, 41, 54 

Collatinus, 62 

Collegia sodalicia, 714 

Collegium, pontificum, 38, 171, 212, 
213 (note) : augurum, 171 ; election 
to, 650 

Colline Gate, battles at the, 597, 644 

Colonies, lists of, 164 (note), 654 (note) 

Coloniae (Italian) — Aesernia, 269 ; 
Aesium, ib. ; Alba Fucentia, 151; 



INDEX 



797 



Alsium, 269 ; Anxur, 134, 397 ; 
Aquileia, 456, 457 ; Ardea, 396 ; 
Ariminum, 200 ; Auximum, 276 ; 
Beneventum, 200 ; Bononia, 456 ; 
Brundisium, 200, 269 ; Buxentum, 
396 ; Cales, 134 ; Carseoli, 396 ; 
Casinum, 146 ; Castrum Novum, 
175 ; Circeii, 51, 396 ; Copia 
(Thurii), 396 ; Cora, ib. ; Cremona, 
26, 281, 298, 397, 451 ; Croton, 
396; Cyzicus, siege of, 670 ; Firmum, 
200 ; Fregellae, 134 ; becomes Fabra- 
teria, 559 ; Fregenae, 269 ; Graviscae, 
450 ; Hatria, 175 ; Interamna Lirinas, 
146 ; Litermum, 396 ; Luceria, 145 ; 
Luca, 458 ; Luna, 450 ; Minervia 
(Scylacium), 551 ; Minturnae, 156, 
397; Mutina, 298 (note), 456; 
Narnia, 153 ; Nepete, 396 ; Nep- 
tunia (Tarentum), 559 ; Ostia, 397 ; 
Parma, 456 ; Pisae, 458 ; Pisaurum, 
456; Placentia, 281, 397, 451 ; 
PoUentia, 456 ; Pontiae, 146 ; 
Salernum, 396 ; Saturnia, 450, 643 ; 
Sena Gallica, 177, 276, 397 ; Satri- 
cum, 124 ; Setia, 396 ; Signia, 51, 
72 ; Sinuessa, 156, 397 ; Sipontum, 
396 ; Sora, 145, 149, 152 ; Spole- 
tium, 269 ; Suessa, 146, 396 ; 
Sutrium, 396 ; Tempsa, ib. ; Valentia 
(Vibo), ib. ; Velitrae, 124 ; Venusia, 
396 ; Volturnum, ib. 

Comitia curiata, 44, 47 : centiiriata, 
45, 47, 48, 91 ; SuUan reform of, 
395> 396 : tributa, 100, 106, 170. 
See also 209, 649 

Comum taken, 453 ; status of, 733 

Consulship, the, 54, 169, 203-211 ; 
begins on ist January, 541 (note) ; 
second forbidden, 544 

Consus and Consualia, 32 

Corfinium, 591, 592, 739 

Corinth, destroyed by Mummius, 

525 

Coriolanus, 74, 75 

Cornelius Cossus, Aul. , wins the spolia 
opima, 81. Aulus (Cos. 343), 129, 
130. Lentulus, L. (Cos. 327), 
138 ; (Cos. 237), subdues Ligur- 
ians, 273. Publius in command 
of ships, 146. Arvina, P. , 141, 149, 
150. ScipioBarbatus (Cos. 298), in 
Etruria and Samnium, 154 ; his 
epitaph, 154 (note). ScipioAsina, Cn. , 
defeated at Lipara, 243 ; (Cos. 254), 



255 (note). Scipio, L. , takes Corsica, 
245 (note). Scipio, P. (Cos. 221), 
275. Scipio Calvus, Cn. (Cos. 222), 
takes Mediolanum, 281 ; in Spain, 
311, 333 ; death, 363, 364. Scipio, P. 
(Cos. 218), his campaign against 
Hannibal, 298-312 ; in Spain, 322 ; 
death, 363, 364. Scipio, Cn., in Spain, 
311, 312, 322; death, 364. Scipio 
Africanus, p., saves his father's 
life at Ticinus, 306 ; conduct after 
Cannae, 328 ; volunteers for Spain, 
365 ; takes New Carthage, 368, 369 ; 
checks Hasdrubal at Bacculae, 370, 
and defeats Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, 
at Ilipa, 371 ; visits Syphax, 372, 
373 ; quiets a mutiny, 373, 374 ; re- 
turns to Rome, 375 ; consul (205) ; 
goes to Sicily, 375-377 ; at Locri, 
377. 378 ; crosses to Africa, 379 ; 
takes camps of Syphax and Has- 
drubal, 381, 382 ; meets Hannibal, 
388 ; wins battle of Zama, 389 ; re- 
turns to Rome in triumph, 393, 394 ; 
Legatus to Lucius in war with 
Antiochus, 481 ; last years and 
death, 499-501 ; his sons, 488 (note). 
Scipio Asiaticus, L. , brother of 
Africanus, in Spain, 371 ; (Cos. 
190), goes against Antiochus, 481- 
492 ; impeached, 500, 501. Centho, 
C. , in Attica and Euboea, 428, 429. 
Scipio Nasica, P., crushes the Boii, 
455. Corculum, 509 ; opposes de- 
struction of Carthage, 528. Serapio, 
556. Scipio Aemilianus, in Africa, 
530 ; (Cos. 147), besieges and 
takes Carthage, 532-536 ; in the 
Numantine war, 541-545 ; his death, 
557> 558- Lentulus, Cn. (Cos. 201), 
393- ^^- (praetor in 63), 700-705. 
Scipio, P. (son of Africanus), 288. 
Sulla, in the lugurthine war, 576, 
577 ; in the Social war, 592, 593 ; 
(Cos. 88), 592-594 ; puts Sulpicius 
to death, 594 ; his temporary 
measures, 596 ; goes to Greece, 
622 ; siege of Athens and campaign 
in Boetia, 623-634 ; makes terms 
with Mithridates, 635 ; returns to 
Italy, 641 ; defeats Norbanus, Marius, 
the younger, and Carbo, 641-645 ; 
his proscriptions, 645, 646 ; dictator 
(82-79), 646 ; his reforms, 649-651 ; 
abdication and death, 652-653. Sulla 



798 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Faustus, L. , 689. CiNNA, L. (Cos. 
87), recalls Marius, 597 ; the pro- 
scriptions and revolutionary laws, 
598 ; his death, 599. Dolabella, P. , 
176, 177. P. (Cos. 44), 749, 761 

Cornelii cives, 649 

Corcyra, Romans in, 413, 418 

Corsica, reduced by L. Scipio, 245 

Co>-vi, 243 

Cossyra, 254 

Cotta, Aurunculeius, 729 

Country life, abandonment of. 400 ; 
described by Cato, 405 

Crathis, R., 136 

Cremera, R., 79 

Crimisus, R. , battle of the, 193 

Crotona, 16 ; war with Sybaris, 17, 19 

Crustumerium, 29 

Cumae, 17, 67, 68, 78 ; attempted by 
Hannibal, 335 

Cures, battle at, 69 

Curiae, the, 43-47 

Curio, C, 734-736, 740-742 

Curius Dentatus, M". (Cos. 290). 162 ; 
wins battle of Beneventum, 197 

Curtius, Mettius, a Sabine, 32 

Cynoscephalae, battle of, 441, 442 

Cyrene left to the Romans, 586 

Dalmatians, the, 537, 538 
Damasippus, L. , 643, 644 
Debt, laws of, 94, 165-168, 598 
Decemvirate, first, 102 ; second, 103- 

105 

Decemviri sacrorum, 170 

Decius Mus., P. (Cos. 340), 131, 132; 

(Cos. 295), 157, 158 ; (Cos. 279), 

190. P. , conquers Umbrians and 

Etruscans at Mevania, 149 
Deditio, meaning of, 129 (note), 529 
Deiotarus, 745, 749, 750 
Delium, Roman cohort cut off at, 473 
Demaratus of Corinth, 40 
Demetrius, son of Philip, 502, 503 : of 

Pharos, 275, 276, 290, 295, 296, 

319 ; his surrender demanded, 417 
Diaeus defeated at Corinth, 524, 525 
Dictatorship, the, 208, 317 (note), 321 

(note), 647 (note) 
Diminutio capitis, 285 
Dion of Syracuse, 192 
Dionysius, the elder, 19, 192 : younger, 

ib. : of Halicarnassus, 55 
Divorce of Sp. Carvilius, 286 
Domitius Calvinus, Cn. (Cos. 53), 13, 



744, 745. 750. 755. 758- Aheno- 
barbus, L. , in Sicily, 550. Cn., 
conquers the AUobroges, 568, 569 ; 
defeated by Pompey (65). L. (Cos. 
54), 718, 724, 739, 740. Cn. (Cos. 

32), 774. 776. 779 
Drama, the, 134, 287, 288 
Drepana, 255. 256 ; sea fight off, 260 
Ducetius, leader of Siceli, 221 
Duillius, M., 105, 106. C. (Cos. 260), 

his victory at Mylae, 244 
Duaviri capital es, 38, 697 
Dyrrachium, 413, 742-3 

Ebro, R., boundary of Carthaginians 
in Spain, 279, 362, 363 

Eburones, 729 

Ecbatana, Antony at, 778 

Ecnomus, battle of, 247 

Egeria, 36 

Egnatius, Gellius, a Samnite, 155 

Egypt, 198 ; Roman commission in, 
504 ; invaded by Antiochus Epi- 
phanes, 515; Popilius Laenasin, 516; 
Pompey killed in, 747 ; Caesar in, 
748-749 ; Antony in. 776, 778 ; 
province of, 783 

Elissa, 224 

Elymi, 221 

Enna, massacre at, 339 

Ennius, Q. , 26, 400, 401 

Ephesus, decree at, 632 (note) 

Epicydes at Syracuse, 336-340 

Epirus spoiled, 513 

Equites, procession of, 71 ; cease to 
furnish the cavalry, 582 ; posteriores, 
41, 42 : ordoequesterax\d the judicia, 
561, 581, 587, 649, 651 

Equus publicus, 45 

Era, the Roman, 26, 27 

Eryx, Mt. and town, 263, 264 

Etruria, 6, 8, 279 ; decadence of, 78 

Etruscans, 12, 13, 41 ; in Campania, 
13, 67 ; disasters to, 80 ; invasion of 
Latium under Porsena and Arruns, 
64-68 ; combine against Rome (389), 
123 ; wars with, 126, 127, 147, 153 • 
defeated at Mevania, 149 

Eumenes, king of Perganms, 482, 484, 
492, 498 ; denounces Philip, 502, 
and Perseus, 504 ; attempted assas- 
sination of, 505 , ordered to leave 
Italy, 511, 512 
Eunus, leader of Sicilian slaves, 548 
Evander, city of, on the Palatine, 23 



INDEX 



799 



Fabii, fall of the, 79 

Fabius, Q. , and the Gauls, 115. Maxi- 
mus, Q. (Mag. Eq. 325), 140 ; (Cos. 
310), 147. Gurges, Q. (Cos. 292), 
161, 196. Ambustus, daughters of, 
174, 175. Rullianus, victories in Sam- 
nite wars, 155-158. Cunctator, 80 ; 
conquers Ligurians, 273 ; opposes 
Flaminius, 277 ; envoy to Carthage, 
297 ; as Dictator (217), follows 
Hannibal, 317-321 ; saves Minucius, 
322 ; retakes Tarentum, 352 ; 
opposes plan of Scipio Africanus, 
376. Sonof above, 328, 343. Maxi- 
mus Aemilianus, Q. , in Macedonia, 
509 ; in Spain, 539. Hadrianus, M. , 
676. Pictor, 288, 333 

Fabricius Luscinus, C, mission to 
Pyrrhus, 189 (Cos. 278), 191 

Falerii, 83 ; truce with, 127 ; removal 
of inhabitants, 270 

Fannius Strabo, C. (Cos. 122), 564 

Fasces, the, 203 

Feroniae fanum, 37 

Fetiales, 39, 213 

Ficus ruminalis, 22, 59 

Fidenae, 37, 80 

Flamen Dialis, Martis, Quirini, 36 

Flaminius, C. , his land bill, 276, 277 ; 
(Cos. 223), defeats the Insubres, 
280, 281 ; as censor (220) constructs 
via Flaniinia, 281 ; (Cos. 217), 
falls at the battle of Thrasymene, 
313-316 

Flavius, Cn., divulges \ega\ fortfiulae, 
172. Fimbria, C. , legate of Flaccus, 
633 ; causes murder of Flaccus, 635 ; 
successes in Bithynia, 635 ; his death, 
637. 638 

Fregellae, 138 ; taken by Samnites, 
144 ; rebellion at, 558 ; receives 
colony as Fabrateria, 559 

Frentani, 8, 11 

Fulvia, 775, 776 

Fulvius Maximus, Cn. , 154. Flaccus, 
M., conquers Volsinii, 239. Nobi- 
lior, M. , in Spain, 477 ; takes 
Ambracia, 496, 497 ; his acts annulled, 
500. Nobilior, Q. , defeated in Spain, 
541. Flaccus, M. , supporter of C. 
Gracchus, 556, 565, 566 ; victory over 
Salluvii, 568 

Funerals, expense of, 208, 285 

Furina, grove of, 565 

Furius Camillus, M., at Veii, 86, 87; 



exiled, in ; recalled, 119-121 ; de- 
feats the Volscians, 124 ; repels ^ ~ 
Gallic invasion, 125 ; death, 125, ^ 
126. L. , 126 

Gabii, siege of, 51 

Gabinius, A., 681, 689, 712, 733 

Gaesatae, the, 279-281 

Gallia Cisalpina, 5, 6, 8 ; province of, 
455 : Transalpina, 569, 718-731 

Gauls in N. Italy, 14, 15, 114, 115 ; 
capture Rome, 117; subsequent in- 
vasions, 125, 126 ; allied with 
Samnites, 156 ; Hannibal and the, 
307, 308, 313 ; their attack on 
Placentia and Cremona, 397 : in 
Asia, 411, 413, 493, 494, 600 

Gaurus, Mt. , victory at, 130 

Gelo of Syracuse, 99, 192 

Genthius of Illyria, 505, 509 

Genucius, T. , 102. Clepsina, L. 
(Cos. 271), takes Rhegium, 199 

Gergovia, 730 

Germans in Gaul, 720-722, 726, 730 

Gladiators, first show of, 285 ; rebellion 
of, 663 

Gracchus. See Semp7-07ii7is 

Great Plains, battle of the, 384 

Greece, freedom of, 412 ; chief powers 
in, 412-415 ; settlement by Flamininus, 
444, 445 ; Roman commissioners 
in, 514 ; settlement of, after fall 
of Corinth, 526 ; depopulation in, 
527 

Greek cities in Italy, 16-20 ; name of 
Magna Graecia, 16 (note) ; decadence 
of, 19 ; attacked by Italian tribes, 135, 
136 ; treatment of, after second Punic 
war, 395, Greek influences in Rome, 
286, 400, 402, 518-519 ; Cato's opposi- 
tion to, 519. Greek works of art in 
Rome, 341, 507, 518. Greek religion 
identified with Roman, 402, 403 

Greeks, first diplomatic relations with, 
276 : after the war of Antiochus, 501 

Haedui, 14. See Aedni 

Hamilcar at Panormus, 244 ; at 
Ecnomus, 247. Father of Hannibal, 
at Hercte, 262-267 ; takes Spendius, 
272 ; in Spain, 277, 290, 291. 
Phameas, 531 

Hannibal defeated at Mylae, 244 ; at 
Lilybaeum, 259. Rhodius, 259. 
Son of Hamilcar, his oath, 291 ; 



8oo 



HISTORY OF ROME 



commands in Spain, 293 ; takes 
Saguntum, 296 ; his march to Italy, 
298-303 ; his victories in the valley of 
the Po, 304-311 ; marches south to 
Arpi, 314-317 ; foils Fabius in Cam- 
pania, 320 ; his poUcy after Cannae, 
332 ; at Capua, 333 ; beats Fulvius 
at Herdonea, 346 ; his march on 
Rome, 347, 348 (note), 349 ; three 
days' fight with Marcellus at Canusium, 
352 ; foiled at Salapia, 355 ; on the 
Lacinian promontory, 353, 399 ; 
leaves Italy, 386 ; meets Scipio, 388 ; 
defeated at Zama, 389-391 ; insists 
on accepting Roman terms, 393 ; 
forced to leave Carthage and goes to 
Antiochus, 467, 468 ; story of his 
meeting with Africanus, 469 (note) ; 
his death, 498, 499 

Hanno at Messana, 237 ; at Ecnomus, 
247 ; at New Carthage, 367, 368 

Hasdrubal at Lilybaeum, 256 ; in 
Spain, treaty with, 277, 291-293. 
Brother of Hannibal, left in Spain, 
299, 322, 333, 363-371 ; starts for 
Italy, 355 ; defeated and killed on 
the Metaurus, 357-359. SonofGisco, 
355. 363. 366. 371. 372. 381, 382, 
388, 389. In third Punic war, 529- 

535 
Helvetii, the, 719, 720 
Heracleia (i), in Magna Graecia, 16; 

battle of, 186 ; (2) in Phocis, 477, 

478 ; (3) in Pontus, 673 
Hercte, 264, 265 
Herdonea, battle of, 346 
Hermaeum, 248 ; battle off, 254 
Hermodorus of Ephesus, 102 
Hernici, 11, 149 
Herod, 778 
Hiero I. of Syracuse, 78. II., 199, 223; 

joins in siege of Messana, 238; makes 

peace with Romans, 239 ; lends ships, 

256 ; sends corn and men to Rome, 

323 ; death of, 334 
Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero II., 

336, 337 
Himilco in Lilybaeum, 258 ; sent to 

relieve Syracuse, 339 
Hippo Zarytus, 271 
Hippocrates at Syracuse, 336, 337 
Hirtius, Aul. , 764, 768, 769 
Hispania, the Carthaginians in, 290- 

296; the Scipios in, 311, 312, 322, 

333. 334. 362-365 ; operations of 



Africanus in, 365-375 ; affairs in, after 
Punic war, 458-463 ; two provinces 
in, 459 ; Cato in, 459, 460 ; settle- 
ment of Tiberius Gracchus, 462-463 ; 
wars in, with Lusitani and Celtiberes, 

538-545 
Horatii and Curiatii, the, 37 
Horatius Codes, 64. Flaccus, Q., 789, 

790. Pulvillus, M. , dedicates temples 

on the Capitol, 63 
Hortensius, L. , his plundering in Greece, 

507 (note) : legate of Sulla, 627-630. 

Q. , orator, 681, 682 
Hostilius Mancinus, C. , disasters of, in 

Spain, 543 
Hydruntum, 17 
Hyrcanus, 686 
Hyria, 19 

I.\PYGIANS, the, II, 17 

Iberes, Pompey's battle with, 685 

Ilipa, battle of, 371, 372 

Illium Novum, 422 (note) 

lUyrian war, first, 274, 275 ; second, 

295, 296 
Illyrians subjected to tax, 512 
Illyrium, Caesar in, 718, 724 
Imperiui7i, 2, 47 (note), 203-205 
Indibilis and Mandonius, Spanish chiefs, 

370, 373. 374. 458 
Insubres, defeat of, 280, 281 ; join the 

Boii, 451, 452 ; dispersed, 453 
fnterreges, 35 (note) 
Isthmian games, proclamation at, 445 
Istri, the, 275 
Italy, geography of, 5-9 ; inhabitants of, 

10-20 ; Italia vetus, 16 

Ianiculum, the Veientines on, 80 ; 

secession to, 173 
lanus, temple of, 36 ; closed, 273 
Jerusalem taken by Pompey, 688, 689 ; 

by C. Sosius, 778 
Jews seek Roman alliance, 516, 674 ; 

defence of the Temple, 689 
luba, 742, 750, 752-753 ; his son, 782 
lubellius, 187, 199 
ludicia, 561, 585, 651, 679, 695, 754, 

765 
lugurtha, 570-572 ; war with, S7^'S77 '> 

in Rome (no), 572 ; starved in 

Mamertine prison, 578 
lulia, wife of Pompey, 711, 732 
lulius Caesar, Sext. , in Greece, 524. 

Sext. killed in Syria, 764 (note). L. 



INDEX 



8oi 



(Cos. 90), 590; his mission to lulius at 
Ariminum, 737, 738 ; proscribed, 
772. C. lulius, his early life, 695, 696; 
prosecutes Rabilius, 697 ; Pontifex 
Maximus, 697, 698 ; speech on the 
Catilinarian conspirators, 704 ; his 
praetorship, 706 ; in Spain, 707 ; 
(Cos. 59), 711 ; his conquest of Gaul, 
718-731 ; question of his recall, 732- 
736 ; crosses the Rubicon, 737 ; 
in eastern Italy, 738, 739 ; at Mar- 
seilles and Spain, 739-741 ; consul 
II., and dictator, 742; war with 
Pompey in Greece, 742-747 ; at 
Alexandria, 748, 749 ; in Asia, 749, 
750; dictator II., 748; in Africa, 

I 751-754 ; his triumphs and legisla- 
tion, 754 ; in Spain, 755, 756 ; last 
triumph and projects, 756-759 ; his 
death, 760 

, Junius Norbanus, C. (Cos. 83), 640, 
641. PuUus, I.. , 261, 263. Brutus, 
L. , 53. Dec. , gives the first show 

, of gladiators, 285 ; (Cos. 131), in 
Spain, 540. Brutus, M., partizan of 

I Carbo, 641. M., partizan of Lepidus, 

I 660. M, (assassin of Caesar), 759, 

( 7^4. 765. 773-775 

luno, statue of, at Veii, 87 
I lunonia (Carthage), 559, 564 
i lupiter Indiges, 22 ; Capitolinus, 41,51; 
I Latiaris, 29, 133 

Ilustitium, 594 
Kings expelled, 53, 54 ; substitute 
I for, 8g, 90, 203 

iLabienus, T. , 697, 720, 729, 739, 745, 
755. 756: Q-. 776, 778 

ILacinian promontory, 353, 359 
jLaelius, C. , 368, 369, 374, 2>n ^ 379. 
I 384, 385, 390 
jLaevi (Gauls), 14 
jLanassa, wife of Pyrrhus, 193 
Lanuvium obtains Roman civitas, 133 
jLarinum, skirmish near, 321 
\Latinitas, 133, 589, 592, 654 
jLatinus, king, 21, 22. Silvius, 22 
JLatium, 6; vetus, 11, 29; subdued by 
\ Tarquin, 41 ; rebellions in, 124, 126 ; 
the Latin league, 29 ; war with, 39 ; 
Rome excluded from, 61 ; hostility of, 
during Etruscan invasion, 68 ; Latini, 
great war with (340-338), 131-133 ; 
end of Latin League, 133 



Laudatioiies, 57, 58; of women, 121 

Laus, 16 

Lautulae, battle of, 145 

Lavinium, 21 

Lebecii (Gauls), 14 

Legio77es (see Army) ; of Caesar, 722 

(note) : linfeatae, 160 
Lentulus Spinther, Corn. (Coss. 57), 

715 

Leontini, 194, 337 

Lepidus. See Aemilius 

Leucopetra, 6 

Lex: Acilia (121), 561 ; Aelia (160), 
713 ; Aemilia (435), 109, 209 ; 
Aemilia Baebia (182), 521 ; Afittalis 
(180), 532 (note); Aterriia Tarpeia 
(454). 97, loi ; A-ufeia (123), 605; 
Aurelia (70), 679, 695 ; Caecilia 
Didia (98), 588 ; Calpurnia (549), 
518 ; Canuleia (445), 108 ; Cassia 
(137), 521 ; Cincia (204), 658 ; 
Claudia (257), 284 ; leges Clodiae 
(158), 714 ; Cornelia Fulvia (159), 
521; leges Cor7ieliae (81-79), 649- 
651, 667 ; Cornelia (70), 707 ; Didia 
(143), 518 ; Domitia (104), 650 ; 
Duillia (449), 106 ; duodecim Tabu- 
larutn (451-450), 107, 108 ; Fannia 
(161), 518; Fla7ninia[i2,'z)^'2.^^\ Ga- 
binia (139), 521 ; (67), 681 ; Ho7iensia 
(286), 173 ; I cilia sacrata (492), 97, 
100, 206 ; lulia (90), 591 ; leges 
luliae {$g), 711, 754, 757; Licinia- 
Ahicia (95), 586, 587 ; Lici7iian (367), 
167-169; Manilia (66), 682; Ogulnia 
(296), 172; Oppia (215), 286, 518; 
07-chia (182), 518 ; Papiria (421), 
III ; Papi7-ia Plantia (89), 592 ; 
Plotia (73), 695 ; Poetilla (326), 167; 
de a7nbitu{2S^)' 170 (note) ; Po7npeia 
(89), 592 ; leges Pompeiae (70), 679, 
(55). 725; (52), 731. 732; Porcia, 
93 (note) ; P7ibliliae (339), 106 
(note), 133, 170; Publilia-Volc7'07iis 
(471), 99, 100; P7ipia (?6i) 736 
(note) ; 7-egiae leges, 92 ; Rupilia, 
(132), 549; Rtitilia (105), 170; 
(265), 210 ; Sacnia (30), 783 ; Sem- 
p/-07iia (133), 553, 554 ; Se7nproniae 
(123), 559, 562, 602 ; Se7-%'ilia (100), 
585 ; Trebonia (52), 725 (note), 733 
(note) ; Valeria (508), 38, 93, 204 ; 
(300), 93 (note) ; Valeria- Horatia 
(447), 105, 112; Vati7iia (59), 71 

Libertini in city tribes, 284, 285 



3 F 



8o2 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Libri lintei, 57, 58, 81 (note) 

Libui (Gauls), 14 

Libyans, subdued by Carthage, 252 

Licinius Crassus, L. (orator), 657. C. , 

• 97. Spurius, 99. C. Licinius Stolo, 
167. Crassus, P. (Cos. 171), de- 
feated at Larissa, 506. Lucullus, L. 
(Cos. 151), in Spain, 541, 542. 
Nerva, praetor in Sicily, 549. M. , 
695: 725 ; his fall in Parthia, 733, 
734. Lucullus, L. , collects a fleet 
for Sulla, 625-635 ; quaestor in Asia, 
639 ; commands in the second Mith- 
ridatic war, 670, 677 ; mutiny in his 
army, 676, 677 ; his history, 657. 
Lucullus, M. , in Macedonia, 666 ; 
in the Sullan war, 644 ; in the war 
of Spartacus, 665. Murena, L. , his 
war with Mi thri dates, 666, 667 

Liguria, 5 ; the Ligurians, 13, 14, 273; 
wars with, 451, 452, 457, 458 ; Lig- 
ures Corneliani et Bacbiani, 458 

Lilybaeum, rise of, 195, 226 ; strength- 
ened by Carthaginians, 255 ; invest- 
ment of, 258-262 ; surrender of, 267 

Lingones, 14, 115 

Liris, R. , 7 

Literature, 163, 164, 286-288, 400-407, 
657. 658. 785-791 

Livia, 776 

Livius Drusus, M. , outbids C. Gracchus, 
563, 564. Drusus, M. (the younger), 
his reforms, 587, 588. Macatus, M. , 
atTarentum, 342-345, 352. Salinator, 
C. , commands in the Aegean, 481- 

483 
Locri Epizephyrii, 16, 19 ; troubles at, 

377. 378 ; status of, 395 (note) 
Lollius, Samnite hostage, 199 
Lucania, 6, 8 ; invaded, 196 ; subdued, 

198, 199 
Lucanians, 19 ; join the Samnites, 

139 ; attack Thurii, 177, 180 ; join 

Pyrrhus, 187 ; join Hannibal, 331 ; 

in the Social war, 589 
Lucca, 717 
Luceria, 144, 145 
Lucretia, 53, 54 
Lucretius, C. , commands fleet in Greek 

waters, 506. Carus T. , 788, 789. 

Ofella, 645, 651 
Lucus deae Diae, 40 
Luna, 6, 453 
Lusitani, the, 538-540 
Lutatius Catulus, C. , victory at Aegusa, 



265, 266. Q. (Cos. 103), defeated at 
Verona, but victorious at Vercellae, 
579, 580, 657 (Cos. 78), 659, 
660, 701 

Macedonia, history of, 408, 409 ; its 
connexion with Greece, 410; first 
Macedonian war, 417-422 ; effects of, 
on Rome, 408 ; second Macedonian 
war, 423-443; third Macedonian war, 
505-511 ; division of, 512 ; plunder 
of, 513 ; becomes a province, 522 

Macella, capture of, 244 (note) 

Machanidas of Sparta, 419 

Macra, R. , 6 

Maelius, Sp. , no 

Magister equitum, 208 

Magistracies, continuation of, 554 (note) 

Magnesia, battle of, 490, 491, 632 

Magna Mater, 52, 520 

Mago in Spain, 366, 367, 371, 372; 
ordered to Italy, 374 ; defeated in 
Cisalpine Gaul, 385 ; dies on board 
ship, ib. 

Mahabal after Cannae, 329 (note) 

Maiestas, 584 (note), 649, 650 

Mamertines, the, 193, 194, 234-236 

Mamilius, C. , brings in a law to try 
those bribed by lugurtha, 572, 575 

Man liana imperia, 131 

Manlius, Aul. , sent to Athens, loi. T. 
Manlius Torquatus, 131, 132. M. 
Manlius defends the Capitol, 119; 
his popular measures and death, 165, 
166. T. Manlius Torquatus (Cos. 
235), reduces Sardinia, 273. Cn. 
Manlius Vulso (Cos. 189), in 
Galatia, 493 

Marcellus. See Claudius 

Marcius C. , first plebeian dictator, 
127 ; (Cos. 342), 130. Coriolanus, 
74. Tremulus, Q. , victory over Sam- 
nites, 150. L. , saves the armies in 
Spain, 364, 365; subsequent services, 
373> 374- Philippus, Q. , deceives 
Perseus, 506 (Cos. 169) ; enters 
Macedonia, 507, 508. Figulus, C. , 
537. RexQ., 569; (Cos. 68), 677 

Marius, C, 573; birth and early life, 
574 ; (Cos. 107), 575 ; finishes the 
lugurthine war, 576, 578 ; defeats 
the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae, 578 ; 
the Cimbri near Vercellae, 579 ; as a 
politician, 582, 585, 592 ; his army 

I reforms, 583 ; in Asia, 586 ; in the 



INDEX 



803 



Social war, 591 ; appointed to 
supersede Sulla, 594 ; his flight, 594, 
595 ; return of and death, 397, 398. 
C. , the younger (Cos. 82), 642, 
643 ; defeat of, at Sacriportus, 643 ; 
death of, 645 M, (the One-Eyed), 
adherent of Sertorius, 669, 671. 
Gratidianus, M. , 644. A pretended 
Marius, 764 

Marrucini, 8, 11, 589 

Mars, 22, 25, 35 ; flamen Martis, 36 ; 
as god of blight, 405 (note) 

Marsi, 11, 153, 589 

Masannasa, 363, 371, 375, 377, 379, 
380, 382, 384, 385, 390, 527, 528, 
570 

Massilia, 569, 741 

Mauretania, 782 

Mediolanuni taken, 281 

Mednia, 16 

Melpuni, 13 ; taken by Gauls, 88 

Memmius, C. (Tril. PL 112), 572 ; 
assassinated, 585 

MeneniusAgrippa, 96. T. Menenius,99 

Mercenary war in Africa, 270-272 

Messana, 223 ; besieged, 237, 238 

Matapontum, 5, 6, 16, 19 

Mettius Fufius, 37 

Mevania, 149 

Milo, ofificer of Pyrrhus, 182, 198 

Milo. See Amiias 

Minucius, L. (Cos. 458), 75. Rufus, 
M. (Mag. eq. 217), 321, 322. Ther- 
mus Q. (Cos. 193), in the Ligurian 
war, 453, 454 

Misenum, peace of, 777 

Mithridates, Eupator, king of Pontus, 
refuses aid to the Socii, 592 ; early 
life and character, 603, 604, 606 ; his 
conquest of the Crimea, 607 ; invades 
Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, 609, 
610 ; first war with Rome, 615 ; 
occupies Asia and Greece, 616-619 I 
his army defeated at Chaeroneia and 
Orchomenus, 630-633 ; makes peace 
with Sulla, 636 ; attacked by Murena, 
667 ; second Mithridatic war, 668 ; 
successes of LucuUus against, 669- 
673 ; recovers Pontus, 676 ; de- 
feated by Pompey, 683 ; retreats to 
Bosporus, 684 ; his death, 687, 688. 
Of Pergamus, 748, 750 

Motye, in Sicily, 192, 226 

Mucius Scaevola, C, 656, 657. Q. (jur- 
ists), 657 



Mummius, L. , in Spain, 538 ; (Cos. 

146), takes Corinth, 525, 526 
Munatius, Placcus, L. , 755. Plancus, 

L., 764, 768, 769, 780 
Munda, battle of, 755 
Miinicipia, 589 
Murcus, Statius, 773, 774 
Muthul, R., battle on the, 573 
Mutina, war of, 769 
Mylae, battle of, 244 

Nabis, of Sparta, 422, 470 

Naebian meadow, 63 

Naevius, Cn. , 288 

Narbo Martins, 566, 655 

Navy, appointment of duoviri navales, 
146 ; absence of, at the beginning of 
Punic war, 237 ; first construction 
of, 241, 242 ; wreck off Camarina, 
254 ; a new fleet, 255 ; again 
wrecked, 249 ; a new fleet, 265 ; 
fleet during the first Macedonian war, 
418 ; fleet for the war with Antiochus, 
469-487. Sext. Pompeius commander 
of, 770 

Neapolis, 17, 139, 188, 323 

Nebrodes montes, 6 

Nemean games, proclamation at, 448 

Nequinum, 153 

Nervii, 722, 723, 729 

Nexus, 93, 94, 166 ; abolition of, 167 

Nicaea, congress at, 437 

Nicomedes II., king of Bithynia, 549, 
609, 610, 611, 613: III., king of 
Bithynia, 613, 614, 668 

Nobility, the new, 165, 399 

Nola, Marcellus at, 333, 335 

Nomentum obtains civitas, 133 

Nonius, A., murdered, 584 

Noviodunum, 722 

Nuceria, 149, 150 

Numa Pompilius, 35, 36 ; pretended 
writings of, 521 

Numantia, war of, 540-545 

Numidia, province of, 753 

Numitor father of Rea, 22 

Nuvius, silver, 200, 245 

OCTAVIA, 776, 778, 782 ; Opera 
Octaviae, 790 

Octavius, M. , opposes Tib. Gracchus, 
553. 554- ^- (Caesar Augustus), 756, 
758, 766-769 ; his first consulship, 
770, 771 ; triumvir, 771 ; his part in 
the proscription, 772 ; his policy and 



8o4 



HISTORY OF ROME 



acts, 775-780 ; his victory at Actium, 

781 ; his reforms, 783 
Oenotri, 17 
Opici, II 
Opimius, L. (Cos. 121), puts followers 

of C. Gracchus to death, 564-566 ; 

commissioner to lugurtha, 571 
Oppius, Q. , 615, 616, 635 (note) 
Optimates, the, 581 ; compared with 

Populares, 693, 694 
Orchomenus, battle of, 633, 634 
Orgetorix, 719 
Oscans, the, 11 
Otacilius, Tit., in Sicily, 323 
Ovinium plebiscitum, 173 

Pacorus, 778 

Pacuvius, M. , 519 

Padus {Po) R. , 5, 304, 311 

Paestum, 6, 16, 19, 323 

'^«^". 45 (note), 92 

Palaepolis, 9, 17, 138 

Palatinus, Mons, 22 ; site of first city, 
23-25. King of Alba, 22 

Pa/ilia, the, 24, 27 

Pandosia, 136 

Panium, battle of, 465 

Panormus, in Sicily, 192, 226 ; taken 
by L. Scipio, 255 ; battle at, 256 

Papirius, M. , 118. L. Papirius Cursor 
(diet. 325), 140-144 ; recovers 
Luceria (diet. 310), 147. L. Papir- 
ius Cursor, son of above, 160, 198. 
C. Papirius Carbo (Cos. 120), 566. 
Cn. Papirius Carbo opposes Sulla, 
599, 641-644 ; his death, 651 

Papius, Mutilus, Q., Samnite, 590 

Parthians, the, 612, 686, 733, 734, 756, 

758, 776, 77^ 
Padres minorum gentiutti, 41 
P atria potest as, 92 
Pedius, Q., 749, 758, 771 
Pedum obtains chnfa<;, 133 
Peiraeus, destruction of, by Sulla, 627 
Peligni, 11, 321, 589 
Perduellio, 38, 92, 584 (note), 697 
Peregrini, 285, 654 
Pergamus, kingdom of, 411 ; left to 

Rome, 558, 561, 602; its extent, 600; 

treaty of, 636, 637, 667 
Perpenna, M. , kills Sertorius, 661-663 
Perseus, king of Macedonia, 430, 502 ; 

accession and character, 503 ; policy, 

504, 505; war with, 505-511 
Perusia, siege of, 775, 776 



Pestilences at Rome, 74, 119, 161 

Petreius, M., 740, 753 

Phalanx, the, 441, 490, 491 

Pharnaces, 749, 750 

Pharsalus, battle of, 745 

Philip V. , 290 ; hears of Thrasymene, 
318, 319 ; treaty with Hannibal, 335, 
336, 416, 417 ; his scheme for invad- 
ing Italy, 416, 417 ; opposition in 
Greece, 417, 418 ; war with, 418- 
421 ; makes peace at Phoenice, 421 ; 
secretly supports Hannibal, 423 ; 
agrees with Antiochus to partition 
Egypt, 424 ; at war with Rhodes and 
Attalus, 425 ; takes Abydos, 427, 
428; defends Stena Aoi, 431, 432; 
has a conference with Flamininus, 
432 ; at the congress of Nicaea, 437 ; 
defeated at Cynoscephalae, 441, 442 ; 
aids Romans against Antiochus, 474, 
475- 438. 439. 482 ; his later designs, 
502 ; his death, 503 

Philippi, battles of, 774, 775 

Philochares of Tarentum, 180 

Philonides of Tarentum, 181 

Phocaea, victory at, 481, 487 

Phoenice, treaty of, 421 

Phoenicians in Sicily, 192 ; in Africa 
and W. Europe, 223, 224 

Phraates, 686 

Picenum and Picentini, 11, 154, 200 

Pirates, the, 680, 681 

Pisae, harbour of, 273 ; fighting with 
Ligurians at, 454 

Pistoria, 705 

Placentia. See Colonics 

Plautus, T. Maccius, 401-405 

Plebs, origin of, 44 ; rise of plebeians, 
84 ; disabilities of, 91 ; informal 
meetings of, 95 ; first secession of, 
96 ; last, 173 ; concilia plebis, 100, 
105 ; plebiscita, 105, 106, 173, 286, 
399. 572. 584. Plebeians obtain 
conubium, 108 ; the quaestorship, 
hi; the consulship, 169; censor- 
ship, 170 ; the sacred colleges, 172 ; 
first plebeian dictator, 127 

Pleminius, Q. , propraetor at Locri, 
377< 378 

Polybius (quoted), 14, 56, 63 (note), 
165, 219, 228, 230, 231, 238, 302 
(note), 321 (note), 333 (note), 368 
(note), 488 (note), 514 (note), 529 
(note) 

Po>noe}-ium, 31 



INDEX 



805 



Pompadius, Q. , Marsian leader, 590 

Pompeia divorced by Caesar, 709 

Pompeii Curia, 759 

Pompeius, Rufus, Q. , in Spain, 542. 
Strabo, Cn. , 591. Rufus, Q. (Cos. 
88), 592 ; murdered, 596. Strabo, 
Cn. (Cos. 89), in Social war, 
591, 592, 596 ; his death, 597. 
Magnus, Cn. , enrols legions in 
Picenum, 641 ; joins Sulla, 641-643 ; 
triumphs from Sicily and Africa, 651, 
652 ; sent against Sertorius, 661-663 ; 
cuts off surviving gladiators, 666 ; 
consul (70), 678 ; Piratic war, 
680-682; supersedes Lucullus in 
Pontus, 682-691 ; his position in 
Rome, 708-717 ; sole consul (52) 
731-733. 734. 735. 736 ; leaves Italy, 
739 ; his defeat and death, 743-747. 
Gnaeus (the younger), 750, 755. 
Sextus, 751, 755, 765, ^^^, 776, 777 

Pons Sublicius, 39 

Pontijices, 38, 57, 213, 697 

Pontius, C, Samnite, 141-144 ; put to 
death, i6r 

Pontus, kingdom of, 603-606 

Popilius, Laenas, C, in Egypt, 516. 
P. (Cos. 132), tries adherents of 
Tib. Gracchus, 556, 559 

Populus, 43, 90, 202 

Porcius, Cato, M., 26, 56, 288; 
quaestor in Sicily, 379 ; his writings, 
405, 406 ; (Cos. 195) in Spain, 453 ; 
his character and views, 519-520: the 
Basilica Porcia, 404 (note) ; at Ther- 
mopylae, 476. C, in Macedonia, 569. 
L. (Cos. 89), 591. M. (Uticensis), 
speech in the Senate, 704, 705, 710, 
711, 742, 746, 750-753- C. (Tr. PL, 
56), 712. Licinus.L., 355, 357 

Porsena, 63-67 

Porta CoUina, 25 : Capena, 40 : 
Mugionis, 22 : Romanula, 22 

Postumius Elva, 70 ; L. Postumius, 
ambassador at Tarentum, 180, 181. 
Sp. Postumius at the Caudine Forks, 
141-144. L. Postumius (Cos. 291), 
161, 162. C. Postumius, killed at the 
Silva Litana, 323, 334. Sp. and 
Aulus Postumius Albinus in Numidia, 

572, 573 
Pothinus, 746, 748 
Potitia, gens, 172 
Praetoria cohors, 583 
Praetors, early name of consuls, 89 



Praetorship, 169, 210-211 

Proca, king of Alba, 22 

Proconsul, first, 138 

Proeneste, rebellion at, 124 

Proscriptions, by Marius, 598 ; by Sulla, 
646 ; by the triumvirs, 771, 772 

Provincia, meaning of, 445 

Provinces, the, 649, 655 (note) ; revenue 
from, 656. Africa, 536 ; Africa 
Nova, 753 ; Asia, 561, 656 ; Bithynia 
and Pontus, 677 (note) ; Cilicia, 586 ; 
enlarged, 666 ; Crete and Cyrenaica, 
585, 681, 682; Gallia Cisalpina, 455; 
Gallia Transalpina, 569 ; Hispania 
citerior, 459 ; Hispania ulterior, 459 ; 
Macedonia, 522 ; Sardinia and Cor- 
sica, 273 ; Sicily, 267, 656 ; Syria, 
687 

Provocatio, 38, 91, 106, 205 ; extended 
to the army, 217 (note) 

Prusias, king of Bithynia, 498, 511 

Ptolemy, Philadelphus, 198. Ptolemy 
XL, Auletes, 716, 717. XII., 746, 
748. XIII., 74S 

Publicani in Asia, 561, 602, 668 

Publilius Philo, Q. (Cos. 327), 138, 
144 

Punic wars, I. (264-242), 232-268 : II. 
(218-202), 289-394 : III. (150-146), 
527-536 

Pydna, battle of, 510 

Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, 6 ; invited to 
Tarentum, 181 ; parentage and early 
life, 183, 184 ; first campaign in Italy, 
185-191 ; goes to Sicily, 191-195 ; 
second campaign in Italy, 195-197 ; 
his death, 197 

Pythagoras, 18 ; schools of, 19 

Pyxus, 17 

QuAESTioNES, 92 ; perpetuae, 518, 650 
Ouaestorship, 90, 211 ; open to ple- 
beians, III 
Quintius Cincinnatus, L. , 75, 76; dic- 
tator, no. T. , 124. Flamininus, T. 
(Cos. 198), goes to Epirus, 431 ; to 
Thessaly, 433 ; at the Congress of 
Nicaea, 437 ; conquers at battle of 
Cynoscephalae, 441 ; at conference 
of Tempe, 443 ; his settlement of 
Greece, 444-449 ; forces Nabis to 
surrender Argos, 447 ; triumphs, 
448 ; discontent of Aeolians with, 
443, 444 ; sent again to Greece, 470. 
L. , 447. Atta, T. (dramatist), 659 



8o6 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Quirinalis coUis, 25 

Quirinus, 35 ; Quirini flamen, 36 

Quirites, quiris, 33 

Quiritium, fossa, 25, 40 

Rabirius, C. , prosecution of, 697 

Ranines, Titii, Luceres, 33 

Ravenna, 739 

Rea, mother of Romulus, 22 

Regillus, battle of lake, 70 

Regulus. See Ait lias 

Religion, identified with. Greek, 404, 
405 ; novelties in, 520, 521 

Republic, fall of, 3 

Rex sac ro rum, 89 

Rhegiuni, 17, 19, 187, 199, 350 

Rhine, crossed by Caesar, 727, 730 

Rhodes, 419 ; proclaims war with Philip, 
425, 427 ; policy of, in third Mace- 
donian war, 505, 511 ; its commerce 
crippled, 514 ; resists Mithridates, 
619 

Rhone, Hannibal on the, 300, 301 

Rome, growth, i ; position, 28 ; street 
life in, 404 ; adornment of, 779, 
790 

Romulus and Remus, legend of, 22, 23 ; 
first king, 31-35 

Romulus Silvius, king of Alba, 22 

Rubicon, R. , 6, 72? 

Rubra Saxa, 79 

Rufuli, 170 

Rupilius, P., in Sicily, 548, 549 

Ruspina, 752 

Rutili, 21 

Rutilius Rufus, P., his unjust condem- 
nation, 603 (note) ; Memoirs of, 657 

Sabellians, the II, 12 

Sabine women, the, 32 

Sabines in Rome, 32-34 ; wars with, 

37,38, 69-73, 104; assist the Veien- 

tines, 80 
Sabinus, Titurius, 729 
Sacred Mount, first secession to, 96 ; 

second, 105 
Saguntum, alliance with, 277, 293 ; 

capture of, by Hannibal, 295, 296 
Salassi, 779 

Salii CoUini and Palatini, 29 
Sallentini, 17, 200 

Sallustius Crispus, C. , 752, 753, 788 
Salluvii in Gallia Cisalpina, 14 ; in 

Transalpina, 568, 592 
Samnium, 6 ; Samnites, 12, 83, 127 ; 



attack Sidicini, 129 ; first Samnite 

war, 129- 131; second, 135-151; 

third, 154-162 ; joins Pyrrhus, 187 ; 

invaded, 196 ; in the Social war, 590 ; 

in the war of Sulla, 644 ; desolation 

of, by Sulla, 648 
Sardinia, 245 ; Sardinia and Corsica a 

province, 273 
Saturninus. See Appulcius 
^Scerdilaidas of Illyria, 416, 417 
Scidrus, 16 
Scipio, see Cornelius 
Scipionic party in literature, 519 
Scribonius Curio, 

dani, 666 
Segesta in Sicily, 
Sempronius, P. 

Longus, Tib. 



C, conquers the Dar- 



239, 241, 244 
(Cos. 304), 151. 

(Cos. 218), 298, 304, 
308-310 ; defeats Hanno, 335. P., 
commands in first Macedonian war, 
421. Longus, Tib. (Cos. 194), 453. 
Gracchus, Tib. , in Spain, 462. Grac- 
chus, Tib. (son of last), Tr. PI. (133), 
553' 554 ; his death, 555. Gracchus, 
Gams, Tr. PI. (123), 559-563; his 
death, 564, 565 
Senators restrained from commerce, 

399 

Senatus, 2, 206-298, 283, 284 ; its posi- 
tion after first Punic war, 283 ; in- 
creased influence during second Punic 
war, 397-399 ; its decadence in first 
century, 581 ; bankrupts expelled 
from, 593 ; Sulla's changes in, 649 ; 
position under Augustus, 785 

Senatus consultum de Latinis, 133 ; de 
Campanis, 351 ; de Macedonibus, 
512 ; de Bacchanalibus, 521 ; ulti- 
mum, 736 

Senones, 14, 157, 176 ; lands of, 
divided, 277 

Sentinum, battle of, 158 

Septem pagi, 34 

Septimontium, 25 

Septumeleius, L. , kills C. Gracchus, 565 

Sequani, 719, 720, 769 

Sertorius, Q. , 642; war with, in Spain, 
660-663 

Servilius, Sp. (C06. 476), 80. Ahala, 
C, no. Geminus Cn. (Cos, 217). 
sails to Africa, 322. Caepio, Q. , 
secures the murder of Viriathus, 540. 
Caepio (Cos. 106), 570 ; killed in 
Social war, 589. Glaucia, C. , 584- 
585. Vatia, P., in Isauria, 166 



INDEX 



S07 



Servius 'I'uUius, 42-50 ; his agger, 43 ; 

his reforms, 43-49, 90 
Sibyl, the, 52 ; the Sibylline books, 52, 

319. 717. 7S^ 
Sicambri, 727 
Sicani and Siclei, 221, 222 
Sicily, history to time of Pyrrhus, 191- 
193 ; inhabitants of, 220-223 \ ^^"^- 
thaginians in, 223, 226, 227 ; object 
of first Punic war, 219 ; becomes a 
Roman province, 267 ; war in, 336- 
342 ; Carthaginians wholly expelled 

from, 362 ; slave wars in, 546-550 
Sicinius, murder of, 104 
Sicoris, R. , 740, 741 
Sidicini, 129 
Signia, 51 
Sila, 6, 199 
Silva Litana, 334, 453 
Slaves, increased numbers of, 284 ; in 

comedy, 403, 404 ; tax on sale, 518 ; 

slave wars, 546-550 
Social war, the, 589-592 
Socii navales, 242 
Soloeis in Sicily, 192, 226 
Solon of Athens, laws of, loi 
Sopater, 423, 426 
Sora, taken by Romans, 145 ; retaken 

by Samnites, 149 ; recovered, 150 
Sosigenes, 754 

Sosistrates of Agrigentum, 192 
Sosius, C. , 778, 779 
Spain, See Hispania 
Sparta, 413 
Spartacus, 663-666 
Spendius, 270, 271 
Spolia opima, 35, 81 (note), 281 
Suevi, 722, 727 
Suffetes, 228 
Sulla. See Cornelius 
Sulpicius, Ser. , sent to Athens, loi. 

Q. , negotiates with Brennus, 120. 

Galba, P., commands fleet against 

Philip, 419, 520 ; (Cos. 200) in 

Epirus, 428, 430. Ser.. treacherously 

destroys the Lusitani, 538, 539. 

Rufus, P. , revolutionary laws and 

death of, 592-594. 595 
Sutrium, 147 

Sybaris, 16, 17 ; its fall, 18 
Syphax, 363 ; visited by Scipio, 372, 

2>Ti ; renounces Roman friendship, 

379 ; negotiations with, 380, 381 ; 

burning of his camp, 382 ; captured, 

384, 385 ; at Rome, 394 



Syria, made a Roman province, 687 
Syracuse, 190, 192 ; territory of, 223 ; 
revolutions in, 336-338 ; siege of, by 
Marcellus, 338-341 ; topography of, 
338 ; art treasures of, 241 

Tabellariae leges, 521 
Talys of Sybaris, 17 
Tanaquil, 42, 43 
Tannetum, 298 

Tarentum, 5, 17 ; Archidamus and 
Alexander invited to, 136 ; quarrels 
with Rome, 177-182 ; Pyrrhus at, 
185 seq. ; taken by Papirius, 198 ; 
guarded in second Punic war, 334 ; 
plot to surrender to Hannibal, 343, 
344 ; entered by Hannibal, 345 ; 
citadel of, defended by Livius, 345, 
352 ; recovered by Fabius, 352 ; its 
position after Punic war, 395 
Tarquinii, 62, 83 ; forty years' truce 

with, 127 
Tarquinius Priscus, 40 - 42 : Lucius 
Superbus, 49-54, 70; death of, 71. 
Sextus, 53, 70. Collatinus, L. , 61, 62 
Tarracina, 72 
Tarraco, 362 
Tatius, Titus, 32, 33 
Taurini conquered by Hannibal, 304 
Tauromenium, Pyrrhus at, 194 ; slaves 

in, 548 
Teanum, 129 
Telamon, 279, 597 
Tempe, conference of, 443 
Temples of Bellona, 645 ; Concord, 
126, 566 ; Diana, 49, 59 ; Fors For- 
tuna, 59 ; Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, on 
Capitol, 23 ; Jupiter Stator and Fere- 
trius, 59 ; Mater Matuta, 59 ; Vesta, 
59 ; Venus, 334 ; Venus Genetrix, 
790 ; Honor and Virtus, 341 (note) 
Teos, sea-fight in Bay of, 486 
Terentius Afer, 519. Varro, C. (Cos. 
216), 323 ; at Cannae, 324-327 ; his 
energy after the battle, 328-330 ; in 
Greece, 426. Varro, M. , 741, 'j^j 
Terina, 16 

Teuta, Queen, 274-276 
Teutones, the, 569, 570 ; defeated at 

Aquae Sextiae, 578 
Thapsus, battle of, 752 
Theatre begun but demolished, 520 ; of 

Pompey, 790 
Thebes, 412 ; destroyed by Sulla, 631 
Thermopylae, battle of, 476 



8o8 



HISTORY OF ROME 



Thoenon of Syracuse, 194, 195 
Thrasymene lake, battle of, 314-316 
Thurii, 16 ; dissensions at, 19 ; Spar- 

tacus at, 664 
Tiber, R., 7 : insula Tiberina, 62 
Tiberinus, king of Alba, 22 
Tibullus, A., 791 
Ticinus, R., battle on the, 306 
Tifata, Mt. , 129, 320; Hannibal's 

camp on, 342 ; defeat of Norbanus 

near, 641 
Tigranes, king of Greater Armenia, 611. 

671, 673, 684. Tigranes (his son), 

682, 684 ; sent to Rome, 685, 715 
Tigranocerta, 671, 675-675 
Tigurini, 569, 570 
Timaeus, 25, 56 
Timoleon, in Sicily, 192, 227 
Titles taken from conquered coimtries, 

286 
Tolosa, 570 
Tolumnius of Veil, 82 
Trebia, R., battle on the, 308. 309 
Trebonius, C. , 740, 749, 755. 759, 

764, 770 
Treveri, 729 

Tribes, 44 ; increase of, 125, 134, 145 ; 
Italians in, 593, 596 

Tribuui plebis, first appointed, 96-98, 
205, 206 ; powers curtailed by Sulla, 
596, 650 ; restored by Pompi'^y, 679. 
Mill tares consulari pot estate, 109. 
Aeran'i, 680 (note), 754. Militum, 
elected, 170 ; nominated, 203. See 
Rufitli 

Tributum of citizens suspended, 517 ; 
reim]>osed, 773 

Trifanum, battle of, 132 

Triumvirate, first, 710, 725 ; second, 
771 ; renewed, JTJ. See also 585 

TuUia, 49, 50 

TuUius Cicero, M. , on the Republic, 
55, 56 ; his political views, 693, 694 ; 
(Cos. 63), 699-706 ; his exile, 709- 
717 ; meets Caesar, 740 ; joins 
Pompey in Greece, 741 ; returns to 
Rome, 750, 754, 756 ; at the murder 
of Caesar, 760 ; opposes Antony, 

765, 767, 768 ; connexion with 
Octavius, 766, 770 ; death, 772, 
773 ; works, 705-7. Q. , 729, 730, 

773 
TuUus Hostilius, 36-39 
Tunes, occupied by Regulus, 249 ; by 

Scipio, 384 



Tusculum, 67 ; rebellion at, 124 ; ob- 
tains the civitas, 141 
Tuscus Vicus, 68 
Tyndarion of Naxos, 194 
Tyndaris, in Sicily, naval battle off, 246 
Tyrrhenian Sea, 6 

Umbria, 6, 8, 151 ; the Umbro-Latini 
and Umbrians, ii; defeated with 
Etruscans, 149 ; outbreak in, 153 
I Urban State, the, 2 

Utica, 271, 381-383, 751-753 

Vada Sabbata, 6, 759 
Vadimonian Lake, the, 149, 177 
V^alerius Publicola, P., 62, 63, 69. 
M., 69. Publius (Cos. 475), 80. 
Corvus, M. , 129, 130. Maximus, M. , 
153. Lucius, killed in harbour 
of Tarentuni, 180. Laevinus, P., 
defeated at Heraclea, 185, 186. 
Maximus Messala, M. (Cos. 263), 
defeats Hiero, 239, 394. Flaccus, L. 
(Cos. 195), 397. Laevinus, M., 
(Cos. 210), takes Agrigentum, 361 ; 
wins naval battle off Lilybaeum, 362 ; 
commands fleet against Philip, 418, 
419. Flaccus. L. (Cos. 86), sent to 
supersede Sulla, 633 ; murdered, 
635. Triarius, L. , legate of Lucullus, 
676, 677. Catullus, C. , 789. Mes- 
salla, C., 779, 780 
Varius, Q. , his prosecutions for niajestas, 

589. 593 

Veii, 13, 62 ; wars with, 77-85 ; fall of, 
86-88 ; effects of siege of, 84 ; pro- 
posed migration to, HI, 121 ; Roman 
fugitives in, 117 

]'elabrum, the, 24 

Velea or Elea, 17 

Velites, 583 

Veneti, in Gaul, 726 ; in Italy, 5, 8, 14, 
120 

]''er sac7-nm, 319 

Vercingetorix, 730 

Veretrum. 17 

Vergilius, C, 752, 753. Maro, P., 789, 
790 

Vermina, son of Syphax, 391 

Verres, C. , 668, 758 

Veseris, battle of, 132 (note) 

Vesontio, 720 

Vestini, 8, 11 
j Vetilius, C. , killed in Spain, 539 
J Vettius, L. , 706, 712 



INDEX 



809 



Veturia, mother of Coriolanus, 75 

Via Appia, 171, 281 ; Aemilia, 456, 
769 ; Aemilia Scauri, 458 ; Aurelia, 
ib.\ Egnatia, 522; Flaminia, e8i, 
775 ; Latina, 329 ; Portuensis, 40 

Vibius Pansa, C, 764, 768, 769. Vibius 
Virius of Capua, 350 

Vipsanius Agrippa, AT., 766, j^j, 791 

Viriathus, 539, 540 

Voltumnae, fanum, 123 

Voltur, Mt. , 7 

Volturnus, R. , 7; gorge of, 320 



Volumnia, wife of Coriolanus, 75 
Volumnius, L. (Cos. 296), defeats the 
Samnites, 156 

Wall, begun by Tarquin, 41 ; com- 
pleted by Servius, 43 

Xanthippus of Sparta, 250-252 

Zama, battle of, 389 ; Macedonians at, 

423 
Zela, battle of, 750 



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